A Theory of Conservatism

Author(s): Francis G. Wilson

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 1941), pp. 29-43
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM
FRANCIS G. WILSON
of Illinois
University

The conservative oftodayhardlyknowswhatto conserve.His

bargainwithdestinyseemsbroken,and insteadof consciousness
ofachievement and contentment withwhatis, he is morelikelyto
be filledwitha senseoffrustration. Thisfrustration is an uncertain
quantitywithwhichto deal,sinceit is characteristically explosive
and negative.Underits guidance,conservatism may becomea
drivingforceto suppressthe inconsequential; it may be a force
thatis forgetfulat thesametimeoffundamental changesthatwill
undermine a wayofpoliticalexistence.The conservative is happi-
est whenhe is unconscious ofpolitics,whentheessentialproposi-
tionsof social organization do not have to be defended.But the
weaknessofconservatism appearsin notknowing alwayswhatare
thefundamental propositions supporting its mannerofliving,and
in inabilityto judge the consequencesof politicaland economic
mutation.Conservatism, however,is at least that body of social
thoughtwhichdoes nothave to be defended.
struggle,
Conflict, and protestmustbe consciousand filledwith
a senseofpurpose.In conflict, thereis alwaystheconsciousdefense
of whatis presumedto be an interest, and thereis an attackon
what othersdeem to be theirinterest.Likewise,radicalismcan
neverbe unconscious or merelyhabitual,forit is a protestagainst
something thatis. But it mustnotbe forgotten thatin no stateof
societyhave all interests reachedan equilibrium whichpermitsof
completecooperationand no struggle.In thissense,conservatism
represents a functional value in existence, sincethe stabilityof a
conservative societyis a situationin whichtheconflict ofinterests
and willsis mutedand restricted.
A clearviewof the natureof conservatism is difficult to reach
becauseofthechangingcharacterofimmediate issues.Suchissues
do notcoverthegamutofsocialexperience, and theyarechanging
constantly fromone aspectofpoliticalor economiccontestto an-
other.Witheach changeofissue,or themovement ofissues,new
alignments of forcesare provokedwhichlast onlyso longas the
issueofitselfremainsas it is. Anamorphous wordlike"liberalism,"
iftracedthrough thenineteenth century and in different countries,
willshowan astonishing varietyof propositions that have been
29

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30 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

called liberal.These propositions extendfromthe defenseof the

Churchin France,theargument forfreetrade,thedefenseofcon-
stitutionalmonarchy in Germany, topre-MarxianandtheMarxian
condemnation ofpovertyunderthemoderneconomicsystem.'To
whatextentis Russia,sincethe Russian-German pact of August,
1939,conservativeor radical?Is the ThirdReich reallyrevolu-
tionary,or is it covertlythedefender ofthebourgeoisie?Can any-
onewhoresortsto revolution, suchas GeneralFrancoin Spain,be
calleda conservative? Perhapsit is safeto say thatideologiesdo
nothave a verycloseconnection witheitherconstructive radical-
ism or conservatism; an ideology,like the weather-cock, points
withthewind.2The explicitsideofan issueis notalwaysthelasting
clue.
But if thereis to be any meaningin the termconservatism,
something beyondtheboilingpointofthemomentmustbe sought.
Conservatism, it may be argued,is a phase or a formof social
thought.In itself,it is an aspectofsocialprocess.It maybe sug-
gestedthat thereare onlyso manyfundamental issuespossible
amongmenas theyare; and,further, thatthereareonlyso many
possibleanswersor positionson theseissuesas longas menare as
theyare. Suchmightbe arguedat least,on a readingofhistorical
humannature,and such probativeconclusionsas may growout
ofthehistorical studyofhumanbehavior.It is thepurposeofthis
articleto trya clarification ofsomeofthesepoints.
Beyondall doubt,conservatism involvesa theoryofchange.The
wholeworldofsocialexperience is neverstatic,thoughpartsofit
may approachsuch a condition.Parts of the contextof our lives
changemorequicklythanothers,and thusit is readilyadmitted
thattechnology is changingfastertodaythansocialattitudes.3 If
radicalismis continuallylookingforthe new worldaroundthe
corner,conservatism is not.The conservative looksuponsimilari-
tiesand dissimilarities in socialchange,and the"fundamental" is
practicallyalwaysthe similarity betweentwo periods.Thus the
fundamental is continuous throughchange;thechorusrepeatsit-
selfevenif thestanzasdo not. The radical,on theotherhand,is
1 See Guido de Ruggiero,The HistoryofEuropeanLiberalism,tr.fromthe Italian
(1927).
2 See, forexample,Stuart Chase, "Ideological Immunity,1975," New Republic,
Nov. 8, 1939.
8 See W. F. Ogburn,Social Change(1922); R. M. MacIver, "The HistoricalPat-
ternof Social Change," in Authority
and theIndividual(1937).

