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JQME
21,1
Risk-based maintenance and
remaining life assessment
for gas turbines
100 Mohamed Khalifa
Received 26 December 2012
Project Execution and Technical Services,
Revised 9 July 2013 Newfoundland Hydro – A Nalcor Energy Company, St. John’s, Canada
9 November 2013
Accepted 19 April 2014 Faisal Khan
Department of Process Engineering, Memorial University,
St. John’s, Canada, and
Joseph Thorp
Aramco Services Company, Houston, Texas, USA

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a quantitative model for risk-based maintenance
and remaining life assessment for gas turbines.
Design/methodology/approach – The proposed model uses historical failure and repair data from
the operation of gas turbines. The time to failure of gas turbines is modeled using Weibull distribution.
Findings – The total risk is estimated considering replacement cost, repair cost, operation cost, risk of
failure and turbine remaining value after a specified period of time.
Originality/value – The model is an effective tool to make optimal decisions regarding maintenance
strategy (repair or replacement) and to assess the remaining life based on a comparison of the total risk.
The literature review focusses on developing different models to make risk-based decisions regarding
the selection of a maintenance strategy and maintenance interval, however, literature is silent
regarding risk-based assessment of the equipment remaining life, which is the focus of present work.
The model is tested and applied to ageing gas turbines in a cross-country pipeline.
Keywords Gas turbines, Remaining life, Repair, Replacement, Risk of failure
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
The complexity and demand of the safety and integrity of ageing assets require
an advanced approach to manage asset integrity in safe and cost effective manner.
The asset integrity ensures that the asset performs its intended function according
to the design requirements.
The risk-based maintenance is an approach that helps making decisions
regarding repair or replacement of assets components to maintain the asset integrity
during its operation.
While companies operating within the oil and gas industries employ unique
definitions of risk to accommodate specific business categories, segments or plants, etc.
It is necessary to utilize a common model to account for the risk of failure in order
to uniformly apply in the industry when making decisions regarding maintenance and
Journal of Quality in Maintenance
replacement of equipment.
Engineering
Vol. 21 No. 1, 2015
pp. 100-111 The author (F. Khan) thankfully acknowledges financial support provided by Natural Sciences
© Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1355-2511
and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC); and the support extended by industry
DOI 10.1108/JQME-12-2012-0047 partner Aramco Services Company.
The literature review focusses on developing different models to make risk-based Life
decisions regarding the selection of a maintenance strategy and maintenance interval, assessment
however, literature is silent regarding risk-based assessment of the equipment
remaining life, which is the focus of the present work.
for gas
Thorp (2001) presented a probabilistic model for determining maintenance cost turbines
savings for petroleum pipeline pumps. Khan and Haddara (2003) proposed a risk-based
maintenance methodology for designing an optimum inspection and maintenance 101
programs. The methodology consists of three modules: risk estimation, risk evaluation
and maintenance planning. Each module consists of many steps; for example, risk
estimation module involves: failure scenario development, consequence assessment,
probabilistic failure analysis and risk estimation.
Kazunari et al. (2004) introduced a methodology for risk-based maintenance to provide
the optimum maintenance intervals of steam turbines components. Kazunari and et al.
(2004) estimated the aggregated risk as a function of sum of the risk function of all events
leading to the component failure. The total cost is obtained as the sum of maintenance cost.
The total cost is plotted vs operating hours showing a concave curve. The optimum
maintenance interval is determined at the minimum value of the total cost.
Krishnasamy et al. (2005) developed a risk-based inspection and maintenance
methodology for a power generating plant. This methodology is used to reduce risk,
increase the reliability of assets, and minimize the maintenance cost.
Khan and Howard (2007) presented a simplified practical approach to use statistical
tools for inspection planning and integrity assessment. The study is focussed on
corrosion-related material degradation of piping of an offshore production facility.
Thorp (2010) presented a risk-based approach applied to machinery. This approach
was used to develop generalized maintenance strategies.
Ahmadi and Kumar (2011) proposed a cost rate function (CRF) to identify inspection
and restoration intervals of hidden failures (while the system in non-operating state) for
aircraft’s repairable components. The proposed method considers the costs associated
with inspection, repair/restoration and failure. The optimum inspection interval is
obtained at the minimum value of the CRF.
Available literature addresses quantitative models for risk-based maintenance.
Available standard codes such as API 579/ASME FFS (2007) provide means to assess the
remaining life based on the fitness for service which is quantified using the tolerance to a
damage and damage growth rate due to different degradation mechanisms. The
proposed model provides an assessment of the remaining life based on the total risk. The
advantage of using the total risk over using the fitness for service approach is the ability
to consider the safety and financial consequences on a quantitative basis in the
assessment of the remaining life. The proposed model would help operators in making
well-informed decisions regarding the optimal selection of maintenance strategy and its
impact on the remaining life and the overall risk of the asset.
This model uses time to failure data from the history of the operation. It was tested
and applied to ageing gas turbines in cross-country pipeline. It is applicable to other
equipment such as pumps and compressors.

