Comparative Strategy

ISSN: 0149-5933 (Print) 1521-0448 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20

Western orientalism and the threat from Russia

Kevin Blachford

To cite this article: Kevin Blachford (2020) Western orientalism and the threat from Russia,
Comparative Strategy, 39:4, 354-367, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2020.1772625

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772625

Published online: 30 Jun 2020.

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COMPARATIVE STRATEGY
2020, VOL. 39, NO. 4, 354–367
https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772625

Western orientalism and the threat from Russia

Kevin Blachford
Estonian School of Diplomacy, Tallinn and Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia

ABSTRACT
Contemporary security discourse on the belligerence of Russia is often
understood through cultural terms. Russian culture and its way of war are
seen to be a fundamental cause of tension. This cultural divide is increas-
ingly described in civilizational terms in which a liberal democratic West is
opposed by an irrational Russian-East, ever resistant to modernity. This per-
spective is known as orientalism. The following paper argues that oriental-
ism and its cultural explanations of war are problematic. Western
orientalist portrayals of Russia increase the chances of militarization and
limits the scope of negotiation.

Introduction
The subject of international relations (IR) has been defined by questions of war and peace, and
the foundations of the discipline can be traced to debates on why states go to war. Cultural
explanations of war and culture as a source of conflict has also become a major strand of
research.1 Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations went so far as to suggest that cultural dis-
tinctions would define war and conflict for the 21st century.2 Understanding war through cultural
identities demonstrates how groups “other” the opposing side and how war can play a constitu-
tive role in social and political relations. War itself, can also be understood as a cultural act in
which the traits of a society are “violently affirmed.”3 However, the way IR treats the concept of
war has recently come into criticism for its Eurocentric ontology.4 Eurocentric ideas and histori-
ographies have shaped and informed our understanding of conflict. War as a cultural act can also
create a distinct division of identity between “us” and “them.” This is evident in the way Western
wars, led by the US and its European allies, are interpreted in very different ways to other actors.
Liberal democracies regularly portray their wars as conflicts against irrational aggressors.5 While
non-Western war is seen as “criminal” in its intent or irrational in its justifications.6
In portraying warfare through a cultural lens, war often becomes a “potent site of orientalism”
where “the West” is defined through opposition to “the East.”7 It is a perspective that exaggerates
cultural differences and often views other cultures, as exotic, uncivilized and dangerous.
Orientalist understandings of war portray conflict between distinct identities of West and East.
Western warfare is understood through overwhelming firepower, surgical strikes and swift action
relying on advanced technology,8 while Eastern warfare is portrayed in orientalist terms. The East
becomes seen as a source of irrational zealots who embrace fanaticism and primeval violence.9
War creates an existential crisis that shapes self-identity and this can be illustrated through the
tensions between Russia and the West. As this paper shows, Russia’s recent wars in Georgia
(2008), Ukraine (2014) and Syria (2015-) have helped shape Western and Russian discourse as
competing identities and cultures. Specifically, Russia is often portrayed in orientalist terms as an
Eastern power that has rejected Western values. The following paper argues that orientalist