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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM 31

forcedto conceive of a time in the futurethat in essentialswill be

different fromthe present; he looks upon dissimilaritiesbetween
periods as the clues to social meaning. But some continuityin
fundamentalsis necessaryforany idea of historicalcontinuityor
repetition,unless indeed one is willingto argue that all repetition
is frothon the surfaceofreality.
Conservativeemphasistouchesin various ways the idea ofwhat
is changing,how it is changing,and what ought to change from
one period to another. These notions of what,how,and oughtin
change focus finallyon the problemof inequalityin social experi-
ence. The great inequality,above all others,concernsthe posses-
sion ofpower,whethereconomicor political,or simplypowerifone
is not willingto make a distinctionbetween the political and the
economic.4But as power is of no significancein the abstract, so
inequalityis importantas it touches the lives of men and women.
Like money,poweris valuable forwhat it will purchase,and aside
fromthat it is worthas much as a continental.Inequality, there-
fore,is a phase of movementand change; it is a dynamicconcept,
and the mosaic of inequality is continuouslychanging in some
aspects, yet always remainingthe same in others.The fact of in-
equality itselfis a fundamentalcontinuityof history.It is part of
the pattern of existence.
"The influentialare those who get the most of what thereis to
get," declares ProfessorLasswell. "Available values may be classi-
fiedas deference,income,safety.Those who get the mostare 6lite;
the rest are mass."' Conservativeemphasishas tended to approve
of the fact of inequality,but it has also accepted changes in the
structureofinequalityin any society.If inequality,and its obverse,
power, remains a fundamentalsimilarityin historicalcontinuity,
thereis no argumentimpliedthat eitherX or Y oughtto be mem-
bers of the elite.
Thus to the conservativeit is the structureof inequalitythat is
changing;inequality,or differentiation in the possessionof power,
is accepted as a normalfact in social life. It is normal,inevitable,
that the composition of classes, of elites or oligarchies,should
change; thereis nothingradical in this,forthe radical is drivento
attack the postulates of normalitythat the conservativeaccepts.
4 Cf. C. E. Merriam,PoliticalPower (1934); BertrandRussell, Power;A New
Social Analysis(1938).
5 Harold D. Lasswell,Politics:WhoGetsWhat,When,How (1936), p. 3.

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32 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

It would be no change of importance-ifthe boards of directorsof

the leading corporationsin the United States were altered com-
pletelyin twenty-four hours; the functionalaspects ofthosedirec-
torships would remain the same. The conservativemind at its
best seeks forthe basic patternsofrepetitionand changein relation
to power. We may argue, therefore,that thereis a trend toward
permanencein -thesubstance of these patterns,thoughthe details
may vary greatlyfromtime to time. To be conservative,the as-
sumptionmust be that the enduringpattern is the fundamental
fact. ThorsteinVeblen has argued that the search forprestigeis
one of the fundamentaldrives in the pattern of social behavior,6
while Marx and Pareto have seen inequalityin the distributionof
economicpower as fundamentalin society.7But systemsof pres-
tige value and economicorganizationmay disappear; that is, they
may change, fromthe conservativestandpoint,in superficialas-
pects,but theyare not likelyto on fundamentals.
Conservativethought,more than othertypes, has stressedthe
continuityof moral values. To the economicradical, such an atti-
tude is facade fora mansionofiniquity.Christianityas a conserva-
tive force,for example, assumes continuityin moral principles.
Depending upon the exegetical point of view, these values arise
fromhuman experienceor fromdivine law, but as basic factsthey
do not need revisionwiththe passage oftime;the applicationmade
to specificsituationsmay vary withsocial evolution.In The Mind
in theMaking,James Harvey Robinson raised the question: Why
should we stay withAristotle'sNicomacheanEthics whenwe have
deserted his biology? The conservative would answer that the
Ethics considersprimaryand lastingevaluations while the details
of the biologyare secondaryas to social judgment.However, the
conservativemightconsentto the propositionthat continuityin
moral values involves slow change, not only with the secondary
aspects of life,but also withthe primaryevaluations containedin
a systemofethics.
I The TheoryoftheLeisureClass (new ed., 1912).
If the Marxiandoesnotassumethatin thehigherreachesofsocialismtherewill
7

