University of Glasgow

The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy

Author(s): David Kerr
Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 6 (Sep., 1995), pp. 977-988
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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 EUROPE-ASIASTUDIES,Vol. 47, No. 6, 1995, 977-988

The New Eurasianism: The Rise of

Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy

DAVID KERR

Russia is seeking to define its place in world affairs. It could be argued that in this
it is no differentfrom other states which are having to take account of the rapid and
dramaticchanges in the internationalorder,but the magnitudeand complexity of the
task is markedlygreaterfor Russia, given that it is both productand catalyst of those
changes. Moreover, the process of change in Russia has both an internal and an
external dimension and the foreign policy debate has been drawn into the arena of
political contention within the country, where domestic and external policies are
closely interlinked.
According to Alexei Arbatov,1Directorof the Centrefor Geopolitical and Military
Forecasts in Moscow, it is possible to define four broad foreign policy positions
within Russia, which vary in terms of number and influence but span all the major
institutions engaged in policy formulation. The dominance of the foreign policy
process since August 1991 enjoyed by the pro-Westerngroup, headed by the Foreign
Minister,Kozyrev, and drawing supportfrom other membersof the presidentialstaff
and sections of the Foreign Ministryand parliament,has been eroded, owing both to
a perceptionthat more has been conceded to the West than has been gained and to
the linkage between this foreign policy position and the attemptto radicallymarketise
the domestic economy. This has led to the growing influence on the foreign policy
process of two centristgroups, definedby Arbatovas moderateliberals and moderate
conservatives.The former see themselves as pragmatistswho are seeking to develop
a distinctively Russian foreign policy based upon a realistic assessment of the
country's interests.The moderateconservatives,representativesof importantinstitu-
tional forces within the militaryhigh command,the industrialmanagersand the main
segments of the federalbureaucracy,do not see the end of the Soviet Union as leading
inexorably to the end of major power status-Russia, in their view, should develop
its sphere of influence, particularly in the 'near abroad', and avoid excessive
dependence on the West. The crisis situation in the country has also encouraged
popular support for the radical left and right who advocate a rebuilding of the
superpowerstatus of the country, by military means if necessary, but to date these
groups are largely isolated from the policy process.
The criticism levelled at the Atlanticist policy does not mean that Russia is once
again moving into oppositionto the Westerneconomic and political model. It is rather
the wisdom of assuming that Russian domestic and foreign policy interests are
0966-8136/95/060977-12 ? 1995 University of Glasgow

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978 DAVID KERR

necessarily identical to the interests of other states because they share a commitment
to this model that is being questioned. According to Andrei Zagorsky of the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations,

In Russia... people show increasing reserve in speaking of the prospects and limits of
cooperation with the West. Seen as particularlyrevealing is the fact that the concept of
universalvalues has disappearedfrom the Russianpolitical vocabularyand that the emphasis
has shifted to Russian national interests. While reference to the former was aimed at
substantiatingthe need for rapprochementwith the West and stressing coinciding interests,
today's accentuationof Russian national interests calls attention to the country's special
interests, which differ from those of the West and often clash with them.2

The increasing concentration on Russia's national interests indicates, therefore, the

need both to address the country's specific conditions and to impose some sort of
consensus on the foreign policy debate. This inevitably leads to consideration of what
criteria should be used to define the national interests of any state, and Russia in
particular. One contribution from a leading group of analysts at the Institute of the
USA and Canada proposed the following:

The term 'nationalinterest' is used by us in the same way which it has long been applied
in the whole civilised world. The meaning of 'national' and 'state' in the sphere of foreign
policy are in this sense identical, in as far as by state is understoodnot the aggregate of
political and social institutions, but the concrete characteristicsof the country. In other
words, our nationalinterestsare the interestsof the Russian Federationas a Eurasianpower,
possessing a defining composition of historical, cultural, socio-economic, geographic and
demographicindicators,the combinationof which also makes up the political phenomenon
of Russia as a single multi-nationalstate.3

As this suggests, one of the key criteria being used to define Russia's 'special
interests', and thus the new foreign policy, is the country's spatial dimensions and its
changed geopolitical position, in relation to Europe and Asia, or, as it is increasingly
expressed, as a Eurasian power.