CONTACT Kevin Blachford Kevin.Blachford@baltdefcol.org

ß 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 355

portrayals of Russia limit our understanding of these conflicts and leads to increased militariza-
tion as Russian culture is seen as incompatible with Western liberal values.
Historical patterns of geopolitical competition between the US and Russia have often been
understood through their respective competing identities and cultural explanations of contempor-
ary Russia continue to be mired in clich
es, stereotypes and caricatures.10 Stereotypes of Putin
“playing chess”11 or “facing up to the bear”12 also continue to shape Western discourse about ten-
sions with Russia. Understandings of Russia then become mired in attempts to explain Russian
foreign policy as irrational, deceptive and non-Western. This orientalist perspective deserves to be
investigated because Russian culture is widely seen as a primary cause of conflict and tension
with the West. Russia is accused of following a “perpetual” and “historical pattern,”13 in which
Russia’s actions can be understood largely through its history, national identity and its expansive
geography. The culture of the Russian leadership and its “way of war”14 are viewed as a signifi-
cant source of tension with the West and one of the major causes of the Georgia15 and Ukraine
crises.16 These cultural explanations of the tensions between the two sides portray Russia as
diverging from Western norms.17 This creates an othering of Russia as it is portrayed as the
“West’s mirror image” and antithesis.18 Orientalist perspectives limit the possibilities of negoti-
ation as the othering of Russia leads to an increasingly militarized dispute viewed in cultural
terms in which competing identities are seen as radically different and incompatible.
This paper does not aim to be an apologist for Russia. While there can be no doubt Russia is
actively seeking to undermine Western institutions, there is however, a need to understand how
current tensions have been shaped by cultural divides. Western foreign policy is often described
as acting in the name of human rights, democracy promotion, or for a liberal order; whereas
Russian foreign policy is largely understood solely through its strategic and national culture.
Tensions between the East and West are therefore blamed on Russia’s resistance to Western val-
ues and modernity. To explore this discourse the following paper develops in four sections. The
first section will argue that Russia’s culture is uniquely seen as a source of tension. Section two
builds upon this argument to provide examples of Western orientalism toward Russia. The third
section develops this argument further by looking to the current crisis of confidence within the
liberal order. I argue that Russia’s resistance to the West has introduced narratives of self-doubt
within the Western liberal order. The final section therefore examines how Russia has equally
sought to promote a narrative of Russian identity standing apart and separate from the West.
The aim of this examination is not to provide a conclusive study of media sources and academic
discourse, but to argue that the othering of Russia as a non-Western power, hardens separate
identities and reinforces conflict between seemingly incompatible cultures. This paper concludes
by arguing that the promotion of distinct cultural divides serves to militarize relations between
the two sides and further increase tensions.

Russian culture as a source of conflict and orientalism

Edward Said’s seminal study, Orientalism,19 provided an account of how Western cultural identity
is shaped, formed and defined through comparison and contrast to an Eastern orient. For Said,
the orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality
[and] experience.”20 Said’s groundbreaking study showed the West’s ideological suppositions in
viewing the orient. Although originally developed from the colonial era, orientalism illustrates
how the West defines itself and its view of others. Orientalism is a view based on an “imaginative
geography” and can be used to understand how the West portrays the East.21 Orientalism pro-
vides a framework to understand cultural constructs and purported differences.22 In this case, the
following study looks to the othering of Russia as an Eastern power. Western portrayals of the
East have shaped identities and culture, but “crucially, it is not the actual, geographic East and
West (wherever located) that is at issue” it is the portrayal of distinctive and opposing cultures.23
356 K. BLACHFORD