be equality,he does not therebycondonethe inequalitiesof economicpowerfound

in capitalisticsociety.The continuingpatternin Marxismis exploitation,thoughit
is arguedthat capitalismis a moderneconomicsystem.It can hardlybe arguedin
thelightofthe Communist forinstance,thattherewas a Greekor Roman
Manifesto,
capitalism.Pareto makes no assumptionthat economicinequalityor politicaline-
quality can be eliminated.See The Mind and Society,tr. fromthe Italian (4 vols.,
1935).

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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM 33

The continuity ofmoralvaluesextendsalso to thepossessionof

economicand politicalpower,that is, to politicalregimesand to
economicsystems.Debate is mostdifficult on just whatis funda-
mentalin a religioussystem,a politicalregime,or an economic
system.The conservative and his opponentscannotagreeon this,
simplybecause of the difference in mentalattitudeinvolved.If
the radicalor the non-conservative sees the differencesbetween
religious,
economic,and politicalsituationsas mostimportant, the
conservativeis convincedofthecontinuity oftheprimary orfunda-
mental.What is basic,forinstance,in politicaldemocracy? Is it
the seriesofindividualrightsthatthelawyerhas tracedwithro-
mantichistory fromtheearlydaysofthecommonlaw downto the
present,or is it the rightof the people to experiment withthe
organization of society,even if in a capriciousmanner?In both
instances,thereis continuity, but what is the primaryaspectis
not a matterof agreement;thereis no concordon just what is
changing.
The discussion ofwhatis changing, orwhataspectsofinequality
are varying,leads to theproposition that,in thisrespect,thereis
a primaryand secondaryconservatism. The primaryor funda-
mentalconservatism is broadin its nature,thoughit is constantly
intermingledwiththesecondary ornon-essential features
ofchange.
The conservative maywellinsiston the-principle ofprivateprop-
ertywhilenot maintaining the presentsystemoftherelationsof
production.8Variousencyclicals ofthepopessincetheriseofsocial-
isminthenineteenth centuryhavemadethispositionofChristian-
ityabundantly clear.The CatholicChurchis a defender ofprivate
property,thoughit cannotbe said thattheChurchis a believerin
thecurrent systemofcapitalistic production; fundamental changes
are necessary,as the RerumNovarumand the QuadragesimoAnno
show.What manymodernbusinessmen wouldacceptas funda-
mentalsin theirconservatism is nothingbut secondarydetailin
theprinciples statedbytheVatican.
Muchthesametypeofargument mightbe developedin relation
to politicalregimes.
To thedemocratic
conservative, themechanics
ofpopularrule,suchas parliamentarism have be-
and civilliberty,
comeincreasingly importantin recentyearsas thesetechniques
have been demolishedin the authoritarian countries.Gaetano
Dawson, EnquiriesintoReligionand Culture(1933); Religionand
8 Christopher
theModernState (1935).

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34 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Mosca has regardedthe juridicaldefenseof the individualas a

proposition of fundamental characterin the stabilityof any r6-
gime.9It is clearthat one of the techniquesemployedby fascist
governments is to breakdownthe independence of the judiciary
so thatit willnotbe a havenforthepoliticaldissenter. We have
yet to judge the propriety of the attemptto place techniquesof
government, suchas areinvolvedinthediscussion ofdemocracy, in
the categoryof fundamentals. Can a primaryconservatism rest
uponpoliticaltechnique?All we can say is thatthe defenders of
democracy are at thepresenttimemakingsuchan effort.
Changestake place throughtime,and bothradicalsand con-
servativesmusthave an attitudetowardhistory.The morethere
is emphasison thejusticeofa cause or theiniquityofa situation,
themoreis theelementoftimerestricted in thought, and themore
is therea willingness to leap overtimecompletely. If we inquire
howchangetakesplace,we findthattheconservative is generous
and uncritical of time,especiallypast time,and thathis concern
forthefuture is lessthanforthepast.The liberalmaybe conscious
ofthepast,buthiseyeis fixedon thefutureand theachievements
thatwillbe attained;thepastcannotbe forgotten, butit wouldnot
hurtto forgetit. Radicalsor utopianshave littlesenseoftimeat
all; the momentofapocalypticrealizationis the culmination ofa
history that has beentelescopedintothe smallestduration.'
Oneoftheprimary valuesofconservatism is beliefinthewisdom
thathas emergedfromthe past; norcan the conservative admit
thatchangesacceleratedto thepointofrevolution can everbe of
substantialvaluein thefuture.The case againstrevolution argues
thatit is uncreative, and thatit is merelydestructive. Thosepat-
ternsofsocialorganization whichareessentialeitherto progress or
to stabilitycomeonlywiththe maturing oftime;theimpatience
oftheradicalcanneverrecreate whathehasbeen,byaccident,able
to destroy.The valueseenin thepastmaybe moreemotionalthan
reasonable, as is shownin thesentimentalism ofEdmundBurkein
his Reflections
on the FrenchRevolution.But in the emotional re-
sponseto a time-tested politicalorganization we have one of the
strongest drivesin politics,and it is a sourceof supportforcon-
servativeideology.Indeed,power,in its impactupontheindivid-
ual, can be an estheticexperienceofthefirst rank,and somemight
9 The RulingClass,tr.fromtheItalian (1939).
10 See Karl Mannheim,Ideologyand Utopia,tr. fromthe German (1936).