Geopolitics in historical context

Russia has always had an ambiguous relationship with Asia. By reason of its eastward
expansion from the 16th century onwards, it incorporated a third of the Asian
landmass into what was by culture and history a European country. In both the
imperial and communist eras the predominant Russian perceptions of Asia remained
rooted in European culture, including the officially sanctioned ideologies of the time.
The imperialism of the 19th century and the Marxism-Leninism of the 20th were both
derived from Russia's involvement in the European state and class system.4
However, consciousness of Russia's singular position between Europe and Asia,
and the implications of this for its social development and external orientation, has
also been a constant element in Russian political culture. There was an inherent
element of geographic, as well as cultural, distinctiveness within the Slavophile
movement of the 19th century, though this did not imply any preference for Asiatic
culture over European culture. N. V. Riasanovsky, for example, is unable to cite a

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 THE NEW EURASIANISM 979

single Russian intellectual before the 20th century who was consistently willing to
identify himself or his country with Asia.5 The argument lay between the view
predominant since the time of Peter the Great, which was that Russia was a branch
of European culture, and those who emphasised the constancy of traditional, popular
culture, in which the country's spatial dimensions and location were important
factors.
It was not until the 20th century, however, that the concept of Eurasia as a
geopolitical entity emerged, particularly in the work of a group of Russian emigres
in the 1920s. A contemporary Russian assessment of these Eurasianists describes the
basis of their thinking and its current appeal:

The formulationof their geopolitical doctrine aspired to a single truthfulinterpretationof

national (to be exact, ethical) traditions,the name of which would be awarded to a new
ideological current.They proposed that Eurasianismwas a special form or type of culture,
thinking and state policy ingrained from time immemorial in the space of the greatest
Eurasianstate-Russia. This thesis was founded mostly on non-traditionalargumentsdrawn
from the past, presentand even future.The Eurasianiststhoughtof themselves as expressing
a special world-view, orientated primarily on spatial categories. The creation of their
political constructswas acquired,therefore, above all from geopolitical measurements.
Evidently it is precisely this attributeof the Eurasianworld-view which gives it special
relevance to our time, when geopolitical and national-territorialproblems are extremely
acute, when the concepts of Westernand Easterncivilisation, Europeanand Asian republics,
'the turn to the East', are once more coming into common usage.6

The primary reasons for the strengthening of the geopolitical character of the Eurasian
concept from the beginning of the 20th century were the changes in the international
order, including, in East Asia, the decline of Russia's long-term partner, China, and
the rise of Japan. Russian expansion eastward had been driven by the traditional aims
of imperialism-economic gain and territorial security-in which it had been
markedly successful throughout most of the 18th and 19th centuries. With the demise
of the Qing and the defeat by Japan, however, the prospect that the East might pose
a threat to Russia, as it had in the pre-modern era, arose once more. Hauner has
argued that the implications of the defeat by Japan were considerable:

Following the disasterof 1905, one can observe that the traumaof the two-frontwar, to be
fought simultaneously at both of the Empire's extremes, some 15 000 km apart and
connected for most of the distance by the then inefficient and vulnerable Trans-Siberian
Railway, was to become the principal geopolitical factor that the Soviet Eurasianstrategy
inherited. Without bearing in mind this fundamental strategic factor, one cannot, for
instance, understandStalin's balancing act between East and West, right up to Hitler's
attack,or the underlyingmotives that led to the enormousSoviet militaryand naval build-up
in the Far East since the 1960s.7

Having said this, geopolitics played no more explicit a part in the official ideology of
the Soviet era than it had in imperial times. Rather it was those states which
threatened the Soviet state from the periphery of Eurasia, notably Germany and Japan,
which were moved by geopolitics, making the concept anathema for most of the
modem era.
The degree to which geopolitical concerns did shape Soviet foreign policy and

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980 DAVID KERR

military doctrine during the Cold War only became open for discussion in the last
years of the Soviet Union. Thus Igor Malashenko of the CPSU International
Department could admit in 1990:
The confrontationof the continental power which controls the heart of Europe, and the
coalition opposing it, is by no means confined, geopolitically, to a contest between East and
West, socialism and capitalism (or 'totalitarianism'and 'liberal democracy' in Western
parlance),as it has quite often been made out over the last few decades, but is an element
of genuinely global politics. Properlyspeaking,the very terms 'East' and 'West' also reflect
in a way, if inadequately,the fact that it is not only ideological rivalry or even a clash of
social-political systems but also a 'de-ideologised' geopolitical confrontation.8

