Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
BRINAS VS. PEOPLE  negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people.
Facts: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought
a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-
year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita
Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon.  head might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause
They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm.
Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and
the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas, shouted “Lusacan,
Lusacan!”  predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with
one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When they were
near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and
the child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks
and were hit by an oncoming train, causing their instant death.  Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver,
Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente
Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower
court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA,
respondent CA affirmed the decision. 
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant
was negligent?  the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he
Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court
and in the conclusion drawn from the findings.  15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common
carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop
they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It
is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus
slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the
nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full
stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if
the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark; there is no
way to stop it as a bus may be stopped. The appellant was negligent
because his announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a
full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached.
The premature announcement prompted the two victims to stand and
proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims
would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train
jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the
victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-
appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO ILIGAN
2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT
IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801, March 27, 1974,
56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to
the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of
the felony committed by the offender. (People v. Mananquil, L-35574,
September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these
requisites are present in this case.
3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. — The intentional
felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by
Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the physician who
autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the
instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the
wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to
do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the
body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The
hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are
expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later
when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having barely
Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the
cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle. Under these
circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s
of the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Urbano v.
SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In other
words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him to the time
Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short
span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having
triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.
4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES. — We agree with the lower court that
was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THE
CASE AT BAR. — But we disagree with the lower court with regards to
its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in
view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr.
Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show
treachery. (People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA
559) There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously
adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. (People v. Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by
Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a
warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of
the appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on
guard for any subsequent attacks against them. (People v. Mercado, L-
33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 455). The requisites necessary to
appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the
time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their determination
to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78,
August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY
MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE
ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE
NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. —
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for
homicide. Again, contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond
reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis
liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active
part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which
led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier
pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of
the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming
from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of
Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the former’s criminal intent
but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the
act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
(People v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such being the case, his mere
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator,
a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan.
(Orobio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988, 165
SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW. — There being no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249
and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as
minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find
insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim’s
unrealized income and therefore, the same is disallowed.
PP vs DOMASIAN
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso
Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez,
Quezon, he was approached by Pablito Domasian who requested his
assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate.
Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a
building to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started
to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a
minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The
man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father.
When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time
bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market.
Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded
a tricycle headed for San Vicente.  As Enrico was crying and being
firmly held, Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and
asked Domasian about his relationship with the boy who told him they
were brothers.  Their physical differences and the wide gap between
their ages made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to
two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. 
Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the
boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, Domasian was able to
escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a
passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the
hospital ambulance and already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return,
Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note
demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that
otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the
note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital,
he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination.
March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed.  .
Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred it
to the NBI for examination and it turned out to be Dr. Samson Tan’s
signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon.
Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a
mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic
with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila.
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.   SC: The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight (something
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties.
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with
serious illegal detention
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only
in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of
the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not
punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which
clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4.    Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1.    By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act
cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no
inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note
would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under
the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been
possible under the new Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of
one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts were
complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the
common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in
exchange for Enrico's life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to
Agra, Tan approached him 6 days before the incident happened and
requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at
that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra
could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.
PP vs PAREJA
Together with Antonio Pareja and one John Doe, herein accused-
appellant Jose Toledo was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8, with the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide in an Information1which reads as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 1986, in the City of
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, with intent of gain, being then armed with a knife and by
means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of HENEROSO (should be
"Generoso") JACOB, by forcibly detaching the bamboo wall of the
kitchen and once inside, threatened the occupants thereof and
demanded for the video machine trade mark "betacord", however
Sabina Jacob grabbed the cloth covering the face of accused Antonio
Pareja which caused the latter to scamper away together with the two
other accused and on the occasion of said attempted robbery the
accused Antonio Pareja, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab (sic) said HENEROSO JACOB several times
consequently inflicting injuries which directly caused his death; thus
said accused commencing the commission of the crime of Robbery
directly by overt acts and was (sic) not able to perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance. That
there is present in the commission of the offense the aggravating
circumstance of night time.
the culprits had not taken into account) may not be considered as
voluntary desistance from the commission of the crime so as to remove
the element of asportation from the complex crime charged. Such
failure to consummate the robbery was not caused solely by their own
volition and inabilities. It was likewise brought about by factors such as
their unmasking and the arrival of neighbors who responded to
Emelita's shouts for help. These circumstances forced them to flee,
leaving behind the objects.
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
Appellant is liable for attempted robbery with homicide even if he was
not himself the author of the killing of Generoso Jacob, for lack of
evidence showing that he endeavored to prevent such slaying. Thus,
the general rule applies that whenever homicide is committed on the
occasion or as a consequence of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery shall be held guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part
in the homicide.30 The same principle applies even if the crime
committed is attempted robbery with homicide.
PP vs RAVELO
The trial court made the following inference which we find to be
erroneous:
To this Court the real intention to kill Joey Lugatiman was made
manifest at 5:00 in the morning of May 22, 1984 when the accused
Bonifacio Padilla together with Hermie Pahit and Nicolas Guadalupe
tied his hands to the wall with a nylon line and gagged him; and when
the accused said they will kill him (Joey Lugatiman) at 9:00 o'clock
p.m. at Awasian bridge. These final and parting words uttered to Joey
Lugatiman eloquently expressed intent to kill. Killing, however, was not
consummated because Joey Lugatiman was able to escape at around
10:00 o'clock in the morning of May 22, 1984. (Rollo, p. 25)
The facts and evidence on record do not show anything from which
intent to kill could be deduced to warrant a conviction for frustrated
murder. A mere statement by the accused stating that Lugatiman
would be killed is not sufficient proof of intent to kill to convict a person
of frustrated murder.
In a crime of murder or an attempt or frustration thereof, the offender
must have the intent or the actual design to kill (US v. Burns, 41 Phil.
418 [1921]) which must be manifested by external acts. For there to be
frustrated murder, the offender must perform all the acts of execution
that would produce the felony as a consequence, but the felony is not
thereby produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. A verbal expression that Lugatiman would be killed sixteen
(16) hours after such statement was made is not sufficient to show an
actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a
statement by the aggressor of the purpose to kill, but also by the
execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal
blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.
