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Introduction 1
Robert Arp and Benjamin W. McCraw
Index 191
About the Contributors 197
v
Introduction
Robert Arp and Benjamin W. McCraw
Evil has been, remains, and surely will continue to be, a fruitful and
important topic for philosophical analysis and thought. This collection is
composed of new essays centering on philosophical examinations of the
existence, nature, and problem of evil. The chapters draw upon a wide
variety of philosophical methodologies and positions, offering a diverse
set of aims, views, and approaches. But what exactly is evil?
With cognates in the German übel and the Dutch evel, the English
noun evil is derived from the Old English yfele, meaning “harm,” “misfor-
tune,” “damage,” “disease,” “ill,” “malice,” “misery,” as well as that
which is “defective,” “cruel,” “wretched,” “wicked,” and “bad” (Mackay
1877, 158; Hall 1894, 366; Onions 1966, 332). The Oxford English Diction-
ary defines the noun evil as “profound immorality, wickedness, and de-
pravity” and “something that is harmful or undesirable” (http://
www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/evil), while
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as that which is “sinful,”
“wicked,” “offensive,” “undesirable,” and “pernicious” (http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/evil). English speakers will look
at these definitions and, at first blush, likely agree with them as resonat-
ing with their experience.
The term’s etymology and modern-day definition(s) notwithstanding,
evil and its opposite, good, are probably among the most vague and
ambiguous terms in the English language (van Inwagen 2006, 4). We can
distinguish evil from the mere bad, but it is far from obvious just how
much commonality we find in the term’s usage, even amongst philoso-
phers and other thinkers who have spilt much ink over it throughout
human history. There are more than 25 different senses of the term used
in the Bhagavad Gita, for example, which have been noted, discussed, and
debated by scholars (Palshikar 2014). As Aristotle famously affirms of the
notion of being in his Metaphysics, we might say that evil is “said in many
ways.” Indeed, it seems as though we can only get as clear as something
really bad as a rough and ready description of evil in general.
1
2 Introduction
Philosophers usually say more about the nature of evil than it has to
do with something really bad. Especially within the analytic tradition of
philosophical theology—specifically concerning the so-called problem of
evil, discussed below—the focus has been limited to instances of suffering
or pain, including physical, emotional, psychological, and so forth. 1
Nevertheless, this move identifying evil with pain is usually accompa-
nied by a proviso that such an identification is only made for the sake of
space, to limit the problem for discussion, or some other move clarifying
that evil is taken, strictly speaking, to extend beyond suffering or pain
alone (see van Inwagen, 2006).
In the history of Western philosophy and philosophical theology, two
broad theoretical approaches to the nature of evil have been developed,
what we will call nothing evil and something evil. Christian philosophers
such as St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas have advocat-
ed nothing evil. 2 Aquinas, for example, does not think evil is a physical
or metaphysical thing at all, but rather is “simply a privation of some-
thing which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it
ought to have . . . it is a negation in a substance. Therefore, evil is not an
essence in things” (Aquinas 1924, 3.7.2; also 2003, I.1.3; 1948, I.49.2–3). In
The City of God, Augustine tells us, “Evil has no positive nature; but the
loss of good has received the name ‘evil’” (2003, XI.9), and in his Confes-
sions: “Things that exist are good” (1961, VII.12). In the Summa Theologica
at I.14.10, Aquinas affirms what Augustine claims in his Confessions at
III.7, namely, “evil is the privation of good,” rather than a positive entity
or substance in its own right. On this approach, the nature of evil is
compared to silence or darkness; there is silence only insofar as it is a lack
of sound, and darkness exists only as a lack of light. We speak of there
being or existing darkness or silence only in a loose way since they have
no substantial existence themselves—there is no thing or entity out there
called silence or darkness. 3
Evil is like a metaphysical “nothing thing”—to paraphrase Aquinas
(1948, I.48.3)—that results when goodness or existence is removed, like a
moral or metaphysical hole; thus, our choice of the name, nothing evil. To
say that something is evil is another way of saying it either lacks good-
ness or being, or is a lower order of goodness or being than what should
have been or should be. In Davies’ (2001) words, evil “signifies any kind
of failure or shortcoming, anything we might think of as less than good”
(14; also Davies 2006). 4 So, for example, life and limb are good things that
are supposed to exist for embodied organisms; taking them (through
human action, morally) or missing them (naturally, through disease or
being born that way) is evil in that there is now a lacking and the entity is
deprived of them. Further, to reach their fullest potential as rational beings
(and not mere animals), humans are supposed to be virtuous (self-con-
trolled, just, prudent, caring, knowledgeable), so any vice (self-indul-
gence, injustice, foolishness, wickedness, ignorance) is evil because it is a
Introduction 3
Unfortunately, we can easily add to Adams’ list: the art museum or histo-
ry museum located in any major city of the world (New York, Chicago,
Los Angeles, London, Paris, Barcelona, and many others) will likely have
a collection of implements used to torture and kill some 32,000 “infidels”
during the Spanish Inquisition; countless millions of people (Jews, as well
as Poles, Romani, Africans, homosexuals, Russian POWs, the mentally
and physically handicapped, the old and infirmed) were murdered in
Nazi Germany and other places in Europe during the reign of the Third
Reich; some 78 million Chinese people were murdered during Mao Ze-
dong’s reign from 1949 to 1976 (not to mention the 100 million more who
were murdered as a result of mass genocides all throughout Chinese
history since the 2nd Century CE); more than 60 million were murdered
or unjustly killed between 1917 and 1953 in the Soviet Union; and some
40 million were murdered in their homelands during the Mongol con-
quests of the thirteenth and fourteenth Centuries (Hewitt 2004; Guiber-
son 2010). This kind of morally despicable evil is utterly unimaginable to
most people. “How could a human being do such a thing to another
human being?” we ask in disbelief. In fact, we often equate the morally
despicable evil done with the morally despicable evildoer, saying things
such as, “Hitler was evil,” “Jack the Ripper was diabolical,” “John Wayne
Gacy was a monster,” or “The Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, is an evil son
of a bitch”—as has been noted in countless Internet blogs since 1996.
When all is said and done, even if the concept of evil remains vague
and/or ambiguous, there is no shortage of analyses and discussions of its
nature in the philosophical literature. The nature of evil, as reflected in
the first part of this volume, remains a topic that encourages significant
philosophical work.
perish but have eternal life.” The Magisterium of the Catholic Church
throughout its existence has also affirmed that God is a Father who loves
and cares for His earthly children—Christians universally pray “Our
Father” in the Lord’s Prayer. In paragraphs 218–221 under the section
“God is Love” in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (Libreria Editrice
Vaticana 1994), we are told about the “sheer gratuitous love” that God
has for people which is “compared to a father’s love for his son. His love
for his people is stronger than a mother’s for her children. God loves his
people more than a bridegroom his beloved; his love will be victorious
over even the worst infidelities and will extend to his most precious gift:
‘God so loved the world that he gave his only Son.’”
Thus, at its most general level, the problem of evil in various ways
urges some kind of justification or defense of religious belief or theism (in
general). Of course, such a claim is so vague as to border on being unin-
formative and empty of any interesting philosophical content. But, given
this general framework, how evil poses a problem for theism via argument
leads to the standard way of characterizing the various instances of the
problem. That is, just how the logic of the argument from evil works in the
specific problem of evil at hand helps categorize it. Analytic philosophers
of religion almost always divide the problem into two camps: the logical
(deductive) and evidential (probabilistic, inductive) version of the prob-
lem of evil.
The logical problem of evil works deductively by trying to establish that
the existence of evil and the truth of classical Western theism generates,
in some fashion or other, a straightforward logical contradiction. 9 The
locus classicus for the logical variant of the problem of evil is J. L. Mackie’s
(1955) “Evil and Omnipotence.” There, he argues that one can show “not
that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively
irrational, that several parts of the essential theological doctrine are in-
consistent with one another” (200). In particular, he (and other propo-
nents of this version of the problem) argues that propositions asserting
that God exists and possesses the various divine attributes part and par-
cel of classical Western them (including omniscience, omnipotence, and
omnibenevolence most crucially), in conjunction with a proposition as-
serting the existence of evil, leads to a formal contradiction.
On the other hand, one might argue not that the existence of evil
forms a strict logical contradiction in conjunction with (classical Western)
theism but, instead, serves to decrease the probability or likelihood that
theism is true. 10 Call this the evidential problem of evil (since evil serves as
evidence making theism unlikely). 11 Whereas the logical problem of evil is
deductive, this argument (type) is inductive: even if the premises in any
given evidential argument are true, they only contribute to the likelihood
that theism is false. William L. Rowe (1979) provides what’s probably the
most cited and influential evidential version of the problem, arguing that
“it does seem that we have rational support for atheism, that it is reason-
Introduction 9
able for us to believe that the theistic God does not exist” (338; his empha-
sis). Note that Rowe only claims that atheism is rational/reasonable: not
that atheism is true. Accordingly, the point is not that theism is false (full
stop) but only that theism is not rational/reasonable. In short, evil provides
strong, reasonable evidence that the probability of theism is low or, at
least, lower than that of atheism.
There are two important points to note following this distinction.
First, as noted by Plantinga (1974, 27–9), whether one gives a logical or
evidential version of the problem of evil determines what kind or
strength of a response is adequate. Since the logical version attempts to
show that a formal contradiction occurs with the conjunction of proposi-
tions describing theism and the existence of evil, what’s needed is not to
show that these propositions are actually true but only that they could be
true (together). That is, one only needs to show that theism and evil are
consistent (i.e., not-inconsistent) to rebut the logical problem of evil, and
this can occur even if they are, in fact, false. In Plantinga’s language,
defeating the logical problem of evil requires only showing that there’s a
possible world where God and exist coexist (are both actualized or in-
stantiated) even if the actual world is not it. Considerations like this lead
him to distinguish a theodicy from a defense. A theodicy, on his view, is a
response to the problem of evil showing the reason why God does in fact
permit evil. That is, the theodicies gives a true proposition (or set of
propositions) showing that theism and evil are consistent. A defense,
though, is weaker: showing only that theism and evil could be true (to-
gether). Giving a defense requires only a possibly true proposition imply-
ing the consistency of theism and evil, but it’s crucial to note that this
position need not actually be true. Whether one aims to give a defense or
a theodicy alters what kind and strength of evidence one needs in making
one’s argument, and the strength of the evidence needed can often deter-
mine the adequacy of the argument given for that evidence.
The second point concerns how the argument in question uses evil to
generate the problem for theism. In particular, the question concerns
whether one appeals to abstract/general or concrete/local evil. 12 When
arguments use evil without any specification, they give an abstract for-
mulation. Abstract usages of evil tend to occur in logical arguments from
evil. Consider Mackie’s argument: his proposition leveled at theism as-
serts only that “evil exists” (200). Now, he might specify in more detail
what he means by “evil exists” but this abstract/general formulation is all
that his logical version of the argument needs. As one might expect,
concrete usages of evil focus on specific instances of evil: particular peo-
ple doing particular things or particular events happening to particular
people/groups. Concrete usages tend to fit in evidential arguments from
evil. Rowe’s (1979) article famously imagines a fawn dying a gruesome
and painful death and from that specification of evil—not just “evil ex-
ists”—goes on to generate his argument against theism.
10 Introduction
Considerations like this form the general landscape into which argu-
ments from evil and the responses to them occur. What type of argument
from evil one gives or considers can impact its adequacy as well as how
the interlocutor may respond. It is by understanding this landscape that
one can see how the problem of evil in general works in the literature and
also how the responses to this problem relate. And it is these responses to
which we turn in the next section.
So, let us suppose we have some version of the problem of evil on the
table (leaving the logical/evidential and abstract/concrete particularities
aside). What sorts of responses are available? In the previous section, we
explored the landscape of the arguments from evil and this section con-
cerns the terrain of the major responses to such arguments. As one would
expect, such a survey will be general and not exhaustive: the aim is sim-
ply to examine a few of the more frequent, influential, or persistent re-
sponses.
One can respond to the problem of evil either from within or outside
traditional Western theism. We will begin with the latter sort of response.
On this route, the problem of evil gives good reason to reject traditional
Western theism in some fashion. Two obvious candidates here might be
general religious skepticism (=agnosticism) or the rejection of all religious
traditions or belief systems (=atheism). In either case one would reject
belief in theism overall. Yet, one might reject classical or traditional Western
theism without rejecting theism simpliciter. Many options lie along this
path: we mention only a few. Certain non-Western religious traditions
would be options here. For instance, certain non-theistic strands of Bud-
dhism would resist the problem of evil as stated. If the Divine Reality is
not a person or agent, then it is hard to see how a problem involving
personal properties (such as knowledge or goodness) can get off the
ground. Another possible option would be to adopt a dualist approach:
accepting a second, potentially evil/bad, (element of) Divine Reality. 13
Also, one might keep to a Western tradition but reject classical or tradi-
tional theism. For instance, one might reject one (or more) of the divine
attributes in order to preserve the rest. John Stuart Mill, for example,
denies omnipotence in response to the problem of evil in order to main-
tain God’s goodness (see Raeder 2002, 193–8). Limiting God’s power,
then, keeps Mill in the Western religious tradition but only by rejecting
the classical version of theism. Others, instead of flatly rejecting the classi-
cal model might alter it. A neo-classical or process theology, arising out
of the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, af-
firms with the classical theist that God is perfect but differs in ways from
how God’s perfection is understood. For instance, some process philoso-
Introduction 11
phers have argued that God has as much power as possible for any being
to possess but this level falls short of the all-powerful attribute of classical
theism (where only logical contradictions limit the scope of God’s pow-
er). That is, one might accept that God has maximal power but still deny
that “God has the power to unilaterally bring about any logically possible
creaturely state of affairs” (Keller 2007, 117). David R. Griffin (1981) sug-
gests that, on the process view in question, “there has always been a
plurality of actualities having some power of their own” such that “the
power possessed by the non-divine actualities is inherent to them and
hence cannot be cancelled out or overridden by God” (105). On Griffin’s
view, then, God lacks unilateral, coercive power; instead, “divine creative
power is necessarily persuasive” (105). Process or neo-classical theists
like Keller and Griffin, therefore accept the notion of God’s having maxi-
mal power (pace Mill) but reject the classical conception of God’s power as
entirely unlimited, coercive, and unilaterally efficacious.
So, we have discussed a few of the many potential options one might
have in responding to the problem of evil from outside traditional West-
ern theism. But, of course, there is no shortage of responses from within
that tradition: views claim that one can rationally square the existence of
evil with a Perfect Being. Let us now turn to a few of them, again, making
no claims to exhaust all potential theistic replies to the argument from
evil. 14
First, consider a couple of views that get very little attention from
philosophers because they tend to strike us as tremendously counterin-
tuitive. One might, as with Spinoza, deny that there really is evil in the
world. This is not the privation account from Section 1: for them, evil is a
(quasi) real element of the world—it is just not a substantial entity in its
own right because it exists only as a parasite on some good, substantial
entity of which it is a privation, lack, or what have you. Instead, Spinoza
(and adherents to this sort of view) argue that evil really is not real at all
when viewed properly. What we think as evil really is not. Evils are only
goods that we misperceive to be bad. Call this view Spinozism. Or one
might affirm, with Leibniz, that we live in the best of all possible worlds.
There really is evil and it really is bad (to varying degrees) but there just
is not any world possible of containing less of them or evils with less
intensity. Things may be and frequently are genuinely evil/bad but every
other possible way things could have happened is worse. Call this view
Optimism. The problem most people have with Spinozism and Optimism
is the same: they both just strike resoundingly against our intuitive pic-
ture of the world. There really does seem to be real evil in the world (pace
Spinozism) and it seems that we could imagine some way things turned
out that’s better than the actual state of the world (pace Optimism). So, let
us take these intuitions for granted if only for the sake of argument.
One important response to the argument from evil from within (tradi-
tional Western) theism emphasizes our free will as a way to rebut the
12 Introduction
problem. Suppose, for instance, that we make free choices and are there-
by morally responsible for our actions. Without this freedom and respon-
sibility, we think, our actions would be far less valuable. An automatic or
robotic act of charity wouldn’t be as good as a freely chosen act for which
we can bear responsibility. Along this line of response, one can see this
value as a way to reject the argument from evil: so long as we are really
free moral agents, God cannot (on pain of contradiction) force us to do (or
refrain from doing) anything. With the possession of free will, it is sug-
gested, there is always at least the possibility of misusing it to do evil. The
free will response here can take one of two forms corresponding to a
defense or a theodicy (discussed in Section 2). A free will defense, as
typified in Plantinga (1974), uses free will to show that there is no contra-
diction arising between the existence of a Perfect Being and evil. A world
containing free moral agents that misuse their freedom to do evil is a
possibility that would make consistent God’s perfection and evil existing
(or, at least, so Plantinga and philosophers giving similar defenses
argue). However, a free will theodicy, an important example of which
being Swinburne’s (1998) Providence and the Problem of Evil, would try to
show that free will actually does provide an adequate reason why God
does permit evil. 15
But, as with any interesting philosophical position, important objec-
tions arise that we can only mention. First, a free will response might
assume that compatibilism is false—which would presuppose a signifi-
cant philosophical thesis in a live and rigorous debate. If compatibilism is
true and one can freely choose an action that is also fully determined, it
seems as though God could have created a world where every agent is
determined to act for the good and still do such actions freely. Also, one
(see Schellenberg 2004) might argue that free will is not so valuable as to
sanction God’s permission of evil. Another popular route of criticism has
to been to note that a free will maneuver seems designed to explain moral
evils but natural evils seems to be left out of the theory.
A key objection to the free will maneuver would likely focus on con-
crete formulations of evil. One might agree that in general free will might
justify the existence of evil: this is the abstract formulation. However, one
might consider an instance of what’s come to be called gratuitous evil. The
term gratuitous has been used to describe evils following Rowe’s (1979)
description: “instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omni-
scient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (336). Indeed,
Rowe’s evidential argument there focuses on a concrete/local example of
evil—a fawn’s slow, painful suffering death—to emphasize that it is gra-
tuitous (i.e., we can’t see any good to be got from the suffering of Bambi
or any worse evil that such suffering could have prevented). The shift
from the abstract good of free will to a concrete instance of gratuitous
suffering, it is suggested by these objectors, is either a lacuna (best case)
Introduction 13
or defeater (worst case) for the free will theory. But, as with the objections
to the free will maneuver, its adherents have no shortage of replies.
Another important response from the theist to the argument evil
arises, in its modern guise, from the work of John Hick (1966). His Evil
and the God of Love provides a different value than free will that, he
argues, defends God from the argument from evil. On his view, it’s the
value of soul-making or, alternatively, as character development that
drives his theodicy. God allows (much of) the evil we experience so that
we can develop our souls or character for the better. It is through suffer-
ing ourselves or our connections to the suffering of others that we can
develop virtues like kindness, courage, generosity, and so forth. Having
to develop kindness makes no sense in a world devoid of suffering and
there would be little to cause fear and, thus, the need to overcome it in
bravery without evil. Hick’s soul making theodicy doesn’t deny the real-
ity and the genuine badness of evil; it only claims that God has good
reason—via development of the soul or character—to allow suffering or
evil to occur.
As with the free will maneuver, many philosophers take issue with
the soul making response. One particularly compelling objection picks
out plausible cases where evil does not make the soul but rather breaks it.
Take, for instance, the infamous case of “Sue” so named by Alston (1991)
derived from Bruce Russell’s (1988) “The Persistent Problem of Evil.”
Russell examines the case of Sue, a five-year-old girl who was raped,
tortured, and finally murdered. It is hard to see just how Sue’s soul is
made after only five years of life, especially when ended in such a ter-
rible, atrocious fashion. Augustine (1993, Bk III) suggests that God may
permit (or perhaps even cause) the death of children to improve their
parents, friends, and family; which would fall into Hick’s general line of
thought. But, as with Spinozism and Optimism above, many will find
this inadequate, in the best case, and positively callous in the worst. At
any rate, we can easily imagine instances where someone’s life is not
made better by suffering but rather positively crushed by the experience
of evil. Recall from Section 1 that we may call instances of evil like this
“horrendous” evils following Marilyn McCord Adams. For her, horren-
dous evils are “evils the participation in which (that is, the doing or
suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the
participant’s life could… be a great good to him/her on the whole” (1999,
26). In effect, Adams’ horrendous evils are Rowe’s gratuitous evils dis-
tilled to the worst possible extent: implying one’s whole life is/was prima
facie not worth living. If there are such horrendous evils, then they seem
to cut against the soul-making theodicy for evil. 16
Another important response to the argument from evil comes from
skeptical theism. A skeptical theist affirms that God exists and evil exists
but denies that the latter counts decisively against rational belief in the
former. Why? Well, the skeptical theist rejects the problem of evil by
14 Introduction
NOTES
all, for that matter) of these theories (insofar as they can be combined without contra-
diction, of course). For a mention of such a hybrid or cumulative case against the
argument from evil see McCraw’s chapter in this work (chapter 6) or Dumsday (2014,
302).
15. A. G. Holdier’s chapter in this volume discusses Augustine’s free will theodicy
at length.
16. One important note here is that Hick anticipates this sort of objection and sug-
gests that, in response, we need to affirm some kind of postmortem existence to devel-
op one’s soul after a life containing horrendous evils. This might be reincarnation
(where one lives multiple lives to develop one’s soul) or a kind of purgatory (wherein
one goes through some process after death by which one develops the virtues one
didn’t in life). For Hick’s hypothesis of a reincarnation approach see (1994, 408) or his
views regarding a purgatorial sort of response (1978, 347–8). Importantly, though, this
response requires adding a lot of conceptual machinery to theism (by adding reincar-
nation, purgatory, etc.) and such addition will add to the burden of proof one needs to
satisfy in order to give an adequate response to the argument from evil overall.
17. For more on redemptive suffering, see Neal Judisch’s chapter in this volume.
18. Again, Gleeson’s (2012) approach making one’s form of life crucial to the argu-
ment from evil would be relevant here.
19. For a similar approach see Nathan Loewen’s chapter in the current work.
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Dougherty, Trent. 2008. “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical The-
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331–50.
Draper, Paul. 1992. “Probabilistic Arguments from Evil” Religious Studies 28(3): 303–17.
Dumsday, Travis. 2014. “Divine Hiddenness as Deserved” Faith and Philosophy 31:
286–302.
Evans, Jeremy. 2013. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs. New
York: Broadman.
Ferré, Frederick. 1986. “Theodicy and the Status of Animals” American Philosophical
Quarterly 23(1): 23–34.
Frances, Bryan. 2013. Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil. New York: Routledge.
Gale, Richard. 1996. “Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil.” In The Eviden-
tial Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 206–18. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Gleeson, Andrew. 2012. A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil. Basingstoke:
Palgrave-Macmillan.
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York: Macmillan.
Hasker, William. 1988. “Suffering, Soul-Making, and Salvation” International Philosoph-
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Hewett, William, ed. 1994. Defining the Horrific: Readings on Genocide and Holocaust in
the 20th Century. London: Pearson.
Hick, John. 1966. Evil and the God of Love. New York: Harper and Row.
Hick, John. 1994. Death and Eternal Life. Louisville: John Knox Press.
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Introduction 21
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Religion 16: 73–93.
ONE
Is Pure Evil Possible?
Hugo Strandberg
In Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Kant writes:
there is thus no comprehensible ground for us from which the moral
evil in us could first have come.—This incomprehensibility, adding a
more detailed determination of the wickedness of our species, the
Scriptures express in the historical narrative by projecting evil certainly
in the beginning of the world but not yet in man, but in a spirit of an
originally sublime destiny: thereby the first beginning of absolutely all
evil is thus presented as incomprehensible to us (for whence the evil in
that spirit?), man however as fallen into evil only through temptation,
thus not fundamentally corrupted (not even as regards the first predis-
position to the good), but as still capable of improvement, in contrast to
a tempting spirit, i.e. such a being whom the temptation of the flesh
cannot be accounted as mitigation of his guilt. (1968, 693–4; my transla-
tion)
When Kant here discusses the ground from which the moral evil in us
has come, he is discussing the origin of evil in mankind. But a similar
question can also be asked about the origin of evil in the individual,
either as a question about his or her first sin or as a question about how
each and every sin originates. An account similar to the above, but relat-
ed to the latter question, is often found in comic books, when people are
depicted with an angel over one shoulder and a devil over the other,
speaking for virtue and vice respectively. 1 Accounts of these kinds are
not only used to give temporal descriptions but also to describe the logic
of evil. Freud (1973b) writes:
About the evil demon we know that he is thought as opponent of God
and is yet very close to his nature. [ . . . ] Not much analytical acuteness
23
24 Chapter 1
is needed to guess that God and the Devil were originally identical, one
single character, which was later divided into two with opposite qual-
ities. [ . . . ] This is the process, familiar to us, in which a notion with
contradictory—ambivalent—content is divided into two sharply
contrasting opposites. The contradictions in the original nature of God
are however a reflection of the ambivalence that governs the relation of
the individual to his personal father. (300–1; my translation)
Referring to ambivalence is not to say anything about how my relation to
my father has acquired the form it has; it is to say something about the
logic of my way of relating to him, that it cannot be accounted for by
reference to one single term but should be understood in terms of a
tension between two principles (good and evil, love and hatred, “the
spirit of God” and “the spirit of the Devil”).
As we have seen, Kant points out a problem to accounts of this kind:
whence the evil in that spirit? This does not mean that Kant rejects them.
On the contrary, his own account of the origin of evil differs from the
above primarily only in his attempt to express it in what he sees as ration-
al, in contrast to mythological, terms. The incomprehensibility, and hence
the above problem but only in another form, is still there: evil as we know
it presupposes that the person who succumbs to it is susceptible to temp-
tation, but since being susceptible to temptation is already having suc-
cumbed to evil, that first fall cannot be understood in those terms but is,
Kant says, incomprehensible (1968, 667–8; 671–2; 690–7). There is much
confusion in the way Kant expresses the point, but the problem he high-
lights is there also when this confusion has been cleared up. As to the
confusion: That I succumb to a temptation does not mean that the suscep-
tibility to this temptation must already have been there. On the contrary,
I might become tempted to do something the possibility of which had
never struck me before someone pointed it out to me. If I worry over
economical problems I have, I need not have given a single thought to the
possibility of solving them by means of a swindle before an acquaintance
of mine asked me if I would like to join him in a swindle; in fact, the
economical problems would not have been as worrying and, if I am
tempted, the offer he gives me not as tempting (in contrast to just being a
great opportunity), had such a swindle been an option for me all along. Is
it not merely to insist on a philosophical a priori claim to assert that there
must still have been some susceptibility in me already before this—if not
to such a swindle, then to swindles in general, if not to swindles in gener-
al, then to being dishonest—that there must be some more general de-
scription under which what I am now tempted to do falls, designating a
susceptibility which is already there? Kant’s point should then not, I
believe, be understood in temporal terms, but in this way: someone does
not become tempted to do something just because you try to tempt him,
that is, saying that I see something as a tempting possibility just because
someone else said it is, is a very bad attempt at exculpating myself. In
Is Pure Evil Possible? 25
other words, I can feel remorse not only for what I have done, but also for
what I have seen as possible to do, and although it may sometimes be
important to be clear about who came up with the idea, the remorse I feel
need not be affected just because I know that the idea was not mine
originally. This means that all attempts to account for the origin of evil in
me by referring to someone else tempting me still leaves questions unan-
swered: he tries to tempt me, that is right, but why am I tempted by what
he says? Answering this question by saying that the possibility of being
tempted is simply given is also a very bad attempt at exculpating oneself;
in remorse, I worry about it and do consequently not see it as something
that should simply be accepted. In this sense there is something to saying
that the origin of evil is incomprehensible, even though one should be
open to the possibility that there is something wrong with the question
here said not to have an answer.
This was the incomprehensibility of evil as Kant sees it, now to the
problem he highlights. The problem is that an infinite regress arises:
whence the evil in that spirit? The same question can, in slightly different
forms, also be asked with regard to my other two examples. If the evil
things I do are the result of me yielding to temptations the devil who sits
on one of my shoulders whispers in my ear, are the evil things this devil
does—tempting me—to be described in the same terms or not? If in the
same, we get an infinite chain of creatures sitting on one of the shoulders
of the previous one; if not, we get a very different kind of evil, which then
must be described in very different terms. And if my relation to my father
is one of ambivalence, does this mean that I vacillate between two ways
of relating to him, each of which is non-ambivalent and hence must be
described in very different terms than the ambivalent relations we in fact
know of? Or goes the ambivalence all the way down, so that it is not
possible to remove the ambivalence by isolating one of its alleged sides,
hatred (evil, “the spirit of the Devil”) being essentially ambivalent?
