Professional Documents
Culture Documents
$7
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Yearly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
$12
$10
$6
$4
$2
$0
0
5
5
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
Lower 48 Wellhead Price for Natural Gas, 1990-2030
(2005 dollars per thousand cubic feet)
$10
$9
$8
$7
$6
Wellhead
$5
Henry Hub
$4
~$0.70
$3
$2
$1
$0
0
0
9
3
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Lower 48 Wellhead Price for Natural Gas,
1990-2030
• Lower 48 wellhead prices for natural gas are projected to
decline from current levels to ~$5/Mcf in 2013
• Price is expected to rise to ~$6/Mcf in 2030
• Henry Hub spot market prices are projected to decline to
~$5.70/Mcf in 2013
• Then rise to ~$6.70/Mcf in 2030
• Historically the price of LNG imported to North America
has been pegged to the Henry Hub spot price
• Some sources estimate that by the year 2010
approximately 6-8% of the total US gas supply will come
from LNG produced from foreign stranded gas reserves
Lower 48 Wellhead Natural Gas Price Uncertainty,
1990-2030
(2005 dollars per thousand cubic feet)
$9
$8
$7
$6
Reference
$5 High price
Low price
$4 Rapid technology
Slow technology
$3
$2
$1
$0
90
95
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Natural Gas Consumption by Sector, 1990-2030
(trillion cubic feet)
30
25
20
Transportation
Electric Power
15 Industrial
Commercial
Residential
10
0
0
0
9
3
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Domestic Natural Gas Production by Source, 1990-2030
(trillion cubic feet)
25
20
15 Alaska
Lower 48 Deepwater Offshore
Lower 48 Shallow Water Offshore
Lower 48 Onshore Unconventional
10 Lower 48 Onshore Conventional
0
0
0
9
3
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Net Imports of Natural Gas by Source, 1990-2030
(trillion cubic feet)
7
4
Net Inport
Mexico
3
Canada
LNG
0
90
95
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
-1
Estimated Percentage of the Total US Gas
Supply Coming From LNG
20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
-2%
So What Can We Gleam From This Data
Regarding Compressor Station Design
• Exports from Canada to the lower 48 are expected to
diminish
• LNG will steadily increase over the next 20+ years to
~4.5 tcf/yr
– Gas originating from LNG is proposed to have the following
properties:
• Maximum Wobbe index of 1,400
– Wobbe Index = HHV/(SG)½
• Maximum high heating value of ~1,100 Btu/scf
• Maximum C4+ (butane, pentane, hexane, +) of 1.5%
• Maximum inerts of 4%
• LNG cost will approximate the Henry Hub spot market
• Increased deliveries to electric generation facilities will
require highly reliable and flexible compression
Special Design Challenges -
continued
• Incremental production of lower 48 onshore natural gas
comes primarily from unconventional resources,
including coalbed methane, tight sandstones, and gas
shales
– Unconventional resources can be difficult to cleanup; especially
immediately downstream from producing wells
– Fine dry particulate along with production enhancing fluids make
these gas streams particularly challenging to filter
• The Alaska natural gas pipeline is expected to begin
transporting natural gas to the lower 48 States in 2018
• Alaska’s natural gas production totals ~2.2 tcf by 2030
Challenges
• Challenge 1: Going forward the price
and demand of natural gas will
probably remain high
• Challenge 2: LNG will become a player
The History of Regulation
• The Early Days of Regulation
• The Beginnings of Federal Regulatory Involvement
• The Natural Gas Act of 1938
• The Phillips Decision - Wellhead Price Regulation
• The Effects of Wellhead Price Control – 1958 to1978
• The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
• FERC Order No. 436
• The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
• FERC Order No. 636
The Early Days of Regulation
• The regulation of natural gas dates back to the very beginnings of the industry
• In the early days of the industry (mid-1800s) natural gas was predominantly
manufactured from coal, to be delivered locally, generally within the same
municipality in which it was produced
• Local governments deemed natural gas distribution a business that affected the
public interest to a sufficient extent to merit regulation
• Because of the distribution network it was decided that one company with a single
distribution network could deliver natural gas more cheaply than two companies
• Local governments regulated the rates these natural monopolies charged, and set
down regulations that prevented them from abusing their market power
• In the early 1900s, natural gas began to be shipped between municipalities
• Pipelines began carrying gas from city to city
• This new mobility of natural gas meant that local governments could no longer
oversee the entire natural gas distribution chain
• State level governments intervened to regulate the new 'intrastate' natural gas
market, and determine rates that could be charged by gas distributors
• This was done by creating public utility commissions and public service commissions
• The first states to do so were New York and Wisconsin, which instituted commissions
as early as 1907
The Beginnings of Federal
Regulatory Involvement
• With transportation of natural gas via interstate pipelines,
