Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION

DR. ROBERT H. WAINBERG,

Plaintiff, Civil Action File No.

2:19-cv-00251-MHC
v.

PIEDMONT UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAMS OINONEN LLC

Julie Oinonen
44 Broad Street, NW, Suite 200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 654-0288/ (404) 592-6225 FAX
julie@goodgeorgialawyer.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 2 of 20

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.
A. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Defamation
(Libel-Per-Se) As A Matter Of Law 1
B. Defendant Misstates the Law Concerning Charitable Immunity 4
C. It Should Be Deemed Established For Trial That Dr. Wainberg
Was Not An At-Will Employee: He Had A Contract Of
Employment As Well As A Contract For Tenure Terminable
Only For Cause And Afforded The Right To A Fair, Impartial
And Timely Hearing 6
D. Both the Failure to Terminate Wainberg Without Sufficient
Cause and the Failure to Provide a Fair and Impartial Hearing
Warrant Compensatory Damages 7
E. Title VII Does Not Preempt Plaintiff’s Title IX Claim 11
F. It Should Be Established At Trial That Piedmont Had A Duty
To Comply With Title IX And Its Requirements To Afford An
Equitable Grievance Procedure 12

i
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 3 of 20

A. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Defamation (Libel-Per-

Se) As A Matter Of Law

On May 17, 2018, President Mellichamp sent the following from his

University (Piedmont.edu) email address:

A group of students came forward in March and filed a Title IX

complaint against Wainberg. Three weeks of investigations and I
terminated him a week ago. Hostile learning environment by
introducing sex into every class. So there you go. He had the option
to appeal to the board, and no severance, or walk away with $30K.
He's walking.” (Pl. Reply to SOMF ¶124; Mellichamp Dep. 322:1-25;
Ex. P-52 (ECF 154-52), emphasis added.)

Stating that “a group of students came forward in March and filed a Title IX

complaint against Wainberg” (which never happened)1 and stating that Dr.

Wainberg created “a hostile learning environment by introducing sex into every

class” and by claiming what we know to be an indisputable lie—that Dr.

Wainberg agreed to accept $30,000 instead of fighting the false charges made

against him (Pl. SOMF ¶124-125; Mellichamp Dep. 213-215, 322:1-25) is

textbook libel per se in that it is the “[m]aking [of] charges against another in

reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein....”

O.C.G.A.§ 51–5–4(a)(3) Davita Inc. v. Nephrology Associates, P.C., 253 F. Supp.

2d 1370, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2003.)

1
(Pl. SOMF ¶125; Mellichamp Dep. 213-215.)

1
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 4 of 20

In writing this, there is no question that Mellichamp falsely conveyed that

Dr. Wainberg was conceding that he created a “[h]ostile learning environment

by introducing sex into every class” and opting to “walk away” rather than

challenging these false charges. In fact, what better way to make a charge against

a teacher “in reference to his profession” than doing what Mellichamp did, claiming

that Dr. Wainberg “had the option to appeal to the board” but instead he “walk[ed]

away” after being charged with “a hostile learning environment” in “class?” (Ex. P-

52, ECF 154-52.) It is irrefutable that Dr. Wainberg didn’t “walk away” but

rather chose to fight the charges made against him with a termination appeal hearing

and later, this lawsuit. Infra, secs. C and D.

Regarding the meaning of, “[m]aking [of] charges against another in

reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein...”:

“[T]he words must be charged to have been used in reference to one's

trade or profession. The speaker must [1] have had the trade or
profession of the plaintiff in view, and [2] utter the words in reference
to it, as if he should say of a grocery merchant, he keeps false
weights, or of a lawyer, that he won't pay his clients the money he
collects for them....Van Epps v. Jones, 50 Ga. 238, 241 (1873); see also
Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga.App. 542, 543, 278 S.E.2d 124 (1981);
Mell v. Edge, 68 Ga.App. 314, 314, 22 S.E.2d 738 (1942) (“Words to
be actionable per se, as tending to injure one in his trade, profession, or
business, must contain a charge in reference to such.”). To “reference”
ones’s trade, profession, or business, “ ‘the charge must be something
that affects his character generally in his trade.’ ” Rogers v. Adams, 98
Ga.App. 155, 158, 105 S.E.2d 364 (1958) (quoting Van Epps v. Jones,
50 Ga. 238, 242 (1873)) (emphasis added). Stated differently, “the

2
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 5 of 20

alleged defamation must actually be made in reference to the plaintiff's

profession. Davita Inc, 253 F. Supp. at 1377–78.