That these questions are possible to ask does not mean that the ac-
counts they are directed to must be rejected. As long as the accounts shed
some light on what they are supposed to shed some light on they are of
significance, even if that light is dim and restricted. In answering the
questions, however, there seems to be two ways to go. Either one could
break off the regress and try to give an account of pure evil, an evil which
hence must be described in very different terms than the evil we started
out from. Or one could accept that the impurity goes all the way down,
that is, that any process of analysis will end up with elements as impure
as the ones started out from.
In this chapter I will not try to answer these questions. What I will do
is point out some problems you run into if you try to answer the ques-
tions in the first way. In other words, I will not try to show that pure evil
is impossible, only that the idea of that kind of purity is more problematic
than one might be inclined to believe. My discussion has three parts. In
26 Chapter 1
the first one, I will present some examples in which an impurity of evil
goes all the way down. In the second one, I will discuss some alleged
examples of pure evil and show that they are not as pure as they might
seem to be. In the third one, I will point out that it is possible to direct
moral criticism to the very idea of pure evil. And lastly I will give some
concluding remarks on the possibility of discussing evil philosophically.
Speaking in terms of the Devil, what I will do is investigate the
psychology of the Devil, one might say. If pure evil is possible, the Devil,
understood as a personification of evil, will be evil through and through;
if pure evil is not possible, such a personification will be as full of ten-
sions as the concept personified.
conscience is to commit all the more and all the more horrendous crimes,
in that way trying to hide each one of them amongst the rest and burn all
bridges that lead away from evil.
Additional entanglements are there when what the issue concerns are
questions of prestige and status. Retaliation is then obviously relational:
promoting myself means demoting the other and vice versa. In that sense
it is not strange that I could take something merely destructive to be a
positive thing—to the extent prestige were not a morally strange thing,
that is. This also means that the thing which has happened for which I
retaliate need not be there to be seen in any straightforward sense. The
impression that what someone does diminishes one’s prestige and that
there thus is a need for elevating oneself by humiliating her can be intan-
gible for everyone but the person having it. (It is in cases such as this that
the conflict really becomes unlimited, for to the extent what we are fight-
ing over is something neither the possession of which nor the point of
possessing it presuppose the relation between us, there will be a natural
end to the fight, namely when I have acquired that which I fought over,
but in cases such as this there is no such end.) And that promoting and
demoting can be done using moral terms makes all this even more entan-
gled: presenting oneself as a victim and throwing the blame upon the one
whose position I want to make precarious is one way of playing this
game. One form of such moralization is touched upon by Freud (1973a)
when he claims that “the Devil is certainly nothing but a personification
of the repressed, unconscious life of drives” (28–9). Mind the racist who
runs down those who live lives he secretly wants to live but for some
reason or other does not—”the wild and irresponsible Gypsies,” “the
woman-hating Muslims”—and hides his envy in contempt.
What I have said here—about evil in the form of punishment, revenge
and retaliation—has been an attempt of showing how manifold the con-
nections between evil acts and other things often are and that an under-
standing of what doing evil is here about cannot abstract from this very
complicated context. And the more complicated we realize that such situ-
ations are, the more difficult it will be for us to clearly delimit them,
which means that even though I have only given a few examples, it will
not be a straightforward task to give examples of evil which undeniably
have nothing in common with them.
That these complications are not always paid attention to is obvious in
one of those doctrines that portray the world as ruled by two principles,
strictly opposed and with equal primordiality: Manichaeism. When the
evil principle that opposes the good one is here substantiated, it is de-
scribed in terms of bitterness, envy, hate, and resentment. 2 But these are
of reactive characters, presuppose moral relations between, say, the envi-
ous one and the one she is envious of, and are not without connections to
questions of prestige. In Christian theology, on the other hand, evil is
understood as having a secondary character: “evil [ . . . ] even if this is a
Is Pure Evil Possible? 29
infects someone from without and takes control over her, and even
though there is something to such a description—one might be fright-
ened by one’s feelings of rancour towards someone who has wounded
one—its alien character may very well be illusory, for the discomfort
which is the reason for describing it as alien is also the reason why one
keeps away from those situations which may excite it. Furthermore, note
another respect in which what Montaigne describes is not as clear as it
might appear to be. On the one hand, it sounds as if the people Mon-
taigne is talking about are doing what they are doing just for the kick of
it. But if we took that suggestion literally, this would mean that what we
here have examples of is Schopenhauer’s egoism: the suffering and pain
of others would then only be an unfortunate secondary result. But on the
other hand, the suffering and pain of others are said not to be possible to
isolate from the kick which causing them brings about; they belong to its
content, as it were. But how is this internal relation between them to be
understood? If we could take recourse to the concepts we made use of in
the first section—revenge, for example—there would be a clear answer to
this question. But if we want an example of pure evil, that road cannot be
taken. This not only means that it is not yet clear what we are talking
about when we are talking about pure evil, it also means that the kind of
purity which however is not hard to imagine—a fit of mine, causing
suffering and pain to others—is pure, or rather does not necessarily pre-
suppose any moral relations between us, to the detriment of its being an
evil action on my part.
A somewhat similar point is made by Anscombe (1963) in Intention.
She writes:
“Evil be thou my good” is often thought to be senseless in some way.
Now all that concerns us here is that “What’s the point of it?” is some-
thing that can be asked until a desirability characterisation has been
reached and made intelligible. If then the answer to this question at
some stage is “The good of it is that it’s bad,” this need not be unintelli-
gible; one can go on to say “And what is the good of its being bad?” to
which the answer might be condemnation of good as impotent, slavish,
and inglorious. Then the good of making evil my good is my intact
liberty in the unsubmissiveness of my will. Bonum est multiplex: good is
multiform, and all that is required for our concept of ‘wanting’ is that a
man should see what he wants under the aspect of some good. A col-
lection of bits of bone three inches long, if it is a man’s object, is some-
thing we want to hear the praise of before we understand it as an
object; it would be affectation to say “One can want anything and I
happen to want this.” (75)
“Wanting x” is not a function that can take any argument; is “to commit
murder for the sole pleasure of it” one of them? If we, like Anscombe,
would refer to something more than this pleasure—”condemnation of
good as impotent, slavish, and inglorious […] my intact liberty in the
Is Pure Evil Possible? 31
All this brings us to the last part of our discussion, dealing with the moral
criticism it is possible to direct to the very idea of pure evil. If the idea of
pure evil has a possible application, it is applied to others or to oneself.
The last alternative is hard to get one’s head around, and I will drop it.
But what about applying it to others? Applying it is a way of relating to
the people it is applied to, and as there are moral concerns that can be
brought to bear on these relations, these moral concerns can be brought
to bear on the concepts I apply to them. Since the discussion about the
possibility of pure evil runs the risk of degenerating into psychological
speculation, this is especially important to point out.
In Enten—Eller, Kierkegaard (1962) writes: “That I point out the reality
of remorse also shows that I do not presume a radical evil; for remorse is
certainly an expression of reconciliation, but also an absolutely irreconcil-
able expression” (2:165; my translation). 5 The possibility of remorse
means that the evil someone has done does not permeate her as a whole,
in which case there would be no way from evil to goodness, in which case
goodness would only appear by leaving everything that has been behind
32 Chapter 1
and the sense in which she feels remorse for something she has done
would be obscure. Saying that someone is purely evil is to say that re-
morse is not within the horizon of her possibilities, and the problem with
saying this is not only that it is far from clear how one can claim to know
that this is so, but first and foremost that saying this is to give up hope
about her: she will never come to even an inkling of moral understanding
of what she has done. And this not only concerns my relation to her;
speculating about such a possibility risks making one’s own conscience
turbid. This would be the moral criticism it is possible to direct to the
very idea of pure evil.
This criticism could be said to be present also when it is not explicitly
stated. If my reaction to the evil I am confronted with is one of perplex-
ity—”how was it possible for him to do it, how could he do it?”– I am not
taking what he has done as a matter of course, that is, not as something
that were only to be expected (given his psychological make-up, say).
This perplexity need not be of the kind that aims at being disentangled,
and if it is not of that kind, the above criticism is implicitly present. In
that sense, the chain of devilish creatures sitting on one of the shoulders
of the previous one is really infinite, someone might say, for the question
“how could he do it?” can be asked again and again and will never be
given an answer that settles everything.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The one who claims that pure evil is possible runs into problems, as we
have seen, and the problems in the second and third sections are the most
important ones I believe: it is not possible to show that pure evil is pos-
sible by presenting an example of such purity from real life, for the ques-
tion concerns how that which is presented should be understood and
concerns how I should relate morally to those it concerns, and my way of
understanding it thus says as much about me as about those people, for a
relation has more than one term. In order for it to be possible to say that
pure evil is, or is not, possible, moral clear-sightedness is hence needed,
and that clear-sightedness is not given by the case alone.
The possibility of discussing evil philosophically is consequently beset
with difficulties, and by way of conclusion I would like to say a few
words about them. One of those situations in which it is most difficulty to
be morally clear-sighted is precisely when being confronted by real evil:
here questions about rancour, resignation, bitterness, corruption, and en-
chantment, to name but a few possibilities, become topical. Discussing
evil philosophically in the context of such real situations is, if it is at all
possible, consequently no guarantee for the lucidity of what one says, on
the contrary. Discussing evil philosophically without contact with such
real situations, on the other hand, risks trivializing it. So how is evil to be
Is Pure Evil Possible? 33
NOTES
1. The earliest instance of this picture I have run into is found in The Shepherd of
Hermas, (2007) second century CE, even though there is not much detail to it there
which means that it can be read in many ways: “there are two angels with the human
being, one of righteousness and one of wickedness” (36.1; my translation).
34 Chapter 1
2. See Jonas (2001, 210–15). One way of understanding this is that Manichaeism is
in fact not as dualistic as it is often described, also by Jonas himself.
3. Ideas in some respects similar to these are to be found in Stoicism (see Epictetus
1916, Enchiridion 27) and in Plotinus (1964–82, 1.8.3.2–7).
4. For a similar distinction, see Schopenhauer (1998, 1:433).
5. That it is Kierkegaard who writes this is only true in a sense, the publisher of
Enten—Eller being “Victor Eremita” and the author of the above quote “Judge Wil-
helm.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEING IS UNIVOCAL
One of the heretical claims in the philosophical corpus of the great Catho-
lic mystic Meister Eckhart is the proposition that “God is neither good
nor better, nor best; hence I speak as incorrectly when I call God good as
if I were to call white black” (1981b, 88). In the first section of this chapter,
I demonstrate why Eckhart must be committed to the truth of this claim
given his commitment to the thesis that Being is necessarily indivisible
and God is Being. 1 Eckhart’s insistence on the univocity of Being engen-
ders the identification of Being with Nothingness. 2 In the second section,
I reflect on how Eckhart’s identification of Being with Nothingness ap-
pears to generate a special paradox concerning the existence of evil. 3 It is
important to note that the paradoxical nature of Eckhart’s conception of
evil has been recognized since Eckhart’s own lifetime, both by his inquisi-
tors and scholars alike. 4 Nonetheless, I offer my own reading of this
paradox, and argue that the paradox concerning evil is a logical conse-
quence of Eckhart’s speculative mysticism, not an aberration or lack of
attentiveness on Eckhart’s part. 5 In the third section, I suggest that the
dialectical relationship of God to the Godhead in Eckhart’s treatment of
Being accounts for why the special paradox of evil is present in Eckhart’s
work. 6
Unlike the Aristotelians who claim that Being is said in many ways, 7
Eckhart advances the thesis that Being is univocal. Eckhart posits that God
is Being, and Being as such is undifferentiated. Since God is Being, and
35
36 Chapter 2
When we approach Being with our intellect and attempt to grasp that
which differentiates Being from nothing, we find that the difference by
which Being is differentiated from nothing cannot, in principle, be dis-
covered. The simple reason for this is that there is no difference. Or, if we
follow the common logic, we presume that no category can differentiate
itself. Accordingly, if Being behaves similarly, Being as such cannot dif-
ferentiate itself. Thus, what differentiates Being into differences must
have its origin outside of Being. Since only Nothing is outside Being, it is
only Nothing that can differentiate Being. Thus, any distinction in Being
is ultimately no distinction at all. If any distinction in Being is no distinc-
tion at all, there cannot even be a distinction between Being and Nothing-
ness. 9
Eckhart has the tendency to identify contingent beings, beings that do
not necessarily exist, but could or could not exist, as nothing “in them-
selves.” They only have being in Being itself or as Being itself. Since Being
is in itself undifferentiated, no being has any Being that is separate from
Being itself. The being of every particular being is Being itself. Insofar as
they are differentiated, they are differentiated from Being, and are noth-
ing. Eckhart is not equivocal about the radical equality of all beings: “All
things possess existence immediately and equally from God alone”
(1981c, 89–90). Having freed ourselves from an understanding of “God”
as a being differentiated from others, Eckhart implores us to pursue de-
tachment through which we may experience the radical equality of all
entities in the God: “So let us pray to God that we may be free of “God,”
and that we may apprehend and rejoice in that everlasting truth in which
the highest angel and the fly and the soul are equal . . .” (1981h, 200; my
emphasis).
Upon initially encountering Meister Eckhart, one might wonder why
the problem of evil is not one of his major preoccupations. Eckhart schol-
ars such as Elizabeth Brient have pointed out that if one has recognized
what is essential for salvation in Meister Eckhart, (namely detachment)
one should see that the problem of evil is an issue with which one ought
not be primarily concerned (Brient, pers. comm.). Since the one who is
detached is unified with the God, and in God there is no good or evil
whatever, the detached one is beyond good and evil. For this reason, the
detached one would have no concern for evil. Because tranquility and
security are the fruits of detachment, the enlightened mystic is not dis-
turbed by the problem of evil. In a discussion of willing and suffering,
Eckhart invokes Seneca, the great Stoic philosopher and endorses the
view that the best consolation for a person in a time of trouble is for one
to embrace whatever happens as if one had asked for it oneself with the
understanding that everything that happens only occurs by an act of
divine willing (1981a, 215). Through his affirmation of Seneca’s consola-
tion, it appears that it is improper to prefer some happening over another.
In other places, Eckhart is clear that the life of prayer ought to preclude
38 Chapter 2
preference when he claims that one ought not pray that one acquire some
virtue or obtain some way of living, but only to pray that God does
whatever God wills to do, without qualification regarding what that may
be (1981e, 248).
This indifference towards evil in the detachment of God may by itself
constitute a moral objection to Meister Eckhart, for one may claim with
great plausibility that it is immoral to be indifferent to evil. 10 Though this is
a serious moral objection that deserves consideration, there is also a fun-
damental ontological problem concerning the existence of evil that must
be addressed in advance of the moral consideration. 11
hold instead that evil exists. Since Eckhart holds that there is no Being
except for God, or what is the same, that all beings are equal insofar as
they have the same Being, it would follow that if evil were to possess any
Being whatever, then God would necessarily be evil. In conclusion, it
appears that Meister Eckhart’s identification of Being with nothing gener-
ates a special paradox of evil such that either it is possible for God to be
evil or God must necessarily be evil. Neither are attractive options. Given
that Eckhart appears to be committed to the necessary non-existence of
evil in God (as well as the necessary non-existence of the good), 14 it may
appear that Eckhart ought not accept either of these conclusions. None-
theless, in order to remain philosophically coherent, Eckhart’s philosoph-
ical mysticism must ultimately force Eckhart to admit that, at least in
some sense, God is evil. In what follows, I work out, in some detail, the
sense in which God is evil in Eckhart’s mysticism.
Godhead not only establishes order, and establishes himself as the princi-
ple of that order, but also undermines that order by absolutely negating
himself: there is nothing but mere multitude. Because undifferentiated
Being cannot be differentiated from differentiated beings, undifferentiat-
ed being is just another differentiated being among the multitude. Being
gives rise to the multitude of beings out of itself, and the multitude of
beings is the absence of undifferentiated Being. In the passage above, the
Good is identified with the One, and the many, insofar as they constitute
a fall from the Good, are evil. The good and perfection of the creatures is
in the Good, the One. Insofar as evil is the multitude, and the multitude is
created, evil exists and is created, as Eckhart states. Though evil exists as
the multitude, it is also the absence of Being, for insofar as it is a multitude
it is the absence of the indivisible unity, or to use the language Eckhart
invokes, it is a defect of the indivisible unity of Being. Evil is the self-
negation of God into mere multitude, the complete self-abandonment of
God. Accordingly, evil is also the defect of absolute nothingness. 20 Viewed
this way, evil is created, but only as the absence of Being.
We now have the resources to begin to unpack the meaning of the
apparently contradictory claims in Eckhart’s text, 21 namely his assertion
that evil does not exist, and his assertion that evil exists. As Eckhart
states, evil is made, since it comes to be from the creation, but it is only
made “without him” and exists “without him,” for its existence as the
self-negation of God is just that which is “without him.” In sum, it ap-
pears that it is differentiated being that is initially posited as natural evil, as
the defect of Being. For this reason, it is not mere Nothingness that is
opposed to Being but differentiated being. Indeed, it is only from this
position of multiplicity from which the journey back to God in the prac-
tice of religious mysticism may begin.
In the creation there are various kinds of beings, and not all of the
kinds of beings are capable of moral evil. Only those living, intelligent
beings capable of willing and affirming the multitude are capable of moral
evil. 22 For Eckhart, moral evil is not simply willing the multitude, but
willing the separation of the multitude from Being, or what is the same,
willing the separation of the multitude from God. One wills the separation
of the multitude from God, whenever one wills oneself to be a creature
separated from God, or intentionally attaches oneself to any characteristic
of the creature. When one wills the separation of the multitude from God,
one wills the separation of oneself from God. In contrast, he who has a
good will wills nothing but God alone and strives for detachment. In “The
Book of ‘Benedictus’: The Book of Divine Consolation” Eckhart (1981a)
claims that God possess all of the properties of Goodness in his very
essence, and that a truly good person possess all of these properties (217).
In this passage we encounter another conflict in Eckhart’s text. Here,
Eckhart claims that God has all the properties of goodness in itself, while
in other passages, Eckhart exclaims that God is not good (see 1981b, 80).
42 Chapter 2
When we contemplate Being once more, we find that all beings have
their Being in Being. Nothing escapes Being. Insofar as anything is, it is
God. When Meister Eckhart claims that contingent beings are essentially
nothing, and God as the Godhead is essentially nothing, he is simultane-
ously claiming that contingent beings are essentially divine. When the
philosopher comes to see that everything is God, he has a new sense of
his proper dwelling place. 34 Christ’s proper dwelling place is with every-
one:
Then Jesus’ mother and brothers arrived. Standing outside, they sent
someone in to call him. A crowd was sitting around him, and they told
him “your mother and brother are outside looking for you.” “Who are
my mother and my brothers” he asked? Then he looked at those seated
in a circle around him and said: “Here are my mother and my brothers!
Whoever does God’s will is my brother and sister and mother.” (Mark
3: 31–4; NIV)
The universal dwelling of God in beings is succinctly expressed in Ebe-
rhardt Arnold’s (2011) contention that Christ’s redemption is not “from
nature” but “the redemption of nature” (80). 35 Accordingly, the natural
state of the human being is that of divinity, and the goal of the religious
life is to rediscover that inner divinity out of one’s fallenness. Upon
achieving detachment, the self re-discovers its finitude as an expression
of the infinite God, as a unity of the indivisible and the differentiated, and
thereby undergoes the same process as that of God or Being. 36
In order to achieve Christhood, and to “redeem nature,” evil is neces-
sary. According to Eckhart, God permits human beings to sin in order
that they might recognize the mercy of God, and in order to incite them
to do great things (1981e, 262). Upon recognizing the necessity of evil for
the good, Eckhart claims that if one desires to achieve perfection, then it
is necessary to will sin. 37 In defense of the charge of heresy, Eckhart
insists that the perfect man wills that he has sinned: “A perfect man,
knowing that God has willed and wills him to have sinned, in loving
God’s honor wills that he had sinned, but ought not will sin for the sake
of anything that is beneath God” (quoted in McGinn 1981, 44). 38
McGinn (1981, 44) claims that this is a weak response to the charges of
heresy, though once we recognize the dialectical aspect of Eckhart’s ac-
count of Being, we are able to recognize why Eckhart thinks that sin is
necessary for the development of detachment. On the whole, evil is the
separation of the differentiated being from the whole unity of differentiated
and undifferentiated being. The separation of differentiated being from
the whole unity of differentiated and undifferentiated being may be of a
natural or moral type. Only through the fall of differentiated being from
the undifferentiated Godhead may the undifferentiated be united again
with the differentiations. Likewise, it is only through sin, through going
astray, that one recognizes one’s own desire and need for detachment. As
46 Chapter 2
Eckhart claims, one only wills sin in loving God’s honor, that is, insofar as it
has been instrumental for turning the soul back to God. Sin ought not be
willed insofar as it is for the sake of anything that is “beneath God,” for in
this case, one does not will the reconciliation of the soul with God, but
wills the separation of God from the soul and the inversion of the proper
order of the cosmos (McGinn 1981, 44).
In sum, for Meister Eckhart the indivisibility of God entails that God is
nothing. This leads to the problem that God must be conceived as evil. By
heeding the dialectical aspects of Eckhart’s account, it becomes clear how
the dialectical relationship of “God” to the Godhead reveals how Eck-
hart’s thesis on evil is endemic to his speculative mysticism. Though this
discussion certainly does not answer all our questions regarding evil in
Meister Eckhart, it may at least begin to shed some light on how the
special paradox of evil follows from the univocity of Being and why the
Meister choose to defend himself by insisting that perfection requires the
practitioner to will sin.
NOTES
1. As Bernand McGinn (1981) points out, for Eckhart unity is connected with the
concept of the “indistinct,” because everything that is indistinct is also one, while
everything that is distinct is at least two or greater (from McGinn 1981, 34). Further,
McGinn rightfully notes that for Eckhart, Being and God are identified with “one” in
this sense of “indistinct.” Being (ens) is what is held in common by beings and is
differentiated by its own lack of difference or distinction. In addition, God is differen-
tiated by his lack of difference (from McGinn 1981, 35).
2. One may rightly be skeptical that Eckhart’s heretical claims (as well as many of
the apparently contradictory claims between various texts) cannot be adequately ad-
dressed without attending to the political context of Eckhart’s writing. Though I am
sympathetic to this concern, my main concern is to inquire into whether Eckhart’s
texts maintain a conceptual coherency and plausibility on their own accord. For a
comparative analysis of mystical and non-mystical theology in providing a coherent
theodicy, see Stoeber (1992).
3. The main concern motivating my inquiry into Meister Eckhart’s ontological
account of evil is a broader concern regarding the coherency of philosophical mysti-
cism. In particular, there is a profound question about whether philosophical mysti-
cism can provide a coherent account of evil. Instead of tackling this issue all at once in a
very general fashion, this paper investigates the coherency of Meister Eckhart’s philo-
sophical mysticism in respect to the question of the ontology of evil. By thinking
through particular philosophical mystics, we avoid equivocating on various forms of
mysticism. On the whole, I offer this analysis as a case study.
4. Eckhart’s inquisitors condemned Articles Fourteen and Fifteen. Article Fourteen
claims that a good man should not will that he had not sinned, and that God wills for
him to have sinned (1981b, 79). Article Fifteen also claims that a man ought not will
that he had not committed sins (1981b, 79).
5. Some scholars have indicated that Eckhart’s defense of his view of evil is weak,
and fails to properly address the heretical nature of his claims. I suggest that his
dialectical treatment of Being motivates the way Eckhart’s response to the charge of
heresy, and thereby brings us into closer proximity to the spirit of Eckhart’s work.
6. A concept is “dialectical” if it is unified with its opposite in virtue of what it is.
Though Eckhart advances the thesis that Being is meant univocally, it is in virtue of the
The Problem of Evil in the Speculative Mysticism of Meister Eckhart 47
univocity of Being that different senses of Being arise, namely Being as God and God-
head. Because different senses of Being develop out of the univocity of Being, the
meaning of Being in Eckhart is “dialectical.”
7. See Aristotle (1979, 54).
8. See 1981f, 288.
9. Of course, the claim that “Being is Nothingness” is a contradiction. Eckhart
claims that “reason” is a lower faculty, and it is with “intellectual” understanding that
such truths may be grasped. With intellectual understanding, one perceives Christ
“without images” and “without a medium,” that is, one perceives Christ directly. As a
mystic, Eckhart argues that God cannot be grasped in a mediated way via concepts,
but directly. Likewise, as philosophers we fail to grasp the meaning of such sentences
as long as we are beholden to reason and have not yet understood “intellectually.”
Naturally, this appears to require that Eckhart must reject his own claims if he is going
to accept them. But this is not a surprising feature of Eckhart’s account or unique to his
philosophy, since it is a basic feature of much philosophical mysticism from Nagarju-
na to Wittgenstein. See (1981i, 207–8).
10. Though this problem deserves more attention that I can afford to give it here, I
think that Eckhart provides us the resources to answer the objection. Given the inte-
gration of differentiated beings into the indivisible unity of God, self-love cannot be
contrasted with the love of others. Because the mystic seeker begins by loving herself
enough to seek God through detachment, and in detachment she recognizes that all
beings have the same Being in the Godhead, she comes to see that her self-love cannot
be distinguished from the love of others. As Bernard McGinn (1981) points out, when
one loves God over everything else only then does one come to love oneself and all
other things in an egalitarian fashion. By becoming indistinct in God, one’s love ceases
to differentiate among entities (58). So naturally, one practiced in the mystic life comes
to obey Christ’s commands quite naturally as a result of the practice: to “love others as
oneself” and “to love God.” As it turns out, the love of others is also the love of God,
and the love of God nothing other than the love of others. Since God is love, one
becomes the vehicle of God’s self-love in which all otherness is included. For this
reason, in detachment the mystic is not at all indifferent to beings or to evil. Quite to
the contrary, the mystic resists evil through unconditional love.
11. For more on the question concerning the moral consequences of mysticism, see
Jones (1984).
12. Bernard McGinn (1981) notes that Eckhart’s Neo-platonic optimism led him to a
paradoxical position on evil (44). I am not sure that the optimism is exactly what is
relevant here. More exactly, it is Eckhart’s Neo-Platonic mysticism that is of greatest
relevance. Once we think through the consequences of Eckhart’s assumption concern-
ing the oneness of Being, we see that it is the dialectical nature of his reasoning that not
only (1) leads to the paradox in the first place, but also (2) provides a way to overcome
the problem.
13. Though this passage appears consistent with a Thomistic perspective on evil, it
appears quite problematic when placed in conjunction with his other claims.
14. As will become evident, this claim must be qualified. In particular, God under-
stood as the Godhead could neither be good nor evil.
15. Eckhart draws the distinction in many places. In (1981h, 200) Eckhart distin-
guishes between the Godhead as an absolute emptiness from “God” who is a being
distinguished from creatures.
16. Much of the third section of this chapter is reproduced from my discussion of
Eckhart and Heidegger (see 2014; chapter 5).
17. Bernand McGinn is spot on when he notes that “since indistinction is the distin-
guishing mark of unum, what sets it off from everything else, to conceive of God as
unum, or Absolute Unity, is to conceive of him as simultaneously distinct and indis-
tinct, indeed, the more distinct insofar as he is indistinct” (1981, 34; my emphasis).
18. For more on the dialectic of Being and one in Eckhart see Kertz (1959, 342n53
and 351–3).
48 Chapter 2
19. I want to thank Elizabeth Brient for referring me to the Commentary on John as a
source for Eckhart’s perspective on evil.
20. Often it is supposed that “something” is merely opposed to “nothing.” But for
Eckhart “something” is defect of absolute nothingness, which is indistinguishable
from absolute Being. Accordingly, “something” is opposed not only to “nothing” but
also to “Being.”
21. The apparently contradictory texts are “Commentary on John” (1981d) and
“Commentary on Genesis” (1981c). Although to say of God that he is “goodness” is
not the same to say that he is “good,” if nothing can be said of God, then it cannot be
said of God that he is “goodness.” Naturally, this raises questions concerning the
relation of the universal to the particular. Is “goodness” itself “good”? On the one
hand, if it were a good, then it would be a particular good, and would assume “good-
ness” itself as its antecedent, which would be problematic, since God is goodness,
according to the passage. Yet, it seems that “goodness” is good—for it is the good
integral to goodness in virtue of which anything is good.
22. As Eckhart points out, it is not the inherent disposition to sin that is sin, but it is
wanting to sin that is sin (1981e, 256).
23. See 1981c, 109.
24. God is the One and the Good, the principle of order from which the many fall
(1981d, 166–7).