new regulatory hurdles arose
• In the same sense that municipal governments were
unable to regulate natural gas distribution that extended
beyond their areas of jurisdiction, the state governments
were unable to regulate interstate natural gas pipelines
• However, due to concern regarding the monopoly power
of interstate pipelines the federal government saw fit to
step in to fill the regulatory gap created by interstate
pipelines
• In 1935 Congress passed the Public Utility Holding
Company Act to limit the ability of holding companies to
gain undue influence over a public utility market
The Natural Gas Act of 1938
• In 1938, the federal government became involved directly in the
regulation of interstate natural gas with the passage of the
Natural Gas Act (NGA)
• The NGA gave the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction over
regulation of interstate natural gas sales
• The FPC was charged with regulating the rates that were charged
for interstate natural gas delivery
• The NGA specified that no new interstate pipeline could be built
to deliver natural gas into a market already served by another
pipeline
• In 1942, these certification powers were extended to cover any new
interstate pipelines. This meant that, in order to build an interstate
pipeline, companies must first receive the approval of the FPC.
• The NGA required that 'just and reasonable' rates for pipeline
services be enforced, it did not specify any particular regulation of
prices of natural gas at the wellhead
The Phillips Decision
(Wellhead Price Regulation)
• The Supreme Court ruled that natural gas producers that sold
natural gas into interstate pipelines fell under the classification of
'natural gas companies' in the NGA, and were subject to regulatory
oversight by the FPC
• This meant that wellhead prices would be regulated much the same
as natural gas that was sold by interstate pipelines to local
distribution utilities
• The Phillips decision had a complicated and far-reaching effect on
the natural gas industry
• The FPC instituted a traditional 'cost-of-service' rate making
determination rather than the market value of that service
• The U.S. was divided into five separate producing regions, and
the FPC set rates for all wells in a particular region
• The FPC set interim ceiling prices based on the average natural gas
contract prices paid during 1959-1960 for a particular area
The Phillips Decision - continued
(Wellhead Price Regulation)
• By 1970 rates had been set for only two of the five producing areas,
for most of the areas, prices were essentially frozen at 1959 levels
• The problem with determining rates for a particular area based on
cost-of-service methodologies was that there existed many wells in
each area, with vastly different production costs.
• By 1974 the FPC adopted national price ceilings for the sale of
natural gas into interstate pipelines
• Realizing that the prior price ceilings, based on the cost-of-service
approach, were much lower than the market value of interstate
natural gas, the FPC set a national price ceiling of $0.42
• Although this price ceiling doubled the prices that had been set
during the 60s, it was still significantly less than the market
value of the natural gas being sold
• This system of price controls was in place until the passage of the
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978
Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
$8
1992 2007
FERC Order No. 636
$7
$6 89 92
19 19
The NG Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
$5
1985 1989
FERC Order No. 436
$4
1978 1985
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
$3
1958 1978
Wellhead Price Control
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
The Effects of Wellhead Price Control –
1958 to 1978
$6 89 92
19 19
The NG Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
$5
1985 1989
FERC Order No. 436
$4
1978 1985
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
$3
1958 1978
Wellhead Price Control
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
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19
19
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20
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
• In November of 1978, at the peak of the
natural gas supply shortages, Congress
enacted legislation known as the Natural
Gas Policy Act (NGPA), this act had three
main goals:
– Creating a single national natural gas
market
– Equalizing supply with demand
– Allowing market forces to establish the
wellhead price of natural gas
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 -
continued
• The NGPA was a fundamental first step in
deconstructing the regulatory problems that had been
created by the NGA. The market response to the
provisions of the NGPA included:
– Pipelines, accustomed to gas shortages in the past years,
signed up for many long-term natural gas contracts
– Producers expanded exploration and production, drilling new
wells and using the long-term sales contracts with pipelines to
recover their investment
– Average wellhead prices rose dramatically in the years
following the NGPA
– Prices for end-users increased, but were mitigated by the
pipelines, which blended the cost of gas under new contracts
