J Bus Ethics (2019) 157:27–44
DOI 10.1007/s10551-017-3680-6
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders
to Relationholders
Minka Woermann1 • Schalk Engelbrecht2
Received: 25 November 2016 / Accepted: 18 August 2017 / Published online: 5 September 2017
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017
Abstract This paper addresses whether, and to what
extent, the African ethic of Ubuntu can contribute to ethical
thinking in general and provide an alternative to stake-
holder theory specifically. The conception of Ubuntu that is
employed to further the analysis is Thaddeus Metz’s
Ubuntu principle of right action, which focuses on pro-
moting harmonious social relations premised on a shared
identity and solidarity amongst people. This principle is
used to develop an Ubuntu heuristic for organisational
decision-making, which serves as the basis for a relation-
holder theory. It is argued that this relationholder theory
can overcome the weaknesses identified with a libertarian
account of stakeholder theory, as well as serve as a prof-
itable framework for determining both the purpose of the
firm, and the responsibilities that management has towards
those parties who affect, and who are affected by, the firm.
Keywords Ubuntu
Harmony
Relational
Thaddeus
Metz
Stakeholder theory
Libertarianism
Employee
relations
& Schalk Engelbrecht
Schalk.Engelbrecht@kpmg.co.za
Minka Woermann
minka@sun.ac.za
1
Department of Philosophy, Stellenbosch University,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa
2
KPMG Wanooka Place, 1 Albany Road, Johannesburg 2193,
South Africa
Introduction
The Ubuntu scholar Augustine Shutte (2008) laments that
African voices have been severely underrepresented in
debates regarding a global ethic. This, he argues, is a
serious omission for the reason that ‘‘there exists a char-
acteristic indigenous ethical tradition… in sub-Saharan
Africa that has certain common characteristics… [and that]
embodies ethical insights that are both true and important
in themselves, and are also significantly lacking in domi-
nant ethical thinking in the global community’’ (p. 16).
This indigenous ethical tradition commonly goes by the
name of Ubuntu, which is summarised in the maxims, ‘‘I
am because you are’’ or ‘‘a person is a person through
others’’.
In this paper, we critically interrogate Shutte’s claim in
order to determine whether Ubuntu does indeed add to our
ethical thinking. Although we examine this claim at the
general level of moral theory, our more direct purpose is to
establish whether, and how, the Ubuntu ethic can enrich
our thinking on business ethics, specifically as concerns the
firm’s duties towards those parties who affect, and are
affected by, the firm.
Traditionally, this latter issue has been addressed in
stakeholder theory, which in itself constitutes a number of
different perspectives on, and approaches to, determining
the firm’s responsibilities towards affected parties. Rather
than seek to do justice to this plethora of theories that
constitute the body of stakeholder theory, we provide a
brief overview and critical appraisal of arguably the most
famous and influential version thereof, namely Edward
Freeman’s libertarian-based stakeholder theory. We
attempt to show that the contractual language that governs
stakeholder relations cannot do justice to the interests of
the full range of stakeholders whom Freeman wishes to
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include in his theory. Given the shortcomings of stake-
holder theory, we set out to explore whether, and to what
extent, the Ubuntu ethic can ground an alternative theory
for determining a firm’s responsibilities towards the parties
with which it engages. We argue that such an alternative
cannot be accommodated within the stakeholder paradigm,
because—from an Ubuntu perspective—the primary issue
does not concern the stakes of the firm and its various
contracting parties, but rather the nature of the relationship
between the firm and these parties. As such, we argue for a
relationholder theory, as opposed to a stakeholder theory,
for determining in whose interests the firm ought to be
managed.
In order to ascertain whether the Ubuntu ethic can
indeed provide a robust alternative to stakeholder theory,
we firstly give a general overview of Ubuntu at the hand of
prominent theorists. While theorists such as Reuel Khoza,
David Lutz, and Barbara Nussbaum have all argued for the
value of applying the Ubuntu ethic to business contexts in
order to humanise business practices, our aim is different.
We argue that the moral significance and the potential
contribution of Ubuntu for business will only become
apparent once we have a clear understanding of the nor-
mative content of Ubuntu. Therefore, before attempting to
apply Ubuntu or to demonstrate its value in business con-
texts, we firstly seek to establish what the normative con-
tent underlying the African ethic of Ubuntu is. To this end,
we turn to the work of Thaddeus Metz, who arguably offers
the most rigorous systematisation of Ubuntu in terms of a
principle of right action that can compete with influential
Western moral principles such as the Kantian categorical
imperative or the utilitarian Greatest Happiness principle.
After presenting an account of Metz’s Ubuntu principle of
right action, we briefly look at his applications of this
principle, with the goal of formulating an Ubuntu heuristic
for guiding organisational decision-making. Having sys-
tematised the normative content of Ubuntu, we proceed to
demonstrate how this heuristic can help to overcome the
weaknesses identified in libertarian stakeholder theory, and
lastly we apply the heuristic to the relations between an
organisation and its employees (characterised in terms of
leadership practices, decision-making, ownership, profit
sharing, termination and retrenchment) in order to motivate
our relationholder theory.
Libertarian-Based Stakeholder Theory
Freeman (1994) argues that stakeholder theory is best
understood as a genre of theories, rather than as a mono-
lithic theory. The identifying characteristic of this genre of
theories is that the managerial task is viewed in terms of
managing stakeholder relations in order to achieve a firm’s
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M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
purpose. In order to successfully manage stakeholder
relations, managers have to address two questions, namely
‘‘What is the purpose of the firm?’’ and ‘‘What responsi-
bility does management have towards stakeholders?’’. The
first question requires that management articulate the
shared value that the firm creates for its core stakeholders,
whereas the second question necessitates that management
define the type of stakeholder relations that are needed in
order to realise the organisation’s purpose. The manage-
ment task is thus descriptive, instrumental, and normative,
in that management must assume responsibility for
organisational purpose, strategy, and ethics (Freeman and
Phillips 2002, p. 339).
The above description of stakeholder theory is prag-
matic. Rather than defend a specific conception of value,
the pragmatist defines value creation in terms of ‘‘the
practical relevance of a set of ideas as defined by their
purposes and those shared by their community’’ (Wick and
Freeman 1998, p. 129). The pragmatist concern is with
living ‘‘richer and more fulfilling lives’’ (p. 129), and this is
viewed as facilitated by joint decision-making and meaning
creation, rather than by starting with a predetermined the-
ory of the organisation’s purpose. In the light of this broad
framework, Freeman and Phillips (2002, p. 340) define
business as ‘‘that human institution that is about value
creation and trade’’. Drawing on previous research, Free-
man and Phillips further argue that ‘‘the engine of value
creation and trade is the human desire to create… [and
also] that the desire for solidarity fuels capitalism, the
desire to come together and build something which no
single person can accomplish’’ (p. 340).
Freeman and Phillips (p. 336) further argue ‘‘that in the
background of stakeholder theory are libertarian argu-
ments’’ that draw on the following five tenets:
(1) relies on freedom, liberty, the equal liberty prin-
ciple, or some kindred notion; (2) relies on basic
negative rights, like those defined by Rawls’s first
principle, and including individual property rights;
(3) allows for the creation of positive obligations
through various voluntary actions (e.g., contracting
and promising); (4) countenances at most a minimal
state, as defined by Nozick and others; and, (5)
assumes that human beings are largely responsible for
the effect of their actions on others (p. 336).
They argue that these basic assumptions underscore both
instrumental and normative theses of stakeholder theory.
Whereas the former states that managers ought to pay
attention to stakeholder relationships if they wish to
maximise shareholder value over the long-run, the latter
accepts the normative claim but without further instru-
mental qualification. Freeman and Phillips offer a number
of libertarian arguments that support these stakeholder
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
theses. The instrumental thesis is easier to defend on
libertarian grounds than the normative thesis. In this view,
managers are hired by shareholders to promote their
interests. There exists a type of contractual agreement
between managers and shareholders, whereby managers
are obligated to act in the shareholders’ interests. Although
libertarians do not support positive obligations as such, the
instantiation of contracts may demand positive obligations
provided that these contracts are freely agreed to by the
contracting parties. In the instrumental thesis, the agree-
ment to protect the property rights of shareholders gener-
ates positive obligations. The normative thesis is not
premised on property rights, yet Freeman and Phillips
forward a number of arguments that also support this thesis
on libertarian grounds. Two of these arguments are
particularly relevant for our purposes: The first argument
states that managers ought to pay attention to stakeholder
relations on the basis of the understanding of the firm as ‘‘a
nexus of contracts or the centrepiece of an ongoing
multilateral agreement, based on voluntary consent’’ (p.
338). Furthermore, ‘‘[i]f there is a weak presumption that
the agreement is ongoing, managers must take the interests
of all parties to the contract, or the nexus, into account’’ (p.
338). The second, related argument is that fairness
demands that managers should attend to stakeholder
interests, due to ‘‘the voluntary acceptance of the benefits
of a mutually beneficial cooperative scheme’’ (p. 338). As
such, Freeman and Phillips argue that, given tenet five of
the libertarian position (i.e. human beings are largely
responsible for the effect of their actions on others), ‘‘we
would expect managers to try to keep the joint interests of
stakeholders in balance in any instance where positive
obligations have been created through consent, contract,
voluntary acceptance of benefits, or any other voluntary
action’’ (pp. 338–339).