Russian imperial expansion in the 19th century, has itself, often been a source of orientalism
within the work of Russian geographers, and anthropologists, coming into contact with people in
Central Asia.24 However, in contemporary politics, Russia is increasingly described in orientalist
terms that helps to otherize Russia as a distinctive culture that differs to a liberal democratic
West. The following section argues that it is cultural differences that are seen to be a primary
cause of geopolitical tensions.
Geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West are commonly understood in cultural
terms. This goes beyond an examination of differing national interests, to become an ideological
divide between a liberal democratic West and an irrational Russian East. The Cold War confron-
tation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was often expressed in ideological terms. Russia
was portrayed in the Cold War as an oriental enemy based on godless communism against
America’s liberal democracy.25 What is significant about the portrayal of the opposing sides in
the Cold War is that cultural explanations were used to explain state behavior. The Soviet Union
was seen as an irrational enemy that was more likely to use nuclear weapons.26 The Cold War
conflict was also viewed as an “irreconcilable struggle between two fundamentally different value
systems.” American culture was celebrated for its embracing of personal freedom, while the
Soviets were understood as an oppressive empire.27 Since the end of the Cold War, the West has
assumed that tensions would disappear and Russia would become more “Western.” Russia’s
actions in Ukraine and Crimea have led to the revival of tensions, but crucially, Russian culture
is again seen to be a major cause for conflict. The fall of the Berlin Wall led the West to assume
that “as Russia became more prosperous it would become more like other European countries.”28
The post-Cold War era saw an ideological wave of support for a Fukuyama-esque future in which
Western style liberal democracy would spread inexorably across the globe. Underpinning these
views was an ideological belief in the evolution of progress and a triumphalist understanding of
Western modernity.29 Liberal scholars in IR have continued to claim that “there is ultimately one
path to modernity.”30 This ideological understanding of politics in evolutionary terms views an
American West and a liberal international order as the highest form of modernity. Russia’s own
interests and understandings of political order can therefore be dismissed because of “Russian
backwardness.”31
The triumphalist post-Cold War mood led liberal scholars of IR to argue that the West and
Europe was in a fundamental new era. The EU was celebrated for achieving a Kantian Peace,32
having created a new approach to international politics through acting as a “civilian”33 and
“normative” power.34 Conflict and war within Europe was believed to have been all but essentially
eradicated. The political order of European security based on international institutions and collab-
oration was celebrated for creating a Europe “whole, free and at peace.”35 Some scholars even
went so far as to claiming Europe had moved into a new historical era through creating “post-
Clausewitzian political cultures” that openly questioned “the utility of force.”36 Russia’s own will-
ingness to use force in defence of its national interests has therefore caused disbelief amongst
elites within Europe. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea caught European elites by
“surprise”37 and led to criticisms of Western elites being caught “napping.”38 The end of the Cold
War created a Western ideology, which believed in a “prolonged sense of inevitability about
Russia rejoining the West.”39 Russia’s use of force in defence of its interests led one observer to
declare the West is “discovering that Russia’s understanding of events, its discourse, methods and
calculus of risk differ from its own.”40 The annexation of Crimea appeared to show that Western
triumphalism had misunderstood Russian culture and identity, that the West had simply “got
Russia wrong.”41
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the politics of Ukraine has been
explained largely through a cultural lens. According to Mark Galeotti, Russia believes that it is
fighting a “political” war and “faces an existential cultural” threat from the “West.”42 In trying to
understand the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare is explained as originating from a
 COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 357

particular “ideological vision and political ambition”43 and from the “worldview” of Russian elites
and society.44 Russia’s actions in Ukraine are also attributed to the way the Russia’s leadership
“look at the world.”45 Anatol Lieven argues that overused analogies comparing Russia’s actions to
Nazi Germany also imply that Russia’s leadership is a “force of absolute evil, drawing on deeply
rooted, malevolent elements of Russian culture.”46 It is the “culture” of Russian society and its
elites that is uniquely blamed for “the return of geopolitics” to Europe.47 Analysts have rushed to
also explain these tensions as a new “East-West” confrontation48 in which Russia’s non-Western
culture has exacerbated the divide between NATO and Russia.
This East-West divide continues an orientalist tendency within Western security debates. The
idea of a “West at war with an East conceived as radically other is pervasive and longstanding”
within political discourse.49 The War on Terror is just one recent example of a long propensity
within Western security discourse to fall into an orientalist perspective. But it is during conflict
and warfare that an orientalist perspectives frame an “us” versus “them.” Political discussions on
the War on Terror often portrayed a “law abiding, Christian and Western civilization” as threat-
ened by an irrational Eastern enemy that was “ever-resistant to modernity.”50 In trying to explain
the return of geopolitical competition to Europe, there is an orientalist tendency to see Western
states as acting rationally, responding to incentives; while Russian foreign policy is shaped by a
resistance to modernity and the Russian culture of its elites, or by a primordial instinct traced to
its national character and the weight of its history.51 As the following section explores, Western
political discourse toward Russia is often framed through this orientalist lens.