with regulated gas under old contracts when selling their bundled
product to their customers
– Price increases led to decreased demand
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 -
continued
• The pipelines, used to the era of curtailment, were quick to sign up for long-
term 'take-or-pay' contracts
• The increasing wellhead price, mixed with the eagerness of pipelines to
deliver as much natural gas as possible, led to a situation of oversupply
• Where it was necessary to curtail natural gas deliveries in the 60s and 70s
due to high demand and low supply, the situation reversed in the period
from 1980-85
• Rising natural gas prices resulted in the dropping off of some of the demand
that had built up when the price for natural gas was held below its market
value
• The resulting 'oversupply' scenario had a number of effects, including
requiring the pipelines to make 'take-or-pay' payments to their suppliers
despite no longer needing the amount of natural gas that had previously
been contracted
• Pipeline customers sought the right to purchase their own gas from
producers and transport it over the interstate pipelines, instead of
purchasing the bundled product directly from the pipelines
Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
$8
1992 2007
FERC Order No. 636
$7
$6 89 92
19 19
The NG Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
$5
1985 1989
FERC Order No. 436
$4
1978 1985
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
$3
1958 1978
Wellhead Price Control
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
FERC Order No. 436
• FERC Order No. 436 had a number of immediate
effects, including:
– Pipelines began offering transportation service to all
customers
– Pipeline customers realized cost savings, in that the
spot market prices of natural gas were much lower
than the prices offered for natural gas by the pipelines
(due to the long term 'take-or-pay' contracts that the
pipelines were bound under)
– The payments necessary under these 'take-or-pay'
contracts increased for pipelines, as few customers
were willing to purchase higher priced gas from the
pipelines
– Pipelines and producers were often forced into
litigation to resolve issues surrounding 'take-or-pay'
contracts
FERC Order No. 436 - continued
• FERC Order No. 436 also had a number of
longer term effects, including:
– The transportation function became the primary
function of pipelines, as opposed to offering the
bundled merchant service
– A wide variety of natural gas purchasing and
transportation patterns and practices emerged due to
the availability of choices to the end user
– New pricing patterns emerged, known as 'netback'
pricing, in which a reasonable price was set at the
point of consumption, and that minus the cost of
distribution, minus the cost of transportation, gave the
'netback' price to the producer at the wellhead
Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
$8
1992 2007
FERC Order No. 636
$7
$6 89 92
19 19
The NG Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
$5
1985 1989
FERC Order No. 436
$4
1978 1985
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
$3
1958 1978
Wellhead Price Control
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
The Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act of 1989
• The NGWDA stated that 'first sales' of natural gas were
to be free of any federal price regulations. The Act
defined 'first sales' as the sale of gas:
– To a pipeline
– To a local distribution company
– To an end user
– Preceding the sale to any of the above
– Determined by FERC to be a first sale
• Excluded from falling under the definition of a first sale
were any sales of gas by pipelines and local distribution
companies, including interstate pipelines
Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
$8
1992 2007
FERC Order No. 636
$7
$6 89 92
19 19
The NG Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
$5
1985 1989
FERC Order No. 436
$4
1978 1985
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
$3
1958 1978
Wellhead Price Control
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
FERC Order No. 636
• While FERC Order No. 436 made the unbundling of pipeline
services possible, the establishment of transportation only services
by a pipeline continued to be only voluntary
• FERC Order No. 636 completed the final steps towards unbundling
by making pipeline unbundling a requirement
• Issued in 1992, the Order states that pipelines must separate their
transportation and sales services, so that all pipeline customers
have a choice in selecting their gas sales, transportation, and
storage services from any provider, in any quantity
• Order 636 is often referred to as the Final Restructuring Rule, as it
was seen as the culmination of all of the unbundling and
deregulation that had taken place in the past 20 years
• Pipelines could no longer engage in merchant gas sales, or sell any
product as a bundled service
• The production and marketing arms of interstate pipeline companies
were required to be restructured as arms-length affiliates
• Order 636 also requires that interstate pipelines offer services that
allow for the efficient and reliable delivery of natural gas to end
users
FERC Order No. 636 - continued