25. I by no means pretend to have justified attributing “good” to God here, only
that upon removing the lack of differentiation, a necessary condition for attributing the
usual theological predicates to “God” (such as “goodness”) is fulfilled. Again, see
(1981d, 166–7).
26. As Bernand McGinn points out, if we correlate indistinction with immanence
and distinction with transcendence, one is in possession of a way of talking about God
as transcendent just insofar as he is immanent in creatures (1981, 34).
27. In the formulation of God as the unity of undifferentiated and differentiated
being lies Eckhart’s formulation of the Trinity. God as the merely undifferentiated
Being is the Father. The Son is God the father, undifferentiated Being, in his differen-
tiated Form, or the word become flesh. The Holy Spirit is the return of God to himself
through the Father and the Son. Or what is the same: the Undifferentiated Being
returns to itself out of differentiation through the integration of differentiation into his
own undifferentiated Being. Each of these persons of the trinity are inseparable from
the others. As is evident, Meister Eckhart appears to clothe his Neo-Platonic theology
in Trinitarian terminology. One of the concerns that arises when the Neo-Platonic
theology is clothed in Trinitarian terminology is whether Eckhart has equivocated on
the acts of creating and begetting. According to the Nicene Creed Jesus is begotten not
created, yet here it is unclear whether a clear distinction between these two can be
properly maintained. This is a problem endemic to Neo-Platonist theologies and is not
specific to Eckhart.
28. Three senses of infinity correspond to the three moments of undifferentiated
Being: (1) The undifferentiated Being is indeterminate, insofar as there is no differen-
tiated being with which it stands in contrast. (2) Undifferentiated Being falls into
contrast with differentiated being, and an infinite regress of differentiated beings en-
sues. The infinite multitude of differentiated beings constitutes the second sense of the
infinite as a quantitative series, in which there is an infinite multiplicity of beings. This
is the sense of “the bad infinite” in Hegel’s terms. It is also the infinite as the fall from
the One, and thus as evil. (3) Undifferentiated Being is infinite as perfection. It is
perfect because it lacks nothing. This sense of the infinite contains the previous two.
29. As is evident, this reading of Eckhart makes his theology plainly heretical. I
think any attempt to render his theology consistent with Catholic teaching on this
point will fail to appreciate why Eckhart falls into this paradox concerning evil.
30. As Eckhart states, one must desire to be “free of God” (1981h, 200).
The Problem of Evil in the Speculative Mysticism of Meister Eckhart 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arendt tells us that a new phenomenon of evil can be found in the ex-
traordinary shallowness of thoughtless individuals like Adolf Eichmann.
Eichmann sincerely believed that he was innocent because he had never
killed anyone or given an order to kill anyone. And because his actions
did not arise from base motives but from his determination to perform
his utmost in carrying out the orders and law of the Third Reich, he did
not want to deny or regret his actions. He believed he was not a moral
monster but a victim of history.
Eichmann’s case clearly shows us that not all evildoers are monstrous
or have evil propensities. Psychologically, Eichmann was tested normal;
he did not have any malevolent tendencies, did not take pleasure in the
suffering of others, and had no intention to make others suffer. In fact, he
found the Final Solution to be “one of the greatest crimes in the history of
Humanity” (Arendt 2006, 22). How then do sound ordinary people be-
come evildoers? Some psychological tests seem to suggest that when or-
dinary and normally decent people are put into dichotomized groups,
they can descend mindlessly into brutality. For instance, well-adjusted
individuals willingly followed instructions to deliver electric shocks to
strangers in Stanley Milgram’s obedience test and student participants
actively performed their roles and even creatively adopted their tasks as
prison wardens in Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment. Like
Eichmann, Milgram’s obedient test subjects followed the instructions
from someone in authority, and like Eichmann, student participants in
Zimbardo’s basement prison carried out what was expected of them sim-
ply by belonging to a group.
But this “blindless obedience” theory has its limits in explaining the
actions of all ordinary people in a group. The experimenters were not
exactly regarded an authority figure in Milgram’s tests, and the partici-
pants were clearly struggling to follow orders, appearing distraught and
visibly upset. And in Zimbardo’s experiments, not all guards embraced
the oppressive role even when they were encouraged. In other words, not
all ordinary people mindlessly succumb to acts of brutality because of
authority or social pressure. Instead, what these experiments reveal is
that some ordinary people choose to identify themselves with a perspec-
tive or ideology that considered brutal means to be necessary for bring-
Evil by Nobodies 53
ing about what they considered a right order or consequence. They are
thus a self-selected lot rather than mere ordinary people.
In fact, social psychologists such as Alexander Haslam and Stephen
Reicher (2007) have questioned the idea that ordinary people can commit
atrocities without awareness, care, or choice, and had instead shown in
recent studies that these participants in violence have acted thoughtfully,
creatively, and with conviction. 1 They have also shown that individuals
will only move towards tyranny when they identified with their roles,
developed and shared their identification with others in the in-group,
and when the interests associated with this identity is being advanced by
leaders of the group. Indeed, from Arendt’s documentation of Eichmann,
we also observed the conviction and pride he had when he performed his
role in the SS machinery, and carried out his duties creatively and zeal-
ously to achieve the vision of the Reich.
Eichmann’s motivations in joining the SS were also clear. As a failure
in his family and in his social class, Eichmann was eager to be part of an
organization where he could draw an identity from, achieve recognition,
and advance his ambitions. He made efforts to creatively adapt to his
situation, overcame challenges and took initiatives, and even went
against the changing tide of the moderate wing by sabotaging Himmler’s
orders as much as he could. His choices were made freely and not
coerced, and his actions were deliberate, not accidental. In short, he was
not an automaton who happened to be at the wrong place and at the
wrong time, but an opportunistic individual who purposefully made the
best of his situation. His evildoing was not the result of malice, coercion,
or circumstances, but the absoluteness of his motive to promote his per-
sonal ambitions at the cost of causing excessive harm to others; exactly
the same reason why Franz Stangl accepted the top post at Treblinka. As
Wolfgang Bialas (2014) puts it, when we examine their motivations, it
was as if “below the surface of cultural domestication and moral safe-
guards, man had been lying in wait for opportunities to become once
more that beast he had always been despite his guise as a civilised being”
(15).
Eichmann was also in a position which gave him visibility over the
consequences of his actions and not someone who was removed from
reality, shielded by “self-deception, lies and stupidity” as Arendt (2005)
suggests in Responsibility and Judgement (54). Initially in charge of Evacua-
tion and Emigration, Eichmann was put in charge of Jewish Affairs
(Evacuation) by March 1941 where he had learnt about the killings car-
ried out by the Einsatzgruppen and also made several trips to the different
types of camps and saw enough to be fully informed of the atrocities. Yet,
the only times he suffered a crisis of conscience was when he realized
German Jews were also murdered and when his job to make the Reich
judenrien was compromised. According to Arendt (2006), because Eich-
mann had wrongly believed that he was no longer able to change any-
54 Chapter 3
thing and no longer the “master of his own deeds,” he thought he needed
to blindly follow the Führer’s order like “obedient corpses” (135). He
believed that his duty to the Führer was so absolute that when he could
choose between profiteering from Jews who could pay to save their own
lives and carrying out Hitler’s orders, he would choose to follow orders
than take part in the corruption.
Thus to Arendt, his inability to tell right from wrong by hiding behind
Nazi clichés and not taking a larger perspective of the implication of his
actions was indicative of his thoughtlessness. Her solution for his banal
evil is found in Responsibility and Judgement. “Thinking,” which involves
the shattering of idols, opens our learned or innate rules to examination
and questioning, and in this way, unfreezes what we thought we know
so that we can judge anew (2005, 103). It is when we shield people from
thinking that they get used to “never making up their minds” and contin-
ue to “hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of conduct” are at a
given time, in a given society (2005, 178). Hence, she praised the doubters
and the skeptics, and found them more reliable because they examine
things and make up their own minds. Those who did not participate in
the crimes, she argues, “were the only ones who dared judge by them-
selves” and did not allow their conscience to function in an “automatic
way” by applying fixed learned or innate rules to situations (2005, 44). In
other words, it is better to find a monster than a machine like Eichmann
on Arendt’s terms, as Terry Eagleton (2010) suggests.
But Eichmann was not a machine lacking in judgement, according to
Barry Clarke (1980). Eichmann was heteronomously evil because he “sur-
rendered only his autonomy and not his spontaneity and at each moment
[in] time he could presumably have resumed exercising his judgement
and reason and used his freedom of will to recommence choosing for
himself” (Clarke 1980, 438). Therefore, having freely chosen to defer to
some external judgment rather than autonomously initiate significant ac-
tion, Clarke argues that the rightness or wrongness of Eichmann’s action
depended on the rightness or wrongness of the Nazi laws to which he
deferred. Furthermore, Eichmann’s evildoing was not as banal as Arendt
made it to be, that is, ordinary individuals thoughtlessly applying fixed
moral categories simply because their normal moral standards have col-
lapsed into a mere set of mores to be changed at will (Arendt 2006, 54).
What Arendt failed to realize, as Clarke points out, was that Eichmann
could not judge because he lacked an independent moral standard to
judge from.
Thus, if we have to identify a feature of Eichmann that can explain his
deliberate choices and failed judgement, it would be that he did not have
a conscience—an independent standard of right and wrong—to begin
with. Being a morally vacuous individual also explains why he was not
in a moral struggle when he took on the role of a “desk murderer” and
why he can be easily seduced by the opportunity to be part of what he
Evil by Nobodies 55
In Roots of Evil, John Kekes (2007) explains that the Enlightenment ap-
proach to evil is to see that reason helps us realize our propensity for
good (6). Thus, the more reasonable we are, the better human life is
supposed to become. In the Platonic sense, with reason, we will not carry
out evil out of ignorance or out of false beliefs concerning what is good.
But when we turn to Nazi ideology, the system of false beliefs has a
certain reasoning of its own. Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of anti-
Semitism, for example, gives us an idea of the false beliefs about the Jews
and demonstrates how their bad faith is perpetuated through the Nazi
ideology.
In Anti-Semite and the Jew, Sartre (1995) discusses how the idea of “the
Jew” does not rest on a set of biological, physiological, geographical,
religious, historical or political characteristics, nor did it arise from the
actual encounters with the Jewish people. The “Jew” is an idea invented
by the anti-Semite to explain their socio-economic experiences based on
their irrational passion of fear and hate. Passion, Sartre explains, is irra-
tional because it precedes the fact, seeks to nourish itself upon these facts,
and interprets facts in a way that is offensive (1995, 17). In other words, it
is unprovoked unlike how ordinary hate and anger work. And as a meta-
physical concept, “the Jew” arose from a Manichean world-view which
understood History as a struggle between the irreconcilable “principle of
Good with the principle of Evil” in which Evil is the Being of the Jew and
in them is a metaphysical principle that drove them to do evil such that
they are only free to do evil (40–1). In this way, anti-Semitism attributed
all Evil in the world to “the Jew,” and used this metaphysical principle to
56 Chapter 3
David Livingston Smith (2011) argues in Less than Human that through
methods of dehumanization, one group of human beings treats another
group as though they were sub-human creatures by seeing not just what
they lack but also seeing them as creatures that are less than human (26).
In so doing, they convince themselves that they have no moral rights and
obligations towards this group of sub-human creatures. In fact, the dehu-
manization of the enemy is necessary for soldiers in combat precisely
because they tend to still see their enemies as human beings like them-
selves. And for this reason, each group uses an us-versus-them paradigm
to describe their enemies in animalistic terms. But we must first distin-
guish Smith’s idea of “dehumanization” from the other uses of dehuman-
ization such as dehumanization to mean the taking away of individuality
(for example, an administrator seeing himself as a cog in a bureaucracy)
and dehumanization as a process of objectification where one is treated
as mere means.
For Arendt, the lack of individuality characterizes the mass of ato-
mized individuals in our modern era, and the Nazi movement filled their
need for a sense of identity. The identity for atomized individuals like
Eichmann is built on his race, and with that, the moral duty to maintain
the purity of the Volk by exterminating sub-human creatures. In her judg-
ment of Eichmann’s crimes, she described crimes against humanity as the
extermination of whole groups of people and endangerment of mankind
in its entirety by seeing them as sub-humans:
And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to
share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of
other nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to
determine who should and who should not inhabit the world—we find
that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to
want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only
reason, you must hang. (2006, 279)
While Arendt pointed out that what formed this new crime was the pro-
cess of reducing humans into sub-humans, Sartre’s “look phenomenon”
in Being and Nothingness was able to explain the element of racism in anti-
Semitism further, that is, how the anti-Semite came to objectify the Jew as
the Other through Manichean lenses. Sartre tells us that in our encounters
with others, we reveal the object-ness of our being as being-for-other as
we encounter their subjectivity. We experience a loss of control over how
the Other comprehends our being that we are nonetheless responsible
for, and this causes us to desire the recovery of our being and we achieve
this by reducing the Other’s freedom. The Other is thus experienced as a
subject that needs to be reduced to its object-ness. But we will realize that
this is a futile attempt because in trying to absorb the subjectivity of the
60 Chapter 3
Other, we need to ensure that the Other is intact since “the Other is the
foundation of [our] being” (Sartre 1956, 475–6). The bad faith of the anti-
Semites therefore resides in this very fact: they require the construct of
“the Jew” for them to destroy, and yet have a vital need for this enemy
because the anti-Semite can only exist through the construct of “the Jew,”
with rights to recover and a “good” to reinstate (Sartre 1995, 28).
We must also understand that for Sartre (1965), it is not always the
case that “our relations with others are always rotten or illicit” because
Hell is the Other only when “our relations with others are twisted or
corrupted” (98). Our concrete relations with others depend on the atti-
tude we assume towards our “being-for-other”—whether we envisaged
it within the perspective of conflict by fleeing from our object-ness and
reducing the Other as object, or whether we identify with our freedom
and recognize the Other as freedom that is fundamental to our being-for-
other and seek to integrate with the Other’s freedom by sharing their
projects. And even when we find that our attempts at unifying with the
Other unrealizable, we can still choose to continue in our attempts to
unify with them by not acting on their freedom. Clearly then, the anti-
Semite is morally at fault for choosing an attitude of hostility towards the
Jew instead of authenticity, and this also puts him in bad faith as he
reduces the Jews’ freedom to their mere object-ness and sees them as sub-
humans under Manichean lenses.
Bad faith explains why soldiers after the war often report that they
would not have been able to commit these acts if they had not seen their
enemies as sub-humans. They admit responsibility for their actions, and
continue to carry with them feelings of guilt towards their victims. Dur-
ing the war, these soldiers had lifted themselves into pure freedom and
reduced their victims to their pure object-ness, and for some of them who
chose to see themselves as objects-for-the-leaders, they have chosen to
deny their freedom to disobey orders and hence devolved themselves
from any personal responsibility for their actions. But after the war, those
who experienced guilt towards their victims are those who acknowl-
edged their bad faith, and thus, expressed regret at not having assumed
their freedom to resist superior orders.
It is however unclear if the tension described between subjects-and-
subjects in a typical us-versus-them structure fully explains the case of
Eichmann. This is because Eichmann did not need to find anything objec-
tionable about the Jews to be able to carry out these crimes. In us-versus-
them paradigms, the perpetrator first sees the Other as consciousness
that needs to be subdued and invents an ideology that justifies structural
and procedural oppression. But Eichmann encounters the Jews as non-
humans. And because of this difference, he did not need to be a racist to
believe that their annihilation must be made an objective fact in order for
the Aryans to negate the present-world and usher in the new Nazi future.
Furthermore, because Eichmann did not see them as humans, he did not
Evil by Nobodies 61
feel any remorse for having done what he did since he did not act against
sub-humans who share some characteristics of human-ness. 3 Unlike the
racist in bad faith who deceived himself about the subjectivity of the
other by encountering the other through irrational fear and hate, Eich-
mann did not experience his encounters through these emotions and car-
ried out his duties in “cold rationality” for which he claimed to be his
Kantian duty.
Hence, it may be the case that those in an us-versus-them paradigm
employed dehumanization and humiliation tactics for the purpose of
making their victims sub-humans but this is because they see their vic-
tims as humans in the first place. But for those like Eichmann who sees
others as non-humans, they do not see the need to dehumanize them, but
instead, adopted tactics that they think were simply treatment befitting
for non-humans. Eichmann was therefore not in bad faith and did not
feel guilty, and this is also the reason why to him and others like him on
trial think that no crimes were committed against the Jews because
crimes can only be committed against humans. And what this means is
that both a racist and Eichmann-like perpetrator could commit the same
act and be held culpable for the same crime, but their perception and
attitude they adopt were fundamentally different.
What can we therefore deduce about the structure of consciousness of
one who grasps other human subjects as non-humans and conceives of
their complete annihilation? Sartre’s phenomenological account of con-
sciousness may offer us some explanation and we start with Sartre’s ap-
plication of Husserl’s basic theory of consciousness: that consciousness is
always consciousness of something because the being of consciousness is
itself empty. “Nothing” on the other hand, is a revelation of an absence in
the world and is also introduced as negation into the world by conscious-
ness. In the first instance, “no-thingness” is revealed as an absent fact in
the world by an “expectation” of a presence in the world. In Sartre’s
(1956) example, it is with an expectation of seeing Pierre in the café that I
experience his absence. His absence is thus understood in relation to the
café that served as the condition or the ground in which Pierre’s absence
is experienced as “nothingness” (42). 4 Put in another way, absence or
“no-thingness” is not “something” residing in the world or a thought, but
a disclosure of an objective fact situated in the world based on a judg-
ment made in light of some human expectation. For the Nazi new man,
the absence that is revealed in the present world is the necessary condi-
tion of a unified Aryan race to bring forth the future Nazi Germany they
desire.
In the second instance, “no-thingness” is introduced into the world as
negation. As beings-in-itself-for-itself, we are free to negate the given and
posit an alternative state of affairs, and we can also create and destroy
our own possibilities at will, even though in the same moment, we appre-
hend that these motives for negating the given are not sufficiently effec-
62 Chapter 3
tive (Sartre 1956, 67–8). 5 We can thus transcend our current condition
through negation and create the possibility of it being-what-it-is-not. In
the same way, we can also introduce the possibility of negating our past
and our future. What therefore seemed to be positive freedom and liber-
ating in Sartre’s account also explains how the Nazi “new man” liberates
himself by exterminating the present conditions that were seen as obsta-
cles to the future that Nazi Germany wants to create.
In addition, Eichmann negated himself. Arendt observed this “nega-
tion of self” in her idea of banal evil when she described Eichmann as
“nobody.” Accordingly, nobodies are people who had no higher mean-
ing in their lives but instead found purpose in a movement they thought
was historical, grandiose, and unique. And because they were neither
monsters nor bureaucrats, they refused to be somebody in the machinery,
unable to grasp the meaning of their acts to the community and deny
their responsibility towards them. Hence, in responding to the judgement
of Eichmann, she returns the responsibility to the individual—the perpe-
trator of crimes against humanity:
We heard the protestations of the defense that Eichmann was after all
only a “tiny cog” in the machinery of the Final Solution . . . in its
judgement the court naturally conceded that such a crime could be
committed only by a giant bureaucracy using the resources of the
government. But insofar as it remains a crime—and that, of course, is
the premise for a trial—all the cogs in the machinery, no matter how
insignificant, are in court forthwith transformed back into perpetrators,
that is to say, into human beings. (2006, 289)
Hence, to Arendt, Eichmann was a textbook case of an unrepentant crimi-
nal, deceiving himself by using self-fabricated stock phrases even after
these cliché lines were no longer issued from above. It is also clear for
Sartre that this question of whether anyone can claim to be nobody and
deny individual responsibility was never an issue. In fact, he discussed
the bad faith of the anti-Semites at length.
First, Sartre described anguish as our experience of our ontological
freedom where we become conscious that we are not free to choose not to
be free. We experience freedom through anguish because it is a realiza-
tion that we alone are responsible for all our choices and actions with a
separation between our present ontological for-itself and our past and
future in-itself. Flight emerges as a reaction against anguish before the
dreadful freedom we have. In a project of flight, we attempt to flee from
our transcendence as for-itself by pursuing being in-itself. But flight is a
futile attempt to escape from anguish because we are attempting to flee in
order not to know but we cannot avoid knowing that we are fleeing. This
is what Sartre described as bad faith—a project of flight of self-deceit
aimed at reducing being-for-itself-in-itself to pure facticity (in-itself) or
absolute freedom (for-itself). And it is a state of faith because it is a belief
Evil by Nobodies 63
that is not true of human reality, and requires one who is in possession of
the truth to alter the truth and persuade themselves of it (1956, 89). In
other words, there is only a single consciousness at work because the
deceived and the deceiver are one and the same person, not infected by
an external situation or a situation that one encounters, but what reflec-
tive consciousness creates.
Deception works by choosing to turn oneself into a mere thing that is
compelled to act in a certain manner determined by external forces. The
“I” which emerges upon reflection is a free being, and it is this very “I”
that one in bad faith wishes to deny. Another way to live a life of bad
faith is to assume complete freedom by disengaging oneself from the
surrounding and one’s present, and even one’s past and future. In short,
the “I” which emerges is one that is situated in facticity that one in bad
faith wishes to disregard. Living a life of bad faith thus means that one
puts into place a set of mental and behavioral mechanisms to escape from
anguish.
Eichmann, however, is not always in bad faith because he as the de-
ceiver in him does not exist. Eichmann negates his “I” by being unreflec-
tive so that his “I” does not even emerge. Sartre explains that conscious-
ness is consciousness of something, but in this same moment where it
intends a transcendental object, it is also aware of itself. This is what
Sartre referred to as first-degree consciousness. The “I,” however,
emerges only through a second-degree consciousness, that is, a reflection
on the first-degree consciousness. Here, “the Self itself apprehends itself”
where the “I” emerges as a state of self-consciousness (Sartre 1956, 319). 6
But what we can observe from the example of Eichmann is that the nega-
tion of self can occur from a failure to reflect. Eichmann’s first-degree
consciousness is intended towards the world—his negation of Jewish
subjectivity based on the Nazi ideology and conscience he differed to, his
annihilation of the present world, and annihilation of “non-humans” for
a future only for Aryans. He is fully immersed in the experience of his
transcendental first-degree consciousness, and in failing to reflect on his
first-degree consciousness, the “I” that needs to emerge for judgment to
take place does not appear. 7 As a consequence, Eichmann will not realize
that he is morally vacuous, nor see that he needed to overcome the Nazi
lies he adopted as truth, or be able to grasp himself as being-in-the-world
with other beings like himself. 8 And because he is unreflective, he failed
to constitute his own object-ness in a world with others, ascribe values
and meanings to his choices and actions, and be a judge of himself. In
order to do so, reflection is necessary, and hence, also more fundamental
than the thinking and judging that Arendt argued for. 9
What Eichmann is therefore morally blameworthy for is his failure to
reflect in order for him to be able to assume his being as a moral agent.
And what we can conclude is that for Eichmann and those along with
him who argued that their actions were not criminal but “acts of states,”
64 Chapter 3
they need to not only see others as “somebody” and not non-humans, but
also for them to see themselves as somebody and not nobody. Only when
“I” emerges upon reflection would the notion of moral responsibility
make sense—for one to judge oneself for one’s choice of beliefs and ac-
tions, and for feelings of shame and guilt to surface, and for one to as-
sume personal responsibility. And only then can we return ethics to the
individual; individuals as members of the human race. For Sartre and
Arendt, this is both a collective and personal moral responsibility we
have in forming moral judgements about our responses and our conduct.
The revision made in military law immediately before the Nuremberg
trial also appears to be the right step in this direction by reinstating the
responsibility to the individual (regardless of whether one is combatant
or non-combatant) where crimes against humanity are concerned. The
United Nations War Crimes Commission revised the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal before the trial in order to prevent the Ger-
mans and Japanese standing for trial on crimes against humanity to ap-
peal to the plea of superior orders by restating Article 8 as follows:
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government
or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility but may be con-
sidered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that
justice so requires. (quoted in Lewy 1970, 118) 10
In addition, the court of Nuremberg removed the plea of head of state
immunity as a defense or mitigation of punishment by ruling that
a person in a position of superior authority should be held individually
responsible for giving the unlawful order to commit a crime, and he
should also be held responsible for failure to deter the unlawful behavi-
our of subordinates if he knew they had committed or were about to
commit crime yet failed to take the necessary and reasonable steps to
prevent their commissions or to punish those who had committed
them. (Robertson 2002, 222)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The new crime I have presented in this chapter is the act of annihilating
groups of people that were considered to be evil non-humans. The new
criminal I have described is one who is ordinary, psychologically sound,
and bears no malice to specific groups of people, but because he is moral-
ly bankrupt and unreflective, he chose to adopt an ideology that justifies
annihilation as his response to the world. Unreflective individuals like
Eichmann negated the emergence of an “I” for which they can judge
themselves as moral agents situated in a world with responsibilities to
others like themselves, and because they are morally bankrupt, they
failed in their judgment in distinguishing what is morally reprehensible,
and what is morally good. It is these nobodies—individuals who do not
Evil by Nobodies 65
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ang, Jennifer Mei Sze. 2009. “Thinking and Ignoring Conscience” Philosophy Today 53:
203–11.
Arendt, Hannah. 2005. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books.
Arendt, Hannah. 2006. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New
York: Penguin Books.
Augustine. 1953. Augustine: Earlier Writings. Edited and translated by J. H. S. Bur-
leigh. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
Bialas, Wolfgang. 2014. “Nazi Ethics and Morality: Ideas, Problems and Unanswered
Questions.” In Nazi Ideology and Ethics, edited by Wolfgang Bialas and Lothar Fritze,
15–56. New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Clarke, Barry. 1980. “The Banality of Evil” British Journal of Political Science 10: 417–39.
Eagleton, Terry. 2010. On Evil. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Haslam, Alexander S., and Stephen Reicher. 2007. “Beyond the Banality of Evil: Three
Dynamics of an Interactionist Social Psychology of Tyranny” Personality and Social
Psychology 33: 615–22, accessed 3 March 2015, doi: 10.1177/0146467206298570.
Haslam, Alexander S., and Stephen Reicher. 2012. “When Prisoners Take Over the
Prison: A Social Psychology of Resistance” Personality and Social Psychology Review
16: 154–79, accessed 3 March 2015, doi: 10.1177/1088868311419864.
Heinsohn, Gunnar. 2000. “What Makes the Holocaust a Uniquely Unique Genocide?”
Journal of Genocide Research 2: 411–30.
Kekes, John. 2007. Roots of Evil. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
King, Peter. 2010. Introduction to On the Free Choice of the Will, by Augustine, ix–xxxii.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewy, Guenter. 1970. “Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of Con-
science.” In War and Morality, edited by Richard A. Wasserstrom. Belmont: Wads-
worth.
Margalit, Avishai, and Gabriel Motzkin. 1996. “The Uniqueness of the Holocaust”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 65–83
Mineau, Andre. 2014. SS Thinking and the Holocaust. Leiden: Editions Rodopi B.V.
Robertson, Geoffrey QC. 2002. Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice
2nd ed. London: Penguin Books.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel Barnes. New York:
Washington Square Press.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1957. The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Con-
sciousness. Translated by Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York: The
Noonday Press.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1965. “Sartre gives the keys to Hell is Other People” Le Figaro litté-
raire, Jan 7–13. Cited in Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, eds. and Richard C.
McCleary, trans. The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre Vol.1 (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1974).
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1992. Notebooks for an Ethics. Translated by David Pallauer. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Evil by Nobodies 67
A.G. Holdier
In a field filled with out of control trolley cars, brains-in-vats, and at least
one color-blind neuroscientist, philosophers often find ourselves return-
ing to the same illustrations to express our ideas; in the library of such
thought experiments, somewhere between one of Theseus’ ships and a
room holding a Chinese writer, lies a dog-eared copy of Dostoevsky’s The
Brothers Karamazov with a long line of theodicists waiting for their turn to
read it. Amidst the classic story of a struggling Russian family, one con-
versation between Alyosha and his brother Ivan has stood out as a fa-
mous study of what academics have dubbed “The Problem of Evil.”
If God truly exists, Alyosha’s brother demands, then why does He not
prevent the tragedies that fill our world? After cataloging a series of such
profane abuses, primarily of children, Ivan laughs at the suggestion that
such evils could all be ultimately used for some “greater good,” some-
how woven together into an ultimately beautiful tapestry, and proclaims
that even if some Deity exists, that method of operation should disqualify
such a god from being worthy of any worship. “I don’t want harmony,”
Ivan cries, “From love for humanity I don’t want it. . . . Besides, too high a
price is asked for harmony; it’s beyond our means to pay so much to
enter on it” (Dostoyevsky 1966, 222). Instead, Ivan tells a story of a bitter
humanist who has secretly rejected God for the sake of caring for God’s
people; by painting himself the color of his own Grand Inquisitor, Ivan
seeks to embody his commitment to holding God accountable for the
many who are damned.
