Alliance Strategies

Perhaps the most common strategy for reducing vulnerabilities or diminishing threats is to augment military power, not just by building
up one’s own capabilities, but by enlisting the aid of others. As Thucydides observed 2,500 years ago, and as modern experimental and
historical studies have substantiated, mutual fear is the most solid basis upon which to organize an alliance. When two or more parties
perceive a common threat, they are likely to engage in various types of military collaboration, which can range from the informal
provision of technical advisers, granting of arms, or exchange of information, to its most concrete form: a formal alliance.

There are a variety of alliance forms. The distinctions between them are important, because they have significant effects on
military planning and deployments. Some, for example, provide only for the augmentation of a country’s military forces through foreign
assistance; others imply much greater commitments. Military alliances can be classified and compared according to four main criteria:
(1) the nature of the casus foederis (the situation in which mutual commitments are to become operational); (2) the type of commitments
undertaken by the alliance partners; (3) the degree of military integration of the military forces of the alliance partners; and (4) the
geographic scope of the treaty.

The Casus Foederis. — Although partners to an alliance have similar or overlapping foreign policy objectives, negotiators of
the treaty are usually very cautious in defining the casus foederis. Some treaties, particularly those in recent years that have been used
for offensive purposes, contain a very vague definition of the situation that will bring the alliance into operation. Because of universal
condemnation of outright aggressive military alliances, offensive treaties seldom express their real purpose. The 1939 German-Italian
“Pact of Steel,” for example, provided: “If it should happen, against the wishes and hopes of the contrasting parties, that one of them
should become involved in warlike complications . . . the other contracting party will come to its aid as an ally and will support it with
all its military forces.” The term war-like complications is so vague that it could (and did) commit Italy to assist Hitler in an almost any
situation. Soviet mutual-assistance treaties with Bulgaria and Romania (1948) also had such obscure definitions of the casus foederis
(“drawn into military activities” was the phrased used) that it was difficult to predict when and under what exact circumstances the
Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian armies would begin military operations. In contrast to the vague casus foederis are those that contain
a very precise definition of the situation in which the alliance is to be put into effect militarily. The NATO treaty, in Article 5, states that
military measures can be taken only in response to an actual armed attack on one of the signatories.

Commitments Undertaken. — Alliance treaties also differ according to the type of responses and responsibilities required
once the situation calling for action develops. The Soviet-Bulgarian treaty of 1948 unequivocally provided that if one of the parties is
“drawn into military activities,” the other will “immediately give . . . military and other help by all means at its disposal.” This type of
commitment is called a “hair-trigger” clause, because it automatically commits the signatories to military action if the casus foederis
occurs. A similar clause is found in the Brussels pact among Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Since the
clause establishes automatic commitments, it leaves little leeway for decision makers and diplomats to decide what to do once the
casus foederis arises.

In contrast, some treaties only vaguely spell out the type of responses the treaty partners will make. The ANZUS treaty, which
ties Australia, New Zealand, and the United States into a defensive alliance system, provides that each party will “act to meet the danger
. . . in accordance with its constitutional processes.” This treaty contains no precise military commitments, nor does it prescribe any
course of action to which the parties commit themselves if one of them is attacked. Similarly, the renewed Japanese-American security
treaty of 1960 provides only for “consultations” between the parties if Japan is attacked.

Alliance responsibilities may be mutual or one-sided. Mutual-defense treaties theoretically require all the signatories to assume
equal commitments toward each other. According to the principles in the NATO and Warsaw Treaties, an attack on any one of the
signatories is to be considered an attack on all, requiring every signatory to come to the aid of the victim of aggression or armed attack.
Other alliance treaties impose unequal burdens on the signatories. After “consultations,” the United States may become obligated to
defend Japan against external attack, but the Japanese are not obligated under the 1960 security treaty to assist in the defense of North
America if war or invasion should occur there.

A variation of the unequal-burden treaty is the guarantee treaty, whereby one or more states receive guarantees for their security
from a third party or parties, while the guaranteeing power or powers receive nothing in return except perhaps the possibility of
enhancing stability and peace. Guarantee treaties of this variety were popular in the 1920s; one prominent example was the Locarno
treaty of 1925, in which Great Britain and Italy undertook to come to the assistance of France, Belgium, or Germany, depending on
which was attacked or was the target of a violation of the Franco-Belgian-German frontiers. For guaranteeing these frontiers, Italy and
Great Britain received in return no tangible commitments from the beneficiaries.

Integration of Forces. — Alliances may also be distinguished according to the degree of integration of military forces.
Alliance treaties in historic international systems seldom provided for more than casual coordination of military planning, while national
forces remained organizationally and administratively distinct. European alliances in the eighteenth century typically required
signatories to provide a specified number of men and/or funds for the common effort, but otherwise set forth no plans for coordinated
military operations or integrating forces or commands. Any coordination that did take place was the result of ad hoc decisions made
after hostilities began. In one of the most enduring alliances of the nineteenth century, the Austro-German Dual Alliance of 1879,
rudimentary military coordination was carried out only through the services of military attachés in Vienna and Berlin; and when the
alliance was put to the test in 1914, German military and political leaders knew very little about Austria’s mobilization plans.