• These services include the institution of 'no-notice'
transportation service, access to storage facilities,
increased flexibility in receipt and delivery points, and
'capacity release' programs
– No-notice transportation services allow LDCs and utilities to
receive natural gas from pipelines on demand to meet peak
service needs for its customers, without incurring any penalties
– The capacity release programs allow the resale of unwanted
pipeline capacity between pipeline customers
– Order 636 requires interstate pipelines to set up electronic
bulletin boards, accessible by all customers on an equal basis,
which show the available and released capacity on any particular
pipeline
– A customer requiring pipeline transportation can refer to these
bulletin boards, and find out if there is any available capacity on
the pipeline, or if there is any released capacity available for
purchase or lease from one who has already purchased capacity
but does not need it
Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
$8
1992 2007
FERC Order No. 636
$7
$6 89 92
19 19
The NG Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
$5
1985 1989
FERC Order No. 436
$4
1978 1985
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
$3
1958 1978
Wellhead Price Control
$2
$1
$0
0
0
2
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Ja
$0
$2
$4
$6
$8
$10
$12
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De
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(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
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Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
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Agile Gas Compression is Mandatory for
Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline
Key Regulation Impact on Gas Compression
• Pipeline customers have a choice in • Volumes of gas compressed can
selecting their gas sales, change 4 or more times per day
transportation, and storage services • Based loaded compression will
from any provider, in any quantity continue to be the exception rather
• ‘No-notice' transportation service, than the norm
access to storage facilities, increased • Gas compression facilities need be
flexibility in receipt and delivery points, extremely flexible; regularly varying
and 'capacity release' programs volumes, pressures and is some cases
• Resale of unwanted pipeline capacity bidirectional flows
between pipeline customers • Expanded operating flexibility is
• Electronic bulletin boards show the required to meet the demands of
available and released capacity on any customers
particular pipeline • Efficient operation over a wide range
• Released capacity available for of flows and pressures insures
purchase or lease from one who has competitive transportation costs
already purchased capacity but does • Gas compression should be designed
not need it with an eye on the expansion
Challenges
• Challenge 1: Going forward the price and
demand of natural gas will probably
remain high
• Challenge 2: LNG will become a player
• Challenge 3: Deregulation of the natural
gas industry requires compression
facilities to very flexible and agile
Project Development Stages and
Timelines
• Identify Need
• Determine Facilities to Satisfy Need
– Includes definition of requirements and evaluation of
alternatives
– Timing: 1 month to 24 months
• Have Open Season to Determine Additional
Market Interest
– Assumes an economic alternative has been identified
to satisfy the need or identified need and anticipated
additional market interest
– Timing: 1 month
Project Development Stages and
Timelines - continued
• Finalize Facilities to Satisfy Requirements
Identified during Open Season
– Timing: 1-6 months
• Prepare and Execute Contracts to Support
Project
– Timing: 1-6 months
– This starts the project stopwatch
• Detailed Engineering, Procurement and
Construction of Project
– Includes required FERC filing and associated reports,
right-of-way procurement, environmental permitting
and facility commissioning
– Timing: 6-36 months
‘Squeeze Play in Engineering’
• These legitimate outside forces, Management and Board approvals,
regulations and permits substantially reduce design and
construction timelines for engineering projects
• We need this facility online in 15 months for 17
million dollars; can you do it?
“Yes but we may need to expedite some of the key elements of the
project”
• We being engineers, and not being independently wealthy, take on
the challenge
• These semi-unrealistic timelines can limit ‘attention to detail’ of
some critical elements of the compression facility
• Rigorous specification preparation and evaluation may give way to
the time honored selection method:
“We sent the RFP out to four suppliers, three responded; we made
the selection based upon (first) cost”
Challenges
• Challenge 1: Going forward the price and
demand of natural gas will probably remain high
• Challenge 2: LNG will become a player
• Challenge 3: Deregulation of the natural gas
industry requires compression facilities to very
flexible and agile
• Challenge 4: Outside forces can substantially
limit the design and construction phase of
most gas compression projects
Enough History and Doom and Gloom
Let’s see how to better meet these challenges!