2. Proposed risk-based maintenance and remaining life assessment model


2.1 Risk of failure under preventive maintenance (PM)
Probability of failure, Pf, under PM is estimated as follows:
P f ¼ 1Rm (1)
JQME where Rm is reliability under PM given by (Ebeling, 1997):
21,1  
Rm ¼ ½RðT Þn :R t9nT (2)

where T is the maintenance interval and n is number of times that the PM is carried out
during a period of time, t. R(t|nT) is the conditional reliability that the asset is survived
102 during a period of time t ¼ nT.
The time to failure is modeled by Wiebull distribution. Thus, from Equation 2, the
reliability under PM at time, t is given by (see Ebeling, 1997):
"   # "   #
T b tnT b
Rm ðtÞ ¼ exp n :exp  ; nT p t p ðn þ 1ÞT (3)
a a

After n times of PM, the reliability at time, t ¼ nT is given by:


"    #
t T b
Rm ðtÞ ¼ exp  (4)
T a

From Equations (1) and (4), the probability of failure at t ¼ nT is given by:
"    #
t T b
P f ðtÞ ¼ 1exp  (5)
T a

Probability of failure for a system can be determined from the knowledge of probability
of failure of each component and system configuration. For a system composed of
independent components, the reliability block diagram can be used (Ebeling, 1997). The
“reliability block diagram” is a method to represent a complex system with blocks
connected by series and parallel configuration. The series configuration is used if a
component failure will lead to a system failure. The parallel configuration is used for
redundant components. Once the blocks are configured properly and probability of
failure of each component is provided on the corresponding block, the system
probability of failure and therefore the system reliability can be estimated. For a system
composed of dependent components, Markov analysis can be used. Components are
called dependent if failure of a component affects probability of failure of the other
components (e.g. standby and load-sharing pump systems). If one of the two online gas
turbines should fail, it is replaced with the standby one. The online pump experiences a
failure rate higher than the standby pump. The failure rate of the standby pump will
increase if it is put into service in case of a failure of the online turbine (i.e. the state of
the online turbine (operating or failed)) affects the failure rate of the standby turbine
because if the state of the online turbine changed from “operating” to “failed,” the
failure rate of standby turbine will increase once it is put into service. Also, if a pump in
a load-sharing system fails, the probability of failure of other pumps increases as the
result of the additional load placed on them.
Failure consequences such as damage to people, equipment, environment and
business interruptions are estimated as loss (in $ value).
The risk of failure, Rf, is estimated as multiplication of probability of failure and
consequences of failure.
2.2 Repair cost Life
The repair cost is estimated as follows: assessment
C Repair ¼ C r :n (6) for gas
turbines
where Cr is the average cost of repair, n is number of maintenance intervals in a period
of time t given by:
103
t
n¼ (7)
T
where T is the maintenance interval.