69
70 Chapter 4
the same terms, “Philip played God” and “Philip worshipped tennis,”
indicate a state of affairs that, because they are disordered, are evil and
therefore degrade the subject, verb, and object through their disjunc-
ture. (104)
Again, even without intrinsic change, Philip’s shift in relational proper-
ties is equally dubbed “evil.”
By way of example, consider a compassionless brute attacking a help-
less victim: because the attacker exists, he must lie somewhere on the
Great Chain of Being, but his lack of compassion (a property that, as a
human being, he should possess) means that he is lacking an intrinsic
property that would make him more good or more God-like—this lack of
goodness is evil. However, this brute is also choosing to attack an inno-
cent person, an event that should not take place, so he is also disrupting
the proper ordering of the universe; this lack of order is also evil. 6
Yet, because some level of variation in goodness is necessary for the
variety in Creation to exist and because God is “the best Maker of all
natures, the One Who oversees them with the greatest justice” (2010a, 98)
then Augustine is confident that a good God will successfully weave both
intrinsic and relational evils together into something ultimately worth-
while. This shall be addressed further in the third section of this chapter.
In the meantime, Augustine’s definition of evil as the privatio boni
effectively eliminates much of the apparent evil in the world under the
guise of a preeminent God’s just and loving care of the Creation He
fashions as good, the inner workings of which are not always clear to its
inhabitants:
Divine providence thus warns us not to indulge in silly complaints
about the state of affairs, but to take pains to inquire what useful pur-
poses are served by things. And when we fail to find the answer . . . we
should believe that the purpose is hidden from us. . . . There is a useful
purpose in the obscurity of the purpose; it may serve to exercise our
humility or to undermine our pride. (2003, 453–4)
For those examples of evil that are identifiable as such, however, Augus-
tine is still loathe to attribute them to a perfect God—it is to finite crea-
tures that the blame for evil must fall.
In what has been called “the most famous and central aspect” of his
theodicy (Tallon 2012, 114), Augustine deploys legal language of guilt
and blame to recognize the depravity of evil while attempting to absolve
the Creator God of responsibility for the chosen evil actions of free
agents. Although Augustine’s overall conception of freedom takes some
unpacking, it never completely diverges, not even in his developed
Pursuing Pankalia 73
thoughts later in life, from the sentiment expressed early on in his Chris-
tian writings that “evils have their being by the voluntary sin of the soul,
to which God gave free will” (1890, 131).
To equate evil with sin, a chosen action contrary to the perfect will of
God, allows Augustine to shift much of the problem of evil squarely onto
the backs of free moral agents and away from the shoulders of the perfect
Divine. Following from the understanding of evil as the privatio boni, evil
as sin is any chosen action that fails to meet God’s expected standards of
behavior and therefore lacks the goodness that it should possess. If
agents truly are free to choose either right or wrong actions (in the way
that we naturally assume them to be blameworthy), then it is not only the
case that evil becomes a logically necessary possibility under genuine free
will, but it is also true that God is not to blame when a genuinely free
agent abuses their free will and sinfully actualizes something evil. By this
definition, a free evil act becomes a sin, an act that God would not will
and does not, Himself, choose—to blame God for an action He neither
wills nor controls is hardly appropriate.
This libertarian understanding of free will does assume that an action
must be voluntary and intentional in order to be blameworthy: a woman
who sneezes and drops a kitchen knife out her window might be faulted
for carelessness, but even if that knife happens to fall on and kill a passer-
by on the street below, the woman could not be properly blamed as a
murderer—she neither chose to kill nor intended it to happen. 7 But if
blameworthiness for moral evil is based in intention, so too is praisewor-
thiness for moral goodness, therefore the necessity of a genuine choice
between right and wrong—what Plantinga (1998) has come to call a mo-
rally significant choice—becomes central to a free-will theodicy. As Plan-
tinga, a foremost contemporary free will defender, puts it:
God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine them to do
only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t significantly free
after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable
of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral
evil. . . .The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however,
counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness;
for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by
removing the possibility of moral good. (1998, 27)
Much like how if God desires to create a two-dimensional, three-sided
geometric figure, then He is bound by logic to make a triangle, God is in a
similar bind if He desires to create potentially good free agents: to get the
possibility of good, He must simultaneously create the possibility of evil.
This is precisely Augustine’s position. He begins On the Free Choice of
the Will III by having Evodius agree that “no blame can be attached
where nature and necessity predominate” (2010a, 72) before contrasting
human actions with a falling stone to point out that “the movement of the
74 Chapter 4
stone is natural, but the movement of the mind is voluntary” and while
we would not charge the stone with a sin, “we charge the mind with sin
when we find it guilty of abandoning higher goods to put lower goods
first for its enjoyment” (2010a, 74). To put this description of evil into
terms already used in this chapter: we charge the mind with sin when it
willfully tries to replace God at the pinnacle of the Great Chain of Being
and pursues something of lesser importance. This reordering of one’s
desires is a disruption of one’s intrinsic properties (and is therefore evil);
by acting on those corrupted desires, the agent chooses a course of action
that differs from God’s perfect will, thereby disrupting the relational
properties of the agent (which is also evil), as well as damaging both
intrinsic and relational properties of other objects in the universe. As
Augustine reiterates elsewhere, because evil is only the privatio boni,
“There is no evil in the universe, but in individuals there is evil due to
their own fault” (1953, 246).
One might fairly ask, though, why God would care to create free
agents at all, if freedom truly is such a dangerous tool to be wielded—
would it not be better for God to create morally neutral automata if it
meant that no evil would result? To this, Augustine replies that freedom
allows for greater goods to exist than if freedom were absent. However,
he firstly chastises anyone who would imagine their own creative ability
to surpass God’s perfect skill and argues that it is petulant to complain
that lesser things exist (sinful agents) when greater things can be ima-
gined (non-sinful agents) (2010a, 82). 8 Simply because greater things can
exist on the Chain of Being does not mean that God is to be blamed for
allowing gradation along that chain; as Augustine says, “it is like some-
one who, grasping perfect roundness in his mind, become upset that he
does not find it in a nut, never having seen any round object except fruits
of this sort” (2010a, 83). God allows freedom because a being who freely
displays love and devotion to God is greater than one who does so mind-
lessly or un-freely; 9 criticizing freedom itself on the basis of its abuse at
the hands of free agents is, again, quite missing Augustine’s point.
To be fair, not all philosophers affirm libertarian free well and com-
patibilists would have no problem with a free agent being unable to act
otherwise than she does in a given scenario. Particularly in the case of
Augustine, it would be a significant oversight to ignore compatibilist
notions of freedom for the sake of focusing entirely on the above libertar-
ian presentation. Later in life, Augustine’s apologetics for the doctrine of
original sin colored his definition of freedom sufficiently such that many
readers now identify a shift in his thinking from his earlier writings to his
later ones. 10 If Augustine did come to embrace a different definition of
freedom that would allow for God to fully determine an agent’s free
choices, then everything in his theodicy as it has been presented thus far
would crumble—a consequence that Augustine himself never seemed to
admit. Although space does not permit a full response to the charge of
Pursuing Pankalia 75
opportunity to be great by loving God, even though they have the ability
to sin. This serves Augustine’s model primarily by underlining the penal
character of evil, whether or not moral blameworthiness is compatible
with determinism. This is simply to say that although both the libertarian
and the compatibilist will understand the metaphysical situation differ-
ently, their moral assessment of a sinful agent’s depraved condition will
ultimately agree, meaning that one more facet of evil on Augustine’s
view should be recognized: its function as a tool for righteous punish-
ment of sin.
The possible retributive function of evil follows a line of thinking
exemplified well by Augustine’s recognition of a certain element of beau-
ty in death; in The City of God XIII, Augustine explains why sin leads to
death for all people, even those who are forgiven of their sins and jus-
tified in God’s sight: in light of Christ’s victory over death, “it is not that
death has turned into a good thing . . . [but] . . . that God has granted to
faith so great a gift of grace that death, which all agree to be the contrary
to life, has become the means by which men pass into life” (2003, 514).
This is why examples of so-called “natural” evils are nothing of the sort
to Augustine; actions or events such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and dis-
ease are not attributable to the sinful choice of a human agent, but stem
directly from the perfect God who may use their evilness for a variety of
good reasons, including as a means to administer the “just deserts” for
freely chosen sins. This means that either, as mentioned in the previous
section, we may not know the reasons why God would allow such devas-
tation (but must rest in the comfort of His perfect love and goodness), or
we can recognize God’s victory over even life’s greatest enemy to bring
the beauty of justice to His Creation—that second option, to Augustine at
least, “precisely because it follows from and gives expression to the di-
vine justice, needs no theodicy” (Babcock 1988, 31).
Without question, a free will approach to theodicy, grounded in the
definition of evil as a privation, has been one of the most historically
influential elements of Augustine’s model. 14 It is a powerful one: many of
Ivan Karamazov’s complaints can find a response in blaming the free
human agents who chose to create such evils. Consequently, many read-
ers of Augustine discover his privation + free-will theodicy to be suffi-
cient enough for their apologetic purposes and simply stop reading,
thereby failing to discover the final, and most important, piece of Augus-
tine’s theodicy—the element that allows Augustine to consistently main-
tain that “God, who is supremely good in his creation of natures that are
good, is also completely just in his employment of evil choices in his
design, so that whereas such evil choices make a wrong use of good
natures, God turns evil choices to good use” (2003, 448–9).
Pursuing Pankalia 77
places; in the same way the whole universe is beautiful, if one could see it
as a whole, even with its sinners, though their ugliness is disgusting
when they are viewed in themselves” (2003, 455–6). To myopically view a
chiaroscuro painting from mere inches away would trivialize a given
brushstroke’s contribution to the overall aesthetic effect of the interplay
between light and dark; in much the same way, to focus on the experi-
ence of a given fraction of the universe—however bad it may appear—
limits one from appreciating the derivative beauty that suffuses all of the
Beatific God’s Creation. 16
Finite creatures such as ourselves, however, often cannot help but
focus on the given fraction of Creation that appears most readily to us—
particularly when the visceral pain of ourselves or others demands our
attention. This is certainly Ivan Karamazov’s complaint: his inability to
rationalize the immense suffering of an apparently innocent child leaves
him hamstrung to approach any God who could allow such a thing. At
this point, Augustine can be fairly criticized for failing to meet such exis-
tential questions; as Tallon (2012) points out, Augustine’s hope of “per-
fect harmony evades our vision and fails to connect with much of how
we experience the world” (131–2). However, Augustine would likely
point out not only that logically consistent answers are not always per-
sonally satisfying, but that a single actor in Creation should not selfishly
expect to understand all of the Grand Design. 17
However, Augustine’s aesthetic theodicy does grant him more ex-
planatory power than some contemporary theodicists who wish to stark-
ly divide a “logical” sphere of explanation for evil from an “emotional”
one. 18 Not only does Augustine’s answer simultaneously touch, however
briefly, on both spheres, but it does so in a manner that allows him to
easily fold in one final concern: the moment-by-moment aesthetic tri-
umph of righteous judgment for sin. Given that sin is not merely an
offense against God’s law, but is a degrading perversion of one’s self
further down the Great Chain of Being, 19 Augustine’s understanding of
justice becomes something more than a mere penal debt and instead
offers an opportunity for Creation to poetically display a darker brush-
stroke, automatically redeeming, at least in part, even the worst life has to
offer. With a definition of beauty as the harmony of opposites, Augus-
tine’s theodicy allows God to easily “send rain on the just and the un-
just,” condemning sinners to floods, famines, and plagues, and to still
genuinely work all things for good; His ultimate, transcendental purpose
is always meant to be something harmonious. Whether free creatures
provide depraved elements of Creation for the Grand Artist at the top of
the Chain to paint with (thereby absolving the Artist for the blame of
those evil acts) or whether the Artist himself is structuring painful experi-
ences as moment-by-moment “just deserts” for those free choices, the
ultimate product is something beautiful.
Pursuing Pankalia 79
SOMETHING PROBLEMATIC
true awfulness, of their state” (257; see also Blocher 1993, 310). Although
it does not quite reach the level of individual balance that either Sohn or
Adams is seeking, Augustine would likely gravitate towards this latter
view, perhaps allowing us to once again blunt the force of Sohn’s criti-
cism while still recognizing the point being made. 22
ALYOSHA’S RESPONSE
For better and for worse, St. Augustine’s theodicy has been firmly ce-
mented for centuries as a wellspring for Christian theodicy. His defini-
tion of evil as the privatio boni is often assumed in scholarly conversations
about the topic and his free-will defense of sinful evil (as well as God’s
justified punishment of said sins) has become standard fare both inside
and outside of the academy. Notably, his aesthetic themes, though not
given the same level of consideration, are equally important to a consis-
tent reading of his project: God’s pursuit of pankalia is the only thing that
rationally undergirds his allowance of freely chosen evil actions.
Ultimately, this means that Augustine’s final answer to Ivan Karama-
zov looks remarkably similar to the response actually given by Ivan’s
brother Alyosha in the pages of The Brothers Karamazov: after a heated
conversation with his brother culminates in a powerfully poetic meta-
phor (Dostoevsky’s famous parable of the “Grand Inquisitor”), Alyosha’s
final argument is not a sentence, but an action: he kisses his brother in a
tender display of love and affection. Whatever criticisms may be brought
fairly against Augustine’s system, his goal is undoubtedly to devotedly
proclaim and intellectually defend the God to whom he prayed “Belated-
ly I loved thee, O Beauty so ancient and so new, belatedly I loved thee”
(1955, 224).
So, although Ivan’s rebellion sparked a famous debate, one need not
assume the role of his Grand Inquisitor in the face of the world’s evil.
Instead, we might paint ourselves into the position of Dostoevsky’s
Prince Myshkin, whose childlike faith mirrors the young Augustine’s
own journey into Christianity. And when The Idiot’s prince is said to have
proclaimed that “Beauty would save the world” (Dostoyevsky 2003, 382)
the bishop of Hippo would simply smile and nod.
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1999. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press.
Pursuing Pankalia 83
Edward N. Martin
85
86 Chapter 5
ASSUMPTIONS
tinga surely does. This property is that God enjoys necessary existence, that
is, that God exists at all possible worlds. In other words, God is not
contingent, but God is a necessary being: this means that God is not just a
being who happens to exist in a few worlds, and we happen to be at a
world in which God also exists. Rather, it’s the notion that God couldn’t
so much as not exist; His non-existence is impossible. But if God exists
necessarily, this will likely have a vast affect on the way in which we
view probabilities since the logical probability that God exists would either
be Pr=1 or Pr=0. As we will see in Tooley’s new evidential argument from
evil, God’s being necessarily existent would throw a wrinkle into things,
because if God were necessarily existent, then God would be necessarily
existent and necessarily good, since if God had essential properties in all
worlds, then it seems to follow that to be God (the same referent in all
worlds), God would have to have all those properties in each world. I
rather gather from Tooley’s examples that he conceives of the concept
and being of God in some fundamentally different ways from the Theist.
For example, when Tooley treats the so-called Paradox of Omnipotence,
he describes why he thinks ultimately the paradox dissolves (2008, 87).
He envisages the omnipotent being, O, as acting at some moment of time
(call it time-1) to create a stone that no one will be able to lift it once it’s
created (say, at time-2), not even O. Employing the widely accepted Hu-
mean principle that a cause and its effect cannot happen simultaneously,
Tooley says that O, who can perform the action of making a very heavy
stone that no one can lift, must be said either to commit deicide, or to
continue to exist but cease to be (presumably at about time-2 or so) om-
nipotent. Tooley quickly notes that an omnigood being is likely not to act
in such a way so as to destroy himself or cause his own non-existence, but
nonetheless Tooley sees no contradiction in this possible act description.
Thus, he thinks, the Paradox of Omnipotence disappears. But surely this
line of reasoning, this method of saving the phenomena regarding this
famous paradox of all-potency, would constitute a Pyrrhic victory that
the theist would avoid like the plague. The theist may of course accept
the Humean causal principle that Tooley keenly utilizes; however, there
is an easier way here for the theist viz., just argue that the act description
of the omnipotent being bringing about a stone that no one can in turn lift
is in fact a contradictory state of affairs, and since we don’t hold it against
an omnipotent being for not being able to perform the logically impos-
sible, there again (but for better reasons, I think) there is no Paradox of
Omnipotence. At any rate, the point to see is that the Theist isn’t going to
buy Tooley’s line of reasoning; the Theist will prefer to bank on the idea
that it is logically impossible for an essentially necessarily existent, om-
nipotent person to commit deicide. Let us merely bear some of these
points in mind as we proceed, for they will help us understand some of
our criticisms of Tooley’s objective probability later on.
88 Chapter 5
priety, and extreme laziness. Rather, he has something like a Lex Luthor
type of person in mind, but with the qualities infinitized as it were in
excelsis: The perfectly evil person is one who is perfectly malevolent. And
concerning this concept, Tooley reports that it seems to him that the
concept of a perfectly malevolent person is neither more nor less proble-
matic than its counterpart here, viz., the concept of a morally perfect
being endowed with all goodness (2008, 90).
But I disagree with Tooley here. I do believe that the concept of a
perfectly evil being, interpreted as a perfectly malevolent person, is logi-
cally incoherent, because it appears to my lights that if being B were per-
fectly evil, He would be bent on destroying all things, including himself.
If he had all-power, he would in fact, when measured from any particular
time, t1, in the space of time surrounding this being’s life history, have
already destroyed himself. If he were perfectly evil and had all knowl-
edge and all power, then He would have destroyed himself as close to his
beginning as one wishes: in fact, it appears that such a being would have
destroyed himself from eternity past (if he is eternal), or in the first mo-
ment at his existence (if he is everlasting or comes into being). For if the
being destroyed himself only after x number of years, then I can imagine
an even more evil being, who destroys himself even more quickly than
that. And, importantly, given Tooley’s argument for the coherence of the
notion of ‘omnipotence,’ cited above, he seems to think it is coherent that
a perfectly evil person could in fact bring about his own destruction
(even though, as omnipotent, one might pause to affirm that this is really
a live possibility). Thus, the concept seems to fall in upon itself, so that it
becomes impossible for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly evil being to
exist at all, or, at least, for anything but one insignificant, temporal mo-
ment. We should keep in mind here—and this is a not insignificant point
against Tooley’s prior probability argument we are now criticizing—that
if a being is to be truly “omnipotent,” it means that that being must have
direct access to the things or events or persons that exist at all times. If to
be omnipotent, in other words, is (in Aquinas’s terminology, with slight-
ly implicit things made explicit) for a being to be able to do all things that
are logically possibly able to be done, and that are not inconsistent with
other essential attributes, then one could not be omnipotent without hav-
ing access to such metaphysical states, substances, persons, or events at
all times unless one exists either at all times, or, in an eternal now that had
access to all times from one’s atemporal standpoint. So, if this line of reasoning
is right, then for any being to be omnipotent, it follows that being must be
omnitemporal, or everlasting, or atemporally eternal (or some best con-
ceivable mixture of these temporal/eternal options).
Thus, if the old saying that “Power corrupts, and absolutely power
corrupts absolutely” is correct and applies to omnipotent, omniscient,
non-morally perfect beings—covering Tooley’s omnipotent perfectly evil
being as well as his omnipotent morally neutral being—, it seems to follow
90 Chapter 5
that in any state in which one did not have a steady, morally perfect
reason for not ending one’s own existence, sooner or later there would be
a sufficient reason for ending one’s existence. In the case of a morally
perfectly evil being, this being would be bent on destruction, including of
one’s own being, and thus would use one’s omnipotent power to destroy
oneself (and would do so immediately—in at most a split second after
one’s existence). In the case of a morally neutral being one wonders if a
non-morally perfect being wouldn’t again enter into a path of moral re-
gression that would inevitably lead one into the moral and in turn the
ontological destruction of oneself. For a morally neutral being, this might
result from not having an omnipotent, morally perfect means and will to
remain morally steadfast and non-destructive, or, it could simply mean
that such a being would not see the intrinsic good of surviving, the worth
of surviving—which could lead to the destruction of that being, since the
being would not have a sufficient reason to exist, but would have suffi-
cient power to bring about its own non-existence. Here a modal distinc-
tion may be enough to prove the point, since (supposing such a concept
to be logically coherent for the moment) a morally neutral omnipotent
being would at least have the possibility of bringing about its non-exis-
tence. But it seems that we can strengthen our reasoning above. For an
omnipotent being would not only have to exist at all times to be omnipo-
tent, but it would, arguably, also have necessarily to exist at all times (or
over all times in an eternal now). For, if it did not have this modally
necessary qualitatively rich property of necessary omnipotence, then it
would lack some power, and thus not be omnipotent, viz., it would lack
the power of having power over (which minimally is being translated as
having metaphysical “reach” to, or access to) all actual and possible per-
sons, states of affairs, events, and times, and thus would fall short, in
essence, in omnipotent power.
This means that we now have a reductio argument against Tooley’s a
priori argument which tries to show that atheism is the default position.
For on the assumption that any omnipotent being would in fact necessar-
ily exist at all times (or over all times), it follows that no necessarily
omnipotent being can be less than morally perfect. What follows from all
of this?
The point to see is that Tooley’s reasoning that God’s existence has an
overall logical probability of no more than 1/3 seems questionable at least
and downright logically incoherent at worst. Tooley himself is bent on
trying to establish that atheism is therefore the default position as a result
of his a priori logical probability argument. But we must ask: where is the
rule that says that one’s default position is not to be based on one’s total
background knowledge, and is only to consult one’s use of a priori logical
possibilities, rather than one’s propositional evidence, as well as non-
propositional cognitively-related evidence (such as the productions of the
sensus divinitatis) for belief in one’s starting point? No reasons are given
On the Impossibility of Omnimalevolence 91
for this, and I don’t think Tooley can provide any reasons, besides what
are imposed by the rules he derives from his particular version of Carna-
pian logical probability. But why should we think that that version of
logical probability should be the dominant one we accept? I see no reason
why—and no compelling reason given by Tooley at all why—this should
be the version of probability that we use. But suppose we play along with
Tooley, and allow him his view of Carnap’s logical probability and then
wonder about the a priori probability of the existence of an omnipotent,
omniscient, morally perfect being. I would be warranted to say, in light of
my objections so far, that God’s prior probability is 1, since it seems (as
I’ve just argued above) that (a) the logical probability of a hypothesis that
is logically incoherent and thus logically impossible is 0, and (b) the prior
probability of an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly malevolent being must
therefore be 0, since the concept is incoherent and it is impossible for such
a being to exist (or to exist for more than a certain very brief moment of
time). Since any omnipotent being O must exist at all times, and the only
way for this to occur is for O to possess moral perfection at all times of its
existence, it therefore follows that Tooley’s claim that atheism is the de-
fault position is wrong. Actually, it appears that theism, in contrast to
Tooley’s bold claim, is the default position, and that it is in fact incoher-
ent to think that it is even logically possible for any omnipotent being to
be less than morally perfect, and to be so at all times (or through all
times) of its existence.
This means that there are already significant trouble brewing for Too-
ley’s treatment of theism and atheism and the attempt Tooley makes to
establish a pivotal step in his propaedeutic for his evidential argument
from evil. Already the timbers are threatened; the lineaments of the struc-
ture seem already in danger of collapse. At any rate, Tooley’s initial argu-
ment that atheism is the default position is way off base, relying on two
incoherent hypotheses, and thus is faulty.
the evil at hand that God would have been justified in allowing that evil
to transpire.
In the past, many proponents of the evidential argument from evil,
including Rowe, each of which gave what he calls an “axiological” for-
mulation of the argument, failed because such an argument is lacking in
some central tenet, according to Tooley. He claims that these axiological
formulations usually fail in making explicit the manner in which not bring-
ing about an intrinsically good state of affairs or eliminating an intrinsi-
cally evil state of affairs implies that one has fallen short in one’s moral
action, thus placing one in a morally reprehensible state (2008, 105). Then,
Tooley declares, the issue becomes that one such as Rowe must at that
point refer to questionable moral principles or claims, and the Theist can
simply beg off at that point and claim that the principle is false, or ma-
neuver around the principle.
So, Tooley’s insight is to build right into the relevant act descriptions
of God’s allowing a certain evil act (without intervening to stop it from
occurring) that since the action itself has known wrongmaking qualities,
then this sets the action already on a trajectory against the moral perfec-
tion of God. Now Rowe and others have all acknowledged that God’s
allowance of any particular evil act, if the Theist believes, for example, in
a traditional “greater-good” approach to God’s allowance of evils, will
always be matched up with some God-justifying reason—perhaps un-
known to us—as to why God allowed that evil to occur.
Tooley sees that if he builds in the wrongmaking quality of an action,
then he can avoid getting waylaid by the theist who might stop to talk
about abstract notions of ethical goodness or conceptions of intrinsic evil
and intrinsic goodness and never get back onto the main particular evils
again. The argument might get derailed in this fashion, Tooley thinks. He
intends to impose the wrongmaking quality of the action, deontological-
ly, from the get-go, so that no matter what moral theory the Theist holds,
Tooley will be saying that God ought to prevent any action with known
wrongmaking properties, unless there are outweighing unknown right-
making properties that might justify God in permitting the evil in ques-
tion. Tooley also holds that the occurrence of an earthquake, presumably
one that takes innocent human lives, is one that has a wrongmaking
property attached to it, which means that God would be (Tooley seems to
be contending) prima facie morally wrong to allow such an event to occur
(2008, 116).
But is this approach much of an advance over what he claims is
William Rowe’s formulation(s) of the evidential argument from evil?
Tooley claims it is; I think there is merely a repackaging of the moral
elements of the background and foreground elements in presentations of
the evidential argument, such as we see in Rowe’s classic version. I fear
that in both Rowe and Tooley, there is an attempt to ignore or sidestep
the important properties of what G. E. Moore calls “organic unities,” or
94 Chapter 5
organic wholes, which bear on how the intrinsic value of wholes are made
up of parts of the whole, a complete value of which is known only by a
mind sensitive and intelligent enough to comprehend all of the physical,
psychological, social, relational, inter-personal, historical, spiritual, and
moral dimensions of the states of affairs involved in the organic whole,
which is a set of states of affairs taken together, and whose value, Moore
states, is not necessarily equal to the (mere) summing up of the value of
the parts of the whole (Moore 1971, 26). And which wholes are the ones
that God would aim at? Where do these wholes stop, that is, what are the
outer boundaries of the part-to-whole properties of wholes, such that the
summing up of values of parts to whole stops there? Are there evils so
bad that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being cannot permit them
simpliciter, evils which cannot be combined with any other possible ar-
rangement of states of affairs such that the value of the whole defeats, to
use Chisholm’s (1990) word, presumably at least for the person or the
animal who suffers, the badness of the bad they endure? Are there goods
which can remedy any allowed evil, in all of its multi-dimensional intrin-
sic, extrinsic and relational properties? Quite apropos to the case Tooley
presents—as well as Rowe and most other arguments from evil—Moore
comments lucidly:
Whenever, therefore, we ask “What ought we [or insert: God] to do?” or
“What ought we [or insert: God] to try to get?” we are asking questions
which involve a correct answer to two others, completely different in
kind from one another. We must know both what degree of intrinsic
value different things have, and how these different things may be
obtained. But the vast majority of questions which have actually been
discussed in Ethics—all practical questions, indeed—involve this dou-
ble knowledge; and they have been discussed without any clear separa-
tion of the two distinct questions involved. (26)
Moore goes on to state the principle of organic wholes or unities, that the
value of a whole is not necessarily equal to the sum of the values of the
parts of that whole. The portion of this discussion that seems to be miss-
ing in Tooley’s framework and analysis of his evidential argument from
evil, an exposition and evaluation of which follows, is in his distinction
between ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ wrongmaking and rightmaking proper-
ties. Tooley seems to treat such properties as essential, intrinsic proper-
ties of states of affairs. Again, perhaps this is right; however, the relation-
al, overall value of those parts within a larger whole of which the part is a
subset, is not necessarily equal to a mere summing up of, a counterbal-
ancing of, goodmaking and wrongmaking properties, if Moore is right.
So, while Tooley claims that his formulation of the evidential argument is
“concrete,” “inductive,” and “deontological,” I think each of these claims
needs to be assessed in view of the wider ethical framework of defeat
(which the theist is more readily to adopt, it seems to me) versus the
On the Impossibility of Omnimalevolence 95
In his concrete formula of the EAE, then, Tooley chooses to dwell on the
Lisbon earthquake of 1755 in which some 60,000 people—men, women,
and children—died. I will attempt to summarize elements of Tooley’s
long argument (consisting of 20 premises and a conclusion), lay out an
important principle of the symmetry of unknown values Tooley employs,
and examine some of the justification that is offered for these moves.