Western orientalism and russia

Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea and willingness to support Assad in Syria,
challenged Western presuppositions of the post-Cold War era. The revival of tension between
NATO powers and Russia has also ended the post-Cold War optimism that Russia would
Westernize and become a Western style liberal democracy. The following, aims to provide a crit-
ical examination of the discourse surrounding tensions with Russia. As Western analysts have
rushed to explain Russia’s belligerence, there is a frequent recourse to simplistic cultural
explanations.
In looking to Russia’s foreign policy actions since the Georgian war of 2008, “many Western
observers,” have concluded, “Russia and the Russians defy logic.”52 The failure to adequately
engage with Russian politics and develop a deeper understanding of Russian foreign policy
reflects a long trend of Western discourse to see Russia as defined by its geography and culture.
It is the legacy of a Soviet and Tsarist past which is used to understand Russia’s actions today.53
Thomas Graham even argued that Europe has a “Russia problem” stretching back 200 years based
on a cultural “values gap.”54 Graham further argued that contemporary tensions could essentially
be traced to the Tsarist policies of the post-Napoleonic era. Explanations of Russian foreign policy
have often relied on a primordialist perspective to explain Russia’s actions. That only by looking
long back into Russia’s history and national identity can we understand Russia’s contemporary
foreign policy. To explain Russia’s actions in the international sphere, Western observes look to
Russia’s long history and expansive geography;55 but this primordial explanation is used in a
deterministic manner. Because of Russia’s history and geography it is accused of following a
recurring “pattern” of conflict with the West.56 Historical and geopolitical explanations are not
orientalist by themselves, it is the tendency to reduce these explanations to a deterministic
approach which is orientalist. Western foreign policy then becomes portrayed as rational,
responding to incentives, while Russia is portrayed as being guided by some historic impulse or
flaw in its culture.
The fighting in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea has been interpreted as a “frontal chal-
lenge to the post-Cold War European regional order.”57 Russia’s actions created surprise and
358 K. BLACHFORD

shock for analysts and policy makers alike, but there have been few serious investigations into
Russia’s strategic decisions. Instead, Western public discourse has followed an orientalist trend in
blaming an irrational leadership and its Eastern culture. The use of force by Russia is also seen as
uniquely linked to Putin’s leadership. The Ukraine and Georgia crisis is blamed on Putin’s
“unique response”58 and Putin’s “choice.”59 There seems little attempt to explore either the work-
ings of the Russian leadership or to consider in more detail why Russia chose to intervene.
Instead, there is a tendency to embrace simplistic arguments blaming Putin’s “unconstrained,
erratic adventurism.”60 Western analysts argue Putin’s “surprise policy decisions,” and his
“rashness,” “have astounded even expert analysis.”61 What is significant about the attempts to
blame solely Putin is that he is seen as uniquely responsible. Putin as the sole figure involved is
then portrayed as an “ideologue”62 and as a “gambler.”63 His actions are not seen as the rational
choice of a leader responding to a realpolitik environment. However, counter arguments have
been made which show Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine was not an irrational opportunistic gam-
ble, but an attempt to coerce Kiev into negotiations.64 But while such alternative explanations
have been discussed in academic publications they have not been widely covered within the
Western media.
The Ukraine crisis has, however, been widely covered in the media for its use of hybrid war-
fare. The surprise and confusion these events created within Western political commentary was
intertwined with an orientalist perspective that sought to highlight Russia’s cultural differences to
the West. Hybrid warfare has been described as a conflict between “East and West.”65 What is
significant in this portrayal is that Russia’s hybrid warfare is then viewed in omnipotent terms
which exaggerates Russia’s power and ability.66 Western observers have long demonized Eastern
tactics in war as irrational, deceptive and underhanded.67 In describing Russia’s actions, Western
analysts repeat this formula by accusing Russia of using “shadowy tactics”68 of being “sneaky”69
and using tactics based on “deceit.”70 Hybrid warfare is further interpreted with reference to the
Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu.71 The reputation of Sun Tzu as an Eastern general willing to
use deception and secrecy to win battles is then compared to Russia’s own use of asymmetric
warfare.72 But crucially, this historical analogy devolves further into an orientalist perspective
when Russia is accused of being, not just a “sneaky” Easterner, but by not playing by “the
rules.”73 Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare is not interpreted as a rational response to material
or strategic constraints, but is blamed for being deceptive.
The significance of these critiques is that Russia is accused of not acting in a manner accept-
able to the West. Russia’s hybrid war is understood as breaking the rules and as Martin Zapfe
argues, Russia “seems to have rejected the established Western playbook.”74 It is the “strategic
culture” of Russia which is seen to be at fault in rejecting Western ways of war.75 These por-
trayals of a Russian East as enigmatic and dangerous, diverging from Western norms shows an
orientalist perspective.76 Looking to Sun Tzu in order to understand contemporary military strat-
egy can be illuminating. But what makes these perspectives problematic is the way Russia is
viewed as acting in a way that the West would never contemplate. For example, Russia is accused
of being uniquely better suited to hybrid warfare because of Putin’s “central guiding authority.”77
This ignores that the concept of hybrid warfare originated with the US78 and Western uses of
deception, covert tactics or proxy fighters becomes essentially ignored. Rod Thornton argues fur-
ther that, “the basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste
for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as
psychological warfare.”79 The long US history of propaganda and covert war in both the Cold
War and the War on Terror is therefore negated and exempt from consideration. As Rory
Cormac and Richard Aldrich have argued, much of IR, “offers a simplistic view of secrecy” and
Western covert action by taking “plausible deniability at face value.”80 Attempts to critically ana-
lyze Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare have therefore failed to fully engage with the West’s own
use of covert warfare.
 COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 359

