Legal Ethics

LEGAL
ETHICS
Gervin Gale Arquizal 1st year

November 22, 2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
B.M. 850. October 2, 2001
B.M. 1922
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, v. ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA,
Rule 137
2|Legal Ethics
EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL

EDUCATION
FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

(MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy,
and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves,
the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. – Continuing legal education is

required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. – Within two (2) months from

the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE
Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance
with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. – Members of the IBP not

exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six
3|Legal Ethics
(36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent
to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills
equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute

resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on

substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9)
credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as
may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit
units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. — The initial compliance period shall

begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules.
Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted
after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for
thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. — Members of the IBP not exempt from the
MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups,
namely:
4|Legal Ethics
(a) Compliance group 1. — Members in the National Capital Region
(NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. — Members in Luzon outside NCR are

assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. — Members in Visayas and Mindanao are

assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity

wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the
MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after

establishment of the program. – Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar
after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of
admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on

the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the
same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member is not required to
comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education
activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall
be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in
proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period.
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
5|Legal Ethics
SECTION 1. Guidelines. – CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO
CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE
requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyer’s
participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for
computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor:
CREDIT
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
UNITS
1. SEMINARS,
CONVENTIONS,
CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA,
IN-HOUSE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS,
DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7
AND OTHER RELATED RULES
1 CU PER
HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ ATTENDEE
ATTENDANC WITH NUMBER OF HOURS
E
FULL CU
FOR THE
1.2 LECTURER
SUBJECT PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR
RESOURCE
PER SPONSOR’S CERTIFICATION
SPEAKER
COMPLIANC
E PERIOD
1/2 OF CU
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR FOR THE
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT CERTIFICATION FROM
MODERATOR/ COORDINATOR/ PER SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR COMPLIANC
E PERIOD
6|Legal Ethics
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING
AND REVIEW
FULL CU
FOR THE
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT LESS SUBJECT
PUBLISHED BOOK
THAN 100 PAGES PER
COMPLIANC
E PERIOD
1/2 OF THE
CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF AS
2.2 BOOK EDITOR
AUTHORSHIP EDITOR
CATEGORY
1/2 OF CU
FOR THE
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER
SUBJECT DULY CERTIFIED/ PUBLISHED
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/
PER TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
CREATIVE PROJECT
COMPLIANC
E PERIOD
1/2 OF CU
FOR THE
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT SUBJECT
PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES PER
COMPLIANC
E PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ LAW 1 CU PER PUBLISHED

JOURNAL EDITOR ISSUE NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
7|Legal Ethics
FULL CU
FOR THE
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/
SUBJECT CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN OR
BAR REVIEW LECTURE LAW
PER BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR
TEACHING/
COMPLIANC
E PERIOD
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. — Credit units are either participatory

or non-participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. — Participatory credit units may
be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars,

conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education programs,
workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,

commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in
approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. – Non-participatory credit

units may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published

or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or
book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member,
which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member’s practice or
employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
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SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. — Credit hours are computed
based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest
one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. — The following members

of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the
Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government

Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy

Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
9|Legal Ethics
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy;
and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. – The following Members
of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of
the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement -A

member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption
(such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven
expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance
with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. – The compliance period shall begin on the first
day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections
1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. – Applications for exemption from or

modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported
by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. – Subject to the implementing

regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1)
the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the
10 | L e g a l E t h i c s
activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. – All continuing legal

education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical

content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning

related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross
profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance
legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing
and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate

professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length,
substantive written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such
materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and

location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other
distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. — Accreditation of providers shall

be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. – Any person or group

may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal
education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be
accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. — All approved accredited

providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be

maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the completion
date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of
attendance only if the member’s signature was obtained at the time of
attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the
member’s name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the
time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A
copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in

the amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal
ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education

activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be
prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants

identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved

continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members
of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP
staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of

the activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors.
The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation
Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity

under this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these
Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. – The accreditation of a

provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the
provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails
to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. — the accreditation of any

provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the
MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF

PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. – Application for approval of an education

activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate
fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. — Each member shall secure from the

MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance
period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has
complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying
the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to
the Committee not later than the day after the end of the member’s
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. — Each member shall

maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the
MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by
the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record
of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory
activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3
of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. – The following shall

constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the

compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including

evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence

of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance
notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended
to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -

Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the
specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following
language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH

THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE
OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER
AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH
TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE
MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice

may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for
compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless
units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess
may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. — A member who, for whatever reason,

is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. — A member who fails to comply

with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has
expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member
for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. — Membership fees shall continue to

accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is
listed as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process. — The involuntary listing as a delinquent member

shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with
the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A
member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for
the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive
status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of
non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior
compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. –

The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in
nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Composition. – The MCLE Committee shall be composed of

five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair,
and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and
associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity.

They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years
and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. – The MCLE Committee shall administer and

adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board
of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. – Subject to approval by the

Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be
necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and
other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. – The MCLE Committee shall

submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy]
to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000,
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF

COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc

dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing

Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the
Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008,
of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee
on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing
interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee

on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of
the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A.

ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for

his failure to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the
attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE
application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a
pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the
MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the
following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof.
Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director:
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll
Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the
requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance periods:
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from
the MCLE requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE
Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE
Committee for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes),
Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court
the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation,
Report and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First
and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15
April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law"
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board
denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing
Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the
Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk
of Court to furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The
Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days from
notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that
he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that
he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He
further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for
exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof.
Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo
family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had
total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that
the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been
practicing law for about 50 years. He stated:
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme
Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after
she took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court
but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some members of the
Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the

canvassing of the results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING
CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI
revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national canvassing before the National
Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL
RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN
CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading
generals like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like
GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including
now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and
validity of the 2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only
decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona
conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other
laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF
IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the regular
Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the
Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that

prepared and orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against
PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances
before the Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL
REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have
exemptions from the MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From
Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning,
Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to
undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the
alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and
Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported
that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request
on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his
application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to
the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant
to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant
must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise
in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the
requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to
indicate in all their pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The
OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his
"MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section
12 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE
requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the
pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of the
MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with
the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to explain his
deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also
provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a
non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent
to respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013,
the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed against respondent
in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE
compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance period
and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer.
The OBC stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements
jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be
stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the

Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to
comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure
to comply with the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14
April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April
2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and
2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements
for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the
four compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an
application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE
Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and
Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application
for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet
the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its
letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries
from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial
Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October
2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November
2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a
letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply

with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not
follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with
his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on
his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the
MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to
comply with the requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was
reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a
Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days
from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and
Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of his involvement in
public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar
Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered
with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on
those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will
receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or
otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written in
capital letters as follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-

COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE
SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER
AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME
AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the
MCLE requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay
a non-compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of
the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP

Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He
is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The
Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with
the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for
exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly
wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that
his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider
the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for
reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board
on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest
that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day
period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and
without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to
allow him to continue practicing law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to
inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office only
informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding
the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he
was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for
exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application
for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still
aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when
respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a
pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of
the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE
Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a
lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using
its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from
directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six
months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is
also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such
time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the
IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it
proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend
him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied with the
requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act
on matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to
applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties
within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE
compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE
Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements
for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later,
and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal

record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also
furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate
actions.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 137
Disqualification of Judicial Officers
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Section 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. — If it be

claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party
objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection,
stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial,
or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the
other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason
of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the
case.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1833 : June 28, 2005]
ALEXANDER B. ORTIZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE IBARRA B. JACULBE,

JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DUMAGUETE CITY, BRANCH
42, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Alexander B. Ortiz against Judge
Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr.1
In a verified letter-complaint2 dated March 20, 2003, Ortiz averred the following:
That he is a respondent in a case filed before the sala of Judge Jaculbe; that Atty.
Richard Enojo, who is the son-in-law of Judge Jaculbe, represents the plaintiff in
the same case; that a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties; that
pursuant to the compromise agreement, plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution; and that the motion was hastily granted by Judge Jaculbe
without holding a hearing to prove the failure of defendants to comply with the
compromise agreement.
Complainant cites Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
reads, as follows:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
...
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree.
Complainant further claims that the relationship between Judge Jaculbe and Atty.
Richard Enojo is within the third degree of affinity and thus covered by the rule.
In his Comment,3 Judge Jaculbe alleges that it has been his practice to voluntarily
inhibit himself when a case handled by his son-in-law is raffled to his sala or,
alternatively, for his son-in-law to withdraw his appearance. In support of his
assertion, he attached as annexes to his Comment some orders of inhibition he
issued and some withdrawals of appearance filed by his son-in-law.
The Judge further claims that there is only one exception to his above-stated
practice and that is the case now subject of this complaint. He contends, however,
that:
. . . there is no legal, equitable and reasonable necessity to inhibit himself and the
case can be counted as a disposal from his court, in view of the following cogent
and valid grounds:
1. No factual and legal issue [had] been resolved by the undersigned in rendering
the judgment based on the compromise agreement, and, there was no issue being
resolved by the undersigned in issuing the order for the Writ of Execution, for
which issue undersigned could have possibly been biased in favor of his son-in-
law;
2. Atty. Richard Enojo (son-in-law of undersigned) participated and appeared very

much later and ONLY AS ADDITIONAL COUNSEL for plaintiff, because, Atty.
Jose Arbas since the start of the case consistently appeared as the only counsel for
plaintiff for several years;
3. During the FIRST court appearance of Atty. Richard Enojo, he immediately

manifested that his client is accepting and willing to sign the pending and proposed
compromise agreement already submitted by the defendants, which compromise
agreement was eventually finalized and submitted to the court for approval;
therefore, the appearance of his son-in-law was instead favorable to the defendants
and [is] without [the] possibility of partiality and undue influence by the judge;
4. The Judgment was rendered in accordance with the Compromise Agreement, no
more[,] no less;
5. The order for issuance of a Writ of Execution as a ministerial duty only of the
court was in accordance with the procedure of the Rules of Court, after hearing the
same with no opposition and no motion for reconsideration and/or other legal
remedies availed of by the defendants; andcralawlibrary
6. The appearance of his son-in-law as additional counsel for plaintiff, has long
been with the express conformity and acquiescence by the defendants; therefore,
the defendants are in estoppel [and] thus cannot now question and complain as to
the conduct of this Presiding Judge.
In a Manifestation and Comment,4 Judge Jaculbe likewise takes exception to the

narration of facts by the complainant, as follows'
The apparent and deliberate misrepresentation of facts briefly states that:

undersigned Judge "x x x immediately granted the motion and as a matter of fact,
issued [a] writ of execution on April 29, 2002 without conducting a hearing xxx."
"Worst is the fact that Hon. Ibarra B. Jaculbe had ordered for the issuance of a writ
of execution not in conformity to its decision." "[T]he only reason why the same
was expedited by the court is the fact that Atty. Richard Enojo, plaintiff's counsel
is his son-in-law." Also, complainant falsely alleged that undersigned Judge
"ordered for the issuance of a writ of execution not in conformity to its decision."
Upon referral of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator made the
following evaluation and recommendation:
Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides that "a
judge should take no part in any proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." Paragraph (d) of said Rule provides [as an instance
thereof] the following:
"(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree."
Clearly, respondent violated the above canon by deciding Civil Case No. 12320
since his son-in-law, who is related to him in the first degree of affinity, was a
counsel for the plaintiff. At least respondent does not pretend to be ignorant of the
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and he can not deny that he had
violated the same. However, his excuse that his son-in-law was not an original
counsel but had only entered his appearance after the case had been pending for
over a year and only to announce that his client was ready to sign the compromise
agreement is unacceptable. What he should have done the moment his son-in-law
entered his appearance was to forthwith disqualify himself and have the case
reraffled to another branch. His reluctance to let go of the case, according to him,
was [due to] his desire to include the same case among his disposals and
considering that it was nearly finished he preferred not to unload it. This, again, is
a poor excuse for violating the clear injunction written in the Code.
Under Rule 140, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may be classified as
simple misconduct which is punished by suspension from office without salary for
not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that this case be