It is clear from both the instrumental and normative
defence of stakeholder theory that Freeman and Phillips
(2002) assume that contracts can be unproblematically
entered into by free, consenting stakeholder groups. Yet, as
Mitchell et al. (1997) note, the successful establishment
and enforcement of contracts is contingent on issues of
‘‘power, legitimacy, and/or urgency’’ (p. 864). Mitchell
et al. (p. 856) offer three definitions of power from the
extant literature: ‘‘the probability that one actor within a
social relationship would be in a position to carry out his
own will despite resistance’’ (Weber 1947); ‘‘a relationship
among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get
another social actor, B, to do something that B would not
otherwise have done’’ (Dahl in Pfeffer 1981, p. 3); and,
‘‘the ability of those who possess power to bring about the
outcomes that they desire’’ (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974,
p. 3). From these definitions, one can conclude that power
differentials thus have the potential to substantially impact
29
on the terms of the contracts, specifically with regard to the
benefits to be accrued by the different contracting parties.
In order to address this problem, Freeman (2002) proposes
that we undertake a Rawlsian thought experiment whereby
we determine the ground rules for entering into contracts
behind a veil of ignorance. In other words, stakeholders
have to determine the ground rules in ignorance of their
actual stakes, which will ensure fair outcomes. Although
this may constrain abuses of power, the Doctrine of Fair
Contracts (p. 179) does not sufficiently address the issues
of legitimacy and urgency that determines which stake-
holder groups are recognised in the contracting process.
Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that power and legitimacy are
often implicitly connected: even stakeholders with legiti-
mate claims may not achieve salience with the organisa-
tion, if they are powerless to make their claims or the
urgency of their claims heard. Here, urgency is understood
either in terms of time sensitivity (i.e. ‘‘the degree to which
managerial delay in attending to the claim or relationship is
unacceptable to the stakeholder’’) or criticality (i.e. ‘‘the
degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate
attention’’) (p. 867). On the basis of the analysis of this
argument, Woermann (2011, p. 32) argues that:
When viewed in terms of these three attributes [i.e.
power, legitimacy, and urgency], it clearly becomes
inappropriate to view all manager-stakeholder rela-
tions as consensual, voluntary agreements. This is
because such agreements only account for the legit-
imacy of stakeholder claims, and do not necessarily
attend to the attributes of power and urgency… [I]f
certain stakeholder groups are unable to articulate
their legitimate claims and/or hold very little power
over the organisation… it seems impossible for
stakeholders to hold organisations responsible or
accountable for their actions.
The contractual language in which stakeholder theory is
framed thus suffers from a serious shortcoming, namely
that the interests of poor and needy stakeholders may not
find salience with the firm due to the fact that they have
very little value to offer the firm; or, as Annette Baier
(1986, p. 247) states rather more eloquently: ‘‘Contract is a
device for traders, entrepreneurs, and capitalists, not for
children, servants, indentured wives, and slaves’’. As such,
contracts make it is all too easy to dismiss the interests of
the disenfranchised. For this reason, we argue for an
alternative to stakeholder theory, which is premised on an
Ubuntu perspective. As will be demonstrated in the
following sections, the Ubuntu ethic can more readily
accommodate a wider range of stakeholder interests by
premising a firm’s duty to respond to stakeholder claims on
the moral imperative to foster harmonious relationships
with those parties with whom the firm communes, rather
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than on their stakes. Note that our argument is not that
parties who affect, or who are affected by, a firm do not
have stakes; rather the argument is that making stakes the
central focus of organisational decision-making introduces
problems of power, legitimacy, and urgency that have not
been sufficiently accounted for in business thinking
regarding stakeholder value creation (thereby restricting
the range of interests that the firm responds to in practice).
The claim is thus that shifting the focal point of organi-
sational deliberations from stakes to harmonious relation-
ships introduces a new lens through which to view the
firm’s relations, and thus new criteria according to which
the urgency and legitimacy of the interests of parties should
be assessed.
From Stakeholder Theory to Relationholder
Theory
Ubuntu provides an alternative to libertarian stakeholder
theory that grounds the moral responsibilities of firms
towards different parties related to it, neither on ongoing or
assumed contracts with these parties, nor on the benefit
derived from the relationship. An Ubuntu ethic assumes
that a moral responsibility is generated a priori due to the
mere fact of a relationship. To understand what is entailed
by this responsibility, it is first necessary to understand
what Ubuntu means.
The meaning of Ubuntu is most often explained with
reference to the aphorism ‘‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’’
or, as stated in the introduction, ‘‘a person is a person
through other people’’1. In this sense, it is an ethic, claimed
to be indigenous to sub-Saharan African culture, which
focuses on the relationality or interconnectedness of human
existence. According to Nussbaum, Ubuntu is ‘‘an under-
lying social philosophy of African culture’’ and one of ‘‘the
inspiring dimensions of life in Africa’’ (2003, p. 1). Ubuntu
‘‘…addresses our interconnectedness, our common
humanity and the responsibility to each other that flows
from our deeply felt connection’’ (Nussbaum 2003, p. 1).
Likewise for Nhlanhla Mkhize, Ubuntu is ‘‘an African
1
Van Niekerk (2013) describes Ubuntu as ‘‘a theory of moral value’’,
an ‘‘African communitarian philosophy‘‘, and a ‘‘constellation of
African value claims’’ (2013, p. vii). From the growing recent
literature on Ubuntu Van Niekerk identifies a trend in explanations of
the meaning of Ubuntu. First, a provocative slogan is claimed to
capture the essence or meaning of Ubuntu (most often ‘‘Umuntu
ngumuntu ngabantu’’). Thereafter, examples are provided of actions
that demonstrate (or are infused with, or are instances of) Ubuntu. The
problem with this language game, according to Van Niekerk, is that
the provocative moral appeal is not supported with normative clarity.
The normative expectations entailed by Ubuntu remain vague and
ambiguous. We return to the issue of normative clarity later in the
article.
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M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
view of morality and ethics’’; an idea that is ‘‘realised
through relationships characterised by interdependence,
justice, solidarity of humankind, respect, empathy and
caring’’ (2008, p. 36).
From these descriptions, it is clear that Ubuntu, although
referred to as a lived practice (Mkhize 2008, p. 35), entails
both descriptive (or ontological) and prescriptive (ethical)
content. Ubuntu contains an idea of the nature of persons,
specifically that ‘‘human society’’ has ontological inde-
pendence and is more fundamental than ‘‘the individual’’
(Menkiti cited in Shutte 2008, p. 27; Praeg 2014, p. 4). The
distinguishing feature of human persons is their relatedness
or interdependence—human persons are not isolated and
self-contained individuals who enter into relationships with
other isolated and self-contained individuals. Instead, a
person’s relatedness and interdependence precede and give
form to his/her personhood. As Lutz claims, ‘‘we human
persons are naturally communal’’ (2009, p. 313). Yusufu
Turaki, in turn, explains that ‘‘[p]eople are not individuals,
living in a state of independence, but part of a community,
living in relationships and interdependence’’ (2006, p. 36).
One of the ontological assumptions of Ubuntu is therefore
the communal or relational nature of being (Mkhize 2008,
p. 9). The ‘‘self’’ or ‘‘being’’ is understood as a social
practice and defined in relation to community.
From the communal or relational nature of the self
follows a moral ideal. To be (or to become) a complete
person (a human being) depends on the quality of rela-
tionships or participation in community. Nussbaum
describes Ubuntu as ‘‘a way of being’’ and a ‘‘code of
ethics and behaviour’’ that ‘‘seeks to honour the dignity of
each person and is concerned about the development and
maintenance of mutually affirming and enhancing rela-
tionships’’ (2003, p. 2). The moral injunction contained in
Ubuntu is articulated as follows by Mogobe Ramose (2003,
p. 231):
to be a human be-ing is to affirm one’s humanity by
recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis,
establish humane relations with them. Ubuntu,
understood as be-ing human (humanness); a human,
respectful and polite attitude towards others consti-
tutes the core meaning of th[e] aphorism [‘‘umuntu
ngumuntu ngabantu’’].
The types of (humane) relationships envisioned in Ubuntu
thinking are characterised by the values or virtues of
compassion, caring, sharing and responsiveness to the
community as a whole (Nussbaum 2003, p. 2). A person
who ‘‘has’’ ubuntu (in the moral sense) demonstrates it by
being ‘‘generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compas-
sionate’’ (Tutu 1999, p. 34–35).
On the one hand, Ubuntu therefore designates a rela-
tional understanding of the self that purportedly stands in
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
opposition to (Western) individualism with its ‘‘basic
assumption that the autonomous, rational individual is prior
to (in the sense of being more fundamental than) social
relations, interdependence and the kind of obligations
(moral, political, social) that would follow from holding
these relations as more fundamental’’ (Praeg 2014, p. 4).
The contrast with individualism is highlighted in John
Mbiti’s translation of the Ubuntu aphorism that pits a
relational Ubuntu self against the Cartesian cogito: ‘‘I am,
because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’’ (1989,
p. 106). On the other hand, the relational composition of
the self entails the moral prioritisation and maintenance of
relationships that affirm the humanity of others. Accord-
ing to Jason van Niekerk, Ubuntu ‘‘picks out the idea that
human beings are radically interdependent, and that this
interdependence entails a morally normative pressure
towards generosity, hospitality, friendliness, compassion,
forgiveness, reconciliation, consensus, and positive group
identification’’ (2013, p. 5). On the basis of these onto-
logical and normative assumptions, Ubuntu ethics could
be described as a communal or communitarian ethic—the
good of the community is seen as fundamental, and
recognising the role of community is essential in
respecting individual persons (Senghor cited in Shutte
2008, p. 28).