2.3 Total risk


The total risk is formulated as a function of replacement cost, operation cost, repair
cost, risk of failure and remaining value as follows:
X   X
RT ¼ N
C Repl þ C o :t þ C Repair þ Rf  N Rv (8)
u u

where RT is the total risk over a period of time, t (t ¼ the remaining life); Nu , the
number of components/units in the system; CRepl , the replacement cost per component;
CRepair, the repair cost per component (Equation 6); Co, the component operating cost
per unit time. Rf , the risk of system failure estimated as multiplication of probability of
system failure and consequences of failure; Rv, the component remaining value after
a period of time, t.
The total risk is used to compare different options such as replacement or
continuing operation. The option associated with the least total risk is selected.

2.4 Risk-based maintenance and remaining life assessment


Different options such as repair and replacement or continuing the operation till failure
are suggested. For each option, the total risk (RT) is then estimated using Equation (8)
for different periods of time t for a given maintenance interval, T. The total risk (RT) is
plotted vs time, t, as shown in Figure 1.
From Figure 1, the total risk, RT, increases as time increases. The optimum option is
selected corresponding to the less total risk at a specified period of time, t. The
crossover point (Figure 1) is the point at which the total risk of both options is equal.
The crossover point helps to determine the optimum option before and after it. For
example, Option I in Figure 1 is selected as the optimum option till the time
corresponding to the crossover point. After the crossover point, the total risk in the case
of Option II is less than the case of Option I. This means the risk-based remaining life
(useful life) for the equipment when selecting Option I is the time corresponding to the
crossover point. Therefore, a decision to select Option II after the crossover point
should be made. The time corresponding to the crossover point is the risk-based
remaining life for Option I (see Figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the flowchart for the proposed risk-based maintenance and life
assessment model.

3. Application of the proposed model to ageing gas turbine


Gas turbines that have been driving the pumps of a cross-country pipeline since 1981
are considered in this application. While these gas turbines have been considered very
JQME reliable, they have experienced a steady rise in failure rates over the last years. Making
21,1 the matter more challenging is the fact that the turbine manufacturer, suspended
aftermarket support including the manufacturing of critical spare parts. Some
replacement parts are reconditioned components that were previously used. These
have clocked thousands of cycles of fatigue prior to their installation yet it is difficult to
quantify the degree to which these parts are contributing to the increasing failure rates.
104 The proposed risk-based model has been applied to make a well-informed decision on
the viability of continued operation with the old turbines (Option I) vs replacement with
new gas turbines (Option II).

3.1 System configuration


The pipeline system consists of 11 stations. Each station has two active gas turbines
and one standby as shown in Figure 3. Each turbine drives a single pump. All gas

Option II

Total Risk, Crossover point


RT Option I

Figure 1.
Total risk vs time Risk-based remaining life for Option I
for a given
maintenance interval
Time, t

Suggest all possible maintenance options

Consider a maintenance option

Suggest a maintenance interval, T

Next T
Estimate RT
Next
option

Plot RT vs time for this maintenance option

Compare RT curve for different maintenance intervals and


Figure 2. determine the optimum option corresponding to the minimum RT
The flowchart for the
proposed risk-based
maintenance and life
Determine the risk based remaining life for each option
assessment model
corresponding to the crossover point
turbine stations are similar; thus, only one gas turbine station is considered to compare Life
the two possible options. assessment
3.2 Consequence of failure for gas
The consequence of failure is production loss. If one gas turbine fails, the standby turbines
gas turbine becomes active; and there is no production loss. If two gas turbines fail
(only one gas turbine is active), the production loss is C1 ¼ $50 million/day for 60 days. 105
If three gas turbines fail, the production loss is C2 ¼ $100 million/day for 60 days.