redocketed as a regular administrative matter and considering that respondent had
earlier been reprimanded in RTJ-97-1393, he should be made to pay a fine
[of] P11,000.00 for simple misconduct.5
As indicated by the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Jaculbe does not
dispute the fact that Atty. Richard Enojo is his son-in-law and is, therefore, related
to him by affinity in the first degree.
The prohibition against the Judge's sitting in the case is found in the Rule 3.12 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as quoted above and in Section 1 of Rule
137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
The prohibition under the rules is clear. Therefore, Judge Jaculbe's failure to inhibit
himself when his son-in-law appeared as counsel in a case he was trying is a patent
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court. In Sales v.
Calvan,6 the Court found that Judge Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of
judges as set out in the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court when he
conducted the preliminary investigation of a criminal case where his wife was the
niece of the private complainant. The Court articulated therein, as follows -
In Garcia v. De la PeÃ±a, we explained the rationale for this disqualification:
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the
instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should
preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his
integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his
authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties
concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the
courts of justice.
The disqualification is mandatory, and respondent has no option other than to

inhibit himself from the criminal case. The appropriate step for respondent to take
would have been to immediately desist from hearing the case, even at the
preliminary investigation stage. His failure to do so is a glaring violation not only
of the Rules of Court but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates in
Canon 3, Rule 3.12:
Rule 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,
proceedings where:
...
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
...
Even in Perez v. Suller, which respondent cites in support of his arguments, we
ruled that respondent Judge Suller should have refrained from handling the
preliminary investigation of the case involving his nephew, a relative by
consanguinity within the sixth degree and thus covered by the prohibition in Rule
137 of the Rules of Court. We further held:
While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as

"sitting in a case," the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12
[of Canon 3] of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the
same.
We have time and again reminded judges of their obligation to keep the image of
the judiciary unsullied and worthy of the people's trust. Respondent clearly failed
to uphold this duty.
In that case, the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on Judge Calvan for violation of
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and of Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme
Court rules falls under a Less Serious Charge. Section 11 of the same rule states
that the following sanctions may be imposed for Less Serious Charges: "1.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00."
In the present case, since Judge Jaculbe was earlier reprimanded by the Court in
RTJ-97-1393, the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to
impose a fine of P11,000 is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 42, is found GUILTY of violating Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and a FINE of P11,000 is hereby imposed on him.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,

concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124760 July 8, 1998
ANTONIA J. GUTANG, ELIZABETH J. GUTANG, and DAVID

GUTANG petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON P.
MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge, Branch 35, Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Manila; HON. MARINO M. DE LA CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
NCJR, Manila, ALBERTO LOOYUKO; and JUAN UY, Respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This Petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of public respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39067 1 which dismissed the petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order filed before it. The petition before public respondent sought:
1) the annulment of the orders dated July 26, 1995 and September 5, 1995, issued
by respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 22, wherein said judge voluntarily inhibited himself from Civil
Case No. R-82-5792 and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the
order of inhibition;
2) the issuance of an order enjoining respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of

Branch 35 of the same court from further acting in Civil Case No. R-82-5792; and,
3) the issuance of an order for respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to
reassume jurisdiction over Civil Case No. R-82-5792. 2
The undisputed facts are as follows:
In an Order dated August 30, 1994, respondent Judge Marino M. de la Cruz, Jr.
granted the two (2) motions filed by private respondents Alberto Looyuko and
Juan Uy in Civil Case No. R-82-5792, namely: (1) a motion for issuance of the
final deed of sale and for an order to cancel TCT 242 and to issue a new title for
plaintiffs to vest title; and (2) a motion for issuance of a writ of possession, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, both motions are granted and accordingly let a writ of possession
over the subject property issue in favor of the herein plaintiffs, Alberto Looyuko
and Juan Uy and, further, T.C.T. No. 242 in the name of the Spouses Gutang is
ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila is ordered to
issue another Transfer Certificate of Title over the said property in the name of
plaintiffs Juan Uy and Alberto Looyuko, with all existing encumbrances in T.C.T.
No. 242 to be carried over thereto.
This is without prejudice to the right of oppositors under Section 17 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court as decreed in the September 24, 1991 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24505 as aforestated.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Antonia J. Gutang questioned the order before the respondent Court via
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35213. However, the petition was denied due course
and dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon motion of private respondents, a writ of possession was issued by the court a
quo in an Order dated August 30, 1994.
On May 17, 1995, private respondents filed a motion for alias writ of possession
since the sheriff who previously served the writ of possession died.
On June 7, 1995, private respondents filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Marino M. de

la Cruz, Jr., alleging that for almost two (2) weeks from April 12, 1995, respondent
Judge de la Cruz, Jr. did not act on their motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession and appointment of a special sheriff which led them to seek the aid of
the Office of the Court Administrator to direct the respondent judge to act on said
motion. An opposition thereto was filed by the petitioners.
On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued the assailed order
denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily inhibited himself, thus:
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for inhibition is hereby denied.
However, as aforestated, the Presiding Judge voluntarily inhibits himself from
further sitting in this case.
Let the entire records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Office of the
Executive Judge for immediate re-raffle in view of the other pending incidents to
be passed upon by the judge to whom this case will be assigned.
SO ORDERED. 3
A motion for reconsideration of the aforecited order was denied. 4
Pursuant to the Order dated July 26, 1995, the case was re-raffled to Branch 35 of
the same court, presided by respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals. Public respondent dismissed the petition in its decision dated April 22,
1996. 5
Hence, this Petition before this Court. Petitioners set forth the following grounds
for the allowance of the petition:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR

OF LAW IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO ANNUL
THE ORDERS DATED JULY 25, 1995 AND SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 OF JUDGE
MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR. INHIBITING HIMSELF, EVEN AS HE FOUND
THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR SAID
INHIBITION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS TO COMPEL
JUDGE MARINO DELA CRUZ, JR. TO PROCEED IN THE CASE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF

LAW IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AGAINST
JUDGE RAMON MAKASIAR AND IN ANNULLING HIS ORDER DATED
MARCH 18, 1996 GRANTING THE ALIAS WRIT OF POSSESSION AND
THE ALIAS WRIT OF POSSESSION ITSELF DATED MARCH 25, 1996.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
As correctly pointed out by the public respondent Court of Appeals, the resolution
of this case would hinge on the proper interpretation and application of the second
paragraph of the above-mentioned provision.
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for
inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based
on just and valid reasons. 6 The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of
judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion
and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the
occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes
that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition.
That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preference or
predelictions are many and varied. 7
Thus, in the case at bar, the question is whether there were just and valid reasons
for respondent Judge Marino dela Cruz to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
Petitioners contend that there are none. They argue that since respondent judge
found the motion for inhibition to be without factual nor legal basis, unjustified
and unfounded, as stated in the assailed order, there was no just and valid reason
for him to inhibit voluntarily. It is thus contended that respondent judge committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the
motion for inhibition and at the same time voluntarily inhibited himself from the
case. Petitioners also question the wisdom and legal soundness of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, contending that it was an error of law for the appellate court
to deny the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the above-
named petitioners.
We are not convinced.
In the questioned orders, 8 respondent Judge Marino dela Cruz, Jr. invoked the
ruling of this Court in the case of Pimentel v. Salanga, to wit:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity
to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of
challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be
induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm
is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of
his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice
against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of
serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not
altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should,
therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or to
withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good
grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where
no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the
result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent the all-
important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he
should resolve to voluntarily desist from setting in a case where his motives or
fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving
meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves
the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
While not expressly stated, respondent judge nevertheless did have a just and valid
reason for voluntarily inhibiting himself. In the questioned order, it was evident
that he thought it more prudent to inhibit himself than to have any decision, order
or resolution he would make on the incidents of the case be put under a cloud of
distrust and skepticism. In this sense, he would no longer be effective in dispensing
justice to the parties to the litigation.
Taking the cue from the Pimentel case, the respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr.
properly took heed of this Court's advice, to wit:
. . . But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith
in the courts of justice is not impaired. . . . 9
Truly, the presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the
parties-litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very
first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. When
circumstances appear that will induce doubt as to his honest actuations and probity
in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith
in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under such
circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood,
his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the
ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. 10
While we admire and commend petitioners for their scholarly examination and
analysis of the cases 11 cited by public respondent, We take this occasion to remind
petitioner that the cases merely showed instances when the court decided one way
or another in tackling the issue of whether or not there were just and valid grounds
for inhibition.
In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the
inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on
its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the
result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any
manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial
judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to
determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the
parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge Marino M. dela
Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the motion to
inhibit involves the exercise of discretion. The right or duty to exercise this
discretion has been imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any
matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right to the
issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature.
With regard to the prayer for "the issuance of an order enjoining respondent Judge
Ramon P. Makasiar of Branch 35 of the same court from further acting in Civil
Case No. R-82-5792," respondent: Court put the matter to rest in this manner:
We now proceed to the question of whether co-respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the same Court, to whom said case was re-raffled
as a result of the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. may be enjoined or
prohibited from further acting in said case. Since the voluntary inhibition of Judge
dela Cruz, Jr. was valid, Civil Case No. R-82-5792 must of necessity be re-
assigned by raffle to another judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
disposition. Supreme Court Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, provides:
IV. Re-assignment of Cases of Disqualified Judges. - In any case where the Judge
concerned is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself, the records shall be
returned to the Executive Judge and the case shall be included in the regular raffle
for re-assignment. Another case, similar in category to the one re-assigned, shall be
assigned by raffle to the disqualified or inhibiting Judge to replace the case so
removed from his court.
The petition alleges that pursuant to the order of inhibition dated July 26,1995, the
Civil Case No. R-82-57920 was re-raffled and fell on Branch 35 presided by
respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar. Be that as it may, and considering that the
case was validly re-raffled pursuant to the aforecited Circular No. 7, respondent
Judge Ramon P Makasiar may proceed to take cognizance of the case and may not
be enjoined by the writ of prohibition prayed for by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ,. concur.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987
QUERY OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF MAIOLOS, BULACAN, ON TIHE CONFLICTING
VIEWS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT — JUDGES MASADAO and
ELIZAGA RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4954-M
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue before us brings to mind the words of Eugen Ehrlich, philosopher, who
stated: "There is no guaranty of justice except the personality of a judge." (Ehrlich,
"Freedom of Decision", The Science of Legal Method, 0 Mod. Leg. Philos, Ser. 65,
1917 trans. by Bruncken). Indeed, judicial integrity is the first and highest
qualification a judge must possess — integrity maintained especially in cognizance
of the limits ofman. In this wise, we cite the oft quoted example of a judge
voluntarily inhibiting himself so as to preserve the prized ideal of "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo,
Jr. v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).
Submitted for the consideration of this Court is the question of who shall resolve a
motion for reconsideration filed against the decision of Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr.,
after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in Criminal Case No.
4954-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, Malolos entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Jaime Tadeo".
The following facts gave rise to the present controversy:

On May 4, 1987, Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., rendered a decision in the
aforementioned criminal case finding the accused guilty of the crime of estafa as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused JAIME