However, after the performance of the last act necessary, or after the
subjective phase of the criminal act was passed, the crime is not
produced by reason of forces outside of the will of the aggressor.
(People v. Borinaga, 55 Phil., 433 [1930]).
Tying the victim's left leg with a chain on a 2" by 3" piece of wood and
leaving him inside the house of accused-appellant, Bonifacio Padilla
are not acts that would result in death. These were done only to
restrain his liberty of movement for the period of time the accused-
appellants were busy hanging and burning the body of Reynaldo
Gaurano some thirty (30) meters away from where Lugatiman was left.
Also, tying Lugatiman's hands behind his back and his whole body to
the wall, and blindfolding him were for the purpose of restraining his
liberty until the evening of May 22, 1984 came.
Accused-appellants also maintain that the injuries sustained by
Lugatiman from the manhandling at the Headquarters of the Airborne
Company were not fatal as stated by the prosecution's expert witness,
Dr. Petronila Montero; hence, there can be no frustrated murder. This
is supported by the records (Exhibit "A-2", Records of Criminal Case
No. 1194, p. 21; TSN, June 4, 1985, pp. 24-26) Lugatiman did not lose
consciousness as a result of the blows he sustained (TSN, May 31,
1985, p. 49, Record, p. 115)
It is worthy to note that the trial court, in concluding the existence of
frustrated murder, did not even use as its basis, the manhandling of
Lugatiman. The trial court in fact concedes that the real purpose of the
manhandling or torture was to have Lugatiman admit and confess his
being a member of the New People's Army (NPA) and the activities of
the NPA's. It was the statement made by the accused-appellant
NicolasGuadalupe that Lugatiman would later be killed, that was the
basis of the court for inferring the commission of frustrated murder.
According to the trial court, murder was not committed because of the
timely escape. Escape from the aggressors cannot establish frustrated
murder without first showing that the aggressors intended to kill and
that they really attacked the victim.
Under the circumstances, accused-appellants could not even be
convicted of an attempt to commit murder. There was no
commencement of the criminal act by over acts which have a direct
connection with the crime of murder intended to be committed. As
stated earlier the manhandling, express statement of purpose, and the
restraint of liberty were not such as to put the victim in danger of an
imminent death. The small abrasions and hematomas of the victim
resulting from the torture by the accused were not mortal. After the
victim was restrained of his liberty immediately before Gaurano was
killed, he was able to watch how Gaurano was burned hanging upside
down from a mango tree near the Awasian bridge. Due to his fatigue
and extreme weakness, he was even able to lie down and sleep after
looking at the horrible incident. (TSN, May 31, 1985, pp. 22-23)
During the long period of time Lugatiman was informed that "he would
be killed" and was left behind (5:00 in the morning) until he was able to
escape at 10:00 in the morning, it was not certain whether or not
appellants would really kill him as they did to Gaurano. Anything could
have happened in between. There was no distinct evidence to prove
that the accused appellants were really decided on killing him at the
time specified.
The records show that Lugatiman himself was not sure that the
accused-appellants would pursue it.
CANCERAN vs PP
"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with
which he was charged in the complaint or information and on which he
was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of
guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any
offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which
he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be
informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged
before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than
that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would
be an unauthorized denial of that right."20 Indeed, an accused cannot
be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.21 An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.22
The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the
crime in its attempted stage. In this case, although the evidence
presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he
could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the
overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft,
because the Information did not charge him with consummated Theft,
the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he
so protests.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been
violated – these being conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information." 23 In the case of Domingo v.
Rayala,24 it was written:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation
of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor,
but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the
crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.25
In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the
offense, which was "Frustrated Theft," may be just his conclusion.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the
additional allegation, "but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
some cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they were
discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented
them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream, x x x.26 This averment, which could also be deemed by
some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous. There
being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the
accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that
the charge against him was consummated theft.
PP vs PADIT
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove carnal knowledge on the ground that AAA
explicitly stated in her testimony that accused-appellant merely rubbed
his penis against her vagina. AAA, who was then four years old at the
time of the molestation, was not expected to be knowledgeable about
sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The fact that she claimed
that accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not
mean that there was no penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as
the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman.21 This explains why the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates the rape.22 As such, a mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
already constitutes consummated rape.23 In the present case, AAA
testified that she felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed his penis
[against her] vagina."24 This Court has held that rape is committed on
the victim's testimony that she felt pain. 25 In fact, AAA still felt severe
pain in her vagina when she was being given a bath by her mother
after her molestation.26 This kind of pain could not have been the result
of mere superficial rubbing of accusedappellant's sex organ with that of
the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result of penile
penetration sufficient to constitute rape.27
Besides, the testimony of AAA is corroborated by the findings of the
physician who examined her indicating the presence of slight hymenal
abrasion upon examination of her vulva.28 Thus, the RTC and the CA
are correct in concluding that both the victim's positive testimony and
the findings of the medico-legal officer complemented each other in the
conclusion that there was penetration, however slight.
CORPUZ vs PP
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending
the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied
through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the
power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately
presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
xxx
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief
Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to
prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court
to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the
Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to
civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is
awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is
truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on
the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law
is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only
pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil
indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current
conditions.
PP vs GALLO
This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the
accused-appellant and the other persons in the agency who are
currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of
syndicated illegal recruitment.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together
with Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and employees of MPM
Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the active
involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single
purpose – to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of
guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that
complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their
papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible
salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about
the business and what to expect from the company. Then, here comes
accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyn’s relative and
specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send
many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers
visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-
appellant signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down
payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the
actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM
Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking.
Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.
In People v. Gamboa,13 this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy
in the context of illegal recruitment, viz:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident
from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and
after the commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one
in purpose and united in its execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. As such, all the
accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of
illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is
sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.1
PP vs RECONES
CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; WHEN APPRECIATED. -
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.  Proof
of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not necessary to
establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the acts of the accused,
before, during, and after the commission of the felony, demonstrate its
existence.
3. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - Conspiracy was appropriately inferred
from the following circumstances, to wit: (1) accused-appellant was in
the company of Recones and Wahing in the afternoon of July 7, 1993;
(2) upon seeing Garate at the waiting shed, the trio alighted from the
motorcycle and ganged up on Garate with Recones and Wahing
raining blows on Garate in the presence of accused-appellant who did
nothing to stop his companions; (3) when Garate attempted to flee,
accused-appellant, together with Recones and Wahing, pursued him;
(4) when accused-appellant caught up with Garate, he gripped the
latter tightly, thereby effectively preventing any possible escape; (5) he,
likewise, blocked the path of Garate when the latter attempted to flee
towards the safety of his house; (6) accused-appellant was holding
Garate while Recones and Wahing were raining blows on the victim;
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(7) accused-appellant did not stop Recones when the latter hit Garate
on the head with a stone marker; and finally, (8) accused-appellant fled
from the crime scene together with the two assailants.  Taken
collectively, these circumstances clearly and satisfactorily provide the
bases for this Court's finding that Recones, Wahing and accused-
appellant acted in concert with each other in killing Garate.  Although
accused-appellant did not deliver the fatal blow, he remains
accountable for the death of the latter on the principle that the act of
one is the act of all.
ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in
multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-
called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or
group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as
with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.[23]
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears
similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada
while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the
spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge
against the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of conspiracy in
the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed
that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents
appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in
American criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine law,
conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a
crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such
as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In
contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or
conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.[24] The essence of
conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted
action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose
not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. [25]Its
elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled
with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and
requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive
offense.[26]
PP vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioners first argument denigrates as grave abuse of discretion the
public respondents rejection of the theory of overlapping conspiracies,
which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first level
of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of,
another conspiracy in the next level of which the actor is not an active
party. As the petitioners logic goes following this theory, respondent
Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President Estrada
in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth from jueteng under par. (a) of the
amended information. He has also a culpable connection with the
conspiracy, under par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco excise tax
and in receiving commissions and kickbacks from the purchase by the
SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other illegal sources
under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three
paragraphs. And since the central figure in the overlapping
conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense,
all those within the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with
the same kind of non-bailable offense.  reaches the City Administrator, the Court cannot consider the
Explaining its point, petitioner cites People v. Castelo[16] which, as here,
also involves multiple levels of conspiracies. Just like in the present
case where the lead accused is a former President no less, the prime
suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking government
official a former Judge who later rose to hold, in a concurrent capacity,
the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National
Defense, to be precise. In Castelo, charges and countercharges were
initially hurled by and between Castelo and Senator Claro Recto, who
was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star witness against
Castelo in a scandal case. Castelo left the Philippines for Korea. While
away, someone shot Monroy dead. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy
led by a certain Ben Ulo (who appears to be the mastermind) and a
group of confidential agents of the Department of National Defense,
one of whom was the triggerman. Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close
bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the Solicitor General tagged Ben Ulo
(not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This
notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for desiring Monroys
demise. The conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then
determined to be overlapping with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo
and the confidential agents, one of whom was the triggerman.
Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies, petitioner
cites the ruling in People v. Ty Sui Wong,[17] featuring a love triangle
involving a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the heart of
Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead
body of Mariano was found with multiple stab wounds in a dark alley
in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among Sampaloc
hoodlums who had no direct link with Victor. However, one of the
neighbors of the Sampaloc hoodlums was a classmate of Victor. In the
end, on the basis of interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor
and his classmate together with all the Sampaloc hoodlums guilty of
murder.
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the
premises, petitioner presently argues: 
It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Joseph
Estrada conspiring with former Gov. Singson for the collection and
receipt of bribes (jueteng protection money); and of former Gov.
Singson involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet another level of
conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e., the regular collection of jueteng
protection money for accused Joseph Estrada; and, respondent
Jinggoy Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy between
accused Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson, agreeing to remit the
greater part of his collection of bribes to accused Joseph Estrada as its
ultimate beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy Estrada reached an
agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed the plan and
participated in furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and
collection of jueteng protection money, i.e., collecting P3 Million
in jueteng protection money every month; remitting P2 Million thereof
to former Gov. Singson for delivery to accused Joseph Estrada and
retaining P1 Million thereof for himself.
ARIAS DOCTRINE VS JACA CASE
c2.2 The Arias ruling and the present case
The Arias ruling squarely applies where, in the performance of his
official duties, the head of an office is being held to answer for his act
of relying on the acts of his subordinate. In its Memorandum, 100 the
prosecution submitted that the petitioners were the heads of the three
"independent" offices at the time material to the controversy, i.e., the
Office of the City Treasurer, the Office of the City Accountant and the
Office of the City Administrator. On this point alone, Gaviola’s reliance
on Arias already stands on shaky grounds.
However, the Court observes that the key functions of the City
Administrator do not relate either to the management of or accounting
of funds of the local government or to internal audit. His concern is the
overall administration and management of the affairs of the local
government as a whole. Given the prior certifications of the two other
offices; the internal check employed by Gaviola before affixing his
signature; and the intervening process before the voucher actually
deficiency in the "particulars of payment" alone to charge Gaviola with
knowledge that something was amiss and that his failure to do so
would amount to gross and inexcusable negligence. Unlike the
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signatures on the disbursement vouchers of the City Treasurer and of
the City Accountant, the City Administrator signs Box C ultimately as
an "approving officer" without any direct involvement in the
management and audit of local government funds before and after the
disbursement. It would seem, therefore, that Gaviola’s own reliance on
the signatures of the heads of the two other offices is not entirely
misplaced.
The signatures of the other petitioners, however, are only part of the
picture. Gaviola’s reliance on these alone does not establish good faith
if the bare signatures on the voucher and the written request from the
paymaster are all that he has with him when he affixed his signature on
Box C.101
Amidst conflicting assertions, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the
prosecution’s evidence that the disbursement vouchers did not have
the required supporting documents when Gaviola affixed his signature.