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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM 35

contendthatpatriotism is abouttheonlyestheticexperience that

manycitizensexperience. No ideologycancommandsupportunless
it has controlover some emotionalexperience, and the ideas of
Burkewarmedthe hearts,not only of Englishmen, but also of
Europeansofmanynationalities. Whilemanyconservatives in the
late eighteenth and earlynineteenth centurieswerecontentwith
theBurkeaninterpretation ofhistory, it can hardlybe arguedthat
his historicalconservatism is equal to thatof Machiavelli,Hegel,
Spengler,Pareto,or Mosca. As a propagandist, Burkeis strong,
whileintellectually and systematically he is weakerthanothers
whohave based theirconservatism uponan interpretation ofhis-
toricalmovement.
We have alreadyarguedthattheconservative seescontinuity in
history,whiletheradical,becauseofhisvisionofthefuture, must
insistonsharpdifferences in theelements ofhistorical epochs.Con-
tinuityin fundamentals, similarity betweenperiods,blendsinto
theconceptofrepetition in history;forrepetition in theconserva-
tiveemphasisbecomessimplya differentiation in continuity. Out
ofthisdifferentiation, whichis recurrent in nature,arisesthe no-
tionof patternin the historicalprocess.Patternitselfis without
meaningunlessit concernsfundamentals or primaryelementsin
thesocialprocess.11Cyclesand fluctuations in historyare pattern-
likebecausethereis a formofrecurrence in each; thecyclemoves
back to something like the previoussituation,whilefluctuations
have antipodallimitsofmovement. To theconservative, thecom-
pleteevidenceofpatternis foundin thepast,in a studyofthehis-
toricalbehaviorof humanbeings.On the otherhand, utopian
thought, becauseit is disconnected fromreality,and is a prophecy
of whatwillhappen,seeksa patternin a reasonedinterpretation
ofwhatcan be; theevidenceofpatternis notto be foundinexperi-
ence,but in what may be experience in the future.To say that
something has been meanslittlein an argumentforthe discon-
tinuityof history.The Marxian dialecticor the argumentfor
Fabian socialism,forexample,cannotbe basedon whathas been.
In theend,contempt forhistory impliesa revolutionary philoso-
phy.In an age ofchangesuchas ours,it is possibleto see theele-
mentsofrevolution in everydarkinterstice ofthesocialstructure,
and,just as theconservative developsan exaggerated fearofrevo-
11 See PitirimA. Sorokin,Social and CulturalDynamics(3 vols., 1937), fordata
on divergenttheorieson historicalmovement.

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36 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