Since World War II, the major leaders of both coalitions sought to increase military integration to the extent that allied forces
would operate, if war came, almost as one unified armed force. Integration may be accomplished by establishing a supreme commander
of all allied forces (such as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in NATO); standardizing weapons system for all national forces
(barely begun in NATO); integrating military personnel of different countries into one command structure (as proposed in the ill-fated
European Defense Community); or permitting one of the major alliance partners to organize, draft, and direct all strategic and tactical
war plans for the other partners. Major alliances today also have permanent headquarters, continuous political and military
consultations, innumerable meetings of technical experts, and a continuing avalanche of memoranda and staff studies.

Geographical Scope. — Finally, alliances differ with respect to the scope of their coverage. Soviet mutual-aid treaties were
designed to cover only the territory of the state that is attacked or “drawn into military activities,” but one of the major problems in
drafting and interpreting the NATO treaty concerned whether the signatories could be committed to defend the overseas colonies
territories of France or Great Britain. The French and British governments insisted that NATO obligations extend to at least some of
their overseas territories; so Article 5 of the treaty was drafted to read: “. . . an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to
include an attack on the territory of any of the Parties . . . , on the Algerian department of France, on the occupation forces of any Party
in Europe, on the islands under jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, or on the vessels or
aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.” In 1965, coverage of the treaty was extended to Malta, which had received protection under
Article 5 by virtue of being “an island under the jurisdiction of” Great Britain, but which received its independence in 1964.

Although these distinctions relating to the forms and types of alliances may seem quite technical, they are important because
precise definitions of scope, casus foederis, and obligations lend predictability to the responses alliance partners will make in crises
situations. Predictability is an important element in international stability and may become crucial in crisis situations. One of the main
objections against secret treaties and alliances is that decision makers cannot plan actions and predict responses of both friends and
potential enemies if they are not familiar with treaty commitments and obligations. However, it must be acknowledged that treaties do
not provide complete predictability, and the circumstances of the moment will largely determine the responses alliance partners make
in critical times. The NATO treaty, for example, stipulates that the parties will decide how to commit themselves only at the time an
“armed attack” takes place against one of the signatories. Yet, if the Soviets had launched a massive invasion of Western Europe, there
is little doubt that previously drafted retaliatory plans of the NATO bureaucracy would have come into effect almost instantaneously,
with slight latitude for negotiations and discussions among the treaty partners. In such a situation, even when alliance commitments
are common knowledge, do alliance strategies succeed?

No generalizations can be offered as to whether defensive alliances successfully deter aggression or provide stability for the
international system. Presumably, a potential aggressor faced with an overwhelming coalition against it will not risk destruction of its
society when it possesses foreknowledge of certain defeat. Yet decision makers do not always behave rationally in crisis situations, and
there are enough examples (discussed in more detail in Chapter 10) of their going to war knowing that the probability of success was
low to disprove this presumption. All we can say is that alliances probably inject a factor of caution among decision makers with
aggressive designs; defensive alliances increase greatly the risks and costs to the aggressor, but do not necessarily prevent organized
violence. We can only speculate on the wars that did not begin because alliances effectively performed the deterrence function; but
both past and present reveal occasions when defensive alliances failed to deter, lower tensions, or promote stability in the system.

Strains in Alliances

Aside from poor military coordination or planning, one reason that alliances may fail to deter potential aggressors is that they lack
political cohesiveness or are riven by quarrels and political disagreements. Presumably, any military coalition will be more effective to
the extent that its members agree on the major objectives to be achieved, help each other diplomatically, and trust that once the casus
foederis arises, the partners will in fact meet their commitments. In any international system compromised of independent and sovereign
states, however, there is no automatic guarantee that even the most solemn undertakings will be fulfilled if those commitments are in
conflict with the prevailing interests of different governments. Several situations can cause strains in alliances, impairing their
effectiveness both as a deterrents and as fighting organizations.

(1) The first when the objectives of two or more parties begin to diverge. If all partners of a defensive military coalition perceive
a common enemy or threat, the alliance is likely to withstand strains caused by ideological incompatibles or distrust arising from
personality differences between political leaders. But if the objectives become incongruent, or the potential enemy of one alliance
partner is not the enemy of the other, serious problems of cooperation and coordination arise and make the alliance more formal than
real.