While the vouchers themselves indicate that it had gone through the
Internal Control Office, allegedly for a determination of the
completeness of the supporting documents before Peña finally turned it
over to Gaviola, the Sandiganbayan gave emphasis on Gaviola’s
failure to present evidence that he indeed requested the submission of
the supposed attachments from the COA and put a premium on Chan’s
testimony.
We find no reason to reverse the Sandiganbayan. Additionally, we
observe that while payment of salaries of employees of the Cebu City
government is either on a quincena or weekly basis, still there are only
two payrolls prepared, corresponding to the first and second halves of
the month. The payroll for the first quincena is prepared on the first
week of the month, in time for the weekly-paid employees to receive
their first week salary. For purpose of payment for the next pay periods
- the payment of the 2nd week salary and the 1st quincena - the payroll
(together with its supporting documents) stays with the
paymaster/disbursing officer.102 This arrangement only means that if
Badana would make a cash advance for the 1st week or 3rd week, the
disbursement vouchers could not actually be supported by complete
documents since the same stay with the paymaster herself.
As described by the prosecution, the offices involved in the processing
of cash advances are technically independent of each other; one office
does not form part of, or is strictly under, another. Thus, each has
independent functions to perform to ensure that the funds of the local
government are disbursed properly and are well accounted for. While
the Court views Gaviola’s failure to inquire further before affixing his
signature despite the absence of the "particulars of payment" in the
disbursement vouchers as negligence on his part,103 to additionally affix
his signature despite the lack of supporting documents only shows a
gross and inexcusable disregard of the consequences of his act as
approving authority. If Gaviola bothered to glance at the supporting
documents, he could have signaled to his co-accused that their acts or
omissions opened an opportunity for Badana to commit malversation
that would result in a loss to the local government’s coffers.
MATIC vs PP
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending
himself.9
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused
and the victim. The established circumstances indicated that such did
not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only
against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of
Talampas’ attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene
of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed
any unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not
repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto), thereby
rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by
invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal
Code,10 the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a
situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal,
exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process
produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in
the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal
act.11 Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of
our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. 12 In
short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong
done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas
brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting
Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that
point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the
right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the
ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall
on his back. Certainly, Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful, being
a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo,
not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal
hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas’
felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim
amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance
that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his
criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal
causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused).13 Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, 14 criminal liability
is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
PP vs GENOSA
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the
battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the
concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-
defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. [23] By appreciating
evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome,
foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state
of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled
over a period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man
in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-
esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female
sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency
to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that
the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by
the so-called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could
be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.
The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually
happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her,
are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of
the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes
his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
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However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate
him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse
worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the
growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the
battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes
angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the
violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident.
[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its
nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are
his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she
cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her
condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her
apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized
thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she
knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back.
Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such
that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he
has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand,
the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and
that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she
loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair,
she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the
chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are
very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she
leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her
back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is
most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a
battered womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of
tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is
better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]
PP vs SALDAA
As to herein appellants Morales and Malit, we find here a fit occasion
to reiterate our ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario.[100] Under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, [101] a person is exempt from
criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force,
or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
because such person does not act with freedom. [102] In Del Rosario,
[103]
 however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending,
and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury
is not enough.[104]
In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the ransom
money was to be delivered, appellants Arturo Malit and Fernando
Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused, entered the van
wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time Narciso Saldaa, Elmer
Esguerra and Romeo Bautista were waiting for both appellants from a
distance of about one (1) kilometer. [105] By not availing of this chance to
escape, appellants allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable.
[106]
 We have held that in order that the circumstance of uncontrollable
fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal
combat.[107] Moreover, the reason for their entry to the van, where the
father of the victims was, could be taken as their way of keeping
Feliciano Tan under further surveillance at a most critical time.
Appellant Morales contention that their families were similarly
threatened finds no support in the evidence. The records are bereft of
any showing that such threats to appellants families were made at
all. We have held in People v. Borja[108] that duress as a valid defense
should not be speculative or remote. Even granting arguendo that
Saldaa, Bautista, and Esguerra threatened to harm appellants families
to coerce appellants to receive the ransom money at Gumi, Lubao,
such threats were not of such imminence as to preclude any chance of
escape. In fact, as already discussed, appellants had a real chance to
escape when they went to Felicianos van. Under the circumstances,
even if true, the fear that appellants allegedly suffered would not suffice
to exempt them from incurring criminal liability.
Moreover, kidnap victim Jefferson Tan categorically testified that each
of the kidnappers acted of his own accord and that nobody
commanded anyone.[109] According to Jefferson, while appellant Malit
trained the gun on driver Cesar Quiroz, appellant Morales opened the
right-side front door of the van at the same time that accused Elmer
Esguerra took the wheel.[110] The trial court found Jeffersons testimony
worthy of credence. It disbelieved appellants attempts, while on the
witness stand, to put all the blame on co-accused Narciso Saldaa and
Elmer Esguerra who, up to now, remain at large.
Based on the evidence at hand, we find no sufficient reason to disturb
the trial courts assessment of the defense presented by
appellants. The crime of kidnapping is not committed on impulse. It
requires meticulous planning to determine who would be the
prospective victim or victims. Its execution needs precise timing and
coordination among the malefactors. It is improbable that a group of
kidnappers would risk the success of their well-planned criminal
scheme by involving unwilling persons, much less strangers, who could
abort the kidnapping by refusing to cooperate in its execution.
[111]
 Worse, such unwilling companions could easily expose their plan to
the authorities and subsequently even testify against them in
court. Thus, we find the defense claimed by appellants neither logical
nor satisfactory, much less consistent with human experience and
knowledge. For this reason, we also agree that appellants version of
the facts is unworthy of credence, in the light of candid testimonies
given by prosecution witnesses.
PP vs ROA
In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the
plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence,
the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be
sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the
issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing
the crime. This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of
insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing
evidence to support the claim. Insanity as an exempting circumstance
is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an
exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who
pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of
an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged.