lution,so the radicaldevelopsa systematic mythology about the

comingoftherevolution. Whilephilosophic radicalism in thenine-
teenthcenturydid not becomerevolutionary in its mainstream,
it mighteasilyhave becomeso had it not aligneditselfwiththe
thenunadmitted principleofa broadenedrightofsuffrage.12 Quite
properly, Jeremy Benthamhad contempt forhistory, sincehe was
arguingfordiscontinuity withthepast. Today it is possibleto see
thatBenthamdid not needto be so antagonistic towardhistory,
considering theextentofthenewpropositions he was advocating;
butlivingin theshadowofBlackstoneand laterofBurkeimposed
on Bentham'sthoughtburdensthatwe todaydo nothave. On the
otherhand,Marxismis a revolutionary philosophy, and is so in-
escapably.To drawa chartofthefuture so fundamentally different
fromall therecordedpast makesit necessaryto postulatea sharp
breakin continuity, thoughit has beenhelpfulto believethathis-
toryhas been workingtowardthe achievement of socialism.For
Marx,historicalmovement mustextendbeyondthe limitsof ex-
perience.Hence,bourgeoishistoricism can onlybe reactionary in
its nature.1
The broadoutlinesoftheconservative patternofhistorybegin
to emergewhenwe considerthe relationof the individualwillto
historicalevents.Historicaldevelopment in the conservative em-
phasishas alwayssomething of the objectiveabout it, especially
iftheresultis to be approved;theconservative recognizes always
thedestructive powerofthewillas it is reflected in revolutionary
activity.If thehistorical
processis in a measureobjectiveas to the
individualwill,it meansthefutility ofprimary reforms, and often
bad consequences followingsecondaryor less important reforms.
Why shouldbad consequencesfollow?Why shouldprimaryre-
formsbe futile?Much of the case of conservatism mustreston
provingthesepoints.The conservative answersthat the durable
humaninstitutions have developedthroughtimeand in a given
moldorprocess,andthatonlytheundisciplined effortofthehuman
willseeksto breaktheselastingbonds.Reformof a fundamental
natureis onlytoo oftenflying againsttheprinciples ofstablesocial
action,and the destructive minorreformpreventsforthe time
beingthenormalworking ofhistoricalprocess.
12 Elie Halevy, La formation du radicalismephilosophique(3 vols., Paris, 1901,
1904), is one ofthe best worksdealingwiththisquestion.
" Cf. N. I. Bukharinand others,Marxismand ModernThought(1935), pp. 235
ff:A. I. Tiumeniev,"Marxism and BourgeoisHistoricalScience."

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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM 37

But conservatism alwaysexistsin relationto a particular situa-

tion.WithHegel,it is said that the real is the rationaland the
rationalis thereal.Indeed,to arguetheirrationality ofanything
thatis involvesa mostdifficult argument."The verycoreofradi-
calismis a denialof the presenceof any ultimaterationality in
whatexistsat thepresent.It may be admittedthat the course
of dialecticaldevelopmentcan use the present,but the final
rationalsocietywillbe an overcoming of whatexists.The more
utopianand unhistorical theradicalmentality becomes,the more
is therean inclinationto deny any rationalityin what exists.
Conservatism, on the otherhand,believesthatboththe rational
and theethical(thoughno distinction betweenthemis necessary)
mustbe validin termsofthepossible,thatis, in concreteobjects
orsituationsthatcan expressrationalor ethicalevaluations.Con-
servativethoughtis here separatedprofoundlyfromutopian
thought,and to a less degreefroma radicalismthat acceptshis-
toricaldevelopment as partofitsjudgmentofcurrent institutions.
Will is alwaysmorelimited,therefore, in conservatism thanin
anyopposingphilosophy. The processofhistoryobjectively limits
will,and the reasonofrealityis monitory or minatory in relation
to thewill.Thus thefreedom ofthemassesis limitedin fact,and
thereis groundforurgingtheeliteor therulingclassto resistthe
massesin theirassaulton the turretsof heaven. Thus conserva-
tive leadershave triedto sensethosechangeswhichwouldfree
the masses,and theyhave opposedthemas theywereable. The
greatChancellorKent of New York State,forexample,opposed
thedemocratic tidesofhisday. He was opposedto populareduca-
tion,and he believedin government by thosewhoweremostable
andintelligent intheirpointofview."5 In spiteofan amazingly long
recordofthemassesfordocility, theconservative has fearedthem
fortheoccasionaldisturbance in politicsand economicsthatthey
have caused.
It has longbeenarguedthatthetyranny ofthemajoritymust
be prevented, and the argument has been accepted as one of the
pillarsofconservatism. Yet modernexperience mightshow,in the
lightofthemalleability ofthemasses,thatthetyranny oftheelite
can be moredestructive ofindividualfreedom, as arguedby con-
14See G. W. F. Hegel, Grundliniender Philosophiedes Rechts(Berlin,1833),
Vorrede.
1"See J. T. Horton,JamesKent; A Studyin Conservatism(1939), fora studyof
one ofthegreatAmericanconservativesofthenineteenthcentury.