3.3 Probability of failure


In case of standby systems, the units of the system are dependent. Thus, Markov
analysis is used to estimate probability of failure of the gas turbine station.
For simplicity assume no failure while the gas turbine is standby, and all active and
standby (when online) gas turbines have the same failure rate, λ given by:
l ¼ 1=M TTF (9)
where MTTF is mean time to failure under PM given as follows (Ebeling, 1997):
Z 1 RT
Rðt Þdt
M TTF ¼ Rm ðt Þdt ¼ 0 (10)
0 1RðT Þ
For Wiebull distribution, substitute R(t) ¼ Exp(-(t/α)β) in Equation (10):
RT         
t b b
0 Exp  a dt 1
2 Exp  Ta þ 1 :T
M TTF ¼    J     (11)
b b
1Exp  Ta 1Exp  Ta

Define the states of the system (gas turbine station) as shown in Table I.
Figure 4 shows the rate diagram for each gas turbine station. The rate
diagram shows a representation of the transition from a state to another and the rate
of this transition.

Turbine, T1 (active)

Figure 3.
Turbine, T2 (active) The configuration
of each gas
turbine station
Turbine, T3 (standby)

T1 T2 T3 State State probability System condition Failure consequences


Online Online Standby 1 P1 Operating None
Online Failed Online 2 P2 Operating None
Failed Online Online 3 P3 Operating None
Failed Failed Online 4 P4 Partially failed C1 ¼ $50 million/day Table I.
(reduced production) for 60 days The states of the
Failed Failed Failed 5 P5 Failed C2 ¼ $100 million/day system (gas turbine
for 60 days station)
JQME 1
21,1 


3
2
106 


Figure 4. 
The rate diagram for
each gas turbine
station 5

From the rate diagram, the resulting differential equations are:


dp1 ðtÞ
¼ 2lP 1 ðtÞ (12)
dt

dp2 ðtÞ
¼ lP 1 ðt ÞlP 2 ðt Þ (13)
dt
dp3 ðtÞ
¼ lP 1 ðt ÞlP 3 ðt Þ (14)
dt

dp4 ðtÞ
¼ lP 2 ðt Þþ lP 3 ðt ÞlP 4 ðt Þ (15)
dt
dp5 ðtÞ
¼ lP 4 ðtÞ (16)
dt
Solving these equations, while the initial conditions are P2(0) ¼ P3(0) ¼ P4(0) ¼ P5(0) ¼ 0,
results in:
p1 ðt Þ ¼ e2lt (17)

p2 ðt Þ ¼ elt e2lt (18)

p3 ðt Þ ¼ elt e2lt (19)


p4 ðt Þ ¼ 2lelt þ 2e2lt 2elt (20)

p5 ðt Þ ¼ 12ltelt e2lt (21)

As a confirmation of the solution, the sum of P1(t), P2(t), P3(t), P4(t) and P5(t) equals 1.
From Table I, probability that the system completely failed equals P5 and the
corresponding failure consequences is C2. Probability that the system is partially failed
equals P4 and the corresponding failure consequences is C1.
It should be noted that The Markove analysis was carried out for one gas turbine Life
station as all gas turbine stations are similar. However, the gas turbines are not assessment
operating under similar conditions because there are two online gas turbines and one
standby gas turbine in each gas turbine station. All calculations and results are given
for gas
for a typical gas turbine station and applicable to all the similar gas turbine stations. turbines

3.4 Risk of failure 107


The risk of failure, Rf, is estimated as follows:

Rf ¼ P 4 :C1 þ P 5 :C 2 (22)

3.5 System’s historical data


The time to failure data for the gas turbines since 2008 is shown in Table II. The data
are fitted to Wiebull distribution with parameters α ¼ 3,951 h and β ¼ 1.53. The time to
failure for the new gas turbines is assumed to fit Wiebull distribution with parameters
α ¼ 39,513 h and β ¼ 1.53. The values of α and β can be obtained by fitting the time to
failure data of similar new gas turbines to a Wiebull distribution or assumed based on a
recommendation from the manufacturer. The acquisition cost of a new gas turbine,
CA is $25 million. The remaining value RV after a period of time, t, is $0 for the old gas
turbine and conservatively assumed $0 for the new gas turbine. The operation cost
Co is assumed the same for old and new gas turbines; thus, it is ignored.
Table III shows the costs incurred in repair of the gas turbines since 2008.
The average repair cost/failure (Cr) is estimated as $600,000.
The failure rate, λ is estimated using Equation (9). Equation (11) is used to estimate
mean time to failure, MTTF, for different maintenance intervals, T, as shown in
Figures 5 and 6.
From Figures 5 and 6, MTTF decreases as maintenance interval increases.
The repair cost and risk of failure are estimated using Equations (6) and (22),
respectively, for different maintenance intervals, T. For example, repair cost and risk
of failure are shown in Figures 7 and 8 for T ¼ 4,000 h.
Figures 7 and 8 show that the repair cost increases as time increases because the
number of maintenance increases as time increases (i.e. as the gas turbine stays longer
in service).