Russia’s actions are no doubt threatening to the West and are problematic in raising tensions.
But in adapting an orientalist perspective, Western discourse surrounding Russia has limited our
understandings of these conflicts. The US and its allies routinely use covert action as part of the
War on Terror but Western war is still seen as fundamentally different to Russia’s Eastern way of
warfare. As Jonathan Caverley argues, Russia has 4,000 troops involved in the Syrian “war,” while
the US has had 10,000 personnel involved in Afghanistan 19 years after the invasion and yet, this
is not considered as a “war.”81 It is described as a NATO support mission. Debates over the
nuance of these definitions are not meant to confuse our understandings of war, but can help to
illustrate our presuppositions. As this section has shown, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Syria and
Georgia have often been understood through cultural explanations. There is a risk, however, of
such cultural explanations slipping into an essentialist and “ahistorical myth.”82 Conflicts are not
just about physical security, but raise existential questions in relation to the self and the other.
Narratives of conflict can also lead to the reproduction of conflict as ontological security for one
group can lead to insecurity for another.83 The following section will therefore examine how cul-
tural explanations have led to an othering of Russia as separate and distinct from an American
led Western liberal order.

Western identity: Europe, Russia and orientalism

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria have considerably raised tensions and
security concerns for Europe and the Atlantic alliance. Russia’s belligerence toward the West also
continues to pose a security threat. Russia’s aggressiveness challenges not just the Western under-
standing of European security, but challenges Western ideas of identity. As the following explores,
in resorting to the use of force and in challenging Western powers, Russia has created self-doubt
in Western narratives and the ontology of Western ideas about political order.
At the end of the Cold War, Russia and Europe sought to find new ground for cooperation
after decades of mutual distrust. The West sought to consider the place of Russia within
European society and political order; and debate centered on the question of “is Russia a
European Power?”84 In 1999, the European Union’s common strategy toward Russia made use of
conciliatory language that emphasized the shared cultural and ideational values between the two
sides. The strategy declared that “the European Union welcomes Russia’s return to its rightful
place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of inter-
ests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civi-
lization.”85 Richard Rosecrance captured the zeitgeist of the optimism when he argued that
“developed states are putting aside military, political and territorial ambitions as they struggle not
for cultural dominance but a greater share of world output.”86 As Zbigniew Brzezinski also
argued, Russia had the opportunity to “join” into this “democratic community of nations.”87 For
liberal internationalist thinkers, the expansion of Europe had a “desecuritizing effect,”88 which
would inevitably expand to one day include Russia. Such liberal internationalist arguments
believed in globalization as a homogenizing process. The expansion of the European Union was
represented as a distinctly European model of progress, which rested on benign conduct, open
borders, economic interdependence and the rejection of military force. Liberal internationalist
scholars therefore see contemporary Russia as rejecting this “distinctly European model of inter-
national conduct.”89
The expansion of the EU as a civilian power was largely interpreted as devoid of geopolitical
or security significance. John Mearsheimer has been one of the most vocal critics of these “liberal
delusions” and argues the West is to blame for provoking the Ukraine crisis.90 With the return of
tensions between NATO and Russia, critics now lament “Europe’s Shattered Dream of Order.”91
Such optimism always presumed that a Russian democracy would ultimately show “acquiescence
to American foreign policy preferences.”92 The revival of tensions therefore challenges this
360 K. BLACHFORD