It is not difficult to see the potential relevance of Ubuntu
to business, the corporation or firm. Similar to individual
persons, firms are radically interdependent and constituted
by a network of relationships which include employees,
customers, suppliers, regulators and communities. To bor-
row from Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a firm is ‘‘caught up,
is inextricably bound up… in a bundle of life’’ (1999,
p. 35). From an Ubuntu perspective, the firm therefore has
a moral responsibility to affirm and enhance the humanity
of those it relates to. Put differently, a firm should maintain
relationships characterised by compassion, caring, and
responsiveness.
A similar idea already informs libertarian stakeholder
theory. Freeman (2002) argues on both a legal and eco-
nomic basis that the purpose of a firm is not merely to
make money for the owners of the firm (the shareholders).
Instead, the firm creates value for a range of parties related
to the firm, and the key responsibility of management is to
balance the legitimate expectations of these parties. The
parties in question here are dubbed stakeholders who earn
the moral consideration of the firm based on the skin they
have in the game, or their stake. For instance, the expec-
tations and needs of employees are considered because
they invest their time, skills and loyalty in the firm and
depend on it for their livelihood (Freeman 2002, p. 42).
The primary difference between Ubuntu and libertarian
stakeholder theory is that, in Ubuntu, moral consideration
is not earned based on stakes. Instead, parties related to the
31
firm have moral status solely from the fact that they stand
in a relationship to the firm. A firm is not regarded as a
nexus of contracts, as in libertarian stakeholder theory, but
as a nexus of relationships. An Ubuntu-based business
ethics would therefore replace the stakeholder with a
relationholder.
Scholars like Shutte (2008), Nussbaum (2003) and Lutz
(2009) believe that Ubuntu, with its focus on relationships,
interdependence, and the accompanying desire to establish
harmonious, caring, humane and affirming relationships,
could act as a corrective for the limitations of deontological
and utilitarian ethics within a dominant scientific and
technological culture. Shutte (2008) argues that Ubuntu has
much to offer in an age of globalisation and global
inequality and can help address the current challenges of
the unequal distribution of resources, AIDS, terrorism,
fundamentalism and environmental degradation. Nuss-
baum similarly believes that the ‘‘beauty and power’’
(2003, p. 1) of Ubuntu paves the way towards embracing
global interconnectedness and overcoming global division
so prominent after 9/11. Focusing specifically on Ubuntu’s
relevance for business and management, Lutz (2009)
argues that Ubuntu is an ethic that can address the mis-
guided individualism at the root of most current theories of
business management.
While a focus on interdependence and harmonious
humane relationships has prima facie relevance amid a
global reality plagued by inequality, poverty and ideo-
logical and religious division, it is not clear how the
application of Ubuntu to, for instance, business manage-
ment would change business practice in a significant,
fundamental, meaningful or morally desirable way. On
the contrary, there is reason to believe that Ubuntu is not
up to this task. Doubt has been cast on the efficacy of
Ubuntu as a moral enterprise due to, for instance, its
primary political content. It has been suggested that even
asking the question ‘‘What is Ubuntu?’’ (or ‘‘What does
Ubuntu mean?’’) is already a political act, rather than an
ethico-philosophical investigation (Praeg 2014; Louw
2010). Defining Ubuntu is the paradoxical attempt to
assert the independence of an African identity through the
promotion of an ethics of interdependence (Louw 2010,
p. 1). It is the political nature of the question, as well as
its positioning amid the push and pull of local authenticity
and global participation, that contributes to difficulties in
defining Ubuntu, which in turn has led critics to claim
that it is too vague to be of any practical use (Praeg 2014,
p. 11; Lutz 2009). As Andrew West notes, ‘‘[the] prolif-
eration of values or virtues that can be associated with
Ubuntu, [has the] possible consequence that Ubuntu
comes to mean no more than what is good or virtuous’’
(2014, p. 52).
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For our purposes, the political overdetermination of the
concept of Ubuntu is only relevant to the extent that it
influences clarity. As mentioned, one of the problems with
Ubuntu is understanding exactly what its implications are
for moral decision-making, specifically in business. If
Ubuntu is merely the broad or vague appeal to affirm and
promote humane relationships, the business manager is left
with insufficient guidance to direct decision-making, frus-
trating any attempt to explicitly motivate a normative
decision. An example of this challenge is the question
which communal relationships one should prioritise when a
decision impacts on different relationships or communities.
As Van Niekerk explains (2013, p. 6):
[an] ambiguity stems from the question of what scale
of communal relations we are to privilege in situa-
tions where benefitting some communal relations
harms others: are we to prefer extant communities to
new ones; should we enrich family ahead of greater
society, or sacrifice benefits to family on behalf of
society; if persecuting a few would generate soli-
darity among the many, are we obliged to endorse
such persecution or to promote friendlier actions at
the risk of creating discord?
To demonstrate the moral significance and potential
contribution of Ubuntu for business practice would there-
fore require a clear understanding of the normative content
of Ubuntu. Put differently, Ubuntu would have to translate
into a principle for right action that allows a moral agent to
resolve dilemmas. The challenge, however, is that one
clear definition of what Ubuntu entails is not forthcoming.
Instead, we can speak of different interpretations of
Ubuntu. West (2014) suggests that one would have to talk
of, for instance, Shutte’s Ubuntu, Nussbaum’s Ubuntu or
Metz’s Ubuntu. Given the need for clarity amid a diversity
of interpretations, we have chosen to focus on and apply
Thaddeus Metz’s account of Ubuntu, primarily because he
attempts to systematise Ubuntu in terms of a principle of
right action. His analytically defended interpretation of
Ubuntu also arguably represents the most philosophically
sophisticated account to date. Moreover, Metz’s Ubuntu
principle entails many of the moral duties demanded by
Western ethical theories but also incorporates Ubuntu’s
distinct focus on promoting harmonious social relations,
premised on good-will and a shared identity amongst
people. This offers a new dimension to our ethical
thinking—one which is able to better explain a number
of moral duties that are more prevalent in Africa than in the
West. The moral value of social relations is often neglected
(or regarded as secondary) in Western philosophies, which
tend to be either individualist or holist. Metz thus argues
that this relational theory of moral status offers a new
perspective on ethical thinking.
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M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
Metz’s Principle of Ubuntu
The overarching aims of Metz’s Ubuntu project are two-
fold. Firstly, he attempts to analytically defend a principle
of Ubuntu that can be used to resolve concrete moral
dilemmas; secondly, he attempts to demonstrate that the
application of such a principle leads to different (and
sometimes superior) outcomes to those derived from
Western moral theories (particularly, those theories com-
prising the deontological and teleological traditions). In
this section, his methodology for deriving such a principle
of right action is briefly considered, before presenting (and
defending) his favourite account of such a principle. His
own applications of this principle to a number of practical
issues are also briefly considered in order to develop a
heuristic that follows from this principle and that can
arguably aid decision-making within the context of the
firm’s relations with those who affect the firm and/or are
affected by the firm.
Towards a Principle of Right Action
As a starting point, Metz (2007a) identifies two set of moral
judgements, namely: those that are uncontroversially
accepted in both Africa and the West and those that are
more widely-held in Africa than in the West. Those
judgements that are deemed ‘‘African’’ are identified on the
basis of anthropological and philosophical work on African
ethics (Metz 2007b). He defines the moral judgements that
are considered to be uncontroversially pro tanto2 immoral
by both Westerners and Africans as follows:
A. To kill innocent people for money.
B. To have sex with someone without their consent.
C. To deceive people, at least when not done in self- or
other-defence.
D. To steal… unnecessary goods.
E. To violate trust… for marginal personal gain.
F. To discriminate on a racial basis when allocating
opportunities (p. 324).
Those moral judgements that are more commonly accepted
by Africans3 as uncontroversially pro tanto immoral are:
G. To make policy decisions in the face of dissent, as
opposed to seeking consensus (p. 324).
2
See Farland (2007) for a critique of Metz’s attribution of pro tanto
wrongness to a number of these judgements, as well as Metz’s reply
in Metz (2007c).
3
Metz (2007a) excludes moral considerations based on the super-
natural. The reasons for this is that he wishes to develop a non-
religious moral theory, and the literature indicates that ‘‘many African
societies are best interpreted as believing moral norms to be logically
independent of supernaturalist theses’’ (p. 328).
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
H. To make retribution a fundamental central aim of
criminal justice, as opposed to seeking reconciliation
(p. 325).
I. To create wealth largely on a competitive basis, as
opposed to a cooperative one (p. 325).
J. To distribute wealth largely on the basis of individual
rights, as opposed to need (p. 326).
K. To ignore others and violate communal norms, as
opposed to acknowledging others, upholding tradition
and partaking in rituals.
L. To fail to marry and procreate, as opposed to creating a
family.
Metz (2007b) describes these moral judgements as ten-
dencies, rather than essences, thereby side-stepping ‘‘the
sins of ‘essentialism’ and ‘homogenisation’’’ (p. 333), of
which Ramose (2007) accuses him. Metz (2007b) notes
that while his enterprise is not descriptive, it is also not
normative in that he does not endeavour to determine
whether these tendencies are sound. Rather, his project
constitutes ‘‘the more narrow, epistemological task of
ascertaining which principle best accounts for, among
others, intuitions that are more common in Africa than in
the West’’ (334).