Year of Total Time to failure


failure hours (hours) Failed component Identified cause of failure
2008 90,546 4,619 Tower shaft Laminated shims and wave washer
2008 84,432 3,661 Tower shaft Laminated shims and wave washer
2009 80,575 4,312 Bearing No. 5 Misalignment during assembly
2010 71,160 100 Diffuser plugs Deteriorated gasket
leakage
2010 67,199 1,400 ACC gearbox Wrong bearing used
Incorrectly stamped by
manufacturer Table II.
2010 91,082 6,650 Bearing No. 5 Unknown Failure data of
2011 64,263 4,502 Main line bearing Unknown the gas turbines
2011 50,261 4,071 Unknown Unknown since 2008
JQME Year Labor O&A Material Customs Total
21,1
2008 $277,926 $88,959 $156,378 $1,463 $524,727
2009 $294,352 $80,351 $272,200 $2,777 $649,680
2009 $258,942 $63,069 $200,333 $2,039 $524,382
2009 $254,369 $60,914 $155,454 $1,485 $472,222
2009 $281,074 $80,068 $151,394 $2,163 $514,699
108 2009 $302,772 $80,434 $154,529 $1,857 $539,591
2010 $305,225 $99,868 $146,481 $1,407 $552,981
2010 $288,138 $111,942 $254,229 $2,252 $656,561
2010 $301,090 $202,786 $174,609 $1,355 $679,840
2010 $309,601 $102,967 $155,240 $2,221 $570,028
2010 $307,186 $117,958 $224,086 $1,381 $650,610
Table III. 2010 $298,294 $116,229 $256,194 $1,381 $672,097
The cost of repair of 2011 $303,694 $123,860 $285,200 $5,095 $717,849
the gas turbines 2011 $287,650 $94,445 $328,461 $4,326 $714,883
since 2008 2011 – – – – $738,807

12,000

11,000

10,000

9,000
MTTF, h

8,000

7,000

Figure 5. 6,000
Mean time to failure
“MTTF ” for 5,000
different
maintenance 4,000
intervals “T” (old 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
gas turbine station) Maintenance Interval "T ", h

Figure 8 shows that the risk of failure increases as time increases because of the
deterioration of the gas turbine with time.
The total risk, RT, is estimated for different maintenance intervals and plotted vs
time. The total risk curve is compared for each maintenance interval for the two
options. For example, Figure 9 shows the total risk curve for the new gas turbine
station (Option II) is lower than the total risk curve for the old gas turbine station
(Option I) for T ¼ 4,000 h. This comparison was repeated and showed that the total risk
curve is less in case of Option II for different suggested maintenance intervals. This
leaded to selecting Option II as the optimum option.
There is no crossover point in Figure 8. This indicates that there is no risk-based
remaining life for the old gas turbine station and a replacement of the old gas turbine
station is required immediately.
14
× 104 Life
assessment
13
for gas
12 turbines
11

10 109
MTTF, h

6
Figure 6.
Mean time to failure
5 “MTTF ” for different
maintenance intervals
4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
“T” (new gas turbine
4
× 10
station)
Maintenance Interval "T ", h

6
× 10
14

12

10
Repair Cost, $

Figure 7.
2 Repair cost vs time
for (old and new gas
0 turbine stations) for
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 T ¼ 4,000 h
Time, years