narrative. As Neumann argues, the post-Cold War era believed in an idea of Russia “as a learner”
of Western ideas.93 Implying that Russia would inevitably become more like the West. Zbigniew
Brzezinski argued that the “only path” was for “Russia, like Ukraine,” to “become a real
democracy.”94 The former American ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul asked “who lost
Russia?”95 Such a question implied Russia is essentially a bad student that has not learned the les-
sons of Western modernization and has become lost on the path to Western modernity. The cli-
mate between Russia and the West has now radically changed from the optimism of the
immediate post-Cold War era. Observers now conclude that the Euro-Atlantic community and
Russia seem to “live in different worlds.”96 Russia’s development has not followed the lines of
Western liberal democracy and Russia’s willingness to use military force has created a stream of
self-doubt and questioning over Western narratives.
Russia’s use of force in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria has challenged Western narratives and
understandings of international order. This can be seen with the way that the conflict in Syria
raised many difficult choices for the NATO alliance in regards to ideational norms of human
security and the responsibility to protect. President Obama called the use of chemical weapons
within Syria a “game-changer” and warned this would be a “red line” that the US could not
accept.97 But while the US refrained from a full scale intervention, Western powers intervened
through air strikes, covert means and the sponsorship of local armed groups. As the philosopher
John Gray observes, for Western leaders ISIS could only be destroyed if Syria was “reconstituted
as a democratic polity under the rule of “moderate forces.”98 Russia’s intervention in support of
Assad changed the tide of the conflict and challenged Western ideas about liberalism and order.
Russia’s “obstruction” of Western intervention99 has been interpreted as part of a “crisis” in the
lack of American leadership.100 Former Vice President Joe Biden called to “defend the liberal
international order” and he argued that resistance to liberal internationalism and a desire for a
return of spheres of interest was a movement that “is principally led by Russia.”101 The Western
liberal international order is challenged by many structural and systemic problems, but the resur-
gence of concerns surrounding Russia has created a renewed sense of insecurity. This has led to
an outpouring of “nostalgia”102 and questioning of are we now seeing “The End of Liberal
International Order?”103 Hal Brands argues that the divisions between Russia and the West are
not just clashes over geopolitical influence, but are about fundamentally different conceptions of
“governance, political values, even morality.”104 He further argues that the US should engage in
this ideological competition to defend a liberal order. The vision of a liberal international order
assumes a relative homogeneity of the West that does not reflect reality. It also creates a cultural
divide between those considered seen as part of the “West” and those considered as outside
this order.
Russia’s failure to acquiesce toward the policies of a self-identifying liberal democratic order
are therefore increasingly seen in civilizational terms in which Russian culture has rejected the
West. The NATO alliance has reacted to tensions with Russia through a crisis of ontological inse-
curity, which has sought an “attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North
Atlantic alliance.”105 This has involved shoring up alliance commitments and reestablishing
NATO’s ability to deter Russian power. For many Western observers, Russia’s intervention in
Georgia was a precedent that would encourage Russian aggression against post-Soviet and new
NATO states.106 The annexation of Crimea and the use of hybrid war was also seen as a particu-
lar threat to the Baltic states. Analysts expected a “domino” like repetition of hybrid war being
used in the Baltics107 and this allowed NATO to reinforce a narrative of an Atlantic alliance built
on Western liberal democratic norms. The significance of these developments are reflected in the
way that Russia and the NATO alliance are now seen as radically different identities.
This paper has so far argued that the West has sought to otherize Russia through endorsing a
distinction between the liberal democratic West and a non-Western “spoiler”108 which seeks
to defy liberal Western norms, as defined by Russia. Typologies of oriental and Western act to
 COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 361

categorize distinctions and shape identities. As Said argues, “the result is usually to polarize the
distinction- the oriental becomes more oriental, the Westerner more Western.”109 As the follow-
ing section explores, Russia has equally sought to shape an identity that is distinct and different
from the “Western” identity of the US and its NATO partners.