Tooley gives his evidential argument in two stages—not unlike
William Rowe’s famous article—one having a deductive part, and an-
other an inductive, probabilistic part. The first deductive stage is set up as
a conditional proof, pivoting on some 3–4 putative necessary truths about
God and God’s interventions in the world. The first general principle
Tooley states, like Rowe’s second premise in his famous EAE, says that if
98 Chapter 5
Tooley says we can say this premise more succinctly (preserving Too-
ley’s own numbering in what follows):
(15) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a
known wrongmaking property such that there are no rightmaking
properties that are known to be counterbalancing. (2008, 120)
One begins to sense that the end of the argument is drawing near, and at
this point Tooley introduces a very bold claim, that ultimately will re-
quire him to introduce his “symmetry” principle, introduced still later.
(16) For any action whatever, the logical probability that the total
wrongmaking properties of the action outweigh the total rightmaking
properties—including ones of which we have no knowledge—given
that the action has a wrongmaking property that we know of, and that
there are no rightmaking properties that are known to be counterbal-
ancing, is greater than one half. (120)
Next, Tooley says that it is a necessary truth that if the complete package
of wrongmaking properties of an action are stacked up against the com-
plete package of rightmaking properties—and the balance falls to the
wrongmaking side—then permitting or undertaking that action is ultima
facie morally repugnant, sub-par, base and not fitting certainly for a mo-
rally perfect being. Let me simply insert here that given what I said in the
last section, the idea of merely checking the balance of right and wrong in
this sort of case seems to approach the values of individual, episodic,
synchronic elements of one’s life experiences in a way that does not catch
the depth of what it might mean to judge and assess the value of a human
life diachronically, during which one makes sense of what one knows,
and also comes to later stages of one’s life during which what one knows
and remembers is different from earlier stages, and the organic value of
this life that emerges for the person can be vastly different from what one
would ever imagine given the synchronic evaluation of (say) a specific
tragedy in history—much too abstract still to be of ultimate value-intro-
spection and value-veridicality to the person who actually suffers.
Tooley then concludes that, given the machinery of Carnapian objec-
tive probability he adopts, which fuels his introduction of the idea of the
value of some likelihood being larger than 1/2 (see his premise 16, above),
that for any action, the likelihood that the action would objectively be
morally repugnant, ultima facie, given that there is some known bad-
making property so attached, and no known good-making properties
that would balance out the bad-making ones, has a probability figure of
greater than 1/2.
Finally, plugging in the specific action of God’s allowing the Lisbon
earthquake, the objective probability of such, given that there are known
bad-making characteristics of the earthquake, and no known good-mak-
100 Chapter 5
ing qualities for is that balance out the bad-making ones, has a probabil-
ity figure of greater than 1/2.
Tooley then concludes that it then follows from
(11) Its being the case that the Lisbon earthquake exists, and that any
action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake is morally
wrong, all things considered, logically entails that God did not exist at
the very start of the Lisbon earthquake (119)
—the conclusion of the first part of his long argument—and from prem-
ises
(18) If the logical probability of q, given p, is greater than one half, and
if q logically entails r, then the logical probability of r, given p, is also
greater than one half (121)
and
(20) The logical probability that an action of choosing not to prevent the
Lisbon earthquake is morally wrong, all things considered, given that
choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a wrongmaking
property that we know of, and that there are no rightmaking properties
known to be counterbalancing, is greater than one half (121)
the grand conclusion that:
(21) The logical probability that God did not exist at the time of the
Lisbon earthquake, given that choosing not to prevent the Lisbon
earthquake has a wrongmaking property we know of, and that there
are no rightmaking properties known to be counterbalancing, is greater
than one half (121).
The argument, Tooley claims, is valid, meaning that if all the premises are
true, then the conclusion must be true. However, Tooley then proceeds to
say that in order for his argument to go through, there is an assumption
of an ethical symmetry principle. In order to develop this, let us note
Tooley’s use of the terms “rightmaking” and “wrongmaking” as they
apply to the evaluation of his argument.
The justification for Tooley’s argument: in the second part of his ex-
tended EAE, Tooley employs the concept of logical probability. Tooley
seems to be eager to employ whatever means possible to say that God is
morally to be impugned for not having prevented the Lisbon earthquake,
and thus, by implication, that God does not exist. There is still, however,
the issue of the possibility of an unknown rightmaking property that
God’s action (his choosing not to intervene and stop the earthquake from
happening) of permitting the earthquake may have such that that right-
making property would be sufficiently robust to make the action of God’s
allowing the earthquake to occur overall a morally permissible action.
Here is where Tooley likes to employ his logical conception of probabil-
ity.
On the Impossibility of Omnimalevolence 101
c. the earthquake has KW of value -k, and the UR value is itself -n,
and thus the action is even worse off than our already negative
judgment of it.
d. the earthquake has a KW value of -k, but it turns out there are not
any relevant UR properties (or for that matter, UW properties). The
principle “What you see is what you get” would apply in this
possibility. So, in this case, the objective judgment would be that
God’s allowing the earthquake has an objective a priori probability
of 1/4. Therefore, granting all this machinery Tooley manipulates,
and the descriptions he gives, and given the truth of a symmetry
principle for his a priori probability fields to work out properly
(see just below), it would be overall improbable that God existed at
the time of the Lisbon earthquake, and thus, at any other time, as
well.
In order for this view of logical probability to have any grounding, Too-
ley realizes that a principle must be affirmed, and he calls this the Symme-
try Principle with Respect to Unknown, Rightmaking, and Wrongmaking Prop-
erties. It states:
[SP] Given what we know about rightmaking and wrongmaking prop-
erties in themselves, for any two numbers M and N, the probability of
there being an unknown rightmaking property with a moral weight
between M and N is equal to the probability of there being an un-
known wrongmaking property with a (negative) moral weight whose
absolute value is between M and N. (129)
What reasons are we given to accept SP?
and it might be false; we don’t have any way of telling. The right attitude,
here, is abstention, withholding belief” (173). But this means, then, Plan-
tinga concludes, that Tooley’s EAE isn’t successful. “It doesn’t succeed in
showing that (abstracting from whatever justifying evidence there is for
G) the logical probability of G on the occurrence of the Lisbon earthquake
is less than 1/2” (173–4).
If one says that God reveals Himself to whomever He wills, and draw-
ing near to God would cause repentance and moral and spiritual cleans-
ing to the n-most level, then it would be logically impossible for God to
reveal Himself in the Beatific Vision to a person unprepared for the Beatific
Vision. All who experience God in such an intimate way are undeserving;
only God is essentially and originatively holy and necessarily so! (Any
other being, say a great angel, might be holy, but only because made so
by God through an act of fiat.) So, anyone who has an intimate Beatific
vision of God will be there solely on the merit of God’s grace and love and
other-directed alterity. “Against such things there is no law.” And once
again aid from an earlier point might be gotten. For, just as to be truly
omnipotent seems to entail being necessarily omnipotent, so also with
morally perfection: to be morally perfect, one cannot have some part of
one’s moral perfection that is willy-nilly accidentally the case: rather, to
be morally perfect entails that one is necessarily morally perfect: that is,
that one would have morally perfect intentions and thoughts, minimally,
in every conceivably possible way the world could have gone, that is, at
every possible world, that is, one has one’s moral perfection essentially,
and, has power over (in the sense of control over in such a way that it
would not cause the possessor of moral perfection to cease being morally
perfect) every possible person, event, state, condition, or time. 4 There-
fore, there is not, nor could there be, any logically corresponding oppo-
site state to the now-existing logically necessary conditions for a created
person to come into the Beatific Vision, to come into Union with God.
This follows, for, in effect, there is no opposite moral property that is the
logical counterpart of God’s grace. In effect, there is no other logically
possible way to come to behold God in the Beatific Vision except that God
actualizes all the necessary conditions. And, all those conditions turn on
God’s graciously allowing the created person to be transformed in order
to enjoy that Beatific Vision. However, there is only one set of conditions;
God must provide them to the created person to enjoy the Vision; and,
since God is necessarily morally perfect, He cannot allow the Beatific
Vision except by meeting the gracious conditions, and, being necessarily
omnipotent, He cannot be overpowered by any other being to allow the
vision on some other set of conditions. So, I feel that this counterexample
shows Tooley’s SP is not true. As I said above, if it were logically possible
that there be an all-powerful, all-evil Being, then perhaps such a being
could provide the greatest conceivably bad counterpart of the Beatific
Vision. However, such a being is impossible, for reasons I’ve stated,
above. Therefore, this counterexample seems successful to show that
Tooley’s SP is false. But, Tooley needed SP to be true in order for his EAE
as stated to be sound. Thus, I conclude that Tooley’s new EAE is un-
sound.
106 Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
We have seen that Tooley's new EAE hinges on his so-called “Symmetry
Principle” (SP). If we fail to have good reason to believe SP, then Tooley's
EAE, as he himself says, fails. I have tried to show the ways Plantinga
doubted this principle and to offer some reasons for doubting the princi-
ple as well. As Plantinga says, Tooley’s argument only has any chance of
getting off the ground by assuming that G (God) is contingent. But the
Theist, at least those of the Anselmian variety, holds that God is necessar-
ily existent. And, there can be no doubt that a corollary of God’s neces-
sary existence is that God is the delimiter of logical possibilities. God’s
modal status is the determiner of the modal status of certain other propo-
sitions, but Tooley doesn’t account for this Theistic theoretic point. The
point itself seems legitimate and is not something just ad hoc to avoid
Tooley’s logical probability argument. When one asks, what is the prob-
ability of God’s allowing the Lisbon earthquake given that God exists, it
is clear that the situation has substantially changed. For we know that
there is, solely by virtue of God’s allowing the earthquake to transpire, as
Plantinga says, a rightmaking property attached to that allowance. This
means in effect that God has some good reason for allowing this event to
take place, whether that good is a known or unknown rightmaking prop-
erty. By definition, God has a morally sufficient reason for any evil He
allows. According to theism, there is a belief—and a hope—that each of
our lives, taken diachronically and evaluated at some suitable stage, will
in fact allow us to see the great value of being and being us—having our
lives—and for having enjoyed ultima facie and been given so graciously
by the God who gave the imprimatur to create this world ab initio. Rowe’s
‘Sue’ case and Ivan Karamazov surely come to mind here: the hope I
mentioned that theism provides is that we will each individually come to
see our lives as constituted by the experiences we have been privileged to
experience—even the severe evils. Each of these past experiences are part
constituters of who we actually are at any later stage, and are necessary
conditions for continuing along life’s journey. It appears that we must
seriously reflect on the idea of giving permission to God and God’s plan
to allow said sufferings in our lives, since without those sufferings, if
Adams is tracking the truth here, we would not be able to be at that place
of evaluation looking back anyway. In other words, our sufferings may
well play an essential part in the very fabric of our lives, our very iden-
tities, as we find them. From the theistic point of view, giving God per-
mission to endorse God’s plan may well be a necessary condition of our
being in the best situation or condition by which to value the entire
organic whole of our lives without any negative factor that could serve as
an enduring defeater to that value.
On the Impossibility of Omnimalevolence 107
NOTES
1. The passage of time here is only envisioned as a necessary condition for the
possibility of such a future state wherein one cannot recall a previous instance of
severe suffering that one himself endured in an earlier phase of one’s life. There are
surely other conditions that may be required: there may be choices or decisions, for those
who have free will and can exercise it to some not-insignificant degree with some modi-
cum at least of realization of knowledge and awareness, to free or keep oneself from
harboring an ongoing distrust, disbelief or bitterness due to one’s suffering toward
God or whatever divine powers one might believe in. These are deep waters; I merely
here signal toward the all-importance that willfulness and decision might play in the
larger, developed story here.
2. For a magisterial development of some of these themes, see Eleonore Stump
(2010).
3. In the opening bars of Kant’s (1981) “the sight of a being who is not graced by
any touch of a pure and good will but who yet enjoys an uninterrupted prosperity can
never delight a rational and impartial spectator” (7).
4. I leave it to the reader to see the connection between perfect moral goodness and
omniscience: they both seem to presuppose omnipotence. To have control over a
situation such that one was ensured that he would not go wrong necessarily seems to
imply a requisite omnipotence to stay on track morally without any possibility of
swerve. But this would not necessarily do away with the freedom of others, so long as
God knew with perfect clarity what people will freely do, and, in the spirit of the
doctrine of divine middle knowledge, in light of what I said above, viz. how the
property of omnibenevolence, when examined, is modally charged, also of what peo-
ple would freely do, that is, knowledge even of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Robert. 1987. “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil.” In The Virtue
of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, 65–76. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1962. Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Chisholm, Roderick. 1990. “The Defeat of God and Evil.” In The Problem of Evil, edited
by Robert Adams and Marilyn M. Adams, 53–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Draper, Paul. 1992. “Probabilistic Arguments from Evil” Religious Studies 28: 303–17.
Kant, Immanuel. 1981. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by James W.
Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Moore, G. E. 1971. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1979. “The Probabilistic Argument from Evil” Philosophical Studies
35(1): 1–53.
Plantinga, Alvin, and Michael Tooley. 2008. Knowledge of God. Oxford: Wiley-Black-
well.
Rowe, William L. 1979. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”
American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335–341.
Rowe, William L. 1991. “Ruminations About Evil” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 69–88.
Stump, Eleonore. 2010. Wandering in the Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tooley, Michael. 1991. “The Argument from Evil” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 89–134.
SIX
Epistemic Evil, Divine Hiddenness,
and Soul-Making
Benjamin W. McCraw
109
110 Chapter 6
Criticism of (2) is by far the most common target for those taking on
the argument. Schellenberg himself (rightly) assesses this premise as the
linchpin for the overall success of the argument. He notes that his argu-
ment “is rebutted if and only if (i) it is shown conclusively that an offsetting
good necessitating the permission of reasonable nonbelief exists, and/or
(ii) it is shown to be plausible that an outweighing good requiring the
permission of reasonable nonbelief exists” (2006, 87–8; emphases his).
Attacks on (2) then become the focus of a criticism of the overall argu-
ment once we leave aside worries about (3). My goal here is no different,
and a quick discussion of the hiddenness argument and the problem of
evil leads to the line of criticism I shall develop later. So, let me begin
there.
from evil and hiddenness, we find the same structure whether we are
considering deductive (logical) or inductive (evidential) arguments.
But the connection goes beyond the same structure. (Or, perhaps, the
sameness of structure is merely a symptom of substantive connections.)
Consider what makes the argument from evil what it is. Most obviously,
evil does the work in (6)–(10). What is evil? Well, that’s nothing easy to
nail down and, given a tweak on a common Aristotelian phrase, evil is
said in many ways. We use “evil” to name so many things/events/people
and so many kinds of things/events/people, that it seems implausible to
think that some informative, single analysis fits all such uses. At best, we
can take “evil” here to mean the almost uninformatively vague and am-
biguous “bad stuff that happens.” At its most fundamental level, the
problem of evil states that there’s something bad that exists/occurs/ob-
tains such that we wouldn’t expect that bad thing’s existence/occurrence/
obtainment in a world where there exists a Perfect Being. Fill in the de-
tails however you like, but I submit that this description is about as
universal and nonspecific as one is bound to get regarding the argument
from evil.
If the foregoing is correct, we can see that the problem of divine hid-
denness fits neatly into the general framework of the problem of evil. If
God does, in fact, exist, then presumably ignorance (lack of knowledge)
of this fact is bad. That is, if there really is a Perfect Being, it would be
good to know this fact and bad to be ignorant of it. Therefore, we can say
that hiddenness is a bad thing. Accordingly, it seems to be one of those
things we classify as “evil” given the general “evil = bad stuff” formula
from above. Divine hiddenness, accordingly, is just a specific instance of
evil. That is, we should see (3)/(3’) simply as a more specific instance of
(8)/(8’). Hiddenness, then, is simply a kind of intellectual or epistemic
evil—a bad thing for the mind or one’s store of knowledge. Whereas
typical versions of the problem of evil focus on moral or natural evil, the
hiddenness argument picks out a kind of epistemic evil upon which to
model the argument. As many philosophers of religion note, the problem
of divine hiddenness is simply a particular variant, species, kind, or in-
stance of the generic problem of evil. 3 Herein lies the first key point for
the view I will defend later: the hiddenness problem is (no more or less
than) a particular instance of the problem of evil, albeit one emphasizing
an epistemic evil. It’s fair to characterize the problem of divine hiddenness
as the problem of epistemic evil.
Peter van Inwagen sees the force of this realization: “the two problems
[of hiddenness and evil in general] are similar in their logical structure,
and I recommend that, because of this similarity, theists who attempt to
solve the epistemic problem employ the same methods and techniques—
mutatis mutandis—that theists have generally employed in their attempts
to solve the problem of evil” (2002, 32). The arguments of the previous
paragraph just strengthen van Inwagen’s recommendation here: taking
114 Chapter 6
the mutatis mutandis clause seriously. Take the influential free will de-
fense, for instance. It has a distinctive variant suited to the problem of
divine hiddenness.
Known for this soul-making response to the problem of evil, John
Hick gave a free will type of defense against the epistemic evil of hidden-
ness early in his career. He argues that
the more ultimate reason [for divine hiddenness] is that the infinite
nature of the Deity requires him to veil himself from us if we are to
exist as autonomous persons in his presence. For to know God is not
simply to know one more being who inhabits this universe. It is to
know the One who is responsible for our existence and who determines
our destiny [ . . . ] and One whose commands come with the accent of
absolute and unconditional demand [ . . . ]. There is thus involved a
radical reordering of his outlook such as must be undergone willingly
if it is not to crush and even destroy the personality [ . . . ]. Only when
we ourselves voluntarily recognize God [ . . . ] can our knowledge of
him be compatible with our freedom [ . . . ] (2009, 133–4; emphasis his).
Thus, Hick argues that God hides because that is the only way to keep a
person’s response to God free. One could not, on Hick’s view, really grasp
the existence of a genuinely Perfect Being and not respond positively.
Since God is our ultimate end and felicity, rejecting God with full knowl-
edge would be akin to rejecting the good life if freely offered. To make
our acceptance of God voluntary and thus an act for which we can be
responsible, God must hide in order to avoid compulsion. Hick’s argu-
ment seems essentially identical to a standard free will defense. On this
view, even if God could have arranged the world so that no evil occurs,
this ordering would preclude morally significant, voluntary action on
humans’ part. Thus, in order to get the good of moral action, God permits
free yet potentially evil-producing agents. In an exactly similar way, Hick
views God’s hiddenness as God’s way of making cognitively free re-
sponses to God possible. In order to get the good of responsible religious
commitment, God permits the epistemic evil of hiddenness. Hick’s argu-
ment about hiddenness, accordingly, falls in line with van Inwagen’s
recommendation by taking up an identical solution to hiddenness that
we see in the free will response to evil (mutatis mutandis, of course).
Generally, then, we can interpret van Inwagen’s recommendation as a
program to examine the problem of divine hiddenness. And Hick’s (later)
soul-making theodicy is the inspiration for my own response to the epis-
temic evil of hiddenness.
I want to make a few points of clarification before we move to the
details of Hick’s theory and how I develop it to address divine hidden-
ness. First, I want to note and keep in mind a distinction that both Plan-
tinga and van Inwagen emphasize between a defense and a theodicy. The
stronger sort of approach, a theodicy, attempts to give a reason why God
Epistemic Evil, Divine Hiddenness, and Soul-Making 115
does in fact permit evil or why evil must exist. To give a theodicy for evil
is to give the reason (or set of reasons) why God allows evil. But a defense
is weaker: it merely gives a possible story where God and evil co-exist.
The reason given for evil in a defense need only be possible rather than
decisively established as obtaining in fact (as with a theodicy). And oth-
ers (see Sennett, forthcoming) suggest a third option: a “robust” defense.
Where a theodicy attempts to give the actual reason(s) and a defense (a)
merely possible reason(s) God permits evil, a robust defense attempts to
give a plausible reason for God’s permitting some evil. We may construe
“plausible” as some probably north of .5 but shy of 1; leaving the details
of just how much greater than .5 one needs for plausibility undefined.
Those details needn’t bog us down for the purposes here.
Let’s take theodicy off the table right away: it’s too strong of a project
for my aims. But there’s still an important question: should we intend a
defense (simpliciter) or a robust defense? Recall Schellenberg’s assessment
(2): rebutting it works “if and only if (i) it is shown conclusively than an
offsetting good necessitating the permission of reasonable nonbelief exists,
and/or (ii) it is shown to be plausible that an outweighing good requiring
the permission of reasonable nonbelief exists.” He’s missing an option:
“(iii) it is shown that it’s possible that some outweighing good requiring
the permission of reasonably nonbelief exists.” A theodicy requires (i), a
robust defense (ii), and a theodicy only (iii). Which answer we give to the
problem of hiddenness or, put differently, how strong of a claim one
needs to make depends on the strength of (2). Does Schellenberg take (2)
to describe God’s love in relation to hiddenness across all worlds or just
ours (or perhaps ones close to ours)? That is, should we read the modal
status of (2)? If (2) is necessary, then merely a defense will suffice and,
thus, all that’s needed is (iii). Yet if (2) isn’t necessary, holding only for
some worlds but not others, then merely showing that (2) could be false—
that is, (iii)—isn’t strong enough. In this case, we’ll need a robust defense
arguing for the truth of (ii).
The modal status of (2), though, is unclear. Now, assuming that all
plausible claims are possible (as is obvious), arguing for (ii) will thereby
argue for (iii), since (ii) entails (iii). So, it’s wise to show (ii) in response to
(2) because this will cover a non-robust defense and (iii) as well. But, still
this requirement is fairly weak (even if stronger than a non-robust de-
fense). We need to recognize that, in giving a robust defense, we don’t
need to satisfy (i). So my aim is to describe and give some motivation for
a plausible reason (=a good one would want to obtain) that God might
permit hiddenness instead of a conclusive reason that necessitates hidden-
ness. This would be true for a theodicy but not a defense (of either sort).
Also, as I suggested above, I want to take the ambiguity of “evil” in
the problem of evil seriously. If evil really is “said in many ways,” it
strikes me as implausible that any single theory will or could “solve” it.
That’s because, with the ambiguity of “evil,” there is no single problem of
116 Chapter 6
In Evil and the God of Love, Hick argues that our evil-ridden world is one
of “soul-making.” That is, we encounter evil, and deal with it and its
effects on a near constant basis. Such “dealings” play a big role in how
our souls or characters come to be what they are. The evil we suffer, the
evil that we do, and how we interact with these evils over the course of
our lives helps generate our characters. We can become vicious in afflict-
ing evil or taking delight in seeing evil inflicted on others. Or we can
develop courage in overcoming evil, kindness in trying to counteract it,
and sympathy in attempting to help others through their difficulties. As-
suming that such traits as courage, kindness, and sympathy are good
traits of character, we can see that the evil in the world—while irredu-
cibly bad (i.e., having a negative value in itself)—can often promote cer-
tain goods in humans, or so Hick argues. Put in more straightforward
moral terms, evil can develop in human beings certain moral virtues and,
in doing so, can take on a role in bettering humans and make them more
like whatever religious exemplar one’s tradition sees as essential. It is my
contention here that we can extend Hick’s soul-making defense from the
standard problem of evil to a response to Schellenburg’s argument from
hiddenness qua problem of epistemic evil. Just as moral evil can promote
the development and expression of moral virtues, the intellectual evil of
God’s hiddenness can promote the development and expression of faith.
Later on, I shall argue that faith is a good that God has (would have)
reason to promote and that it involves character or soul development in
ways that link to Hick’s emphasis on the moral development of one’s
character in encountering evil. However, before we turn to Hick’s soul
making theory so as to understand the purpose of the epistemic evil of
hiddenness, let’s address a few other ways others have used a Hick-
styled response to Schellenberg’s argument.
Epistemic Evil, Divine Hiddenness, and Soul-Making 117
Trent Dougherty (2007) suggest that “[i]t may be that there are certain
goods of character formation that require some epistemic distance from
God” (195). Following the mystical tradition of St. John of the Cross,
Laura L. Garcia sees
God’s hiddenness [as] a result of His merciful love, which develops
love and perseverance in His disciples by withdrawing the signs of his
presence from time to time [ . . . ]. Suffering, including the suffering
brought about by God’s hiddenness, is necessary to effect [ . . . ] detach-
ment and to lead us to seek our good in Him and to receive everything
from Him. (2002, 92)
In each case, we find some kind of moral development that divine hid-
denness can promote or cultivate. This follows more closely with the
soul-making approach we see in Hick as applied to the problem of divine
hiddenness. If this line of reasoning holds, then we have a plausible
reason to reject (2). God hides in order to spur the moral development of
human creatures confronting a religiously ambiguous world.
But I have a concern with these types of approaches that applies to
Murray’s as well. It’s hard to see in their responses any distinctive epis-
temic solution to the problem of divine hiddenness. If hiddenness is, as
we’ve analyzed above, a kind of epistemic evil, then the response given
should track that epistemic focus. And I see none of that in Murray’s
view: the good to be gotten is morally significant free action and the bad
to be avoided is moral coercion. His view does nothing to address the
epistemic badness of divine hiddenness. Even if Murray’s view would
take the soul-making theory more seriously like those approaches above,
it would still seem to focus on only moral considerations. And in the
views of Howard-Snyder, Poston and Dougherty, and Garcia, we have a
soul-making sort of response (unlike Murray) but still there’s little sense
of seeing their positions having a decidedly epistemic focus. They argue
that divine hiddenness promotes moral goods of character—not epistemic
or intellectual ones. Recall van Inwagen’s recommendation that theorists
give parallel responses to the problem of hiddenness based on ap-
proaches to the problem of evil. Yet, the recommendation is couched in
the nearly perfunctory mutatis mutandis proviso; but, as I’ve argued here,
these approaches don’t “mutatis” enough. We need an epistemic-focused
response in order for the epistemic problem of hiddenness to fit ade-
quately.
My aim in this section is more than mere criticism of Murray and the
others. By seeing where their soul-making approaches lack, we can better
determine just how a successful soul-making defense against divine hid-
denness must work. We can draw two ‘big’ lessons from the previous
section’s criticism of other approaches.
A. An adequate response must focus on the development of a good
character
Epistemic Evil, Divine Hiddenness, and Soul-Making 119
Faith, or more specifically a significant kind of faith, can satisfy the re-
quirements from the previous section, or so I argue in this section. As I
see it—and more on how I construe faith below—it’s an epistemic atti-
tude involving one’s character that a loving God interested in developing
personal relationships has good reasons to promote. Thus, this sort of
faith can serve as a response to (2): it’s plausibly not the case that if a
perfectly loving God exists, then reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
Before we can see how faith can give us a plausible reason to reject (2), we
need to become clearer about just the sort of faith I have in mind.
By “faith” I don’t mean an exclusively propositional attitude. 4 The
locution that better picks out my use is having faith in S rather than faith
that p where the latter but not the former simply reduces to propositional
belief that p. So, when I use the term “faith,” I mean something very
different from just believing or accepting some proposition. I mean a
much richer attitude, and the object of these attitudes differ. Faith-that, as
should be clear, has its object in a proposition. It concerns propositional
belief that some p is true. However, faith-in usually or paradigmatically
tracks a person (or something one treats as a person). Whereas we can see
faith-that as a species of belief-that, taking trust as our model most ade-
quately captures the richer faith-in. It’s the core of trust within faith (in)
that sets up this sort of faith as the response to (2) above.
120 Chapter 6
In a world where God’s existence is not obvious, faith qua trust becomes
necessary. Faith has a core of dependence inherited from trust and such
dependence can easily come about by the obscurity of God’s existence,
aims, works, and so forth. If there is to be faith, then there must be
reliance and such dependence requires divine hiddenness. 6 If we lived in
a world where God’s existence, plans, and so forth were open to all, it
seems difficult to imagine a context in which one could really have
faith—there would be no real depth of epistemic dependence or reliance
necessary in such a world. And, furthermore, if faith is more than just
belief (that), it must be developed. Such development requires an under-
lying context—often a kind of religious-social community—where one
learns to depend on persons consistently and acquires the right kind and
level of confidence necessary for proper trust and, hence, faith. 7 So, di-
vine hiddenness promotes not only individual, discrete acts of faith in
particular instances (requiring reliance) but also in a general, extended
sense of making possible the acquisition of trust expressed as faith over
the course of a person’s life. Moral evils can make possible and promote
one’s moral development and the epistemic evil of hiddenness can make
possible and promote the growth of one’s intellectual character via faith.
