EN BANC [B.M. 850.

October 2, 2001] MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules. SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours: (a) (b) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units. At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units. (d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units. (e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units. (f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units. (g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period. SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely: (a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1. (b) (c) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2. Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement. SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program . Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission. The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group. (a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance. (b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor: PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ ATTENDEE 1.2 LECTURER RESOURCE SPEAKER

1 CU PER HOUR OF ATTENDANCE FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF HOURS PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSORS CERTIFICATION CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING COORDINATOR/

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR COMMENTATOR/ MODERATOR/ FACILITATOR

1/2 OF CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD ORGANIZATION

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW 2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT LESS THAN 100 PAGES 2.2 BOOK EDITOR FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED BOOK

1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS EDITOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD DULY CERTIFIED/ PUBLISHED TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ CREATIVE PROJECT

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD 2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE LAW JOURNAL EDITOR PUBLISHED NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory. SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for: (a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities. (c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance period for: (a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the members practice or employment. (b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement: (a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments; (b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education; (d) (e) (f) (g) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice; The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General; The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel; The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman; (i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools; (k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and

(l)

Governors and Mayors.

SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt: (a) (b) Those who are not in law practice, private or public. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.

SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee. SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group. SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education. SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards: (a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy. (c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.

(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered. (e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall: (a) (b) (c) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee; Contain all information requested in the form; Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to the following: (a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of attendance only if the members signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE. (b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity; (2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE. (c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity. (d)The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules. (e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form. (f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE. (g)Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions. SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period. SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.

Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members compliance period. SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-compliance: (a) (b) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period; Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period; (d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice; (e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;

(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements. SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters: IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee. SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee. SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors. The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court. SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court. SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program. This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, YnaresSantiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Kapunan, J., on official leave.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC March 23, 1929 In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

of

the

Philippines COURT

Duran & Lim for Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government. MALCOLM, J.:

respondent.

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows: LUIS Attorney Notary CANDIDATE Province of Isabela B. TAGORDA Public MEMBER

FOR

THIRD

(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration. Yours respectfully, (Sgd.) Attorney Notary Public. LUIS TAGORDA

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper.

But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929, Street, Johns, Johnson, J., reserves his vote. Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions OSTRAND, J., dissenting: I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC

of

the

Philippines COURT

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985 ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents. Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf. Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is

your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.) WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Plana, J., took no part. Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC A.C. No. L-1117

of

the

Philippines COURT

March 20, 1944 RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

THE DIRECTOR OF vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General Francisco Claravall for respondent. OZAETA, J.: De

la

Costa

and

Solicitor

Feria

for

complainant.

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. Legal assistance 12 Escolta, Manila, Tel. 2-41-60. service Room, 105

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof. Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent. Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded. Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

justice. As Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of thepeople and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence of the court is gone andpopular respect impaired."6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASEDPERSONS; PROBATE COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP WHEREPROPERTY ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO ESTATE CLAIMED BY ANOTHER PERSON.

Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged tobe part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, suchquestions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probatecourt, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in theexercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates amanifest disregard of well-known legal rules.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM p:JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch172, Metro Manila, is charged 1 with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct ina complaint filed on 15 November 1991 with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uyand Rizalina C. Uy, relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for settlement of the estate of the lateAmbrocio C. Pingco. LLprThe records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of PazRamirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela apetition for settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, or on 23 November 1988,respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.On 27 March 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion stating that sometime inFebruary 1978 two (2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco and his wife covered by TCTNos. 7537 and 75101 had been sold to complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale withthe Register of Deeds of Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel requested the court to direct theRegister of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involvingthe properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T39565, T-50276, T52754, T-220168, TCT. Nos. T-7537 and 75101. On 29 March 1989, respondent Judge granted the motion.On 18 April 1989, upon order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela reported on the statusof the titles to the properties subject of the "freeze order;" informing the Court that on 3 February 1989, a deedof absolute sale executed by the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated 9 December 1978 wasfiled with the Register of Deeds, describing therein fifteen (15) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15345to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, and B163276; that, by virtue of the deed of sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276which could not be located in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 werestill registered in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez, and, that the status of TCT Nos. T-39565and T-220168, which were with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan, could not yet be determined.On 5 May 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titlesissued in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was able to register the titles in his name in February1989 through fraud, and the signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.On 7 June 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of complainant Jose P. Uyand the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of newtitles in their name.On 3 July 1989, complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of 7 June1989 of respondent Judge, with prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from implementing the Order of 7 June 1989, and that respondent Judge be restrained from furtherproceeding against him.Meanwhile, acting on the questioned Order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela cancelledthe certificates of title of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy and reverted them to Ambrocio C. Pingcoand Paz Ramirez. cdphilOn 28 September 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition of complainantsand set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding againstcomplainant Jose P. Uy in the intestate proceedings thus ". . . a probate court has no authority to y decide questions of the ownership of property, real or personal. Theonly purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, orconveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination there is good reason for believingthat the person so examined has property in possession belonging to the estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by ordinary action, to recover the same (Alafriz v. Mina, 28 Phil. 137 [1914]; Modesto v.Modesto, 109 Phil. 1066 [1959]; Chanco v. Madrilejo, 12 Phil. 543 [1909])."Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos sought a reconsideration of the ruling of the Court of Appeals but thesame was denied on 15 November 1989.On 28 December 1989, Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Courtof Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 91092.On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved a project of partition dated 18 August 1990 submitted bySpecial Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together with Paz Ramirez (surviving spouse of Ambrocio C.Pingco) and Alicia