The American-Pakistani alliance during the Cold War was more a means through which Pakistan received arms than a coalition
leading to meaningful diplomatic cooperation. When the United States induced Pakistan to join SEATO in 1954, it regarded the Moslem
country as a bulwark against communism. The purpose of the alliance, as seen from Washington, was to prevent the USSR or Communist
China from moving into South Asia. Pakistan, however, concluded the alliance primarily to obtain America arms and diplomatic support
against India, its traditional enemy. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan reached a low point in the 1960s when
Pakistan criticized the United States for failure to lend it support on the Kashmir issue and, as the Pakistan government saw it, for giving
comfort to the Indians. Left virtually isolated on the Kashmir problem, Pakistan turned increasingly to Communist China, which was also
embroiled in a border conflict with India. The American response to Pakistan's flirtation with China was manifested in reduction of
economic and military aid. American diplomats desperately tried to induce the government of Pakistan to reiterate that the “common
enemy” was China, a view the Pakistanis could not easily accept as long as their only diplomatic support against India came from Beijing.

(2) Alliance cohesion is also apt to be strained if a threat arises against only one or a few of the alliance partners, so that other
members do not perceive the same threat. The Cyprus issue has long divided Greece and Turkey and created strains between each of
them and other NATO members. Planning to fight an unlikely war against the Soviet Union seemed less important to them than the
emotion-laden ethnic issues surrounding the Cyprus conflict. Indeed, in this case, the alliance has functioned more as an arena for
prosecuting an intra-alliance conflict than as an organization for collective security.

(3) A third factor that may lead to strains in military alliances is incompatibility of the major social and political values of allying
states. By themselves, ideological incompatibilities seldom prevent formation of military coalitions as long as the parties face a common
enemy. The study by Ole R. Holsti and his colleagues of 130 alliances, nonaggression pacts, and ententes reveals that ideology is not
an important factor in creating alliances, although ideologically homogeneous partners are more likely to create alliances of high
commitment (such as military undertakings rather than ententes). We would hypothesize that in a condition of high threat, alliances of
ideologically heterogeneous partners might cohere; but, given lack of a common enemy, or even a low level of threat perception,
ideological factors would operate to reduce alliance cohesion. Certainly there are recent illustrations that would lend some support to
the hypothesis. Ideologically mixed alliances may be confronted with misunderstandings and suspicion, usually expressed in
unwillingness to share military secrets or coordinate military programs and campaigns, and a decided feeling that the other alliance
partner is failing to live up to its commitments. During World War II, the Soviet Union, which for two decades had urged and worked
for the overthrow of “decadent” bourgeois regimes in Western Europe, eagerly formed an alliance with these regimes once it was
attacked by Germany. The threat posed by Nazi Germany to the rest of the world was so apparent that even Western liberal democrats
and conservatives supported the alliance with the Communists. On the other hand, the wartime alliance operated with many irritations
because of deep-seated attitudes of distrust and ideological differences. Stalin feared that the Western Allies would make a separate
peace with Germany, leaving the Nazis free to crush his regime; alternately, he interpreted the failure of the Allies to invade France
before 1944 as evidence of their intention to let the Nazis and Communists bleed each other to death so that the capitalists could come
in later to pick up the pieces. Even at the administrative level, distrust was reflected in Stalin's refusal to allow British and American
military officials to observe Soviet operations in the field, let the Western Allies establish air bases on Soviet territory, or permit Lend-
Lease officers to investigate Soviet military and matériel requirements. The allied wartime coalition was only a temporary marriage of
convenience. On the other hand, the Anglo-American alliance is strong and withstands frequent disagreements between the two
partners, not just because the overall interests of the two countries coincide but also because the two countries represent similar
cultural, political and social traditions.

4. Finally, development of nuclear weapons may have divisive effects on modern alliances. In the post-World War II period, most
states of Western Europe were eager to receive the protection of the American “nuclear umbrella.” Military weak, they had no capacity
to deter a possible Soviet invasion carried out by the massive Red Army in Eastern Europe and had to allocate their scarce resources
for rebuilding their war-torn economies. By the 1960s, the situation had changed. Europe was recovered economically and entering a
period of unprecedented prosperity. The Russians no longer possessed a military manpower advantage as compared to NATO. Most
important, the nuclear monopoly held by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s had come to an end. Washington, New
York, and Houston were as vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack as Leningrad, Moscow, and Baku were to an American nuclear salvo. In
a system of Soviet-American mutual deterrence, some observers — particularly French military officials — questioned whether the
United States would be willing to destroy itself in order to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union.

Is a deterrent really credible if the guaranteeing power knows beforehand that it must destroy itself to save others?

Contemporary critics of American-European relations have argued that even though they find no fault with American intentions
to defend Europe, they are not convinced that in all possible crisis situations, the Americans could be expected to live up to their
commitments. This is not a uniquely American weakness, they emphasize. It is a fact of international life that no state is apt to invite its
own destruction in order to defend others. In this kind of nuclear statement situation, the “others” must be armed with nuclear weapons
so that if the “nuclear umbrella” fails to operate, smaller allies would still have independent means of deterring possible moves against
their vital interests.