But one might object: why, if this is the case, think that faith is so
valuable? If faith requires divine hiddenness, then so much the worse for
faith. The world would be better with divine openness since we would be
in a better epistemic position with respect to God in the first place. Even
if hiddenness promotes faith, why think faith is good enough to provide
a plausible reason that God might hide? This certainly seems to be the
impression that Schellenberg’s tone suggests.
I suppose that, if by “faith” one only means “belief that God exists,” I
would readily agree with this criticism and concede the point. But, by
“faith” (and, equivalently my use of “trust”) I don’t mean something as
thin as mere propositional belief. And I think this is where a large part of
Schellenberg’s project is not simply wrong but wrong-headed. If God’s
aims concern a personal relationship, as Schellenberg contends, then just
“belief that God exists” is a very small part of such a relationship. Even if
such propositional belief is necessary for a personal relationship, it
shouldn’t be the focus here. We are not simply talking about “evidence
sufficient to produce justified belief” but a significant segment of an
agent’s character and how that character relates one to God if we really
122 Chapter 6
evil has many different responses: the free-will defense, Hicks’ moral
soul-making theodicy, skeptical theism, and so forth. And, as I argued in
Section 2 as well, each of these views has a parallel for the epistemic evil
of hiddenness. I see my view as dovetailing into these responses as an
overall answer to the problem of evil. And I suggest that we should expect
a dovetail here working into a convergent approach to evil. If we take
seriously that evil “is said in many ways,” we won’t find a single theory
adequate because the target for that theory would be an irreducibly di-
verse set of “bad stuff” to which the tag “evil” applies. So, just as there
are multiple kinds of evil—including the epistemic variants—we should
expect multiple facets responding to evil in different ways. Even if it’s not
necessary that hiddenness promotes faith, my faith-based response to (2)
can still fit part of the overall rejoinder to the problem of hiddenness in
particular and evil in general.
I take the response I’ve described and defended to have a general and
specific point. My specific point is to give a plausible reason to contest the
implication in (2)—a reason why God might be loving and still permit
instances of nonbelief. My rejoinder is that the good of developing robust
faith-in God makes divine hiding plausible since openness would seem
contrary to the development of significant trust in and reliance on God.
Emphasizing the role of character in developing, having, and expressing
trust/faith in God reorients our focus from mere reasonable belief or non-
belief that God exists towards centering on the character of the person
involved in a personal relationship that God would want to promote. So,
while my view takes Schellenberg’s argument on its own terms, I also
what to point out that the ultimate focus for the argument from hidden-
ness should remain on a personal relationship rather than resting with
“reasonable nonbelief.” To take Schellenberg seriously requires making
that goal, rather than simple disbelief in a certain proposition, as the real
target for a defense against the hiddenness problem. I take it as a benefit
that my faith-based response can speak to both kinds of emphases: the
propositional focus of (2) and the personal relationship point of the hid-
denness problem overall.
However, a level-headed assessment of my own response’s force
speaks to how we should think of the problem of evil overall and how we
should best respond to it. Noting that developing faith does not imply
hiddenness shows that we shouldn’t think of a “solution” to the problem
of evil in overly strict ways. Evil is ambiguous, and we should probably
expect a convergent overall response with many specific prongs that en-
gage the different kinds of evil one might examine and encounter. Given
this overall approach to addressing evil, we shouldn’t be disappointed in
124 Chapter 6
a view that can’t “solve” the problem (in a robust sense) with a single
theory because that’s to expect of a theory something no theory could
accomplish. So, I take my response for what it is: a partial and yet plau-
sible response to the problem of hiddenness rather than the “solution” to
epistemic evil. And though this may be more modest than one would
optimally wish, it seems to be as responsible of an answer to a multi-
faceted problem as one could reasonably give.
NOTES
1. Of course, nothing about that claim or any others I may state imply that one
must or should accept a classical, Western theistic approach or even a theistic approach
at all.
2. James A. Keller (1995) makes the same point about the identical structure of
both types of arguments.
3. For philosophers emphasizing the point that the argument from hiddenness is
simply a type of the argument from evil, see: Schellenberg (2006, 7) and several chap-
ters in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays from Peter van Inwagen, “What Is the Problem of
the Hiddenness of God?”; Jonathan L. Kvanvig, “Divine Hiddenness: What is the
Problem?”; and William J. Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and the Hiddenness of
God”.
4. For more on my views on the relation between faith and trust see McCraw
(2015).
5. For more on ET, see McCraw (forthcoming).
6. There’s a parallel Kierkegaardian point from his Concluding Unscientific Post-
script about the necessity of risk for faith. I see my point about dependence as includ-
ing a kind of intellectual risk, so I’m (more than) happy to accept the Kierkegaardian
point here regarding (the riskiness of) faith.
7. Crummett (2015) develops a role for one’s social community in responding to
the problem of divine hiddenness. Given that I see faith (in) as a kind of trust that is
developed over time, I think he’s exactly right to emphasize one’s community in light of
hiddenness (at least in part). In particular, he suggests that “[b]y doing good deeds
and building loving relationships with one another [in a community], we can transform
one another’s characters and make ourselves more receptive to God’s will” (50; my emphasis).
This point clearly links character development and living in a community, but his talk
of receptivity to God, as I read him, brings us closer regarding my view on faith as a
response to hiddenness. My focus remains on how a community can develop one’s
character—including one’s trust/faith—but Crummett also emphasizes (rightly, on my
view) that one also plays a role in this community in directing others: one is both
developed by and contributes to others’ development in a community. By living a in a
community, one can not only learn to trust well oneself but also, by virtue of member-
ship in that community, lead others to trust properly: either by direct mentorship/
teaching or indirectly as a kind of role model. My use of character development, then,
I suggest here dovetails with a response to divine hiddenness highlighting a commu-
nal or social element-based response as we see in Crummett’s piece.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crummett, Dustin. 2015. “‘We are Here to Help Each Other’: Religious Community,
Divine Hiddenness, and the Responsibility Argument” Faith and Philosophy 32:
45–62.
Epistemic Evil, Divine Hiddenness, and Soul-Making 125
Evans, C. Stephen. 2006 “Can God Be Hidden and Evident At the Same Time? Some
Kierkegaardian Reflections” Faith and Philosophy 23: 241–253.
Garcia, Laura L. 2002. “St. John of the Cross and the Necessity of Divine Hiddenness.”
In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K.
Moser, 83-97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hick, John. 2009. Faith and Knowledge. Eugene: Wipf & Stock.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel. 1996. “The Argument from Divine Hiddenness” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 26: 433–453.
Keller, James A. 1995. “The Hiddenness of God and the Problem of Evil” International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37: 13–24.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2002. “Divine Hiddenness: What is the Problem?” In Divine
Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser,
149–163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCraw, Benjamin W. 2015. “Faith and Trust” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 77: 141–58.
McCraw, Benjamin W. Forthcoming. “The Nature of Epistemic Trust” Social Epistemol-
ogy.
Moser, Paul K. 2002 “Cognitive Idolatry and Divine Hiding.” In Divine Hiddenness:
New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, 120–48. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murray, Michael J. 2002. “Deus Absconditus.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited
by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, 62–82. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Poston, Ted and Trent Dougherty. 2007. “Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief”
Religious Studies 48: 183–98.
Schellenberg, J. L. 2006. Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. 2014. “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism.” In Philosophy of Relig-
ion: An Anthology, edited by Michael Rea and Louis Pojman 7th ed., 288–97. Cen-
gage Publishing
Sennett, James F. Forthcoming. “‘Now, Who Could it Be?’: Satan and the Argument
from Natural Evil.” In Philosophical Approaches to the Devil, edited by Benjamin W.
McCraw and Robert Arp. New York: Routledge.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002. “What is the Problem of the Hiddenness of God?” In Divine
Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, 24–32.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wainwright, William J. 1995. Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of
Passional Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wainwright, William J. 2002. “Jonathan Edwards and the Hiddenness of God.” In
Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser,
98–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
SEVEN
What the Hell Is God Up To?
God’s Evils and the Theodicies Holding God Responsible
John R. Shook
127
128 Chapter 7
some wisdom and practice a little stoicism. (It is said among the fools and
wits that comedy is simply tragedy plus time.) Theodicies basically ad-
vise the same counsels about due perspective to religious people without
having to talk specifics concerning God. If there is a deity, as theism
claims, it may be the case that what we label as “evils” are actually just
inconvenient events and privations, which must inevitably happen to
frail yet proud creatures like ourselves. Theism has no problem telling us
that we vainly expect too much from life. Naturalism’s wisdom sends the
same message: only seek what is good for your own nature, not extrava-
gances and excesses, to which you have no right. One’s evils of privation
are one’s own fault, as unjust demands go unmet. The world isn’t failing
to give you your due measure, if you’d empty your head of vanities. As
for the world, it cannot be what we’d wish it to be. Other sorts of evils are
evil from any perspective and really do deny us what would be naturally
good for us, but in some sense they are necessary for the world. Theism
prefers creationism to account for cosmic structure, but naturalism’s cos-
mology ends up making the same point without a divine designer: You
temporarily enjoy a habitable part of the universe while most of it is
uninhabitable and dangerous, and these two sides to the cosmos must
come as a balanced package or not at all. So far, naturalistic philosophy
and stern theodicy agree.
These three kinds of “evils,” the evils of perspective, privation, and
proportion, are certainly evils in every sense of the word. They are just as
regrettable and tragic as humanity takes them to be. Classifying evils
doesn’t dispel them or turn them into good, however much they may
relate to the good. Most aren’t really as bad as we suffer them to be, but
we can’t enjoy them or treat them as good no matter what the intellect
may say. Lesser evils are still evils. We must be wary of all evils and
warmly comfort each other as best we can, because what humanly counts
in the end is the suffering. Philosophical stoicism has its place in the
privacy of one’s temperament and domicile. Stoicism out among one’s
fellow sufferers is simply public indecency. Evils suffered do not call for
emotional indifference; evils encountered do not call for moral quietism.
Just as there has to be a cosmic balance of goods and evils, there has to be
a moral balance as well, for despising evil is necessary for pursuing good.
To let go of regrets over evils to keep one’s head only abandons morality
and chills the heart. Stoicism must be taken in moderation, too. Philo-
sophical naturalism will always have a place for the tragic and knowing
the difference between good and evil. Can theism say the same thing, in
all honesty?
Returning to our hotly contested subject, we ask, Is Hell a genuine
evil? For those doomed to Hell, it must be an evil, the Hell-friendly the-
isms all agree. Inhabitants unable to regard their hellish conditions as
unremittingly evil are just passing through (Jesus, Dante) or perhaps they
are entirely evil themselves (Satan, presumably). On the topic of Satan,
130 Chapter 7
however, theologies can disagree. Those who know the True Good the
best would be those most sensitive to its complete deprivation, right? So
Satan suffers Hell as evil more than anyone. On the other hand, True Evil
cannot regard the True Good as good, right? After all, if Satan could
acknowledge how God is more good than anything else, wouldn’t some-
thing in Satan still be oriented towards the good, so could Satan really be
completely evil? Theologies can’t agree on this devilishly tricky problem
because they don’t share the same theory of personal evil. We would
disagree among ourselves as well: Is being evil more about knowing the
good but choosing the bad, or is it more about lacking any sense of the
good in the first place? Psychologists crudely distinguish between two
kinds of cruel murderers: those who can’t understand the suffering they
cause as they kill, and those who kill because they can understand the
suffering and choose to cause it. Who is more evil? Perhaps both are
equally evil.
Dualistic theologies can go either way. In Zoroastrianism, the Evil god
is entirely evil by divine nature; no mindful choice was involved. Chris-
tian theology sometimes makes it sound like Satan made a knowing and
willful choice against the Good deity to become fully evil. (Which is more
than Judaism’s Adam in the Garden did—he ate of the apple without
knowing good and evil as he did it—Adam only knew of evil and sin
afterwards, unlike the serpent, thanks to ingesting the apple.) The most
arrogant jinn, known to Islamic theology as Iblis or Shayṭān, plays much
the same role, as the persuasive temptation to sin so that humans join in
rebellion against the Good deity. However much psychoanalysis is given
to the Evil One, as John Milton tried with fascinating results, the fact
remains that Hell isn’t supposed to be genuinely good for any of its
inhabitants. Hell is objectively evil. It’s not as if Hell is only evil from a
limited perspective, as if taking a bigger perspective would permit some-
one under its tortures to find them tolerable. (“Sure it’s plenty hot here,
but it’s a dry heat.”) Nor could Hell’s afflictions be due to exaggerated
expectations and unjust disappointments. People dying and finding
themselves in Hell may feel disappointed in themselves, but not in Hell
(“But I’d heard some nice things about Hell!”) Bottom line: Stoicism isn’t
supposed to work in Hell. Hell’s status as evil isn’t simply a subjective
matter. Only Dante’s Hell has a tedious first circle that’s tolerable for
those rare people, the philosophers, with the wisdom to tolerate it.
The objective status for Hell’s evil is clear, but that can imply that Hell
is objectively proportionate, as an inevitable feature of creation. To say
that Hell was objectively created along with the rest of creation isn’t the
same thing as saying that Hell’s evil is co-originally and con-substantially
real. Evil, even Hell’s evil, may still lack its own categorical reality, as if it
had its own essential and independent nature apart from the good and
God. To use an oft-used analogy, the unadulterated light in the presence
of structure can produce shadow, but “shadow” is just a deprivation of
What the Hell Is God Up To? 131
after creating them, and treating a predictably poor choice as an evil sin,
is an unjustifiable and unethical exercise for an all-knowing God, so per-
dition must be dropped. As another example, suppose evilH is inevitably
part of evilG so that any sufficiently sentient God would understand how
all deeds by finite creatures must fall infinitely short of perfection no
matter what happens in Creation. Faulting those creatures for inevitable
defects is similarly unworthy of a Good deity, so this God had better
regret making Creation before entertaining any regrets over sending peo-
ple to perdition, and perdition must again be dropped. Similarly, if evilJ
is just part of evilG so that the whole point to Jesus is to render the
inevitably imperfect Creation and the invariably unworthy Humanity
somehow worthier in the eyes of God, eternal damnation for anybody is
out of the question, and perdition is irrelevant.
In order to reasonably maintain creedal conviction in perdition, hu-
man evil can’t be reduced to the other evils so that it isn’t foreseeably
necessary. This is the case, regardless of the view that a theodicy takes
concerning why some people should suffer eternal damnation, or why
some other people deserve eternal salvation. Whether the point of Hell is
punitive vengeance or retributive justice, or a metaphor for permanent
separation from God, or something else, the key point is that God can’t
morally use Hell in response to some human failure.
This hardly means that we deserve paradise either. The question is not
whether anybody deserves paradise; the question is whether anyone de-
serves perdition. Perhaps God would be ethically responsible for grant-
ing a pleasant afterlife to some while denying any afterlife to others. At
least that outcome isn’t as morally monstrous as leaving people in Hell. It
doesn’t appear that a good God can avoid moral responsibility for an evil
Hell.
justice can seem unthinkable. Theodicy does have some thinkable options
about cosmic justice violating the good, as far as atheology can tell. Here
is the run-down, from atheology’s standpoint.
A “privation” theodicy, for which evil in any Creation is a necessary
feature, reconciles God’s goodness with God’s justice by claiming that the
cosmic balance of good and evil in the world is providentially the best
possible. Plotinus, Aquinas, and Leibniz offered influential versions of
this theodicy. A “greater good” theodicy, by contrast, treats evil as inevi-
tably and foreseeably arising from a prioritized good (such as free will)
that God providentially included in the world, so that evil is justly right
in service to this higher Good. A “limited providence” theodicy takes
God to be perfectly righteous, but treats evil as inevitable due to God’s
less-than-supreme capacity to intervene in cosmic affairs after creation. A
fourth kind of theodicy, a “submission” theodicy, declares that all crea-
tures must submit to God’s authority regardless of the distribution of
good and evil in this world, because it is only right that we are piously
grateful for existing at all. 2
The privation theodicy, despite its association with the “best of all
possible worlds” label, suggests that God’s aim in creating the world
actually isn’t to ensure fine lives for us all, but only to give each of us a
fair opportunity at life despite inhabiting a difficult and troubled world.
If God had withdrawn less from creation to allow this world to be easy
and delightful, we’d never strive for anything, and never appreciate our
dependency on God along the way. God allows ‘evil’ to afflict humanity,
but those evils are just part of the overall balance of life and death in the
world. Besides, there’s salvation and a wonderful afterlife for the right-
eous. God is righteous and just, rather than reliably beneficent in any
simplistic way, and God surely isn’t in the never-ending business of res-
cuing us from our own hurtful decisions. God wants our salvation for our
own good, of course. But you can kill with kindness—it is wiser to let
people suffer so they know what they’d miss. Apparently there’s no bet-
ter way to guide people towards pious faith and righteousness. Even if
only some individuals are saved in the end, righteousness is preserved
forever by God in the face of chaos and extinction.
Atheology’s reaction to this privation theology is to ask a simple ques-
tion: “Why would God allow so many evils to afflict us, when persuading
us to follow God could be accomplished with less torturous means?” It is
easy to imagine a world with less evil and suffering but plenty of relig-
ious people. Proponents of privation theology must be convinced that a
short duration for life and a long list of afflicting evils is necessarily the
“best” way to bring people to their knees. However, this couldn’t be the
best way, for an all-powerful deity prioritizing goodness. Even if this
might look like a fair deal for adults, what about the terrible afflictions
and sufferings delivered to babies and small children before their prema-
ture deaths, who never get a chance to grow from suffering or reach a
What the Hell Is God Up To? 135
take human free will seriously, on the other hand, then this requires an
admission that God cannot maximize multiple important goods and can-
not control creatures exercising free will, lessening God’s effective pow-
ers.
The third theology, the “limited providence” theodicy, accordingly
admits that God really isn’t all-powerful after creating the world. Because
God designed the world with its own forces and laws, and created hu-
mans who follow their own (somewhat free) minds, this creator couldn’t
have made a perfectly good creation and cannot perform all of the world-
ly interventions otherwise expected from a perfectly good and righteous
deity. Evil tragedies and terrible holocausts are inevitable, because God
cannot prevent them all and might not be able to foresee all of them. As a
practical matter, God is effectively less than all-powerful and cannot
guarantee maximal providential guidance over the world. God did estab-
lish creation with some providential planning, wishes us well, and may
send extra help when possible, but little more should be expected from
God.
Because this “limited providence” theodicy surrenders that triad of
perfections (omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness) which
arouses most problems concerning evil, atheology has far fewer objec-
tions here. For those religious spirits able to courageously accept these
harsh terms of existence and survival, life appears far more adventurous
and risky. Perhaps atheists themselves are just that courageous, willing to
take on life’s adventure since there are no gods anyways. Yet even athe-
ists can notice how this theodicy neglects weaker, timid, or broken spirits
unable to struggle on in a gamble for uncertain victory, and for whom life
appears to be pointless suffering or a cruel joke. Hell is out the question.
If a God of limited powers expects sinlessness from us and demands
eternal punishment for our inevitable failure, that God must be heartless
and evil.
The fourth theodicy awaits, after the other three have been found
severely wanting. This “submission” theodicy returns to the core idea
within “privation” theodicy and fully admits that perfect righteousness,
not beneficent providence, is truly the divine priority. This “perfect” God
just lets terrible sufferings happen in a far from perfect world, and the
truly innocent do sometimes suffer before tragic death. But the truly
innocent also get to go to a heavenly paradise (or at least purgatory
perhaps), while the sinners are bound for a hell. There must be some
genuine evil in the divine plan, it seems to this theodicy, to guarantee a
greater righteousness. But we shouldn’t get fixated on tragic evils that
had to happen in God’s righteous plan. All that matters is that provi-
dence is fine-tuned perfectly to allow God to demonstrate perfect right-
eousness in the face of inevitable sin. It really doesn’t matter what sort of
creation this God bothered to design—that mistake dooms the other theo-
dicies. Asking for beneficence is a distraction, since it keep us alert for
What the Hell Is God Up To? 137
evils. The truth is that evils shouldn’t be any surprise to anyone. Evils are
no surprise to God, after all. We are busy noticing evils only when we are
forgetting to be grateful to god for existing anywhere at all, and grateful
for whatever natural home allowing us live as we do.
Atheology has no difficulty pointing out what is plainly obvious for
this fourth theodicy: God has no obligation to adjust the ratio of good to
evil in creation whatsoever. If evil must be a necessary feature anyways,
then standing up for righteousness in the face of evil is all that matters.
The more evil, the better! On this theodicy, God has a righteous duty to
create Hell and guarantee eternal torment as the just punishment for sin.
After all, what better way for God to ensure the sharpest possible contrast
between divine righteousness and evil sinfulness than to contrast the
infinitude of divine right against the infinitude of divine punishment? A
lenient policy of no punishment, or temporary punishment, wouldn’t do
the job. Who is more against sin: the one who eventually forgives, or the
one who never forgives? God can’t forgive, not ever.
nor be at all careful lest you should suffer too much, in any other sense
than only that you shall not suffer beyond what strict justice requires:
nothing shall be withheld, because it’s so hard for you to bear. . . .[Y]ou
shall be tormented in the presence of the holy angels, and in the pres-
ence of the Lamb; and when you shall be in this state of suffering, the
glorious inhabitants of heaven shall go forth and look on the awful
spectacle, that they may see what the wrath and fierceness of the Al-
mighty is, and when they have seen it, they will fall down and adore
that great power and majesty. (1995, 99–101)
Edwards exhaustingly explains how god’s plan for heaven would be less
than perfect unless the saved can view the damned suffering in hell.
Heaven truly is the happiest place, praise the Lord!
Edwards understood theodicy all too well. He knew better than to
place the blame for evil on Satan, the devilish creature ensuring that the
Christian God looks good by comparison. Theologians can comprehend
what ordinary believers are apt to overlook: Satan and the suffering he
causes must be just as much an essential part of God’s supreme plan as
anything else. Among the faithful, one is instead more likely to hear the
legacy of Persian Zoroastrianism in the dualistic Manichaeism of the 3rd
to 7th centuries CE rather than its cousin, monotheistic Christianity. Man-
ichaeism depicted a cosmic struggle between two co-eternal divine pow-
ers, one good and the other evil. Needless to say, both religions agree that
only a terrible fate awaits those on the wrong side of this cosmic contest.
A monotheistic religion like Christianity can’t shift evil around meta-
physically so easily. It must credit its God for creating all the conditions
for any demonic power, if one exists, and for allowing such a power to do
its evil deeds. Evils are still only redistributed around this simpler theo-
logical scheme, and never eliminated entirely. Religions constrained by
monotheistic principles have no other choice than to “resolve” the prob-
lem of evil by finally admitting that evil is a necessary and essential
component of the grand divine design. As Christian apologist Dinesh
D’Souza honestly admits, “hell is an essential part of the Christian
scheme” (2007, 271). 4
NOTES
Regarding the fourth kind, one recent proponent is D’Souza (2012). Although Islam
also has emphasized dutiful submission to divine righteousness, Islamic thinkers have
pondered theodicies as complex as any Christian systems, and contributed to their
development. See a survey by Ormsby (1984).
3. See Kvanvig (1993) and Seymour (2000). Kronen and Reitan (2012) philosophi-
cally argue against any divine need for hell.
4. On Manichaeism, see Coyle (2009) and Baker-Brian (2011). On Satan, see For-
syth (1987). Popular Christianity can’t resist a grand conflict narrative among relative-
ly well-matched deities; see for example Boyd (2001), or the Left Behind book series
authored by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins. A sober diagnosis of such enthusiasm
for the “end times” is provided by Price (2007).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
James M. McLachlan
that he believed in such a God. And this was proved by the fact that no
one ever threw himself on Providence completely. Anyhow, in this
respect Rieux believed himself to be on the right road in fighting
against creation as he found it. . . . Since the order of the world is
shaped by death, mightn’t it be better for God it we refuse to believe in
Him and struggle with all our might against death, without raising our
eyes toward the heaven where he sits in silence. (Camus 1991a,
116–118)
In The Rebel Camus explains Rieux’s position as “metaphysical rebellion.”
The metaphysical rebel is therefore not definitely an atheist, as one
might think him, but he is inevitably a blasphemer. Quite simply, he
blasphemes primarily in the name of order, denouncing God as the
father of death and as the supreme outrage. . . . If the metaphysical
rebel ranges himself against a power whose existence he simultaneous-
ly affirms, he only admits the existence of this power at the very instant
that he calls it into question. Then he involves this superior being in the
same humiliating adventure as mankind’s, its ineffectual power being the
equivalent of our ineffectual condition. (Camus 1991b, 100–103; author’s
emphasis)
Two points emerge here. The first is that we cannot live as though we are
unfree as though what we do is totally in the hands of either providence
or determinism. This supposes that we have power as real as God’s.
What appears in all these examples are not so much logical criticisms of
the traditional Judeo-Christian-Islamic theological conception of God as
pragmatic and ethical critique. For Ivan Karamazov and Dr. Rieux, for
Mark Twain, Victor Hugo, and Albert Camus the question is not whether
or not we can conceive of an omnipotent, omnipresent deity removed in
Its metaphysical perfection from all finite worldly cares, but why we
should want to conceive and whether there are moral reasons we
shouldn’t. It may be that creaturely suffering is but the dark speck, the
contrast that makes for the greater beauty of the whole, but to forsake the
suffering individuals for the beauty of the whole is a betrayal those who
must sit in that part of the picture. As Patrick Masterson wrote in 1971 in
Atheism and Alienation: A Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary
Atheism:
Atheism of our day consists chiefly in asserting the impossibility of the
coexistence of finite and infinite being; it is maintained that the affirma-
tion of God as infinite being necessarily implies the devaluation of
finite being, and, in particular, the dehumanizing of man. (1971, 1)
Masterson’s characterization seems to me to be correct of the writers I
have mentioned. The concern among these is that traditional ideas of God
and the theodicies they generate are demeaning to the existential situa-
tion of suffering creatures. This is not only true among Camus’ “meta-
physical rebels” but even among some theists. Clearly this is also the case
Mystic Terror and Metaphysical Rebels 143
for Schelling and Dostoevsky. Schelling shared with Dostoevsky the real-
ization the quest for reality forces one to philosophize from the point of
view of practical rather than theoretical reason.
and order and form nowhere appear to have been original, but it seems
as though what had initially be unruly had been brought to order. This
is the incomprehensible basis of the reality of things, the irreducible
remainder which cannot be resolved into reason by the greatest exer-
tion but always remains in the depths. Out of this which is unreason-
able, reason in the true sense is born. (2003, 34)
Thus the basis of the world is not an eternal unchanging, untroubled God
nor Being but a chaos in need of order.
Joseph Frank claims Dostoevsky’s early novel The Insulted and the In-
jured contains many autobiographical details of Dostoevsky’s life in the
1840s. The narrator, a young and impoverished writer, speaks about be-
ing before reality as a kind of “mystic terror.”
Of something that I cannot define, something ungraspable and outside
the natural order of things, but which yet may take shape this very
minute, as though in mockery of all the conclusions of reason, and
come to and stand before me as undeniable fact, hideous, horrible and
relentless. (Frank 1987, 51)
This eternal is not the peaceful eternity of the traditional neo-platonic
One or the way Christian theologians regularly think about the perfection
and harmony of God beyond the struggles of existence. The mystic terror
is before a much more disturbing and yet also potentially creative reality;
freedom that makes possible good and evil, love and depravity. The
interpretation of freedom that Dostoevsky develops is related to a radical
concept of creativity at the heart of reality and the relations between
persons. This type of irrationalism remained a part of Dostoevsky’s art.
This ideal of groundless freedom, prior to both God and persons, as the
source of the good and beautiful he pits against the nihilists and material-
ists. This struggle begins to mature in Notes from the Underground and
extends through the great novels to The Brothers Karamazov.
Frank claims that Dostoevsky sees a division between reason and the
psychic irrational. The idea here is that there is something that ultimately
cannot be explained rationally. In Philosophical Inquires into the Nature of
Human Freedom and Related Matters (hereafter Of Human Freedom) Schell-
ing called this the irreducible remainder, the Ungrund, the abyss, free-
dom, chaos, will, creativity. But where philosophers like Arthur Schopen-
hauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky’s disciples Lev Shestov and
V.V. Rosanov are ultimately nihilistic irrationalists for whom reason and
human existence are ultimately in themselves meaningless, Schelling,
Dostoevsky and his disciple Nicolas Berdyaev argue for meaning based
on moral reason, creativity, relation, and, ultimately, love. For them the
negative moment of alienation from the whole is the assertion of the
individual autonomy freedom. But this is only the first movement, the
irony is that the assertion of egoistic autonomy is necessary to the second
movement of love and relation. A movement that must be freely taken by
146 Chapter 8
an autonomous individual. Berdyaev would later call these the first and
second freedoms. The first freedom is the assertion of the individual
breaking always from the pure potentiality of the groundless one. The
second freedom is a move back into unity through love and relation to
another (Berdyaev 1934, 69–72).