Dr. Wainberg need not affirmatively prove special damages as the

communication at issue constitutes libel per se since the “element of damages is

inferred” and “because defamation concerning trade, office, or occupation is

defamation per se, damage is inferred.” StopLoss Specialists, LLC v. VeriClaim,

Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (citing Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.

App. 872, 876 (2008).)

Moreover, Defendant is liable because, not only does Georgia law hold that a

president of a corporation is presumed to be its alter ego (Sims v. Miller's, Inc., 50

Ga. App. 640 (1935); see also Stringfield v. IAP World Servs., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1378,

1386 (S.D. Ga. 2011); Baker v. Lowe Elec. Co., 47 Ga. App. 259, 263-64 (1933)

Williams v. City of Social Circle, 225 Ga. App. 746 (1997)), but the Georgia

Supreme Court has held that a “corporation is liable for a libelous publication caused

to be published by an agent acting within the scope of his authority” and there is “no

requirement that the agent be expressly authorized or directed to publish the libel.”

Garren v. Southland Corp., 237 Ga. 484, 485 (1976.) Without dispute, President

Mellichamp, writing from his university email address in his capacity as university

president, committed libel per se by writing these false statements referencing Dr.

Wainberg’s profession. (See Pl. Reply to Def. SOMF ¶124; P-98.)

3
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 6 of 20

While there are other defamatory statements that Mellichamp made that do

pose a jury question (see Pl. Resp. to Def MSJ, ECF 173, pp. 21-26), the above

example of stands out as one that should render judgment as a matter of law. It is a

proven false statement that is slap-in-your-face libel per-se. The University President

made false charges against Dr. Wainberg in reference to his profession that were

calculated to injure his reputation, an unprivileged lie made to an individual outside

the corporation. (Pl. SOMF ¶124; Mellichamp Dep. 322:1-25; Ex. P-52, ECF 154-

52.) Thus, Defendant is liable. Garren, 237 Ga. at 485. As such, Plaintiff is entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law.

B. Defendant Misstates the Law Concerning Charitable Immunity

Defendant asserts in its response to Plaintiff’s motion that, “[t]here is simply

no authority (and no grounds) for the claim that any claims that arise in contract are

not subject to charitable immunity.” See Def. Br. p. 14. The foregoing statement by

Defendant is plainly inaccurate. Charitable immunity is a potential, not automatic,

tort defense, but it does not shield charities in Georgia from liability for contract

claims, federal law claims, and other types of non-tort claims.

At best, Defendant misunderstands Georgia law regarding charitable

immunity. At worst, Defendant misrepresents Georgia law regarding charitable

immunity. The key to understanding how misleading Defendant’s argument is in

4
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 7 of 20

paragraph 3.2 of the report quoted below by Expert Cass Brewer:2

“3.2.1 Georgia nonprofit corporations generally may be held liable for

damages. Georgia nonprofit corporations such as Piedmont College,
Inc. [hyperlink omitted] generally are not immune from suit or liability
for their actions or failure to act. In fact, OCGA § 14-3-302 provides
in relevant part as follows with respect to the purposes and powers of a
Georgia nonprofit corporation: “[E]very [Georgia nonprofit]
corporation has the same powers as an individual to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including
without limitation power:
(1) To sue, be sued, complain, and defend in its corporate name; . . .
(7) To make contracts and guaranties, incur liabilities, borrow money,
issue notes, bonds, and other obligations, and secure any of its
obligations by mortgage or pledge of any of its property, franchises, or
income; . . .
(17) To carry on a business; and
(18) To do all things necessary or convenient, not inconsistent with law,
to further the activities and affairs of the corporation.” (See Pl. SOMF
¶193; Ex. P-69 (ECF 154-69) Brewer Report.)