Having established both the six universal moral judge-
ments, and the six moral judgements that are more com-
mon amongst adherents of Ubuntu, Metz (2007a) proceeds
to determine to what extent six popular, yet competing,
interpretations of Ubuntu can accommodate the moral
judgements stipulated above. The criteria against which
Metz (2007b) measures these competing principles of
Ubuntu are entailment (i.e. the more particular moral duties
the principle entails, the more justified it is) and the ability
to explain why these duties obtain. In this vein, Metz
(2007a: pp. 328–334) endeavours to develop an integrating
principle that approximates a more precise, unified, and
complete theory of Ubuntu.
The first four formulations of Ubuntu (U1-U4) that Metz
considers seek to ground morality in something internal to
the individual ‘‘whether it be her life (U1), well-being
(U2), rights (U3), or self-realization (U4)’’ (p. 333). He
rejects these interpretations, arguing that the focus on the
individual does not capture the core of Ubuntu, which is to
ground morality in the relationship between one entity and
another. In another context, Metz (2016, p. 174) defines a
relational theory as one that ‘‘implies that something war-
rants moral consideration only if (and because) it can or
does exhibit certain attitudes towards, or have a causal
effect on, another being’’. In other words, ‘‘[i]t is an indi-
vidual’s extrinsic properties that count’’ (p. 174). The last
two formulations of Ubuntu (U5 and U6) emphasise this
relational account and thus resonate better with the broad
‘‘Afro-communitarian’’ (Metz 2016) orientation of Ubuntu,
33
which stands in contrast to western individualism. Of the
two formulations, Metz prefers U6, which provides us with
a broader conception of Ubuntu than U5, and which reads
as follows: An action is right just insofar as it produces
harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent
that it fails to develop community (p. 334).
Metz argues that the strength of this account, which is
advocated by the Archbishop Desmond Tutu, is that it
‘‘posits certain relationships as constitutive of the good that
a moral agent ought to promote’’ (p. 334). Metz is of the
opinion that this account has the potential to entail all
twelve intuitions, but in order to serve as a principle of
right action it needs to be more specific. He attempts to
refine this principle by focusing on harmony as the means
by which to foster relationships that are constitutive of the
good.
Harmony as Basis for a Principle of Right Action
Tutu (1999, p. 35) argues in favour of understanding
Ubuntu in terms of harmony, in writing that:
Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods.
Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the
greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines
this sought-after good is to be avoided like the pla-
gue. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even suc-
cess through aggressive competitiveness, are
corrosive of this good.
Metz (2007a) accepts Tutu’s argument, but poses the question
of how we are to understand harmony. In this regard, he
explores three conceptions. The first understanding of
harmony (H1) is in terms of shared identity, which constitutes
a distinct relational theme (Metz 2016). Harmony, under this
interpretation, implies ‘‘a common sense of self’’ (Metz
2007a, p. 335) and presupposes ‘‘certain psychological
attitudes of ‘we-ness’ [i.e. to refer to oneself in terms of
‘we’, as well as to feel pride or shame for the actions of others]
and cooperative behaviour’’ (Metz 2016, p. 177).
A second way in which to develop the notion of har-
mony (H2) is in terms of a caring or supportive relation-
ship, i.e. a relationship that fosters good-will, which
constitutes a second relational theme (Metz 2007a; 2016).
As with a shared sense of identity, good-will seems to be an
important component of harmonious interpersonal rela-
tions, in that it concerns attitudes that are ‘‘positively ori-
entated towards the other’s good and include an empathetic
awareness of the other’s condition and a sympathetic
emotional reaction to this awareness’’ (Metz 2016, p. 177).
Metz (2007a: p. 336), however, notes that ‘‘[g]ood-will
and shared identity are logically distinct types of rela-
tions’’. There can be cases of shared identity without good-
will and—conversely—there can be cases of good-will
123
34
without shared identity. As such, Metz enriches and
extends U6 by offering an account of harmonious inter-
personal relations (H3) that combine a shared sense of
identity and good-will. Together, these two components
characterise harmony as love or friendship. Friendship
implies that we should ‘‘honour relationships in which
people share a way of life and care for others’ quality of
life’’ (Metz, 2010, p. 51; italicised in original).
On the basis of this conception of harmonious inter-
personal relations or relations of friendship, Metz (2016,
p. 178) offers the following Ubuntu principle of right
action:4
An act is right if it prizes other persons in virtue of
their natural capacity to relate harmoniously; other-
wise, an act is wrong, and especially insofar as it
prizes discordance. An agent must honour those who
can by nature be party to relationships of identity and
solidarity, and she ought above all to avoid honouring
relationships of division and ill-will.
Metz (2007a) shows that this principle is capable of
entailing all twelve intuitions (see pp. 338–339) and is
also an attractive alternative to individualism and holism.
As an alternative to Western forms of individualism, Metz
argues that the prescription to honour others is essentially
deontological and can thus ground human rights (unlike
teleological accounts such as utilitarianism). However, the
motivation for human rights is not grounded in reason and
autonomy (as in a Kantian account), but is rather
premised on ‘‘another person’s ability to relate harmo-
niously’’ (Metz 2016, 179). As an alternative to Western
forms of holism, Metz (2007a) argues that the relational
account of moral status is less relativistic than commu-
nitarian conceptions that view the norms of a particular
community as binding, and it is more impartial than the
views of certain care ethicists that ground moral status in
existing relationships (and reciprocal interaction). In the
Ubuntu account, a relational theory implies that an entity
can be deserving of moral consideration for reasons other
than membership to a certain group (Metz 2016), those
being the entity’s ability to identify with others and to
exhibit solidarity.
Metz (2010, p. 57) argues that the more a being is
capable of a harmonious interpersonal relationship, the
greater its moral status. A primary attraction of a relational
account of moral status is, therefore, that it allows for
different degrees of moral status (Metz 2010; 2012). To
ground moral status in respect or well-being (as is common
in the western tradition) only allows for all or nothing
4 ing. In the last section, these principles will be applied to
Note that the formulation of Metz’s principle of right action that is
offered here constitutes a reworking of the original formulation
provided in Metz (2007a: p. 338).
123
M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
judgements, in that either the being in question has moral
status, or it does not. Here, moral status is contingent on
being capable of pain or preferences (utilitarianism) or
having the capability to act rationally (Kantianism).
However, if—following Metz’s Ubuntu account—we
ground moral status in an entity’s ‘‘capabil[ity] of being
part of a communal relationship of a certain kind’’ (Metz
2012, p. 393), then a differential account of moral status
becomes possible in that an entity can be ascribed either
full or partial moral status. The moral status of an entity is
contingent on whether it is capable of being both the
subject and object of a loving relationship, or whether it is
only capable of being the object of a loving relationship.
Whereas being ‘able to be a subject of a harmonious
relationship means having the capacity to identify with
others and to exhibit solidarity with them oneself,… being
able to be an object means having the capacity to be
identified with and to benefit from another’s solidarity’
(Metz 2016, p. 57). Metz (2012, p. 394) states that ‘‘large…
differences in degrees of ability to be either a subject or an
object of a communal relationship constitute differences in
moral status’’. Metz argues that this relational conception
of moral status can, for example, explain why a newborn
has higher moral status than a foetus, despite the fact that
there may be no intrinsic differences between these beings.
In this account, newborns have a greater capacity to be the
object of shared identity and good-will than foetuses, who
are, ‘‘by their nature, cloistered in such a way as to make
communal relationship with them much more difficult’’ (p.
399). Metz also argues that this account has compelling
explanatory value for questions concerning the moral status
of animals.
The value of Metz’s account of Ubuntu is, however,
not restricted to questions concerning the moral status and
treatment of animals. Indeed, Metz has convincingly
argued for the explanatory appeal of the Ubuntu principle
of right action across a range of topics, including medical
practice (especially as concerns treatment, consent, and
ancillary care obligations), moral development, public
governance, and social justice. Space does not permit us
to summarise his arguments here. What is, however,
significant for the purpose of this research is that certain
common heuristic guidelines emerge from his treatment
of the above subjects. It is our belief that that these
guidelines can also serve as a convincing alternative
framework to stakeholder theory in determining in whose
interests the organisation should be managed. For this
reason, we briefly contextualise and motivate these
heuristic guidelines, before attempting to formulate them
into principles for guiding organisational decision-mak-
a number of questions.
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
Developing an Ubuntu Heuristic to Guide
Organisational Decision-Making
One of the most striking features of applying Metz’s
Ubuntu principle is that it overcomes the strict impartialism
that defines (most) forms of western moral philosophy.
Since Ubuntu is a relational theory, it stands to reason that
the nature of specific relationships is also qualitatively
important. Indeed, Metz (2010) notes that common maxims
of African morality are that ‘‘family comes first’’ and that
‘‘charity begins at home’’. Existing blood ties therefore
take precedence over other relationships. Metz (2017;
2010) reconstructs and extends these maxims in terms of
the idea that the claims of those who are already in a
communal relationship with an agent principally trump the
claims of others with whom the agent does not have a
relationship or whom she is in a position to influence. This
is because in entering a relationship, one identifies with a
specific party and must thus show solidarity towards this
party. It also stands to reason that the deeper the relation-
ship between two parties, the greater the obligation to aid
(Metz 2016), where ‘‘deepness’’ is determined by both
intimacy (i.e. the extent of communion) and duration (i.e.
the historical configuration of communion) (Metz and Gaie
2010). Furthermore, the nature of a given claim also
influences an agent’s duty to meet the claim. A given
claimant may have trivial, moderate, and urgent interests,
and it can reasonably be expected of an agent to sacrifice
her trivial (or even moderate) interests in order to meet the
urgent interests of the claimant in order to honour their
communion. Metz (2017) is, however, careful to point out
that honouring communion is not the same as maximising
it. ‘‘Instead’’ he writes, ‘‘honouring the capacity to com-
mune means giving all of one’s extant relationships their
due…. It also means protecting one’s capacity to com-
mune’’ (p. 12). Metz (2010) also notes that the duties that
we owe others are further constrained by the nature of the
relationship that we have with another party, i.e. by that
which is shared between us.
