BRINAS vs.

PEOPLE
G.R NO. L-30309, November 26, 1983

FACTS
• Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Quezon for his 55-year old
mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for
Barrio Lusacan. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and
her granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua, Victor Millan took over as engineman,
Clemente Briñas as conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon
approaching Barrio Lagalag at about 8:00 p.m, the train slowed down and the conductor
shouted 'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Because of that, the old woman walked towards the left front door
facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with
the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed.
As a result, the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more. It took three
minutes more before the train stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not
among the passengers who disembarked thereat. The accused willfully and unlawfully drove
and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to
existing laws, regulations and ordinances, that although there were passengers on board the
passenger coach, they failed to provide lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the necessary
precautions for the safety of passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, as a result of which, they
were over run, causing their instantaneous death.
• CFI of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double homicide thru
reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan. For lack of
sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes Buencamino and on the ground of
reasonable doubt in the case of defendant Victor Millan the court hereby acquits them of the
crime charged in the information and their bail bonds declared cancelled. As to the
responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this will be the subject of court
determination in another proceeding.
• Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
• During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the
heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages
against the Manila Railroad Company.

ISSUE
1. WON, the CA gravely erred in convicting petitioner- appellant under the facts as
found by the said court
2. WON, the CA erred in including the payment of death indemnity by the petitioner-
appellant, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, after the heirs of the
deceased have already commenced a separate civil action for damages against the
railroad company.

RULING
1. No. There is no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from those findings.
• It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-
appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the
conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up and proceeded to the nearest
exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its regular
 speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop
was still a full three minutes ahead. The negligence of petitioner- appellant in prematurely
and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of
Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most
contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

2. NO. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced is culpa contractual, not an act or
omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title
of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-
appellant Briñas Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct
sources of obligation. A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the
criminal action for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right
to file an independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila
Railroad Company. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it
of the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death
indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant. It is well-settled
that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items
of damages may be recovered:
(1) an indemnity for the death of the victim;
(2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
(3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and
(6) interest in proper cases.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death indemnity is
increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for
the death of EmelitaGesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

As this Court held in Tucker v. Milan, CA G.R. No. 7059-R, June 3, 1953: 'The proximate cause of
the injury is not necessarily the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury. It is
only when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is to be charged with the
disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and continuous sequence between the negligent act the
injury (sic) that it can reasonably be said that but for the act the injury could not have occurred,
such negligent act is the proximate cause of the injury, and whoever is responsible therefore is liable
for damages resulting therefrom. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape
liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an
act of God for which he is not responsible intervenes to precipitate the loss.