Georgia law has “held that the doctrine of charitable immunity in Georgia was

not to render the charity immune from suit but to merely see that “charitable trust

funds are not to be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence.” Eschen v.

Roney, 127 Ga. App. 719, 729 (1972) citing Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga.App. 664

(1961). This limited form of the charitable immunity doctrine exists in Georgia to

protect charitable nonprofits from respondeat superior negligence claims. See Hricik

2
https://law.gsu.edu/profile/cass-brewer/ Associate Dean at GSU; Professor of Law
in nonprofits; drafter of Georgia legislation; former head of the Tax Division at
Morris, Manning & Martin; and co-founder/former co-chair of the Nonprofit Law
Section of the State Bar of Georgia wrote:

5
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 8 of 20

& Adams, Georgia Law of Torts § 16:11 (2019-2020). Defamation (an essential

claim for Defendant to keep pertaining to the coverage dispute with their insurance

carrier3) and IIED are not negligence claims, rather they are both intentional torts.

Breach of contract, implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Title IX are not

subject to charitable immunity. Neither is the negligent hiring and retention claim as

admitted by Defendant in its brief, see Def. Br. p. 12. Thus, charitable immunity is

not a blanket defense to any and all liability of a Georgia nonprofit corporation as

Defendant erroneously suggests and, it should be established that charitable

immunity is not a viable defense against Plaintiff’s claims.

C. It Should Be Deemed Established For Trial That Dr. Wainberg Was Not
An At-Will Employee: He Had A Contract Of Employment As Well As
A Contract For Tenure Terminable Only For Cause And Afforded The
Right To A Fair, Impartial And Timely Hearing

Because Defendant does not dispute this contention in its response brief, and

because of the admissions of its own 30(b)(6) witness, President, and expert (Pl.

3
Notably, in the event the Court did find that any claim was covered by charitable
immunity, the Court should establish that charitable immunity is certainly waived
to the extent of a Georgia nonprofit corporation’s income-producing real estate not
used directly in charitable activities. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125
Ga. App. 713 (1972);13 Ga. Jur. § 8:8 (2020) and charitable immunity is waived to
the extent the nonprofit has noncharitable assets or income Morton v. Savannah
Hosp., 128 Ga. 438; Harrell v. Louis Smith Memorial Hospital, 197 Ga. App. 189
(1990) such as the ten-million-dollar liability insurance policy even though
Defendant is in a dispute with its carrier for bad faith. (Pl. SOMF ¶ 192.)

6
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 9 of 20

SOMF ¶¶113, 118, 219; Mellichamp Dep. 339:7-11; Schall Dep. 166:17-168:8;

30(b)(6) Dep. 40:1-8; Ex. P-47 (ECF 154-47)), it should be established at trial that

Dr. Wainberg was not an at-will employee, and that he had contracts of employment

and for tenure where he could only be terminated for sufficient cause and had the

right to a fair, impartial, and timely hearing. It is anticipated that Defendant will try

to confuse the jury by referencing the at-will policy. (See Def. SOMF ¶8.) However,

it should be established at trial that the at-will policy does not apply to Dr. Wainberg,

an employee with a contract, and thus he could not be terminable at will. Moreover,

Defendant should be ordered by this Court to refrain from making argument that the

at-will policy applies or has any relevance to Dr. Wainberg which will only serve to

confuse the jury and imply to them that Dr. Wainberg could be terminated “at the

will” of the President.

D. Both the Failure to Terminate Wainberg Without Sufficient Cause and

the Failure to Provide a Fair and Impartial Hearing Warrant
Compensatory Damages

i. A fair and impartial hearing is an essential term in a tenure contract

Defendant cited both Odem v. Pace Acad., 235 Ga. App. 648, 648 (1998) and

Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. v. Nulph, 265 Ga. 662 (1995) to make the

flawed argument that a failure to provide a fair and impartial hearing was not a

breach of the contract that caused the termination and thus will not warrant

7
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 10 of 20

compensatory damages. (See Def. Br. Sec. I.) However, the Odem and Savannah

cases are both distinguishable because neither involved a contract for tenure where

the right to a hearing was an essential element of the contract of tenure. Dr. Wainberg

not only had a 2017-2018 employment contract but he also had a “contract for

tenure,” awarded to him years ago, that not only afforded to him the expectation of

continued employment each year but insured that he could not be terminated except

with sufficient cause and the right to a “fair and impartial” hearing. (Schall Dep.