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38 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

servatives,than any other despotism. If the conservativeshave

long thoughton how the masses can be stopped,theymightthink
more today on how to create an intelligentrulingclass that will
not exploitthe masses. From the timeofthe Greeksonward,it has
been admittedthat the best should rule,that the best formof gov-
ernmentis aristocracyin the true sense of the word. The crisisof
today,however,is a combinationmass movementand irresponsible
oligarchy.There is a core of individualismin the argumentforthe
governmentof the best-that is, individualismof the superior
membersof society-but the contemporarymovementseems to
threatenthe freedomthat republicanismor limiteddemocracyhas
believed in forthose who are superior.Certainly,the currentex-
ploitationofthe masses forwar or domestictyrannydoes not bring
into responsiblepositionsofrulershipthose who are the mostintel-
ligentin society.As Plato argued,the best should rulein the inter-
est of the many,and thereshould no doubt be some controlof the
masses, yet littlecan be hoped forin the presentsituationforthis
historicalprincipleof conservatism.
We are thus led to examine, fromthe conservativeviewpoint,
what ought to change. No conservativethought has been able,
any more than radical thought,to reach a satisfyingconclusion
on the patternat workin the interactionbetween the will of the
masses or leaders on the one hand and the objective processesof
historyon the other.Conservatismhas admittedthat whichexists
in historicalfact, one of these admissionsbeing the possibilityof
revolution. The conservative has tended to underestimatethe
change broughtabout by revolution,while the radical, seeing the
revolutionas a kind of superstitionof the future,has consistently
overestimatedthe alterationsthat will be broughtabout by the
revolutionnot yet consummated.A long historicalperspectiveis
necessaryin any case to see what changes have taken place. We
can betterexaminethe changeswroughtby the FrenchRevolution
today than we can thoseproducedby the Russian; and the Chinese
Revolution is obviously still in process. One can only wait. But
each revolutionproducesits newconservativesor its defenders,and
the remnantsof the old regimemay fightthemhopelesslyas radi-
cals. The emigr6mentality,however,has in historicalperspective
been more false than any normalconservatism.
The lastingissue raisedby revolution,however,is the extentthat
primarychanges are wrought.To what extent have the primary

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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM 39

values of the old society been changed? To what extent is the

change related only to the superficialand secondary aspects of
society?If the institutionsof property,family,and religion;if the
principlesof patriotismand of historicimperialismsurvive the
Russian Revolution,can we say that the changes have been more
than secondaryin their nature? Likewise, the forcesreleased by
any revolutionrequiretime to mature,and the sharp, quick judg-
mentofthe dispossessedis hardlyworththe laterand dispassionate
concernof the historian.16
Conservatismhas been able undermostcircumstancesto accept,
or even advocate, secondarychanges in the social structure;but
it has been unable to see underminedwithout a struggle the
broader underpinningsof the type of societyto whichit adheres.
Yet bothradicalismand conservatismhave suffered fromignorance
of the social processat workabout them. Neitherhas been able to
predictwith accuracy some of the most ordinaryconsequences of
behavior. The more intelligentconservatismbecomes, the more
able is it to foreseewhat is goingto happen. It can be argued with
some plausibilitythat conservativepredictionhas a slightmargin
in its favor,simplybecause, aside fromwar and revolution,spec-
tacular change has been extremelyslow in becomingclearly out-
lined. Conservativepredictionhas usually rested on two proposi-
tions: the evil of human nature and the improbabilityof funda-
mental change comingin a shorttime. Men are as they are; and
the frameworkof reason and ethics has been that of men as they
have actually behaved. Because of their method of prediction,
Machiavelli and Bacon"7must be accepted as leaders in conserva-
tive technique.Ignorance of the historicalprocesshas producedin
conservatismpeculiar cases of social astigmatism.As the present
issue has loomed over all others,the conservativehas been able
to predictthe returnof the age of Saturn, or the golden age, on
the turnof an election,whichin historicalperspectiveis unimpor-
tant enough. Conservativesare at theirbest when they only have
to live and do not have to argue that a change of policy might
produceagain the golden age.
Conservatismis not necessarilya defenseof the statusquo; in no
16 See L. P. Edwards, The Natural Historyof Revolution (1927); Crane Brinton,
TheAnatomyofRevolution (1938); G. S. Pettee, The ProcessofRevolution(1938).
17 See The Essays ofFrancisBacon (ed. by M. A. Scott, 1908), p. lxxx; also Carl
Schmitt,Der Begriff des Politischen(1933).