VERDADERO vs PP
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence,
the Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at
the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from
that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not
clearly proven.
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It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental
state at the exact moment the crime was committed. This, however, is
not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be
shown by circumstances immediately before and after the incident.
Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be
taken into account.
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was
suffering a relapse of his schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing
incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might
have been in a lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the testimony of an expert
witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he stabbed
Romeo.
Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the
observations made by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution.  meters away from Vicente's house where his nephew, Jeffrey
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for
a long time. He had observed that there were times that Verdadero
appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become
violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that
Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes
and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred
to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to
control him from harming himself and others.
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony
that drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among
the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as
basis for his previous diagnosis. 29 The evidence on record supports the
finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu
reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a
relapse of his illness on that fateful day.
Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse of schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity
after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be
appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior before or simultaneous to the crime.30
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done
with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard
against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general
plea of insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do
not indicate that the defense of insanity was merely used as a
convenient tool to evade culpability.
The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already
raised the defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting that
he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead,
consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous
cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised
only when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's
alleged insanity was not a mere afterthought.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not
totally free him from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts.
Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person
has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall
order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his
mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a
member of society. He shall remain confined therein until his attending
physicians give a favorable recommendation for his release.
Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him
from criminal responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to
indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities
exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33
PEOPLE vs. UMAWID
On November 26, 2002 at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente
Ringor was staying with his two-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy
Ringor, at the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San Manuel,
Isabela. Suddenly, Roger Ringor Umawid appeared and started
attacking Vicente with a long bolo (panabas) without any reason. While
Vicente was able to escape Umawid's blows, the latter nevertheless hit
Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instant death. Upon
seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five
Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken by the sudden noise, Jeffrey went
outside only to see his uncle rushing to attack him with his panabas.
Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to
seek for safety. However, Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from
closing the door and the former barge into the house. Jeffrey crouched
and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid's
impending attacks.
Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation
of the latter's fingers. Umawid only stopped upon seing Jeffrey, who
was then pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained.
In court, Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however,
take the witness stand to attest the same. Instead, he presented the
testimonies of Dr. Arthur M. Quincina and Dr. Leonor Andres Juliana to
support his claim. Dr. Quincina testifies that he evaluated Umawid's
psychiatric condition in May 2002, February 2003, and on March 2003
and found that the latter was evident od psychotic symptoms.
However, he could not tell with certainty whether Umawid was
psychotic at the time of the commission of the crimes. On the other
hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on Umawid's mental stare since she
merely referred the latter to another doctor for further evaluation.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liablity
due to insanity?
Ruling: No. Under Article 12 of the RPC:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liabity - The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance
because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the
crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The
presumption is in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.
Considering the case, the evidence must relate to the time immediately
before or during the commission of the offense/s with which one is
charged. Also, to support the defense of insanity, it must be shown that
the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.
In this case, Umawid relied solely on the defense of Dr. Quincina and
Dr. Juliana to support his claim of insanity. However, Dr. Quincina only
examined Umawid six months before he committed the crime and
three months and four months thereafter. Her findings as she admitted
did not include Umawid's mental disposition immediately before or
during the commission of the crimes. Also, given that Dr. Juliana failed
to testify in favor of the accused, Umawid's defense of insanity
remained unsubstiantiated, hence, he was properly adjudged by the
RTC and CA as criminally liable.
PP vs ANTICAMARA
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was
only forced to participate in the commission of the crime because he
and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense fails to
impress us. Under Article 12[17] of the Revised Penal Code, a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. [18] To
avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1)
the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at
least equal to, that committed. [19] For such defense to prosper, the
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.[20]
 
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence
that he was under duress from his co-accused while participating in the
crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability.
The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and
directed to station himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was
there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.[21] of the following day, while the rest
of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al
had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a
real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across
the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours, [22] and thereafter
returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his report.
Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas house. When the
group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to
wait for his companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a
vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and
AAA.[23] Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he
wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from
the authorities or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas
during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any
effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof
that would exempt himself from criminal liability.[24]Therefore, it is
obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.
MANANSALA vs PP
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
courts a quo convicting Manansala of the crime of Falsification of
Private Documents, but disagrees in the appreciation of the "mitigating
circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in her
favor.
As already stated, Manansala was charged with committing the crime
of Falsification of Private Documents defined and penalized under
Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC, which
respectively read as follows:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
xxxx
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxxx
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172
(2) of the RPC are: (a) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code; (b) that
the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. 25On the
other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the
RPC are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the
facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found
Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime,
considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally
obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she
prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b)
she knew all along that Siy never made any cash advance nor utilized
the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such knowledge,
she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a
statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused
great prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job on
account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that
findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree
of respect by an appellate tribunal 27 and, absent a clear disregard of
the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case
or any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court,28 as in
this case.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper,
it was error for the MeTC to appreciate the "mitigating circumstance" of
acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the
CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without correcting the latter
court's mistake.
To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not
among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the
RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of
the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated
in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal
to, that committed.29 For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not
enough.30
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was
apprehensive in committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject
report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions,31 nothing
would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that
matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do
so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat,
intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do
what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would
modify Manansala's criminal liability in this case - and also taking into
consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law - she
must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
DE VERA vs DE VERA
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites
should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s
agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. 24 The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself
up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.25 Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to
ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore,
cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a
mitigating circumstance.26
Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas 27 and in People v.
Taraya,28 the Court added a fourth requisite before "voluntary
surrender" may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there is
no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of
arrest had been issued, petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and
the "surrender" could not be considered "voluntary."
In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper
portion of the cemetery where a police officer caught up with him.
Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself up. The Court held that if the
accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left with
no choice. Thus, the "surrender" was not spontaneous.  tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched
In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were
looking for him (because of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately
went to the police station where he confessed that he killed the victim.
Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police, the Court
refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr.,29 the accused surrendered to the
authorities after more than one year from the incident in order to
disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court refused to
mitigate the accused’s liability because there was no acknowledgment
of the commission of the crime or the intention to save the government
the trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there was a
pending warrant for his arrest.
Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case.
Cagas is not applicable because the accused therein did not surrender
but was caught by the police. In Taraya, the warrant of arrest had, in
fact, been issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for
implementation. In Barcino, it was a year after the commission of the
crime when the accused went to the police station, not for purposes of
acknowledging his culpability, nor to save the government the expense
and trouble of looking for and catching him, but actually to deny his
culpability.
In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on
February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order
finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of
bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of
the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for
reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more
need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest.30
The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the
surrender. As distinguished from the earlier cases, upon learning that
the court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and
even before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest,
Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was
bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the
trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
"voluntary surrender."
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or
the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the
surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco,31 the Court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been
served on him, the accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear
that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the
accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he
surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of
giving himself up.  his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not
DELA CRUZ vs PP
In People v. Malngan,115 barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman
were deemed as law enforcement officers for purposes of applying
Article III of the Constitution. 116 In People v. Lauga,117 this court held
that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation under Article III, Section 12118 of the Constitution, "has the
color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement
of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"119
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-
related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is
inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to
port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin
to routine security procedures in airports.
DEL CASTILLO vs PP
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay
warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of
persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines
persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation,
board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority.A
barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons
in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes
the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in
authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal
Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and
members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be
deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order,
protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of
a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed
agents of persons in authority.
 
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as
the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority
during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the
confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus, making the
same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the
prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated
drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
PP vs SIBBU
With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial court
correctly held: 
In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house
when accused Tirso Sibbu fired shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was outside
the house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against Tirso Sibbu.
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled:
xxxx
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into
account. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house,
necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling
of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have
devised means to perpetrate the assault from without x x x.23
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PP vs ALICIA
The lower court correctly found the existence of the special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, defined under Article
160 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:  their statements were immaterial considering the swiftness of the
ART. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty
imposed for another previous offense. — Penalty. — Besides the
provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same, sham be punished by
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony.  that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked.
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which imposes
the maximum of the penalty for the new offense. It makes no
difference, for the purpose of the effect of quasi-recidivism under
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which an
accused is serving sentence at the time of the commission of the
offense charged, falls under the said Code or under special
law. 3 Quasi-recidivism is punished with more severity than recidivism
proper because the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as any
other aggravating circumstance, may be offset by a mitigating
circumstance present in the commission of the crime, whereas, in a
case of quasi-recidivism the maximum degree of the penalty
prescribed by law for the crime committed should always be imposed
irrespective of the presence of any mitigating circumstance.
PP vs FELICIANO
The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is
fully apprised of the charge against him to enable him to prepare his
defense. The argument of appellants that the information filed against
them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them holds no water. The Court found
no merit on the appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should not
have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise” in the information since they were presenting testimonial
evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their
masks fell off.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being
alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an
aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such.
It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to
that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because,
like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and
unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends
to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not
prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.
What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance
is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense
they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused
were not wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be
informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy
presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean all
the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if
there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have
done so.
xxx
The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the
witnesses for the prosecution. It was held that the trial court, in
weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies in
incident.
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have
little persuasive value in this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he
arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him
This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the
res gestae.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating
lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that
the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in
res gestae.
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have
little persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the events
transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time.
Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack,
testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on,
some remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of
the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from
beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account
of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight
than that of the victims.
 
Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and
there was treachery in the commission of the crime
The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not
at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for
any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes
and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with
their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered,
it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The
attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the
incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity
for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.
PP vs AQUINO
However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as
an aggravating circumstance in this case. As per jurisprudence, when
the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery,
the former is absorbed in the latter.24 Since there is no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code,25 it being the lesser penalty between the two indivisible
penalties for the felony of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death.
PP vs CAÑAVERAS
Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.74 It must be
shown that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength. 75 When appreciating this
qualifying circumstance, it must be proven that the accused
simultaneously assaulted the deceased.76 Indeed, when assailants
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
attack a victim alternately, they cannot be said to have taken
advantage of their superior strength.77
In this case, the unidentified companions of appellant punched Claro
first. He was already about to escape when he was struck by appellant
on the head with a beer bottle. Thus, the attack mounted by the
unidentified persons had already ceased when appellant took over.
Also, the fact that Claro would have been able to escape showed that
the initial attack was not that overwhelming, considering that there
were three of them attacking. Clearly, there was no blatant disparity in
strength between Claro, on the one hand, and appellant and his
companions on the other.
PP vs TAMAYO
Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one
helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed
him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the
accused took advantage of their superior strength.
PP vs PRADO
The prosecution ably established the presence of the element of
treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The shooting of the
unsuspecting victims was sudden and unexpected which effectively
deprived them of the chance to defend themselves or to repel the
aggression, insuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.
PP vs NABONG
Appellants assert that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
appreciating treachery since the evidence is bereft of proof that
appellants plotted to carry out the attack on the victim.
Appellants’ contention is unmeritorious.  other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape.20 Thus, this Court has ruled that even frontal attack can be
treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed.21 Treachery can still be appreciated even when the victim
was forewarned of the danger to his/her person. 22 What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself/herself or to retaliate. 23 In the present case, the victim
did not even have sufficient warning of the danger that was looming,
since the attack against her came from behind and was so sudden and
unexpected, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare her
defense or enable her to offer the least resistance to the sudden
assault.
PP vs FIELDAD
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards
were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to
maintain peace and order within the compound."17 This argument is
untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might take.18
In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was
killed, we held:
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are
present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also be
appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life
where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction
of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six
wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of
the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were
armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then
shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he
was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his
death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the
killing of three peace officers, one of whom was armed and assigned to
maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event where
many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order.
In that case, the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no
means of defending themselves against the sudden attack.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not
afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning,
Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile,
Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite,
and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and
shot JO1 Bacolor.