However, sustaining geopolitical stability had become an increasingly onerous burden

for the Soviet Union:
A heavy price had to be paid for the preservationof the 'monolithic unity' of the huge
geopolitical conglomerate.It was artificiallyisolated from the world economy, its scientific
and technical level and living standards were low. The protractedcrisis of the Soviet
economy is a natural consequence not only of its anti-marketcharacterbut also of its
submission to geopolitics in its classical imperial interpretation.9

What was also notable about the Soviet Union, however, was that it failed to
recognise the changes in the nature of state power which were driving Germany and
Japan back to global prominence. The emerging international order was not new
solely in terms of its distribution of power but the bases of that power. Thus S. I.
Verbitsky of IMEMO has this to say on the failure of the Soviet Union to take
account of the implications of the technological revolution for Japan's position in the
international order:
The rise of Japan as a major world power only established itself with difficulty in the
consciousness of the Soviet people. How do we explain this? Probably,that our understand-
ing of 'great power' has usually been associated with states enjoying vast territory,
significantpopulationand, primarily,military might. Hence the underestimationof the role
of economic and especially technologicalpotentialas importantfactors of the 'strength'and
'authority'of the state in our time.10
In this sense the failure of the Soviet Union to sustain the post-war geopolitical
balance was due not only to internal limitations but also because it did not recognise,
at least not before the Gorbachev era, that those powers that it sought most to contain
by the post-war system had by-passed that system by abandoning traditional geopol-
itics as a philosophy of state in favour of global economic competition. This is not
to say that there was not a fundamental economic component behind traditional
geopolitics, but this was based upon competition and control over resources, whereas
contemporary regionalisation of the international economy is based on competition
and control over production and markets."M
The demise of the Soviet Union has not only necessitated a reassessment of the
position of the state and its role in the international order, therefore, but of the
meaning of geopolitics itself. According to Konstantin Pleshakov of the Institute of
the USA and Canada, the military component within geopolitics has been consider-
ably modified by changes in economics and technology:

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 THE NEW EURASIANISM 981

The essence of geopolitics as a phenomenonhas to do above all with the idea of controlling
variousdimensionsof space. Whereasin the early phases of the evolution of humanityit was
a ratherprimitive idea (struggle for direct control of neighbouringterritories),today this
control is vastly diversified, nor can it in most cases be described as outright military or
political control. With the development of technology and the growing interdependenceof
the world, control of space assumes new, partly transnationalforms, such as economic,
communications and information control. This is because an advanced civilisation gains
control of new dimensions of space. In a numberof cases this makes it impossible to apply
earlier forms of control, among which direct military control is the most traditional.12

Contemporary geopolitics assumes such importance in Russia today precisely because

it addresses the question not only of where the legitimate boundaries and interests of
the new state lie but also the permeability of those boundaries and the interdepen-
dence of the interests of states.

The new geopolitical context

As suggested, the starting point for the new Eurasianism is the changed geopolitical
position of the Russian state. Despite the fact that the proportions of the Russian
Federation distributed between Europe and Asia-25%:75%-are very close to those
of the Soviet Union, there is a perception that the balance of the country has shifted
eastwards:

Russia cannot reproducethe military-strategicphenomenonof the old Union-her geopolit-

ical as well as geostrategiccharacteristicshave changed. The populationhas shrunk,and so
has the land, its line of contact with the outside world is different. Having recognised the
independenceof her neighboursin the West, the country has involuntarilyretreatedEast.
Accordingly, its stabilising function is naturallyconverted from a predominantlyEuropean
one into properly a Eurasianone.13

The shift to the East and the emergence of new sovereign states along the southern
periphery has heightened Russian awareness of Asia in a way that was impossible in
the Soviet era of fixed and impermeable boundaries. The need to address the
questions raised by these changes was one of the most persistent criticisms levelled
against the Atlanticism of the early years of the El'tsin administration. According to
some commentators, internal stability within Russia could only be met by constructive
engagement with Asian powers. Sergei Goncharov of the Institute of the Far East
argued that:
If we proceed from geopolitical categories then Russian foreign policy must achieve the
realisation of the fundamental interests of the country in two more vitally important
directions, besides the Western-Islam and China. Both these directions already play a
principalrole now, above all in the sphere of security,directly influencingour side not only
purely militarily, but also the internal stability in our state.14