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40 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

case could it be a defenseof everything- as it is, but it is a defense

of primaryelementsin the social structure,withconcessionsmade
on secondary problems. Conservatism,however,is a manner of
thoughtand a contentof thinkingthat can be used if necessaryin
defenseof thingsas they are, or at least it can be an argumentfor
the decelerationof social change. Yet we have observed that the
axiomaticthoughtof conservatismdoes not like controversy, since
the present has always been wicked and it is hard to defendit
againstthe speculative,doctrinaireideas of the championsof ideal
justice. Criticalthoughtis generallymorecomprehensiveand more
carefullyarrangedthan is the defenseof existinginstitutions.As
its appeal spreads, conservatismbecomes more emotional, and
more detailed in its response.Hence, conservatismseems weaker
than it reallyis. The criticalthinkermay be self-assuredabout his
pictureofthe future,but he is morelikelyto be strongin depicting
the customaryevils of the present.The conservativecan usually
affordto wait or to accept secondarychanges,since therehas al-
ways been a gap between the criticalanalysis of the presentand
the predictionofthe future.In fact,therehas been littleconnection
betweenthe condemnationof the presentand the defenseof what
ought to be. Radicals may be united in denouncinginjustice,but
they have seldom been able to agree on the next step forward;on
the otherhand, the conservative,in defendingwhat is, can usually
argue that he is not responsibleforit.
What is the strengthofconservatism?Its forcelies in its reliance
on historicalprocessand the probabilitythat human behaviorwill
followa patternsomewhatlike the past. Conservatismis weak in
its statementof purpose,except on the most generallines, and in
such a statementthereis no basic difference betweenconservatism
and criticalthinking.One must descendfromthe clouds, fromthe
mistofthe generalitiesof highhumanpurpose,beforea distinction
can be drawnbetweentypes of social attitude.All thinkersare for
the bettermentoftherace orthe nation;theyare all forthe greatest
possiblerealizationofjustice. But it is the body ofinstitutionsand
immediatepoliticaldevicesthat countin the differentiation ofcon-
servatismfromothertypes of thought.
Conservativeemphasis does not overestimatehuman nature,or
its capacity to attain organizedpurposes. It is one thing to say
that men should cooperate,and it is anotherto state the termsor
the conditionson which cooperationon a social problemmay be

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 A TREORY OF CONSERVATISM 41

attained. The conservativeas well as any one else may agree that
ifall men would be menofgood willany humanhappinessmightbe
attained. That stated purpose is disparate fromthe realization of
purpose is the core of the conservativeattitude toward life. The
conservativediscountsthe passion forjustice,just as he minimizes
the consequences of new organizationsfor gaining utopia. His-
torical process and the workingof historicalhuman nature are
much the same, althoughhistoricalprocess assumes the objective
interactionof historicalhuman nature with its environment.In
politics,this implies no idealization of the facts or the process of
ruling.Governmentis littlebetteror littleworsethan the average
level of social behavior,and political techniquesdo not rise above
theirlevel.'8
The conservativepictureof politicsis the mechanismof power.
It may be simply a realisticapproach to the problemsof public
opinion,and a willingnessto spend moneyon propaganda. It may
be a consciousnessthat the public angeroftoday willpass and that
the techniquesof the trade can be used in more calm days ahead.
At least, the people always have calmed down; so they should do
it again. It may be the statementof high principlesso that men
will lay down theirlives to stop X who is the latest menace to the
empireand thereforeto civilization.Mr. Mencken,in his Noteson
Democracy,speaks of the negative,emotionalcharacterof the ac-
tion of public opinion,and the conservativerealizes only too well
its ineffectiveness compared with the results of steady and well-
organized administrationin business or politics. It may be Mr.
Frank R. Kent withhis GreatGameofPolitics,and his demonstra-
tion, which should be unnecessary,of the balance of power held
by the minority-ifit is organized.Or it may be Machiavelli and
the lucid doctrinesof The Prince,whichhelp to explain the vicissi-
tudes offortuneand virtuein the processofpolitics.Again,it may
be the doctrineof ragionedi stato,the principleof the interestof
state, i.e., the dynasty,or that of national interestswhich every
democratis ready to defend.
Whateverthe immediateissues,the conservativetakes thingsas
they are on the secondaryplane of practical politics. To reverse
the Jesuitstatement,to him who has assumed the end, the means
must be assumed also. Conservatismin its forcefulmomentsis
neverseparated fromthe actuality of experience,whileradicalism
18 Cf. HenryJonesFord, Representative
Government
(1924).