PP vs ENOJAS
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the
aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of
unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In
“aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only. They must not
be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as
the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-
principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the
the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as qualifying a homicide to murder. 14 Consequently, the accused in this
case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of
unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
SIMANGAN vs PP
Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the
victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty
to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof
that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator
intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim.[32] The
number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty.
PP vs CARPIO
Use of a deadly weapon was duly alleged in the information. Use of a
deadly weapon is not, however, among those provided in Article 14 of
the RPC enumerating aggravating circumstances nor in Article 15 of
the RPC enumerating alternative circumstances. Consequently, use of
a deadly weapon cannot be appreciated as an aggravating or
alternative circumstance against appellant.
PP vs BALDOGO
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was
seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the
mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept
under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was
prevented from going back home for a period of about six days.
Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally
detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie
was taken from their house by accused-appellant and Bermas.
However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information as an
aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
"SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it."57
Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an
aggravating circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate the
penalty.58
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code59 is alleged in both Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to
have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the
penal colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-
recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. 60 The prosecution is
burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to prove quasi-
recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a
certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of
homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory.61The raison d'etre is that:
"x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such
information, there was a joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or
innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of the modifying
circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was thus burdened to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the
existence of the modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for
the trial court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to
object to the prosecution's omission as mentioned earlier."62
PP vs BLANCAFLOR
The Information did not allege the qualifying circumstance of minority
of complainant and the fact that appellant is the common-law spouse of
the mother of the victim. Evidence show that the appellant is actually
not the stepfather of Mylene as it was duly proven in the trial court that
appellant is merely the common-law spouse of Mylenes mother, not
having been legally married.[27] The correct allegation should have
been that appellant is the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim, as contemplated by law, so that appellant may be fully apprised
of the exact charge against him.
There was also no competent evidence presented below to establish
the age of the victim. In People vs. Viajedor,[28] we held:
The minority of the victim and the offenders relationship to the victim,
which constitute only one special qualifying circumstance, must be
alleged in the Information and proved with certainty. Recent rulings of
the Court relative to the rape of minors invariably state that in order to
justify the imposition of the penalty of death, there must be
independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the
accused. xxx xxx xxx The prosecution has the burden of proving all
the elements of a crime, including the qualifying circumstances,
especially in death penalty cases.
For failure of the prosecution to properly allege in the Information the
qualifying circumstance that the victim is under eighteen years of age
and that the offender is a common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim, the special qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship
could not be taken into consideration and appellant could only be found
guilty of simple rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus,
the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death on appellant.
GUILLERGAN vs PP
The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by
making it appear in several public documents that ₱1,519,000.00 in
AFP funds intended for the CIAs’ payroll were paid for that purpose
when in truth these were just given to Rio, resulting in damage and
prejudice to the government. Although the charge was estafa in
relation to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts alleged in the information
sufficiently made out a case for violation of Article 172 of which
Guillergan was convicted. What is important is that the Information
described the latter offense intelligibly and with reasonable certainty,
enabling Guillergan to understand the charge against him and suitably
prepare his defense.15
What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed
in it.16 Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a
public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his
official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any
of the ways it is done.17
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171; 18 and 3) the falsification was committed in a
public or official or commercial document. 19 All of the foregoing
elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense
charged. He was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6.
While the Information said that he took advantage of his position in
committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found that his work as
comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and
payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody of the pertinent
documents.20 His official function was limited to keeping the records of
the resources that the command received from Camp Crame. 21 Still, he
took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the time record,
book, and payrolls in question.
Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the offense
charged by "causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or
a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate."22 In People v.
Yanson-Dumancas,23 the Court held that a person may induce another
to commit a crime in two ways: 1) by giving a price or offering a reward
or promise; and 2) by using words of command. In this case, the
Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered Butcon to sign the
"receive" portion of the payrolls as payee to make it appear that
persons whose names appeared on the same had signed the
document when they in fact did not.24
Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was committed on the
time record, book, and payrolls which were public documents.
What is more, given that some of the essential elements of Article 171
constitute the lesser offense of falsification of public documents under
Article 172, then the allegations in the Information were sufficient to
hold Guillergan liable under Article 172.
As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the factual findings of
the Sandiganbayan unless these fall under certain established
exceptions.25 Since none of those exceptions can be identified in this
case, the Court must accord respect and weight to the
Sandiganbayan's findings. It had the better opportunity to examine and
evaluate the evidence presented before it.26 As aptly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the payrolls did not
receive their salaries. First, x x x Guillergan declared that he personally
turned over the entire amount of [₱1,519,000.00] to Gen. Rio. Second,
Butcon’s narration that he was instructed by Guillergan, to [affix his]
initial at the receive portion of the payrolls. Lastly, according to the
records of the case, the office of Guillergan had no business in
processing the payroll of these personnel. x x x
Additionally, the appointment papers from which these payrolls were
based do not reveal any information about the acceptance of the
appointments by the agents. In a letter dated April 14, 1989 of the Anti-
Graft Board of the Armed forces of the Philippines x x x [to
Ombudsman Vasquez], it was stated that the appointment papers of
the agents "must" be accompanied by the acceptance of the agents.
These papers "should ordinarily" be attached to the payrolls for proper
clearing purposes. Since there were no acceptance papers presented,
it only suggests that the lists on the payrolls are names of ghost
agents. Even more, the board made a comment that x x x Guillergan
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
denies knowledge of the persons appointed even if he certified to the
correctness of the payrolls.
The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification of the payrolls;
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.27
PP vs DULAY
Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a
principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal
purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.15 Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in
the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA,
from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied
AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own
services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being
raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in
the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as
well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a
fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed.
PP vs PILOLA
The direct participation of the accused in stabbing the victim, resulting
to the victim’s accelerated death, constitutes to conspiracy. The overt
act executed by accused qualifies the latter to be a co-principal in the
crime.
Article 17 of the revised Penal Code states:
Principals – The following are considered principals
1. Those who take direct part in the execution of the act
(emphasis provided)
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been
accomplished
All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during,
and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to
kill the victim.
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim.