Alinsunurin. In the project of partition, TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352 and B-15354 to B-15359 covering the parcels of land in Bulacan (which were reverted in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingcopursuant to the Order of 7 June 1989) were adjudicated to the surviving spouse Paz Ramirez Pingco.On 16 January 1991, on motion of counsel for the Special Administratrix, respondent Judge ordered theRegisters of Deeds of Valenzuela and Manila to cancel the titles in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and PazRamirez and to issue new ones in favor of the persons mentioned in the approved project of partition.On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approvalof the deed of absolute sale of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351, B-15348 and B15349, and stating therein that as far as the intestate proceedings were concerned, complainant Jose P. Uy wasnot a participant either as heir or oppositor; that the property covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351 and B-15348 and B15349 were part of the intestate estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco over which the trial courthad jurisdiction and in whose name said titles were registered when the proceedings were instituted, that even asthe Decision of the Court of Appeals annulled her Order of 7 June 1989, it did not prevent her from proceedingwith her actions on the properties, neither did it direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to revert the titlesagain from Ambrocio C. Pingco to complainant Jose P. Uy. As a result, instead of complying with the Decisionof the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge directed the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her ownOrder of 16 January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and ordering the issuance of new titles inaccordance with the project of partition she obstinately approved.On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals which annulled and setaside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge. Thus "We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply provides that a person who issuspected of having in his possession property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examinehim under oath on the matter. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land underadministration and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot beobtained through a mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom theprobate court has no jurisdiction. To recover the property, an independent action against the vendee must beinstituted in the proper court" (citing Tagle, et al. v. Manalo et al., 105 Phil 1124).On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter disregard of Our Resolution of March 1991, granted the ex-partepetition of the Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of properties covered by TCTNos. B-15345 and B-15346 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale of her questionedOrder of 4 February 1991.On 29 April 1991, undaunted by her reversal by the Court of Appeals and this Court, and in blatantdisobedience to judicial authority, and established precedents and jurisprudence, respondent Judge againgranted an ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of another deed of absolute sale coveringthree (3) more parcels of land originally titled in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos. B-15347, B-15355 and B-15356 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, reiterating for the second time thereasons stated in her Orders of 4 February and 2 April 1991.In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency of the petition for review by way of certiorari before thisCourt, respondent Judge continued issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the propertiesin the name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the damage and prejudice of complainants. llcdComplainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals thatrespondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings concerning the ownership of theproperties, respondent Judge still, in an attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial authority,issued, orders approving the sale of the properties to the further prejudice of complainants.In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the filing of the complaint against her is merely to harass her.While she admits that her Order of 7 June 1989 was annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals, whichannulment was affirmed by this Court, she argues that no temporary restraining order was issued and that beforethe Decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated her Order of 7 June 1989 was already complied with bythe Register of Deeds of Valenzuela. She further contends that even as she was prohibited from proceedingagainst complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not order the reversion of the titles to them.We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The charges against her are clearly meritorious and supportedby the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability 2 as it is well documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her open defiance of higher judicial authority.In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge committed the followinghighly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct

prejudicialto the public interest, to wit: (a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of complainantsJose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the latter; (b)respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling herdisputed Order of 7 June 1989; 3 (c) respondent Judge issued another order authorizing the sale of the otherproperties previously titled in the complainant Jose P. Uy; 4 (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) moreorders approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appealsannulling her Order of 7 June 1989. 5These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to the lawful orders of superiorcourts and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous orders in good faith as would excuse her fromadministrative liability.Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom thepeople draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be thefirst to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously carefulto avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. 6 To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of thelaw, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. 7 If the judge is already aware of them, the latter should notdeliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise such omission can never be excused. 8Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of propertyalleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not byvirtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting asprobate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court inthe exercise of its general jurisdiction. 9 The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicatesa manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been registered and thecertificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on thevalidity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is theconstitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In cancellingthe titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording them dueprocess, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it,constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decisionof the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision,respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of properties titled in thename of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher courtconstitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of atemporary restraining order or an order from the Court of Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is notsufficient justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent orders contrary to the appellate court'sproscription. Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the necessary consequence of the appellate court'sdecision is to put back the complainants to their former status prior to the issuance of the annulled order.Consequently, the Order of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of the properties subject of the settlement proceedings remains vested in complainants and will continue to be so until declared void in anappropriate proceeding, not in the intestate proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an order from theappellate court that will revert the titles to complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from itsdecision annulling the questioned cancellation. llcdMoreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991 cannot be condoned.Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction incancelling the titles of complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. Sheissued two (2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which were titled inthe name of complainants.We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and seriousmisconduct. 11 Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to showproper respect for, and due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court. 12By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance of her duties thatprudence and circumspection which the law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicialsystem of which she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act oromission which would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice. 13 As Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence of the court is gone and popular respect impaired."WHEREFORE,

this Court finds respondent JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG guilty of grossignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service; consequently, she ishereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with prejudice to reinstatementor reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, includinggovernment owned or controlled corporations.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,Bellosillo, Melo, Campos and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

EN BANC [A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005] OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: This is a verified petition for disbarment [1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, [2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.[3] The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus: It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. [4] The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co -accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respo ndents dismissal from service. On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents[6] in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a

breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent). In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order. [7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994. On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession.[9] In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law[10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co -defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified. Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, [11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides: ORDER When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared. The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12] On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandezs recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states: Resolution No. XII-96-153 Adm. Case No. 4018 Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation. Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors.[14] In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter [15] informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel[16] had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years. On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandezs Order dated 23 February 1996. Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondents motion.[17] Complying with t his directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondents motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. [18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondents evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides: RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors. [20] Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. [21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process. Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter. In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panels order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit: RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice. [25] Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. [26] Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. [28] According to Atty. Castillo After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City. WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof. In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows: The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in: a) b) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and, Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. [29] In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained

solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper. On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court. [30] The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. [31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. [32] Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared [A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character. [34] Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, [35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to o ccupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law. As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38] A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardle ss of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. [39] WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Carpio, J., no part. Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 46371 February 7, 1940

FORTUNATO N. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs.

SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS, VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ, respondents. Godofredo Reyes for petitioner. Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas Hermogenes Caluag for respondents. LAUREL, J.: This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with this court, to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course. It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the respondents in this case, filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, charging the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas, with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint, upon preliminary examination, was docketed and given due course. While the said case was pending preliminary investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas, moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20, 1935, and the case thus dismissed. At the instance of the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Perfecto R. Palacio, in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed, according to the information under date of July 8, 1935, as follows: That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas, without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever, moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going to Calauag, and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused, Damian Jimenez, justice of the peace of the said municipality, prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition; that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez, conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez, without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours. The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as criminal case No. 6426. While the case was pending in the latter court, on petition, of the accused, the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such reinvestigation, he filed on April 23, 1936, a motion for the dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the petitioner herein, on May 5, 1936, asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution, alleging, among other things, that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor, and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. The Bar Association of Tayabas, through its president, Emiliano A. Gala, entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. On August 14, 1936, the then presiding judge of Branch I of the

Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed. Gutierrez David, after hearing, denied the motion, ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. The court, upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to handle the prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed, and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. So, on September 23 1936, he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. Later, Judge Serviliano Platon, one of the respondents herein, was appointed to preside over case No. 6426 corresponded, and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. Judge Platon, after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case, considered the court's order of August 14, 1936, and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. From this order, the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G.R. No. 45431. On June 30, by a closely divided court, the appeal was dismissed. The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition, in which, as stated in the opening paragraph of this decision, we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ: Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez, despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados. Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa, en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz, demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A").] Que el Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". (E.U. vs. Barredo, 32 Jur. Fil., 462, 482.) Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez, the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa, y examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las circunstancias del caso, ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta causa." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal of April 23, 1936: En sintesis, los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935, en ocasion en que el abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia, se encontraron en el tren que iba a Calauag, aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio, y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal, por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag, ambos tuvieron un cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli, y por haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado, de que los sakdalistas estaban

perseguidos en Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia, y que era un abuso de las autoridades dicha persecusion, trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos, y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas, y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas, teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas, uno de los acusados en el municipiode Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion, que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion,fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez, conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas, quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion del tren en Calauag, diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. Que despues de haberles arrestado, presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion, en el juzgado de paz de Calauag, aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores, dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia. Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas, ni que haya incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las autoridades y oficiales, sin embargo, de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes, se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y subversivas, maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los sakdalistas, a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Rosa. La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. Godofredo Reyes contra el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L. Jimenez, por el delito de detencion arbitraria. El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal Revisado, que dice asi: El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera castigado; etc. . . . Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos, y que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito, el que suscribe, haanalizado este extremo, relacionando los hechos que determinaron laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. Suarez, con las circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna, acondicionandolos con las palabras proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas,por lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno, especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion, y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion arbitraria, que para que exista este delito, la detencion tenia que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno, creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado Sr. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas, y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello. (E.U. vs. Vallejo y otro, 11 Jur. Fil., 202; E.U. vs. Santos, 36 Jur. Fil., 909.) We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14, 1936. It appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case, moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for

reconsideration and dismissed the case. In this motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal, but adds: (a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais, no existe prueba alguna en los autos de esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. Aunque es verdad que el Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de autoridad', sin embargo, no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma, por tanto, no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. (Vease pag. 1, Anexo O.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos, en nuestra humilde opinion, existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Se debe tener en cuenta, ademas, el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez, juez de paz de Calauag, por infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado. We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one," (69 United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.) Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon, in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez, abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact, since such a duty is not ministerial. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 156, pp. 173-175). Upon the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais, in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. See generally Voorhees on Arrest; 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R.C.L., 450. (United States vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, 855.)" The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding cost. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, J., dissenting: The majority decision takes for granted that which precisely is in issue in this case. In the morning of May 9, 1935, the accused, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, and Attorney Fortunato Suarez were both in the train on their way to Calauag, Tayabas. In the conversation which ensued between them, Attorney Suarez made certain remarks about the abuses of authority committed by the officers of the Government who conducted the raid against the Sakdalistas at Sariaya. Upon inquiry of Lieutenant Orais as to what party Attorney Suarez belonged, and, pressed upon to state whether or not he was a Sakdalista, Attorney Suarez replied "may be". On the strength of these facts, Lieutenant Orais arrested Attorney Suarez for the alleged offense of uttering seditious words, and conducted him to the municipal building of Calauag and there lodged him in jail. He filed in the justice of the peace court of the same municipality an information against Attorney Suarez for uttering seditious words, in violation of article 142 of then Revised Penal Code. On the day following, Lieutenant Orais, acting under the instruction of his superior, moved for the dismissal of the case. Thereafter, the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas, at the instance of Fortunato Suarez, filed an information against Lieutenant Orais and Damian Jimemez, the latter as justice of the peace of Calauag, Tayabas, for the crime of arbitrary detention, the information reading as follows: That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the province of Tayabas, without any legal ground whatsoever, moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going to Calauag; and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused Damian Jimenez, justice of the peace of said municipality, prepared and subscribed under oath before said justice of the peace a complaint falsely charging said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition; that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez, conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez, without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours. The justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, conducted the preliminary investigation, and, thereafter, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance. On April 23, 1936, the provincial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case upon the alleged ground, that after a supposed reinvestigation, the new facts established therein disclose no sufficient evidence to sustain the information. The motion was overruled by Judge Gutierrez David, then presiding the second branch of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Jacinto Yamson, appointed as special fiscal to take charge of the case, moved for the reconsideration of the order of Judge Gutierrez David. To this motion, Attorney Suarez, through counsel, interposed an opposition. Judge Servillano Platon, then presiding the first branch of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, acceded to the motion and dismissed the information. From this order, Attorney Suarez appealed, but the appeal was dismissed by this Court on the ground that mandamus was the proper remedy. Accordingly, the present action is filed in this Court.