4. Conclusion
A quantitative model for risk-based maintenance and remaining life assessment is
proposed for aged gas turbines. The total risk is estimated as sum of replacement cost,
repair cost, operation cost, risk of failure and remaining value. The optimum
maintenance option is made based on the total risk. The risk-based remaining life is
determined at the crossover point of different suggested maintenance options. After the
crossover point, the selection of the optimum maintenance option changes to maintain
the total risk as minimum during the operation.
The proposed model uses historical failure and repair data from the operation of gas
turbines without the need to look at the physical reasons of the failure. This avoids the
complexity in physics-of-failure modeling due to different reasons such as mechanical
JQME 6
× 109

21,1 Old Turbine Station


New Turbine Station
5

4
110 Risk of Failure, $

Figure 8.
Risk of failure vs time 0
for T ¼ 4,000 h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time, years

× 109
6

Old Turbine Station


New Turbine Station
5

4
Total Risk, $

Figure 9.
Total risk vs time for 0
T ¼ 4,000 h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time, years

seal failure, bearing failure, shaft misalignment and incorrect installation. Thus, this
model is an easy and quantitative tool to help the operator to make well-informed
maintenance decisions to manage the integrity of gas turbines.
The model is applied to gas turbines; however, it can be applied to other equipment
such as pumps and compressors.

References
Ahmadi, A. and Kumar, U. (2011), “Developed a cost based risk model to identify inspection and
restoration intervals of hidden failures subject to aging”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability,
Vol. 60 No. 1, pp. 197-209.
API 579/ASME FFS (2007), Fitness For Service, The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Life
Three Park Avenue, New York, NY.
assessment
Ebeling, C.E. (1997), An Introduction to Reliability and Maintainability Engineering, McGraw Hill,
New York, NY.
for gas
Kazunari, F., Satoshi, N.A., Yasunari, A., Toshihiro, F., Kenichiro, F., Shigeru, M., Kentaro, T. and
turbines
Taro, K. (2004), “Risk-based inspection and maintenance systems for steam turbines”,
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 81 Nos 10/11, pp. 825-835. 111
Khan, F. and Howard, R. (2007), “Statistical approach to inspection planning and integrity
assessment”, Non-Destructive Testing and Condition Monitoring, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 26-36.
Khan, F.I. and Haddara, M. (2003), “Risk-based maintenance (RBM): a quantitative approach for
maintenance/inspection scheduling and planning”, Journal of Loss Prevention in the
Process Industries, Vol. 16 No. 6, pp. 561-573.
Krishnasamy, L., Khan, F. and Haddara, M. (2005), “Development of a risk-based maintenance
(RBM) strategy for a power-generating plant”, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 69-81.
Thorp, J.M. (2001), Deconstructing Life Cycle Costing: A Case Study on Petroleum Pipeline Pumps;
Pumps and Systems, Randall Publication, pp. 16-31.
Thorp, J.M. (2010), “Risk based inspection of machinery”, Proceedings of the Middle East
Maintenance Conference, pp. 212-241.

Further reading
API 581 (2000), Risk-Based Inspection: Base Resource Document, American Petroleum Institute,
Washington, DC.
Khalifa, M., Khan, F. and Haddara, M. (2009), “Optimal selection of non-destructive inspection
technique for welded components. The British institute of non-destructive testing”, Insight,
Vol. 51 No. 4, pp. 192-200.
Paris, P.C. and Endogan, F. (1963), “Critical analysis of crack propagation laws”, Basic Eng.,
Vol. 85 No. 4, pp. 528-534.
Thorp, J.M. (2011), “Risk based integrity management of machinery”, Proceedings of API Fall
Refining Meeting, November 14-18, Los Angeles, CA, American Petroleum Institute,
Washington, DC.
Zhao, J.P. (2009), “Risk-based inspection analysis for high-pressure hydrogenation cracking unit”,
Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol. 131 No. 2, pp. 1-6.

Corresponding author
Professor Faisal Khan can be contacted at: fikhan@mun.ca

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