TADEO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
ESTAFA as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate period of imprisonment of six (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum,
to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS
of prision mayor, as maximum, and all the accessory penalties
provided by law, with costs de officio. (p. 10, Annex "A"). *
On July 11, 1987, counsel for the accused, Atty. Efren C. Moncupa, filed a motion
for reconsideration which was submitted without arguments.
On July 23, 1987, retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes entered his appearance for the
accused, wherefore, on July 30, 1987, Judge Masadao issued an order inhibiting
himself from further sitting in the case on the ground that retired Justice J. B. L.
Reyes had been among those who had recommended him to the Bench. Judge
Masadao directed that the case be transmitted to Executive Judge Estrena T.
Estrada for re-raffling among the other branches of the court for further
proceedings.
On August 6, 1987, a raffle was conducted and the case was assigned to Branch
No. 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, presided over by Judge Luciano G.
Elizaga.
On August 7, 1987, Judge Elizaga returned the records of the case with an
accompanying letter stating a refusal to act on the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration and assailing the re-raffling of the case as impractical and uncalled
for.
On August 13, 1987, Judge Masadao replied by way of a second Indorsement

justifying his decision and standing pat on his order of inhibition, unless and until
overruled by judicial authorities of higher rank. Wherefore, Executive Judge
Estrada certified the matter to us.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court embodies the rule on
disqualification and inhibition of judges.
The rule on disqualification provides:
No judge or judicial off icer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir. legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without written consent of an the parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record (Par. 1, Sec. 1,
Rule 137, Revised Rules of Court).
On the other hand, where no grounds for disqualification as above enumerated

exist, as in the case at bar, the rule on inhibition provides:
A judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above (Par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule 137, supra).
The exercise of this discretion and the validity of the reasons for inhibition are now
put in issue before us.
It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge
and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for
disqualification. In Vda. de Bonifacio v. B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc. (34 SCRA 618, 631),
we held that the fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial
judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification of said judge. To allow it would
unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred.
Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a judge would be
barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could
have many) appeared." Likewise, the rule applies when the lawyer of the defendant
was a former associate of the judge, when he was practising law (Austria v.
Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247, 1255).
Judge Elizaga correctly commented on the dilemma with which his colleague was
faced: " ... this is one rare opportunity for the presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 9 to
show — (1) that Justice J.B.L. Reyes who recommended him to the Bench did not
err in so recommending him for his competence and known probity; (2) that he has
conducted himself with the cold impartiality of an impartial judge; and (3) that no
one can sway his judgment whoever he may be."
Indeed, as President Manuel L. Quezon had advised: "Once you are appointed, do
not be influenced by the recommendations of your sponsor or patron. for if you do,
he will be the first to lose confidence in you" and former Chief Justice Paras
adds: ... that is good policy for our judges to remember" (Paras, Consent and
Dissent, p. 38).
However, where the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is
such that there would be a natural inclination to prejudice the case, the judge
should be disqualified in order to guarantee a fair trial (State Ex. Rel. Tumer v.
Marshall, 176 N.E. 454, 123 Ohio St., 586).
A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity (Geotina v. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 73-74).
However, men of the Bench are not without imperfections. A judge too,
experiences the "tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which
he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals" (Azucena v. Munoz, 33 SCRA 722,
723). The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court
"made clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there
may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus
calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead
to preferences or predilections are many and varied." (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, 50
SCRA 18) Among these may be the Filipino "utang na loob".
Judge Masadao expounds on the matter thus: "For Filipinos, in particular, a sense
of gratitude is one trait which invariably reigns supreme over any and all
considerations in matters upon which such tender sentiment may somehow
inexorably impinge. Generally, whoever owes a debt of favor endeavors to repay
the same in any discernible fashion as soon as the opportunity therefore energes."
Judge Masadao is not necessarily stretching the Filipino "utang an loob" —

gratitude which renders a man beholden to another, a sense of obligation which is
valued as highly as pride and honor — beyond its proper limits. The best way to
show one's "utang na loob" to whoever recommended him is to do honor to the
position, not only in rendering just, correct, and impartial decisions but doing so in
a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness and impartiality and as to the
integrity of the judge. (See Martinez v. Gironella, 6 SCRA 245).
Judge Elizaga is correct in rhetorically asking — "In the remote possibility that a
Motion for Reconsideration is filed in a case to every final order or decision of a
judge by one who recommended him to the bench, should he escape responsibility
by inhibiting himself from any further action and pass the buck to other judges?"
The answer is a categorical NO.- The judge should not evade his responsibility.
Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or

patron of a presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a
case. "Utang na loob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of
justice. Nor should recognition of such value in Philippine society prevent the
performance of one's duties as judge. However, where, as in this case, the judge
admits that he may be suspected of surrendering to the persuasions of utang na
loob or he may even succumb to it considering that he "and the members of his
family, no less, shall ever remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice Reyes", the
negative answer to the question of judge Elizaga yields to exceptions in
extraordinary cases.
The circumstances before Judge Masadao are not ordinary ones. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, one of the most distinguished legal scholars of our country and a towering
paragon (to use the words of Judge Masadao), highly respected during his stints in
the Office of the Solicitor General, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court and
through his post-retirement life, is no ordinary sponsor. The accused is an activist
leader of peasant and farmer groups involved in rather controversial
confrontations. Compelled to act in this case, Judge Masadao may be inclined to
rule against his sponsor to demonstrate independence, Either way, the resulting
impressions would not be salutary to the judicial system.
We apply the guideline expressed in Pimentel v. Salanga (21 SCRA 160, 167-
168):
xxx xxx xxx
... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation,

this when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act
in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising
out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of
mind, he, should conduct a careful self-examination. He .shuold
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on ,he
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mnd the
thought that the judge had unmeritoriously, tilted the scales of Justice
against him. That passion on the part of a judge may he ge-nerated
because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or
his counsel. is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the
frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and
caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from asuit
where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit
himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved thereon.
On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great
extent that all-important confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist
from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously
impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves
the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
We repeat. There are certain circumstances when a case could well be heard by
another judge and no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved
therein, where a voluntary inhibition may prove to be the better course of action.
In that case, his fellow judges should be ready to help preserve the reality and the
appearance of an impartial administration of justice.
The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions involving a judge's
disqualification. here, a judge voluntarily inhibits himself and, instead of a party or
both parties filing a motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that he
continue with the case.
A judge's decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification is not