The sole question here involved is whether or not, according to the evidence in the hands of the prosecution, there is sufficient ground to proceed with the criminal case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Justice of the Peace Damian Jimenez. A close examination of such evidence, which is attached to the record, will disclose that the arrest of Fortunato Suarez by Lieutenant Orais in the morning of May 9, 1935, was prompted obviously, not by official duty, but by personal resentment against certain statements made by the former. I have taken pains to scrutinize carefully the testimonies of all the witnesses who testified in the preliminary investigation, and they show nothing seditious in the utterances of Attorney Suarez on the occasion in question. My conclusion, then, is that the detention of Attorney Suarez by Lieutenant Orais was arbitrary, and that the charge made against Lieutenant Orais for arbitrary detention is well founded on facts. The fiscal, in moving for the dismissal of the case before the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, mentioned a reinvestigation conducted by him of the case, in which he supposedly found a new evidence warranting its dismissal. Counsel for Attorney Fortunato Suarez, however, insisted on the production of such new evidence before the court, but the prosecution could not respond to such demand. This is an indication that the supposed additional evidence never existed. But the majority, instead of deciding the issue as to whether or not the evidence in the hands of the prosecution was sufficient to proceed with the charge for arbitrary detention, takes for granted that such evidence was not sufficient, relying upon the assumption that the "circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas . . . must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas." In other words, the majority assumes that which is the subject of the petitioner's challenge, which is tantamount to a refusal to consider his complaint after he has been told that he may come to this court by mandamus proceedings. Although a broad discretion must be conceded to prosecuting attorneys and trial courts in the determination of sufficient grounds for dismissing or continuing a criminal prosecution, yet when, as in this case, the basis for the action of both officers fiscal and judge is produced in this court, and we are called upon to determine whether, on the basis of such evidence and determine the question at issue. And, in the present case, it is my opinion that the evidence we have in the record sufficiently shows that the prosecution for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais must take its course, and that its dismissal without trial by the Court of First Instance is without basis on facts and constitutes an abuse of discretion. I agree, however, that there is no reason for including in the charge for arbitrary detention the justice of the peace of Calauag, Damian Jimenez. The evidence shows no connection between him and Lieutenant Orais in the arbitrary arrest of Attorney Fortunato Suarez. My vote, therefore, is that the petition for mandamus must be granted with respect to the prosecution against Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, but denied with respect to the prosecution against Damian Jimenez. Imperial, J., concurs in the result.

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005] PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN

KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. [1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265. In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. [7] After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law. On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. [11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. [12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. [14] It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. [16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17] Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not timebound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19] The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue. I

Substantive Issue The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. I.A. The history of Rule 6.03 A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice. The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20] The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. [21] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by

lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. [22] In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. [23] In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. [24] As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverseinterest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. [27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. [28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.: 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31] In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government. The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. [34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36] Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were set -out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the on ly enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.[38] In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility .[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.: Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruentinterest conflicts. The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03 . Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al. I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03 The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter.

The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40] The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states: Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure should be taken: 1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public. 2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. 3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. 4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank. The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads: The Board decided as follows: ...

E.

To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of: 1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank; Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977; Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

2.

3.

4.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz: The provision reads in part: SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions. ... If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or nonbank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce

individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section. Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community. The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981) We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved

was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.: 1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41] On the other hand, intervention is defined as: 1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.[42] There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant . Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in u njust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee. It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we

note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. II Balancing Policy Considerations To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule. In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent . At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. [45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. [46] Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.[47] In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. [48] Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence. [54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence . It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law. No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. [55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession. It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best [56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. [58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60] It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved. It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. [61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. [62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of governme nt policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm

that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases. Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism. [68] III The question of fairness Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied. No cost. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur. Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion. Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion. Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair. Chico-Nazario, J., No part.