Russia and Eurasianism

The chronic problems of economic corruption and underinvestment have plagued Russian society
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite these problems, the leadership of Putin has sought
to develop a narrative of Russia’s rightful role as a great power on the world stage. The growing
tensions with the NATO alliance and the EU have led Russia to emphasize its place apart from
Europe and its separate identity as a unique power situated between Europe and Asia. The estab-
lishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015 has also helped to shore up Russian
influence in the post-Soviet space and create a regional organization that counters the expansion
of the European Union. As the following explains, these developments continue a trend of seeing
East-West divides through cultural distinctions and civilizational spheres of influence.
Contemporary Russian foreign policy is built upon defending Russia’s perceived traditional
culture and in establishing Russian influence as a Eurasian power. The Russian leadership has
embarked upon a “systematic development of its cultural statecraft” to promote Russian language
and Russian traditional values.110 The establishment of Russia Today in 2005 and Sputnik news
in 2014 have helped to advance a Kremlin approved account of events. These media outlets also
help to serve as a vehicle for challenging Western narratives and for promoting a “brand of
revanchist nationalism for an international audience.”111 The promotion of these media outlets
forms a major part of Russia’s cultural statecraft and as a significant tool of Russian foreign pol-
icy. Domestically, questions of civic and human rights continue unabated within Russia, but are
often dismissed as Western interference or Western cultural imperialism. The rise of the
Orthodox Church as a major source of support for Putin has also helped to reinforce an image
of Russia as a country resistant to, or as an alternative to Western modernity. This systematic
promotion of a Russian alternative identity to the West goes beyond the promotion of a strong
national identity. Russian elites are promoting an ideal of Russia as a civilization apart from the
West.112 As Chebankova argues “Russia deploys the ideas of civilisational particularity in defence
of its territorial and political integrity.”113 The active promotion of a civilizational ideology has
helped to firm up ideas of Russia as apart from Europe. The European Council on Foreign
Relations reported that by early 2015 a public opinion poll showed that 70 percent of Russians
took a negative view of Europe with just 20 percent still feeling positive about relations
with Europe.114
Russian foreign policy aims to enhance its status within its near-abroad and seeks to promote
Russian leadership of the Eurasian Economic Union. Originally, the EEU was modeled on the
example of the European Union and was promoted by Russian elites as a way to develop links
across “Greater Europe.” The tensions arising since the Ukraine crisis have shifted this focus
toward now advocating the EEU as a form of “Greater Eurasia.” The EEU is promoted as a way
to link Europe to Asia and to secure the heritage and civilizational ties of the post-Soviet area.
For the Russian elite, the EEU “exemplifies” a “deep-seated belief” that the “post-Soviet space
needs to be fenced off and protected from the outside world.”115 Russia is increasingly promoting
its vision of being a civilization apart from the West in order to defend against what it sees as
cultural encroachment by Western powers. Liberal institutionalism has been puzzled by the rise
of regional integration across countries lacking democratic norms and struggling with corrup-
tion.116 Although Eurasian regionalism has so far failed to generate substantial economic benefits,
it plays an important symbolic role in shoring up Russia’s self-image as a culturally distinct civili-
zational power. The EEU acts as a vehicle for regional integration, but for countries such as
362 K. BLACHFORD

Kazakhstan, there has been concern of the EEU acting to revive Russian domination.117 The EEU
serves for Russia as a way to bolster Russia’s ontological security through promoting its self-image
as a regional leader.118
Russia’s ontological security rests on promoting its cultural differences to the West as a civil-
ization apart. With the rise of China and the shift in global economic power to the pacific,
Russia’s foreign policy is increasingly looking to the East. Tensions with the West have also
pushed Russia into a closer alignment with the leadership of China. Joint military drills in 2018
have shown that, for Russia, the East provides challenges and opportunities.119 Systemic theories
of the balance of power might expect Russia to join with the US in order to contain China.120
This has not happened as systemic theorists would perhaps predict and instead, Russia is increas-
ing its promotion of a Eurasian cultural identity that is separate from the West. Although cultural
differences alone are not enough to explain the current tensions between Russia and the NATO
partners, Russia’s ontological security has become tied to the promotion of a discourse in which,
cultural and civilizational differences are repeatedly emphasized.
Civilisational differences are also becoming reinforced by the securitization of Russia’s cultural
identity and “national memory.”121 Sergey Lavrov has argued that Russia’s place as a Eurasian
power can be traced to its history under the Golden Horde in which the Rus “bent but did not
break.” He further argued that the Mongol invasions of Russia “facilitated the emergence of a
new Russian ethnos.”122 Lavrov links this period of Russian history to its contemporary import-
ance in “asserting the independent role of the Russian state in Eurasia.” For Russia, advocating a
distinct non-Western identity is a way to secure itself against perceived Western interference. But
these patterns of behavior also help to further and deepen the security and political divides
between NATO and Russia. The ontological insecurity of the West is therefore built on the West
constituting itself against Russia and vice versa, thereby, reproducing “mutual insecurities” and
reinstating “historical animosities” instead of alleviating them.123 Viewing the security challenges
of Russia and NATO through the divides of distinct and separate civilizations helps to securitize
cultural identities and increase military tension.