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42 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

hangs always over the abyss of utopianism.Men may vote to end

povertyin California,but povertyis not to be ended,ifever,in this
way. The crucial issue to the conservativeis all too oftento mark
offthe boundariesbetweenwhatis "sound," "expedient,"or "prac-
tical," fromthat whichis utopian vision. This boundaryis a fluc-
tuating and uncertainline that haunts magnanimousminds, for
all men know that the consequencesof action are seldom like the
purposesof the beginning.
The conflictbetweenpurposeand consequencesofaction is to be
explained, according to the conservative,only by the objective
interventionof historicalprocess,and the burdenof the realistis
to understand,so faras possible,those factorswhichdirectobjec-
tivelythe course of historicaldevelopment.Because the best con-
ceived purpose is erratic in result, because purpose tends to be
utopian in character,and because when purpose is utopian it be-
comes destructivein its collisionwithprocess,stabilitybecomes a
primaryvalue in conservatism'sanalysis of how thingsought to
change.Stabilityis the keystonein the arch ofsocial reality.Stabil-
ityis a value in itself.And so it has been withconservativethought
forcenturies.Whetherwe take Coluccio Salutati, quotingAugustus
to the effectthat "He who is unwillingto changethe existingorder
in the state is a good citizenand a good man,"'9 or followThomas
Hobbes' Leviathan,the answeris always the same. Revolutionand
civil disturbanceare bad because risks of change are great, and
because the revolutionnever attains its firstintentions.Stability
is the contextof progress,and upheaval is the matrixof retrogres-
sion. In certainstituations,it is stabilityalone that can preserve
the group. In reviewingBryce's AmericanCommonwealth, Wood-
row Wilson remarkedthat Americawill one day findherselfgrown
old, strained,and perplexed,and "she will be obliged to fall back
upon her conservatism,obliged to pull herselftogether,adopt a
newregimenoflife,husbandherresources,concentrateherstrength,
steady her methods,sober her views, restricther vagaries, trust
herbest,not heraverage,members."20
No conservativewould denythat in the workingout ofhistorical
development,there are times of rapid change and times of rela-
19 See EphraimEmerton,Humanismand Tyranny (1925), forSalutati's treatise
"De Tyranno,"chap. 4.
20
Reprintedin R. C. Brooks (ed.), Bryce'sAmericanCommonwealth, Fiftieth
Anniversary (1939), p. 182.

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 A THEORY OF CONSERVATISM 43

tivelyslow change,and that thereis a difference in the rate of

changeofdifferent environmental structures.To theconservative
mind,a periodofrapidchangeshouldbe regardedas a transition
betweenstabilities,sincethe object of understanding and policy
is againto reachsocialorderand coherence. If technology is march-
ingahead withseven-league boots,as Professor Beard is wontto
say,theconservative willnotadmitthatbasicinstitutions, or that
the primarysocial values,are changingat the same rate.But in
judgingdynamicelementsof inequalityin society,the conserva-
tive mustkeep in mindthe difference betweenhis primaryand
secondaryconservatism. Social stabilitypostulateshistorical con-
tinuityofpoliticaland economicinstitutions; it meansthatmoral-
ity as social cementis steadierthan technology. But the tech-
niquesof politicsand economicsneed not be placed in the same
category;it wouldmeanthatproperty, forinstance,is morefunda-
mentalthan the techniqueswhichmake up moderncapitalism,
and that politicalexperiment withinthe contextof orderis not
always to be condemned.It would mean that such a wordas
"democracy"shouldbe lookedat throughhistoricalperspective
ratherthanthrough thesmoke-screen ofideologicalemotion.
We livein a timewhenintellectuals aresatisfied withlittleofthe
socialstructure, but muchwiththeconceptofnaturalscienceand
itsexpansionto coverthesocial.Intellectuals are nowfloundering
on theshoals ofanalogybetweensocial and naturalscience.But
naturalscienceis law or probability, whileto the rebelssocial
sciencemustanswerthe enigmaof the relationbetweenpurpose
and processin history.The conservative leans on processas his
governor, whilethecriticalthinker strugglesdesperately to expand
thepredictability ofpurposein action.2"
21 The historianwho claims to be purelyscientific wants to be used by neither
radicalsnorconservatives.He is interestedin the past, whichofferssome possibility
of beingcertain.He does not claim great insightinto the future.However,social
thoughtwillnotlet the historiansalone.

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