166:17-168:8; see also Mellichamp Dep. 159:1-161:8; Ex. P-5 (ECF 154-5) at

Wainberg-D-1434-1436, Tenure Policy 4.13; Id. at Wainberg-D-1437-1438, Tenure

Termination Policy 4.16.) This right to a fair and impartial hearing is a minimum

contractual requirement of what tenure means. (See Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 196-197; Exhs. P-

35 (ECF 154-35) Finkin Report, P-16 (ECF 154-16) Kreiser Report.)

As such, it would be a substantial breach by the Defendant not to fulfill the

procedural requirements within the terms of the contract because “to hold otherwise

would nullify” such a contract. Anderson v. USI Ins. Servs. LLC, 1:19-CV-5582-

SCJ, 2022 WL 2111982, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2022.) Likewise, the Georgia

Supreme Court has stated that if a Defendant (a private university) would be relieved

of the tenure provisions within the Faculty Handbook’s tenure policy, it would

render tenure (this additional compensation) “meaningless.” Wilson v. Clark Atlanta

8
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 11 of 20

Univ., Inc., 339 Ga. App. 814, 822 (2016.) Similarly, there is an entire body of

caselaw in Georgia that outlines the meaning of “tenured” educators and establishes

that schools may not terminate or non-renew a “contract of a tenured teacher only

for cause and after providing specified procedural safeguards.” Clayton Cnty. Bd. of

Educ. v. Burnedetta Wilmer, 325 Ga. App. 637, 638 (2014). These procedural

safeguards must be strictly complied with and if they are not met in the manner

required, it “deprives the decision of any binding effect.” Id. at 648. Granted, the K-

12 body of law is distinguishable because it concerns public school tenured

educators, but the case law is relevant to Dr. Wainberg’s case in that it establishes

the meaning of “tenure.” And in Dr. Wainberg’s case, an essential element of what

it means to have a “contract of tenure” is the right to a ‘fair and impartial’ hearing.

(See Ex. P-5 (154-5) at Wainberg-D-1437-1438, Tenure Termination Policy 4.16.)

Neither a college President or school Superintendent can arbitrarily be the sole

decisionmaker as to what determines a tenured educator’s “cause for termination”

but rather answers and is accountable to an appellate body that “hears” an appeal of

this decision. In Defendant’s case, the right to a “fair and impartial hearing” is the

essential element of this contract of tenure. (See Ex. P-5 (154-5) at Wainberg-D-

1437-1438, Tenure Termination Policy 4.16.) To find that the failure to afford a fair,

impartial hearing is not a substantial breach, would nullify the essential term of the

9
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 12 of 20

contract and thus, as stated above, render tenure “meaningless.” Wilson, 339 Ga.

App. at 822.4

ii. Moreover, failure to afford Plaintiff a fair and impartial hearing

caused his loss

Defendant’s references to Odem and Savannah are also distinguishable, not

only because those cases do not involve a tenured educator, but because they found

that the procedural flaws were not substantive ones because they did not cause the

loss. Savannah 265 Ga. at 662. However, in Dr. Wainberg’s case, the Defendant’s

failure to afford him a “fair and impartial” hearing did in fact cause the loss which

contributed to his termination. Under the undisputed set of facts that exist, the unfair

and partial hearing panel would never have voted anything but to terminate the

Plaintiff--undisputed by Defendant’s own admissions as President Mellichamp

himself stated in writing: “there is no way they will override my decision” (Pl.

SOMF ¶128d, Ex. P-54 (ECF -54-54) at Wainberg-D-4293-4294) as he had

personally hand-selected them and they had already communicated whose “side”

they were on even prior to the hearing. (Pl. SOMF ¶99, Ex. P-36 (ECF 154-36);

Arrendale Dep. 229:8-12, 305:4-9.) The hearing panel never learned that

4
While Wilson was not about a hearing, the Court found that failing to comply with
the private university’s tenure policy would render the tenured professor’s contract
“meaningless.”