Some time ago Emil Fackenheim noted that among Western philosophers
only Schelling really deals with the idea of radical evil (1982, 234). Schell-
ing’s most radical treatments of the problem of evil are located in his last
published book Of Human Freedom (1809), in the unpublished Stuttgart
Seminars, and the first two drafts of The Ages of the World in which he
locates the possibility of evil within the Absolute itself. The reason to read
Dostoevsky along with Schelling is that unlike Mellville, Lautrement,
Hugo, Twain, and Camus, Dostoevsky endeavors to give a new view of
the Christian God and Christ that responds to metaphysical rebellion. In
this Schelling and Dostoevsky to mutually illuminate one another.
Schelling’s solution to the problem of evil is to oppose “essence, in as
much as it exists to essence in so far as it is the principle (Grund) of
existence” (2003, 31). For Schelling, evil resides, not in any lack or priva-
tion of being, but in the radical reversal of God’s creative order—evil is
active. Evil is possible because freedom to create or to return to chaos is at
the foundation of Being and beings. This formulation seems obscure but
it’s central to Schelling’s consideration of the mystery of evil and free-
dom. Schelling sees indeterminate freedom as the essence or ground of
both God and creatures. God only becomes God through determining
her/himself through freedom. This is an anti-platonic understanding of
God and eternity. Time and finitude are an advance on a static eternity
with time as the creation of meaning through the creation of the possibil-
ity of dialogue with others. Schelling describes the God as the ideal per-
son, and human persons reflect the struggle within the divine life. For in
the divine life itself is an irrational, brute creativity that can never be
completely made transparent. This can only make sense for Schelling if
reality is interpreted as personal. A person contains within his/her being
possibility. By a person Schelling means a being that is in relation with
others and experiences growth and opposition. God is not complete at
the beginning but only becomes complete through relation to other per-
sons. Schelling sees cosmic history as the process of the personalization of
God: “[a]lready, then we can note that the entire process of the creation of
the world—which still live on the life process of nature and history—is in
effect nothing but the process of the complete coming-to-consciousness,
of the complete personalization of God” (1994, 206). This is opposed to
Mystic Terror and Metaphysical Rebels 147
begins with decision on the part of God to become a person. One can only
be a person in relation to other persons. Unlike traditional theists, Schell-
ing rejects creation as creation ex nilhilo because it separates God from
creation in a timeless eternity. The created world has added to God, and
in a significant way it has created God through God’s creation of the
world. The mistake arises in seeing the no-thing of creativity (Ungrund)
as nothing.
As a result of the misconstrual of this concept, the notion of a creation
ex nihilo could arise. All finite beings have been created out of nonbeing
yet not out of nothing. The ouk on is no more a nothing than the me
pheinomena of the New Testament; it is only the nonsubjective, the Non-
being, yet precisely therefore Being itself. (Schelling 1996, 209)
The finite is no longer a simple fall or descent from God but is seen as an
ascent toward personhood. It is the process through which God and hu-
manity finds Him/Herself in another. Thus the fall is not a fall but a
Beginning.
Part of the appeal of Dostoevsky's Underground Man is that he stands
out from his world. In fact he seeks emphatically to do so. His self-
assertion makes him standout from the world but it also is what threatens
his destruction. Egoism is the basis of the vortex in which the under-
ground man finds himself. He tells us at the beginning, “What does a
decent chap talk about with the greatest possible pleasure? . . . himself.
Very well, so I will talk about myself” (Dostoevsky 1968, 65). But the
underground man as an egoist, a man of intensified consciousness or
rather intensified self-consciousness, is cut off from the rest of the world.
He has retired into his hole in the floor, as a man of acute consciousness
must, becoming a complete egoist and moral solipsist. But the egoism of
the Underground Man leads to disintegration and chaos not to his full
development as a person.
The importance of humanity as the image of God permeates most
everything that Dostoevsky writes. Even his most humiliated, debased,
and unsympathetic characters have something lovable and divine about
them. The image of God is in all humans unless they destroy it them-
selves but in doing so they destroy themselves. The Underground Man
destroys himself when he rejects the love offered him by Lisa. He disinte-
grates into chaos as if he returns to the unground incapable of decision.
Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment commits a murder in order to prove
he is an “exceptional” human being. He suffers because he has destroyed
another person in the image of God. He is saved by what he thinks is his
“weakness”: he feels guilt for having killed another. His name comes
from the Russian word “Raskol” that literally means split or dissenter.
He is split from humanity by his idea that he is superior to other persons,
and he is also split in his soul because he can’t make the final decision
between becoming a “superior” man who can kill without remorse when
Mystic Terror and Metaphysical Rebels 149
necessary and a human being who feels sympathy for others. Raskolni-
kov thinks that it is only his weakness, his basic compassion that prevents
him from being the superior man. For Dostoevsky this “weakness” is his
salvation (Dostoevsky 2012, 11381 [Kindle]). Had he succeeded in his
plan he would be like the Underground Man or Nicolas Stavrogin in
Devils, who becomes a monster because he becomes completely self-suffi-
cient, completely indifferent to the world around him. He can do good or
evil acts with equal satisfaction and boredom. However this temptation
to egoism is necessary to real goodness.
the whole theodical tradition that point of view of the eternity all may be
well but for the humiliated little girl in outhouse, shaking her fist at God
all is not well. We must remain with the suffering creatures in the dark
part of God’s beautiful painting; never surveying finite misery from the
point of view of infinite and eternal harmony. But it is to miss Dostoev-
sky’s point that against traditional theodicy Ivan is right. Future harmony
does not justify the suffering of billions of creatures, human and animal.
If God is to be good in any sense of the term that we can understand, God
has to have experienced temptation and despair and overcome them.
Goodness is a matter of will and not being. 2 For Ivan both the defenders
of God and the atheist dreamers of the future utopia are wrong. Both look
at the world from God’s point of view. The future utopians like Hegel,
Marx, Comte, and the Russian Nihilists seem to think that the future
happiness somehow affects the billions of dead victims who don’t get to
participate in it. 3 Both theists and atheist believers, changing beings in
inevitable process, view the world from of point of divine indifference.
Ivan returns this ticket as well: the world is not just if the future happi-
ness of billions is built on the unatoned misery of one tortured child.
For both Schelling and Dostoevsky, it is just this fact that Ivan can and
does rebel against God that indicates God’s greatness and humanity. God
has brought about a being free enough that it could rebel against God. “It
is the beholding itself in complete freedom, no longer the tool of the
universal will operating in nature, but above and outside nature” (Schell-
ing 2003, 40). We can say “no.” Later both Schelling and Dostoevsky will
talk about the possibility of saying “yes” (Schelling, 2003 40). It is this yes
that is ultimately creative. In God and humanity, desire and passion re-
late to freedom and selfhood. In the Freedom essay Schelling says that no
one claims that the instinct for self-preservation is something that was
added later to the already finished creature (Schelling 2003, 53). Schelling
claims that self-preservation is a basic characteristic of each individual.
His claims must be a basic principle of all natural science. This leads
eventually to selfhood and individuality. Schelling says that there are in
nature “premonitions of evil alongside pre-established moral relation-
ships” (2003, 43); he means that the will for survival, for self-preservation,
can overcome our relation to any other being. This will be the source of
evil. This is easy to see in people like the Underground Man who intellec-
tually sets himself apart from all other persons, but also in Father Karam-
azov who sees others as only means to satisfy his pleasure. But it is also in
Ivan’s story of “The Grand Inquisitor.” On the surface the Grand Inquisi-
tor seems to be acting out of love for humanity, yet he sees them as little
children at best and probably as pets at worst. He has isolated himself
from them, does not respect them as even potential equals, and kills them
when they get out of line, all for their happiness.
This dark desire that is at the source of our individuality is also the
ground of the possibility of egoism and evil. Jason Wirth notes this partic-
Mystic Terror and Metaphysical Rebels 151
termed a disease: the contagion that spreads after the initial corruption.
Though Schelling does not use these terms, it might be possible to call
these evil1 and evil2. This seems to be at the basis of Ivan’s claim that we
are “artistically cruel.” We have a will to self-preservation and assertion,
but we can carry this so far as to create a fantasy world in with us at its
center. In The Brothers Karamazov we encounter this most clearly in Liza’s
temptation toward the demonic in Book XI, chapter 3, “A Little Demon.”
Liza says “I just don’t want to do good, I want to do evil, and illness has
nothing to do with it.” When Allyosha asks why she wants to do evil, She
replies: “So there will be nothing left anywhere, Ah, how good it would
be if there were nothing left” (Dostoevsky 1990, 582).
Thus the beginning of evil is going from true being to non-being, light
to darkness, truth to falsehood in order to become himself the creative
basis of his being and to rule over all things with himself as the center.
Even he who has moved out of the center retains within him the feeling
that he has been all things when in and with God. There is a desire to
return to this condition. This is the birth of the hunger of selfishness. As
one deserts the center, one becomes ever needier, ever hungrier to the
point of being ravenous and poisonous (Schelling 2003, 69–70). In evil
there is that contradiction which devours and always negates itself,
which just while striving to become creature destroys the nexus of crea-
tion and, in its ambition to be everything, falls into non-being. Moreover,
manifest sin, unlike mere weakness or impotence, does not fill us with
pity but with fear and horror, a feeling which can only be explained by
the fact that sin strives to break with the world, to touch the basis of
creation and profane the mystery. Schelling refers to this as a false imagi-
nation. The Underground Man and Raskolnikov imagine themselves ex-
ceptional men the masters of their worlds but this is a world of fancy.
Stavrogin becomes an exceptional man but he is a monster.
In his famous letter to Mme Fonvizina just after his being released from
prison camp Dostoevsky wrote, “If someone proved to me that Christ is
outside the truth, and that in reality the truth were outside of Christ, then
I should prefer to remain with Christ rather than with the truth”(Frank
1986, 298–299). Dostoevsky was not a fideist who would sacrifice all his
reason to fundamental doctrines, rather for him Christ represented “the
ideal of man in the flesh” (Frank 1986, 298), the freely loving individual.
In context the lines are written against the nihilists like N.G. Chernychev-
sky, the champion of enlightened self-interest. Dostoevsky asserts free-
dom, autonomy, and love are still more important than egoism even if it
can be shown that we always pursue our self-interest and the world is a
dark, cold, meaningless place where only the strong survive and only by
Mystic Terror and Metaphysical Rebels 153
The will to love and the will of the basis thus become one, just through
the fact that they are divided and that from the very beginning each
function for itself. Therefore the will of the basis excites the self-will of
the creature from the first creation, so that when the spirit then arises as
the will of love it may find an opponent in which it can realize itself.
(Schelling 2003, 52)
The best example of how all relationships degenerate into duels of power
through isolation caused fascination with the self occurs in what the
Underground Man calls “the man of intensified consciousness.” For such
a self all relations are power duels between separate egos. This shows up
in his affair with the prostitute Lisa. The Underground Man is infuriated
by her indifference for him when he first begins to speak with her, but
when his preaching finally arouses her interest and begins to strike at her
heart, the game changes and he begins to manipulate her. He leaves her
after expounding his noble ideas and actually touches her. She responds
by showing him a love letter from a medical student to show that she is
loved and is not merely an object. As he enters the street the Under-
ground Man is struck by the “terrible truth” of what he has been doing,
manipulating her as he has done in all his other relationships with hu-
man beings. Later, when she comes to see him, he treats her with con-
tempt and tells her that he only wished to humiliate and manipulate her.
But she sees through him, sensing the extreme pain of his isolation and
for a moment, by her love, breaks through the vortex. The Underground
Man’s heart fails him and forgetting his aims, begins to sob as he never
had before in his life. But when the Underground Man realizes that the
hysterical fit cannot go on forever, he feels ashamed and the thought
comes to him that their roles have been reversed. Lisa was now the hero-
ine; she was saving him, not he her.
All I know is that I was ashamed. It also occurred to me just then,
overwrought as I was, that our parts were now completely changed,
that she was the heroine now, while I was exactly the same crushed
and humiliated creature as she had appeared to be that night—four
days before. . . . I cannot live without feeling that I have someone
completely in my power, that I am free to tyrannize over some human
being. But--you can’t explain anything by reasoning and consequently
it is useless to reason. (Dostoevsky 1968, 372)
The Underground Man quickly recovers himself, falling back into the
vortex of his own intensified consciousness, his own egoism. He rejects
the love that she has offered him and insults her by using her as a prosti-
tute. After she leaves he runs after her, but this is only a pretense. He is
still acting as he had done when he first met her; he knows this and
knows he doesn’t really wish to find her. He then justifies the insult
because, as he tells us, an insult is a sort of purification, the most painful
sort of consciousness that will live with her the rest of her life. After a few
Mystic Terror and Metaphysical Rebels 157
What Christ represents for Dostoevsky is the second movement from the
egoism of autonomy to the loving relation with the other. He does not see
Christ in terms of any of the traditional theories of atonement but as the
“ideal man in the flesh.” Christ represents for Dostoevsky the movement
from the egoism of autonomy to the loving relation with the other, but
this paradoxically does not simply dissolve the ego instead affirming it in
the highest sense. One becomes truly oneself through loving the other.
Christ alone could love man as himself, but Christ was a perpetual
eternal ideal to which man strives and, according to the law of nature
should strive. Meanwhile, since the appearance of Christ as the ideal of
man in the flesh, it has become as clear as day that the highest final
development of the personality must arrive at this (at the very end of
the development, the final attainment of the goal): that man finds,
knows, and is convinced, with the full force of nature, that the highest
use a man can make of his personality, of the full development of his
Ego– is, as it were, to annihilate that Ego, to give it totally and to every-
one undividedly and unselfishly. In this way, the law of the Ego fuses
with the law of humanism, and in this fusion both the Ego and the all
(apparently two extreme opposites) mutually annihilate themselves
one for the other, and at the same time each attains separately and to
the highest degree, their own individual development. (Quoted in
Frank 1986, 298–299)
This ideal is once again close to Schelling. Love can only exist where there
is some passion, some relation to another, some need of one person for
another. The unity of love is not the loss of individuality but rather its
158 Chapter 8
NOTES
evil into the absolute itself. But unfortunately, like Spinoza and the theodicists, Hegel
still likes to take the “long view of things” and from Ivan’s view still misses one of the
main points that future harmony does not compensate present misery.
The pure moral being, on the other hand, because it is above struggle with
Nature and sense, does not stand in a negative relation to them. . . But a
pure morality that was completely separated from reality, and so likewise
was without any positive relation to it, would be an unconscious, unreal
abstraction in which the concept of morality, which involves thinking of
pure duty, willing, and doing it, would be done away with. Such a purely
moral being is therefore again a dissemblance of the facts, and has to be
given up. (Hegel 1977, 383)
3. This became an important issue for many Russian thinkers. Dostoevsky’s young
friend Vladimir Solovyov emphasized the resurrection as the only possible solution to
the problem of evil. Nicolai Feodorov and later the Bolshevik Lunacharsky both also
argued for the moral necessity of resurrection as the great human project though these
later were not theists.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frank, Joseph. 1986. Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation, 1860–1865. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Frank, Joseph. 1987. Dostoevsky: The Years of Ordeal. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1955. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. III. Translated by E.S.
Haldane. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1977. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Jones, Rufus. 2009. Spiritual Reformers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 2009. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by H.J. Pa-
ton. San Francisco: Harper.
Koyré, Alexandre. 1968. La philosophie de Jacob Boehme. New York: Burt Franklin.
Masterson, Patrick. 1971. Atheism and Alienation: A Study of the Philosophical Sources of
Contemporary Atheism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Motchoulski, Constanin. 1963. Dostoevski: L’homme et l’oeuvre. Paris: Payout.
Schelling, F.W.J. 1994. “Stuttgart Seminars.” In Idealism and the Endgame of Theory,
translated and edited by Thomas Pfau, 195–243. Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Schelling, F.W.J. 2003. Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom. Translat-
ed by James Guttmann. Chicago: Open Court.
Solovyov, Vladimir. 1995. Lectures on Divine Humanity. Translated by Peter Zouboff.
Lindisfarne Books.
Terras, Victor. 1991. A History of Russian Literature. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Terras, Victor. 1998. “Schellingianism,” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited
by Edward Craig. New York: Routledge.
Wirth, Jason. 2003. The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Zizek, Slavoj. 1996. The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters.
London: Verso.
NINE
Redemptive Suffering
Neal Judisch
horrors; that they might have evaluated the apparent worth or integrity
of their lives similarly, in light of these events, seems questionable. More
to the point, room must give way to lower-grade forms of suffering as
potentially redemptive, and this Adams would not wish to deny.
So for the present, let’s say (a) suffering of potentially redemptive
value excludes the “objective suffering” that just is sinfulness or moral
disorder—though these things do give occasion to redemptive suffer-
ing—and (b) it includes suffering not severe enough even prima facie to
void one’s life of positive meaning, as well as including Adams’ “hor-
rors.” This is a vague description, but it will serve. My aim in this paper is
to understand how our suffering (so described) can stand in a participa-
tory relation to Christ’s, so that it is geared toward a salvific end or
endowed with redemptive significance.
magnifies and reflects His glory, which is itself a magnificent good. Plan-
tinga therefore maintains that worlds including incarnation and atone-
ment are better, more valuable, than any possible world absent this fea-
ture.
I believe this value assignment flows primarily from the religiously
commendable impulse to give all glory, laud and honor to God. But it has
the unfortunate effect of sidelining what may have moved a loving God
to secure our redemption, and this in a couple ways.
Consider a world in which God forges a path to salvation and beatific
intimacy via incarnation and atonement, but in which no one takes up the
offer. If the manifestation of divinity through incarnation and atonement
is of such value as to render the good of its influence on creatures nigh on
negligible, then there is a straightforward sense in which such a world is
just as valuable as ours. 5 And that seems wrong. Kevin Diller (2008)
makes vivid the oddness of this result when he notes, “the traditional
interpretation of the atonement is that it is the means to accomplish the
end of our redemption,” whereas Plantinga’s theodicy reverses the end
and the means:
The fall now becomes the means to the ultimate end of the display of
God’s love in the suffering of the atonement. What makes the world
great on the Felix Culpa view is the towering good of the costliness of
God’s loving action, not primarily what is accomplished by that ac-
tion. . . . If God’s purpose in atonement is to restore relationship with
us, then it is proper to think that close relationship with creation is to
God of greater value than the cost of the atonement. Restoring relation-
ship is worth the sacrifice. The Felix Culpa approach swaps cost and
value in the equation such that the value of the sacrifice of atonement is
considered worth the cost of breaking relationship with creation. (92–3)
Whether Plantinga ignores the (secondary?) value of restored or aug-
mented relationship will be addressed below, but it is fair to say the
language and tenor of his presentation exacerbate the complaint that he
does. It’s strewn with descriptions of the “display,” the “demonstration,”
the “manifestation” and “enactment” of God’s goodness before our
watching eyes, in the incarnation-and-atonement event; but the age-old
theme that God glorifies Himself by diffusion—an inherently relational
notion—is comparatively neglected throughout.
Further aggravating this worry is his reply to the “Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy” objection—an objection to which he devotes consider-
able time—which says that God on this picture is rather like a guardian
who throws those under his care into grave predicaments, only to swoop
in and save the day to the applause of all. Plantinga doesn’t exactly seek
to dispel the aptness of the comparison; but he does insist God’s deci-
sions are overall for the best, and that the epistemic distance between
God and us should give judgment pause. Perhaps (he says), if we were
166 Chapter 9
perfectly apprised of the reasons God ordained sin and suffering, and if
our wills were perfectly attuned to His, we would voluntarily serve as
(sinful and suffering) means to His end—the depiction of His glory—
even if we weren’t in fact consulted on the matter. So perhaps the judg-
ment that God is an uncaring, utilitarian calculator on the Felix Culpa
line owes simply to our sin or ignorance.
All that’s as may be. The point is his reply gives traction to those
who’d charge him with ignoring the value of incarnation and atonement
for us, in favor of the admirable qualities of divinity it parades. Now in
my view, if Plantinga may be accused of imbalance in emphasis—as the
supralapsarian cast of his theodicy pretty well ensures—he doesn’t by-
pass the good of incarnation and atonement for creatures altogether. He
says (for instance) that incarnation and atonement is the vehicle through
which we attain an otherwise impossible degree of union with God—an
incommensurate good for us—and that our sin and suffering are ordered
to it: it is “by virtue of our fall and subsequent redemption,” he says, that
“we can achieve a level of intimacy with God that can’t be achieved any
other way; by virtue of suffering we are invited to join the charmed circle
of the Trinity itself” (2004, 19).
Here the disparate categories of sin and suffering, redemption and
participation, make contact in Plantinga’s theory. The idea is that sin
gives rise to atonement, which itself calls for incarnation and divine suf-
fering, with the result that human suffering and sin become avenues for
participation in God’s eternal life. But all this needs scrutiny. I mentioned
above that Plantinga treats incarnation and atonement as a package, and
now I can refine this claim. Atonement is clearly bound up with sin in
Plantinga’s estimation: this is why he transitions to the purpose of suffer-
ing as a further question (17ff). 6 So he distinguishes conceptually the rea-
son why God ordains sin from the reason why we suffer—and he certain-
ly does not commend being sinful as a way of growing close to God!
Nevertheless, the value of suffering as a vital bridge to divine intimacy is
something left mysterious. And the mystery only deepens when we re-
flect that incarnation is metaphysically as well as conceptually distinct
from atonement, and looks motivationally distinguishable too. 7 The good
that is the hypostatic union by itself exhibits God’s humiliating love, and
itself paves way for humanity’s inclusion in His life. What’s suffering got
to do with that? How does it enter the redemptive equation?
Plantinga is not without reply. Beyond noting with approval Hick’s
contention that suffering is instrumental to character development, and
nodding toward a natural law theodicy, he cites a few Biblical texts 8 from
which he draws these conclusions: (i) “sharing in the suffering of Christ is
a means to attain . . . salvation”; (ii) sharing in Christ’s sufferings “is a
means of fellowship with him at a very profound level” and a way “to
achieve a certain kind of solidarity with him”; (iii) by sharing His suffer-
Redemptive Suffering 167
Like Plantinga, Marilyn McCord Adams (1999) draws from the well of
Christian tradition in her treatment of sin and suffering: with respect to
these, she too holds “the central doctrines of Christian theology—Chris-
tology and the Trinity—have considerable explanatory power”(164).
However, her approach is different and more demanding in orientation
than Plantinga’s. If Plantinga explains sin and suffering by connecting
them to God’s ultimate end—actualizing a world in which He magnifies
His greatness—and this end outweighs in value the intrinsic badness of
its prerequisite conditions, Adams insists sin and suffering be “defeated”
within the context of each individual life (not just “outweighed” by an
aggregate, global good). It isn’t true, according to Adams, that God’s
justice obligates Him to ensure such an outcome for each of us; it is rather
168 Chapter 9
God’s love that moves Him to secure the good for His creatures, through
the suffering they undergo. 9 So there is between Plantinga and Adams a
reversal of explanatory direction—suffering is related organically with
some great good for us, and God enters into our sufferings that this good
for us may be vouched safe.
The tremendous breadth and richness of Adams’ writings on this top-
ic make it impossible to summarize her contribution to Christian Under-
standing in such limited space. Still, as before, we may gainfully review
her work with an eye toward the nature of participatory redemptive
suffering as she develops it.
Central to her concern is horrendous suffering—suffering so profound
as potentially to destroy the meaning or worth of life for those who
participate in it. Since suffering of this order works to erode meaning, the
defeat of suffering is meaning-restorative: it lays bare the significance of
horrendous suffering such that participants can retrospectively affirm the
value of their lives, despite (even in) the horrors they’ve endured.
It is important to emphasize that the “meaningfulness” of horrendous
suffering is in principle subjectively recognizable as meaningful, as well
as really or objectively purposive. For despite the corrigibility of our
judgments about the value of a life lived, one essential component of a
life worthwhile on the whole is the individual’s estimation that it is (see
1999: 27, 81, 145–6). But it is only too evident that those who suffer hor-
rendously sometimes judge their lives a loss, regardless of the piecemeal
goods they’ve met with in their earthly careers. It follows, according to
Adams, that no aggregate of finite or creaturely goods could guarantee
for all a subjective assessment of life’s worth, and that a loving God must
therefore stand ready “to preserve them in life after death, to place
them . . . in new and nourishing environments where they can profit from
Divine instruction on how to integrate their participation in horrors into
wholes with positive meanings” (84).
Three aspects of this eschatological conclusion need noting, if we are
to appreciate the meaningfulness (thus the “defeat”) of suffering as she
conceives it. First, the postmortem reality she envisions is no mere contin-
uation of the “vale of soul-making” experienced here below. Rather, it is
tied to the incommensurate good of beatific vision, existential union with
the Triune God, which engulfs and absorbs all the minuses of life so as to
ensure positive assessment of its great worth. Second, the retrospectively
recognized meaningfulness of suffering consists chiefly in awareness that
participation in horrors was in each case a point of contact with God, who
threw in His lot and suffered there with us. Third, it is precisely in the
suffering of God Incarnate that this identification occurs: “It is God’s be-
coming a human being, experiencing the human condition from the in-
side, from the viewpoint of a finite consciousness, that integrates the
experience into an incommensurately valuable relationship” (168). Post-
mortem revelation that God-in-Christ met us there, in and through suffer-
Redemptive Suffering 169
whelmingly worth living and, so, is meaningful apart from any puta-
tive causal . . . consequences. (167)
But then the meaningfulness of horrendous suffering is not intelligible
through its organic relation to beatitude, which would anyway occur
without it.
My point is not that the lower-tier suffering of souls who escape hor-
ror participation shouldn’t “partially constitute” meaningful identifica-
tion with God—I think it should. It is that the obscurity of horrendous
suffering’s relation to the beatific outcome frustrates Christian under-
standing of suffering tout court. Any affliction of life—horrific or not—
appears as nothing when compared to the eternal weight of glory, await-
ing us all. Thus all suffering (horrific or not) will inevitably be judged in
some way to just not matter. I hope so. But this does not illuminate why
suffering and death (whether human or divine, horrific or pedestrian) is
redemptively significant in the end, nor why any of it was introduced to
start with.
Note, here, that Adams considers (and rejects) process theology’s con-
tention that a world of suffering is metaphysically inevitable, and that
God’s suffering-with-the world is a metaphysical inevitability too.
Against this she maintains it is God’s free choice to create, and divine
suffering is a function of His loving-care: neither of these things simply
had to be. 10 Now I agree with her here. But this posture only sharpens the
problem of suffering, since the contingency of suffering (both creaturely
and divine) only escalates explanatory standards. That is: God’s uncon-
strained willingness to suffer and (in Christ) to die alongside us does
inspire conviction that Wisdom weaves these things into creation for
good and satisfying reasons; but that this course was freely chosen, as
opposed to strictly unavoidable, just heightens expectation that suffering
should be teleologically and redemptively intelligible from a Christian
point of view.
I think Adams would agree. 11 Her primary problem with process the-
ism isn’t really that it makes divine and creaturely suffering metaphysi-
cally inevitable, but more that it sidesteps the incarnation—and with it
the “considerable explanatory power” of Christology—in its account.
Under this heading, she argues that (i) God’s love for creation culminates
in His assumption of a particular human nature as His own; that (ii) the
suffering of God-as-man “cancels the curse of human vulnerability to
horrors,” because “the very horrors, participation in which threatened to
undo the positive value of created personality, now become secure points
of identification with the crucified God;” and that (iii) this “shifts meta-
physical frameworks” by locating divine participation in horrors square-
ly in “God’s assumed human nature” (165–8).
I believe this Christological focus is what we need to make good on
the promise of Christian Understanding. But we must ask what these
Redemptive Suffering 171
At this point it is sensible to pause and ask whether I’m expecting too
much of “Christian Understanding,” and whether my expectations have
led me to pass too lightly over the Christological elements integral to
Adams’ view.
In answer, I deny it is asking too much for Christian Understanding to
further the teleological intelligibility of suffering and death within a
Christian framework. 13 Such intelligibility does not as I see it require
disclosure of a morally sufficient reason for God’s ordination of suffering
(by which He is “justified”), so I’m not holding Adams’ theory to a stan-
dard she rejects. Nonetheless, the forward-looking promise that suffering
will be considered meaningful retrospectively, as she develops this claim,
seems to me insufficient for purposes of understanding it at last—even
while the breathtaking vision of God’s suffering in Christ looms large.