In the context of medical care, for example, the above
means that a patient who is already in treatment is entitled
to continued treatment, relative to someone who has not
received any treatment; and, the deeper the relationship
between a medical practitioner and a patient, the more is
owed to the patient. Furthermore, a medical practitioner’s
duties to a patient are partly determined by the urgency of
the patient’s needs. However, the non-contractual duties
owed to the patient cannot tax the medical practitioner to
the extent that she cannot honour her commitments to other
parties (such as, for example, her family), and nor should
these duties extend beyond the shared experience with the
patient (i.e. the medical practitioner would not be obliged
35
to aid the patient with paying school fees, for example, as
this falls beyond the sphere of their shared identity). Hence,
the maxim ‘‘family first’’ can cash out in such a way as to
help medical practitioners determine whom to treat, and
can help to determine the scope of the treatment. Metz
(2010, p. 56), however, notes that this rough maxim is
‘‘limited by institutional concerns and restrictions on
advancing the good of harmony by means of the bad of
discord’’.
This restriction is well illustrated in his essay on public
governance, wherein he argues that a strongly partial state
(i.e. one that favours nepotism) cannot be justified for the
reason that it does not produce harmony and thus does not
serve the common good (Metz 2009, p. 346). The duty to
serve the common good is justified on the basis that, in
principle, ‘‘all human beings are deemed part of a family
who provide some reason to be responded to out of love’’
(Metz and Gaie 2010, p. 284). Unlike the standard care
ethic, the duty to respond out of love is also not restricted
by whether the other party is capable of responding or
reciprocating positively; indeed (and as previously argued
at the hand of Ubuntu’s implications for animals) less
stringent duties also apply to those who are only capable of
being the objects of loving relationships. Given the
emphasis on respect for an entity’s capacity for being the
subject or object of a loving relationship, it follows that the
overriding principle governing relations between parties
should be that ‘‘friendly relationships should not be pro-
moted by unfriendly means’’ (Metz 2009, p. 346). How-
ever, even in the context of public governance, Metz
(2009) argues that partialism would, to some degree, be
justified according to Ubuntu. In line with this, he argues
that ‘‘according to African ethics, people such as veterans
and victims of state injustices may, in principle, be given
some degree of preference in the awarding of government
jobs and contracts’’ (p. 348), if only for the fact that
friendly relations demand that we show gratitude or
repentance to those who have worked for the benefit of
others or who have been subject to discordant relations
with others.
The fruitful implications that the relational ethic of
Ubuntu holds for practical decision-making can also be
extended to the firm and—we contend—can provide a
good basis for determining the levels and limits of a firm’s
duties towards different relationholders. In order to make
this argument, we firstly summarise the above implications
in terms of a decision-making heuristic, which reads as
follows:
The firm has a duty to foster harmonious interpersonal
relations with (potential) parties who have the capacity to:
a. Identify with, and show solidarity towards, the firm;
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36
b. Be identified with, and to benefit from, the firm’s
solidarity.
Conversely, the firm has a duty to avoid sowing divi-
sion, ill-will, and discordance with (potential) parties.
Where harmonious interpersonal relations are fostered
via friendly means, and in the event that the needs and
interests of parties conflict, precedence should be afforded
to the needs and interests of those with whom the firm has:
a. Close relationships (intimacy);
b. Historical relationships (duration, configuration).
The levels and limits of the firm’s obligations are sub-
ject to:
a. Satisfying those needs that fall within the scope of the
shared relationship;
b. Balancing the urgency of the needs of the parties
(relative to the ability of the firm to meet these needs).
Note that this decision-making heuristic can be used to
overcome the problems arising from Freeman’s stakeholder
model, which—to recall—is premised on the assumption
that the firm enters into free, consensual, contractual rela-
tions with stakeholders with the aim of creating value for
all. We previously argued that a shortcoming of this model
is that it assumes that all stakeholders are capable of
entering into contractual relations, which we contend is an
assumption that simply covers over the issues of power,
legitimacy, and urgency. These are issues that cannot be
sufficiently addressed within a contractual framework, and
yet they are critical to determining how stakes are defined
in practice. This shortcoming of contracts is also succinctly
summarised by Baier (1986, p. 241) as follows:
the more we ignore dependency relations between
those grossly unequal in power and ignore what cannot
be spelled out in explicit acknowledgement, the more
readily will we assume that everything that needs to be
understood about trust and trustworthiness can be
grasped by looking at the morality of contract.
Freeman’s definition of stakeholders is one of the broadest
in the literature in that the notions of stake and stakeholder
can be extended to include basically anybody or any entity
that has a claim on the organisation (Mitchell et al. 1997).
Although this inclusive definition is attractive, it is—
following Baier—not clear that all stakeholder relation-
ships can be underwritten by voluntary contractual obliga-
tions. While relationships with shareholders can easily be
stipulated in contractual terms, it is less clear that the firm’s
relationship with the community, for example, can also be
sufficiently captured in contractual language. On the
libertarian stakeholder view, different parties’ interests
are dependent on the power and influence that these parties
123
M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
can exert on the organisation due to the strength of the
contractual underpinnings of their claims or stakes. In the
case of the community, these contractual underpinnings
(often referred to in terms of an implicit social contract
whereby society gives business the so-called license to
operate) are weak.
The above Ubuntu heuristic can rectify this shortcom-
ing, or blind spot, by framing the firm’s relations with
others who affect, or are affected by, the firm in terms of an
a priori moral obligation to foster harmonious, trusting
relations via friendly means. On the Ubuntu view, the
emphasis is on the relation between the firm and a given
party, rather than on the stakes of the firm and a contracting
party. It therefore stands to reason that the firm’s decision-
making should be centred on promoting a harmonious
relation with a given relationholder, rather than on pri-
marily ensuring that claims or stakes are met. This shift in
emphasis helps to mitigate the problem of power, insofar as
it would be unethical from an Ubuntu perspective to strive
to carry out the firm’s individual interests, despite stake-
holder resistance.
The Ubuntu heuristic is also a valuable decision-making
tool for addressing issues of legitimacy (i.e. who is
recognised within the contracting process) and urgency
(i.e. whose interests are deemed time sensitive and/or
critical). This is true insofar as the heuristic provides a
clear guideline for prioritising the interests of relation-
holders according to both the nature of their relations with
the firm (defined in terms of intimacy, duration, and con-
figuration) and the urgency of the claims (defined in terms
of the needs of a given party relative to the needs of other
parties, as well as the scope of the shared relationship) that
are relevant within the context of this relation. Note that
even disenfranchised relationholders (or relationholders,
such as animals, who cannot articulate their claims, but
who have partial moral status) may achieve salience with
the firm in the light of the nature and urgency of their
interests. This is because the firm has the moral obligation
to give all relationholders their due, as opposed to
responding to the claims of stakeholders who are capable
of contributing to the value creation of the firm (as per the
stakeholder perspective).
In the case of the firm’s duties towards the communities
in which it operates, the heuristic can be applied to make
the argument that a given firm has a strong duty to help the
communities in which it is embedded due to the intimacy
and/or duration of the relationship. This duty exist even
though the firm may never have committed to helping the
particular communities in which it is based, and even
though these communities may not be amongst the worst
off in the world. As such, the Ubuntu heuristic can also
provide a normative justification for the concept of
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
corporate citizenship, which is the view that firms (like
natural citizens) have duties and responsibilities towards
the societies in which they operate and that these duties and
responsibilities exceed legal requirements.
Having provided a theoretical defence for an Ubuntu
relationholder theory, we now turn to the final section of
the paper, in which we attempt to illustrate some of the
practical outcomes that this theory holds for organisational
decision-making.
Relationholder Theory in Practice
Various aspects of business could be analysed through the
lens of Ubuntu. If Ubuntu means that a sense of human
interconnectedness must spark empathy, charity, inclusiv-
ity and a concern for the common good, then the morality
of an enterprise as such could be assessed according to the
extent to which the products and services provided by the
firm develop community, serve the common good and/or
affirm the humanity of others. Ubuntu could also inform
leadership theory and motivate an alternative leadership
aspiration for business. Alternatively, one could posit that
the firm is a community rather of a nexus of contracts.
Once a firm is viewed as a community, inclusivity and
participation becomes paramount. One could also deter-
mine whether a business demonstrates Ubuntu from the
way it treats its employees, or the extent to which it con-
tributes to (or is responsive to) community. Finally, Ubuntu
could be applied to an economic system as a whole,
judging to what extent human dignity is promoted and
solidarity achieved through the way a society or system
distributes its resources.