Conclusion
The political divides between Russia and the EU, along with NATO, are a very real challenge that
cannot be blamed solely on cultural differences. But tensions often arise because political elites,
particularly within Europe, have often failed to distinguish what do we mean by “European secur-
ity’? The European Union is built on a “European” identity or ideal, but the problems of EU rela-
tions with Russia, Turkey and the Balkans, suggests that there needs to be more consideration of
how we define “Europe” and “European security.” Whereas once these regions may have expected
to become incorporated within Europe, they are now seeking a different path as they have not
been welcomed into the European community.124 Although the Baltics have tied themselves to
forging a European identity, for those countries caught between the EU and Russia, such as
Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus, they are increasingly becoming a battleground for cultural differen-
ces. Civilizational spheres of influence reinforce an East-West divide and encourage the securitiza-
tion of cultural identities creating an “us” vs “them” that limits the scope for diplomacy.
Binary distinctions between the West and Russia also create deeper divisions by overlooking
the nuance of political similarities. Said’s orientalism “reminds us that our others are to a large
extent reflections of ourselves.”125 As this paper has shown, Western security discourse often
becomes mired in clich
es and caricatures when discussing Russian foreign policy. There is also an
orientalist tendency to see Western states acting according to the national interest, while, Russia
acts according to a primordial instinct. Criticisms of Russia also often rest on claiming there is a
flaw in Russian culture, or that Russia is uniquely shaped by its history and geography. Strategic
cultures can shape behavior, but orientalism can also help us to recognize these over-
 COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 363

simplifications of Russian foreign policy. Emphasizing East-West divides through orientalist lan-
guage helps to create tensions and exacerbate political differences. This is particularly seen with
the concept of hybrid warfare which is regularly portrayed as a uniquely Russian strategic tool.
Otherizing Russia as a “sneaky” Eastern power also creates a situation of exaggerating Russia’s
capabilities. Much of the discussions surrounding hybrid war does not consider the next steps
that would occur if Russia was to invade the Baltics. Hybrid warfare therefore becomes a symbol
of Russia’s omnipotence. This has created an alarmist rhetoric within Western discourse as hybrid
war becomes defined as part of a “total war.”126 The House of Commons Defence Committee
considered testimony in 2015 which warned of how “increasingly the psychological and socio-
logical domain is becoming the real “battle space.””127 Referring to hybrid war as part of a psy-
chological “battle” suggests the absurdist position that even our minds must now become
securitized. Categorizing hybrid warfare as a form of total war also presumes that essentially all
aspects of politics will potentially escalate to a full blown confrontation.128 In a situation of the
West and Russia being seen as radically different, tensions between the two sides are becoming
increasingly militarized. Viewing potential conflict through distinct cultural identities which are rad-
ically different also limits the possibilities of negotiation. As Russia is increasingly seen as a
“spoiler” to Western unity, there is less chance of bargaining and reconciliation to reduce tensions.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr. Sean Roberts and Yekaterina Lepikhova for their comments and assistance.
Please note the views and opinions in this article are entirely my own and do not reflect those of the Baltic
Defence College or the Estonian School of Diplomacy.

ORCID
Kevin Blachford http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4963-8334

Notes
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Notes on contributor
Kevin Blachford (PhD) (Kevin.Blachford@baltdefcol.org) is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic
Defence College, Estonia and the Estonian School of Diplomacy.