conclusive, and his competency may be determined on an application for
mandamus to compel him to act, However, as much as possible, the judge to whom
a case is transferred should not resist too much the order of recusation unless the
motives for inhibition are suspect. The prerogative more properly pertains to the
parties to a suit whose rights are directly affected thereby, To accommodate every
objection which a judge, to whom a case is transferred, may have, after the
voluntary inhibition of a presiding judge, would not only disrupt administrative
procedures of courts but would likewise entail further delay ;n the final resolution
of cases. Internal wranglings between judges questioning each other's motivations
should be avoided.
We are not unmindful though of the burdens that may be imposed on other trial
judges to whom such caws may be reassigned. Judge Elizaga's objections are not
without their own merits. In certain cases, inhibition could amount to judges being
recreant to their trust. However, even with all such considerations in mind, there is
still cogency in the approach that would look with favor in the exercise of
discretion in favor of disqualification, given the likelihood that bias or prejudice is
unavoidable (Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776). The dictates of the due process
guarantee of a fair and impartial tribunal override these concerns.
Judge Masadao's actuations are within the terms of Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court. The records do not indicate any improper
exercise of a prerogative conferred on him by law. And, absent any abuse of
discretion or manifest error, we hesitate to reverse his decision holding himself
disqualified. Nor will the wisdom of such inhibition be delved into where the
reasons therefor are concededly subjective. We also suggest that judges of equal
standing should be reticent in passing judgment upon a matter of discretion and in
refusing to act on cases referred to them on account of such discretion.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr.'s

order of voluntary inhibition in an further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4954-
M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, is hereby upheld. Judge
Luciano G. Elizaga is hereby ordered to take cognizance of the said case as re-
raffled to his sala.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180543 : July 27, 2010]
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN

FOUNDATION, AS REPRESENTED BY JOVITO R. SALONGA,
PETITIONERS, VS. LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY; GREGORY S. ONG, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the

promulgation of the Court's Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1] filed a
petition[2] under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the
"amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation" of the entry on citizenship
in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to
Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public
respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.
Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition,

petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four
Orders and the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case.
As Ong's petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28,
2007,[3] petitioners-therein oppositors[4] filed on August 6, 2007 a motion for
voluntary inhibition, which the RTC denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day
after it was filed and prior to the hearing on the motion.[5] Despite the pendency of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ong's petition
on August 14 and 21, 2007. It was only by Order of September 17, 2007[6] that the
motion for reconsideration was resolved, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on October 4, 2007.
Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007,[7] the RTC declared petitioners in

default. Petitioners' motion to vacate the order of default was likewise denied
by Order of October 4, 2007,[8] a copy of which was received by petitioners on
October 17, 2007. Subsequently, the RTC granted Ong's petition and recognized
him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, by Decision of October 24, 2007.[9]
In the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public
respondent "erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily
inhibiting himself from presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein
[p]etitioners as having defaulted; and (c) in granting the Petition of [r]espondent
Gregory S. Ong."[10]
The Court, by Resolution of February 19, 2008, required respondents to comment

on the petition, with which Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
complied on March 14, 2008 and June 5, 2008, respectively. Petitioners submitted
their Consolidated Reply on December 10, 2008.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both
Ong and the OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy
and disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verification
renders the petition as unsigned pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on
all adverse parties violates basic rules.
The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved

in Cerezo v. Tuazon,[11] where the Court discussed the various remedies available to
a party declared in default, including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity
of a judgment by default if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or
even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of
discretion attended such declaration. A party declared in default may thus
alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the
judgment of default.[12] On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners'
recourse procedurally allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the
choice of court forum.
The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum

for appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs. [13] The rule on hierarchy of courts
is not absolute, and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly with it. A direct invocation of this Court's original
jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. [14]
The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and

compelling circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule. In fact, this valid
objection elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural
issues in their Consolidated Reply. If petitioners themselves do not provide the
Court some basis for the direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one.
Further, the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without
stating the basis thereof. In the Verification/ Certification of the Petition, the
affiant states that he "has read the same and all the facts contained therein are true
and correct."[15] The Rules clearly state that a pleading is verified by an affidavit
that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a pleading
required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.[16] Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or
sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of
an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made
in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. [17]
Moreover, this Court observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence
of his identity before the notary public, as required under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.[18] The Court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure,
is personally known to the notary public, for the jurat does not contain a statement
to that effect .
Records also show that petitioners failed to furnish public respondent with a copy
of the petition. The Rules require that the petition should be filed with proof of
service on all adverse parties, and that the failure to comply with the requirement
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. [19]
On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The

Court deems it best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in the interest of
justice.
In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and
public respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which,
along with the school's Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported
Ong's petition through newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of
the proceedings, petitioners point out that issuing the order of default without
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for
inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and wholly
unwarranted.
The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is

provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law,
or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above .
(underscoring supplied)
In keeping with the tenet that judges should not only act with fairness,
independence, impartiality and honesty but should also be perceived to be the
embodiment of such qualities, the Court added the rule on voluntary inhibition in
1964. In outlining the genesis of the provision, the Court narrated:
In Umale v. Villaluz, the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the
above-quoted provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules
of Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of
the case did not depend upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to
sit in a given case. If those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official
duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon to account for their
dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of prejudice
or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an
active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos and Del Castillo v.
Javelona paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for
disqualification- those that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges
concerned.[20]
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for
inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based
on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of
judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and
conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the
occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes
that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition.
That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and
predilections are many and varied. [21]
In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the
inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on
its peculiar circumstances.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound

discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the
reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of
arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an
acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue
of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in
their courtrooms.[22]
Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of
manifestation of its reality, in order to provide "good, sound or ethical grounds" or
"just and valid reasons" for inhibition.[23] Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are
not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according
to law and evidence and without fear or favor.[24] In Gochan v. Gochan,[25] the
Court elucidated further:
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The
inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is
without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality.
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not
suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of
office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably-
both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-
connected.[26] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal
Canning, Inc. [27] where the judge's right to inhibit was weighed against his duty to
decide the case without fear of repression . Indeed, t he automatic granting of a
motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-
shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more
sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair
administration of justice.[28]
A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the