At the same time, I believe the Christological and traditional theologi-
cal themes she canvasses 14 can be appropriated and pressed into further
service. In this final section, then, I propose an approach to human death
and suffering through the categories of sacrifice and participation, with
the hope of framing the Christian context of participatory redemptive
172 Chapter 9
sibility of transforming death into the perfect gift of self that God intends
it to be.
There is some indication this line of thought was present to the minds
of early Christian martyrs (or their hagiographers), for whom the idea of
martyrdom as sacramentally-informed participation in Christ’s sacrifice
was evidently vivid. Thus St Paul foresees his life poured out as a libation
(see Philippians 2.17; 2 Timothy, 4.6); Ignatius looks with notorious en-
thusiasm to the day his flesh will be “ground fine by the lion’s teeth, to be
made purest bread for Christ” (Roberts and Donaldson 1999, 74); Poly-
carp’s immolation gives off the aroma of baking bread (Roberts and Do-
naldson 1999, 42); and so forth. The Eucharistic overtones, lying on the
surface in such descriptions, push Christian martyrdom past “witness-
bearing” and solidarity with divine aims into the territory of participa-
tion in the life and death of God-as-man. But if so, there are attendant
implications for a Christian view of death generally—not only the elite
and spectacular death of the martyr, but anyone’s death may be elevated
into pure and undefiled gift of self, when united to the offering of Christ.
That is, the meaningfulness of a person’s death lies in its quality as a
perfect gift of love, irrespective of the conditions in which it occurs; and
the purpose of death is the making of this gift.
But how exactly does Christ’s sacrifice “elevate,” “transform” our
own deaths into perfect gifts of love? I remarked previously that we’d
need to understand the “mechanics” or form of participation—what mys-
tico-metaphysical union with Christ amounts to, and how it comes to be
effected—in order to fill out a Christian theory of redemptive suffering. I
find I don’t know how to do this, in a way that (a) can be reasonably
articulated and (b) does not reduce to psychological identification or em-
pathetic solidarity, for example; so an essential element of my proposal
remains underdeveloped. But I stand by the claim. I think it is tolerably
clear that penal substitution theories of atonement leave the purpose of
human death hanging, while participatory accounts hold promise of
something more. But the payoff of such theories for Christian Under-
standing awaits an analysis of “participation in the divine nature” (2
Peter 1.4) that I am presently unable to provide.
I do however wish to say something about suffering in life, in contrast
to the suffering that is death. My strategy so far has been to relate the
sacrificial death of the martyr to “the good death” generally, by arguing
that participation in Christ’s redemptive death can sanctify both. What I
want now to suggest is that suffering in general may be viewed as an
extension of death, and can pick up its redemptive significance through
the same route.
A number of philosophers have argued that vulnerability to physical
and psychological harm is unavoidable for material creatures, and I see
no reason to contest this. If the benefit of creating a regular, natural order
in which living beings can thrive comes at this cost, it is perhaps worth it
174 Chapter 9
on the whole. But the thought that living things are prone to suffer by
virtue of finite power and physical frame draws attention to their essen-
tial mortality, or inevitable disintegration of the physical and mental ca-
pacities vital to creaturely persistence. The bodily and mental suffering of
this life is therefore at no great conceptual remove from the fact of death:
both arise from the conditions of material, created being. So, if death
gives opportunity for the gift of oneself back to God, and if suffering is a
kind of proleptic harbinger of death’s eventuality, then suffering may
serve by extension as a gift of created life given back to its Author. Per-
haps, reaching back again to St Paul, our suffering is a way to fulfill the
(Rom 12.1) injunction to “offer [our] bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and
pleasing to God,” as a “proper act of worship.” It is platitudinous to say
we are born to die, that the process of dying begins concomitantly with
life. But there is a metaphysical point to the platitude, which Christian
Understanding would do well to mine.
The proposed approach I’ve put forward in this section is sketchy and
programmatic. Each element of it requires clarification, elaboration, and
support. And I’m under no illusion that seeing to the bottom of these
things will be any the easier for us than it is for the angels, who long to
look in on them. But my hunch is that Christian Understanding of re-
demptive suffering can still labor on, before it runs up against the im-
pregnable wall of divine mystery; and I hope the avenues of exploration I
have identified here will be found to shoulder some of that load.
NOTES
1. A generic philosophical theism may support theodicy along the periphery, but
will be anemic in comparison with the riches afforded by the western theistic religions
in all their robust particularity. On the other hand, as Stump (1985) points out with
respect to these religions, there is the danger of embarrassment by this abundance if
“attempted solutions to the problem of evil based solely on a few theistic assumptions
common to the major monotheisms are likely themselves to be incompatible with
Jewish or Christian or Islamic beliefs” when spelled out in detail (398). But beyond
these considerations lies the Christian conviction that God’s assumption of human
nature in Christ alters the field entirely, and that a Christian theodicy done well will
highlight and explain why this is so.
2. Thus Plantinga (2004) contends that it is time for Christian philosophers to
move beyond defense “to a different task: that of understanding the evil our word
displays from a Christian perspective. Granted, the atheological arguments are unsuc-
cessful; but how should Christians think about evil?” (5). Adams (1999) argues in the
same vein that Christians should write from within the framework of a Christian
value system (as opposed to a system neutral as between secularism and Christianity),
and should draw from the store of their particular array of religious beliefs, in order
the better to explain how God’s love is consistent with participation in horrific evil.
3. Forensic or debt-repayment etymological connotations of “redemption” are not
hereby ignored, since to go from being a debtor to being debtless is a terrific way of
moving from a sub-optimal to a better condition. Or so I can imagine.
4. Adams (1999) has argued that a person may identify with Christ even in the
commission of horrific evil, since Christ was ritually accursed on the cross and thus
Redemptive Suffering 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I imagine that you are likely familiar with the topic of this volume; or, at
the very least, you have a strong hunch of what the parameters of the
discussion will be when you read a title such as The Problem of Evil: New
Philosophical Directions. To a non-specialist, this title might seem lofty or
even esoteric. Any reader with a passing familiarity with philosophy will
likely know that the title marks out well-known topical territory that
ranges from Socratic dilemmas to earthquakes in eighteenth-century
Spain on past the horrific events of the twentieth century up until present
contexts. I think it safe to assume that most readers readily accept that
these are the borders of the general philosophical discourse on evil. In
fact, it is by acknowledging the themes within these borders that may
allow authors within this volume to propose variations on the typical
approaches to evil. This chapter is no different.
There is an indicator that narrows the discursive territory under con-
sideration in this volume. The title is in English. My mention of this fact
may well tip off readers to the traditional focus of this chapter. Recent
English-language philosophical discussions of evil are less concerned
with the philosophy of the classics, the Enlightenment, or events on the
European continent. Instead the discussion revolves around specific
questions related to whether or not “evil” justifies theistic belief. Over the
last 60 years, a discourse has evolved with increasingly clear borders on
the topic of the “problem of evil.” The focus of the problem is derived
primarily by focusing upon a particular abstraction of Christian doctrine
177
178 Chapter 10
into the premises of theism. 1 These premises are put into the form of an
argument whose validity is tested by questions that may be posed in their
general form: does there exist a contradiction whose resolution requires
the exclusion of a premise? Is there an event whose evidence requires the
exclusion of a premise? Is it more probable that the actual world’s state of
its affairs requires the exclusion of a premise?
All three of these questions are “critical” in the narrow sense. They are
aimed at a particular set of premises which comprise the basis of theism.
If one of these premises is rejected then all the others are correlatively
invalidated. The objective here is not critique or criticism. Rather, the
point of these arguments is to “cut off” (krinein) the grounds for an argu-
ment that would support the existence of an actual entity whose attrib-
utes correspond to the premises of theism. My objective in this chapter is
to propose a critique of this discourse by outlining some major figures
whose arguments served to establish and sustain the particular shape of
this approach to philosophically considering evil. I do this in order to
highlight a problematic with the discourse, based on the following
points: (1) the arguments deployed by the major participants share a
commitment to a binary, where either atheism or theism exclusively ob-
tains, and (2) the binary structuring of the discourse, through repeated
performances of its arguments, effectively circumscribes the object of
study for philosophers of religion to arguments about theism. None of
this is necessarily new in a general sense, but it is worth repeating where
considerations of philosophical approaches to evil are concerned.
The ways of making discourses evident is much simpler with the
advent of digital databases and Internet-based media platforms and their
search tools. A search using the hashtag such as “#problemofevil” on
Twitter may deliver thousands of results that confirm the basic outline of
the discourse. A more specialized method to confirm the discourse
would be to review contents of introductions to the philosophy of relig-
ion using a website such as Amazon.com or books.google.com. Undoubt-
edly, the most specialized method would use an algorithm to crawl
through vast amounts of recorded media to produce analytics about con-
tent patterns in the world’s major research libraries. Not too long ago,
this sort of work was done manually to create data such as the following:
between 1960 and 1991, Barry Whitney (1998) determined that scholars
produced just over 4,237 writings related to the problem of evil. Few
other topics falling within the English-language philosophy of religion
have obtained this amount of attention.
The major figures and topics in the discourse largely emerged within
the period overviewed by Whitney’s bibliographic review. The parame-
ters were set by philosophers of religion attacking the acceptability of
arguments for the existence of an entity—God—set forth by the premises
of theism. Nelson Pike’s (1958) “God and Evil: a Reconsideration” set the
stage, where he proposed a revised, concise version of David Hume’s
Predatory Goodness in the Discourse on Evil 179
WHAT IS A PROBLEM?
some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms “good,” “evil,”, and “om-
nipotent” (26) all of which he understands to be conjoined into “princi-
ples” (26) that ought to be necessary for theism. The point being that if
these rules and necessities are logically true, then theism “can be dis-
proved” (25). The idea of predatory goodness, in sum, is that, “a good
omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely” (26).
It is worth noting that defenses against the logical problem of evil do
not challenge these folk expectations. Instead, it is generally accepted that
the being described by the attributes of theism always eliminates evil
insofar as it can (Weisberger 1999, 24). To my knowledge, no arguments
from within the problem of evil discourse under consideration challenge
the expectation of predatory goodness. 3 Defensive counter-arguments in-
stead choose to carry through nearly all elements of the logical problem
in order to suspend its conclusion with a deferral: for all we know, there
are morally sufficient reasons for evils. As a result, the basic outline of the
logical argument places an expectation of predatory goodness that goes
unchallenged.
The defenses of deferral are deployed because they interrupt deduc-
tive conclusions that would suit the “canons of logic” (Pargetter 1976,
242). By demanding a morally sufficient reason for each evil, defenders of
theism construct “an eternal task” (Adams 1999, 17) of connecting every
local evil in a piecemeal fashion to an ultimately global transcendent
good. Namely, “it would seem to require something like omniscience on
our part before we could lay claim to knowing that there is no greater
good connected to the fawn’s suffering” (Rowe 1979, 337).
The outcome of this defense creates far from satisfying philosophical
conditions. It neither buttresses theism nor compels atheism to find that
morally sufficient reason(s) for evil(s). The logical argument from evil
could only establish itself if there were logically deduced evils which lack
both logical necessity and sufficient reason (Martin 1978, 429). That, how-
ever, is not possible. Philosophical logic can establish conditions for what
may or may not be stated, but much like mathematics, that mode of
inquiry does not have any normative purchase on empirical conditions. 4
As Mackie (1990) notes, the logical problem of evil, “is not a scientific
problem that might be solved by further observations, or a practical prob-
lem that might be solved by a decision or an action” (25).
Two formative outcomes for philosophers of religion result from the
logical problem of evil. One is that the entity described by theism is
governed by an obligation to rule out evils. “Goodness” as an attribute
carries with it not only the contradiction with “evil,” but also an expecta-
tion that the being to which goodness is attributed should predate upon
evil to the fullest extent of its potential. The other outcome for the dis-
course is an expectation of a moral calculus, a morally sufficient reason,
to consider what evils might escape predatory goodness. “For the argu-
ment from evil to succeed, it must be shown that it is unreasonable to
Predatory Goodness in the Discourse on Evil 183
believe that any good is such that it morally justifies the evil which ex-
ists” (Weisberger 1999, 28). These outcomes serve to demarcate the bor-
ders of the discourse by virtue of the impossibility of their satisfaction.
They preserve the potential to pose the problem of evil, but the problem
is posed only with respect to the premises of theism. And the success of
the attack on theism finds itself limited by its own tools. 5
posed inference reiterate predatory goodness and affirm the baseline stat-
us of theism for philosophers of religion. Humans ought to be capable of
knowing the intense animal suffering occurring in their world. They
should be able to understand what goods do exist and to imagine what
goods might come about from what exists. They are thereby capable of
making judgments as to what an omnipotent being can and cannot do;
including the capacity to reasonably expect what a wholly-good being
could do with respect to good and evil (Rowe 1990, 1612). By hinging
itself upon inference to such plausibility, Rowe’s argument obtains epis-
temic persuasiveness.
Rowe seeks to affirm that goodness is predatory while doing away
with the plausibility of evils as justified by moral sufficiency. If such a
fawn’s demise never happened, then a more quantitatively and qualita-
tively good world would obtain, and a good omnipotent thing should
completely eliminate such basic evils. However, Rowe’s argument does
not consider the plausibility of not knowing anything deductively certain
about the fawn. Evils, in Rowe’s argument, are occasional, contingent,
and finite. Each instance of evil is not epistemically accessible. The diffi-
culty, as Susan Neimen (2002) puts it, is the following: “Data are what
you have when you have scientific procedures based on causal analyses
and inductive evidence. None of this is present for events that happen
only once. There everything rests upon speculation” (158). When pressed
about “which exact fawn,” there is no specific answer.
The defense against the evidential problem of evil continues the dis-
cursive pattern of rejoinders to the logical problem of evil. Stephen Wyk-
stra’s (1984) skeptical defense affirms all the basic premises and move-
ments of Rowe’s argument, only to undermine its epistemological cer-
tainty: for all we know, there might actually be a justificatory explanation
for every evil that comes to pass. Wykstra’s strategy not merely repeats,
but amplifies the good-eliminates-evil binary of predatory goodness. The
argument may also be summarized as: for all we know, we may expect
that a powerful and good entity will ultimately rule out all evil. By rela-
tivizing the self-evidence of Rowe’s evidential claims, Wykstra attenuates
the rhetorical force of the attack but does not entirely refute to the prob-
lem posed by Rowe. The conclusion of a single fallibility argument tee-
ters provisionally on the possibility of further evidence, which Wykstra
amplifies with a principle of “CORNEA”: the condition of reasonable
epistemic access (1984). To contend that there is an inordinately strong
requirement for the appearance of divine determination of the world’s
affairs towards empirically observable events that qualify as goods. The
purpose for seemingly inscrutable suffering is reasonably limited, given
human epistemological conditions. Thus claims about evils in the world
are true observations, but any judgment upon the balance of good and
evil in the world must be suspended, pending a further possible observa-
tion of outweighing goods in the future.
Predatory Goodness in the Discourse on Evil 185
CONCLUSION
While one must always start somewhere, all three paradigmatic iterations
of the problems of evil—the logical, evidential and probabilistic—intro-
duce and sustain a rather restricted set of considerations for philosophers
of religion who wish to approach the topic of evil. The borderlines of this
discourse are reinforced by the defenses’ counterarguments to each ver-
sion of the problem of evil. David O’Connor (1987) correctly surmises
that the nature of the discourse is “less a duel than a mime, for the
weapons yielded on each side are incapable of inflicting any wounds”
(441). Despite voluminous publications and a status quo of détente, partic-
ipants in this discourse share the expectation that one side or the other
must ultimately be correct, and, that goodness is necessarily predatory.
Perhaps the participants in this discourse cannot be faulted for this
state of affairs. The discovery and resolution of any apparent contradic-
tion is, according to most philosophers, a fundamental element of under-
taking studies in the discipline and the canons of logic are something
taken to provide conditions for their practice. If a philosophical approach
cannot resolve a contradiction, then its mission has likely failed. For the
problem of evil, however, the possibility of contradiction is not a logical a
priori condition of theism or any religion for that matter. The problem is
posed by people in specific contexts by linguistically putting concepts or
categories into relations with one another. In the case of this specific
discourse, the problem requires the formulation of a third element, an
enthymeme, which brings into relief a putative contradiction between
good and evil. To my knowledge the participants in the discourse de-
picted in this chapter never question the basic folk belief of predatory
goodness behind neither the enthymeme that animates the problem of
evil nor the good-versus-evil binary that structures their arguments. As it
stands, these are the basic elements of the so-called correct abstractions
and background knowledge needed to participate in the discourse in
order to pose a problem of evil. The same elements prevent the discourse
from ever arriving at a decisive conclusion.
After surveying the participants and arguments in the discourse on
the problem of evil, an outcome foreign to their considerations can be
stated by asking about the effect of this discourse. The formalizations and
abstractions done in order to pose a clear-cut contradiction, where good-
ness is predatory upon evil, cumulatively work to exclude wider critical
questions about the scope for doing philosophy of religion. Each paradig-
188 Chapter 10
NOTES
1. Neither Jewish nor Muslim figures nor the resources of their religions have a
significant presence in the discourse. An analytic response would remark that, strictly
speaking, the figures and resources of religions along with their diversity are unneces-
sary for working out the form, structure, and solutions to this specific problem.
2. The logical argument from evil is only a pseudo-problem because, as Terence
Penelhum (1990) notes, “[t]heists do not see fewer evils in the world than atheists; they
see more. It is a necessary truth that they see more [. . .]. Only if this [the atheists’
acceptance of the theological concept of ‘sin’ as a valid means of discussing evil] is
accepted can the problem of evil be represented as a logical problem” (70).
3. For example, William P. Alston (1990) discusses, via meta-ethics, God’s moral
obligation within divine command theory.
4. “First, even if he [the atheist] can refute n possible reasons for saying that God
has a morally sufficient reason, there still may be an n + 1th reason, which hasn’t been
refuted. Secondly, and more generally, the anti-theist is committed to the view that the
statement, ‘an omnipotent and omniscient being cannot have a morally sufficient rea-
son’ is a logical truth. However, the only evidence he can bring to bear against the
statement is factual and inductive” (McMahon 1969, 84).
5. Paul Ricoeur (1984), while not a participant in this discourse, nicely summarizes
the issue, “the fact that a finite understanding will be unable to reach the evidence for
this guaranteeing calculation, only being able to gather together the few signs for the
excess of perfections over imperfections in the balance of good and evil” (641).
6. For example, in his 2003 Gifford lecture, Peter van Inwagen (2006) refers to
“Rowe’s fawn” (9).
7. Single fallibility is the hypothesis that, since human knowledge of the external
world bases its reasons upon propositions whose certainty stands contingently upon
experience of the world, that knowledge is the product of inference rather than deduc-
tive entailment. The truth of knowledge then rests upon confirmation of a proposition
which renders the proposition probable. So long as the proposition is not overridden
by a more probable proposition, it does not yet fail as knowledge. Single fallibility
leads to reasoning by what Charles Sanders Pierce named “abduction,” “where we
find some very curious circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition
that it was a case of a certain general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition”
(Walton 2004, 4).
Predatory Goodness in the Discourse on Evil 189
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Alston, William P. 1990. “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In Chris-
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Draper, Paul. 2004. “More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte.” In Christian Faith and
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Howard-Snyder, Daniel. 1996. Introduction to The Evidential Argument from Evil, xi–xx.
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Larrimore, Mark, ed. 2001. The Problem of Evil. New York: Blackwell.
Mackie, J. L. 1990. “Evil and Omnipotence.” In The Problem of Evil, edited by Robert
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Martin, Michael M. 1978. “Is Evil Evidence Against the Existence of God?” Mind 87:
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McMahon, William E. 1969. “The Problem of Evil and the Possibility of a Better
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O’Connor, David. 1998. God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism.
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Pargetter, Robert. 1976. “Evil and Evidence against the Existence of God” Mind
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Index
191
192 Index
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 69, 70, 81, 83, 141, problem of; problem of evil; of
142–144, 145–146, 148–151, 152–153, proportion, 129, 130; pure (impure),
154, 155, 156–157, 158, 159n3 25–33, 130; relational, 72; religious,
Dougherty, Trent, 14, 117, 118 5; social, 4
Draper, Paul, 18n1, 18n11, 103, 178,
179, 185–186, 189n8 faith, 14, 16, 76, 81, 82n12, 109, 110, 115,
116, 119–123, 124n4, 124n6, 124n7,
Eckhart, Meister, 35–46, 46n1, 46n2, 132, 134, 135, 157, 169; bad, 51, 55,
46n3, 46n4, 46n5, 46n6, 47n9, 47n10, 59–61, 62–63, 65
47n12, 47n15, 47n16, 47n18, 48n19, felix cupla, 164–167, 175n13
48n20, 48n22, 48n27, 48n29, 48n30, freedom, 11, 54, 59–60, 61, 62, 63, 65n5,
49n31, 49n32, 49n36, 49n38 72–76, 79, 107n4, 114, 117, 143–145,
Edwards, Jonathan, 111, 124n3, 137, 146–147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155,
138 175n10
egoism, 29, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, free will, 11–13, 70, 72, 73, 77, 82n9,
156, 157, 158 107n1, 117, 132, 134, 135; defense,
Eichmann, Adolf, 4, 51, 52–54, 57–58, 11–12, 77, 81, 92, 113–114, 117, 122;
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65n3 libertarian, 73, 74–75; theodicy,
enthymeme, 181, 187 11–12, 19n15, 73, 76, 135
Epictetus, 34n3 Freud, Sigmund, 23, 28
epistemic trust. See trust, epistemic
eschatolog(y/ical), 44, 49n31 Garcia, Laura L., 117–118, 118
Evans, C. Stephen, 111 Gleeson, Andrew, 15, 19n18
evil, 40, 43, 45, 46, 46n3, 46n5, 47n10, God, 4, 5, 6–7, 8–9, 11–12, 13–14, 15, 16,
47n12, 47n13, 47n14, 48n19, 48n28, 16–17, 23, 24, 35–36, 37–38, 38–46,
48n29, 49n31, 49n32, 51, 54, 55–56, 46n1, 46n4, 46n6, 47n9, 47n10,
62, 72, 73, 75, 79, 81, 127–128, 47n14, 47n15, 47n17, 48n21, 48n24,
132–133, 135, 136, 136–137, 138–139, 48n25, 48n26, 48n27, 48n30, 49n31,
143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 153, 154, 158, 49n32, 49n34, 49n36, 49n37, 65n3,
158n2, 159n3, 164, 174n2, 175n5, 69–77, 78–81, 81n4, 82n12, 82n19,
175n9, 188n5; abstract, 9, 10, 12, 85–86, 88, 90, 92, 93–94, 95, 96,
18n12, 82n18, 91–92; concrete, 9, 10, 97–98, 99, 100, 100–101, 102, 103,
12, 18n12, 82n18, 91–92, 97; 103–106, 107n1, 107n4, 109–111, 112,
demonic, 151; doers, 6, 51, 52, 53, 54, 113, 114–115, 116–118, 119, 120–122,
57, 64, 65; epistemic, 110, 113, 114, 123, 124n7, 127–137, 137–139,
115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123; 141–143, 145, 146–148, 148–150, 151,
gratuitous, 12, 13, 112; Hell, and. See 152, 153–155, 155, 158, 161–162,
Hell; horrendous, 5, 13, 16, 18n8, 164–166, 167, 168–169, 169–171,
19n16, 79–80, 92, 168–170, 174n4, 171–173, 173, 174n1, 175n5, 175n9,
175n9, 175n10; incomprehensibility 175n10, 175n11, 175n13, 175n15, 178,
of, 23, 24, 25; intrinsic, 72, 93, 96, 180, 183, 185, 188n3, 188n4;
167; moral, 3, 5, 23, 41, 73, 98, 103, goodness of (omnibenevolence), 6,
113, 119, 121; natural, 3, 5, 40, 43, 76, 7, 10, 16, 41, 48n21, 48n24, 75, 81n4,
113, 119, 185; nature of, 1–6, 38; 86, 88, 92, 101, 112, 134, 136, 138,
origin(s) of, 23, 24–25, 75, 77, 150, 149, 165, 166; knowledge of
152; of perspective, 128, 129, 130; (omniscience), 6, 7, 80, 88, 109, 112,
privation theory of, 2, 11, 18n2, 38, 132, 136; love of, 7, 47n10, 75, 109,
41, 42, 70–72, 73, 76, 77, 81, 82n6, 115, 119, 135, 154, 167, 170, 174n2;
103, 129, 134–135, 136, 143, 146, 154; necessary existence of, 86, 101, 106;
Index 193
Jesus, 7, 16, 45, 48n27, 82n12, 129, 132, O’Connor, David, 139n1, 187
153, 161, 163, 172 omnibenevolence. See God, goodness
Jews, 6, 17, 53, 55, 57, 60, 61 of
Jonas, Hans, 34n2 omnipotence. See God, power of:
Judaism, 130, 133, 170 paradox of, 86
omniscience. See God, knowledge of
Kant, Immanuel, 23, 24–25, 54, 95, 104, Optimism, 11, 13
107n3, 154, 158n2
Keller, James A., 10, 124n2 pankalia , 70, 77–79, 79, 81, 82n21
Kierkegaard, Soren, 31, 34n5, 111, paradise, 131–133, 135, 136, 138
124n6 Phillips, D. Z., 15, 17, 180, 181
Kirilov, 151 Pike, Nelson, 18n1, 178, 179, 180, 181
Kodaj, Daniel, 5 Plantinga, Alvin, 7, 9, 11, 16, 18n11, 73,
82n14, 85–86, 91–92, 101, 102, 103,
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 11, 134, 106, 112, 114, 139n2, 141, 162,
147, 149, 158n1 164–167, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174n2,
Levinas, Emmanuel, 17 175n5
Plotinus, 34n3, 71, 82n5, 134
Mackie, J. L., 8, 9, 141, 181, 182 Poston, Ted, 4, 117, 118
194 Index
Jennifer M.S. ANG is the author of Sartre and the Moral Limits of War
and Terrorism (2009), “Fighting the Humanitarian War: Justifications and
Limitations” in Routledge Handbook on Ethics and War: Just War in the 21st
Century (2013), and “Contradictions of Race Struggles: The Case of the
Uyghurs” in Philosophy of Race: Introductory Readings (forthcoming). She
has published articles that examine Sartre’s philosophy with Kant, Hegel,
and Arendt on various issues on ethics, war, revolutions and history in
Peace Review, Sartre Studies International, Philosophy Today, and Cosmos and
History.
Robert Arp works as a research analyst for the US Army. He has
published in many philosophical areas, including philosophy of religion,
philosophy of biology, and philosophy of mind. His work in philosophy
of religion has appeared in Religious Studies, History of Philosophy Quarter-
ly, Journal of Philosophical Research, International Philosophical Quarterly,
and American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. He is editor of Revisiting
Aquinas' Proofs for the Existence of God and co-editor of The Concept of Hell
with Ben McCraw. See robertarp.com.
A.G. Holdier is the teacher and program director for southern Idaho’s
Minidoka Christian Education Association, as well as an instructor for
Colorado Technical University. His research interests lie at the intersec-
tion of theology, phenomenology, and art, with a particular focus on the
function of stories as a cultural artifact. He has presented at conferences
sponsored by the Society of Christian Philosophers and Gonzaga Univer-
sity’s Faith and Reason Institute, as well as at the annual Northwest
Philosophy Conference. He holds an MA in the philosophy of religion
from Denver Seminary.
Neal Judisch received his PhD in philosophy from the University of
Texas, Austin, where he focused in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and
action, and philosophy of religion. He is currently associate professor of
philosophy at the University of Oklahoma. His current areas of research
focus on the overlap of metaphysics (especially human agency) and phil-
osophical theology.
Nathan Loewen is an assistant professor in the Department of Relig-
ious Studies at the University of Alabama. He has two primary areas of
research and publication. One focuses on globalizing discourses within
the philosophy of religion, and the other analyzes the emerging conflu-
ence between Religious Studies and Development Studies. A third area of
197
198 About the Contributors
secular organizations, the Center for Inquiry and the American Humanist
Association. Among his recent books are The Future of Naturalism (co-
edited, 2009), The God Debates: A 21st Century Guide for Atheists, Believers,
and Everyone in Between (2010), The Essential William James (edited, 2011),
Dewey’s Social Philosophy: Democracy as Education (2014), and the Oxford
Handbook of Secularism (co-edited, forthcoming).
Hugo Strandberg is lecturer in philosophy at Åbo Akademi Univer-
sity, Finland. His two most recent monographs are Self-Knowledge and
Self-Deception (2015) and Love of a God of Love: Towards a Transformation of
the Philosophy of Religion (2011).