• The effects of these ‘squeeze plays’ can be lessened
– Upfront detailed equipment specification
– Meaningful relationship with the ‘right’ vendors and suppliers
– Qualification of suppliers who have ‘the right stuff’ when it comes
to supplying quality products in a timely manner
– Technical alliances with manufacturer and suppliers to establish
minimum acceptable construction and manufacturing standards
• These are not the traditional (dollar driven) vendor alliances that
many companies established with suppliers in the ’80s and ’90s
• These are technical alliances to streamline product selection and
procurement activities
– Detailed engineering studies, planning and software that will
make the design and construction process easier, allowing more
time for critical design decisions and equipment selection
• Let’s see how
Let’s survey the compressor station
from suction to discharge
120 $2,900
100 $2,800
40 $2,500
20 $2,400
0 $2,300
24 22 20 18 16 14
Nominal Pipe Size (in)
Choosing Pipe Diameter –
A More Rigorous (Better?) Method
$2,900
$2,800
Installed Cost of Pipe, Valves and Fittings
$2,700
$2,500
$2,400
$2,300
14 16 18 20 22 24
Nominal Pipe Size (in)
Installed Cost of Pipe, Valves & Fittings
(PV&F) Has Many Components
• This will only allow us to compare the fuel cost for the 1st
year versus the installed cost of the PV&F
• What we need is a present value comparison over the
projected life of the project
• We need more information…
Choosing Pipe Diameter –
A More Rigorous (Better?) Method
Better generally mean time consuming and costly
14 16 18 20 22 24
Nominal Pipe Size (in)
VCS Sensitivity Studies
• Once you have chosen your piping details and
layout you can use the VCS to perform
sensitivity (what if?) studies
– Suppose the coal seam gas that was scheduled to
produce a flow of 500MM for 3 years and then fall off
expands to 700MM with enhanced drilling
– The temporary compression that was to be used for 5
years becomes a permanent installation; you may
have chosen a small diameter pipe to reduce
installation costs and keep your transportation cost
competitive
General Comments
• Once chosen you are pretty much stuck with your major
gas piping
• The total replacement costs of major plant piping is very
high
• The excessive fuel costs generally will not justify the
expense and downtime required to remedy excessive
pressure losses; this is a cost that your company will
probably endure for the life of the project
• Therefore it is paramount that good choices are made
with proper due diligence
• Another big question is the configuration of multiple
units, series or parallel
• Let’s look at an example using the VCS
VCS Fixed Operating Parameters
• Flow (MMscf/d) ≥ 500
• Specific Gravity 0.599
• LHV (Btu/scf) 943
• Station Suction Pressure (psig) 800
• Station Discharge Pressure (psig) 1,000
• Station Suction Temperature (F) 70
• Station Discharge Temperature (F) 120
• Ambient Air Temperature (F) 100
• Station Elevation (ft) 0
• Heat Rate (Btu/BHP-hr) 7,500
• Fuel Cost ($/Mcf) 8
• Utilization Factor (%) 70
• Compressor Efficiency (%) 80
VCS - Increased Throughput Equates to Increased Fuel Costs
125 $5,000
105 $4,500
85 $4,000
45 $3,000
25 $2,500
5 $2,000
500 600 700 800
Flow (MMscf/d)
VCS - Increased Throughput Equates to Increased Fuel Costs
30 $5.80
25 $5.60
20 $5.40
Suction Pressure Loss (psi)
Discharge Pressure Loss (psi)
Fuel Cost / MM ($/MMscf/d)
15 $5.20
10 $5.00
5 $4.80
500 600 700 800
Flow (MMscf/d)
Compressor Station From Suction
to Discharge
Purchasing
Environmental
Terms & Conditions
Specifications
5 pages
10 Pages
Mechanical Paint
Specifications Specifications
30 Pages 5 pages
Process
Specifications
1 Page
Inlet Filtration / Separation
Specification
Purchasing Environmental
Terms & Conditions Specifications
5 pages 10 Pages
Process
Specifications
1 Page
Knowledge is paramount . . .
A little bit of knowledge goes a long way in properly
specifying inlet filtration equipment
Barriers to knowledge . . .