Many of these themes have already been addressed in
Ubuntu literature. Khoza (2006) and Costa Ayiotis (2008)
provide the outlines of an Ubuntu-informed leadership the-
ory that emphasises participation, servant leadership, and
meaningful work as important considerations for CEOs in
business. Lutz (2009) argues that the firm is a community,
with the implication that the common good should be pur-
sued, instead of the interests of particular individual groups
(for instance shareholders). Based on purported instantia-
tions of Ubuntu, Nussbaum (2003) develops a set of prin-
ciples that can govern how a firm makes decisions and treats
those it interacts with, including responsiveness to the
community and processes that foster common understanding
and harmony. She also suggests that Ubuntu should inspire
the sharing of wealth created through corporate activity.
While this article also aims to demonstrate the moral
significance of applying Ubuntu to business ethics and
organisational decision-making, the approach is somewhat
different. While proposing what Ubuntu-based manage-
ment or employee relations would look like, we apply an
37
analytically more detailed or sophisticated Ubuntu heuris-
tic, derived from the work of Thaddeus Metz, with the
purpose of removing some of the moral ambiguity asso-
ciated with current theories of Ubuntu business ethics, and
simultaneously demonstrate how an Ubuntu approach can
overcome some of the shortcomings of libertarian stake-
holder theory. Space does not allow us to address all the
relations a firm holds, and we will therefore focus on
arguably the most intimate of corporate or organisational
relations, i.e. between the firm and its employees. The
relationship between a firm and its employees is not simple
and includes a variety of practices and routines (from
recruitment and contracting to goal setting and perfor-
mance appraisal). In this section, we will focus specifically
on the implications of an Ubuntu-inspired relationholder
theory on practices of leadership, on decision-making in
businesses, and on the controversial issues of ownership,
profit sharing, termination and retrenchment within a
business.
Ubuntu Compatible Leadership and Decision-
Making
Given the communitarian nature of the Ubuntu ethic,
leadership in an Ubuntu-inspired business would have as its
aim not (primarily) the achievement of certain business or
financial goals (production increases, profit targets, or an
increase in share-earning), but would manage the business
in a way that contributes towards the common good while
promoting certain types of relationships, specifically har-
monious relationships based on shared identity and good-
will. One of these relationships is with employees.
The above leadership aim has the immediate implication
that the community as relationholder is acknowledged and
included in strategic decision-making. While ‘‘the com-
munity’’ does not stand in a contractual relationship with a
firm, the firm’s leadership would take into consideration
the urgent needs of the community in which it operates. For
instance, if different sites are suitable for building a fac-
tory, or opening a branch of a business, cost might be
weighed up against the need for employment opportunities
in the area. Of course the choice would still have to make
financial sense and should not threaten the sustainability of
the business (and thereby the livelihoods of those already
holding a relation with the firm), but the less prof-
itable choice that promises to better develop community
would be the morally preferable choice.
A second implication is that employees would partici-
pate in strategic decision-making. The strategic direction of
the firm would not be determined by a leader who then uses
labour (‘‘human resources’’ or ‘‘human capital’’) as a
means for delivering on the strategy. Employees as ‘‘inti-
mate’’ relationholders would proactively shape the strategy
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38
of the organisation (Khoza 2006). Put differently, the
strategy would be decided through a democratic, partici-
pative and collaborative process, and would be the result of
a consensus (African moral judgement G). The idea of
consensus, a central value within an Ubuntu approach, does
not require complete agreement, but instead a process
where all views are aired and minority opinions incorpo-
rated as far as possible. This is what Khoza proposes with
the concept of ‘‘sufficient consensus’’ (p. 81). Ways of
achieving collaborative or inclusive decision-making that
involve employees include group discussion and forums,
opportunities for employees to pose questions to manage-
ment, and decentralised decision-making power. As Ayi-
otis suggests, ‘‘decision-making authority would be
distributed throughout the firm to lower level leaders or
employees. This would promote greater interaction or
contact between people, improve relationships and in turn
stimulate creative idea generation’’ (p. 20).
Including employees in strategy setting and decision-
making not only fulfils the Ubuntu-based moral intuition
that policy decisions should be a matter of consensus (G),
but also the obligation to acknowledge others (K). More-
over, the inclusion of employees in deciding the strategy of
the organisation honours their capacity to commune—
participation in the determination of strategy promotes a
shared identity within the organisation and demonstrates
good-will towards employees.
This is a different picture from our existing understanding
of effective leadership in business. While few would dispute
that leaders need to foster good relationships, these rela-
tionships are normally understood as strategic or instru-
mental—a leader needs to maintain good relationships in
order to achieve other business or profit-related objectives.
The concept of leadership suggests, after all, a relationship
of influence between leader and those who are led. A leader
effects change and drives people in a coordinated fashion
towards a common goal. As Ciulla (2004, p. 306) notes:
All of these definitions [of leadership] generally say
the same thing—leadership is about a person or
persons somehow moving other people to do some-
thing. Where the definitions differ is in how leaders
motivate their followers, their relationship to fol-
lowers, who has a say in the goals of the group or
organization, and what abilities the leader needs to
have to get things done.
In most businesses, the leadership or executive committee
(EXCO) decides on the strategic direction the business
should take and sets performance goals and targets to
deliver on this strategy. The EXCO may also decide on the
core values of the organisation, with different degrees of
participation from employees. These decisions are then
communicated to employees, who typically have limited
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M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
input (Ayiotis 2008). For example, in South Africa, we see
that even amid the contemporary focus on stakeholder
engagement and inclusivity driven by the King IV Report
on Governance (2016) and the Integrated Reporting
initiative, strategy and goal setting is still largely regarded
as an executive function, which is also why the success or
failure of a firm is often (perhaps fallaciously) attributed to
executives, who are praised and rewarded accordingly.
In line with the above business modus operandi, lead-
ership is associated with vision, power, and influence. Our
most admired business leaders possess a quality vaguely
labelled ‘‘charisma’’. Through the fascination and emo-
tional loyalty they elicit in followers, leaders are able to
influence employees in a way that promotes the achieve-
ment of business success. Alternatively, in organisations
with less charismatic leaders, a leader may influence
employees towards the established vision through ‘‘trans-
action’’—an employee ‘‘earns’’ rewards (increases or
bonuses) through the achievement of certain performance
targets. An Ubuntu compatible leadership would differ
from the picture of business leadership provided above in
terms of both strategy setting and mode of influence.
The leader within a business grounded in Ubuntu is
therefore not a charismatic or transactional visionary
leading employees to achieve predetermined business
goals. Instead, the leader is a ‘‘servant’’ who facilitates a
process through which goals are decided through active
participation by employees. When strategy or goals are
collectively agreed upon, the division (or discord) between
management and employees is reduced and leadership
practically demonstrates a concern with the interests of
employees and the meaningfulness of their work. A leader
influences or moves employees through their own partici-
pation, i.e. by co-ownership of goals that all can buy into
(K). Accordingly, Ubuntu-based leadership is sometimes
referred to as ‘‘servant leadership’’ (Khoza 2006).
There are resemblances between this kind of leadership
and the leadership suggested in libertarian stakeholder the-
ory. According to libertarian stakeholder theory, the firm is
not solely managed in the interests of shareholders, but
should be managed to the benefit of all who ‘‘have a stake in
or a claim on’’ the firm (Freeman 2002, p. 39). Therefore, as
with Ubuntu the role of a firm’s leadership is not only to
increase profit (for shareholders) but to attend to all the
relationships that make up the firm, and to keep the interests
of these stakeholders in balance. Stakeholders have ‘‘a right
not to be treated as a means to some end, and therefore must
partake in determining the future direction of the firm in
which they have a stake’’ (p. 39). Both approaches therefore
recommend an inclusive approach to achieve shared value.
Libertarian stakeholder theory also emphasises the
importance of the purpose of a firm. An executive must
‘‘find a purpose that speaks to the hearts and minds of key
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
stakeholders’’ (Freeman et al. 2007, p. 55). The purpose of
the firm makes clear the value that will be created for all
stakeholders, and motivates and inspires employees. To
‘‘find’’ this purpose requires engagement with stakeholders
in the form of ‘‘intensive communication and dialogue
through multiple methods with customers, suppliers,
employees and shareholders’’ (p. 56).
Inclusion and engagement in a libertarian stakeholder
context is morally justified because of stakeholder power
and because of the value of freedom. Managers are justified
in concerning themselves with specific stakeholder groups,
including employees, based on the potential power they
have over the firm. Freeman et al. (2007, p. 59) refer to this
as ‘‘managerial legitimacy’’: ‘‘…if a group has some power
to affect the company, then it is legitimate to spend man-
agerial time worrying about that group’’. But inclusion is
also based on the value of freedom. According to Freeman
et al. (p. 56), ‘‘dialogue is the foundation of a free society’’
and ‘‘real business is built on a foundation of solid, honest
and open communication’’. Business leaders must therefore
be guided by the goals of freedom and voluntary agree-
ment. These values underlie both capitalism and managing
for stakeholders. Leadership within this context therefore
entails ‘‘creat[ing] situations whereby followers can engage
in a genuine choice to follow them’’ (p. 139).
Ubuntu and libertarian stakeholder theory therefore
seem on par regarding leadership and decision-making.
Leaders must engage with, and include, employees to
decide on the strategic direction of the firm. There are,
however, differences between the role of leadership as
envisioned by Ubuntu versus libertarian stakeholder the-
ory. First, from an Ubuntu perspective employees are
included in the determination of strategy because this type
of harmonious relationship is itself a moral good, in order
to acknowledge those that make up the firm, and to create a
shared identity. Involving employees in the overall strategy
of the organisation is also a recognition of the intimacy of
the relation. Employees represent the most intimate of
relationholders, as the organisation is hard to distinguish
from its employees. As a result of this intimacy, the rela-
tionship with employees is prone to conflicts and dishar-
mony. Hence the increased moral duty to include the
employee relationholder in decision-making. Because
employees are those relationholders that execute the
strategy, their involvement in strategic decision-making
should also take precedence over the involvement of, for
instance, shareholders or suppliers.5
5
This does not mean that other relationholders, for instance
investors, would not be engaged when strategy is formulated;
however, the mode of interaction would be aligned to the intimacy
of the relation—discussions could be held with shareholders while
employees are engaged through employee fora and strategy
workshops.
39
From a libertarian perspective, on the other hand,
employees have ‘‘earned’’ a say based either on their stake
or on their contractual relationship with the firm. Freeman
(2002) suggests that because employees have their jobs and
their livelihood at stake, and because they offer their labour
and specialised skills, they may claim or expect, among
other things, ‘‘security, wages, benefits, and meaningful
work’’ (p. 42). To engage employees also means to adhere
to the moral obligation of voluntary agreement, which
holds practical benefits in the form of a more motivated
workforce who shares the firm’s purpose.
This difference in focus or motivation—harmony in
Ubuntu; freedom in libertarian stakeholder theory—im-
pacts the mode of influence. A libertarian stakeholder
theory provides for employee participation in decision-
making specifically when ‘‘they are used as a means to an
end’’. Employees are also expected to extend their loyalty
to the firm and to ‘‘follow the instructions of management
most of the time’’ (p. 42). It would therefore seem that
employee participation in a libertarian stakeholder context
is only compulsory in certain situations. The division
between management and employees is therefore main-
tained to the extent that leaders do not need to engage, but
could convince or persuade. It would be possible in a lib-
ertarian context for leaders to formulate a purpose, identify
values, and make decisions that take cognisance of
employee interests without including employees in these
decisions. In a sense, libertarian stakeholder theory is
compatible with charismatic leadership. If leaders or
management could determine a strategic direction and win
employees over to this direction (have employees agree
voluntarily), demonstrating how it serves their interests,
they have still succeeded in ‘‘managing for stakeholders’’.
From an Ubuntu perspective, however, such an approach
fails because harmonious communal relationships entail
collaboration (G) and participation (K), and because the
employee relationship has become an instrumental rela-
tionship, albeit effective. Put differently, such an approach
would satisfy the criterion of ‘‘good-will’’, but not neces-
sarily the criterion of ‘‘shared identity’’.
Profit Sharing and Employee Ownership
Apart from collaborative decision-making that recognises
the employee as relationholder and promotes shared iden-
tity and good-will, an Ubuntu-based approach also implies
structural changes to how businesses are generally run, for
instance relating to profit distribution and employee own-
ership (J and I).
Profit sharing and share ownership with employees
accord well with an Ubuntu approach. Co-ownership
would promote solidarity and a sense of shared identity and
profit sharing could solidify common goals and enhance
123
40
collaboration while removing one of the factors that cause
division or tension within a firm. Such measures could also
have a wider effect by addressing the structural inequalities
entrenched in the wider society, thereby achieving a better
sense of community beyond the limits of the firm (Ayiotis
2008, p. 38).
While variations on the above are already present in
some businesses, they are far from the norm and would
doubtlessly cause controversy. Typically, employees earn a
salary and performance-related bonuses or incentives. As
Ayiotis notes, profit sharing and share ownership are
reserved for EXCO, board members, directors, and share-
holders. From a libertarian perspective, extending such
measures is unnecessary and could even be risky. They are
unnecessary because employees have no claim to them.
Employee loyalty, skills, and labour only afford them a
claim on a salary, benefits, and meaningful work. More-
over, employees have freely and contractually agreed to
these terms. Profit sharing and share ownership is also risky
because it threatens the balance between the interests of
different stakeholders. Distributing profit and increasing
share ownership may alienate shareholders who seek
investment where share earnings would be higher. Thus,
while these measures may promote community within the
organisation, it may also upset relationships with owners
and consequently threaten the health of the corporation.
Of course the above initiatives are not incompatible with
a libertarian stakeholder theory. It is possible for share-
holders to be convinced of the benefits of such measures,
for instance ‘‘having a stable, motivated and committed
workforce that is not plagued by low morale, labour mili-
tancy, low productivity, high absenteeism levels and fre-
quent staff turnover or losses’’ (p. 39). Libertarian
stakeholder theory also admits to the psychological com-
plexity of stakeholders, including the possibility that
shareholders are not only motivated by returns, but that
their decisions are motivated by self-interest and the
interests of others (Freeman et al. 2007). However, as
opposed to the Ubuntu approach, there is no moral obli-
gation to acknowledge employees or create harmony in this
way, but only a potential instrumental motivation.
While co-ownership and profit sharing could promote
harmonious interpersonal relationships with employees, the
question is whether the nature of the relationship with
employees entails these practices. Much like the medical
practitioner is not obliged to pay the school fees of a
patient, one could argue that the nature of the relationship
between firm and employee does not require employee
share ownership or profit sharing.
Based on our Ubuntu heuristic, however, there are at
least two additional motivations for deciding in favour of
employee ownership and profit sharing. The first motiva-
tion is the nature or intimacy of the relationship between
123
M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
the firm and its employees. Of all relationholders,
employees spend the most time in the organisation and are
most closely involved in the activities and operations
thereof. Employees have intimate knowledge of the
organisation and are most likely to be able to impact its
nature and functioning. While shareholders, for instance,
have only invested their money and stand at a distance
from the firm, employees invest their time, bodies, and
skills. Moreover, employees are most closely connected to
the process of value creation—it is their efforts that create
the products, services and relationships that earn the
company a profit. Sharing in the profit made and partially
owning the company is therefore hardly analogous to the
medical practitioner paying the school fees of a patient.
The second motivation relates to the urgency of needs.
Based on the idea of marginal utility, one generally expects
that the (potential) additional income gained by an
employee through ownership and profit sharing has more
utility (addresses more pressing needs) than the growth
achieved by investors or the bonuses received by
executives.6
Finally, share ownership and profit sharing better
address the challenge of power associated with the con-
tractual relationship between employees and the firm. The
person seeking employment, or negotiating a salary
increase, is often not in a position to achieve his or her
ideal terms. Especially in conditions of high unemploy-
ment, the job applicant or existing employee must ‘‘take
what they can get’’, while the potential employer fre-
quently has many candidates to choose from. A focus on
the nature of the employee as relationholder and the
urgency of their need could better protect against unfair
treatment of employees in favour of the interest of more
distant investors.
Termination and Retrenchment
While profit and ownership represent the potential upside
of participation in corporations, there are also challenging
downsides, including the practices of termination and
retrenchment. These practices are unfortunate realities
within firms. When an employee consistently underper-
forms or is guilty of serious or repeated transgressions,
their employment is likely to be terminated. When eco-
nomic conditions change and the financial performance of
a firm suffers dramatically, management may resort to the
drastic measure of ‘‘cutting the payroll’’, layoffs, or making
6
An additional implication is that the duration of the relationship
could also impact the benefit. An employee that has been with the
firm longer (developing a stronger shared identity and cementing
solidarity), would therefore be allowed more shares or a larger part of
the profit. However, this would have to be weighed up against the
needs of other employees as well as the good of the firm as a whole.
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
a number of employees redundant in order to free the firm
of the expense associated with their salaries.
From a libertarian stakeholder perspective, these prac-
tices would be unfortunate, but they can be justified as an
instrumental requirement which violates no moral obliga-
tion. The practice of termination is less contentious. An
employee who underperforms has less of a stake in the
business, and consequently less of a claim on the business.
Their underperformance may even threaten the health of
the firm and the balance between stakeholder relationships.
It could be argued, for instance, that their termination is in
the interest of other employees who have to compensate for
their lack of performance. Serious legal or ethical trans-
gressions also threaten the health of the firm and justify
termination. Finally, underperformance or misconduct
would also represent breach of the contract an employee
freely consented to.
Regarding restructuring or retrenchment, management
operating on the basis of libertarian stakeholder theory
would aim to avoid such drastic measures, but could justify
them if it became necessary to protect the firm or to bal-
ance the interests of other stakeholders, including share-
holders, remaining employees, creditors, or suppliers.
Management would avoid such measures, however, on the
basis that employees can expect, due to their stake that the
corporation will ‘‘provide for them and carry them through
difficult times’’ (Freeman 2002, p. 42). From a libertarian
perspective, such measures are only justifiable when the
purpose is to protect the firm, and could not be defended
solely on the basis of shareholder expectations or as a
measure to increase profits through, for instance, out-
sourcing. These reasons would violate the stakeholder
principle that primacy is not given to one stakeholder group
over another, and neglect the belief, central to stakeholder
theory, that ‘‘stakeholder interests go together over time’’
(Freeman et al. 2007, p. 52).
From an Ubuntu perspective, termination and restruc-
turing seem radically opposed to the goal of promoting
harmonious relationships based on shared identity and
good-will. In fact, these practices achieve the opposite—it
sparks dissent, severs relationships, ends a shared identity,
and ostensibly demonstrates a lack of good-will. Termi-
nation would appear to be a failure to reconcile (H), while
restructuring represents the distribution of wealth in terms
of individual rights or interests, instead of need (J). It
follows, therefore, that an Ubuntu-inspired manager would
approach the underperformance of both the individual
employee, and the corporation as a whole, differently.