10
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 13 of 20

Mellichamp was in fact lying to them when they were told “the basis for the

termination decision is for violation of the Piedmont college policy 3.16A on Sexual

Harassment which addresses Federal law with regard to Title IX” (Ex. P-62 (ECF

154-62) at Wainberg-D-557; Rettig Dep. 143:20-144:3) and that “[t]he college has

followed its policy concerning the investigation of these complaints.” (Ex. P-92

(ECF 173-4); see Pl. Response to Def. MSJ pp. 2-12 and Pl. MSJ pp. 15-22.)

Certainly, the evidence is sufficient to show that Defendant’s breach of the tenure’s

contractual requirement which required “fair and impartiality” caused Plaintiff’s

loss/damages, i.e. his termination. But most importantly, this Court, in defining the

law, should find that a fair and impartial hearing is an essential term of a contract for

tenure and cannot be abrogated. Sufficient cause or not, a tenured professor—even

an incompetent one—keeps his job and cannot be removed from a tenured position

without a fair and impartial hearing.

E. Title VII Does Not Preempt Plaintiff’s Title IX Claim

Plaintiff incorporates his response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, showing that Title VII clearly does not preempt Title IX. (See Pl. Resp. to

Def MSJ, ECF 173, pp. 12-17.) Importantly, all of Plaintiff’s Title IX claims stem

from, are based upon, or evolve out of the retaliation he was subjected to for engaging

in protected activity under Title IX. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.

11
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 14 of 20

167, 174, 181 (2005). Here, the United States Supreme Court reversed an Eleventh

Circuit decision, holding that an employee had a private cause of actions to enforce

such rights when he–like Dr. Wainberg –spoke out against gender discrimination

concerning college athletes and was subsequently retaliated against. Jackson 544

U.S.at 174.

In Plaintiff’s case, Defendant began retaliating shortly after an “explosive”

conversation where Dean Nimmo was “yelling” in Dr. Wainberg’s face in a “heated

dispute” telling Dr. Wainberg he would face “serious repercussions” after Dr.

Wainberg stood up to gender discrimination, i.e. engaged in protected activity under

Title IX. (See Pl. SOMF ¶220, ECF 173-2; Wainberg Dep. V.2 372:2-373:14; V.3

417:10-419:22.) Because Congress affords employees substantive rights under Title

IX, because Supreme Court precedent under Jackson mirrors Plaintiff’s Title IX

retaliation claim, and because Title VII clearly does not provide him any parallel

remedy or recovery—this Court must find that Dr. Wainberg’s Title IX claims are

not preempted. Plaintiff incorporates his argument against Title VII pre-emption into

this brief. (See Pl. Resp. to Def MSJ, ECF 173, pp. 12-17.)

F. It Should Be Established At Trial That Piedmont Had A Duty To Comply

With Title IX And Its Requirements To Afford An Equitable Grievance
Procedure

In accepting federal funds, Defendant had a contractual duty to comply with

12
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 15 of 20

Title IX which prohibits retaliation, sex discrimination, and requires equitable

grievance procedure. Title IX 20 U.S.C. §1681; 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b); Jackson,

544 U.S. at 174, 181; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290

(1998); see exhs. P-79 (ECF 154-79) Bullard Report, P-80 (ECF 154-80) Sokolow

Report. Plaintiff does not seek summary judgment on his Title IX claim as there

are clearly issues of disputed fact that should be answered by a jury. Rather, this

partial motion for summary judgment is simply to establish at trial that Piedmont

had a duty to comply with Title IX and its requirements to afford equitable

grievance procedures. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b)

Contrary to Defendant’s brief, the Eleventh Circuit case, Doe v. Samford

University, 29 F.4th 675 (11th Cir. 2022) does not stand for the proposition as it

appears the Defendant would like the Court to believe, that multiple violations of

Title IX processes and procedures (such as failure to provide written notice, failure

to acquire exculpatory evidence, and irregularities at the appeal level) would

always be insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment in a Title IX claim.