However, although the geopolitical weight of the country had declined and shifted,
when analysts approached the question of what functions Russia should perform
within the Eurasian space they found that these were broadly the same as those of the
Soviet Union:

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982 DAVID KERR

Russia has found global geopolitical functions (which, in essence, the Bolsheviks only
widened and modified) thanks to its intermediateposition between the traditionalEast and
West. Abandoning communist messianism, the Russian state has not lost its paramount
internationalrole arising from, firstly, the stabilisingcapacity it possesses within the area of
Eurasiaand, consequently,globally; secondly, its connecting, integratoryfunctionin relation
to a united and well-establishedEurope and what is still a poor and disunitedAsia; thirdly,
its ability to partiallydepreciateand extinguish the negative impulses on both sides, which
are inevitable in the process of rapid global changes, by laying a Eurasianbridge through
Russia.15

This constancy of geopolitical functions has given rise to the most controversial
aspect of the new Eurasianism: can Russia pursue the functions of the Soviet
Union-stability and integration within the Eurasian space-without adopting a
neo-imperial policy? Russia's predominance over the economic infrastructure and
military resources of the former Union ensures it not only a pivotal position within
the CIS, but is increasingly being used to inhibit the external orientation of the other
states, particularly those of the Asian periphery.
The grounds for believing that a neo-imperial policy is emerging are all the more
legitimate given the increasing linkage between Russian policy in the near abroad and
the commitment to rebuilding the country's great power status:

This policy (of re-integration)fits in very well with a bid to assign Russia the role of a great
power. According to a stereotypethat has won widespreadrecognition in Russian political
thinking,which is stung by an awarenessof contemporaryRussia's weakness and its loss of
a decisive say in global processes, 'unless the Russian Federationis leader in its own region
of the world, still less can it expect to become a power of truly global stature'.Self-assertion
in the near abroadhas become something of a substitutefor the superpower-statuscomplex
inheritedfrom both the Soviet period and a remoter,prerevolutionaryera.16

The decision to use military force in Chechnya, part of what appeared to be becoming
an 'inner abroad',17 can only reinforce the impression of a return to traditional policy
and methods.
However, if Russia's capacity and willingness to fulfil the geopolitical functions of
stability and integration within the CIS appear to be resuming, this cannot be said
with regard to Eurasia as a whole. Three years after the end of the Soviet state,
Russia's influence beyond the near abroad continues to contract, including the
strategic position that the Soviet Union developed in Asia at such great expense. This
has been so marked that certain Asian states felt it necessary to remind Moscow of
its commitments to regional stability in East Asia.18
While this gives an immediate scenario of geopolitical isolation, this is not likely
to persist, not least because the Eurasian concept is being driven not solely by factors
internal to the former Soviet Union but also by the rise of Europe and Asia in the
international order. In the perception of some analysts Europe and Asia may be
moving into an era of confrontation driven by differing culturally influenced econ-
omic models, between a conservative, individualistic Europe and a dynamic, collec-
tivist Asia. As Ivan Tselishchev sees the situation,
Anotherlogical constructionbased upon the thesis of the hiddenconflict in relationsbetween
'conservativeEurope' and 'dynamic Asia' concerns the collision of two economic cultures

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 THE NEW EURASIANISM 983

and even civilisational models. Thus Asian countries place in first place among their
priorities economic growth, actively encourage accumulation,make unceasing efforts to
increase their internationalcompetitiveness, form a social climate favourable to labour
returnsand labourmotivationof the people. Encouragingentrepreneurship,they at the same
time widely resort to measures of government support of the economy and utilise the
advantages of collective economic conduct. In Europe economic growth and increasing
exports does not occupy so importanta place among prioritiesof development, innovative
processes are proceedingless actively, rates of accumulationare lower, greateremphasis is
placed upon consumption and state social services, and individuality openly predominates
over collectivism. In conditions of growing interdependencesuch differences in models and
prioritiesof development are fraught with conflict.'9
There are two contradictory implications for the Eurasian thesis if such an analysis is
correct. The first is that the path of economic and political development that Russia
itself pursues cannot be simply an internal matter since it will affect the balance of
relations between Europe and Asia. Russian integration with an exclusivist Europe
would encourage Asian protectionism (already muted in the proposal of Prime
Minister Mahathir of Malaysia for an East Asian Economic Group) and security
integration, dividing Eurasia rather than uniting it. Conversely, a strong Eurasian
power may be essential as a source of balance and a buffer between the two
competing economic, and very possibly political, models at either end of the
continent. As we have argued, however, Russia cannot become such a geopolitical
entity solely by military projection-this was the failing of the Soviet Union. It must
engage with Asia through the new geopolitics of the international economy.