circumstances prevailing in a case brought before him. [29] In the present case,
petitioners cite public respondent's affiliation with an alumni association as the sole
ground to which they anchor their motion for the voluntary inhibition of public
respondent.
Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public
respondent, Ong and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of
Law, albeit years apart, spell partiality.
Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears

before the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however. [30] In one case, [31] the
Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.
Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to

disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a
respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge,
appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college
fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or
Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist
Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically
inhibit himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his
or her group happens to come before him or her for action.
A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more
to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully
comply with the ethics of the legal profession.[32] (underscoring supplied)
The added fact that the law school's alumni association published statements in
support of Ong's application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the
part of pubic respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate
that public respondent actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and
publication of the alumni association's stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that
the alumni association's statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the
manifesto as a matter of creed.
Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent
resolved the motion for voluntary inhibition one day after it was filed. Since the
personal process of "careful self-examination" [33] is essentially a matter of
conscience, the judge may decide as soon as the factual basis of the motions has
been clearly laid before the court because from there on the resolution of the
motion enters the subjective phase.
That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all
graduates of San Beda College of Law was clearly and early on established. Hence,
this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no
longer required a hearing or called for the submission of a comment or opposition,
and the absence thereof did not prejudice petitioners.
In one case,[34] it was held that the Rules of Court does not direct the court to order
the filing of comments or oppositions to the motion before the motion is resolved.
The parties may orally argue and ventilate their positions and, thereafter, the court
may rule on the motion.
The Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for
reconsideration and deferment) which basically reiterated their previous
arguments, they no longer set the motion for hearing and simply submitted their
motion ex parte without further arguments, thereby recognizing the non-litigious
nature of their allegations.
Even assuming that Ong interposed no objection to the motion, it was still up to
public respondent to discern, for a qualified judge cannot be ousted from sitting in
a case by sheer agreement of the parties.
Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and
declared them in default without first resolving their pending motion. Records
show that petitioners filed on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion[35] for
reconsideration of the August 7, 2007 Order and for deferment of the hearings set
on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter, did not appear in the
various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition, which they
deem to be an "overriding consideration" partaking of a "highly prejudicial
matter," had yet to be resolved by the trial court. [36]
While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which
to resolve a motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must
endeavor to act promptly on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to
interrupt the course of trial.[37]
The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007 as confirmed by the
entry of the nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007 making on record the
denial of the Omnibus Motion.
During the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after considering the arguments
and counter-arguments from petitioner [Ong] and the Office of the Solicitor
General, and finding no cogent reasons to reconsider its earlier position, denied in
open court the motion seeking a reconsideration of the Order dated August 7, 2007
which denied movants' "Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Presiding Judge".
Corollarily, for lack of merit, the motion to defer the proceedings in the instant
case was similarly denied. (see TSN, August 14, 2007, pp. 13). (citation in the
original)[38]
The cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial court
on the given date, during which time petitioners failed to appear. After hearing the
arguments, the trial court ruled as follows, quoted verbatim:
COURT: That's right, so there's no basis to overturn our previous Order denying
the motion to voluntary inhibition filed by Atty. Capulong Now, there's another
matter being raised here, counsel could not have a valid argument here to delay the
proceedings What the Supreme Court wanted is to have an Order summary of the
proceeding because Kilos Bayan did sought at their level. Supreme Court was
expecting that they will do so again in our level, but in... since there's seems to be
no good idea waiting for the adversary arguments, so, it will, when it reaches the
Supreme Court, it will repeat the purpose to which they were directed to litigate.
They're supposed to litigate because if they believe they're... for the denial of the
petition, unless the application for declaration of natural born citizen, they should
do so without any delay, so, use Bayan as a very... an active group and Bantay
Katarungan, they should be a party to expeditious resolution of cases, not to a
delay. How many are we here from government. We are here to litigate. So, the
Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings is
also denied. The settings for August were all placed in the Order which was
published in the newspaper of general circulation. We have previously agreed that
we will proceed to cross of petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or would you
agree to the suggestion by the Court that we conduct pre-trial?[39] (underscoring
supplied)
The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually
rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered.[40]
The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then," or that a thing is done now that
shall have the same legal force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have
been done.[41] The purpose of an order nunc pro tunc is to make a present record of
an order that the court made in a previous term, but which was not then recorded.
It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been made, but, by
inadvertence, has not been entered.[42]
In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however,
by mistake or inadvertence, not placed in proper form on record. In any event,
petitioners neither seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for
such confirmatory order nor claim any unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its
resolution during their non-appearance in the scheduled hearing.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show
arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court.[43] For one, the grant of such is not a
matter of right for it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[44] Parties
have absolutely no right to assume that their motion for deferment would be
granted, hence, they should prepare for the hearing, lest they pass the blame to no
one but themselves.
Further, in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the
reason for the postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.[45] In this
case, the requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration. The Omnibus Motion was, however, "submitted ex parte and
without further arguments from Oppositors,"[46] drawing public respondent to
promptly resolve it by denying it.
As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with nothing to
assess since they did not file any Opposition to Ong's Petition despite the grant to
them of extension of time for the purpose and their various submissions to the trial
court all related to peripheral issues.
No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare
petitioners in default after resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally
important doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an
opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge
learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed
by the magistrate, such opinion - even if later found to be erroneous - will not
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may
be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.[47]
Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel

and the judge is not a proper ground for disqualification. Opinions framed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove bias or
prejudice. Repeated rulings against a litigant no matter how erroneous are not
bases for disqualification.[48]
As for the allegation of undue haste, the Court cannot appreciate it, considering
that the trial court even granted petitioners additional period within which to file an
Opposition and in view of the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to
make orders expediting proceedings.[49]
In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling
not to inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned. [50] In this case, p etitioners failed
to demonstrate such acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
as to thaw the attributes of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. U njustified
assumptions and mere misgivings that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and
pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are patently weak to
parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts.
In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did
not inhibit himself from hearing the case.
On the second issue, petitioners assail the Orders of August 21, 2007 and October
4, 2007 declaring them in default and denying their motion to vacate order,
respectively.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.[51] Section 5,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that "[t]he civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto." Records show that
the notice was last published on July 26, 2007. [52]
The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance [53]
without any attached Opposition to Ong's petition and that, despite the grant to
them of additional five days from August 7, 2007, they still failed to make a
submission. Petitioners do not contest the trial court's earlier observation that at
the August 7, 2007 hearing, petitioners' counsel undertook to submit the
Opposition within the extended period and to appear at the next hearing, [54] where
eventually both their pleading and presence turned up unforthcoming.
Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21,
2007 Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that
should have been resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case.
Notably, in both the Motion to Vacate Order and the Memorandum and/or
Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground and impliedly waived other
defenses or grounds for the lifting of the default order.
For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of
the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing
of the existence of meritorious defense.[55]
As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default
failed to comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, [56] it
noting, inter alia, that the motion was "not under oath, it failed to explain or justify
why movants have not filed any opposition to the petition, and it was not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit." [57]
Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default
where such motion was not made under oath. [58] Moreover, a motion to lift an
order of default must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect which caused the failure to answer. [59]
In this case, petitioners' unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason
for their failure to file an appropriate responsive pleading. Petitioners' persistent
stance on the pendency of their Omnibus Motion deserves scant consideration in
view of the recognition of the nunc pro tunc order confirming the August 14, 2007
denial of such motion.
Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the
reglementary period to file a responsive pleading, for where a period is to be
suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for
such a suspension.[60] Despite the grant of an extension of time, petitioners did not
file an Opposition to Ong's Petition, even one ex abundante ad cautelam that
would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the alleged pending incident.
Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense

or any argument to protect whatever interest they may have under the entry which
they resist to be corrected, either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or
embedded in the verified motion itself. [61] Petitioners would later admit that they
are "not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense" as they are acting as
"judicial monitors and observers." [62]
Velayo-Fong v. Velayo[63] discusses the meaning of meritorious defense:
Moreover, when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show
that she has a meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the
order of default set aside. The term meritorious defense implies that the applicant
has the burden of proving such a defense in order to have the judgment set aside.
The cases usually do not require such a strong showing. The test employed
appears to be essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment, that
is, whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for submission to the
trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not clear that the
judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The defendant must show that she has a
meritorious defense otherwise the grant of her motion will prove to be a useless
exercise. Thus, her motion must be accompanied by a statement of the
evidence which she intends to present if the motion is granted and which is
such as to warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would
probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted.[64] (emphasis in the original)
Conjunctively, the glaring deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no
intention to delay the case and that their defenses, if any, deserve to see the light of
day in court. David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda [65] did not countenance the failure to
comply with the basic requirements of a motion to lift an order of default.
Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them in default and deny
their motion to lift the order of default.
Respecting the trial court's Decision of October 24, 2007, petitioners recapitulate
their arguments against the inhibition and default orders to conclude that the
assailed decision is "insupportable." [66] As lone ground, petitioners posit that the
special proceedings under Rule 108 do not fall under the juridical concept of
adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective adversaries since the Office of
the Civil Registrar is a formal party while the Office of the Solicitor General sided
with Ong's legal position. Petitioners admit that they, while being parties in
interest in their capacity as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial
litigants in the juridical sense. [67]
The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[68] stated that substantial

corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or "[o]ne
having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it." [69] In this case, impleaded as
defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other
person having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The
interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
while petitioners' "interest" was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file
a responsive pleading.
Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave

abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent insofar as the issuance of the
October 24, 2007 Decision is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the
Court is precluded from making a definitive pronouncement on
the substantial aspect of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De

Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
and Mendoza, JJ.
Endnotes:
[1]
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 353, 367. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against

respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an
appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have
successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct
the records of his birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 140
Charges Against Judges of First Instance
Section 1. Complaint - All Charges against judges of first instance shall be in

writing and shall set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of
as constituting the alleged serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent,
and shall be sworn to and supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged, and shall be accompanied with copies of
documents which may substantiate said facts.
Section 2. Service or dismissal. - If the charges appear to merit action, a copy

thereof shall be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer within ten
(10) days from the date service. If the charges do not merit action, or if the answer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are not meritorious, the same
shall be dismissed.
Section 3. Answer; hearing. - Upon the filing of respondents answer or upon the
expiration of the time for its filing, the court shall assign one of its members, a
Justice of the Court of Appeals or a judge of first instance to conduct the hearing of
the charges. The Justice or judge so assigned shall set a day for the hearing, and
notice thereof shall be served on both parties. At such hearing the parties may
present oral or written evidence.
Section 4. Report - After the hearing, the Justice or judge shall file with the
Supreme Court a report of his findings of fact and conclusions of law,
accompanied by the evidence presented by the parties and the other papers in he
case.
Section 5. Action - After the filing of the report, the court will take such action as
the facts and the law may warrant.
Section 6. Confidential. - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be

private and confidential.

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LEGAL

Gervin Gale Arquizal 1st year

B.M. 850. October 2, 2001

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL

FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. – Continuing legal education is

Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. – Within two (2) months from

SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. – Members of the IBP not

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. — The initial compliance period shall

(b) Compliance group 2. — Members in Luzon outside NCR are

(c) Compliance group 3. — Members in Visayas and Mindanao are

Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity

SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on

Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ LAW 1 CU PER PUBLISHED

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. — Credit units are either participatory

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars,

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. – Non-participatory credit

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. — The following members

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(l) Governors and Mayors.

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement -A

SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. – Applications for exemption from or

Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. – Subject to the implementing

SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. – All continuing legal

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning

(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate

(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and

Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. — Accreditation of providers shall

SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. – Any person or group

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;

(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. — All approved accredited

(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be

(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity