Power, Not Influence

The Impacts of Russian Foreign Policy in Georgia from 2008-2020

Siobhán M. Wells
Honors Thesis
Advisor: Professor Scott Radnitz
Second Reader: Professor Ileana Marin
University of Washington
Political Science Department
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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Scott Radnitz, for
sharing his expertise and support throughout my thesis journey. Without Professor Radnitz’s
patient guidance and invaluable insight into the post-Soviet states, I would have been lost in the
enormity of this project. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Ileana Marin,
without whom I may have never realized my deep interest in the relationship between Russia and
other post-Soviet states. Professor Marin’s unrelenting support and thoughtful advice encouraged
me to push the boundaries of what I thought I was capable. I would also like to express my
appreciation for my family, who has been amazingly supportive over this past year. I would like
to thank my parents, Scott and Hannah, for their patience and unwavering encouragement in all
of my endeavors. I would also like to thank my brother, Liam, for frequently confirming the fact
that, yes, I was “still working on my thesis”. I would also like to thank my fiancé, Tanner, for
enduring countless hours of proofreading drafts and always being willing to discuss my thoughts
and ideas throughout this process. This has been an amazing experience due to the truly
wonderful people that have helped me along the way.
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Introduction

As the largest successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to reclaim a position

of international influence in an emerging multipolar world. The basis for Russia’s international

power is control over the former member states of the Soviet Union which have remained

dependent upon Russia for trade and energy (Cooley, 2017, p. 7). Since President Boris Yeltsin,

Russian leaders have claimed to promote good neighborly relations with the post-Soviet states

through prioritizing cooperation and promoting integration, but Russia’s tactics have been far

from friendly (Oldberg, 2010, p. 8). Following the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, Russian

President Dmitri Medvedev referred to the post-Soviet states as a “sphere of privileged

interests”, indicating that Russia placed a special priority and alternate set of rules of engagement

on the region (Trenin, 2009, p. 3). The Russian political elite have demonstrated a willingness to

go to great lengths to influence the behavior of post-Soviet states, going as far as to undermine

state sovereignty when Russia’s interests are threatened (Wallander, 2007, p. 112). The greatest

perceived threat to Russian primacy in the post-Soviet area is EU and NATO enlargement

efforts, which have led to an aggressive and multifaceted Russian approach to maintaining

uncontested influence in the region (Oldberg, 2010, p. 15). Georgia, which in recent years has

shown an interest in both EU and NATO membership, is a key post-Soviet state in the Caucasus

in which Russia expends many resources to keep within its “sphere of privileged interests”.

Russia employs a variety of methods to influence the behavior of states in the post-Soviet

area, including tactics from a Soviet legacy of “active measures” (Saari, 2014, p. 59). Russia has

employed cultural, economic, political and military pressures over post-Soviet countries in order

to solidify its role of power in the region by either pushing for deeper integration into the

Russian sphere or discouraging furthering relationships with Western institutions (Orenstein,

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2019, p. 85). In Georgia, Russia has supported separatist movements, occupied territory, cut off

critical naturals gas exports, put in place embargoes, and launched disinformation campaigns to

manipulate Georgia’s international orientation (Saari, 2014, p. 58). In the same breath, Russia

has promoted religious unity through the Russian Orthodox Church, invested in cultural centers,

and launched media campaigns all in an effort to promote unity and provoke sentiments of a

shared culture and history in the post-Soviet states (Saari, 2014, p. 58). These two methods of

influence, one through cooperation and the other one through coercion, seem to undermine one

another.

In addition to Russian foreign policy tactics, structural factors also impact Georgia-

Russia relations. Compared to Russia, Georgia is economically and militarily weak. The

structural environment in which Russia and Georgia exist makes Georgia dependent upon Russia

for economic and political stability. To this day, Russia is Georgia’s second largest importer of

products, and the threat of Russia’s overwhelming military superiority continuously hangs over

Georgia. Due to this power asymmetry, it is reasonable to argue that Russian policy may not

matter at all, because structural factors demand that Georgia defer to Russia, regardless of

domestic Georgian will. Although the structural elements of Russia’s military and economic

superiority are ever present in Georgia-Russian relations, I argue that Russian foreign policy is

still relevant in Georgia’s international orientation. Russian foreign policy has the ability to

cultivate partnership with Georgia, whereas structural factors work to pin Georgia into

submission. If, one day, power structures in the region shift, genuine cooperation will be vital to

Russia’s ability to maintain partnerships in the region. Without attractive foreign policy,

countries such as Georgia, who have suffered under Russia’s structural pressures, will quickly

move to build partnerships that will affirm their sovereignty.

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Russia’s contradictory foreign policy methods call into question whether Russian foreign

policy tactics are accomplishing their goal of maintaining influence over neighboring states. The

guiding question for the following research is whether Russian foreign policy tactics are

successful at influencing Georgia. How do both hard and soft power tactics contradict one

another in Russia’s attempt to maintain primacy in its near abroad? The proposed research in the

following sections seeks to assess whether the multifaceted Russian foreign policy approach

using military, economic, and cultural levers in Georgia has pushed the country towards a more

cooperative relationship with Russia, or inadvertently led to a deeper desire to integrate with

Western institutions.

I will analyze the success of Russian foreign policy tactics in influencing the post-Soviet

state of Georgia. I will begin with a review of the current academic literature on Russian political

worldview, foreign policy goals in the near abroad, and foreign policy tactics. Then, I will trace

major Russian foreign policy actions towards Georgia over time during three, four-year periods

from 2008-2012, 2012-2016, and 2016-2020. I will also examine the Georgian political response

to Russian foreign policy tactics over time and assess whether Russian foreign policy tactics are

successful at projecting influence over the Georgian foreign policy orientation. Finally, I will

engage in a discussion about the effectiveness of current Russian foreign policy practices and the

implications for the future of Russian foreign policy and Georgia’s political orientation.

Literature Review

This research places itself within the dialogue with the studies of Russian foreign policy

outlooks and goals, Russian foreign policy tools, and the history of bilateral Russian-Georgian

relations. Russian foreign policy and it’s impacts on the behavior of post-Soviet states is an ever-

evolving topic that is not afforded complete consensus within scholarly literature. Additionally,
5

this review will address the alternative argument that political outcomes and trends are a result of

mainly domestic factors.

In a 2009 publication by the RAND corporation, Olga Oliker et al. (2009) laid out the

foundations of what drove Russian foreign policy in the 2000’s. Although this research prefaced

its findings with the fact that Russian leaders do not hold a unified view of their country’s

interests or its future in foreign policy, substantial consensus has emerged around the intentions

for Russia to prosper economically, advance technologically, to be culturally influential, and

capable of asserting moral authority (Oliker et al., 2009, p. 87). Each of these areas highlight a

Russian desire to project a global image of influence and importance that are appropriate for a

modern great power. The non-Baltic post-Soviet countries are critical to Russia’s ability to

regain great power status, and Russia has launched a multidimensional approach, using military,

economic, cultural and media-based means to maintaining a semblance of control in the region

(Oliker et al., 2009, p. 88). In addition to military might, Russia’s foreign policy approach has

increasingly expanded into what would be considered as soft power tools (energy resources,

promotion of Russian culture and language, trade in consumer goods, and investments abroad) to

strengthen its influence in the post-Soviet area (Hill, 2006, p. 342). Russia considers the post-

Soviet countries natural allies, and any perceived interference from other states, especially

Western states, into the region of Russian primacy is seen as a threat (Oliker et al., 2009, p. 94).

For this reason, Russia considers the expansion of U.S. relationships and those of its NATO

allies as the core of some of the most extensive threats to Russian foreign policy goals. This

work lays the foundation for the assumption that Russian foreign policy goals in Georgia are to

maintain influential primacy and keep the Georgian government from seeking stronger

relationships with Western states and institutions, including the EU and NATO.
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After identifying Russian foreign policy goals, it is important to examine the tools and

tactics that Russia has implemented in their near abroad in an attempt to accomplish these goals.

As noted earlier in the work of Oliker et al. (2009), Russia has employed an increasingly

multidimensional foreign policy strategy in the near abroad, utilizing military, economic, and

cultural dimensions to maintain influence and cooperation in the region. Many of these tactics

are not entirely new, and in her research, Sinikukka Saari (2014) illustrated how many of these

practices are borrowed from Soviet era “active measures” (активные мероприятия). Active

measures aimed to influence public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies,

which may include undermining confidence in leaders and institutions, disrupting relations

between neighbors and other nations, and discrediting governmental and non-government

opponents of the Soviet State (Saari, 2014, p. 53). Today, Russia’s tactics lack the ideological

aspects of the Soviet Union’s, but the methods are similar in their use of media outlets to

promote Russian approved story lines, manipulation of Russian ethnic minorities in the near

abroad to apply social pressures in favor of the Russian narrative, and the encouragement of

separatist movements within post-Soviet countries (Adamsky, 2017, p. 47). These tactics are

intended to manipulate, destabilize, and apply pressures to all levels of society, and are combined

with economic and military levers to further punish states that behave contrary to Russia’s

expectation (Saari, 2014, p. 56). All of these measures are taken to ensure that states within

Russia’s sphere of privileged interests do not stray westward in their orientation, but is Russia

accomplishing this goal in Georgia?

In addition to foreign policy tools that allow Russia to manipulate and coerce the actions

of neighboring states, Russia also has multiple avenues for soft power influence. In his article

“Limits to the Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area”, Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz (2012)
7

discussed the valuable soft power assets that Russia possesses, including cultural ties, language

proximity, energy resources, an attractive labor market (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2012, p. 1). Despite

having these assets, Russia has fundamentally failed to adopt the concept of soft power as a tool

to build a mutually beneficial relationship between equal states and has therefore missed the

target (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2012, p. 1). When used properly by a state, soft power convinces

others to want what it wants based solely off of the attractiveness and benefits for both parties,

but Russia has instead considered soft power avenues as an extension of previously discussed

manipulation and coercion tactics. After the 2003 and 2004 color revolutions in Georgia and

Ukraine, Russia increased its pseudo-soft power efforts through the establishment of

Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGO), production of films, visits

from the Orthodox Church patriarch, and dissemination of Russian backed narratives of current

events through media outlets (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2012, p. 7). These efforts were said to promote

Russian culture and language through cross-cultural dialogues and collaborations, but in reality,

these efforts concentrated on reinforcing the ethnic Russians living in post-Soviet states by

promoting a Russian agenda (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2012, p. 7). In a country like Georgia, where

military intervention greatly damaged Russia’s image, Russia missed a particularly valuable

opportunity to win hearts and minds of the Georgian people and had instead focused its efforts

on supporting communities that already agree with Russia’s goals.

Many post-Soviet countries, including Georgia, now see themselves vacillating between

Russian and Western influences. Mitchell Orenstein (2019) demonstrated how Russia’s

multidimensional pressures create a national divide in neighboring states based upon visions for

the future and the implications of orientation with Russia or the West (91). Georgia has a history

of benefitting from both Western and Russian cooperation, but Russia’s attempts at dominating
8

its “sphere of privileged interests” have complicated its perception in Georgia. Georgia-Russia

relations have oscillated between blatant defiance of Russia’s wishes and pragmatic, although

sometimes begrudging, cooperation. In their book “Georgia: From Autocracy to Democracy”,

Neil MacFarlane and Stephen Jones (2020) discussed Russian foreign policy towards Georgia

and described the turbulent relationship through a neoclassical realist outlook. This framing

allows not only for the consideration of power maximization in understanding Russia’s foreign

policy, but also for consideration of the historical, cultural, political, and psychological factors

that contribute to Russia’s deep desire to maintain influence in post-Soviet states, even when it

may not be the most pragmatic course of action (Jones & MacFarlane, 2020, p. 201). Russia’s

desire to maintain power over Georgia is not only for functional purposes, but for symbolic

reasons. Russia has declared that Georgia is part of its “privileged sphere of interests”, and if it

cannot maintain power over this privileged sphere, it would undermine Russia’s image as an

ascending global power. These nuances facilitate the understanding of Georgia’s reactions

towards Russian foreign policy. Relations between Russia and Georgia varied between

presidencies, but there seems to be a cyclical pattern between hostile and cooperative stances on

the part of Georgia.

The pattern of Georgian-Russian relations is best understood through a brief review of

the historical sequence of events. In the years immediately following independence from the

USSR, Georgia, under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, sought to establish sovereignty

over its economic and political path (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p. 112). During this time

there was no real structure for Georgia-Russia relations, but it is widely believed by Georgians

that Russian troops left weapons for the South Ossetian separatists in an attempt to manipulate

the conflict and maintain a degree of control over the region (Jones & MacFarlane, 2020, p. 195).
9

The next leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, who came to power in 1992, reluctantly received help

from Russia to mediate a cease fire with the South Ossetians, established a Russian peace-

keeping force, agreed to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), adhere to the

Tashkent Treaty, and allow Russia to retain its military bases in Georgia (Jones & MacFarlane,

2020, p. 196). In 2004 Saakashvili came to power during the Rose Revolution and stated his

commitment to reunifying the country and his unwillingness to subordinate Georgia to Russia’s

will. What began with Georgia’s attempt to unilaterally regulate customs transactions on the

South Ossetian border with Russia, led to a massive escalation of both Russian and Georgian

hostilities (Jones & MacFarlane, 2020, p. 198). Russia placed embargoes on Georgian wine and

water, and in return Georgia arrested multiple Russian military personnel, accusing them of

espionage, and after several more provocations, the war broke out in 2008 (Jones & MacFarlane,

2020, p. 198). After Georgian troops were defeated and the French EU president brokered a

ceasefire, Russia maintained forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognizing both as

sovereign states (Jones & MacFarlane, 2020, p. 198). In 2012, the Georgian Dream Party came

to power and unseated Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM). The Georgian Dream

Party made clear its commitment to improving relations with Russia and began the process of

normalization. Although trade with Russia has grown and Russian tourism has bolstered the

Georgian economy, Russia has not made any attempts to resolve the South Ossetian and Abkhaz

question (Jones & Macfarlane, 2020, p. 201). Russia continues to deploy troops to both regions,

which has halted the normalization process, as Georgia cannot restore diplomatic relations with a

state that does not recognize Georgia’s geographic autonomy (Jones & MacFarlane, 2020, p.

202). Russia’s unwillingness to change its foreign policy towards Georgia’s breakaway regions
10

has begun to alienate their Georgian Dream ally, as the Georgian public has become more and

more vocal in their opposition of a closer relationship with an unyielding Russia.

An alternative justification to Russian foreign policy affecting the trajectory of Georgian

international orientation is that Georgian foreign policy is driven by political elites that believes

that Georgia belongs in the West (Kakachia & Minesashvili, 2015, p. 171). This view places

ideals and identity as the most influential pieces of Georgian foreign policy and argues that a

pro-Western or European perception of Georgian identity influences Georgia’s foreign policy

orientation (Kakachia & Minesashvili, 2015, p. 172). Although the importance of ideology and

national identity are relevant factors at play within the Georgian political arena, external

pressures upon ideology and identity can be impactful. Aggressive Russian foreign policy can

pose a threat to Georgian national identity as sovereignty and geographic borders are called into

question. Russian foreign policy that threatens Georgian national identity and sovereignty would

support the Western-elite’s desire to move towards Europe, but if Russian foreign policy

exercised the ability to attract, rather than coerce, Russia may very well become a reasonable, if

not valuable, alternative alliance to the West.

Methodology

This paper will examine the extent to which Russian foreign policy towards Georgia has

succeeded in keeping Georgia under Russian influence. What foreign policy tactics work the best

when trying to influence other states? Is Russia undermining its own soft power potential with

hard power tactics? Have aggressive Russian policies produced good enough outcomes for

Russia to disregard true soft power options? If not, what explains Russia’s decision to use less

than optimal tactics to achieve its goal of maintaining influence in Georgia?

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In order to answer these questions, this paper goes through Russian foreign policy tactics

towards Georgia over time and Georgian responses. The single case study of Georgia was

specifically chosen to measure the success of Russian foreign policy tactics, because of a recent

history of political leadership that has expressed steady interest in joining the Western

international institutions of NATO and the EU (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p. 115). The

2004 Rose Revolution exacerbated this shift towards the West, and Russian foreign policy

notably changed during this time (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p. 115). Before the Rose

Revolution, Russia was displeased with Georgia’s interest in Western institutions, but did

nothing to actively intervene and interrupt the process; however, after the 2004 transition of

power, Russian foreign policy towards Georgia became increasingly aggressive (Spetschinsky &

Bolgova, 2014, p. 115). Georgian-Russian relations began to spiral in 2006, with Russian bans

on Georgian agricultural products and an increase in the price of deliveries of Russian energy to

Georgia (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p. 116). Relations hit an all-time low in 2008, when

war broke out between Russia and Georgia and both countries severed their diplomatic ties

(Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p. 117). Russia notably changed its foreign policy in an attempt

to influence Georgia’s international political orientation when it feared that Georgia may move

to join the EU or NATO. This makes Georgia an excellent case to measure whether Russian

foreign policy tactics are actually fulfilling their intended purpose of maintaining influence.

The single case of Georgia is broken down into three recent time periods set by the

Georgian political system. In order to narrow the scope of this paper and provide a timely

analysis of Russian foreign policy tactics, the periods begin with the Georgian-Russian war in

2008 and correspond with the Georgian parliamentary elections since then. This allows for three

distinct time periods: 2008-2012, 2012-2016, and 2016-2020. 2008 is an appropriate year with
12

which to begin research, as it marks the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia, signifying

the pinnacle of hard power politics between the two states. The next time period, 2012-2016

sees a dramatic change in political leadership with the rise of the Georgian Dream Party to

power. The Georgian Dream won office on the platform of desire to normalize relations with

Russia, which drastically departs from the nationalistic sentiments of President Saakashvili and

the United Nationalist Movement. 2016-2020 is another interesting time period, as the Georgian

Dream’s pragmatic approach to relations with Russia had not paid off in the resolution of

territorial concerns, and the Georgian Dream’s cooperation with Russia sparked renewed

protests. These time periods mark shifts in Georgia’s political stance towards Russia, which

gives ample opportunities to indicate changes in the dependent variable.

The concept for the independent variable is Russian foreign policy tools. Foreign policy

tactics are usually grouped into the two camps of hard and soft power. Russia’s foreign policy,

however, cannot be categorized so easily, especially in its dealings with the post-Soviet states.

Soft power, as traditionally defined, works to influence other states’ behavior through attraction,

which can be cultivated through culture, values, education, media, and religion (Ny, 1990, p.

167). As discussed previously, Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz (2012) made the distinction of a more

coercive strand of “soft power” that occupies an important role in Russia’s foreign policy toolkit.

With this in mind, Russian foreign policy tends to fall on a continuum between hard and soft

power, rather than into neatly defined camps. The following sections will analyze Russian

foreign policy in each of the time periods along a continuum of soft and hard power tactics.

In order to conduct this analysis, data was collected on the independent variable of

Russian foreign policy tactics towards Georgia from the Russian news outlet TASS, the

Georgian news Outlet Civil.ge, the U.S. funded news outlet Radio Liberty, and Eurasianet. The
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search terms were limited to “Russian foreign policy towards Georgia” and “Georgia-Russian

relations” in order to ensure consistency of search results across sources. The selected articles

were published between the years of 2008-2020. Data points for Russian events were chosen

from article titles that indicated Russian foreign policy tactics towards Georgia. These data

points were then coded based upon the description of foreign policy tactics.

I developed an original measurement system to advance on the old soft-hard power

binary, where Russian foreign policy tactics could be coded along a continuum numbered 1-5.

The pole of hard power on the continuum, categorized as a 5, is indicated by mention of military

involvement and use of weapons and continues down the line of less direct tactics. Economic

sanctions and cyber-attacks, classified as a 4, are a hard power tactic that are considered less

aggressive than military action in the fact that they do not require direct involvement, but still

have the potential to produce significant disruption to the country. Russian political and military

involvement in the breakaway regions through an increase in troops, building of additional

military bases, and integration exist on the hard power end of the continuum and is rated as a 3,

due to its undermining of Georgia’s territorial integrity, but less immediately damaging nature

than open military combat or economic sanctions. The middle ground of the continuum is

occupied by Russian tactics that seem to be meant to attract Georgia but do so with coercion.

These tactics are categorized as a 2 and may include the promotion of Russian backed narratives

of events, full-blown disinformation campaigns, and promoting Russian language at the expense

of the Georgian language. The softer the foreign policy tactic, the more it will rely on cultural,

religious, and language-based ties, but the underlying purpose of manipulation for many of these

softer tactics disqualify them from being considered true soft power tactics. In order to be coded
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as a true soft power tactic and be categorized as a 1 on the continuum, the foreign policy action

will need to be aimed at genuine attraction through mutual cooperation.

The concept for the dependent variable is Georgia’s political orientation. There are two

levels of domestic actors that can pressure for and determine Georgia’s foreign policy

orientation: government officials and citizens. Both political elites and public sentiments are

crucial to understanding political outcomes as demonstrated by Georgian leaders shifting stances

towards cooperation with Russia, and the power of the public to unseat pollical leadership as

seen by the 2003 Rose Revolution and the democratic transition of power in 2012. Georgia’s

political willingness to stay within Russia’s sphere of influence can therefore be measured by the

opinions and attitudes of government officials and the public.

Data on the dependent variable of Georgian political orientation was collected on two

levels: the political elite and the general public. For data on the Georgian political elites’ reaction

to Russian foreign policy, data was collected from the archives of TASS, Civil.ge, Radio Liberty,

and Eurasianet. Articles were selected using the search terms “Russian foreign policy towards

Georgia” and “Georgia-Russia relations” and based on titles that mentioned Georgian policies

and political announcements. Data on the public opinion of the Georgian relationship with

Russia was gathered through public opinion polls from the National Democratic Institute, the

International Republican Institute, and the Caucasus Research Resource Centers.

The analytical leverage for this research will come from the specificity of small-N

analysis that allows intense investigation into the causal relationship between Russian foreign

policy and Georgian political orientation since 2008. This small-N research will be conducted

using the single case of Georgia, broken up into three time periods of four-year increments from

2008-2020. This small-N case study gives the opportunity to trace changes in both the
15

independent and dependent variables and determine whether the causal link between the two is

accurate. As Russia’s foreign policy approach softens after the 2008 war, there should be greater

willingness from Georgian political elites and the Georgian population to entertain cooperation

with Russia. Conversely, if Russian foreign policy refuses to soften, the Georgian orientation

preference should shift towards opposing cooperation with Russia. In order to prove the effects

of Russian foreign policy on Georgian international orientation, I will evaluate specific

indicators on two levels (political elite and popular opinion) through both quantitative and

qualitative means. These indicators include Russian elite’s language in political speeches,

enacted policy goals, public opinion, and domestic election outcomes. This research will assess

the extent to which shifts in Russian foreign policy tools impact changes in these indicators.

Results that indicate an incorrect hypothesis would likely demonstrate a particular trajectory of

Georgian policy and public opinion trends that do not waver based upon Russian external

pressures, such as an overall trend of strengthening relations with the West or Russia

individually, or even a strengthening of relations with both simultaneously.

Limitations

The search terms used for data collection were selected to generate the best results across

all archives. Although different search terms, such as “Russian foreign policy” generated a more

favorable selection of results in one archive, it produced an inadequately low number of results,

or no results at all in other archives. Broader search terms may have produced a greater number

of results from each of the archives, but with the given time constraints, more specification was

needed to conduct the research in a timely manner. Additionally, the term “Russia-Georgia

relations” produced results that were largely repeated from the “Georgia-Russia relations” search

terms, therefore, only one variant of the terms was used across all sources for this research. For
16

this reason, the terms “Russian foreign policy towards Georgia” and “Georgia-Russia relations”

were selected for their ability to generate adequate results from multiple sources without being

excessively broad.

The same search terms were used to collect data on both the independent and dependent

variable. The results for these specific terms generated a substantial number of data point for

each variable, and although most sources produced a greater amount of data points for the

dependent variable, the difference in results is expected and acceptable. Overall, the dependent

variable has a greater number of data points due to the nature of the criteria for selection of data.

Data for the dependent variable was selected based upon titles of articles that mentioned

Georgian policies or political speeches/announcements that suggest Georgia’s political

orientation in relation to Russia or the West. This warrants itself to a greater number of news

articles that cover a constant stream of media from the Georgian government’s officials, while

data for the independent variable is constrained to Russian foreign policy tactics. There are by far

a greater number of speeches, statements, and announcements by Georgian government officials

than events that indicate Russian foreign policy; therefore, there are more data points available

for the dependent variable. The chronological order of events indicates if an independent variable

caused a dependent variable. If an event that shows the Georgian political orientation occurs

shortly after a Russian foreign policy tactic, it can be inferred that the foreign policy tactic

influenced Georgia’s orientation. Conversely, if Russian foreign policy tactics follow after an

event that shows Georgian political orientation in temporal order, it can be inferred that Russian

foreign policy is, in fact, reactive to Georgia’s political decisions.

Additionally, each source produced a different number of search results and a different

amount of true positive data points as compared to false positive search results. When a data
17

point was repeated in multiple archives, it was counted as a point in each source. Data points

with multiple sources were cited using each source in which the data was found. The chart below

shows the number of true positive data points compared to the total search results produced by

the two sets of terms “Russian foreign policy towards Georgia” and “Georgia-Russia relations”

in each archive.

Search Results

Civil.ge Radio Liberty TASS Eurasianet

True Positive “Russian FP towards 10 4 13 2
Georgia” Independent Variable
True Positive “Russian FP towards 43 8 8 7
Georgia”
Dependent Variable
Total 130 250 83 44
“Russian FP towards Georgia”
True Positive 4 1 14 10
“Georgia-Russia relations”
Independent Variable
True Positive 8 6 17 2
“Georgia-Russia relations”
Dependent Variable
Total “Georgia-Russia relations” 45 22 623 36

Findings: 2008-2012

Both Russian and Georgian events are organized chronologically, with Russian events

in bold. Russian foreign policy tactics are measured along the soft-hard continuum from a 1-5, 5

being the hardest.

Date Event

(5) 8 Aug. Russia initiated air strikes on Georgian targets while tanks crossed the Georgian
2008 border (Lomia, 2020, p.117)
14 Aug. 2008 Georgian Parliament voted unanimously to leave the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p.117)
(5) 15 Aug. Russia continued to consolidate forces within Georgia, despite verbal agreement
2008 to withdraw troops (Eurasianet, 2008, August 15)
(5) 26 Aug. Russia recognized Abkhazia and S. Ossetia as independent states (Civil.ge, 2008)
2008 and began building three Russian military bases (Civil.ge, 2008, August 26; Corso,
18

2008, August 26), (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014)

26 Aug 2008 President Saakashvili condemned Russia’s “open annexation” of Abkhazia and S.
Ossetia in televised address (Civil.ge, 2008, August 26)
29 Aug. 2008 Georgia cut diplomatic ties with Russia (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p.117)
(3) 9 Sept. Russia agreed to withdraw troops from Georgia’s heartland within the month,
2008 but no commitment was made about scaling back military presence in
breakaways (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2012, February 2; Civil.ge, 2008,
October 10)
17 Dec. 2008 Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze said U.S. and Georgia are negotiating a
bilateral security pact (Whitmore, 2008)
(3) 22 Dec. Russia opposed the redeployment of the Organization for Security and
2008 Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) military monitoring officers to S. Ossetia and
insists that the OSCE mission to Georgia be altered to reflect its recognition of S.
Ossetia’s independence (Peuch, 2008)
(3) 16 April Russian foreign ministry confirmed troop buildup in Abkhazia and S. Ossetia
2009 (Civil.ge, 2009, April 17)
13 July 2009 Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Russian President Medvedev’s visit to S.
Ossetia (Civil.ge, 2009, July 13)
(3) 15 July Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution to extend the UN
2009 observer mission in Georgia (Krastev, 2009, June 16)
16 July 2009 Georgia welcomed EU “troika” for three-day visit (Lobjakas, 2009).
24 July 2009 President Saakashvili welcomed U.S. Vice President to Tbilisi and said his visit
established support for Georgia’s territorial integrity in the democratic world (Civil.ge,
2009, July 24)
26 Dec. 2009 Georgian Parliament unanimously adopted resolution to proclaim aspirations for
membership in the EU and NATO (TASS, 2009, December 26)
(1) 8 Jan. Russia allowed limited direct flights from Tbilisi to Moscow and St. Petersburg
2010 (RFE/RL, 2010, January 8)
5 March Nino Burjanadze, leader of the Democratic Movement-United Georgia party met with
2010 Russia’s PM Vladimir Putin and said there is a possibility to start talks with Russia on
resolving problems in bilateral relations and pursue business-like nature instead of
current hysteria (Civil.ge, 2010, March 5)
(3) 20 Russia granted international code to Abkhaz Babushera airport in the Abkhaz
March 2010 capitol of Sokhumi and pledged assistance to Abkhazia in reopening the airport
(Patsuria, 2010)
(1) 7 Jan Russian Patriarch Kirill sent message to Georgian Orthodox Church leader
2011 emphasizing that Abkhazia is part of the Georgian Orthodox Church’s canonical
borders (Civil.ge, 2011, January 7)
(3) 24 Jan Russia deployed Tochka-U/SS-21/Scarab B short-range tactical missile in S.
2011 Ossetia, 15 of which were used against Georgia in the 2008 war (Kucera, 2011)
23 April Georgian opposition leaders visited Russia to discuss breakaway regions and
2010 Georgians living in Russia (RFE/RL, 2010, April 23)
25 June 2010 Georgia opposed Russia’s WTO membership (Solash, 2010)
20 Oct. 2010 Georgia dropped visa requirements for Russian citizens from the North Caucasus in a
move to promote “united” Caucasus (Lomsadze, 2010)
Oct 2010 NATO liaison office opened in Georgia (Fuller, 2015)
9 May 2011 Tbilisi demanded that it be able to monitor trade along the borders between
breakaways and Russia in exchange for vote for Russia to join WTO (Coalson, 2011)
(3) 13 July Russian defense minister visited Sokhumi, Abkhazia (Civil.ge, 2011, July 16)
2011
19

28 Oct. 2011 Georgia agrees to compromise on Russia’s WTO accession (TASS, 2011, October 28)
15 Aug. 2011 Head of Georgian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Ilia II, hinted at the need of talks
between Georgian and Russian leaders at the opening of new church close to Russian
border (Civil.ge, 2011, September 15)
8 Dec. 2011 Georgia reached agreement with Russia on access to WTO after years of blocking
Russian membership (Civil.ge, 2011, December 8)
(3) 22 Dec Russian Foreign Ministry said that WTO deal with Georgia will help Sokhumi
2011 and Tskhinvali to gain additional attributes for their independent status and does
not represent Georgian diplomatic victory (Civil.ge, 2011, December 23)
25 Jan 2012 Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze accused Russia of trying to kill the Geneva talks
launched after the 2008 war (Civil.ge, 2012, January 25)
29 Feb. 2012 Georgia unilaterally lifted visa rules on Russia to boost tourism (Civil.ge, 2012, April
13)
(4) April Russian foreign ministry recommended Russian citizens refrain from traveling to
2012 Georgia due to absence of security for Russian citizens (Civil.ge, 2012, April 3)
9 May 2012 President Saakashvili said Georgia will continue to pursue a policy of “constructive
unilateralism towards Russia (Civil.ge, 2012, May 9)

Russia’s aggression in the 2008 war was prompted by increased efforts of the

Saakashvili government to join Western institutions (Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p.117).

During this time period from 2008-2012, Russia’s goal in Georgia was to keep Georgia from

seriously pursuing membership in the Western institutions of NATO and the EU. This goal holds

through 2020, but Russia’s methods that were used to accomplish this goal change over time. For

the first time period discussed in this research, Russia largely concentrates its efforts into

military aggression and territorial disruption through expanding its military presence into the

breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Of the 14 data points gathered on Russian foreign policy tactics between the start of

the 2008 war and the 2012 Georgian Parliamentary elections, three hover at the furthest end of

hard power on the hard-soft power continuum as events of open war and occupation of territory.

An additional nine demonstrate hard power-oriented attempts, categorized as a 3 or 4, to block

international peacekeeping/monitoring missions, build up military capacity on occupied

territories, promote integration with occupied territories, and limit Russian economic flows to

Georgia. Two data points depart from the Russian government’s hard line stance to Georgia
20

during this time, one being the approval of a limited number of flights from Georgia to Russia

(RFE/RL, 2010, January 8). The second demonstration of soft power in the data from this time

period comes from the Russian Patriarch Kirill, who likely sought to maintain a friendly

relationship with the Georgian Orthodox Church despite severed political ties between the

countries (Civil.ge, 2011, January 7). The overall trend of the data of Russian foreign policy during

this time is a tendency towards hard power tactics and coercive measures to undermine Georgia’s

territorial integrity by occupying and building up military capacity in Abkhazia and South

Ossetia.

During this time period, the evidence suggests that structure dominates policy.

Russia’s structural benefit of being a geopolitically large and strong economic and military

presence requires its smaller and more vulnerable neighbors to seek improved relations in order

to make progress on their own national priorities. Despite Georgia’s initial preference to turn

away from Russia completely following the 2008 war, structural pressures drive both the

Georgian government and public to favor reestablishing dialogue between the two countries.

Of the 20 data points collected on Georgia’s political orientation from the outbreak of

the 2008 war to the 2012 parliamentary elections, 14 points indicated Georgian leadership’s

attitudes or political action in opposition to Russia or in favor of Western partnerships. This

evidence indicates Georgia’s attempt to move its international orientation away from cooperation

with Russia and to break out from under Russian influence. The majority of this data is

concentrated between August 2008-December 2009, directly following the hostilities of the 2008

war, and as time goes on, Georgian officials seem to reconsider their relations with Russia. In

2010, both political officials and the Georgian people were tired of the openly hostile relations

between Russia and Georgia and sought a resolution to the damage that had been wrought to the
21

Georgian territory and economy. In 2010, both Nino Burjanadze, leader of the Democratic

Movement-United Georgia party, and a number of opposition party politicians traveled to

Moscow to discuss resolving problems in bilateral relations (Civil.ge, 2010, March 5; RFE/RL,

2010, April 23). In a 2010 International Republican Institute poll of Georgian citizens, 82% of

respondents said that the Russian aggression towards Georgia was still ongoing (IRI, 2015,

p.12). Although the majority of respondents felt that Russia was continuously hostile towards

Georgia, 84% of those respondents also sought further dialogue with Russia (IRI, 2013, p. 13).

The public’s desire to further dialogue with Russia likely stemmed from the fact that the public

knew that Russia was the only world power that was capable of quickly relieving the economic

and territorial pressures that had plagued Georgia since the 2008 war. Russia had history of

mediating and resolving conflicts between Georgia and both Abkhaz and South Ossetian

separatists, so at this time, it was likely that the public held hope for a Russian brokered

restoration of Georgian territory with the reestablishment of a bilateral dialogue (Jones &

MacFarlane, 2020, p.196).

In 2011 and 2012, Georgian officials continued their pursuit towards membership in

NATO and the EU, but made a few key decisions pertaining to Russia. After previously blocking

Russian membership, in 2011, Georgian officials struck a Swiss-mediated deal with Russian

officials on trade across the borders of the breakaways with Russia in exchange for Georgia’s

agreement to back Russia’s bid for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)

(Coalson, 2011; TASS, 2011, October 28). In 2012, after years of decreased tourism by Russian

visitors to Georgia, Georgian officials unilaterally lifted visa rules off of Russian citizens

(Civil.ge, 2012, April 13). Georgia’s desire to improve bilateral relations with Russia demonstrates

how, although Russian foreign policy tactics did not necessarily become more friendly towards
22

Georgia, ongoing conflict and economic strain wore down resolve to completely reject

interaction with Russia. In this case, the asymmetric power structure between Russia and

Georgia dominated over Russian foreign policy.

Russia’s excessively aggressive foreign policy tactics initially seemed to push Georgia

further from Russia’s influence, as Georgia withdrew from the Russian centric CIS and severed

diplomatic relations. Increased Russian military presence through troop deployments and

construction of military bases in the breakaway regions seemed to exacerbate Georgia’s desire to

gain membership into Western institutions, and in 2009 the Georgian parliament unanimously

adopted a resolution to proclaim Georgia’s aspirations for membership in the EU and NATO

(TASS, 2009, December 26). Although Russia’s hard power tactics did nothing to attract

Georgia to maintain a relationship with Russia, they had other immediate benefits for Russian

goals. By occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia, areas in which Georgia was already struggling

to maintain control, Russia ensured that their territorial dispute could not be resolved without

Russian participation. Both NATO and the EU have stipulations that require aspirant countries to

resolve territorial disputes before they can be seriously considered for membership. In this way, a

more aggressive Russian foreign policy (ranging from a 5 to a 3) had the short-term benefit of

immediately blocking any Georgian attempts to gain membership into the EU or NATO, no

matter how hard Georgia may have pushed for closer relations with the West following the 2008

war. In this case, it did not matter to Russian leaders whether Georgia willingly remained under

Russian influence, or if Russia merely asserted itself as a regional power by using overwhelming

military and economic force.

Findings: 2012-2016
23

Date Event
1 Oct. 2012 Parliamentary elections brought Georgian Dream coalition to power, led by Bidzina
Ivanishvili (RFE/RL, 2012, October 22)
9 Oct. & 1 Georgian Dream Party Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili promised to restore economic
Nov. 2012 ties with Russia (Coalson, 2013), but not restore diplomatic ties with Russia until it
reverses its decision to recognize breakaway regions (RFE/RL, 2012, November 1)
13 Nov. Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze said that there is no alternative to Georgia’s course
2012 towards joining NATO and the EU (TASS, 2012, November 13)
10 Dec. Georgian PM Bidzina Ivanishvili designated Zurab Abashidze as special representative
2012 for relations with Russia and said there will be a meeting within the week (TASS, 2012,
December 10) no preconditions to the meeting (TASS, 2012, December 11)
19 Dec. Georgia and Russia initiated direct talks for the first time since the 2008 war (Civil.ge,
2012 2012, December 19)
(3) 20 Dec. President Vladimir Putin said Russia cannot reverse its recognition of S. Ossetia
2012 and Abkhazia (TASS, 2012, December 24)
21 Jan. 2013 Georgian Patriarch Ilia II said in talks with Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Kirill
that the visa regime with Russia must be abolished (TASS, 2013, January 21)
(1) 26 Jan. Russian Foreign Ministry instructed Russian Interests Section at the Swiss
2013 Embassy in Tbilisi to issue Russian visas to Georgian entrepreneurs (TASS, 2013,
January 26)
29 Jan. 2013 Georgian Foreign Ministry turned down Moscow for talks on Georgia returning to CIS
(Civil.ge, 2013, January 29)
(1) 4 Feb. Russia agreed to resume receiving imports of Georgian wine and mineral water
2013 (TASS, 2013, February 4)
(4) 1 March Russian Deputy foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said that Russian will not
2013 establish a visa-free regime with Georgia without diplomatic relations (TASS,
2013, March 1)
24 April PM Bidzina Ivanishvili said a good start was made in establishing relations with Russia,
2013 and that step-by-step Georgia will recover its territories and establish friendly relations
with Russia (TASS, 2013, April 24)
29 April Ivanishvili said in speech to NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly that Georgia does not
2013 have hope that Russia will change its policy towards Georgia, but needs to get breathing
space from Russia by calming the rhetoric so they can further develop (Whitmore,
2013)
2 May 2013 PM Bidzina Ivanishvili said he intends to get a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
in 2014 (Kucera, 2013, May 2)
3 June 2013 Georgian President welcomed NATO Secretary-General’s special Representative for
the Caucasus and Central Asia James Appathurai (TASS, 2013, June 3)
(1) 18 July President Vladimir Putin reached out to Georgia to propose cooperation on
2013 security for the Olympic games (Kucera, 2013, July 18)
(1) 7 Aug. PM Dmitry Medvedev promoted the benefits of joining the Eurasian Economic
2013 Union, saying neighbors should be partners, and Georgia will never be neighbors
with the U.S. (TASS, 2013, August 6)
7 Aug. 2013 Georgian Foreign Ministry said it still seeks gradual normalization of bilateral ties with
Russia despite Russia’s persisting destructive policy to undermine Georgia’s
independence (Civil.ge, 2013, August 7; TASS, 2013, September 2014)
2 Sept. 2013 PM Ivanishvili said at meeting with the Georgian ambassadors, that Georgian
authorities will try to do their best to get Georgia into the next wave of NATO
enlargement (TASS, 2013, September 2)
6 Sept. 2013 Georgian government denied the reopening of the Georgian-Russian railway via
24

Abkhazia, but said it is open for discussion on numerous technical and political issues
that require clarification (Civil.ge, 2013, September 6)
(3) 9 Sept Russian troops set up barbed wire fences along disputed territorial boundaries
2013 around South Ossetia (Bigg & Aptsiauri, 2013)
9 Sept. 2013 PM Ivanishvili publicly stated that, despite EU aspirations, he will not rule out
membership in the Eurasian Union (RFE/RL, 2013, September 10; Civil.ge, 2013,
October 12)
(2) 24 Sept Russian health officials released statements about the threat posed by the U.S.-
2013 funded Lugar laboratory in Georgia (TASS, 2013, September 24)
11 Nov. U.S. 6th Fleet flagship arrived in Georgia’s Black Sea port for combined training
2013 exercises with Georgian Coast Guard (Civil.ge, 2013, November 11)
29 Nov. President Giorgi Margvelashvili told Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius that
2013 Georgia aims at being a “leader in both reforms and integration” with Europe (Civil.ge,
2013, November 29)
21 Jan. 2014 Georgian Foreign Ministry expressed deep concern over expansion of border zone
11km deeper into Georgia (Civil.ge, 2014, January 21)
3 Feb 2014 Prime Minister met with EC President José Manuel Barroso in Brussels (Civil.ge, 2014,
February 2)
19 March President Giorgi Margvelashvili says Russian annexation of Crimea poses a threat to the
2014 stability in the region, while opposition UNM party called for authorities to take tougher
lines towards Moscow and take steps to speed up country’s Euro-Atlantic integration
(Civil.ge, 2014, March 19)
7 April 2014 Minister for Euro-Atlantic integration Aleksi Petriashvili said in an international
conference that the will to join the EU and NATO is the will of the overwhelming
majority of the country’s population (TASS, 2014, April 9)
17 April President Margvelashvili said in an interview with Reuters, that dialogue with Russia
2014 has not been very successful, but believes it is promising, especially is Georgia’s
Western partners support these talks (TASS, 2014, April 17)
13 June Georgia welcomed European Commission President José Manuel Barroso (Civil.ge,
2014 2014, June 13)
27 June Georgia signed Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU
2014 (Civil.ge, 2014, June 27; Fuller, 2014; RFE/RL, 2014, August 3)
(4) 9 July Russia’s Ministry for Economic Development drafted a decree on suspending the
2014 Russian-Georgian Free-Trade Agreement signed in February 1994 (RFE/RL,
2014, August 2; Fuller, 2014)
18 July Georgia Ratified EU Association Agreement (Civil.ge, 2014, July 18)
2014
(3) 13 Oct. Russia proposed new treaty with Abkhazia on “alliance and integration (Civil.ge,
2014 2014, October 13; Kucera, 2014, August 28; TASS, 2014, November 23)
14 Oct. Georgia welcomed U.S. 6th Fleet flagship in Georgia’s Black Sea port to reaffirm
2014 commitment of strengthening ties with NATO allies and partners (Civil.ge, 2014,
October 14).
15 Oct. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister said normalization between Georgia and
2014 Russia will be endangered if Russia moves forward with its proposed treaty with
Abkhazia (Civil.ge, 2014, October 15; Ciliv.ge, 2014, October 17; TASS, 2014,
November 22)
19 Oct. Defense and Foreign Ministers gave statements saying that more active and pro-active
2014 foreign policy steps will be taken in response to the proposed Russia-Abkhazia treaty
(Civil.ge, 2014, October 19)
19 Oct. Georgian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister took measures aimed at heightening
25

2014 international focus on Russia’s attempt to annex Abkhazia (Civil.ge, 2014, October
2019)
05 Nov. Western leaning Georgian Defense Minister dismissed; Foreign Minister and Minister
2014 for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration walked out (Kakabadze, 2014; Kucera,
2014, August 28)
17 Nov PM Garibashvili met with EU and NATO officials in Brussels to assure them of
2014 Georgia’s pro-Western course and discuss implementation of substantive package of
cooperation (RFE/RL, 2014, November 18; Civil.ge, 2014, November 17)
18 Nov. First meeting of the EU-Georgia Association Council in Brussels (Civil.ge, 2014,
2014 November 18)
(2) 2015 Russian-backed authorities abolished the 11 remaining Georgian language schools
in Gali district of Abkhazia (Civil.ge, 2017, July 28)
(2) 18 Feb. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that Russia will take measures to
2015 prevent negative effect of attempts to drag Tbilisi into NATO (Civil.ge, 2015,
February 19)
19 Feb. PM’s special representative for relations with Russia Zurab Abashidze, remarks to
2015 journalists that “Georgia is an independent state; therefore, it has a right to cooperate
with any international organization (Civil.ge, 2015, February 19)
27 Feb. Zurab Abashidze, met with Russian deputy foreign minister, Grigory Karasin as part of
2015 direct bilateral talks ongoing since 2012 to discuss Swiss-mediated WTO agreement
(Civil.ge, 2015, February 27)
10 March Nino Burjanadze, leader of Democratic Movement-United Georgia opposition party
2015 accused the United States of “blatant insult of Georgia’s sovereignty” by allowing
wanted ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili at a hearing in the U.S. Senate’s foreign
relations committee (Civil.ge, 2015, March 10)
2 April 2015 Politicians from UNM opposition party called for a freeze in dialogue with Russia
(TASS, 2015, April 2)
8 May 2015 President Giorgi Margvelashvili and PM Irakli Garibashvili called on the EU to make
an “unambiguous endorsement of visa-free regime” with Georgia (Civil.ge, 2015, May
8)
30 July Zurab Abashidze told reporters that Georgia has no plans to join all sanctions of the EU
2015 against Russia (TASS, 2015, July 30)
27 Aug NATO training center in Georgia opened (TASS, 2015, August 27)
2015
1 Oct. 2015 PM Irakli Garibshvili, in an address to the UNGA, condemned Russia’s “creeping
annexation” of Georgia’s territories, but reiterated Tbilisi’s readiness to forge
constructive, responsible, and pragmatic, relations with Moscow (Civil.ge, 2015,
October 2)
3 Oct. 2015 President Giorgi Margvelashvili visited New York and Washington in part of his effort
to promote “active foreign policy” of stronger relations with western capitals to increase
Georgia’s visibility, especially to the US (Civil.ge, 2015, October 3)
28 Dec 2015 Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze said Georgia will continue its European and Euro-
Atlantic integration process and keep on pursuing “pragmatic and balanced policy”
towards Russia (Civil.ge, 2015, December 28)
30 Dec. New Prime Minister Georgy Kvirikashvili spoke out in favor of the continuation of
2015 Georgia’s pragmatic policy towards Russia (TASS, 2015, December 30)
(3) 15 April Russian State Duma ratified an agreement on the border with South Ossetia
2016 (TASS, 2016, April 15)
11 May US, Georgia, and UK launched joint military exercises, Noble Partner, at the Vaziani
2016 training area (Civil.ge, 2016, May 11)
26

1 July 2016 EU-Georgia Association Agreement signed in 2014 fully entered into force (TASS,
2020, December 25)
8 July 2016 In a joint declaration to NATO Warsaw summit participants, 6 political groups in
Georgian parliament, including opposition and ruling coalition, reiterated their Euro-
Atlantic aspirations (Civil.ge, 2016, July 8)
7 July 2016 Georgia signed security partnership agreement with the U.S. for assistance in
developing self-defense capabilities (Kucera, 2016)
7 Aug. 2016 Foreign Ministry released a statement on the anniversary of 2008 war saying the
government’s pragmatic approach has reduced the risk of escalation of conflict, but
security and humanitarian situation in occupied territories remains grave (Civil.ge,
2016, August 7)
6 Sept. 2016 PM Georgy Kvirikashvili said at an international conference in Tbilisi, that “Georgia
does not want to be dragged into confrontation with Russia and should avoid any
complications in the future”, but this will not happen at the cost of Georgia’s territorial
integrity (TASS, 2016, September 6)
28 Oct. 22 Georgian NGO’s came together as the Coalition of Euro-Atlantic Georgia and
2016 encouraged government to persist in pushing back against Russian occupation of
Abkhazia and S. Ossetia warning against any initiatives that might blur such approach
and create and “illusion of yielding to occupation” (Civil.ge, 2016, October 28)

For a short time during the time period of 2012-2016, Russia pursued its goal of keeping

Georgia out of the EU and NATO through much more attractive means. Although Russia’s

foreign policy is reactive to Georgia’s desire for rapprochement rather than proactive in its

approach, Russia nonetheless employs a greater amount of soft power tactics during the first half

of this time period. Despite a positive shift in Georgian-Russian relations from 2012-2013, more

coercive tactics permeate the latter portion of the time period, signaling a lost opportunity for

Russia to take advantage of Georgian desires for cooperation.