Rather, the Eleventh Circuit simply held that in this particular, specific case, at the

motion to dismiss level, a male student accused of rape named “Mr. Doe” had a

particular set of facts in his complaint alleging procedural irregularities which

didn’t support a plausible inference that the university’s actions were “on the basis

13
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 16 of 20

of sex.” Id. at 688. The Eleventh Circuit did not hold that procedural violations of

Title IX process at disciplinary hearings can never be sufficient evidence of a Title

IX claim as the Defendant misleadingly implies. Rather it simply held that while

this kind of procedural deviation “is at least ‘consistent with’ sex

discrimination” that Mr. Doe’s bare assertions in his complaint of the procedural

irregularities as tied to discrimination were not plausible. Doe v. Samford Univ.,

29 F.4th 675, 688 (11th Cir. 2022). The Eleventh Circuit then adopted the Seventh

Circuit test for analyzing Title IX claims, modifying it to simply question whether

the alleged facts, in a motion to dismiss, permit a reasonable inference that the

university discriminated “on the basis of sex.” Id. at 687. The line of cases that the

Samford Univ. Eleventh Circuit opinion cites which follow this Seventh Circuit

test, include such where Courts have determined that accused plaintiffs had

sufficient evidence to support a Title IX claim where private universities violated

their Title IX policy and procedure. E.g. Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 1 F.4th 822,

831–32 (10th Cir. 2021). For example, here the recent Tenth Circuit decision held

that “pretext can be shown because the University's investigation was replete

with procedural deficiencies… In the Title VII context, we have held that

‘disturbing procedural irregularities surrounding an adverse employment action

may demonstrate that an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory business reason

14
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 17 of 20

is pretextual.’ Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th Cir.

2007). That logic naturally extends to this context, as ‘[s]uch irregularities can

be sufficient to call into question the [University]’s honesty and good faith in

making the [disciplinary] decision and, consequently, establish pretext.’”

Univ. of Denver 1 F.4th at 831–32 (emphasis added.) Notably, the Tenth Circuit

decision involved a private university. Similarly, in a case involving an accused

rights at a private university in Memphis, TN (Rhodes College) a Sixth Circuit

decision recently held: “Clearly, courts are not prohibited from protecting against

procedural irregularities in school disciplinary proceedings that amount to due

process violations.” Doe v. Rhodes College, 2:19-cv-02336 (W.D. Tenn. 2019.)5

This Court should grant partial summary judgment that Piedmont had a duty

to comply with Title IX and its requirements to afford an equitable grievance

procedure.

Respectfully submitted, this 18th day of August 2022.

WILLIAMS OINONEN LLC

/s/ JULIE OINONEN

Julie Oinonen (Ga. Bar No. 722018)
Counsel for Plaintiff
5
See also: Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602,
623 (E.D. Va. 2016); Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 603 (6th Cir. 2018);
Gischel v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 302 F. Supp. 3d 961, 978 (S.D. Ohio 2018); Doe v.
Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2018).

15
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 18 of 20

44 Broad Street, NW, Suite 200

Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 654-0288/ (404) 592-6225 FAX
julie@goodgeorgialawyer.com

16
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 19 of 20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing has been

prepared using Times New Roman 14-point font in compliance with Local Rule

5.1.

/s/ JULIE OINONEN

Julie Oinonen (Ga Bar No. 722018)

17
 Case 2:19-cv-00251-MHC Document 186 Filed 08/18/22 Page 20 of 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT with the Clerk of Court

using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification of such

filing to the following attorneys of record:

Joseph C. Chancey Patrick W. McKee

Barbara A. Marschalk Law Office of Patrick W. McKee,
Meredith R. Guerrero LLC
Drew Eckl & Farnham, LLP 19 Spring Street
303 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 3500 Newnan, GA 30263
Atlanta, Georgia 30308 pwmckee@mckeelaw.com
jchancey@deflaw.com
bmarschalk@deflaw.com Counsel for Defendant Piedmont
mguerrero@deflaw.com University

Respectfully submitted, this 18th day of August 2022.

WILLIAMS OINONEN LLC

/s/ JULIE OINONEN

Julie Oinonen (Ga. Bar No. 722018)
Counsel for Plaintiff
44 Broad Street, NW, Suite 200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 654-0288/ (404) 592-6225 FAX
julie@goodgeorgialawyer.com

18