The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However,
while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed
to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with
their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the
hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together,
while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar
Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow
block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts
of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the
stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.
PP vs GAMBAO
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance
with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may
be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of
design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her
criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to the
resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she
acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she
saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspected something was wrong and would have reported such
incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to
add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is
being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as
an accomplice.62Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People
v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice
rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and considering the evidence presented by the prosecution,
linking accused-appellants’ participation in the crime, no doubt can be
entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants
of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty
of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 64 we modify the penalty imposed
by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of
Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344, 65 a determination
of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority
should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a
privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, 66 the suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer
benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A.
No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce
judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has
ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for
ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than
what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua). 69 Applying Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be
adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the
penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law
(Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than
the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision
Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum
period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and
there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor, as maximum.
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PADIERNOS vs PP
Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are
concerned, the facts alleged in the Information and the crime
proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as
accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for
violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime
The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information
determine the nature of the offense, and not the technical name that
the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From
a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not
concerned with the technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention
should be directed and his interest should be on the facts alleged. The
real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law with
some technical and specific name," but "did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth."50
In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of
committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck
with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and
avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as
tool or instrument of the crime.
Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is
not the allegation that they were accessories to the crime, which is
merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical
name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of
the RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short, their alleged
acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.
These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with
each other to take and carry away the subject truck so that it could not
be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor
of the government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the
petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations,
against which they should defend themselves.
Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in
relation with the legal definition of "accessories" under Article 19 of the
RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused
as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.
Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with
knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent
its discovery.
Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed
for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime.52
In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the
illegal possession of lumber - had already been discovered at the
time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the
confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002.
The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its
confiscation.
In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime
charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term
"accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations in the
Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the
petitioners.
The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of
obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual
allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense
committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC,
constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is
defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct
or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is
committed through the following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or
a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:
xxxx
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record,
document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity,
legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be
used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal
cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during
trial, show that the petitioners' acts actually constituted a violation of
Section 1(b) above.
First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the
crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b).
The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused
of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used
as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of
the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.
In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber
serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal
investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the
truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal
possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the
transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the
lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the
transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that
should be in the possession of the transporter.
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this
particular evidence. The term "suppress" means to subdue or end by
force.54
Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as
evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its
use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for
violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.
DIMAT vs PP
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been
committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft,
"buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or
object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or
should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.[3]
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla's Nissan Safari on May 25,
1998.  Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for
P850,000.00.  Dimat's defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from
Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134
and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of
sale covering those transactions.  The Nissan Safari stolen from
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan
Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat's defense is flawed.  First, the Nissan Safari Delgado
bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the
police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of
sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle's engine and
chassis.
Second.  Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense.  But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. [4]  
Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should
have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to
obtain some gain out of his acts.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where
the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. 
Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and
official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new
certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name.  But
Tolentino reneged on this promise.  Dimat insists that Tolentino's
failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way.  the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or
official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he
bought was not properly documented.  He said that Tolentino showed
him its old certificate of registration and official receipt.  But this
certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been
carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show.  That Tolentino was
unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an
illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.  accomplice while the CA acquitted them of the crime charged, hence,
That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she
did not stand accused in the case.
PP vs SORIA
The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on
December 20, 2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court received a
letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of
accused–appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our
directive, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted on
November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death certificate 4 of
accused–appellant.
Clearly, accused–appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired
before the promulgation of this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012
or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when accused–
appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending resolution.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx
In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation
wherein the accused–appellant died before his appeal could be
resolved. The Court explained the implications of the accused–
appellant’s demise as follows:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his
civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it
was not immediately informed of his death.
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision
dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision and
dismiss the criminal case against Amistoso by reason of his death.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding
accused–appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on
August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the
case against accused–appellant must consequently be dismissed.
PP vs EGAGAMAO
Thus, upon Egagamao's death pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify
that Egagamao's civil liability in connection with his acts against AAA
may be based on sources of obligation other than delicts; in which
case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of
Egagamao, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA vs COURT OF APPEALS
Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged
with the crime of rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted
Carampatana and Oporty guilty as prinicpals and Alquizola as an
this present appeal.
After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her
friends, went to Alson’s Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their
graduation. During such session, they shared their problems with each
other. AAA became emotional and started crying, prompting her to take
her first shot of Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five
glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s
lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply
tried to hide her face with the cap. The group just laughed at her and
still made her drink more. She fell asleep but was woken up so that she
could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused
but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.
 
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at
the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she
had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake
up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw
Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and
having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. Alquizola
then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell
unconscious.
Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately
final and executory and that the prosecution cannot appeal the
acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting the private respondents?
HELD: YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private
respondents. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring
error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant
in a criminal case. If there is grave abuse of discretion, however,
 Criminal 1 Review Cases 2017 (First Exam)
Compiled by: Maria Ayra Celina Batacan

granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private

respondents in double jeopardy.
 
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents. It appears that in reaching its judgment,
the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and
utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will
reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the
testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,
Carampatana,and Alquizola. It presented the private respondents’
account and allegations as though these were the established facts of
the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of
acquittal.

The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here,
the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than
she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was
already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or
unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her.

Moreover, Alquizola should not only be deemed as an accomplice but

a principal as well by virtue of conspiracy. As the caretaker of the
Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be
accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the
room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually
abused AAA and did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his
companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and
other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence,
the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola
including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape.

PP vs PALANAY
In AAA's case, it is evident that she feared Palanay, her uncle, who
can be reasonably expected to exercise moral authority over her, even
prior to the rape incident. This fear caused her to be immobilized and
unable to offer physical resistance to Palanay's advances. The failure
to physically resist the attack, however, does not detract from the
established fact that a reprehensible act was done to a child-woman by
no less than a member of her family. In cases of qualified rape, moral
ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or
intimidation. Physical resistance need not be established when
intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits
herself out of fear. As this Court held in People v. Lomaque, the failure
to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the
victim's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.