Of the 13 data points gathered on Russian foreign policy between the Georgian

parliamentary elections of 2012 and 2016, none of the points fell under the category of the

hardest foreign policy tactics on the hard-soft continuum. Although Russia avoided all-out war,

seven of the 13 points still indicated hard power leaning tactics, categorized as a 3 or 4, including

increased efforts to integrate with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the placement of de-facto barbed

wire border fences, the expansion of occupied territory, and threats of economic sanctions or

other retaliation if Georgia continued to seek closer ties with NATO. Two data points fall under
27

a middle ground, categorized as a 2, on the continuum, with the first demonstrating how Russian

officials use media platforms that are usually reserved for soft power influence to manipulate

onlookers with misleading narratives, this one in particular about biological threats from the U.S.

funded Lugar Laboratory (TASS, 2013, September 24). The second middle ground point

indicates Russia’s desire to control access to language education in occupied regions by

abolishing Georgian language schools. The restriction of access to Georgian language learning in

South Ossetia is considered coercive due to the historical context of Russian efforts to subvert

the Georgian language to the Russian language in 1978 (Parliament of Georgia). By removing

access to formal Georgian language learning, Russia is better able to break cultural ties between

those living in the breakaway regions and Georgia, and further efforts of integration and

annexation by Russia. These two points demonstrate how Russia uses soft power channels of

language and media to either manipulate their target audiences or promote the Russian narrative

of events.

Despite the prevalence of hard power leaning foreign policy and manipulative middle

ground tactics, four data points indicate more genuine soft power. All within eight months in

2013 the Russian Foreign Ministry began to issue Russian visas to Georgian entrepreneurs,

Russia agreed to resume imports of Georgian wine and mineral water, President Vladimir Putin

reached out to Georgia to propose cooperation on security for the Olympic games, and Prime

Minister Dmitry Medvedev heavily promoted the benefits of joining the Eurasian Economic

Union to Georgia (TASS, 2013, January 26; TASS, 2013, February 4; TASS, 2013, August 6;

TASS, 2013, August 6). These four points demonstrate a relatively genuine desire for

cooperation and improvement in bilateral relations, and their proximity to each other indicates

that there may have been a window of opportunity for further normalization in Georgian-Russian
28

relations. This idea that there was a window for greater rapprochement between Russia and

Georgia is supported by Georgia’s desire to improve relations with Russia. Georgian officials

express their hopes for not only restoring friendly relations with Russia, but recovering its

territory in the process, indicating that Georgian officials felt that there was potential for Georgia

to make more progress on this particular national goal with Russia’s help than without. This was

followed by Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s statement that, despite EU

aspirations, Georgia will not rule out membership in the Eurasian Union (RFE/RL, 2013,

September 10; Civil.ge, 2013, October 12). These signals from Georgian officials indicate that

there were seeds of cooperation, of which Russia could have nurtured and taken advantage, but

Russia was not interested in giving up its well-established foothold in the region.

Of the 50 data points for Georgia’s political orientation between the Georgian

Parliamentary elections of 2012 and 2016, 35 points indicate an anti-Russian or pro-Western

stance, while 12 indicate a willingness for greater cooperation with Russia and further

normalization in relations. The desire to integrate with Western institutions and the attempt to

normalize relations with Russia are not mutually exclusive. The Georgian Dream Party that came

to power in the 2012 election vocally advocated for a political trajectory that simultaneously

normalized relations with Russia while actively pursuing membership in the EU and NATO

(Spetschinsky & Bolgova, 2014, p.118). From the 2012 election to September 2013, seven data

points indicate that Georgia was willing to rebuild relations with Russia, and even go so far as to

consider membership in the Eurasian Union (RFE/RL, 2013, September 10; Civil.ge, 2013,

October 12). These seven points, the majority for points indicating willingness to cooperate with

Russia, occurred during the Georgian Dream’s first year in power, which demonstrate the

Georgian government’s pragmatic approach towards Russia. The Georgian Dream Party’s
29

attempt to further dialogue with Russia was fully supported by over 80% of Georgian

respondents to IRI polls in 2012-2013 (IRI, 2019, p.16). This is the window of time in which all

three data points for softer Russian foreign policy tactics occurred, further supporting that there

was potential for a major shift in Georgian-Russian relations. However, the chronological order

indicates that Russia’s more friendly foreign policy during this time was a result of the Georgian

government’s willingness to reestablish a bilateral dialogue, not that Russian foreign policy

brought about a more friendly atmosphere in Georgia.

The Georgian Dream government made the first announcement to restore economic

relations with Russia, before Russia responded with issuing visas to Georgian entrepreneurs and

lifting the ban on Georgian wine and mineral water. Before the 2008 war, Russia had been

Georgia’s second-largest importer of products, as well as the largest market for Georgian migrant

workers (Lomia, 2020, p.118). When Russia placed an embargo on Georgian goods and placed

visa restrictions on Georgian labor migrants, Georgia fell into a financial crisis (Lomia, 2020,

p.118). After years of negative economic impacts from severed ties with Russia, the prospect of

restored commerce with Russia was most likely the pragmatic driver behind Georgia’s shifting

political approach. In a November 2012 NDI poll, 59% of respondents answered that jobs were

the most important national issue facing Georgia, and the Georgian Dream Party’s platform

offered the opportunity to restore trade with Russia, reopen the Russian migrant labor market for

Georgians and provide political stability to attract further foreign investment (NDI, 2012; World

Bank, 2019). For these reasons, the Georgian desire to reestablish dialogue with Russia was

driven by economic concerns, but officials also remained optimistic for the potential of a

bilateral dialogue to make progress on territorial disputes and political normalization. These
30

factors again indicate the structural geopolitical and economic power dynamic between a small

country and a larger and more powerful neighbor.

This evidence does not suggest that Russia would have changed its foreign policy

approach towards Georgia if Georgia had not first changed its approach. Russia knew that

Georgia could not become a serious candidate for membership in the EU and NATO with active

territorial disputes, and Russia had a firm military foothold in the Southern Caucasus with

military bases in the breakaway regions (Jones & Macfarlane, 2020, p. 198). Whether Georgia

sought cooperation or not, Russia was able to advance its own agenda with force and coercion.

This is not to say that the window for cooperation was not a very real possibility, but Georgia

had no levers of pressure with which to push Russia to negotiate on the issue of restoring

Georgia’s territorial integrity. Georgia had nothing greater to offer Russia than the foothold that

Russia already possessed in the region, and despite a year of hopeful cooperation, Georgia and

Russia were bound to hit a stalemate if they could not make progress on the occupied territories.

It seemed that Georgia cemented its decision to fully orient towards membership in

Western institutions with the June 2014 signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade

Agreement with the EU and the ratification of the EU Association Agreement (Civil.ge, 2014,

June 27; Fuller, 2014; RFE/RL, 2014, August 3; Civil.ge, 2014, July 18). This Western

orientation went a step further in August 2015 with the opening of the NATO training center in

Georgia (TASS, 2015, August 27). IRI polls confirm that the Georgian public’s support for

further dialogue with Russia consistently declines from 2013 to 2016, going from 82% of

respondents supporting further dialogue with Russia in 2013, to 59% in 2016 (IRI, 2019).

Although a majority of respondents still supported further dialogue with Russia in 2016, the

steady decline over three years is a noteworthy trend of growing dissatisfaction with the results
31

of Georgia’s dialogue with Russia. Georgian citizens were likely disenchanted with the idea that

Russia would willingly restore Georgia’s territorial integrity and refrain from stoking military

tensions along the borders of the breakaways. After the initial economic benefits of restored

trade between Georgia and Russia, the public likely began to lose hope of further progress from

continued dialogue with Russia.

From here, it seems that the Georgian approach to Russia had been friendly enough to

keep aggression at bay and maintain the possibility of coming to an agreement on the breakaway

regions, while Georgia pursued its more desired goal of membership in Western institutions.

This assessment is further supported by a March 2016 CRRC poll, in which 52% of respondents

answered that Georgia’s foreign policy should be pro-Western, however Georgia should

maintain good relations with Russia, while an additional 14% answered that Georgia’s foreign

policy should be pro-Western regardless of the implication for Russian relations (CRRC, 2016).

These polls indicate a desire among the Georgian people to deepen relationships with Western

states, but also to maintain domestic stability through consideration for relations with Russia.

The next time period of 2016-2020 shows a continuation and deepening of Georgia’s trend

towards the West, followed by a reactionary Russian foreign policy.

Findings: 2016-2020

Date Georgian Event

(3) 2 Nov. Russia ratified treaty with Abkhazia to establish combined security forces led by
2016 Russian military base in Abkhazia in violation of the 2008 cease fire agreement
(Civil.ge, 2016, November 3)
8 Oct. 2016 Ruling Georgian Dream party won the majority of seats in parliament (TASS, 2016,
October 12)
14 Oct. 2016 PM Kvirikashvili visited the U.S. 6th Fleet command and control ship docked in
Batumi and says strategic partnership with the U.S. is the most efficient mechanism for
strengthening Georgia’s security and self-defense capabilities (Civil.ge, 2016, October
15)
10-20 Nov. Georgia held NATO military exercises, third of its kind following Noble Partner drills
2016 in May and Agile Spirit exercise in September (TASS, 2016, November 14)
2 Dec. 2016 EU and Georgia held third meeting of the Association Council in Brussels (Civil.ge,
32

2016, December 2)
29 Dec. 2016 Georgian Parliament approved resolution on foreign policy that names EU and NATO
membership as top foreign policy priorities (Civil.ge, 2016, December 30)
1 March Georgian citizens gain visa-free travel to Schengen Area, but not Russia (TASS, 2020,
2017 December 25; Cecire, 2017)
(3) 4 April Russia began incorporation of Tskhinvali’s armed units under Russian army
2017 (Civil.ge, 2017, April 4)
(3) 18 April Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visits Abkhazia (TASS, 2017, April 18)
2017
20 April Georgian Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze said in a televised speech that the
2017 government needs to get international organizations to hold Russia accountable for its
occupation, then the Georgian government can pursue reintegration, reconciliation and
unification of divided communities (Civil.ge, 2017, April 20)
13 June 2017 Georgian PM’s special representative for relations with Russia Zurab Abashidze calls
on Russia to complete its work on its side of the WTO deal (Civil.ge, 2017, June 13)
(2) 26 June Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said in an interview with
2017 Russian daily Izvestia newspaper that Georgia’s cooperation with NATO
“acquires the forms that make it part of NATO’s containment policy towards
Russia” (Civil.ge, 2017, June 29)
(3) 26 June Russian Deputy Interior Minister, Igor Zubov, announced establishment of
2017 “Information-Coordination Center of Internal Affairs Agencies” in Tskhinvali
(Civil.ge, 2017, June 28)
19 July 2017 Georgian PM Giorgi Kvirikashvili, President Giorgi Margvelashvili, and other officials
spoke at the annual gathering of Georgian ambassadors saying Russia’s factual
annexation of the breakaways is the main challenge for Georgia’s external policy
(Civil.ge, 2017, July 19)
29 July 2017 24 Georgian NGO’s wrote a letter to Vice president Pence ahead of his visit stating
that America is Georgia’s closest and most trusted partner, supporter of sovereignty
and statehood, based on the shared values of freedom, democracy, rule of law and
human rights and notes the US embassy in Georgia and USAID remain effective
partners of the Georgian people and its civil society (Civil.ge, 2017, July 29)
6 Aug. 2017 President Giorgi Margvelashvili said Georgia has been severely punished through
occupation for its decision to pursue free choice in its external relations and that Russia
has been conducting hybrid warfare against Georgia since its independence in the 90’s
(Civil.ge, 2017, September 6)
15 Sept 2017 Georgian officials claimed “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” at Russian-backed
authorities in S. Ossetia to demolish houses of ethnic Georgians in village Eredvi.
Demolition of 268 homes by Moscow funded “South Ossetian Social and Economic
Development Investment Program” (Civil.ge, 2017, September 24)
16 Nov 2017 Georgian PM’s special representative Zurab Abashidze met with Russia’s deputy
Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin in Prague to continue the informal direct bilateral
dialogue launched in late 2012 (Civil.ge, 2017, November 17)
6 Dec. 2017 NATO-Georgia commission met in Brussels (Civil.ge, 2017, December 6)
9 March PM Giorgi Kvirikashvili said in a statement to Russian authorities that he urges
2018 Russian leadership to break the deadlock in relations and reach tangible progress in the
Geneva International Discussions (TASS, 2018, March 9)
29 March Georgia expels one Russian diplomat in solidarity with western nations in response to
2018 the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the UK (TASS, 2018, March 29)
(3) 13 April Russia expels a Georgian diplomat from the Georgian Interests Section of the
2018 Swiss Embassy in Moscow in response to Georgia’s expulsion of Russian diplomat
33

(TASS, 2018, April 13)

(3) 22 April Russian foreign ministry called on Tbilisi to recognize Abkhazia and S. Ossetia
2018 independence (Civil.ge, 2018, April 23)
4 June 2018 Georgian citizens formed vigilante groups to patrol de facto boundary with breakaways
amidst concerns that the Government is not doing enough to prevent “creeping
annexation” (Jardine, 2018)
(4) 19 July Russia’s federal consumer protection agency announced that 16,000 liters of
2018 Georgian alcohol were denied entry to Russia during the first half of the year
(Lomsadze, 2018)
(2) August Russian-backed authorities opened Russian-language school in Akhalgori,
2018 Tskhinvali region (Civil.ge, 2018, September 7)
7 Aug. 2018 Georgian officials condemned the opening of Russian-language school in Akhalgori as
a continuation of occupation and another step towards annexation of the area (Civil.ge,
2018, September 7)
(1) 17 Aug Russia opened visa center in Tbilisi and will accept applications from Georgian
2018 citizens (TASS, 2018, August 17)
(2) 9 Oct. Russian military officials promoted disinformation campaign against U.S. funded
2018 subsidiary of the Georgian National Center for Disease Control and Public Health
(Lugar Laboratory) (Civil.ge, 2018, October 9)
23 Oct. 2018 Georgian officials welcomed U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton to Tbilisi
(Kucera, 2018)
21 Nov. 2018 Georgian Delegation led by PM Mamuka Bakhtadze met in Brussels with European
Commission to further solidify and enhance ties through more than 25 concrete actions
to advance cooperation in the framework of the Association Agreement (Civil.ge,
2018, November 21)
24 Jan. 2019 President Zurabishvili in an interview with EU Radio said that she wishes to develop a
plan for de facto Georgian membership in the EU sooner than official membership, and
restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia is not possible at the moment (Civil.ge,
2019, January 24)
(1) 20 June Russian delegation presented at the Inter-parliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy
2019 in Georgian Parliament (Civil.ge, 2019, September 26)
21 June 2019 Georgian protests began outside Parliament for resignation of Interior Minister Giorgi
Gakharia in response to Russian delegation’s visit and speech. Georgian leaders said
visit was a mistake (Civil.ge, 2019, June 23; TASS, 2019, June 21)
(4) 8 July Russia imposed travel ban on Georgia (Gutterman, 2019; TASS, 2019, July 16)
2019
(3) 7 Aug. President Vladimir Putin met with Abkhazian leader Raul Khajimba in Sochi
2019 (TASS, 2019, August 7)
27 Aug. 2019 Swiss-mediated meeting between Georgian and Russian Foreign Ministers Davit
Zalkaliani and Sergey Lavrov, first since 2008 war (Civil.ge, 2019, September 27)
10 Sept. 2019 Zurab Abashidze said regular meetings between himself and the Russian representative
will continue (TASS, 2019, September 10)
27 Sept. 2019 Georgian FM met with Russian FM on the side at UNGA, making it the highest-level
meeting between the two countries since the 2008 war (Civil.ge, 2019, October 17;
Kucera, 2019; TASS, 2019, September 26)
(4) Oct. 2019 Alleged Russian cyber-attacks on Georgian government websites (TASS, 2020,
February 20)
6 Nov. 2019 President Salome Zurabishvili spoke at the 13th Defense and Security Conference
saying Russian military occupation brings everyday security concerns to her country,
and Russia should be persuaded to adhere to its commitments taken in 2008 to pursue
34

“all roads to a peaceful solution” (Civil.ge, 2019, November 6)

3-4 Dec. Foreign Minister Davit Zalkaliani participated in “NATO Engages: Innovating the
2019 Alliance” and says “full integration in NATO” is Georgia’s top foreign policy priority.
He also noted “humanitarian disaster” of Russian occupation and “borderization”
(Civil.ge, 2019, December 4)
(2) 19 May Russia continued disinformation campaign with focus on Covid-19 continuing to
2020 target Lugar Laboratory (Civil.ge, 2020, May 22)
19 May 2020 President Salome Zurabishvili gave a televised interview saying there was a possibility
of returning to one-on-one dialogue with Russia, but only based on a clear-cut agenda
and disapproved of a “dialogue in name only (Civil.ge, 2020, May 20)
22 May 2020 Georgian Foreign Ministry released statement condemning continued Russian
“borderization” and disinformation campaigns (Civil.ge, 2020, May 22)
June 2020 Georgian government helped repatriate Russian nationals during the Covid-19
pandemic (TASS, 2020, June 11)
11 June 2020 Georgian Foreign Minister Davit Zalkaliani spoke of country’s priorities of Georgia’s
EU aspirations and gradual integration into European single market at the Eastern
Partnership Ministerial (Civil.ge, 2020, June 12)
18 Sept. 2020 U.S.-Georgia led fifth multinational military exercise Noble Partner 2020 with
Georgia, U.S., UK, Poland, and France wraps up an Vaziani Military Base near Tbilisi
(Civil.ge, 2020, September 9)

Of the 16 data points for Russian foreign policy between the Georgian Parliamentary

elections of 2016 and 2020, at least one point was categorized as a 4 on the soft-hard power

continuum. The July 2019 travel ban is considered as an economic hard power tactic, similar to

an embargo, due to the revenue that the Georgian economy lost from a halt on Russian tourism

(Gutterman, 2019; TASS, 2019, July 16). The second point that is categorized as a 4 and

considered in this data set is an alleged Russian cyber-attack on Georgian government websites

(TASS, 2020, February 20). Although Russia has denied involvement in the cyber-attack on

