Emily Danielle M.

Negre
JD – 1, BLOCK A

Canon 1 Cases:

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ,respondent.

Attorneys-at-law; Disbarment; Conviction of crime involving moral turpitude.—Under
Section 5, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder is such a crime.
Same; Same; Same; "Moral turpitude" construed.—The term "moral turpitude" includes
every thing which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Base,
41 Phil. 275). As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. (State ex
rel. Conklin vs.Buckingham, 34 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.)
Same; Same; Same; Effect of Pardon.—The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the
pardon has been granted applies only where the pardon is absolute, but net when, as in this
case the pardon granted is conditional and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of the
penalty. In such a case, the attorney must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for the
crime he has committed.
Same; Requisite for the Practice of Law.—The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to
those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the
admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards
are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to
adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. In re Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661,
Adm. Case No. L-363 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent. People vs.
Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, Adm. Case No. 3360 January 30, 1990
Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.—We should add that the crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of
the land.” Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however,
it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that: “the nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.” People vs.
Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, Adm. Case No. 3360 January 30, 1990

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

Attorneys-at-law; Disbarment; Statutory enumeration of grounds not exclusive; Inherent
power of courts to exclude unfit members of the profession.—The enumeration in Section
25, Rule 172 of the Rules of Court, of the grounds upon which disbarment proceedings may
he based, is not exclusive. The power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members
of the legal profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice, and may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases
unless positively prohibited by statute. The power may be exercised in any manner that will
give the party to be disbarred a fair opportunity to be heard. (I Francisco, Rules of Court
[1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). The statutes enacted by the legislature or
the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power do not
restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and who, as
such, may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S  734).
Same; Same; Same; Rule on disbarment broad enough to cover any misconduct.—The moral
turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The rule is so phrased as to be
broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In
the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that
he refrained from having sexual intercourse with the complainant until she had completed
her eighteenth birthday, limiting himself in the meantime to kissing and embracing her and
sucking her tongue, so as not to incur criminal liability, indicates a scheming mind, which
together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. His act
becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common
law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. Respondent’s adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour’s
niece disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer.
Same; Same; Same; Offenses to be charged by Solicitor General not limited to those charged
by complainant.—Nothing in the language of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in
the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. The Solicitor General is at
liberty to file any case against the respondent as may be justified by the evidence adduced
during the investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Removal of a lawyer any time he ceases to possess good character.—
Good character being an essential qualification for admission to the practice of law, an
attorney may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S.
735). Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859, Adm. Case No. 376 April 30, 1963

COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs. LO
BU and COU RT OF APPEALS, respondents. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union vs. Lo
Bu, 63 SCRA 313, No. L-40136 March 25, 1975
Legal ethics; Attorneys; A legal counsel is expected to defend a client’s cause but not at the
expense of truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws.—For even if such be the
case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend
his client’s cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear
purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the
court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an
errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he
fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing
in the bar. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union vs. Lo Bu, 63 SCRA 313, No. L-40136 March
25, 1975
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar; Candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar
conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989 violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws.—From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the
principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-
Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly non-political” Integrated Bar enshrined in
Section 4 of the By-Laws.
Same; Same; Same; Candidates and many of the participants in the election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession imposed on all
lawyers.—The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the
ByLaws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
“promote respect for law and legal processes” and to abstain from “activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system” (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code
of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves,
who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly
brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. Re: 1989 Elections
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 178 SCRA 398, BAR Matter No. 491 October 6, 1989
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES
YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Attorneys; Duty to advise client on merit or lack of merit of case.—It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricaries and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client’s cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
client’s propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
Same; Counsel as true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.—Forgetting his
sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
counsel has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
and moral justice. Castañeda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505, No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

SAMAR MINING Co., INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V.

TAN and RUFINO ABUYEN, respondents-appellees.
Legal ethics; Conduct of counsel in appealing a case for purpose of delay; Duty to assist in
the administration of justice.—Where counsel interposed an appeal in behalf of his client
manifestly for the purpose of delay, a policy "often resorted to as a means of draining the
resources of the poorer party" and "of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion,"
such conduct of counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the
administration of justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs.
Arnado, 24 SCRA 402, No. L-22304 July 30, 1968

NELITA MORENA VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs. HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION
ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDA BALTAZAR, Judge, City
Court of Iloilo, respondents.
Dilatory tactics; Dilatory tactics of parties subject to court’s condemnation.—The present
petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to
frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such conduct deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court. Vda. de
Bacaling vs. Laguna, 54 SCRA 243, No. L-26694 December 18, 1973

Canon 2 Cases:

The Director of Religious Affairs, complainant, vs. Estanislao R. Bayot, respondent.

Attorneys at Law; Solicitation of Business from the Public.— It is undeniable that the
advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, *
* * is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." Director of
Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, 74 Phil., 579, Adm. Case No. 1117 March 20, 1944

In re Luis B. TAGORDA
1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; SECTION 21 OF THE CODE OF ClVIL
PROCEDURE AS AMENDED BY ACT No. 2828, AND CANONS 27 AND 28 OF THE CODE OF
ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BAR
ASSOCIATION CONSTRUED AND APPLIED; SOLICITATION OF CASES BY AN ATTORNEY AS
GROUND FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION.—Application is given to section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828, providing: "The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice," and to Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917, to the case
of the respondent lawyer.
2.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The law is a profession and not a business.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment
or suspension.
4.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional, and
the commission of offenses of this character amply justifies permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future
As a result the respondent attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for
the period of one month. In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, March 23, 1929

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice of Law.”—Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes practice of law.—What is
palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided-for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.” Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and
so forth.
Same; Same.—Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a
one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be performed by paralegals here as
distinguished from the United States.—Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which
offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As
the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal assistant” evolved in the United States, standards
and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed
to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with
their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants,
Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we still have a restricted
concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed
out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor.
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise.—Anent the issue on the
validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection
with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position,
and all other like self-laudation.
Same; Exceptions.—Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions.
Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data.
Same; Same.—The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable.
Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on its integrity.—Secondly, it is our firm
belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate
what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach,
and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993