When an employee underperforms, the Ubuntu-inspired
manager would aim, firstly, at reconciliation (H). He/she
would honour the employee’s capacity to commune by
allowing them the opportunity to demonstrate shared
identity and good-will towards the firm. In addressing
41
issues of performance, the goal is not merely to correct
employee performance in aid of profit and through strict
disciplinary measures. Instead, in line with the prioritisa-
tion of people and relationships, and against the back-
ground of an attempt to provide meaningful work, the
manager would focus on ways to create ‘‘conditions of
group loyalty and unity’’, and to ‘‘help employees in dif-
ficulty’’ (Ayiotis 2008, pp. 43–44). According to Ayiotis,
this would be done through a compassionate assessment of
the causes of underperformance, collective problem-solv-
ing (involving the views and support of other team mem-
bers), and seeking consensus on how to resolve the
problem. A solution may even be changing the role or
function of the employee, or positioning them in a different
department where work would be more meaningful for this
employee.
In a sense, South African law contains elements of an
Ubuntu approach. Before dismissing an employee for poor
work performance, the reasons for poor performance need
to be investigated, and the employee should be instructed,
trained, guided, and counselled (Labour Relations Act 66 of
1995). The employer should also consider remedies other
than dismissal. However, the legal framework provided and
the general approach to dismissal is often focused on
individual rights and compliance and tends to be an
adversarial instead of a compassionate and inclusive pro-
cess. Managers often decide that dismissal is required, and
then seek advice from Human Resources, Industrial Rela-
tions, or the Legal Department on how to achieve this in a
quick but compliant way. The focus is therefore not on
reconciliation or on fostering harmonious communal rela-
tionships, but instead sows division, ill-will, and discor-
dance with employees. The process also does not take heed
of the potential side effects of dismissal, for instance fear,
distrust, and division within the organisation (Ayiotis
2008).
The Ubuntu approach also departs from current practice
in its involvement of the group. In most firms, matters of
performance are regarded sensitive and private. Involving
the group and seeking consensus could be seen as a vio-
lation of the employee’s right to privacy. From an Ubuntu
perspective, however, it would be viewed as a way of
acknowledging the specific employee and fostering com-
munity (K).
In the same way, retrenchments would be avoided by
Ubuntu-inspired management for the potentially detri-
mental effects on employee morale, but also to preserve
community (K). Before a decision to retrench or restructure
is made, employees would be engaged in a process of
collective problem-solving to consider alternatives, to
generate innovative solutions, or to achieve a sufficient
consensus (G). Alternatives to restructuring could include
upskilling or ‘‘retraining workers for more skilled work’’ or
123
42
even outsourcing employees to other firms (Khoza 2006,
p. 64).
This does not mean that an Ubuntu framework precludes
retrenchments. If the common good is threatened (if the
firm’s sustainability is in jeopardy) such practices could be
motivated, but decision-making in these conditions could
not be ‘‘top-down’’ and would also include consideration of
the duration of the relationship and the urgency of needs. It
is often the case in retrenchment practices that veteran
employees are ‘‘let go’’. While these employees ‘‘cost
more’’, this disregards the need for friendly relations
towards those who have worked for the betterment of
others (i.e. the history and the duration of the employee’s
relationship with the firm, and the partialism that this jus-
tifies is not sufficiently considered). It also disregards the
urgency of their need—given their age, these employees
are less likely to find other employment.
Conclusion
In the introduction to this paper, we posed the question
whether Ubuntu represents a unique ethical position that is
currently lacking in our ethical thinking generally and in
business ethics specifically. To answer this question, we
developed an Ubuntu heuristic, based on the work of
Thaddeus Metz, that offers an alternative to libertarian
stakeholder theory while also addressing the normative
ambiguity often associated with Ubuntu. According to this
heuristic, decision-making should be guided by the moral
responsibility to promote harmonious interpersonal rela-
tionships (based on shared identity and good-will) and to
avoid discord. Where the interests of persons or groups
conflict, precedence is given to close and historical rela-
tionships, within the limits provided by the nature of the
relationship as well as the urgency of the needs of parties.
We argued that this approach can overcome the limitations
of libertarian stakeholder theory associated with its con-
tractual framework that covers over issues of power,
legitimacy and urgency. The result is a relationholder
theory as opposed to a stakeholder theory that grounds
moral consideration for others not on their earned stakes,
but simply on the fact of relating, and on the aspiration to
honour their ability to commune, and achieving harmo-
nious relationships. The practical implications of this
Ubuntu-based relationholder theory for issues pertaining to
a firm’s relations with its employees was also investigated
(and again compared with the libertarian account).
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it can be con-
cluded that Ubuntu does indeed challenge our thinking on
ethics and business ethics. With reference to employee
relations, it can be argued that an Ubuntu relationholder
theory holds the potential to humanise capitalism through
123
M. Woermann, S. Engelbrecht
its emphasis on people and relationships, instead of pri-
marily focusing on profit or individual wealth (which
constitutes a focus on only one relationholder group,
namely shareholders). This does not mean, however, that
profit is excluded. Having employees participate in strategy
and decision-making, allowing them to share in profit and
own shares in the company, and engaging them on critical
decisions relating to individual and company performance
could benefit a business through innovative solutions and a
motivated workforce. What distinguishes an Ubuntu
approach is that, instead of assuming that greater economic
growth and profitability would lead to the betterment of all,
this approach allows for the possibility that a more effec-
tive capitalist business framework requires attention to
multiple goals beside profit, including harmonious rela-
tionships and meaningful work.
While the Ubuntu approach and libertarian stakeholder
theory have much in common, the focus on harmony in
Ubuntu (rather than rights, stakes or freedom in libertarian
stakeholder theory) encourages a greater degree of partic-
ipation from employees and a greater emphasis on well-
being over existing ideas of fairness.
This does not, however, make Ubuntu an unproblematic
messiah in the business environment. The practical
implementation of an Ubuntu approach promises a variety
of challenges. The first problem is that engaging with
employees (and other relationholders) takes time. If wage
negotiations in South Africa provide any indication, or
even the performance appraisal process in large corpora-
tions, it is possible that an inclusive strategy process may
be drawn out and frustrating and that reaching sufficient
consensus (G) would be particularly difficult. Negotiating
the details of profit sharing and share ownership would be
equally time consuming and potentially arduous. Many
executives would argue that such time consuming pro-
cesses are not conducive to efficient and successful busi-
ness and that the likelihood of reaching sufficient
consensus is low.
A second challenge with the Ubuntu approach is deter-
mining how to distribute wealth on the basis of need, as
opposed to individual rights (I). One can assume that
employees and workers need an increase or a bonus more
than executives or shareholders do. However, the distri-
bution of wealth created through a business would have to
be done in a way that all relationholders still feel that their
needs or interests are sufficiently met. If the profit distri-
bution causes executives or shareholders to seek alternative
opportunities, then the health of the firm (the common
good) is compromised. Additionally, ‘‘distribution
according to need’’ necessitates criteria that promote con-
sistency. If annual distribution of wealth was completely
arbitrary, the uncertainty caused among relationholders
could also threaten the health of the firm. One option is to
The Ubuntu Challenge to Business: From Stakeholders to Relationholders
propose a principle akin to Rawls’s ‘‘difference principle’’.
Disparities in wealth distribution must result in more value
being created for all relationholders, while maintaining
harmonious relationships. This still leaves at least two
challenges, namely demonstrating the value that the dis-
parity creates, and the prospect that this principle would
maintain the status quo. Executives operating according to
a managerial or shareholder philosophy often argue that
executive remuneration is required to retain the talent that
promotes increased value creation.
A proponent of Ubuntu could respond that the ineffi-
ciencies and disruptions of current wage negotiations and
performance appraisals are caused, not solely by the par-
ticipatory nature of these processes, but by the adversarial
attitudes that accompany them. If these processes were
grounded in ideas of shared identity and good-will, and if
these ideas were enforced through profit sharing and
increased ownership, they would likely unfold differently.
If sufficient consensus (G) is the goal, moreover, it is more
likely that the information and reasoning behind critical
decisions would be freely shared, promoting increased
value creation for all. Finally, the emphasis on consensus
starts to correct the imbalance in current business decision-
making. Executives and boards can prioritise the interests
of shareholders (and themselves) and neglect the needs of
employees because employees often have fewer options
than shareholders. In societies like South Africa, where
inequality and unemployment are at critically high levels,
employees often have no choice but to accept the decisions
made by executives.
These are some of the challenges of applying Ubuntu
principles to the relationship between a firm and its
employees. Its application to business clearly requires not
only different practices, but also different attitudes. Traces
of these new attitudes are already visible, for instance, in
the King IV Report on Governance (2016) which makes
reference to the ideas of Ubuntu, interdependency and
shared purpose. Ayiotis (2008) also claims that Ubuntu-
based ideas have been successfully applied within busi-
nesses. An application of Ubuntu principles to relationships
with external parties must still be fleshed out, however.
What is evident is that the global challenges of sus-
tainability and inequality will not solve themselves. They
require a deliberate intervention and a change to current
practices, including business practices. An Ubuntu-based
relationholder theory provides guidance on what such an
intervention might look like.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest Author A declares that she has no conflict of
interest. Author B declares that he has no conflict of interest. Author
B received financial support from his employer to attend a conference
where a version of this article was delivered as a paper.
43
Ethical Approval This article does not contain any studies with
human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.
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