“ . . . we have always done it that way. . . . the project
schedule does not allow. . . . we do not have the
resources to expend. . . . It is just a &%#@ filter”
‘Cheesy’ filter
retention
hardware lead to
poor sealing of
filter elements
Fuel Cost for High ∆P Inlet Filtration
$300,000 $2,650
$250,000 $2,600
Additional Fuel Cost / Year ($)
$100,000 $2,450
$50,000 $2,400
$0 $2,350
2 5 10 12 15 20
Pressure Differential (psi)
The Decision to R&R Filter Elements
$25,000
$23,000
$22,334
$20,000
Monthly Fuel Costs Delta ($)
$16,057
$15,000
$12,318
$9,837
$10,000 $9,000
$5,000 $3,672
$0
$0
2 5 10 12 15 20 R&R R&R
Filter Coalescer
Inlet Filtration Pressure Drop (psi)
Separator Filter
Actual Inlet Filtration
Differential Pressure
SUCTION SCRUBBER DIFF PRESSURE (CORMIDWWS91A:PRI_INLET_SCRUB_DP) Cyclic
(9/9/2004 9:52:57 AM) 7.40 psid
(12/17/2005 2:46:54 AM) 5.65 psid -1.75 psid (463 days, 16:53:57)
10.00
6.00
4.00
Filter Element
2.00 R&R
0.00
8/1/2004 6/11/2005 4/22/2006
12:00:00 AM 11:40:14 PM 11:20:28 PM
Inlet Filtration Challenges
Misapplied inlet filtration generally results in one or more of
the following:
• Poor filtration efficiency
– Contaminants enter compressor and pipeline
– Increased compressor maintenance costs
– Reduced pipeline efficiencies
– Increased pipeline pigging
• High frequency of filter element replacement
– High O&M costs
– Station unavailable or unprotected equipment and pipe
• High inlet differential pressure
– Increased fuel costs / transportation costs
In Conclusion
• What is worse than a 20 psi differential pressure across
an inlet filter?
• 0 psi differential pressure across an inlet filter!
– Filter elements have collapsed or have been compromised
allowing unfiltered gas, contaminants and debris to enter the
compressor and pipeline
– Improperly installed filter media, clamping devices or seals
• Removing and installing filters elements is a Mike Rowe
kind of job, many times performed by contract personnel
– Insure personnel are knowledgeable and trained
– Insure the filter clamping devices are working properly
– Inspect all work performed on the vessel and verify proper
operation upon startup
• A comprehensive gas stream analysis should be as
automatic as a geotechnical soil survey for greenfield
installations with unknown gas streams
Compressor Station From Suction
to Discharge
Tangible Costs
Intangible Costs
Tangible Cost Breakdown
Intangible Costs
Prime Mover
Compressor
Coupling
Tangible Costs
Intangible Costs
Intangible Cost Breakdown
Tangible Costs
Design Costs
Manufacturing Costs
Overhead
Warranty
Advertising
• Prime Mover
• Compressor
• Coupling
• Inlet and Discharge Bottles
• Pipe, Valves & Fittings
• Skid & Structural Members
• Controls & Instrumentation
• Ancillary Equipment
– Inlet Filtration
– Exhaust Treatment
– Pumps
– Coolers
– Etc.
Intangible Costs
Which items should we be more proactive in specifying?
• Design Costs
– Torsional & Lateral Studies
– Pulsation Studies
– Finite Element Studies
• Manufacturing Costs
• Overhead
• Wages & Salaries
• Warranty
• Marketing & Sales
• Advertising
• Field & Startup Support
• Profit
Actual LS Vs. HS Recip Performance
2,000
Slow Speed
FL/FL Poly. (Slow Speed System)
Poly. (Slow Speed cyl)
Slow Speed
1,500 Lat/Lat Poly. (high speed system)
Poly. (high speed cylinder)
Design Point
Flow Poly. (guaranteed)
Flow (MMscfd)
High Speed
Lat/Lat
Q Delta Lat/Lat
Presented by Harris &
Raymer, 2006 GMC
0
1.20 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.50 1.55 1.60
Compression Ratio
Compressor Station From Suction
to Discharge
110
100
100
90 87
Average Temp (F)
Average High Temp (F)
Highest Recorded Temp (F)
80
70
60
50
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Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Performance Data – Air Side
• Case 1 – M/L station, FBE coated pipe, no
critical delivery points & adequate line pack
– 90°F – line pack and slowing the unit… small $
• Case 2 – M/L station, coal tar pipe coating, no
critical delivery points & adequate line pack
– 100°F – line pack and slowing the unit… larger $$
• Case 3 – Booster station & critical 24/7 delivery
– 117°F – require water assisted cooling with 10°F
temperature approach… very large $$$$
Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Design – Material - Construction
Cooler A Cooler B
• Size 16.0 x 44.0 • Size 14.5 x 46.0
• Tube rows 6 • Tube rows 5
• Rows/Pass 6/2 • Rows/Pass 5/2
Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Design – Material - Construction
• Assure the design pressure is as specified
• Assure cooler will fit your plot plan including walkways
and tube headers
• Top to bottom or ‘over and under’ pass arrangements
are thermally preferable to side to side arrangements;
especially true if condensation is present
• An even number of passes will have the inlet and outlet
headers on the same end
• Unless you are working in viscous fluids you do not want
to specify turbulators or accelerator rods
• Hail screens, Louvers (API standard) & galvanizing
depend upon environmental considerations
Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Design – Material - Construction
Cooler A Cooler B
• Size of nozzle (2) 12.00 • Size of nozzle (2)
10.00
Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Design – Material - Construction
• Sloping tubes is desirable where condensates
are expected
• Specify gasketed shoulder type header plugs
– Specify compatible thread lubricant be used on all
straight threaded connections
– Specify that no thread sealant is to be used on
straight threaded connections
• Verify nozzle sizes, rating and facing
• Ensure sufficient drains, vents and monitoring
points (pressure and temperature) are specified
on the header as required
Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Design – Material - Construction
Cooler A Cooler B
• Tubes / Bundle 441 • Tubes / Bundle 333
• Length 44.0 ft • Length 46.0 ft
Air Cooler Exchanger Comparison
Design – Material - Construction
• 10,500 BHP
• 95% Mechanical Efficiency
• 85% Compression Efficiency
• 500 MMSCF/D Gas Flow
• 550 PSIG Suction Pressure
• 60 F Suction Temperature
• No Pressure Losses
• Solve for HP/MM
– HP = BHP x Mechanical Efficiency
– HP = 10,500 x .95
– HP = 9,975
– HP/MM = 9,975 / 500 MM
– HP/MM = 19.95
Assume:
– $8 / MCF
– 7000 BTU/BHP-HR
– LHV = 900 BTU (LHV) / SCF
– 100% runtime and 100% BHP utilization.
Solution:
– BTU / HR = 10,500 BHP x 7,000 BTU (LHV)
BHP-HR
= 73.5 x 10^6
– SCF / HR = 73.5 x10^6 BTU(LHV)/HR
900 BTU(LHV)/SCF
= 81,667
– MCF / HR = 81.667
– Annual Fuel = 81.667 MCF/HR x 24 x 365
– Annual Fuel = 715,400 MSCF/YR x 8
$100,000
$80,000
$60,000
$40,000
6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000
BSFC, BTU/BHP-HR
What is the effect of compression ratio on
the cost of compression?
Cost of Compression vs. Compression Ratio
$60,000
7,000 BSFC
$8 per MSCF & LHV = 913.8
$50,000 Mechanical Efficiency = 95%
Compression Efficiency = 85%
Suction Pressure = 500
$ / YR / PSI / BCF
$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Compression Ratio
What is the effect of suction pressure on
the cost of compression?
Cost of Compression vs. Suction Pressure
$250,000
7,000 BSFC
$8 per MSCF & LHV = 913.8
Mechanical Efficiency = 95%
$200,000 Compression Efficiency = 85%
Suction
$ / YR / PSI / BCF
Pressure
$150,000
100
200
$100,000 300
400
500
$50,000 600
700
800
$0
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Compression Ratio
Pressure Loss at Multiple
Compressor Stations and the
Cost of Compression
ABC Pipeline
ABC Pipeline transports gas from point A
to point B. There is 500 MMSCF/D
entering the pipeline at Point A. ABC
Pipeline in turn delivers the gas to point B
at a contract pressure of 550 PSIG. ABC
Pipeline has 5 compressor stations on this
segment of pipe.
ABC Pipeline Pressure Profile
850
800
750
700
A
Pressure, PSIG
650
600
550
B
Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 Station 4 Station 5
10,500 BHP 8,000 BHP 9,610 BHP 10,500 BHP 9,845 BHP
500
Design Flow = 500 MMSCF/D 7,000 BSFC
450
Delivery Pressure = 550 PSIG $8 per MSCF & LHV = 913.8
Mechanical Efficiency = 95%
400
Compression Efficiency = 85%
350
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
What happens to the pipeline pressure
profile when pressure losses are added to
the station piping?
• 500 PSIG
• 450 PSIG
• 400 PSIG
• 350 PSIG
• 300 PSIG
• 250 PSIG
The Effect of Station Piping Losses
and the Pipeline Pressure Profile
850
No Station
800
Piping Losses
750
700 A
Pressure, PSIG
650
600
550
B
Station 1 Station Station 3 Station 4 Station 5
500
5 PSI Suction & 5 PSI 163.5 PSI
450 Discharge
St ti Pi i L
400
386.5 PSIG
350
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
The station pressure losses will require
ABC pipeline to build a 6th compressor
station at point B to deliver gas at contract
pressure or add horsepower to an
upstream station.
Pipeline Losses
Finding Good Data
• Search 2005 historical data base
• Search for 3 hr or more time periods were
data remained stable.
– Station suction and discharge pressures
– Pipeline flows
– Receipts and deliveries between the stations
are negligible.
Pipeline Pressure Loss
150
130
Pressure Loss, PSI
110
90
All Data
70
50
600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100
Flow, MM/D
650 - 700 PSIG Upstream Pressure
150
130
Pressure Loss, PSI
110
90
650
660
70 670
680
690
50
600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100
Flow, MM/D
580 & 680 PSIG Upstream Pressure
150
130
Pressure Loss, psi
110
90
580
680
Linear (580)
70
Linear (680)
50
600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100
Flow, MM/D
What are the potential fuel savings by
operating with the upstream pressure at
680 PSIG vs 580 PSIG?
Assume
– Compression efficiency = 85%
– 5 psig suction & 5 psig discharge losses
– 60 F suction temperature
Solve for HP/MM
– HP/MM = 17.71
Calculate BHP
300 MM/D
500 PSIG
How much fuel is wasted across the
pressure regulating valve?
Assume
– BSFC = 7,000 BTU/BHP-HR
– LHV = 913 BTU/SCF
– Gas = $8 MSCF
MSCF/HR = 5591 x 7000 / 913 / 1000
= 42.87
MMSCF/YR = 375,509
$ / YR = $3,004,080
500 MM/D 200 MM/D
475 PSIG 700 PSIG
Compressor
Station
300 MM/D
500 PSIG
9,500
9,000
BSFC
8,500
8,000
7,500
7,000
1,500 1,800 2,100 2,400 2,700 3,000
Brake Horsepower
Worthington SUTC 1610
10,000
9,500
9,000
BSFC
8,500
8,000
7,500
7,000
1,500 1,800 2,100 2,400 2,700 3,000
Brake Horsepower
Part Load Operation
“A” Plant
• 12 Cooper-Bessemer GMW-6TF
• Installed in the 1950’s
• Engine site rated horsepower = 1,404 BHP
• Total installed horsepower = 16,848 BHP
• Designed for compression ratio ~ 2.0
“A” Plant - Today
• Operating pressures and flows have changed.
• Today “A” Plant is utilized as a swing station.
• Ratios varies between = 1.1 - 1.6.
• Engines run at part load most of the time.
• Average engine load = 58%
• Average required horsepower = 6,000 BHP
• Average units operating =8
Proposed Solution
11,000
10,000
9,000
8,000
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110%
% Load
Potential Savings
6.00
4.00
Filter Element
2.00 R&R
0.00
8/1/2004 6/11/2005 4/22/2006
12:00:00 AM 11:40:14 PM 11:20:28 PM
Why is the cost of
compression so high?
• Turbines?
• Regenerator?
• Suction piping and Scrubbers?
• Discharge piping and coolers?
Station Piping Loses
• ~15 psi pressure loss from the suction piping,
valves and scrubbers.
• ~15 psi pressure loss from the discharge
piping, valves and gas cooling.
• ~25% of the BHP & fuel is used to overcome
the station piping pressure losses.
Solutions
• Replace regenerators
• Replace suction piping and plug valves
• Replace vertical scrubbers with one
designed to remove pigging debris.
• Replace discharge piping and plug valves
• More coolers to reduce pressure losses
• Replace orifice meter with an ultrasonic
• Potential Savings $ / YR = $4.2 MM
Solutions
OR