Changes to the international economy

Despite a natural sympathy for the general dynamic behind the growth of the Asian
economies-the interaction between private enterprise and state regulation, between
the priorities of the market and those of national development-most Russian
commentators tend to stress the cultural and societal factors which differentiate
Russia from the East Asian economies.20 Rather it is Russia's location adjacent to this
region of the most rapid economic development that is seen as significant. There is
a distinctive economic component to the new Eurasianism:

Taking into account the unfolding circumstances,the process of common Europeaninte-

grationclearly will not be quick or simple, especially for Russia. It is impossible not to take
into account that as a result of the break-upof the USSR and CMEA, Russia has moved
further away from Europe, its routes to the sea to the west and south are substantially
narrower,and from western Europe it is now a separated country, with which it must
approachanew the resolutionof problemsof transit,underconditionswhich are significantly
more onerous for it than in the recent past.
In such conditions the geopolitical interests and position of Russia make it objectively
essential for it to devote greater attentionto cooperationin an easterly and south-easterly
direction, particularlywith the near abroad and its Asiatic neighbours. Besides, the very
structureof Russian exports and the location of its basic resources indicate the benefit of
such an orientation,the better appreciationof the Eurasiandisposition of the country, its
wide exit to the Pacific Ocean, and the role of its potentiallymost rich and still least settled
Easternregions.21

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984 DAVID KERR

The primary difference between the new Eurasianism and the old is precisely this
recognition of the importance of economic factors, derived in particular from Asia's
emergence as a power centre of the global economy. It must also be said, however,
that there are advocates of a more active Asian policy who are as much attracted by
the political authoritarianism of certain Asian states as by their economic success. The
Russian debate as to whether open or closed political systems are most conducive to
rapid economic growth parallels a debate taking place among Asian states themselves
in this regard.22
The dynamic processes and 'open regionalism'23 of Asia may not only hold the
prospect of faster integration into the international economy than the European path,
but the heterogeneity of the Russian Federation and the changing nature of its spheres
of interest seem to have more in common with Asian political and economic
processes than those of Europe. Eduard Grebenshchikov of IMEMO argues that
Internationalrelations in that part of the world, now called the Asia-Pacific region, have
acquired in the past decade the greatest dynamism and mobility. Barriers are being
liquidated,passing watershedsin bringing together former antagonists.Earlierunassailable
borders are becoming permeable... In different subregions of the APR re-grouping and
redistribution of forces, the search for new partners and 'community members', the
re-appraisalof nationaland regional priorities,are taking place. New regional combinations
are being drawnup. In this respect, the political and economic palette is significantlyricher
than the European.24

From Russia's point of view the immediate advantage of Asian regionalism is that the
very things which inhibit its rapid integration into Europe-divergent levels of
economic development and differing economic structures and systems-are not only
the norm in Asia but are a contributory growth factor, as each country performs
functions in the regional economy best suited to its existing development and
structure, but with the prospect of attaining development through trade and investment
transfer.
However, it should not be thought that raising Russia's economic interaction with
Asia from the low level which it has inherited from the Soviet Union will be an easy
task.25 There remain very real political constraints upon Russia's economic relations
in the East, most obviously the failure to normalise relations with Japan. This has
been the most glaring example of the failure of assumptions regarding the nature of
relations between democratic states, though for some commentators the limitations of
the relationship and the obstacles that democracy can place in the way of diplomacy
were evident from an early date. Sergei Solodovnik, writing in 1992, complained:
It is difficult to account for the Nipponocentrismwhich seems to prevail in the current
Russian foreign policy in the APR. Japan is the only Pacific nation which we have a
territorialdispute with. Furthermore,it is evident that this dispute cannot be solved in quick
or elegant manner because of our home political considerations.It is also the only APR
economy that even potentially has no viable prospects to establish a mutually complemen-
tary economic structurewith us because of a disastroustechnology gap.26
The failure to normalise relations with Japan is also providing unwanted imbalance
in favour of the Sino-Russian relationship. Despite the stresses caused by the chaotic
nature of economic exchange between the two states and the sensitivity of the Russian

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 THE NEW EURASIANISM 985

populationto Chinese migration,mutualinterests,includinggeopolitical interestswith

regard to stability in Central Asia, seem to be proving a stronger cement than
ideological affiliation.
For the Eurasian thesis to be realised, however, the current stage of Russian
relations with Asia, which may best be regardedas transitional,must be surpassed.
For the dynamicprocesses of the Asian economy to be felt within the countryan even
more intractableproblem must be resolved: the contradictoryposition of Asiatic
Russia-Siberia and the Far East-in the country's political and economic structure,
and in the national psyche.

The position of Asiatic Russia

Asiatic Russia has been simultaneously the economic and strategic repository of
Russia's great power status but also its greatest liability in terms of security and of
resourcesrequiredto develop its economic and social bases. The attempt,and failure,
to rationalise these contradictoryends in the Soviet era has been much analysed.27
They are now compoundedby the bitter struggle between centre and regions within
Russia over control of resources and revenue.28Decentralisationin Russia has not
been the productof reformand growth as in China,but of dislocation and stagnation.
EuropeanRussians are concernedaboutthe dissolutionof the Federationbut reluctant
to commit limited resources to begin yet another attempt to develop and integrate
Russia's prostranstvo (expanses).
This raises a furtherprospect,that if economic developmentin Asiatic Russia is not
to come from within the Federationit will inevitably mean leaving the field to the
Asian economies, creatingan externalpull to match the internalpush of these regions
away from the Europeancentre. In an extreme scenario, relevant most obviously to
the Far East, economic integrationinto North-east Asia could presage attempts to
revise the territorialsettlementsof the 19th century.
To date, however, there is little evidence to supportthe region's hopes that foreign
investment will succeed where central planning failed. Asian partners have been
reluctantto commit themselves to large capital projects, preferringto engage in the
same extractivesectors as the state ministries,29or are using Asiatic Russia primarily
as a conduit to the EuropeanRussian market.30
The question mark over the prostranstvo, moreover, is not simply one of the
economic and political relationshipbetween centre and periphery,but of the impact
the struggle with geopolitics has had upon Russia's culture and politics. Some
Russians perceive that the need to colonise and defend the prostranstvohas shaped
the history of the countryand the balance of forces within it, includingpolitically and
militarily. It is a short step from geopolitics to outrightgeographic determinism:
Societymustundergoa radicalrethinking of the establishedperceptionof the expansesand
its role in economicand social development.For too long we unthinkingly repeated'the
mightof Russiawill grow out of Siberiaandthe NorthernOcean'.At the sametime the
expansesnotonlyopenedup newpossibilitiesbutalsodemanded colossaleffortsto support
them-the provisionof communications, defenceand so on. Even at the
infrastructure,
beginningof the 1980sourwell-knownprofessorof geographyV. M. Gokhmansaidthat
the expanseswereourbeach.We gaveourboundlessexpansesmorethanwe receivedfrom

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986 DAVID KERR

them, they suckedjuices out of the organismof the country,as we continuallypushed them
on the path to extensive development. And if an ocean lapped against the Urals, most
probablyRussia would have been a long time ago alreadya legitimatememberof the society
of civilised countries.31

Although liberal proponents of geopolitical analysis have argued that it is devoid of

ideological connotations, there is little doubt that Eurasianism in the past was
conservative, chauvinistic and isolationist, and that it also persists in this guise
today.32 This gives further weight to the predominant cultural orientation which,
particularly among Russian intellectuals, remains towards Europe. As in the past, they
remain deeply sceptical about the political and cultural consequences of defining
Russia as a Eurasian, as opposed to European, power:

There is no doubt that Russia has vital interests of equal greatness both in Europe and in
Asia. Our countryover centurieshas developed as a Eurasianpower and it is hardlypossible
to dispute this truth.However, one cannot here agree with those who use this as a basis to
speak of some kind of special Eurasiannature of Russia. Is it not true that it developed
thanksto movement from West to East? And our religion and our culturehas, undoubtedly,
a Europeancharacter.This is again an indisputabletruth.It is, of course, not deniable that
Russia has formed a special type of culture, and yes, of nation... But ask any 'real Asian'
what Russian culture is like, in terms of ancestry and mentality. The answer is always the
same: 'We are Europeans'.33

However, to abandon Siberia and the Far East, either to separatist forces or to the
Asian powers, and create an exclusively European Russia would be to abandon the
commitment to Russia's great power status which remains the sine qua non of the
foreign policy debate. From this perspective Russia's submission to geopolitics is
inescapable. As long as Russia desires to be a great power it must remain a Eurasian
power. Its geopolitical position and dimensions are the surest basis of its future great
power status. In Leonid Abalkin's words,
The geopolitical position of Russia makes a multi-directionalorientationof its foreign policy
and its inclusion in all enclaves of world society an objective necessity. Any attemptto put
at the head of the list its relationswith one side or group of countriesis contraryto its state
and nationalinterests.A multi-directionalorientationis a strategicprinciple and it must not
be violated by any conjunctionof considerationsor pressures of the moment.
Even the posing of the question as to the priorityof relations with this or that region or
group of countries-whether the near abroad,the former CMEA countries, SoutheastAsia,
the US or China-is incorrect.It is true, the question of the geopolitical prioritiesof many
countries is legitimate, but not for Russia as a great world power.34

Conclusion
The rise of geopolitics in Russian foreign policy at present is being driven partly by
the conditions of post-communism-the need to define and strengthen the borders of
the new state, and its spheres of interest and influence; the need to construct a foreign
policy consensus around a concept which has deep roots in Russia's political culture
and national psyche. Unlike traditional geopolitics, the new Eurasianism gives much
greater recognition to factors of economic growth and integration, primarily due to the

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 THE NEW EURASIANISM 987

simultaneous, and often contradictory, process of globalisation and regionalisation of

the international economy.
However, beneath the recognition of the changes that economic and technological
development, particularly in Europe and Asia, have wrought on geopolitics, for
Russians the concept of Eurasia remains rooted, as it has been historically, in control
and defence of territory. It should in this sense be seen not only as the current means
of binding the country together against the internal and external forces that may
threaten its unity but also the continuing basis of Russia's great power aspirations.
Institute of Russian and East European Studies, Glasgow

1 A.
2
Arbatov,'Russia'sForeignPolicy Alternatives',InternationalSecurity,18, 2, 1993.
A. Zagorsky,'Russia,the CIS and the West', InternationalAffairs (Moscow), December
1994, p. 65.
3 A. Bogaturovet al., 'Natsional'nyiinteresv rossiiskoipolitike',Svobodnayamysl', 1992, 5,
p. 34.
4 For of Russianperspectiveson Asia in the imperialand communisteras see
interpretations
N. V. Riasanovsky,'AsiathroughRussianEyes', in WayneVucinich(ed),RussiaandAsia (Stanford,
CA, HooverInstitutionPress, 1972);JohnJ. Stephan,'Asia in the Soviet Conception',in DonaldS.
Zagoria(ed), SovietPolicy in EastAsia (London,Yale UniversityPress,1982);MarkMancall,Russia
and China:TheirDiplomaticRelationsto 1728 (London,1971).
5
Riasanovsky,p. 372, n.
6 I. Isaev, 'Evraziistvo: mif ili traditsiya?',Kommunist,1991, 12, p. 107.
7 Milan
Hauner,Whatis Asia to Us? Russia'sAsianHeartlandYesterdayand Today(London,
Unwin Hyman,1990), p. 70.
8 I. Malashenko,'Russia:The Earth'sHeartland',International
Affairs(Moscow),July 1990.
p. 46.9
10Ibid., p. 50.
S. Verbitsky,'Evolyutsiyavzglyadov na Yaponiyuv period perestroiki',in Znakom'tes'-
Yaponiya(Moscow,Nauka, 1992), p. 41.
1 For a Russianassessmentof the regionalisationof the international economysee L. Vardom-
sky, 'Regionalizatsiyamezhdunarodnogo ekonomicheskogosotrudnichestva i Rossiya', Vneshnyaya
torgovlya,1992, 2.
12 K. Pleshakov,'Geopoliticsin the Lightof GlobalChanges'.International Affairs(Moscow),
October1994, p. 25.
13A. Bogaturov,'The EurasianSupportof WorldStability',InternationalAffairs(Moscow),
February 1993, p. 41.
14
S. Goncharov,'OsobyeinteresyRossii', Izvestiya,25 February1992, p. 6.
15A. Bogaturovet al., 'VneshnyayapolitikaRossii', SShA,1992, 10, p. 27.
16 p. Zagorsky,
p. 66. The citation in the text is from R. Ovinnikov,'SNG ne obuza dlya
Moskvy',Nezavisimayagazeta, 16 April 1994.
17 S. Solodovnik,'CentralAsia. A New
GeopoliticalProfile',InternationalAffairs(Moscow)
October1993, p. 62.
18 See J. Lilley, 'RussianHandicap',Far EasternEconomicReview(HongKong),26 November
1992, p. 24.
19 I. Tselishchev,'Sotrudnichestvo v ATR: osnova, vozmozhnosti,spetsifika',MEiMO,1991,
11, p. 34.
20 Most considerationhas, for obvious reasons, been given to Japan and China. See A.
Zagorsky, 'Kuda idet Yaponskii kapitalizm:sotsial'nye uroki sotsialisticheskomureformizmu',
MEiMO,1991, 2; V. Spandaryan,'How have the Japanesedone it?', International Affairs(Moscow)
February1990;E. Leont'eva,'OpytposlevoennoiYaponiii rossiiskieekonomicheskiereformy',in
Znakom'tesYaponiya;N. Korneichuk,'Territorial'naya otkrytost'v KNR', Vneshnyayatorgovlya,
1992,7; A. Onikienko,'Reformagossektorav KNR:poiskputeipovysheniyaeffektivnosti',MEiMO,
1992, 6; I. Balyuk & M. Balyuk, 'Ekonomicheskaya reformav Kitae:do i posle Tianan'menya',
MEiMO,1991, 11.
21 A. Bykov, 'Rossiya, SNG, Evraziya:Geopoliticheskieaspekty vneshneekonomicheskikh
svyazei', Vneshnyayatorgovlya,1992, 11, p. 4.

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988 DAVID KERR
22
See, for example, the debate between Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Fidel Ramos of the
Phillipines as reported in Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1992, p. 29.
The phrase is Tselishchev's, p. 28.
24
E. Grebenshchikov, 'Tikhookeanskaya regional'naya integratsiya', MEiMO, 1993, 1, p. 86.
25 Soviet trade with Asia
averaged less than 12% of total trade throughout the 1980s, with six
countries, China, India, Japan and the socialist states of Mongolia, Vietnam and North Korea, taking
in excess of three-quartersof this figure in any given year. See Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR, various
years.
26 S. Solodovnik, 'Stability in Asia: A Priority for Russia', International Affairs (Moscow)

February 1992, p. 66.

27 See, for example, J. Schiffer, Soviet Regional Economic Policy (London, Macmillan, 1987).
General discussion of the role of Siberia and the Far East in the domestic and internationaleconomies
may be found in L. Dienes, Soviet Asia: Economic Development and National Policy Choices
(Baltimore, MD, Westview, 1987); A. Rodgers, The Soviet Far East: Development and Prospect
(London, Croom Helm, 1990); V. P. Chichkanov, Dal'nii Vostok: strategiya ekonomicheskogo
razvitiya (Moscow, Ekonomika, 1988).
28 For discussion of
separatist pressures in the Russian Far East see V. Vorontsov & A.
Muradyan, 'Far Eastern Regionalism', Far Eastern Affairs, January 1992.
29 Thus
Izvestiya revealed that only 0.5% of the produce of the 500 joint ventures created in the
Far East in 1992-93 was aimed at the domestic market-the timber and fish produce that constituted
the overwhelming bulk of these enterprises' output were aimed at foreign markets-particularly
China and Japan. 'Na Dal'nem Vostoke mozhet nachat'sya "tikhookeanskaya era"', Izvestiya, 2
August 1993.
30 This is most
obviously the case with China, with border trade constituting a third of all trade
in 1992 and 1993.
31 A.
Treivish, & V. Shuper, 'Teoreticheskaya geografiya, geopolitika i budushchee Rossii',
Svobodnaya Mysl', 1992, 12, p. 33. See also Yu. Polyakov, 'Rossiiskie prostory: blago ili
proklyat'e?', in the same issue.
See for example E. Pozdnyakov, 'Russia is a Great Power', International Affairs (Moscow),
January 1993.
33
I. Faminsky, 'Geostrategicheskie i vneshnepoliticheskie prioritety Rossii', Voprosy
ekonomiki, 1994, 1, p. 18.
34
L. Abalkin, 'O natsional'no-gosudarstvennykh interesakh Rossii', Voprosy ekonomiki, 1994,
1, p. 13.

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