Georgia, this point is noted for consideration. In addition to these hard power tactics, eight of the

16 points indicate hard power leaning tactics, categorizes as a 3 or 4, with the majority having to

do with increased integration efforts with the breakaway regions. Four points indicate a

manipulative use of information over media and the subversive establishment of a Russian

language school in South Ossetia (Civil.ge, 2018, September 7). The opening of the Russian

language school follows the abolition of Georgian language schools noted in the previous time
35

period and continues the trend of Russian authorities to restrict access to the Georgian language

and promote the Russian language in its place in an attempt to strengthen cultural integration

between Russia and the breakaway regions (Parliament of Georgia). Despite a prevalence of hard

and coercive tactics, two data points indicate diplomacy, with the opening of the Russian visa

center in Tbilisi and the Russian delegation presentation at the inter-parliamentary assembly on

orthodoxy in Georgian Parliament (Civil.ge, 2019, September 26; TASS, 2018, August 17)

It is important to note that the Russian foreign policy tactics recorded in this data continue

to be reactive to Georgia’s Western trajectory, not proactive in maintaining influence over

Georgia. The majority of Russian foreign policy tactics during this time period seem to aim at

disruption, whether that be through disinformation campaigns or formalizing integration with the

breakaway regions (Civil.ge, 2017, April 4; Civil.ge, 2018, October 9). This is a continuation of

previous Russia foreign policy tactics, but with growing intensity. Russian generated

disinformation campaigns in Georgia increased greatly in beginning in 2017, especially on social

media platforms (McCain Institute, 2019). The disinformation campaigns that are recorded in

this data set sought to create distrust of the U.S. government’s intentions in Georgia and promote

skepticism of the Georgian government’s relationship with the U.S. In addition to supporting a

pro-Russian narrative, these disinformation campaigns also work to foster rampant distrust. This

seems to indicate that Russia is not only concerned with attracting Georgia back into its sphere of

influence, but also to ensure that Georgia is not productive or successful towards endeavors to

collaborate with the West. Although this is not a new method of Russian policy, it increases in its

intensity during this time period, as the Georgian government makes it steadily more evident that

building relationships with the West is its main focus. This is a return to Russia’s policy trends

leading up to and through the 2008, war, where Russia reacts to Georgia’s increasingly Western
36

orientation by attempting to create a high enough level of disfunction in Georgian society, in

order to make Georgia seem less appealing to potential Western partnerships. If Russia cannot

deter Georgia from the West, it will attempt to make sure that the West will not want to pursue

partnership with Georgia.

Georgia’s political orientation during the time period between the 2016 and 2020

Parliamentary elections demonstrate a persistent trend towards cooperation with Western

institutions. 22 of the 32 data points for this time period indicate further displeasure with

Russia’s behavior towards Georgia and progress in developing relationships with Western states

and institutions. The eight data points that mention cooperation with Russia were minimalistic in

their nature, with declarations that bilateral talks will continue or calls for Russian officials to act

cooperatively. It seems that both the Georgian Dream party and the Georgian people were

increasingly disenchanted with the prospects of attaining the national priority of territorial

integrity through bilateral cooperation and have thrown their support behind furthering

relationships with Western countries that would be able to advocate on behalf of Georgia.

Georgian leaders most likely see that they will require the backing of Western powers to get

Russia to budge on the question of the breakaway regions. For now, the Georgian government

continues along a path of basic dialogue with Russia in an attempt to maintain what economic

ties it has reestablished and avoid open hostilities, not to greatly improve relations.

Although the Georgian government attempts to maintain, at the very least, a stable

relationship with Russia, the Georgian public is less patient with Russian antics. In a June 2019

IRI poll on the public’s support for further dialogue with Russia, only 46% of respondents still

fully supported further dialogue with Russia, compared to the 83% of respondents that fully

supported further dialogue with Russia in 2012. Although there was still significant demand for
37

dialogue with Russia, 52% of respondents either very or somewhat negatively viewed how their

government was handling their relationship with Russia, and this point of view became obvious

in the June 2019 protest in response to the Russian delegation’s speech in Georgian parliament

(Higgins, 2019). The June 2019 IRI poll also found that 79% of respondents saw Russia as

Georgia’s greatest political threat, while an additional 57% of respondents believes Russia to be

Georgia’s greatest economic threat (IRI, 2019). With the Georgian public becoming less

supportive of further dialogue with Russia and a majority of citizens believing that Russia is a

great political and economic threat, it seems that the Georgian people are tired of endless talks

that bear no results in furthering political normalization. The public may also be wary of a

government that is willing to continue attempts to normalize relations while Russia continues to

respond aggressively to Georgia’s sovereign decision to forge relationships with Western states

and institutions. It seems that the window of opportunity for genuine improvement in relations

between Russia and Georgia has come to a close, and tensions are rising once again.

Conclusion

This research attempted to assess to what extent Russian foreign policy tactics are

successful at influencing Georgia. Overall, the data suggests that Russian influence has been

damaged between 2008-2020, but Russian power is cemented in the region. The overwhelming

prevalence of Russian hard power tactics in the 2008 war harmed Russian influence most

severely by driving Georgian leaders to leave the CIS and break diplomatic ties with Russia.

Since Russia has occupied and recognized the independence of the breakaway regions, one of

Georgia’s top national priorities has been to reestablish territorial integrity. Russia’s continued

efforts of military occupation and integration with the breakaway regions have been the epicenter

of Georgian-Russian tensions since 2008.

38

Moving forward, it seems that Russia neglected opportunities from 2012-2013 to expand

its influence and attractiveness in Georgia. Structural economic factors drew Georgia back into a

position of willingness to reestablish a bilateral dialogue with Russia in order to promote

economic relations and humanitarian cooperation. Russia responded by lifting embargoes on

Georgian goods but did not take on proactive foreign policy to reestablish cooperative,

diplomatic ties with Georgia. Instead, Russia employed a reactive policy that responded to

Georgia’s willingness to cooperate with Russia by reestablishing trade but did not venture to

negotiate on territory or further normalization. Russia continued to act reactively as Georgia

became impatient with Russia’s immobility on issues of territory. Consequently, Georgia took a

significant turn towards building relationships with Western powers and made agreements with

Western institutions. Instead of working to draw Georgia away from the West when the

opportunity presented itself, Russia instead avoided meaningful political rapprochement and

chose to respond aggressively when Georgia turned away.

In response to Georgia’s turn to the West, the 2016-2020 period saw an increase in not only

Russian hard power and hard power leaning tactics, but in coercive middle ground tactics as

well. In addition to Russia’s increased integration efforts with the breakaway regions, there is a

significant effort on the part of Russia to create instability and distrust through channels that are

often reserved for soft power. Disinformation campaigns in regard to Georgian relations with

Western states and institutions increased greatly during this time period, but the goal of these

campaigns is not necessarily to attract Georgia back to Russian influence, but also to disrupt

Georgian society to a point of either inability to join Western institutions or unwillingness of

Western institutions to align with an unstable Georgia. By promoting instability, Russia most
39

likely sent the signal that although cooperation with Russia will not solve all of Georgia’s

concerns, it is the stable alternative to the costly pursuit of membership in Western institutions.

The evidence suggests that Russia’s foreign policy did not matter to a great extent from

2008-2020. Despite a small window of time from 2012-2013 when Russian foreign policy may

have had a greater chance of generating genuine attraction, structural factors are what promoted

and maintained the reestablishment and maintenance of a bilateral dialogue between Russia and

Georgia. Since 2012, regardless of Russia’s foreign policy tactics, whether they were

consistently coercive or mildly attractive, Georgian leaders have pursued normalization with

Russia. The structural pressures of lost revenue from disrupted trade between a top trading

partner and barred access to an important job market drove Georgian officials to take the first

steps in rapprochement. Georgia’s structural reality is that, for the time being, Russia is an

immediate and powerful neighbor. Until Western states are willing to fill Russia’s shoes by

accepting the same volume of trade, giving easy access to job markets for Georgian workers, and

providing regional security, Georgia will rely on a good enough relationship with Russia to

provide economic and regional stability. For now, Georgia will continue to be vulnerable to

Russia’s structural power in the region.

Due to the asymmetric power structure between Russia and Georgia, Russia does not need

to attract Georgia in order to influence Georgia’s political outcomes. Russia has the option of

utilizing force to ensure an outcome, rather than attempting to use diplomatic channels and risk

the uncertainty of Georgia’s independent decisions. Georgia cannot become a formal member in

any Western institutions so long as Russia can maintain a territorial dispute; therefore, Russia

can effectively keep NATO and the EU away from its border with occupation of the breakaway

regions. Due to the geopolitical power asymmetries, Georgia has no leverage to use in
40

negotiation with Russia in order to advance Georgia’s goal of regaining control over the

breakaways. Therefore, Georgia’s best bet at regaining territorial integrity is through forging

stronger ties with Western powers in hopes that they will pressure Russia on Georgia’s behalf.

Unfortunately for Georgia, the likelihood of Westerns powers applying excessive pressure

on Russia for Georgia’s sake is relatively low, as the costs of provoking Russia are most likely

much higher than the potential benefit of official Georgian membership in NATO or the EU.

Nevertheless, Georgia’s progress towards NATO and the EU is consistent. Western institutions

will continue to attract the Georgian government, because of the opportunities stemming from

economic integration with the EU and the security structure of NATO. Western states will also

continue to attract the Georgian people, because of the appeal of democratic institutions and

structural integrity. Meanwhile, Russia must put its efforts into force and coercion, because its

government and institutions lack the basic transparency and rule of law needed to build external

attractiveness (Cwiek-Karpowicz, 2012, p.1). For now, Russia’s use of force accomplishes its

goal to keep Georgia out of NATO or the EU, and it seems that this uneasy solution will

continue for the near future.

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52

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