WILLIAM T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO and PADECIO [G.R. No. 196529.

July 1, 2013.

FACTS: Respondent Alberto and Jimmy Go, brother of William, were business
partners in Noah's Ark. Their partnership was embodied in a written agreement. In
1986, William was appointed Chief of Staff of Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery. He was
allowed by Looyuko to occupy Gilmore Townhouse. On October 10, 1986, another
agreement was entered into in furtherance of their business partnership. CaAcSE
In a letter, dated October 28, 1998, Looyuko demanded that William vacate
the townhouse. Jimmy filed an adverse claim over the property, annotating his
interest on the title as co-owner. He claimed that the townhouse was bought using
funds from Noah's Ark and, hence, part of the property of the partnership. William
refused to vacate the property relying on the strength of his brother's adverse claim.
Looyuko filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against William before the
MeTC. He alleged that William's occupation was merely by tolerance. William
presented the partnership agreements, the contract to sell off the subject property to
Noah's Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing payment. On May 20, 2000, the MeTC
rendered a decision in favor of Looyuko. William appealed to the QC RTC. The CA,
reversed the QC RTC orders and directed the execution of the MTC Decision.
ISSUE: WON CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EJECTMENT CASE CAN
PROCEED WITHOUT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP

RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. It is apparent from the arguments of

William that he is calling for the Court to reevaluate the evidence presented by the
parties. Even if the Court were to reevaluate the evidence presented, considering the
divergent positions of the courts below, the petition would still fail.

This petition involves an action for unlawful detainer, which is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally
legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession.

The TCT of respondent Looyuko is, therefore, evidence of indefeasible title over the
property and, as its holder, he is entitled to its possession as a matter of right. Thus,
the partnership agreements and other documentary evidence presented by petitioner
William are not, by themselves, enough to offset Looyuko's right as registered owner.
Lastly, William is mistaken in his argument that respondent Looyuko's prior physical
possession is necessary for his action for unlawful detainer to prosper.

Petition is denied.
Yoshizaki v. Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc., G.R. No. 174978, [July 31,
2013], 715 PHIL 609-624

FACTS: Respondent Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc. (Joy Training) is a non-
stock, non-profit religious educational institution. It was the registered owner of a
parcel of land and the building thereon (real properties) located in San Luis
Extension, Purok No. 1, Barangay Buhangin, Baler, Aurora.

On November 10, 1998, the spouses Richard and Linda Johnson sold the real
properties, a Wrangler jeep, and other personal properties in favor of the spouses
Sally and Yoshio Yoshizaki.

On December 8, 1998, Joy Training, represented by its Acting Chairperson Reuben

V. Rubio, filed an action for the Cancellation of Sales and Damages with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the spouses Yoshizaki and the spouses Johnson before the Regional Trial
Court of Baler, Aurora. In the complaint, Joy Training alleged that the spouses
Johnson sold its properties without the requisite authority from the board of directors.

The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Yoshizaki. It found that Joy Training owned
the real properties. However, it held that the sale was valid because Joy Training
authorized the spouses Johnson to sell the real properties.

The CA upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over the case but reversed its ruling with
respect to the sale of real properties. It maintained that the present action is
cognizable by the RTC because it involves recovery of ownership from third parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of agency to sell the real properties
between Joy Training and the spouses Johnson.

RULING: There is no contract of agency between Joy Training and the spouses
Johnson to sell the parcel of land with its improvements.

Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines a contract of agency whereby a person "binds
himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter." It may be expressed, or implied
from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to
repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be
written when the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the Civil
Code provides that the contract of agency must be written for the validity of the sale
of a piece of land or any interest therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related
provision, Article 1878 of the Civil Code, states that special powers of attorney are
necessary to convey real rights over immovable properties.

The SPA mandated by law must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that
includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the authorized act. An SPA must
express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language for the principal
to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate.
Senador v. People, G.R. No. 201620, [March 6, 2013], 705 PHIL 640-654

FACTS: On or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete,, the
said accused, having obtained and received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the same
on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the entire
proceeds of the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of
time and despite repeated demands therefore, failed to remit proceeds of the sale of
said items or to return any of the items that may have been unsold to said Cynthia
Jaime but instead has misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to
his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime.

In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter
undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and, thereafter, to
remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen
(15) days from the delivery.

Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the
prosecution, and instead, she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the
Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. In particular,
Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is
not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. ||| (Senador v.
People, G.R. No. 201620, [March 6, 2013], 705 PHIL 640-654)

The RTC found Senador guilty as charged and was sentenced. The CA upheld the
finding of the RTC. (1) Senador received the pieces of jewelry in trust under the
obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or converted the
pieces of jewelry to her benefit but to the prejudice of business partners, Rita and
Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to return the pieces of jewelry despite demands.

ISSUE: WON an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party
violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.

RULING: The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the
information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the
accused to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the
offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights
of the accused.

It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality
of the erroneous designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not
the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.

In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any
other generic property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense
as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge
was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement.