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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2011

Responding to the Call: Just War and Jihad

in the War Against Al Qaeda
Nahed Artoul Zehr

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 THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

RESPONDING TO THE CALL: JUST WAR AND JIHAD IN THE WAR AGAINST AL-

QAEDA

By

NAHED ARTOUL ZEHR

A Dissertation submitted to the

Department of Religion
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Summer Semester, 2011
The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Nahed Artoul Zehr defended on June
3rd, 2011.

_______________________________________
John Kelsay
Professor Directing Dissertation

_______________________________________
Lois Hawkes
University Representative

_______________________________________
Adam Gaiser
Committee Member

_______________________________________
Aline Kalbian
Committee Member

_______________________________________
Sumner B. Twiss
Committee Member

Approved:

_____________________________________
John Corrigan, Chair, Department of Religion

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.
ii
For my teachers and colleagues, with respect;

For my family and friends, with affection;

For my husband, with love - and all that it entails.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dissertation projects are laborious; this is true. This one has not been an exception.
However it has been a labor that I enjoyed and from which I grew as a thinker and a writer. To
the extent that this was possible, I owe thanks to many.
I wish to thank both the University of Iowa and the Florida State University for generous
financial support – through assistantships and a university fellowship - that allowed me to work
towards the completion of my degree. Additionally, I would like to express a heartfelt thank-you
to the Department of Religion at Florida State University: First, for hosting me as a visiting
researcher in the spring of 2009; and second, for opening their doors to me as an official student
in the fall of 2010. A more welcoming and productive environment I could not have imagined.
My biggest debts (happily accrued) are to my teachers. At the University of Iowa I had
the great fortune to work with Dr. Howard Rhodes, who became an advisor, a mentor, and a true-
blue friend. Dr. Rhodes introduced me to the field of just war, and provided invaluable feedback
on my work and intellectual progress. His counsel and friendship continue to serve as guiding
marks for my academic life. I would further like to thank Dr. Diana Fritz-Cates, whose
dedication and enthusiasm for the field of religious ethics, and for her students, continue to serve
as primary sources of inspiration for my own work and teaching. An additional thank-you to Dr.
Ahmed Souaiaia, and to Dr. Richard Turner for guiding me through the fields of Islam, and
Islam in America, and for patiently agreeing to supervise and comment on numerous
independent studies and research projects.
I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Adam Gaiser, Dr. Aline Kalbian, Dr. Sumner B.
Twiss, and Dean Lois Hawkes - who not only read the dissertation draft, but provided extensive
and insightful feedback. Their comments have allowed me to envision the various outlines and
contours that will shape the future direction of this project.
I wish to especially thank Dr. James Turner Johnson, whose foundational work on the
just war tradition has been formative for my thinking and understanding of the field. While Dr.
Johnson was not a formal member of my dissertation committee, his influence on this
dissertation– particularly in regard to my understanding of the just war‟s characterization and
continuing applicability - are clear throughout the pages of this project.
To my advisor, Dr. Kelsay, I wish to express my very deepest gratitude. My own work
would not have been possible without his groundbreaking books on comparative ethics, the just
war tradition, and Islam. Furthermore, it was through conversations with him on the field of
religious ethics that I was able to imagine the framework for my own projects, and to garner an
understanding of myself as a scholar. Working under his direction has nurtured a more nuanced,
and sophisticated appreciation for a field that I love and respect. Dr. Kelsay has also initiated my
new-found interest in the great American past-time. And while I remain a baseball novice, I
have formed a dedication to the Minnesota Twins, and a commitment to learning the game!
I would also like to express thanks to multiple colleagues who provided support along the
way. A thank-you, expressed in respect and friendship, to the REP women – Betsy Barre
(alumna), Kate Temoney, Rosemary Kellison, Tamara Marks, Shannon Dunn, Julie Fortune,
Emily Cox and, of course, Richard E. Harry. Without their company, feedback, and counsel I
would not have enjoyed (personally or academically) the last two years of graduate school nearly
as much.
To my friends – and in particular – to Melissa Carpenter, and Sarah Saffold – whose
continued support has helped me through the best and most difficult moments of graduate school

iv
life. I am forever grateful for their sincere and deep friendship and their continual assertions that
I could make it through.
A tremendous and profound thank-you - from the very bottom of a daughter‟s and sister‟s
heart - is owed to my family on both the Artoul and Zehr side. It is difficult to express my
appreciation for the love and support that they have provided. In particular my parents, Dr. and
Mrs. Samir and Afifa Artoul, have been an unending source of love and encouragement. Their
insistence on excellence has maintained my ability (in both my personal and professional life) to
continue to reach beyond what I might otherwise have believed to be possible.
And to my husband, Joel: words can neither express, nor do justice to, my love, respect
and appreciation for you. Thanks for believing in me when no one else did, and in the moments
when I couldn‟t. YAMSM. Forever.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract viii

1. INTRODUCTION: 1
1.0 The War against Al-Qaeda 1
1.1 Overall Contributions of the Dissertation 2
1.2 Methods 4
1.3 Arguments 6
1.4 Chapter Descriptions 12

2. A “DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR”: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE WAR AGAINST

AL-QAEDA 15
2.0 Introduction 15
2.1 Irregular War: A Model 19
2.1.1 Terms 19
2.1.2 Tactics 22
2.1.3 Revolution 29
2.1.4 Counterinsurgency Theory 31
2.2 The Battlegrounds of Iraq and Afghanistan in the War against Al-Qaeda 33
2.2.1 Afghanistan 36
2.2.2 Iraq 39
2.3 Al-Qaeda 44
2.4 Concluding Remarks 49

3. FRAMING THE NEW JIHAD: AL-SURI AND THE AL-QAEDA MODEL OF

WAR 53
3.0 Introduction 53
3.0.1 A note on Sources 57
3.1 The Example of the Prophet 58
3.1.1 The Religious Polity, Authority and War 59
3.1.2 The Taking of Mecca: A Paradigm for the Limit of Force 63
3.2 The Early Caliphate 67
3.2.1 A Unified Polity, Authority and War 68
3.3 The Jurists: A Doctrine of Jihad 72
3.3.1 War and the State 74
3.3.2 War and Authority 77
3.3.3 War and its Limits 79
3.4 Contemporary Departures 81
3.4.1 The Faridah on Authority 83
3.4.2 The Faridah on Limits 85
3.5 Al-Suri‟s Formation 86
3.5.1 The Diagnosis 89
3.5.2 Al-Suri‟s Remedy: The Al-Qaeda Model on Authority 93
3.5.3 The Tactical Model 95
3.5.4 Al-Suri on Limits 100
3.6 Concluding Remarks 102

vi
4. JUST WAR REASONING IN THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA 104
4.0 Introduction 104
4.1 The Frameworks: Counterinsurgency 108
4.2 The Frameworks: Counter-Terrorism 113
4.2.1 Drone Technology 114
4.2.2 Preemptive War 116
4.3 The Just War Tradition 118
4.3.1 Applying the Tradition to Contemporary War 122
4.3.2 The Just War Tradition on the Authority of Irregulars 125
4.3.3 The Just War Tradition on Jus in Bello and Irregular War 130
4.3.3.1 Paul Ramsey 130
4.3.3.2 Michael Walzer 133
4.4 The Just War Tradition on Counterinsurgency 134
4.4.1 Al-Qaeda and the Question of Authority 134
4.4.2 Al-Qaeda and Jus in Bello 136
4.4.3 The Just War Tradition on Counterterrorism 140
4.5 Concluding Remarks 148

5. THEOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES: A DEBATE WITHIN THE TRADITION 150

5.0 Introduction 150
5.1 Abou El Fadl and the Crisis of Authority 153
5.2 The Moderate Position: Conceptual Foundations 156
5.3 The Moderate Position: A Critical Issue 165
5.4 Yusuf Qaradawi: A Traditional Contribution to the Moderate Position 167
5.5 Concluding Remarks: Implications for the Long War 171

6. CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD IN THE LONG WAR 174

6.0 The Narratives 174
6.1 The Framing of American Policy 175
6.2 The Uprisings in the Muslim World 177
6.3 The Death of Osama bin Laden 179

APPENDIX 182

A. TRANSLATION OF THE GLOBAL ISLAMIC RESISTANCE CALL; CHAPTER TWO,

SECTION 1. 182

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 196

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 206

vii
 ABSTRACT

This project is an examination of the War against al-Qaeda from the field of religious
ethics. In response to September Eleventh, the United States has spent the last decade fighting a
war against a diffuse and elusive network of militant Islamists. These events have not been
neglected by the scholarly community, and a range of material on al-Qaeda and the War on
Terror1 have been produced.2 However, I argue that the majority of available research does not
take sufficient account of the theological foundation that serves to give al-Qaeda meaning,
legitimacy, and direction in its war against the West.3
As a work of religious ethics, this project begins from inquiries that seek to understand
how individuals and groups are motivated, and action is legitimated, by way of religious and
moral commitments. I argue that such inquiries carry particular relevance in the War against al-
Qaeda, as it stands by way of clear observation that al-Qaeda is a religious, and hence,
theologically driven organization. Understanding al-Qaeda‟s “grand strategy” – a key
component in any effort to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” the al-Qaeda network – requires an
investigation into its theological underpinnings. In order to perceive the full spectrum of al-
Qaeda‟s aims, as well as the manner in which these aims have affected its particular tactical
model of war, it is necessary to examine the religious narratives and symbols that lend them both
meaning and consequence. Through such an approach, this dissertation demonstrates that al-
Qaeda has intentionally put forward a strategic and tactical model that is diffuse in geographical
reach, decentralized in authority, and virtually indiscriminate in its application of force.
Understanding Al-Qaeda‟s war model carries important implications for an American
military response. From the inception of hostilities, major military and policy decision makers
determined that this was a “different kind of war”; one necessitating a decisive shift from a focus
on conventional combat to the realm of irregular warfare As a consequence the relevant
decision makers have made a concerted effort to categorize al-Qaeda‟s structure and strategy.
As discussed above, two conceptual and military models have been put forward in the attempt to

1
As will be discussed, the “War against Terror,” from its inception, was construed as a “War against al-Qaeda.”
Therefore, in this project, unless otherwise indicated the terms: “War against Terror”; “War against al-Qaeda” and
“The Long War” will be used interchangeably.
2
Sf, Michael Scheuer (formerly “Anonymous”, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror
(Washington D.C.: Brassey‟s, Inc., 2004). Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical
Islam‟s War against America (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003). Also see footnote 11.
3
A notable exception is John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

viii
both understand, and to combat, the al-Qaeda network: “counterinsurgency” and
“counterterrorism.” The former construes al-Qaeda as a world-wide militant Islamist insurgency
that has penetrated into Iraq and Afghanistan. Relying on the classic principles of military
counterinsurgency, policy and military decision makers have determined that both “fronts” must
be “secured” to ensure an overall al-Qaeda defeat. The latter, and in many ways much less
dominant stream, understands al-Qaeda as a network of terrorists violating both domestic and
international law. An al-Qaeda defeat, under this second line of thinking, requires apprehending,
detaining, or killing high-level leaders, in the hope that their absence will lead to an overall
infrastructure collapse.
However, once al-Qaeda‟s diffuse and decentralized model is illustrated, I argue that a
reevaluation of both models is in order. The highly irregular nature of the al-Qaeda network
requires that both military frameworks are assessed as they apply specifically to al-Qaeda.
Through the application of the moral and ethical guidelines of the just war tradition, I argue that
neither framework is able to provide an application of military force that is effectual and
proportionate - in other words, that is just.
Furthermore, noting the importance of the interpretive narratives that drive al-Qaeda, I
argue that in addition to the use of military force, the Long War must take note of the theological
alternatives that are presented by a variety of figures within the Muslim community. As this
entity is organized and motivated by a set of theological interpretive narratives encompassing the
historical and textual tradition of Islam, combating al-Qaeda requires the presence, and perhaps
the engagement, of an alternative set of narratives.

ix
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: CONTRIBUTIONS, METHODS, AND

ARGUMENTS

1.0 The War against al-Qaeda

Osama bin Laden issued his first declaration of war against the United States on August
23 , 1996, in a tract called “A Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land
rd

of the Two Holy Sanctuaries.” Those familiar with his earlier statements will note the recurring
references to the “occupation” of Saudi Arabia and Palestine; a central and continuing theme in
his diatribes against the West.4 According to bin Laden, emancipating the Two Holy Sanctuaries
is the stepping stone to the liberation of the entirety of Muslim lands from Western domination
and oppression. All Muslims, he argued, must participate in the armed struggle to unshackle the
Holy Sanctuaries from Western occupation, and to unify the greater Muslim world. As he
exhorts, “Men of the radiant future of our umma of Muhammad, raise the banner of jihad up high
against the Judeo-American alliance that has occupied the holy place of Islam.”5
The full force of this agenda, however, is not apparent until bin Laden –the leading
signatory of the World Islamic Front - produced the “Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,”
issued on February 23rd, 1998. In this relatively short document, bin Laden provides a list of
American “crimes and sins”: the ongoing American occupation of the Arabian Pennisula; the
damage inflicted on the Iraqi people as a result of the first Gulf War and continuing economic
sanctions; American support of Israel; and a pernicious economic and religious foreign policy
that seeks to weaken, fragment and ultimately destroy the Arab-Muslim states. Bin Laden
continues by arguing that such actions clearly constitute an aggressive war on Muslim lands; one
which ultimately seeks the destruction of Islam and its people. For bin Laden, then, an American

4
See, Osama bin Laden, “The Betrayal of Palestine” available at:
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Open_Letter_to_Shaykh_Bin_Baz_on_the_Invalidity_of_his_Fatwa_on_Peace_with_t
he_Jews
5
Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad” in Bruce Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: The Statements of
Osama bin Laden (London: Verson, 2005), 29.

1
war of aggression against the Muslim world is an empirical fact. Furthermore, the injunctions of
Islam on the situation at hand are exceedingly clear. Therefore, he argues that to:

“kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty for
every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it possible to do it, in order to liberate the
al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] from their grip, in order for their armies to move
out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim……every Muslim who
believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God‟s order to kill the Americans and
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it [Emphasis mine].”6

Bin Laden‟s militant organization, al-Qaeda, wasted no time giving constructive form to
its declaration of a global war. Within a span of five years, al-Qaeda had attacked the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (both in 1988), the USS Cole in Yemen, and in a dramatic
climax of events - the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Since then, al-Qaeda has been associated with
attacks on the commuter train systems in Madrid and London (2004 and 2005) and is thought to
be the driving force behind a growing line of “lone wolf” jihadists - such as Richard Colvin Reid
and Faisal Shahzad.
The United States responded with its own declaration of war. Since then, the War against
al-Qaeda, or the “Long War,” as it has come to be called, has been a central tenet in the
American canon of national security. In the attempt to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-
Qaeda, the United States has entered two large-scale and ferociously complex military
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as undertaken the use of what I will term
“extraordinary” tools of counterterrorism (discussed more below).

1.1 Overall Contributions of the Dissertation

This project is an examination of the War against al-Qaeda from the field of religious
ethics. In response to September Eleventh, the United States has spent the last decade fighting a
war against a diffuse and elusive network of militant Islamists. These events have not been
neglected by the scholarly community, and a range of material on al-Qaeda and the War on

6
See, http://www.rbvincent.com/warosama.htm

2
Terror7 have been produced.8 However, I argue that the majority of available research does not
take sufficient account of the theological foundation that serves to give al-Qaeda meaning,
legitimacy, and direction in its war against the West.9
As a work of religious ethics, this project begins from inquiries that seek to understand
how individuals and groups are motivated, and action is legitimated, by way of religious and
moral commitments. I argue that such inquiries carry particular relevance in the War against al-
Qaeda, as it stands by way of clear observation that al-Qaeda is a religious, and hence,
theologically driven organization. Understanding al-Qaeda‟s “grand strategy” – a key
component in any effort to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” the al-Qaeda network – requires an
investigation into its theological underpinnings. In order to perceive the full spectrum of al-
Qaeda‟s aims, as well as the manner in which these aims have affected its particular tactical
model of war, it is necessary to examine the religious narratives and symbols that lend them both
meaning and consequence. Through such an approach, this dissertation demonstrates that al-
Qaeda has intentionally put forward a strategic and tactical model that is diffuse in geographical
reach, decentralized in authority, and virtually indiscriminate in its application of force.
Understanding Al-Qaeda‟s war model carries important implications for an American
military response. From the inception of hostilities, major military and policy decision makers
determined that this was a “different kind of war”; one necessitating a decisive shift from a focus
on conventional combat to the realm of irregular warfare As a consequence the relevant
decision makers have made a concerted effort to categorize al-Qaeda‟s structure and strategy.
As discussed above, two conceptual and military models have been put forward in the attempt to
both understand, and to combat, the al-Qaeda network: “counterinsurgency” and
“counterterrorism.” The former construes al-Qaeda as a world-wide militant Islamist insurgency
that has penetrated into Iraq and Afghanistan. Relying on the classic principles of military
counterinsurgency, policy and military decision makers have determined that both “fronts” must
be “secured” to ensure an overall al-Qaeda defeat. The latter, and in many ways much less
dominant stream, understands al-Qaeda as a network of terrorists violating both domestic and
7
As will be discussed, the “War against Terror,” from its inception, was construed as a “War against al-Qaeda.”
Therefore, in this project, unless otherwise indicated the terms: “War against Terror”; “War against al-Qaeda” and
“The Long War” will be used interchangeably.
8
Sf, Michael Scheuer (formerly “Anonymous”, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror
(Washington D.C.: Brassey‟s, Inc., 2004). Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical
Islam‟s War against America (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003). Also see footnote 11.
9
A notable exception is John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

3
international law. An al-Qaeda defeat, under this second line of thinking, requires apprehending,
detaining, or killing high-level leaders, in the hope that their absence will lead to an overall
infrastructure collapse.
However, once al-Qaeda‟s diffuse and decentralized model is illustrated, I argue that a
reevaluation of both models is in order. The highly irregular nature of the al-Qaeda network
requires that both military frameworks are assessed as they apply specifically to al-Qaeda.
Through the application of the moral and ethical guidelines of the just war tradition, I argue that
neither framework is able to provide an application of military force that is effectual and
proportionate - in other words, that is just.
Furthermore, noting the importance of the interpretive narratives that drive al-Qaeda, I
argue that in addition to the use of military force, the Long War must take note of the theological
alternatives that are presented by a variety of figures within the Muslim community. As this
entity is organized and motivated by a set of theological interpretive narratives encompassing the
historical and textual tradition of Islam, combating al-Qaeda requires the presence, and perhaps
the engagement, of an alternative set of narratives.

1.2 Methods
As a work of religious ethics,10 this project begins from inquiries that seek to understand
how individuals and groups are motivated, and action is legitimated, by way of religious
commitments. In greater detail, this project approaches al-Qaeda through what William
Schweiker describes as a “multidimensional” method of the field; one that is determined through
a set of interrelated modes of inquiry that serve to direct its “comparative, critical, and
constructive” tasks.11 Understood in this way, religious ethics involves the critical investigation

10
Note that the characterization and methods of the field of religious ethics are contested. For discussions on these
points, see William Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. William
Schweiker (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008). Journal of Religious Ethics (Focus on the Comparative Study
of Religious Ethics), 36.3, September 2008. Journal of Religious Ethics (Focus on Anthropos and Ethics), 33.2,
June, 2005. For individual illustrations of method, see David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Religious
Ethics: A New Method (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds, Cosmogony and
Ethical Order: New Studies in Comparative Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). Ronald Green,
Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press).
11
Here, I am indebted to what William Schweiker terms, “the emerging hermeneutical and multidimensional”
approach, which he describes as one option that stands alongside the others described in the works listed in footnote
6. William Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. William
Schweiker (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), 5.

4
and description of a community‟s religious and moral life, as well as the use of its authoritative
sources, in the task of responding to the questions posed by contemporary problems.12
The above is undertaken through a set of categories, or what Schweiker refers to as
“dimensions,” that bring the comparative, critical and constructive tasks of religious ethics into
focus. The first is the “descriptive dimension.” The descriptive dimension refers to the
component of ethical inquiry in which human beings attempt to understand a situation at hand.
Within the realm of religious ethics, this is conducted by reference to an interpretation of a
particular religious framework. It is the component of ethical reasoning that sheds clarity on the
question of why a particular set of circumstances has taken place. It may be further understood
as the attempt to explain or describe what is going on within a particular moral situation.
The second is the “normative dimension,” which encompasses the type of ethical inquiry
that serves to guide human life and action. The normative dimension, in this way, is closely
connected to the descriptive, as the particular way in which a situation is understood or described
will necessarily illuminate certain options for actions, while, perhaps, making others appear
undesirable or never bringing them to the realm of possibility in the first place.
The third is the “practical dimension,” which focuses directly on actual human action in
the world, and is based on a process of reasoning that is determined through the two dimensions
discussed above. The practical dimension, answers the question of what is to be done in the
situation at hand. Through a process of rational reflection on the questions posed in the
descriptive and normative dimensions, the religious community or adherent are moved towards a
set of actions as determined through their interpretation of the religious sources that they deem
authoritative.13
Therefore, when bin Laden, then, argues that to “kill the Americans and their allies –
civilian and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in
which it possible to do it…” he is engaging in the type of reasoning described above.
Demonstrating why it is that, for bin Laden, killing American civilians is a religious duty

12
As Schweiker notes, this is “usually bound to the work of comparison…a scholar critically explores a tradition by
comparing its expression through time and/or seeing it in relation to other cultural and social dynamics, including
other religions.” William Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed.
William Schweiker (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), 5.
13
Note that the above is not intended as a universal description of religious life, reasoning, or practice. Rather, I
have selected a model of religious ethics that I believe is most helpful to understanding the figures that I will
discuss. Note further that Schweiker also discusses the “fundamental” and “metaethical” dimensions which I will
not discuss in this project.

5
requires taking seriously the theological underpinnings of al-Qaeda through the critical,
descriptive and constructive tasks of religious ethics. Such an approach will provide a clearer
and more comprehensive understanding of al-Qaeda‟s structure, tactics, and aims; as these
elements, in the case of al-Qaeda, are intimately related to its ideologues‟ very specific
interpretation of Islam.

1.3 Arguments
Drawing on the tools and methods of ethical reasoning, I argue that an investigation into
al-Qaeda‟s theological foundation calls for a reevaluation of the current strategic frameworks
that organize the Long War. In light of this, this project demonstrates, analyzes, and responds to
the changes and developments in American use of force in the War against al-Qaeda. The
overall aims of this project are four-fold. First, this project investigates the military campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan, highlighting the turn to counterinsurgency principles that developed in
response to an understanding of al-Qaeda as a worldwide Islamist insurgency. Second, it illumes
al-Qaeda‟s depiction of the war it both imagines and understands itself to be fighting. Drawing
on both primary and secondary sources, I argue that al-Qaeda‟s theologically focused
interpretation of the contemporary environment leads it to put forward a new model of jihad.
Third, in light of the more nuanced understanding of al-Qaeda‟s model of war, this project
evaluates the ethical standing of the standard frameworks for the use of military force that have
been applied in the Long War through the lens of the just war tradition. And fourth, in light of
the theological underpinnings of al-Qaeda, this project investigates the current intellectual and
theological debates within the Muslim world that challenges both al-Qaeda‟s interpretation of the
textual tradition, and its accompanying call for war against the West.
A primary strength of this dissertation is its methodological approach to al-Qaeda. While
a significant amount of literature has been written on this group, its focus – generally speaking –
is quite limited. For the most part, the available literature provides a chronological history of its
formation, terrorist events linked to its members, and profiles of its major ideologues. 14 In
addition, since September 11th, there has been a concerted effort to provide English language

14
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006),
Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001),
Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I know, (New York: Free Press, 2006), Terry McDermott, Perfect Soldiers
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of bin
Laden‟s Right-Hand Man (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

6
translations of the texts, interviews and speeches of figures like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri. These texts, while offering important material, remain organized around the same
methodological lines as the secondary works described above.15
In response, this dissertation deliberately changes course and focuses specifically on the
theological underpinnings of al-Qaeda. In so doing, it argues along the lines of Max Weber and
his inheritors, that religion provides a critical analytical lens to various social-historical
phenomena. As David Little writes, “religion … bears relation to action by systematically
producing a very general and extensive „context of meaning‟ which guides actions by rendering
it understandable.”16 Proceeding along these lines, I argue that determining how a group like al-
Qaeda understands and legitimates its actions requires paying careful attention to the reasons
they themselves provide; Reasons that are largely steeped in and determined by a specific
religious interpretation of the world and the responsibility of human individuals and communities
within it.17
Fortunately, a variety of primary sources from which a measure of al-Qaeda self -
understanding may be gleaned are in supply. In this end, I draw on books, speeches, and
interviews written and broadcast by the major ideologues of this group. This literature reveals an
organization committed to a revitalization of the Muslim community, based upon a very
particular, and relatively speaking, quite narrow definition of Islam. Furthermore, it reveals a
discourse of religious reasoning which demands a recommitment of the contemporary Muslim
community to this particular vision of the tradition; as it is only through this that the Muslim
world might revitalize itself, and regain its past strength and glory.
As will be demonstrated, for al-Qaeda, contemporary events are given meaning through
the historical narrative of the Islamic tradition. Its ideologues are particularly concerned with
what they perceive as the relative weakness of the Muslim world vis-à-vis the West. In the
attempt to make sense of the current status of Muslims and the Muslim community, its
ideologues reference and apply the authoritative texts, the interpretive tradition, and the history
of Islam to the circumstances at hand. In this way, al-Qaeda has determined that Islamic decline
15
Bruce Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005),
Raymond Ibrahim (ed. And Trns.), The al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), Gilles Kepel and
Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds.), Al Qaeda in its Own Words (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2008).
16
David Little, “Max Weber and the Comparative Study of Religious Ethics” The Journal of Religious Ethics Vol.
2, Fall (1997).
17
Here, and in many other places, this dissertation is deeply indebted to the work of John Kelsay.

7
and weakness is a result of oppressive and pernicious American economic and political policies
in the Muslim world. Such policies, its ideologues argue, have furthermore been maintained
with the help of corrupt and tyrannical Arab governments, who have worked in conjunction with
American policy makers in order to uphold their own authority while simultaneously oppressing
the Muslim people and robbing them of their resources and treasure. Notably all this, they argue,
is a result of the absence of Islam among the people and their leaders, and their failure to adhere
to the dictates of God‟s law.
As the diagnosis of current Muslim ills references a theological understanding of both
history and contemporary events, al-Qaeda additionally argues that the solution to Islamic
malaise may only be realized by reference to a theological interpretation. For al-Qaeda,
referencing the tradition of Islam reveals that Islamic prestige and Glory may only be restored by
actively combating the forces of oppression. As articulated by figures likes Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al-Zawahiri, this revitalization involves a world-wide and immediate armed
confrontation with the West, and most specifically, with the United States.
The bulk of my analysis, however, draws on the writing of a relatively understudied, yet
critical thinker: Mustafa abu Mus‟ab al Suri. Al –Suri‟s 1600 page treatise, “The Global Islamic
Resistance Call” is considered the leading theoretical and tactical al-Qaeda text, rendering him a
critical figure to understanding al-Qaeda. At the time of writing, one book-length study on al-
Suri exists, as well as two condensed English language translations of his Call. Both echo the
interests and methods of available scholarship, focusing on historical chronologies and edited
excerpts of his work. While both texts provide invaluable contributions to understanding al-Suri,
this project seeks to build upon the foundation they establish and to mine his work in a manner
where the theological background of his thinking comes to the surface.
Through al-Suri‟s treatise, this project places his understanding of jihad within its Islamic
context. Concentrating on the historical tradition of Islamic thinking on jihad, I contextualize al-
Suri‟s account of the current war. Al-Suri draws on the historical jihad tradition to both diagnose
and provide a strategic cure for the current ills that beset the Muslim world. Consequently, I
argue that this theological background provides the conceptual worldview by which al-Suri‟s
understanding of jihad acquires clarity, logic, and most importantly, purpose. In the Call, al-
Suri‟s importance as a strategic thinker is clear. He understand jihad as a categorical and
immediate obligation incumbent on every believer by God ( ‫)ف‬, and – in light of the

8
current environment – necessitating a new tactical framework focusing on individual terror
operations and insurgency war.
This interpretation stands against a larger background of an Islamic theory of statecraft,
and furthermore, within a textual tradition that serves to constrain the use of force. Al-Suri,
however, departs from the jihad tradition in significant ways. Most notably in the way he
decentralizes the notion of authority by arguing that the individual believer, in what he construes
as a defensive war, is imbued with the authority to wage war against the West. Furthermore, al-
Suri radicalizes this individual duty by arguing that Muslims are to conduct terror operations
against American interests in whatever place they can, with minimum restrictions on attacks
against noncombatants. Only in this way, he argues, will the House of Islam be able to fight an
asymmetric and global war against the West. The result is a radically diffuse, decentralized, and
unrestricted model of war that is intentionally advanced by al-Qaeda in its war against the United
States.
This model, then, provides a conceptualization of al-Qaeda that does not fit comfortably
within either the counterinsurgency or the counterterrorism framework. Once this model is
articulated, new questions regarding the military frameworks of the Long War ought to be raised
and examined. In light of al-Suri‟s model of war, are the counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism models, as currently practiced, capable of applying force in a way that is
effective and proportional? In other words, are the current military frameworks capable of
adhering to the American commitment of morality and justice in war?
As noted by President Obama in his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance speech, even as the
United States confronts “a vicious adversary that abides by no rules” the United States must
“remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those
whom we fight.” In this end, this project turns to the moral guidance and wisdom of the just war
tradition. As a historical tradition, just war thinking is a repository of the values and
commitments related to moral and ethical reasoning on war. As James Turner Johnson writes,
“…it is by engaging the historical tradition of just war that we get at the values that underlie it
and the lasting concerns about human life in political community on which just war thinking is

9
based and which it expresses.”18 As a historical tradition, however, the guidance and wisdom it
contains must be applied.
Contemporary just war thinkers have addressed the issue of irregular war, and their
positions ought to be regarded as a starting point for an analysis of the current frameworks. As
will be demonstrated, just war thinking on this issue has proceeded primarily through discussions
of authority, and jus in bello considerations of proportionality and discrimination. In short these
are: the authority of irregulars to incur a right to war; and the jus in bello considerations imposed
upon regular forces against an adversary who typically problematizes the distinctions between
combatants and noncombatants. However, as this dissertation demonstrates, the nature of al-
Qaeda presents moralist with a novel and complex model of war; one that ought to engender
additional considerations. While questions of authority and jus in bello concerns remain
significant, understanding the range of ethical and moral implications of both counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism as they apply to al-Qaeda requires that a larger spectrum of just war
reasoning be brought to bear.
While the planning of strategy and tactics must certainly be in accord with discrimination
and proportionality of means, the just use of force must make a sincere and conscientious effort
to attend to the feasibility and efficacy of war planning and conduct, as required by the criteria of
proportionality of ends and reasonable hope of success. This is particularly the case in a War
against al-Qaeda, where the complex nature of the group further complicates the current
frameworks.
In thinking about the justice of wars, the full spectrum of the just war criteria ought to be
brought to bear. While issues of just cause and jus in bello considerations are certainly critical,
proper just war thinking ought to additionally consider the questions related to the various factors
that would allow (or prevent) a effective and proportional (in other words, a just) use of force.
Questions related to the impact of military action ought to enter into discussions of moral and
ethical assessments of a specific conflict; particularly in its ability to succeed when considering
the relevant characteristics of a specific theater of war. This is not to argue that war planning
must ensure victory or make prophetic determinations regarding the development of events. But

18
James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005.

10
it is to say that any military framework for the use of force must be reflective of whether it may
meet the ends and aims to which it has been tasked.
An analysis that takes these additional criteria into consideration will demonstrate that
neither counterinsurgency nor counterterrorism has successfully constructed a military
framework that is capable of applying force in a manner that is both proportional, and likely to
be effective. As a consequence of a counterinsurgency model, the United States is engaged in
two large scale counterinsurgency campaigns that are heavily embroiled in the domestic
political, social and economic issues of Afghanistan and Iraq, leading to serious questions
regarding the ability of either government to sustain the level of legitimacy required to secure
their territory against the threat posed by terrorism. As a consequence of the counterterrorism
model, the United States has increasingly relied on what are, arguably, extraordinary uses of
force on the territories of other states (with which the United States is not at war). Such factors
raise serious questions around the ability of the United States to continue to rely on the use of
drone technology and to obtain the appropriate intelligence that is necessary for the trans-
territorial use of force against al-Qaeda operatives.
In a critically related vein, war planning in the Long War ought to pay particular attention
to the nature of al-Qaeda – the nature, strategy, and aims of the group. As demonstrated in this
project, Al-Qeada understands itself to be engaged in a defensive war against the United States.
In the attempt to restore the Muslim world from a position of oppression and subjugation, its
ideologues argue that all believers must engage in a global resistance. This suggests that in
addition to the use of military force, the War against al-Qaeda requires responding to its
theological narrative. The War against al-Qaeda, then, requires a direct engagement with the
theological arguments that direct it towards an armed resistance. This task has been taken on by
a number of figures within the Muslim world – notably Bassam Tibi, Abdulaziz Sachedina,
Abdullahi An-Na‟im, and Khaled Abou El Fadl. All have tacked issues of “radicalism,”
“militancy” and “extremism” in Islam by offering alternative interpretations of the textual
tradition. Taken together, these may be loosely referred to as the “moderate” interpretation – one
positioning itself as a direct alternative to the militant interpretation espoused by al-Qaeda.
It is important to note that the work of the moderate thinkers discussed above rests on a
particular hermeneutical method. These figures argue that Islamic law, Sharia, is a human
construction, based on a system of textual interpretation that is influenced by historical time and

11
place. In this way, they argue, the dictates of the Sharia may adjust in response to changing
conditions. The moderate position rests on a hermeneutical method that disputes a relatively
established understanding of history and its normative claims within the Muslim world, leading
some to question its “intellectual viability.” In light of this, it is appears important to include a
“traditional” Muslim thinker that has also contested al-Qaeda‟s militancy. In this end, the work
of Yusuf al-Qaradawi - a prominent and popular Egyptian jurist - will be included in this project
as an example of a more traditional contribution to the overall moderate stream of thought.

1.4 Chapter Descriptions

This dissertation articulates its claims through four chapters. Chapter two outlines the
transition of both the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns from conventional combat to
counterinsurgency wars. As noted above, the construal of al-Qaeda fighters in both campaigns
as component elements of a broader and global militant Islamist insurgency led major decision
makers to argue that that both “fronts” had to be “secured.” While it is relatively clear that al-
Qaeda fighters are involved in both campaigns, an investigation into al-Qaeda‟s interests in Iraq
and Afghanistan demonstrate that this model of al-Qaeda is based on a set of problematic
assumptions. While al-Qaeda has demonstrated some level of interest in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, its war against the West extends beyond these battlefields; ultimately raising
serious questions about a military approach that understand al-Qaeda in this capacity.
Chapter three illumes al-Qaeda‟s strategy through an investigation of al-Suri‟s treatise.
Al-Suri spent the better part of his adult life both training al-Qaeda operatives as well as
constructing a model of jihad he believed to be reflective of the contemporary environment. In
this way, he provides a substantial textual window into al-Qaeda strategic thinking. I argue that
grasping the complexity of this model requires an awareness of what I term is “dual” nature as
on the one hand, al-Qaeda‟s military model is deeply rooted in historical Muslim ethical
discourse on war. While on the other, it departs from this tradition in significant ways.
For al-Qaeda, the social and political events of the present are made clear through the
lens of Islamic history. This is particularly true in the realm of warfare, as al-Qaeda references
the historical jihad tradition to make sense of contemporary issues. The texts, historical events,
and institutions of the early Muslims, for al-Qaeda, are authoritative guide posts that help not
only diagnose current ills, but also help determine the proper course of action for moving

12
forward. Therefore, the early Islamic community‟s statements and actions in regard to warfare
and its proper role in the life of the Muslim community are the driving force behind al-Qaeda‟s
understanding of Jihad.
At the same time, al-Qaeda departs from the historical jihad tradition in significant ways.
This departure is most clear in the area of legitimate authority and discrimination of civilians.
By restricting the use of force in both ends and means, the jihad tradition determined both classes
of noncombatant status as well as determinations for who may legitimately hold the proper
authority to wage war on behalf of the political community. In stark contrast, the al-Qaeda
model, as illustrated by al-Suri, steps out of these restrictions. He argues that all believers hold
the authority to wage war, and furthermore, are immediately called to take up arms in a defensive
war against the West in any place possible - striking against its civilian, military, political or
economic interests.
Once this model has been articulated, and al-Qaeda‟s aims and tactical methods
established, chapter four examines the proposed military frameworks that have been put forward.
As noted in the earlier sections of this introduction, the question of how the United States and its
allies ought to respond to al-Qaeda remains a matter of debate. Chapter four argues that an
examination of both frameworks requires an understanding of how each has been applied
specifically to al-Qaeda and its specific strategic model of war. Equipped with a more robust
and nuanced understanding of al-Qaeda‟s nature and strategy developed in chapter three, chapter
four explicates both frameworks and assesses the ethical implications of each in light of the just
war tradition. Through a robust application of the just war criteria, this chapter argues that
neither framework is particularly successfully in constructing a military response that is capable
of applying force in a way that is both proportional or effective.
The arguments in chapter four, then, suggest that in addition to a military solution, the
struggle against al-Qaeda requires responding to its conceptual infrastructure. Put differently, it
requires providing a theological alternative to the interpretation of Islam that has led its
ideologues to argue that the use of indiscriminate force is both necessary and justified for the
realization of Islam. Chapter five demonstrates the presence and the outlines of what I term the
moderate position; one presenting itself as a direct alternative to the arguments put forward by
militant figures like al-Suri, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. This chapter,
furthermore, discusses the question of whether the moderate position is intellectually viable in

13
the Muslim world by comparing it to the world of a traditionalist thinker who also argues against
“extremism” in Islam – the Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
I conclude this project with a brief discussion on the implications of this debate for
American foreign policy; primarily raising questions regarding the ability of the United States
and its allies to support or promote the moderate position as a component element of the War
against al-Qaeda. The hope is that this conclusion, though brief, can gesture towards both the
importance of paying attention to al-Qaeda‟s theological underpinnings, as well as the continuing
relevance of the just war tradition to the contemporary international environment.

14
 CHAPTER TWO

A “DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR”: COUNTERINSUGENCY IN

THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA

2.0 Introduction
Ten days after the attacks of September 11th, President George W. Bush initiated a Global
War on Terror. Standing in front of a joint session of Congress, and addressing the broader
American public, the President stated:

…enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country…Americans have

many questions tonight. Americans are asking, "Who attacked our country?" The evidence we
have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-
Qa‟ida.”

Continuing, the president assured the American people that the United States,

“…will direct every resource at our command - every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary
weapon of war - to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.”19

In addition to these remarks, President Bush warned that this new war would not follow
in the steps of recent American military experiences. It would not involve, “a decisive liberation
of territory and a swift conclusion.” Rather, Americans should expect a “lengthy campaign
unlike any other we have ever seen.”20
As President Bush presaged on that fateful day, this was to be no ordinary war. The War
against Terror – or the “Long War,”– has undergone notable developments; developments that

19
George W. Bush. Address to a joint session of congress following 9/11 attacks. Transcript available online at:
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens/4?_s=PM:US .
20
George W. Bush. Address to a joint session of congress following 9/11 attacks. Transcript available online at:
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens/4?_s=PM:US.

15
have contributed to a redefinition of its aims and strategy all the way down. To begin, since its
inception, the “War against Terror” has been construed much more specifically as a “War against
al-Qaeda” – a global network of radical Islamist groups loosely led by the central leadership
core in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore, while the War against al-Qaeda has turned U.S.
attention to places like Yemen and Somalia, it has manifested itself most forcefully in the
insurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, and in the attempt to “disrupt, dismantle,
and defeat” an elusive and diffuse network, the United States is fighting al-Qaeda through two
complex and protracted counterinsurgency campaigns on the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
This tactical strategy conceptualizes al-Qaeda as a global militant Islamist insurgency
that has penetrated Iraq and Afghanistan as a part of its global war against the West. In this way,
its aims and tactics are assumed to be those of a traditional (but global) insurgency. This strategy
is structured by an understanding of insurgency as an organized, protracted, and armed politico-
military struggle seeking to overthrow an existing government through the tactics of asymmetric
war. As such, Coalition forces have determined that the application of counter-insurgency
doctrine is the appropriate tactical strategy for both campaigns.21
The foundational element of the current strategy is the cardinal counterinsurgency
principle of “sanctuary denial.” Following the Maoist dictum, major decision makers in the
Long War argue that “securing” Iraq and Afghanistan through a comprehensive
counterinsurgency approach is the linchpin tactical strategy of a categorical al-Qaeda defeat. As

21
The counterinsurgency approach to the Long War continues, as the most recent military assessments of Iraq and
Afghanistan clearly note the counterinsurgency nature of both Iraq and Afghanistan. General David H. Petraeus, in
his 2007 and 2008 reports to Congress, affirms a counterinsurgency approach to the war in Iraq. Characterizing the
situation as a sectarian conflict for “power and resources…influenced heavily by outside actors,” he describes the
execution of counterinsurgency measures against the various levels of Iraqi insurgency – al Qa‟ida in Iraq, Shi‟ite
militias, as well as general groups of warlords and criminals. For Petraeus, “resolution” involves various
counterinsurgency measures focused on bolstering the internal capabilities of the Iraqi state, and protecting the
population from violence. Winning the war in Iraq involves strengthening the ability of the police, the army, and the
government to provide security, order, and economic progress. General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on
the Situation in Iraq, September 10-11, 2007 and April 8-9, 2008. The current administration also operates along
these lines. President Obama‟s remarks in the 2010 National Security Strategy Paper are quite telling in this regard.
The President affirms the strategic importance of both Iraq and Afghanistan to the “global campaign against al-
Qa‟ida and its terrorist affiliates.” Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama remarks, are a part of a comprehensive
strategy to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qai‟da.” In this effort, the United States is “pursuing a strategy that
protects our homeland, secures the world‟s most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qai‟da safe haven, and
builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world.” (emphasis mine) President Barak Hussein
Obama, National Security Strategy May 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

16
Mao so astutely recognized, the guerrilla fighter moves among the people like a fish in water –
drawing on the masses for her lifeblood, sustaining herself on their energy, material resources,
and cooperation. Removing the fish from the water kills the guerrilla war; it extinguishes its
sustenance and drive. The line of reasoning proceeds as follows: if support for the insurgency is
extinguished, then Iraq and Afghanistan will be secured; if Iraq and Afghanistan are secured,
they will be denied to al-Qaeda as bases and training grounds; denying Iraq and Afghanistan to
al-Qaeda will “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” the al-Qaeda network.22
While at first glance, al-Qaeda takes on some of the defining characteristic of insurgency,
the global nature of al-Qaeda raises serious questions regarding the insight that may be gained by
conceptualizing al-Qaeda through this lens. As I will demonstrate, the model of insurgency
organizing both campaigns is not only based on the use of irregular tactics, but also on the notion
that the insurgent forces are concerned with resisting an established government in order to
reinstall one of their own. Al-Qaeda, in contrast, is resisting the entire system of the nation-state.
Its interests in Iraq and Afghanistan are not focused around toppling their respective
governments so that they may install one of their own. Furthermore, its interests are not
demarcated or confined by the geographical borders of Iraq and Afghanistan, nor by concerns
that are particular to them. Rather, they understand both as fronts in the larger war against the
West, and more specifically, against the United States.
Through an investigative study of insurgency war, al-Qaeda, and the current campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan, this chapter contests the current conceptual understanding of al-Qaeda
that is the organizing force behind the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The overall aims are
two-fold. First, I demonstrate the counterinsurgency framework structuring the Long War. As
this requires a foundational understanding of insurgency, I offer a model of asymmetric warfare
that draws on both the classic works of guerrilla war theorists, as well as the major
counterinsurgency doctrines that have developed in response. I then provide a narrative history
of major developments in both Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to articulate the events that

22
See President Barak Obama‟s National Security Strategy Paper, 2010. In this document, President Obama argues
that the frontlines of the War against al-Qaeda are in Afghanistan (and the leadership in Pakistan). President Obama
mentions the war Iraq several times, and I argue that were it not for the administration‟s political efforts to present
the war in Iraq as coming to a close, the war in Iraq would have taken center stage alongside Afghanistan as a “front
line” in the War against al-Qaida. See in particular, the introduction, and pages 1, 4, 5, 14, 17, 19, 20 and 21.
Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

17
directed decision makers to conclude that they ought to proceed under the assumption that both
campaigns are to be conducted through counterinsurgency principles.23
Second, this chapter demonstrates that a conceptualization of al-Qaeda as an insurgency
is problematic, and based on a set of misguided assumptions of its overall intentions both in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It must be noted that Coalition forces are, in fact, engaged in a
counterinsurgency war against various irregular actors in both campaigns, and in many ways,
this chapter establishes this claim. However, I argue that beyond the goals of a stable and secure
Iraq and Afghanistan, questions regarding the War against al-Qaeda remain.
Any attempt to understand al-Qaeda requires a serious investigation into its theological
underpinnings, as any measure of clarity regarding its vision may only be had by taking its
religious discourse seriously. As noted in the introduction, this focus on al-Qaeda‟s theological
discourse is deliberate, as I argue that religion provides a critical analytical lens to understanding
various social-historical phenomena. Human action, in other words, is meaningful. It is done in
light of certain overarching commitments and towards certain ends. In order to determine how
al-Qaeda understands and legitimates its actions, we must pay attention to the reasons they
themselves provide – many of which are steeped in a worldview determined by a specific
religious interpretation of the world and the role of human individuals and communities within it.
To establish this claim, I present epistles and speeches written by the major al-Qaeda
ideologues and juxtapose them to the counterinsurgency model previously developed in order to
illume al Qaeda‟s perception of itself as a group and a movement. This last section demonstrates
that while al Qaeda certainly draws on some of the tactical and political themes of previous
insurgency movements, it departs from them in significant ways.
I demonstrate that the al-Qaeda‟s vision extends beyond Iraq. And despite Afghanistan‟s
strategic and theological importance, it is also beyond Afghanistan. While al-Qaeda leadership
has demonstrated clear interest in both campaigns, the expansive nature of its ultimate concerns
are such that its military struggle is not organized in the same manner as the historical
insurgencies that are the conceptual lens through which major decision makers have understood
the Long War, and al-Qaeda‟s place in it. While al-Qaeda mentions insurgency tactics, and the

23
The difficulty of reconstructing this history must be noted. Narrating ongoing historical events is analogous to
hitting a moving target, as developments in both wars are ongoing. Furthermore, as no conclusive end has been
brought to either war, this chapter draws heavily from primary sources and analyses from the defense forces in the
effort to reconstruct a tactical history of the current campaigns.

18
toppling of governments, its nature as an organization is not ultimately defined through an army
of fighters seeking to eradicate and replace a specific political regime. Rather, al-Qaeda is
seeking a comprehensive Islamic revolution; one culminating in a radical worldwide
transformation of the international order.

2.1 Irregular War: A Model

Demonstrating the arguments of this chapter requires a foundational understanding of
insurgency war. With the onset of the modern period, several notable insurgency leaders
contributed to the task of systematizing the tactics of guerrilla war. T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-
Tung, and Che Guevara had a defining hand in advancing guerrilla tactics into a comprehensive
military method of war.24 Furthermore, the birth of a systematic insurgency war led to the
proliferation of a parallel genre: that of “counterinsurgency” works. Including these texts will
provide an addition lens into this method of warfare.
Through an analysis of the classic texts of both modern insurgency and
counterinsurgency theorists, this section will provide a model of the major tactical and thematic
components of modern insurgency. It is important to note that this section will use the
framework of war particular to each in the task of constructing a category of insurgency war and
guerrilla tactics that is capable of comparison. Consequently, this model ought to be understood
as an “ideal type”; not as perfect representation of reality (or of the work of each thinker), but as
a heuristic device intended for the purpose of juxtaposition with another real-world and complex
phenomenon: al-Qaeda.

2.1.1 Terms.
An investigation of irregular war is clarified through the identification of two terms. The
first is “guerrilla war.” The designation “guerilla” points to the utilization of a set of tactics, the
emphasis of which is to fight asymmetrically against an adversary of superior military strength. 25

24
The first major military text devoted to guerrilla tactics was Calwell‟s “Small Wars”; a counterinsurgency manual
written by a British officer. Its major tactical approach was to impose “moral” lessons of war onto guerrilla forces,
by forcing them to fight the superior conventional army in the open. It is this “moral” element, Calwell argued, that
would eventually lead the superior force to succeed. C.E. Calwell, Small Wars Their Principles and Practices
(London: Harrison and Sons, 1914).
25
The following definitions are my own, and based on my readings of various sources on irregular war and
counterinsurgency. However, they are in close agreement with various source books providing definitions of
irregular war, guerrilla war, and counterinsurgency. See, for example: Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A

19
Specialists trace guerrilla war to the ancient world, demonstrating evidence of guerrilla tactics in
the Israelite wars against the Canaanites in the book of Joshua, continuing through the various
insurrections against the conquered peoples of the Roman Empire, and through the Middle
Ages.26 The long history of these guerrilla campaigns demonstrates a set of common features
that have remained steady over centuries, and when isolated, exemplify a set of attributes that
may be identified as guerrilla war: ambush tactics, quick retreat, operations in difficult terrain,
possession of local knowledge, popular support, and an emphasis on mobility that was not the
privilege of more conventional armies.27 Therefore “Guerilla war” classifies a type of warfare
that appropriates the tactics mentioned above.
“Insurgency”28 identifies a military campaign fought by a weaker group against the
dominant power in attempt to gain political authority, with the ultimate objective of
overthrowing the existing regime.29 While these are distinct terms, they often appear in
relationship to one another. As guerilla implies utilization of a set of tactics, while an
insurgency campaign may be fought through the principles of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, in
light of the asymmetrical nature of an insurgency war, it is quite likely that an insurgency will be
conducted along these lines. The post WWII environment, defined by the birth of two competing
superpowers, ensured that resistance to either would be conducted through asymmetric means.
As most insurgencies in the modern era have utilized insurgency tactics, encompassing these

Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996). Ian F. W. Beckett,
Encyclopedia of guerrilla Warfare (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1999).
26
The most concise historical complication of guerrilla war is Robert B. Aspery, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla
in History Volumes I and II (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1975). Another good, and more concise
compilations is, John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1976).
27
Note that the distinction between “conventional” and “irregular” is somewhat artificial. Even through the Middle
Ages, even the most sophisticated type of warfare showed features akin to what today would be categorized as
“irregular.” Furthermore, by the 18th century, guerrilla tactics were advanced by military theorists as beneficial, in
ancillary roles, to conventional armies in particular circumstances. See John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla
Warfare (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1976).
28
Beckett refers to insurgency also as “revolutionary guerrilla warfare.”
29
Beckett argues that “insurgency” or “revolutionary guerrilla war” is a modern phenomenon, characterized by its
merging of guerrilla tactics with political objectives. See introduction in: Ian F. W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of
Guerrilla Warfare (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999). However, John Ellis argues that it is only the modern
capacity of the historian, armed with “concepts like personal and national freedom, and the right to resort to armed
resistance” that are “more acceptable than they were to the educated classes in the ancient and medieval worlds” to
determine how it is that one can distinguish whether or not such instances were examples of guerrilla war (Ellis
doesn‟t make a clear cut distinction between guerilla war and insurgency). See preface in: John Ellis, A Short
History of Guerrilla War (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1976).

20
materials into this analysis is not only advisory, but critical.30 As guerrilla war remains a
category that designates tactics, we shall expand our frame of discussion by referring more
broadly to insurgency wars, with the understanding that such campaigns are utilizing some
amalgamation of the guerrilla principles discussed below.31
Insurgency war is defined by both tactics and ideology. In regard to tactics, insurgencies
are characterized by the asymmetric tactics of guerilla war. In regard to ideology, this has been
much more varied and has historically ranged from communist, to socialist, to nationalist, to any
combination of the above. However, it is important to note that what remains distinct about
insurgency movements or campaigns is the specific manner in which they weave and interweave
these two realms. Therefore, while the relationship between politics and war is ancient,32 it
comes to the forefront in insurgency war; particularly in light of the fact that insurgencies are, at
the very heart of the matter, concerned with the contestation of the political legitimacy and
authority of the current regime. Broadly speaking, it is the privileging of the political factors
that defines insurgency; particularly that of the modern variety. Consequently, insurgency war is
characterized through a local movement aiming to contest and dismantle a constituted
government, in the hopes of reestablishing another yet on different political and social terms. As
defined by leading counterinsurgency theorist Sir Robert Thompson, insurgency is:

“…designed as a total war to reach a decision without necessarily being dependant on

winning military victory in conventional battles. The political aim of taking over a country
requires more than just military guerrilla strategy because the revolutionary movement has to be
built up in opposition to the existing government until it is in a position to challenge it, and its
allies, for control of the country and to defeat them politically rather than militarily”.33

30
The major post WWII insurgencies have taken this form. For example, insurgencies in Greece, China, Malaya,
the French in Indochina, Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge, etc.
31
For example, as Mao referred to himself as a guerrilla fighting a guerrilla war. However, he was, more broadly
speaking, fighting an insurgency war against the Chinese government, utilizing guerrilla tactics.
32
One of the oldest texts on military strategy (6th C. BC), The Art of War, a Chinese military treatise written by Sun
Tzu, is fundamentally concerned with the relationships between politics (the state) and war. The first lines of Sun
Tzu‟s famous treatise begin, “The art of war is of vital importance to the state.” Lionel Giles (trans.), Sun Tzu on the
Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World (London: Kegan Paul, 2002), 1.
33
Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New York: David McKay Company, Inc, 1969), 46. Thompson (d.
1992), was considered one of the world‟s leading authorities on counterinsurgency. He was the principal advisor in
the Malayan Emergency, headed the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam from 1961 to 1965, and served as a
special advisor to President Nixon.

21
2.1.2 Tactics.
A discussion of the tactics of guerrilla war begins well before the modern “synthesizers”,
as a careful search demonstrates that similar tactical ideas were elaborated and documented
much earlier in military history. The ancient Chinese military classic of Sun Tzu, “On the Art of
War” exhorts the importance of economy of force, stratagem, accurate calculations, as well as
the proper utilization of such tactics – in the hopes that an army could achieve success with the
least amount of force (if any at all). In such a way, smaller, presumably weaker armies could
handle and beat superior forces.34 While Sun Tzu is not specifically referring to guerrilla tactics,
but rather constructing a strategic treatise on war more broadly, he references the fundamental
concepts that are now considered the standard bearers of guerrilla warfare.
While the ideas existed, and the tactics were utilized through a succession of military
conflicts, T. E. Lawrence (also known by the pseudonym “Lawrence of Arabia”) is credited with
the first systematic theoretical contribution to guerrilla war. Born in 1888, Lawrence went to
Syria in 1911 after graduating from Oxford to join an archeological dig. In October 1914, he
joined the War Office‟s geographical section, and then eventually transferred to the military
intelligence department in Egypt. Working in areas under Ottoman control, Lawrence developed
sympathies for the Arabs living under Ottoman control, and, furthermore, became convinced that
an Arab revolt – held together by the force of Arab nationalism – could help win the war against
the Turks. Husein, the Sharif of Mecca, was able to capture Mecca in 1916, encouraging
Lawrence‟s ambitions and inciting a series of events that initiated the Arab Revolt (1916-1917)
against the Turks, and involving Lawrence in an Arab guerrilla war constructed to support the
British advance into Syria, and eventually allowing General Allenby to take Jerusalem.35
Inculcated in the works of Clausewitz and Jomini, Lawrence‟s contemporaries understood
guerrilla war as ancillary to conventional warfare, capable of supplementing regular troops.
Lawrence‟s contribution, understood in opposition to the conventional military thinking of the
time, was to present (or reduce) guerrilla war to a set of rules; rules by way of which a political-
military campaign could be waged.

34
See, Lionel Giles (trans.), Sun Tzu on the Art of War (London: Kegan Paul, 2002), 1-40. Sun Tzu‟s classic is
believed to date from between 400 and 320 B.C.
35
See T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991). For a concise
analytic summary of Seven Pillars, see Asprey, chapter 20.

22
 In his famous book, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, Lawrence explicates the rules
of guerrilla war as they were formed and tested during the Arab Revolt. Lying in a tent, having
just arrived from a long and treacherous journey from Medina, Lawrence is wracked with intense
pain from boils. Feverish, delusional, and suffering from visions, he reflects on the current
campaign against the Turks.36 Military thinking of the Clausewitzian variety argued that victory
was had through the destruction of enemy forces. However, the Arabs, Lawrence reasoned,
could not stand in such a battle. They were not equipped with the forces or the resources for
decisive victories. This, he argued, could not be a war of force. Furthermore, the Arabs fought
the Turks because they wanted to be liberated from their rule – to “extrude the Turk from all
Arabic-speaking lands in Asia...If they would go quietly the war would end. If not, we would
urge them, or try to drive them out.”
These realizations led Lawrence to his military “doctrine,”37 hinging on three elements,
“…one algebraical, one biological, one psychological.” The Arabs wanted an area the size of
140,000 miles. If they were organized into regulars “an army with banners”, the Turks would
entrench them. As he writes,

Suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable,
without front or back, drifting about like gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted,
nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed. Our
kingdoms lay in each man‟s mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might
offering nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a
target, owing only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle
at.38
The “biological” factor, according to Lawrence, was the relations of man to battle in war.
In war, it is the “effusion of blood” – or the killing of enemy soldiers - that defines the
environment until a decision had been reached. However, in this war, Lawrence argued, “things
were scarce and precious, men less esteemed than equipment. Our cue was to destroy, not the

36
All quotes in the following paragraph are from: T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York:
Anchor Books, 1991), 189-192.
37
T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 190.
38
T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 192

23
Turk‟s army, but his minerals.”39 The final factor was the “psychological”, the decisive element
that would allow an army of irregulars to compensate for their numerical and material
disadvantages. The minds of irregular soldiers, their enemies, and the respective nations
supporting them must be “arranged” argued Lawrence, “as carefully and as formally as other
officers would arrange their bodies.”40 These three factors established the foundation for
Lawrence‟s systematization of irregular war. Consequently, Lawrence established a tactic of war
in which,
“Battles …were a mistake…rather they seemed to me impositions on the side which
believed itself weaker…We had nothing material to lose, so our best line was to defend nothing
and to shoot nothing. Our cards were speed and time, not hitting power…since in Arabia range
was more than force, space greater than the power of armies.”41

Under certain conditions, specified by Lawrence as

“Mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the
idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the
algebraic factors are in the end decisive…”42

While Lawrence provided the first theoretical contribution regarding the rules of guerrilla
tactics, Mao Tse-tung systematized these principles into a distinct method of conducting a large-
scale war against a conventional and superior army. Furthermore his understanding of guerrilla
war demonstrates a development of these principles. The son of a relatively well-to-do farmer, a
“middle peasant,” Mao benefitted from the education that his father‟s economic standing
afforded him. Born in central China, in 1893, he took a job as a librarian at Peking University
after completing his secondary education. It was there that he came into contact with Marxist
literature, and eventually was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party in 1921.
However, it was against Moscow, and the Chinese Communist party leadership, that Mao
argued that revolution would be the inheritance of the peasant class – not the proletariat.43 The

39
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 194.
40
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 195.
41
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 196.
42
T. E. Lawrence, “Guerilla Warfare” cited in Robert B. Aspery (War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Vol I
(Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1975), 269.

24
Communist Party of China broke away from Chiang Kai-Shek‟s nationalist Kuomintang and fled
to the rural regions of China. Civil war broke out and continued until the Japanese invasion
united the Kuomintang and the Communists into an anti-Japanese front in an undeclared war
against Japan. It was during this campaign that Mao developed his theories on war. After the
Japanese war, the Soviets provided the Chinese Communists with supplies surrendered by the
Japanese, forces. Mao, utilizing the theory of war he had developed in the anti-Japanese
campaign, and facing a severely weakened Kuomintang, reignited the Chinese civil war,
culminating in the declaration of the People‟s Republic of China in 1949.44
Like Lawrence, Mao was particularly attuned to the environment within which guerrilla
warfare could be (and ought to be) waged. Guerilla war, he argued, is a necessary part of a
revolutionary war in a nation “whose techniques are underdeveloped and whose communications
are poor.” Nations inferior in arms and military equipment will naturally develop and employ
guerrilla tactics against more superior military powers, as guerrilla tactics allow an inferior
military force to capitalize on the resources that are within their means. According to Mao, the
inferior party‟s greatest advantage, and likewise the guerrilla‟s greatest advantage, is time. Time
can overcome the military superiority of conventional armies. Japan, he argued, is equipped and
motivated to fight a quick and decisive war of “speedy decision.” Its army depends on lines of
communication, linking her troops with major cities for supplies. Consequently, Japan does not
have the troops, the treasure, or the patience to engage in a “protracted war” undertaken over a
land mass like China. Yet, Mao argued, China is a “Vast country with great resources and
tremendous population …in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for
communication are poor. Such factors favor a protracted war…”45 As no conflict can be one in
which you merely pit the weak against the strong, a protracted war fought through guerrilla
tactics will reduce the advantages of the strong, and enhance the advantages of the weak.46

43
See Samuel B. Griffith (trans.) On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007) 12-19. Ian F. W. Beckett,
Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 142.
4444
See Samuel B. Griffith trans., On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 1-19. Ian F. W. Beckett,
Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 142.
45
See Samuel B. Griffith trans., On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 68.
46
Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Lanugage
Press, 1966), 208-210.

25
 Mao argued that guerrilla war – as a protracted struggle – must pass through three
successive phases in order to succeed.47 The first is one in which the enemy is on the “strategic
offensive” and the guerrilla on the “strategic defensive.”48 The focus is on the establishment,
growth and expansion of guerrilla bases in isolated terrains. The base areas serve multiple
purposes, and are of critical importance for the war. Here, volunteers are recruited, trained, and
educated. Those who live in areas surrounding the bases are enlisted for support – both
politically and materially (food, supplies, and information on the enemy). Mao emphasized the
importance of the cooperative relationship that must exist between the guerrillas and the people,
as it is only through such a relationship that their power and support may be harnessed in support
of the guerilla war.49 He assumed that the enemy will strike, and strike forcefully during the first
phase, as the enemy is committed to a quick victory. The guerrilla however, is still weak – and
will likely retreat.
The second phase is defined by “the enemy‟s strategic consolidation” and the guerilla‟s
“preparation for the counter-offensive.” It is defined by an increase in guerrilla military actions.
Vulnerable enemy military outposts and columns are attacked – with the primary emphasis of
obtaining arms and other equipment for the guerrilla fighters. The enemy is now safeguarding
what they‟ve managed to secure, and due to lack of troops, is no longer on the offensive. Such
circumstances allow for the most efficient utilization of guerrilla strategy and tactics, one of
“seeming to come from the east and attacking from the West;”50 Guerrilla strategy, according to
Mao, is defined by pursuit of vulnerability and weakness of the enemy. They strike, and retreat.
They engage only when the enemy is weary, and only when the enemy withdraws. When the
enemy advances, they retreat, and pursue only the most vulnerable areas – the rear and flanks.
Attacking, harassing, and then dispersing – the guerrilla understanding his or her strength, and
only pursues when the terrain and the situation are to his or her advantage.51

47
For further detail on the following discussion see, Edward L. Katzenback, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, “The
Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung” in Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla
Movements, 1941-1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 131-146. Samuel
B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 1-19. Furthermore, Andres Krepinevich
argues that insurgencies typically follow Mao‟s three phase protracted war model, indicating its maintained currency
in insurgency war. See, Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1986), 7.
48
Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1966), 208-210.
49
Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 110-111.
50
This portion of Mao‟s writing is probably demonstrating Sun Tzu‟s influence.
51
See Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 46, 57, 94-114.

26
 This final stage, according to Mao, is the most difficult and prolonged stage of an
insurgency war, with the citizenry often finding the financial and social ramifications
excruciatingly difficult to bear. However, it is this stage which will be decisive for the war,
determining its final outcome. The harassment operations initiated in earlier phases continue
until phase three. Phase three is initiated only when a significant percentage of the guerrilla
forces have evolved into a regular fighting force, capable of meeting the superior army in a
conventional battle. At this stage, often accompanied by external support, guerrilla war becomes
an ancillary force to what Mao called positional and mobile forces – conventional battles take
against enemy troops. Only then, argued Mao, may a decisive victory be had.52
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Che” (1928-1967), like Lawrence and Mao before him,
understood the importance of combating the enemy indirectly in an insurgency war. Born in
Rosario, Argentina, Guevara received his medical degree in 1953, at then almost immediately
began traveling through Latin America. While in Guatemala, he witnessed the U.S. engineered
overthrow of the left-wing government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. This experiences cemented
his commitment to revolution in Latin America, and his contact with Cuban exiles, led by Fidel
Castro in Mexico, swept him into the tide of the Cuban revolution. In 1956 Guevara was one of
the 81 men, led by Castro, whom initiated the successful overthrow of Fulgencio Batista.53
Guevara, too, was sensitive to the biological connection of insurgency war. 54 His
thinking on war ought to be understood as one premised on an unwavering commitment to a
socialist revolution. Therefore, as the ends for Guevara are established, the question becomes
one of means. The conditions necessary for revolutionary, insurgency war in Latin America, he
argued, were “objective” and “subjective.” “Objective” conditions being the repression and
economic subjugation of citizens by exploitative regimes. This, he argued, existed throughout
Latin America. The “subjective” conditions were those nurtured amongst a population and
centered on the belief that revolution could be waged successfully.55 Over time, Guevara argued,

52
Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Lanugage
Press, 1966), 210-219.
53
See the introduction by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1985). Ian F. W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999),
91-93.
54
Guevara writes that while guerrilla war is subject to certain “scientific” laws, the application of those laws is
determined by environment. Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 49.
55
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method” in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Guerrilla
Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 182-198.

27
the “subjective” conditions for an insurgency war could be stimulated, and stimulated through a
small group of committed guerrilla fighters would, through their actions, expose the oppressive
nature of the regime.56
While Guevara‟s elaborations on insurgency war are clear and insightful, his
contributions to tactics (relative to Lawrence and Mao) are somewhat limited. Also relying on
Mao‟s three stages of guerrilla war, Guevara wrote on the importance of acquiring intelligence,
mobilization of the population, organization, familiarity with terrain, and flexibility.57
Furthermore, in a particularly significant moment for those interested in insurgency war,
Guevara discussed the difference between sabotage and terrorism.
Guevara begins with the general tactic of stratagem. As demonstrated, the concept of
stratagem is an important one, and dates back to Sun-Tzu‟s influence on insurgency war.
Guevara is not disputing the importance of this tactic; in fact he affirms it. For example, he
argues, one of the enemy‟s most strategic, and most vulnerable points, is the railway.
Maintaining guerrilla presence along a stretch of railway is impossible; while using explosives at
a strategic point could prohibit its use from the enemy soldiers (both for transport of troops and
materials) for an extended amount of time. It also leads to a considerable loss of lives and
materials to the enemy at the same time that a transportation route is closed. At the same time,
he argues, there is discernible difference between an act of sabotage – directed against enemy
soldiers – and defined by Guevara as a “highly effective method of warfare” and an act of
terrorism, one in which “is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results” as it targets
innocents, and “destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution.” in
other words, it does not bring about the intended effects, it turns people against the guerrilla
forces, and furthermore, it produces harm that is out of proportion to the good effects that it has
the potential to produce.58 Therefore, terrorism should only be put to use when it is directed
against significant leaders of the opposition, “well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in

56
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Organization in Secret of the First Guerrilla Band” in Brian Loveman and Thomas M.
Davies, Jr., Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 155-159.
57
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Guerrilla Warfare” in Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 47-77.
58
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Guerilla Warfare” in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Guerrilla Warfare
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 139-142.

28
repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful.” But the killing of innocents,
argues Guevara, is always inadvisable.59

2.1.3 Revolution.
While Mao stated that power grows out of the barrel of a gun, John Ellis, a leading
historian of insurgency, notes that “a guerrilla‟s capacity to be adequately equipped for that
[military] confrontation is a direct function of the duration and intensity of their political effort.”
For while, “power may grown out of the barrel of a gun…first one must persuade people to take
up that gun, care for it, hump it around for years in the most desolate regions, and then stand firm
to pull the trigger.”
This observation governs the work of major insurgency theorists and strategists. As
noted above, it is the privileging of politics over tactics that is the defining feature of insurgency
war. At its foundations is the relationship that exists between the people and the insurgency.
Mao‟s formulation of this relationship is by far the most well-known. He writes,

“…of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former
may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it…It is only undisciplined troops
who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out if its native element, cannot live.”60

Mao‟s formulation certainly demonstrates the guerrilla war‟s need of civilian support. In
a war that is initiated, organized, and fought on a grass-roots level, the guerrilla fighter is both
materially dependent on the citizens as well as politically committed to winning them over to his
cause. However, at the heart of the matter is not only popular support, but the transformation that
the guerrilla is seeking to bring about. As Mao demonstrates, insurgency war is clearly linked to
ideas of social-political reform.
While Mao‟s famous dictum is clear and to the point, Guevara‟s discussion of the
guerrilla fighter and guerrilla war is particularly poignant in its ability to explicate these points.

59
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Guerrilla Warfare” in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Guerrilla Warfare
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 61-62; 139-142.
60
See Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 92-93.

29
He describes a guerrilla struggle as “the process of a people to redeem itself…”61 He continues
by noting that

“…guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band is
an armed nuclear, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of
the people themselves…it is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number
of arms for use in defense against oppression.”62

Furthermore, the guerrilla fighter,

“…is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the
people against their oppressors, and that he gives in order to change the social system that keeps
all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.”63

For Guevara, the guerrilla fighter embodies the revolutionary force of emancipation
against a tyrannical, oppressive, and unjust government. For both of these figures, the
insurgency is a natural result of social, political, and economic grievances resulting from
generations of exploitation of the weak and disenfranchised by the strong and powerful. A
Revolutionary movement must be brought to bear against the forces of economic and social
injustice that are responsible for the misery and poverty of the masses. Only then might the
people be liberated from the chains of oppression.64
Mao, also, was motivated in this regard. Writing on the “internal political situation” in
1928, he argues that the Kuomintang regime remains one that has “capitulated to imperialism in
its foreign relations and which at home has replaced the old warlords with new ones, subjecting
the working classes and peasantry to an even more ruthless economic exploitation and political
oppression.”65 It is these conditions, he argues, that allow for revolutionary forces to form, to
coalesce, and to eventually materialize themselves into a People‟s Army aimed at revolution. At
61
See Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 49.
62
See Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 49-50.
63
See Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA: Praeger Publishing, 2007), 50.
64
Ernesto Che Guevara, “Message to the Tricontinental” in Samuel B. Griffith (trns.), On Guerrilla Warfare (USA:
Praeger Publishing, 2007), 199-213.
65
Moa Tse-Tung, “Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-
Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966) 11.

30
the heart of the revolution are economic, political, and social grievances directed at the
Kuomintang regime. The desire, the impetus for the revolution, he writes, is reform in these
sectors. Accusing Chiang Kai-shek‟s rule of corruption, collaboration with foreign powers in
policies that have been against the people‟s interests, and plunging the majority of the country‟s
citizens into poverty while serving the ruling classes economic interests.66
As outlined by the “Manifesto of the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army”, the goal of the
revolution is to liberate the Chinese people and the Chinese nation from the servitude of these
policies and the current regime, and to form “a democratic coalition government in order to
attain the general goal of liberating the people and the nation.”67 In such a spirit, the Manifesto
outlines an eight-point program – detailing land reform, unifying oppressed classes, and
guaranteeing various forms of civil liberties - to provide the backbone of a government allowing
for “our fellow-countrymen … to live like human beings and to choose the government they
wish.”68

2.1.4 Counterinsurgency theory.

By the early 1960s, literature on guerrilla warfare demonstrated a keen awareness of the
systematization of guerilla tactics in the form of insurgency war. Such literature began to discuss
insurgency war through “principles” and “rules” – arguing that the application of the above to
certain conditions could lead to victory even against conventional forces.69 Claiming that
guerilla war was no longer a “limited military tactic” such literature took the “political and
economic consequences” of insurgency war most seriously.70
Consequently, major counterinsurgency doctrines have focused on the political factor of
insurgency wars, and provide an additional set of materials to draw on when investigating
insurgency warfare. Counterinsurgency doctrine operates under the assumption that both the

66
“Manifesto of the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 1966), 335-341.
67
“Manifesto of the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 1966), 335.
68
“Manifesto of the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army” Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 1966), 338-340.
69
Lt. Col. Frederick Wilkins, “Guerrilla Warfare” and Lt. Col. A. H Sollom, “Nowhere Yet Everywhere” and
Colonel Virgil Ney, “Guerilla Warfare and Modern Strategy” all in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla
Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961 (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).
70
Lt. Col. Frederick Wilkins, “Guerrilla Warfare” in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare:
Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961 (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

31
insurgency and the counterinsurgency campaign are engaged in a war for the people, at the fault
line of which lies the struggle to possess political authority. One example will suffice in order to
demonstrate this point.71 Counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson72 highlights the
political emphasis explicitly in his Five Basic Principles of Counterinsurgency. 73 Three out of
five principles aim at establishing, maintaining or strengthening (or any combination) the
political authority and legitimacy of the standing government. As Thompson states, “An
insurgent movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government measures must
be directed to restoring government authority and law and order throughout the country, so that
control over the population can be regained and its support won.”74 As it is the failure of
governments that insurgents capitalize on, according to Thompson, government must: 1) must
have a clear political aim; 2) function in accordance with the law; and 3) have an overall plan.
This way, he argues, government can give priority to: 4) defeating political subversion (rather
than guerrillas) and do so through: 5) securing its own base areas. Counterinsurgency, then, is
a tactical response to the political privileging in insurgency war.75
For a more contemporary example, we turn to the United States‟ Army and Marine Core
Counterinsurgency Manual. Published in 2006, this manual was developed directly in response
to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It defines insurgency as:

“…an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through

the use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized,
protracted, politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control of an established
government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”

71
Note that theoretical discussion on the strategy of the War against al-Qaeda (discussed below) will reinforce this
point.
72
Thompson was Permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya, and worked closely with Dire Gerald Templer. He
played a critical role in defeating in defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya. He also served as heard of the
British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, and eventually became Special Advisor of Pacification to President Nixon.
73
Thompson‟s model remains the dominant one for fighting a counterinsurgency war. Assessments by General
Petraeus, General McChrystal, as well as David Kilcullen and Lt. Col. John Nagl clearly draw on these five
principles.
74
Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Community Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 51.
75
Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Community Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 50-62.

32
 In light of this, the manual continues, “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance and authority
as legitimate [emphasis mine].”76
What might be illumed from the above discussion? First, we have established a model of
insurgency focused on the systemization of guerrilla tactics. As demonstrated above, certain
elements are inherent in insurgency struggles: maintaining the protracted nature of the war,
establishing bases area, preserving class unity, forming popular support, and the eventual
regularization of a guerrilla army. Second, our model has illumed the heightened importance of
the political, social, and economic elements of an insurgency war, defined – foundationally - as
the struggle of a weaker force contesting the political legitimacy of a standing government.
It is this model of insurgency war that is the driving force behind the tactical and strategic
thinking in the Long War. As major military analysts and policy makers have described it,
fighting a War against al-Qaeda requires implementing the counterinsurgency principles
underlining the model above. In demonstrating this, it is quite useful to elaborate on the
theoretical discussions surrounding the Long War, as this will clarify the manner in which the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan are thought to serve its larger aims.

2.2 The Battlegrounds of Iraq and Afghanistan in the War against Al-Qaeda
David Kilcullen, senior counterinsurgency advisor in Iraq to General Petraeus, provides a
particularly nuanced and sophisticated assessment of al-Qaeda‟s role in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and its connections to the Long War more broadly. Kilcullen argues that the War on Terror is
defined by the interaction of two interdependent factors: local elements and transnational
extremist groups. He argues that the Global War on Terror is driven by a “globalized”
insurgency, headed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates seeking to “organize, aggregate and exploit”
indigenous and particular grievances in order to incite a worldwide guerilla war against Western
powers – and particularly the United States. The Global War on Terror is rooted in the
interaction between al-Qaeda, and local actors.
Through a four part process77, al-Qaeda (understood as a remote movement) infiltrates
local conflicts through marriage and other social customs and established a presence through

76
General David H. Petraeus. Lt. General James F. Amos, Lt. Colonel John A Nagl, The U.S. Army and Marine
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). See also,
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf

33
cells and information gathering networks. It then begins to transfer its ideology amongst local
populations, simultaneously threatening the stability of neighboring states. In response to the
growth of terrorist actions, the United States moves in to such areas to stamp out what it
perceives as radicalism and instability. And lastly, in response to an invasion of their space, the
local population begins to fight against the presence of Western forces, and aligns itself with al-
Qaeda.
At this juncture, according to Kilcullen, the local fighter becomes an “accidental guerrilla”
who is “fighting alongside extremist forces not because they support the takfiri ideology but
because they oppose outside interference in their affairs, because they are rallied to support local
tribal or community interests, or because they are alienated by heavy-handed actions of the
intervening force. The more the takfiri group can paint itself as similar to the local people and
the more it can appear as their defender against outsiders, the stronger this phenomenon
becomes.”78
John A. Nagl, a lieutenant colonel in the United States army and an expert in
counterinsurgency, affirms the “infiltration” underpinning of the Kilcullen thesis. Nagl argues
that both campaigns are part of a comprehensive war against al-Qaeda.79 Specifically in the
connection he draws between insurgency aboard and terrorism threats against the Western world.
Therefore, For Nagl, the al-Qaeda threat is also one of infiltration. Seeking territories lacking
legitimate and functioning governments – failed states –al-Qaeda and its affiliates infiltrate and
use these spaces as combat bases, building their numbers and organizing attacks against Western
targets. It is for this reason that securing Iraq and Afghanistan is of such high strategic
importance for the United States and its allies. As Nagl argues, as “free societies rely on the
relatively free movement of people and goods across and within national boundaries, it is cost
prohibitive to defend every vulnerable point [from terrorism].” Rather, “The best way to prevent

77
Kilcullen describes these steps as “infection”; “contagion”; “intervention”; and “rejection.” David Kilcullen, The
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York, Oxford University Press: 2009),
chapter 1, specifically pages 32-38.
78
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York, Oxford
University Press: 2009), 38.
79
A significant amount of Nagl‟s writing argues that the United States Military is not winning counterinsurgency
campaigns in Afghanistan (and only very recently having the ability to turn around a failing counterinsurgency war
in Iraq) due to an overriding emphasis on conventional combat. This is due to an inability (or disinterest), Nagl
argues, of the U.S. Military to systematize and indoctrinate counterinsurgency principles acquired in Vietnam and
the non-conventional conflicts of the 1990s. See next footnote, and especially, John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup
with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2002).

34
terrorism at home is to deny terrorist the sanctuary they seek in rogue and failed states around the
globe.”80
Both Kilcullen and Nagl argue that denial of sanctuary is at the heart of the
counterinsurgency tactic in the War against al-Qaeda. This tactic is executed along the lines of
fundamental principles of counterinsurgency. Elaborating eight “best practices” Kilcullen
articulates a counterinsurgency strategy focused on building effective and legitimate
government, integration of civil and military effort, strengthening local authority, focusing on the
population, development of government and security efforts of the host nation, and a “region-
wide approach that disrupts insurgent safe havens, controls borders and frontier regions, and
undermines terrorist infrastructure in neighboring countries.81 Referring specifically to
Afghanistan, Nagl argues that key objectives are two-fold: 1) preventing Afghanistan from
serving a terrorist sanctuary; and 2) serving as the “catalyst” for regional instability. Such a
policy calls for a military campaign that has the goal of security and governance as its keystone;
and is in fact, according to Nagl, the only type of military strategy that will provide an exit for
U.S. forces from Afghanistan. An effective counterinsurgency campaign, according to Nagl,
employs all means of “National power.” He argues that,

“It‟s at the grass-roots level that you‟re trying to win. You can kill enemy soldiers- that‟s
not the only issue. You also need to dry up their support. You can‟t just use the military. It‟s got
to be a constant din of propaganda; it‟s got to be economic support; it‟s got to be elections. As

80
Lt. Col. John A. Nagl and Lt. Col. Paul L. YingLing, “New Rules for New Enemies,” Armed Forces Journal
October (2006): 1, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425. See also, John A. Nagl, “Winning the
Wars We‟re In,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Temple University, Center for the Study of Force and
Diplomacy, http://www.fpri.org/telegram/20091130.nagl.winning-the-wars.html, John A. Nagl, “Let‟s Win the
Wars we‟re in,” Joint Force Quarterly, 52 (2009). Peter Maass, “Professor Nagl‟s War,” The New York Times
Magazine, January 11th, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/professor-nagl-s-war.html.
81
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York, Oxford
University Press: 2009), xiv. It must be noted that Kilcullen‟s understanding of counterinsurgency is nuanced in a
very particular way. He argues that while counterinsurgency tactics are, in fact, the best method of conducting the
Long War, in light of the difficult of conducting counterinsurgency, particularly on the large scale necessary in
today‟s conflicts, Western powers ought to refrain from entering into these sorts of campaigns. In other words, we
ought to avoid, as much as possible, the Iraqs and Afghanistans of the future. Kilcullen also displays a marked focus
on the importance of using military force sparingly and emphasizing international coalition efforts that work through
local and civil groups and leaders (pages 263-289).

35
long as you only go after the bad guy with the weapon, you‟re missing the most important
part.”82

This theoretical understanding of the war is also executed on the tactical level. The
elements isolated in the model of insurgency articulated above quickly emerged in both
campaigns. Faced with the presence of irregular fighters, utilizing asymmetric tactics, coalition
forces transitioned from the conventional use of force that had characterized the initial stages of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to counterinsurgency campaigns. The following section will
delineate this shift, as it proceeded in response to major developments in both wars.

2.2.1 Afghanistan
At the time of writing, the war in Afghanistan has undergone three major phases; each
responding to the changing nature of the facts on the ground. Initiated in 2001, the early period
of the campaign utilized heavy use of American fire power with the intent of destroying Taliban
communication and defense capabilities. Shortly after initial air strikes, American and British
Special Operations Teams, in conjunction with anti-Afghan indigenous forces known as the
Northern Alliance, initiated a major offensive against Taliban soldiers in the North. Within six
weeks, Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul and Khandar, followed by the battles of Tora Bora and Anaconda,
had led Coalition forces to believe that they had gained a quick victory against the Taliban.83
In these early stages an estimated 40-50,000 fighters were organized to fight for the Taliban.
Early analyses of the war classified the fighters into three categories: indigenous Taliban
fighters, non-Afghan Taliban who were aligned with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda fighters trained by
Osama bin Laden. During this stage of the war, foreign fighters comprised the largest majority
of Taliban forces.84 Later military documents on Afghanistan confirm this assessment of the

82
Peter Maass, “Professor Nagl‟s War,” The New York Times Magazine, January 11th, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/professor-nagl-s-war.html. Here, Nagl is elaborating on what, in
other works, he has called the “key tenets of counterinsurgency”: securing the population, subordinating military
measures to political ends, using minimum force, and working through the host nation. See: John A. Nagl, “Let‟s
Win the Wars we‟re in,” Joint Force Quarterly, 52 (2009): 23.
83
Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (U.S. Army
War College: Strategic Studies Institute: 2002), 1-23. Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study
Team, A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 57-180.
84
Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (U.S. Army
War College: Strategic Studies Institute: 2002) 13.

36
insurgency.85 Whether or not the “foreign” fighters were al-Qaeda affiliated, however, is
unclear.
This is particularly so in light of assessments by Antonio Giustozzi, a leading expert on the
Taliban.86 Giustozzi‟s analysis is categorized into two groups: “hard-core” and “local” fighters.
“Hard-core” fighters were those whom Giustozzi describes as “politically” motivated. They
were recruited both locally and outside of Afghanistan - predominately from the madrasas of
Pashtun Pakistan. “Local” fighters were those whom were motivated by the concerns of their
local villages.87 Arguing that “foreign volunteers represented a significant share of the ranks of
the insurgents” in the initial stages, particularly in the south-east and in the east. Gustozzio
analyses dates al-Qaeda‟s major entry in the Afghan war as occurring much later than the
assessments above. While he does, clearly, ascribe the importance of foreign fighters in the early
Taliban fighting forces, there is no defined mention of al-Qaeda until much later on in his
analysis. In a later chapter on “Taliban Strategy” he lists “al Qaida” in a table of “Insurgent
groups operating in Afghanistan” dating its major influence in the war to 2004 (700 fighters).88
Once coalition forces had secured the north, their attention shifted to the south and east of
Afghanistan. While Osama bin Laden had evaded Coalition forces, it was thought that a
majority of al-Qaeda fighters had been killed and any remaining fighters had crossed the border
in to Pakistan or fled to remote corners of Afghanistan. In short, “with military threats
defeated”, Coalition priorities shifted to “transforming military victory into an enduring political
and economic settlement that would constitute success for the Afghan population and the
coalition.”89 This led to a decision to extend Coalition presence, and transform the war into a
large scale campaign focused on nation building. Consequently, there was a significant change

85
Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 71. Note that Wright references Biddle‟s assessment.
86
Note that Giustozzo‟s estimate for total Taliban fighters peaks at 16,000.
8787
Note that Giustozzo credits this new recruitment campaign as the driving force behind what he terms the “neo-
Taliban” - a younger, more technologically equipped Taliban organization. Antonio Giustozzo, Koran,
Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), 33-43.
88
The table ends with the year 2006 (2000 fighters, Taliban is listed at 17,000). Antonio Giustozzo, Koran,
Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), 132.
89
Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 71.

37
in the operational order, essentially ending the campaign‟s focus on special operations forces.
Six months into the campaign, conventional units were the backbone of Coalition presence.90
The facts on the ground, however, remained anything but conventional. Despite these early
victories in the north, the south and eastern parts of Afghanistan proved much more formidable.
In light of the various difficulties involved in routing out Taliban and Al-Qaeda presence in the
east and the south, it became quite clear that the two-fold aims of defeating al-Qaeda and
preventing the return of the Taliban government required the Coalition to initiate major changes
in its approach to the war. Initially, Coalition forces transitioned to “search and sweep” village
campaigns focused on finding, and routing out, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters – which ultimately
achieved limited levels of success.91 Meanwhile reconstruction efforts progressed steadily. By
2002, the Loya Jirga established Hamid Karzai as the head of the Afghan Transitional Authority,
and Coaltion forces had committed to expanding the Afghan National Army. Yet, despite these
initiatives Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements continued to evade Coalition forces. Furthermore, by
2003 it was clear that the Taliban was regrouping. They had managed to overtake Quetta
province in Pakistan, and were initiating organized attacks against Coalition forces. 92
In response, Lieutenant General David Barno undertook command of the newly formed
senior military headquarters – Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A). After an
initial assessment, Barno concluded that Afghnistan would not be won through military
operations focused on counterterrorism. Rather, Barno‟s assessments led him to decide “early on
that this wasn‟t simply a counterterrorist environment. This was really a classic
counterinsurgency campaign.” 93
Barno, then, formally shifted Coalition forces to a
counterinsurgency tactical approach. Despite a lack of institutionalized doctrine on
counterinsurgency, Barno and his team developed a “Five Pillar” approach: counterterrorism and
denial of sanctuary; building the Afghan Security forces (army and police); establish and create
area ownership; build good governance, and engagement of regional states.

90
Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 181-183.
91
Although they managed to capture Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, as well as seize large amounts of weapons, lack
of access to local intelligence, as well as large scale interrogation techniques, prohibited lasting results.
92
Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 233-240.
93
Christopher N. Koontz, Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan 2003-2005
(Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army: 2008), 18.

38
 While the campaign plan retained its focus on enabling the Afghan National Army, it also
placed significant emphasis on Barno‟s development of Provisional Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs). Each commanding unit was assigned a specific territory for the duration of their time in
Afghanistan. This allowed Coalition members to engage with, and get to know, the local
population and decision makers. It was the hope that by creating good governance in the areas
under command of the PRTs, security would spread, over time, across Afghanistan. “So, the
idea is, you have these ink spots, lily pads, that you‟re operating from, and that they would
expand; and eventually, over time, these ink spots would all connect, and we‟d have good
governance…”94
The war in Afghanistan continues to be fought along the lines of a counterinsurgency war.
The most recent assessments demonstrate this emphasis. General Stanley A. McChrystal, in his
2009 Commander‟s Assessment, argues that the United States must get the “basics” of
counterinsurgency right. Furthermore, McChrystal argues, military efforts must focus all efforts
on a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign centered on a two-pronged approach. First,
Coalition forces must focus on strengthening the capabilities of the Afghan national government
so that it gains legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the Afghan people. Second, Coalition
forces must focus on protecting the civilian population in order to understand their choices,
needs, and - just as importantly – to gain their support.95

2.2.2 Iraq
Multiple reasons were given by the W. Bush administration for the invasion of Iraq. The
War against Al-Qaeda was one of them.96 In a March 17th, 2003 Address to the Nation,
President Bush stated that Iraq‟s “history of reckless aggression in the Middle East” coupled with
its training and harboring of terrorists, “including operatives of al-Qaeda” leads to a clear danger:
“Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the
terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of

94
Brig. Gen. Olson, in: Christopher N. Koontz, Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in
Afghanistan 2003-2005 (Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army: 2008), 18.
95
At the time of writing, it appears that McChrystal‟s general framework was continued by his replacement in
Afghanistan, General David H. Petraeus.
96
Discussions regarding the evidence provided (or lack thereof) by the Bush administration for Iraq‟s proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as its training and harboring of al-Qaeda operatives is ubiquitous.
Discussion of it here is not warranted, nor is it germane to the argument of this chapter or the overall project.

39
innocent people in our country or any other.” 97
In light of this, President Bush argued that the
objectives of the campaign - the establishment of a free and prosperous Iraq, capable of guarding
against the terrorist threat - necessitated the dismantling of the Saddam Hussein regime.
Initiated on March 19th, The War in Iraq proceeded along three models of engagement.
The first is demonstrated by the initial invasion and the subsequent march up to Baghdad. Air
power, Special Operation Forces and ground troops were used against a mix of regular and
paramilitary Iraqi resistance attempting to repel Coalition forces. 98 Although Coalition forces
were facing large numbers of irregular actors, tactics remained conventional, relying heavily on
the use of superior firepower, technology, and supplementary airpower to force both regular and
paramilitary troops out into open combat.99 Proceeding from the Kuwait border, Coalition forces
eventually overtook Tallil Air Base, As Samawah, and moved forward to An Najaf. Proceeding
through the Karbala Gap, Coalition forces then moved into and occupied Baghdad.
Despite the presence of regular troops (the Iraqi Army), the overwhelming tendency of
the Iraqi resistance was to fight asymmetrically.100 Unconventional forces were present from the
earliest stages of the campaign, with Coalition forces reporting armed men in civilian clothing
accompanying soldiers, tanks and pickup trucks mounted with automatic weapons at the attack at
Tallil Air Base.101 The presence of such irregulars continued throughout this stage of the war.
Well-armed paramilitary forces (machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and mortars) engaged
coalition forces in As Samawah, An Nasiriyyah, An Najaf, all the way through to Baghdad. 102

97
“Bush: Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours” CNN World http://articles.cnn.com/2003-03-
17/world/sprj.irq.bush.transcript_1_weapons-inspectors-iraq-regime-disarmament?_s=PM:WORLD
98
Air strikes began March 19th (the first known as the “Decapitation Strikes”, proceeding with the “Night of Shock
and Awe” on the 21-22) with ground operations beginning on March 20 th. See, Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E.
J. Degen, Lt. Col. David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2005), 86.
99
It is such conditions for which superior militaries, such as the United States, are equipped, and in which they are
capable of winning decisively.
100
Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E. J. Degen, Lt. Col. David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), chapters 3-6.
101
There was some evidence to suggest that civilians were being coerced to fight by the Fedayeen. For examples of
engagement with paramilitary forces, see: Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E. J. Degen, Lt. Col. David Tohn, On
Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 119, 127, 129,
133.
102
Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E. J. Degen, Lt. Col. David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 129, 133, 144, 152, 153, 162, 166, 168, 170,
191, 196. 213, 255, 257. While the Republic Guard wore a red patch as a distinguishing mark, it is not clear how
other paramilitary groups were distinguished. This source indicates that there were numerous indications of
combatants in civilian clothing.

40
 The fall of the Saddam regime in April 2003 ignited an almost immediate Sunni
resistance.103 Concentrated in an area in the Northwest area of Iraq, dubbed the “Sunni
Triangle”, resistance fighters targeted not only Coalition forces, but leaders and representatives
of the emerging Iraqi government.
Between 2003 and 2004, the resistance gained strength and momentum. This, coupled
with the murder of four Blackwater contractors104, and the rise of a Shi‟ite led resistance in the
South, led Coalition forces to undertake an incursion into the city of Fallujah, an area thought to
be the heart of the Sunni Triangle, as well as a swelling training base for the Sunni resistance. 105
The initial incursion failed, leading to a second and much larger incursion in November of that
same year called Operation Al Fajr, “The Dawn.”106 Al Fajr is representative of tactical strategy
at this stage of the war. The intent was to use conventional, mechanized forces (tanks) against
the insurgent stronghold in Fallujah. Fighting an insurgency always raises the question of
civilian casualties, and this was a particularly acute problem in Fallujah, as the insurgents lived
among, and also stemmed from, the population there. Coalition assessments highlighted two
basic categories of insurgents in Fallujah: what they termed, indigenous actors (former regime
elements) and foreign fighters (sometimes referred to as al-Qaeda elements).107
In the attempt to avoid civilian casualties, various attempts were made to communicate
with the civilian population within the city. Coalition forces used leaflets and radio broadcasts in
an attempt to clear the city of all “fence sitters” or noncombatants. 108 Consequently, once
Coalition forces entered the city, an overwhelming use of firepower was utilized. According to

103
For a soldier‟s perspective, see the Journal of Todd S. Brown, who commanded an infantry company in the 4 th
Infantry Division (mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He documents his tour from April 2003 until
March 204. See: Todd S. Brown, Battleground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander (Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army, 2007).
104
On March 31st, 2004, insurgents in Fallujah attacked and killed four contractors from Blackwater USA, a private
security company working with the Coalition Provisional Authority. The insurgents then strung up the corpses on a
bridge, igniting media frenzy over the war in Iraq.
105
Fallujah is an important local center of Sunni Islam, whose population demonstrated a significant amount of
support for Saddam‟s Ba‟athist regime. It was a deeply religious, as well as a deeply tribal society, with many of its
adherents professing some form of Wahhabi Islam. Furthermore, a significant number of its male population had
been employed by the Iraqi National Army, whose disintegration post-the U.S. invasion led to massive numbers of
unemployment. See Kendall G. Gott, ed. Eye Witness to War Volume I: The U.S. Army in Operation AL FAJR: An
Oral History (Fort Leavenworth:Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 1.
106
Initially called “Operation Phantom Fury‟”
107
Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, ed., Al Anbar
Awakening Vol 1: American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009 (Quantico:
Marine Corps University, 2009), 6, 10, 11.
108
Kendall G. Gott, ed. Eye Witness to War Volume I: The U.S. Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History (Fort
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 66-67, 158-59.

41
Coalition analyses, and from the Coalition‟s perspective, Al Fajr was spectacularly successful,
routing out large numbers of Sunni insurgents with minimum numbers of civilian casualties.109
In defense force analyses, Al Fajr was held up as the paradigmatic model for conducting the
future counterinsurgency in Iraq.110
The perceived success on the part of Coalition forces in Fallujah was followed up by the
2005 referendum and national elections in Iraq. These developments were coupled with gradual
success in the growth of the Iraqi security forces, particularly in the numbers of the Iraqi police.
However, despite these milestones, attacks continued against Coalition forces throughout Iraq.
Al Anbar remained entrenched in violence, with insurgent attacks reaching some of the highest
levels of the war.111
At the height of insurgent violence, the campaign took a decisive turn. In September
2006, Sheikh Abdul Saltar Abu Risha announced the formation the “Sahwa al Anbar,” or the “al
Anbar Awakening” - a tribal movement in the al Anbar Province, where local tribes began
turning against the al-Qaeda elements and cooperating with Coalition forces. Across the
province, local tribes began to “flip” from “hostile” to “neutral” and “neutral” to “friendly”
significantly elevating the enlistment and growth of the Iraqi security forces.112
General David H. Petraeus‟s Report to Congress on the War in Iraq confirms and emphasizes the
significance of the events in al Anbar province, leading Petraeus to emphasize the importance of
continuing the counterinsurgency approach. In his 2008 report, General Petraeus argues that,

” defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counter-terrorist
forces, but also major operations by Coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated
109
Oral histories discuss the large presence of foreign, highly trained fighters that were present in the battle in
Fallujah. Kendall G. Gott, ed. Eye Witness to War Volume II: The U.S. Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral
History (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 50, 64-65.
110
James E. Rainey, Lieutenant colonel and commander of the 2 nd Battalion, 7th Calvary regiment during Al Fajr
stated, “That‟s my number one observation. From a tactical lessons learned standpoint, mechanized forces can fight
in urban terrain and can be absolutely lethal and devastating.” Furthermore, the Eye Witness to War study was
commissioned specifically to study operation AL FAJR, in order to assess it tactically as a joint operation between
the defense forces, and for future military operations. For an oral history account of Operation Al Fajr by the United
States Army, see: Eye Witness to War Volume I and II: The U.S. Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History
(Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007).
111
Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lietuenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, ed., Al Anbar
Awakening Vol 1: American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009 (Quantico:
Marine Corps University, 2009).
112
The Iraqi police went from 2,000-13,000. Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant
Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, ed., Al Anbar Awakening Vol 1: American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009 (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 2009), 12-16.

42
intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information
operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in
detainee operations, and many other actions.”113

While the insurgency in Iraq is dizzyingly complex114, some comments may be made in
an attempt to lend some order to this discussion. Literature on the Iraqi insurgency argues that it
is composed of three main groups, each of which, within itself, demonstrates a tremendous
amount of complexity. The Sunni insurgency is composed of three elements. The first are the
Former Regime Loyalists, and their military elements. These are nationalist elements, composed
of former Saddam Fedayeen, Special Republican Guard officers, former Ba‟athists, and Sunni
Iraqis civilians. The Second is composed of Iraqi Religious Extremists, who are also nationalists
in orientation. The third category encompasses the foreign fighters of Zarkawi‟s former group,
Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the umbrella group, Islamic Emirate of Iraq.115 It should be noted that this
typology tends to obfuscate the complexity of the insurgency movements in Iraq. It also fails to
take note of the Shiite groups that have engaged in resistance against Coalition forces and the
post-invasion Iraqi government. Furthermore, the word “insurgency” implies that these groups
are acting in concert, whereas this is not necessarily the case. While at times a collection of
insurgent groups in Iraq may join forces, it is just as likely that they will act in such a manner as
to maximize their own (often localized) interests.
At this juncture, critical questions ought to be raised. While the assessments by Kilcullen
and Nagl attempt to create clear relationships between the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the War against al-Qaeda, the denial of sanctuary arguments invite further investigation.
The counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan may eventually succeed in securing
stable, and well functioning states in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and ultimately, in denying both

113
Petraeus, Report To Congress on Iraq, 2008.
114
See, Kathleen Ridolfo, “A survey of Armed Groups in Iraq” Small Wars Journal,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iraqsurvey.pdf . Zaki Chebab, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency
and the Future of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 2005). Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: al Zarqawi
and the New Generation (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005).
115
This analysis of the insurgency is contained in Malcolm W. Nance, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq – Heroes, Boogeymen, or
Puppets?” smallwarsjournal.com. This is a summary of his argument in his book, The Terrorists of Iraq:Inside the
Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency (Booksruge Publishing, 2007). Nance‟s overall argument is that
Former Reigme Loyalists are waging the lion‟s share of the insurgency, while Coalition, and the U.S.
administration‟s war plan is one against “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” For Nance, this is tantamount to fighting the wrong
enemy. His analysis coincides with early analyses of the campaign in Iraq. Resistance was thought to be comprised
mostly of Sunni elements loyal to the Saddam Hussein regime.

43
states as al-Qaeda sanctuaries. However, despite the inherent logic of this approach, its efficacy
is ultimately measured not only by its ability to secure Iraq and Afghanistan, but by its ability to
contain al-Qaeda. Ultimately, what appears necessary is an exploration into al-Qaeda itself; one
primarily aimed at understanding the role that al-Qaeda constructs, or imagines for itself, in light
of the nature of the Long War and the contemporary environment.

2.3 Al-Qaeda
Fortunately, a set of communiqués, interviews, and transcribed videos from which a
measure of al-Qaeda self-understanding may be gleaned are in supply. This literature reveals an
organization committed – first and foremost – to a revitalization of the Muslim community,
based upon a very particular, and relatively speaking, quite narrow, definition of Islam. For al-
Qaeda, there is only one way to be a proper Muslim – by emulating the practices and doctrines
professed and developed by the very earliest Muslims and Muslim communities. Furthermore,
al-Qaeda argues, it is only by recommitting the Muslim community to this particular vision of
the tradition that the Muslim world might revitalize itself, and regain the strength and glory of
its past. This process of revitalization, as articulated most fiercely and most clearly by its chief
ideologues – Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri – involves several converging factors –
the most prominent being a world-wide and immediate armed confrontation with the West, and
most specifically, with the United States. It is this armed military struggle that I wish to
explore; specifically in the way it relates to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This section will
proceed by outlining the critical steps, as demonstrated in al-Qaeda reasoning, of the global and
incumbent confrontation. It will then detail how this confrontation applies to the current
campaigns.
Osama bin Laden describes the contemporary Muslim world as afflicted by two evils.
The first are the corrupt and tyrannical political regimes, whose illegitimacy, he argues, make
them incapable of properly defending the Muslim community. For the ideologues of al-Qaeda,
there is a necessary connection between the application of God‟s law, and the legitimacy of the
state and its head. Failure to apply the Sharia‟s in all matters of the state leads to an invalidation
of the legal institutions and its leadership. This comes out clearly in bin Laden‟s condemnation
of various Muslim states. His early epistles are focused on critiquing the Saudi regime, and they
provide a clear list of what he understands to be transgressions that while, at this stage are aimed

44
specifically at the Saudi Royal Family, are eventually leveled at nearly every government in the
Muslim world.
The list is long and detailed. Bin Laden cites Saudi practices of usury; willingness to
allow foreign (U.S.) troops on Muslim soil during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm;
support of the Oslo Accords – all transgressions against the Sharia, according to bin Laden.
These acts, he argues, have demonstrated subordination to the U.S. and have set up a rival
authority to God, setting the regime “outside the religious community” and no “longer ruling the
people according to what God revealed.”116
Zawahiri provides a more nuanced elaboration on bin Laden‟s condemnation of current
Islamic governments. He labels democracy a “new religion” – primarily in an effort to hold it up
as a rival source of authority to Islam. In Islam, he argues, legal authority and legislation come
directly from God; whereas in democracy, that authority stems from the people themselves. The
religion of democracy and any of its associations (the process of elections, for example) usurps
the authority belonging exclusively to God, and transferring it to the people. When gods,
“multiply on earth”, he argues, corruption spreads, and the ordained and correct order of the
natural world is distorted, therefore, weakening the Muslim nation, corrupting its moral nature,
and leaving it in a position of vulnerability and weakness.117 In his famous piece, The Bitter
Harverst, Zawahiri states that the connection between religion and state in Islam requires full
submission, on the part of every believer, to the laws of God in every sphere. Consequently, any
government that is constructed by human beings, that does not submit itself in this way, is
illegitimate, and cannot properly govern the Muslim community.118
The illegitimate man-made governments have led to the second problem: lack of piety,
and proper adherence to God‟s law, which has left the Muslim world in a position where they
have been led astray from their religion; from their source of strength and prosperity. As a result,
contemporary Muslim history has been one of colonization, domination and oppression by the

116
Osama bin Laden, “The Betrayal of Palestine,” (December 29 th, 1994) in Messages to the World: The Statements
of Osama bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 3-14. “Interview with CNN (excerpts),” in, Al
Qaeda in its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2008), 51-52.
117
Ayman al-Zawahir, “Advice to the Community to Reject the Fatwa of Sheikh Bin Baz Authorizing Parliamentary
Representation,” in Al Qaeda in its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 182-192.
118
Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Bitter Harvest” in Al Qaeda in its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 171-181.

45
West. While bin Laden‟s early epistles mention Chechnya, Bosnia, and Palestine as
demonstrations of aggression against the Muslim world, his chief preoccupation is the presence
of foreign troops on Saudi soil - arguably the holiest spaces in the Muslim world. Foreign troop
presence in Saudi Arabia holds a great deal of symbolic capital for bin Laden, epitomizing the
struggle of the contemporary Muslim world. Addressing himself to the “honorable scholars of
the Arabian peninsula and Saudi Arabia in particular” he writes,

You are all aware of the degree of degradation and corruption to which our Islamic
umma has sunk in its government and in the feebleness and cowardice of many of its scholars in
the face of its enemies, as well as in its internal divisions. This is because of their neglect of
religion and weakness of faith, which allowed the enemy to attack. The enemy invaded the land
of our umma, violated her honor, shed her blood, and occupied her sanctuaries. This aggression
has reached such a catastrophic and disastrous point as to have brought about a calamity
unprecedented in the history of our umma, namely the invasion by the American and western
Crusader forces of the Arabian peninsula and Saudi Arabia, home of the Noble Ka‟ba, the
Sacred House of God, the Muslim‟s direction of prayer, the Noble Sanctuary of the Prophet, and
the city of God‟s Messenger, where the Prophetic revelation was received. This momentous
event is unprecedented both in pagan and Islamic history. For the first time, the Crusaders have
managed to achieve their historic ambitions and dreams against our Islamic umma…turning the
Arabian peninsula (sic) into the biggest air, land and sea base in the region.119

This interpretation of history has led the ideologues of al-Qaeda to put forward a
specifically defensive interpretation of jihad. Its clearest expression is the declaration of “The
World Islamic Front” on February 23rd, 1998, announcing a jihad against the “Jews and
Crusaders.”120 By the time the declaration was written, bin Laden (and the signatories) had

119
Osama bin Laden, “The Invasion of Arabia (c. 1995/1996),” in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama
bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 15-16. See also, “Declaration of Jihad” (August 23rd,
1996), in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005),
28-29.
120
The declaration had four signatories: Sheikh Osamah bin Muhammad bin Laden; Ayaman al Zawahiri, amir of
the Jihad Group in Egypt; Ab-Yasir Rif‟ai Amhad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group; and Fazlur Rahman, amir of the
jihad Movement in Bangladesh. See “The World Islamic Front” in Messages to the World: The Statements of
Osama bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 58-62. For a second English translation see Gilles
Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in its Own Words (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2008), 53-56.

46
expanded their focus. While bin Laden mentions American presence in Saudi Arabia, the
declaration also focuses on American presence in the peninsula and its war against Iraq (first
Gulf War) as demonstrative of its intentions to further “fragment all the states in the region, like
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, into paper min-states…” Furthermore, it continues, “All
these American crimes and sins are a clear proclamation of war against God, his Messenger,
and the Muslims. Religious scholars have agreed that jihad is an individual duty when an enemy
attacks Muslim countries.” (emphasis mine).121 In these circumstances, the declaration argues, it
is the individual religious duty of all Muslims to engage in armed conflict with the United States
and her allies in order to liberate the Muslim world from the oppression and tyranny that has
been inflicted upon it as a consequence of American acts of aggression.
Consequently, in bin Laden‟s famous “Why we are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden‟s
Letter to the Americans” he writes, “…why are we fighting and opposing you? – the answer is
very simple…Because you attack us and continue to attack us.” Listing the various military
fronts of American aggression against the Muslim nation - Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya,
Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq - this epistle clearly expands the territorial focus of bin Laden‟s
discourse. He argues that American support allows tyrannical and illegitimate regime to stifle
the Muslim people, attacking them and prohibiting the true and proper expression of Islam as
determine by Sharia law. He accuses the West of depleting Muslim resources, and forcibly
occupying Muslim countries, all while starving the people of Iraq through sanctions, and
maintaining the false rhetoric of American as the land of freedom. Then, calling the American
people to accept Islam, and to change their culture of immorality he calls for the United States to
change their oppressive and imbalanced policies, and to “deal with us and interact with us on the
basis of mutual interest and benefits, rather than policies of submission, theft and occupation…”
If the United States fails to meet these conditions, bin Laden warns, they should prepare
themselves for a fight with the Islamic umma.122
The question then, is how does the greater war of the Islamic nation against the West, as
understood by al-Qaeda, apply to Iraq and Afghanistan? As stated in the introduction, bin Laden
has demonstrated clear interest in both wars, and has written tracts dedicated specifically to each

121
“The World Islamic Front,” in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence
(London: Verso, 2005), 60.
122
Osama bin Laden, “Why We Are Fighting You: Osama Bin Laden‟s Letter to Americans” in The Al Qa‟ida
Reader, ed., Raymond Ibrahim (New York: Broadway Reader, 2007).

47
campaign. However, a serious investigation into these writings demonstrates that while bin
Laden was invested in these campaigns to some degree, he was invested specifically in the sense
that Iraq and Afghanistan are understood to be a part of a larger, world-wide confrontation of the
Muslim world with the West. Afghanistan and Iraq are fronts within the larger military struggle;
fronts that bin Laden and al-Qaeda support in their ability to incite and maintain the greater
confrontation. However, neither war holds significance for al-Qaeda beyond this. Bin Laden is
not wholly invested in either front; rather he describes the wars as part of a historic and ongoing
war between the Muslim nation and the “Crusader West” – with Iraq and Afghanistan as the
most recent manifestations of Western oppression and degradation of the Muslim world.
Writing to the “people of Afghanistan” bin Laden urges them to remain steadfast in their
jihad, to “know that it saves our lands, protects our sanctity, spreads justice, security, and
prosperity, and plants fear in our enemies‟ hearts.” He reminds them of the “faithful
mujahideen” who successfully beat Russian forces, and urges them to remain steadfast in the
war against the West. Outside of these comments, there is no privileging of Afghanistan‟s war in
any way; it does not appear to hold any symbolic value or importance. For bin Laden,
Afghanistan is another war that must be waged as a part of the global struggle.123
During the course of the current war in Iraq, bin Laden wrote a series of letters to the
Iraqi people. In the first epistle, bin Laden sought to motivate the Iraqi people to fight the
American forces. He urged them to remain steady to God‟s cause, reminding them that “victory
comes only with God.” He provided detailed advice regarding how to conduct an insurgency
war, based on his own experiences in Afghanistan. He urged the Iraqis to dig trenches, and to
fight a “protracted” war. Most importantly, he emphasized the this war has the ability to
“mobilize the umma to liberate themselves from their enslavement to these oppressive,
tyrannical, apostate ruling regimes who are supported by America and to establish God‟s rule on
earth.” Listing Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen as places most in
need of liberation, it is clear that he understood the Iraq war as part and parcel of the larger
struggle.124

123
Osama bin Laden, “To the People of Afghanistan (August 25th, 2002),” Messages to the World: The Statements
of Osama bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 158-159.
124
Osama bin Laden, “To the People of Iraq (February 11, 2003),” Messages to the World: The Statements of
Osama bin Laden, ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 179-185.

48
 Furthermore, the war in Iraq, he argues, is a continuation of aggression waged against the
Muslim world beginning with the Skyes-Picot agreement.125 Referring to the “Bush-Blair axis”
bin Laden argues that the War against Terrorism is a guise for a war against Islam – seeking to
destroy its people and gain access to the resources of its nations. This war, according to bin
Laden, is a comprehensive one; it does not end with the war in Iraq. Rather, it is one waged
against the entirety of the Muslim world, encompassing Syria, Iran, Egypt, and Sudan (although,
in predicable fashion, he is quick to point out that Saudi Arabia is the prized target).126 However,
in the same epistle, he switches course, arguing that an American defeat in Afghanistan will
leave an irremovable mark on the American campaign in the Muslim world.127
Al-Qaeda‟s concerns undoubtedly draw on some of the same elements depicted in the
model of insurgency war developed in this chapter. It is concerned with various ideas of
liberation, and the overcoming of injustice. These concerns, however, are largely decentralized.
While the symbolic importance of Saudi Arabia renders it a reoccurring theme, Al-Qaeda is not
specifically concerned with the injustice or oppression of any one state. Rather, it disseminate its
concern to the inability of the Muslim world, as a whole, to properly implement God‟s will in the
form of an Islamic state. Second, the war – the jihad – as al-Qaeda understands it, and while
waged with the recognition of various forms of vice and injustice occurring in the Muslim world,
understands those to be secondary to its primary objective. For al-Qaeda, war is waged in order
to force the implementation of God‟s law – a necessary and incumbent feature of Islamic life that
has been restricted and prohibited by the oppressive military and political policies of the Western
world.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This understanding brings a counterinsurgency approach to the War against al-Qaeda into
question. Al-Qaeda does not understand itself to be at war with any one specified government;
rather, al-Qaeda is in the business of inciting a world-wide Islamic revolution. Al-Qaeda is not a
guerrilla army, forming columns out of local fighters with indigenous grievances. Rather, al-
Qaeda understands itself as inciting local actors in various places around the world.

125
An agreement between Britain and France, which delineated their spheres of political control in the Middle East
post World War One.
126
Osama bin Laden, “Among a Band of Knights” in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden,
ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 187-188.
127
Osama bin Laden, “Among a Band of Knights” in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden,
ed., Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005).

49
 A counterinsurgency approach, based on a notion of sanctuary denial, is further
complicated by al-Qaeda‟s recalcitrant nature. From its writings, al-Qaeda‟s leadership appears
irreconcilable. Although bin Laden advances a “defensive war” against the West, a closer
examination reveals a more complex understanding of the world around him.128 Other writings
by bin Laden, particularly those addressed to prominent figures in the Muslim community posit
the confrontation with America as stemming from the Islamic doctrine of “enmity and loyalty”,
which demands that Muslims take an aggressive and militaristic stance against non-Muslims, the
capstone of which is offensive jihad.
In bin Laden‟s “Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West”129 - bin Laden response to
the Saudi letter, “How Can we Coexist” - forcefully condemns what he understand the latter‟s
relative position of Islam. He argues that this attempt to “unify‟ all religion is fallacious, as it
requires dissolving the essential matters that are unique and critical to a proper understanding of
Islam. Any agreement between Islam and other religions may only be done on matters that are
secondary, or peripheral. This document, he argues, presents a diluted and fallacious version of
the faith; one that fails to take heed of primary creeds within the tradition. These attempts at
shared understanding are guises, he argues, for secularism, which “strike at the essence of Islam
and religiosity in the Islamic world, striving to secularize the people, and [initiating a] separation
of religion and state?”130
Furthermore, this document rejects jihad as a creed, as a necessity that is incumbent upon
the umma in light of its duty to submit to God‟s law. Messages of dialogue and unanimity, he
writes, are acceptable only by rejecting offensive jihad, which is “an established and basic tenet
of this religion. It is a religious duty rejected only by the most deluded.” Muslims are obligated
to live under and to propagate the Sharia, nothing more and nothing less. They have no
obligations to form foundational and lasting dialogues with non-Muslims states. They have no
obligation to coexist with those who are not of their faith. Furthermore, it is an impossible task,
as the foundational doctrinal elements of Islam are unique, and therefore, incommensurable with

128
Raymond Ibrahim argues that the above defensive posture taken by bin Laden and al-Qaeda ought to be
reevaluated in light of what he terms al-Qaeda‟s more theologically oriented documents. Ibrahim argues that when
directing himself to the West, bin Laden depicts al-Qaeda‟s war against America as retaliatory, not aggressive, and
undertaken in the name of defense.
129
This letter responds to the Saudi publication of “How Can we Coexist?” which is itself a response to the
American “What We are Fighting For” (discussed above).
130
Osama bin Laden, “Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West” in The Al Qaeda Reader, ed., Raymond Ibrahim,
(New York: Broadway Reader, 2007) 30-31.

50
those of other faiths. Rather, he argues, the obligation of Muslims is to engage in the jihad in
order defend the community and to spread its reach. As jihad remains the primary element to
undertake both, it cannot be abolished, and any position which seeks to do so is in opposition to
the Sharia and to God.131
Ayman al Zawahiri supports this stance. Citing a variety of Quranic verses in support of
his position, he argues that the Muslim relationship with the West ought to be understood
through the doctrine of loyalty and enmity. This doctrine explains that God has forbidden
Muslims from befriending infidels or taking them as allies. It divides the world into two camps,
Muslims and everyone else. Muslims, as commanded by God, and as demonstrated by the
example of Muhammad and the early Muslims are to strive to remain loyal to other believers, to
refrain from showing love, affection or to engage in any amicable relationship with those whom
are not of their faith. Furthermore, the believers are obligated to engage in jihad against the
unbelievers if they occupy or enter Islamic lands. Quoting Ibn Taymiyyah, Zawahir writes, “If
the enemy enters the lands of Islam, he must surely be repelled as soon as possible, for all
Islamic lands are one Umma.” Furthermore, jihad against the apostate rulers, he argues, is vital
to this doctrine. Positioning himself in light of the following Quranic evidence, “Let those
beware who withstand the Messenger‟s commands, lest some trail befall them, or a grievous
penalty be inflicted on him” these rulers have abandoned their faith, and must be treated with the
same accord as any non-Muslim. Consequently, he summarizes, befriending believers and
fighting infidels is a critical pillar of the faith – it defends the Umma and demonstrates true piety
to God.
These writings reinforce a depiction of a movement that, while perhaps might be deterred
by the loss of Afghanistan or Iraq, will certainly not be eliminated. These ideas, while embodied
in the al-Qaeda fighters that have migrated to Iraq and Afghanistan, will continue irrespective of
United States goals and policy for both campaigns. Al-Qaeda will move on; it will find new
sanctuaries; it will regroup; and it will mount new attacks. While it is currently utilizing the
open wounds of Iraq and Afghanistan, its vision is such that once these have healed, it will find
new ground from which to mount the military struggle required for the religious transformation
of the world it seeks to impose.

Osama bin Laden, “Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West” in The Al Qaeda Reader, ed., Raymond Ibrahim,
131

(New York: Broadway Reader, 2007) 22-62.

51
 A more definitive understanding of al-Qaeda‟s aims requires a conceptualization of its
war model; the specific way in which it understands the strategic and tactical framework of the
jihad. For this, we turn to the work of Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri.

52
 CHAPTER THREE

FRAMING THE NEW JIHAD: AL-SURI AND THE AL-QAEDA

MODEL OF WAR

3.0 Introduction
Understanding al-Qaeda‟s model of jihad is an ambitious undertaking; especially
considering the diffuse nature of this organization.132 However, in light of the inspirational
nature of the al-Qaeda leadership, it appears natural to turn to one of these figures in the attempt
to determine the outlines and the particulars of the new al-Qaeda framework. In this end, none
have made as prolific, or as comprehensive articulations on this matter as that of Mustafa Abd al-
Qadir Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Mas‟ab al-Suri.
Al-Suri was a relatively obscure figure until March 11th, 2004. That morning, Spain
was rocked by a series of coordinated attacks against the commuter train system in Madrid. The
blasts left 191 dead and 1800 wounded. Out of the rubble, al-Suri, a young, red-haired, and fair-
skinned young man rose out of anonymity and into the international spotlight. Although
unknown on the international stage, al-Suri had been a comparatively important figure in radical
Islamist circles well before Madrid. He spent time in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Spain and London and was closely involved in each of their respective militant movements.
Initially denying his involvement in the Madrid attacks, al-Suri later issued a manifesto
explaining their importance to the jihadi cause.133 Shortly after these events, the United States

132
Marc Sageman, in a testimony to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and based on a survey
of al-Qaeda plots in the West beginning from August 1988, argues that fifty-four percent of terrorist plots connected
with al-Qaeda are al-Qaeda “inspired”, meaning that they are “autonomous plots…with no connections whatsoever
with any formal transnational terrorist organizations.” Twenty-five percent are “al-Qaeda affiliated” and twelve
percent are “al-Qaeda controlled.” While Sageman argues that this data demonstrates al-Qaeda‟s deflated strength
(particularly since 2004), I argue that the evidence in many ways proves otherwise; indicating al-Qaeda‟s continuing
ability to incite violence around the world, even in situations where they are not directly involved. Furthermore, as
Sageman‟s numbers indicate, forty-six percent of terror operations that he has collected remain under direct or
indirect al-Qaeda control! See, Marc Sageman, “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan
and Beyond,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7th, 2009. Available at
http://www.fpri.org/transcripts/20091007.Sageman.ConfrontingalQaeda.pdf; See also Peter L. Bergen, Holy War,
Inc.: The Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001), specifically chapter 8.
133
Paul Cruickshank and Mohammad Hage Ali demonstrate that reports claiming al-Suri‟s operational involvement
in these attacks were inaccurate. Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri: Architect of the
New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007):1-14. The al-Qaeda connection to the Madrid Bombings

53
offered a five million dollar reward for information leading to his arrest, and consequently
cemented his importance to the jihadi community. In response, al-Suri launched a personal
website, containing links to audio and video files of his lectures, as well as most of his written
works. Tactics, strategy, and theology were now available for the curious jihadi and researcher
alike.
Al-Suri was eventually captured by the Pakistani police on Ocotber 31st, 2005. Despite
his website, he remains a relatively understudied thinker. Perhaps due to the fact that it was not
until his capture (and the U.S. reward) that he was able to achieve any real sense of notoriety in
the jihadi community. Yet, the research that has been conducted reveals, what I argue, is a
thinker of significant import to understanding the phenomenon of al-Qaeda, and of radical,
militant Islam broadly speaking. Despite years of military training, al-Suri is at heart, a
theoretician – seeking to provide a comprehensive and operative framework for future
operations. He spent the better part of his adult life writing, lecturing, and recording his ideas
on military strategy, leaving the scholarly community with a substantial textual window into al-
Qaeda thinking.
I argue that al-Suri, as a representative of al-Qaeda thinking, provides the most articulate
and prolific glimpse into a new model of warfare – of a decentralized, worldwide jihad.
Furthermore, I argue that gaining clarity about this model requires that one grasp what I term its
“dual nature” – a nature that is, one the one hand, deeply rooted in the historical tradition of
Muslim thinking on war; while, on the other hand, departing from this tradition in critical ways.
The interactions described here are complex and multifaceted. The aims of this chapter are not
to reduce them to oversimplified parts. Rather, the aim is to describe how the dual nature of the
al-Qadea model renders it an extension of a mode of Islamic discourse on war that may be traced
to the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims.134 Therefore, as an “extension” of

has not been definitively established. It isn‟t clear whether al-Suri was direct involved in the training, funding,
organization of the men who undertook the attack, or, rather, whether the men acted on their own, but were “al-
Qaeda inspired.” Cf, Paul Hamilos, “The Worst Islamist Attack in European History” Guardian.co.uk October 31st,
2007. Sean O‟Neill, “Spain Furious as U.S. Blocks Access to Madrid Bombing „Chief‟” thetimesonline.co.uk
February 15th, 2007.
134
Note here, that Fred McGraw Donner argues that the Islamic conception of war was influenced by pre-Islamic
conceptions of warfare. See, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War” in Just War and Jihad: Historical and
Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner
Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 31-69. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981), 11-49.

54
Islamic discourse on war, the al-Qaeda model ought to be understood through two different, but
related, lenses.
The first is the historical narrative of Islamic thinking on war – the jihad tradition
(discussed more below). The al-Qaeda model is not constructed upon terms, ideas, and concepts
that were invented by, or unique to al-Qaeda. Rather, al-Qaeda establishes its ideas upon Islamic
theories of statecraft, and within a textual and historical tradition that organizes the use of force.
For al-Qaeda, the world – social, political, and historic events and developments – are
understood through the lens of Islamic history, and the continuing guidance provided by God‟s
providence. More specifically, I argue that this theological background provides the conceptual
worldview by which al-Suri‟s understanding of jihadi operations acquire clarity, logic, and most
importantly, purpose.
Such statements are in no way to claim that the jihad tradition is a monolithic thing.
Quite the contrary; Muslim thinking on war is varied and complex. In reading the work of
Muslim thinkers on the topic, one is quite struck by the variety of positions on this issue.
Whether one reads a medieval text, or the positions of contemporary thinkers, it is clear that
there is more disagreement than agreement on the topic of war.135 This is the clear mark of a
discourse that has changed, adapted, developed and responded to various historical events and
circumstances. In other words, it is the mark of a religious tradition.
As a tradition, however, Muslim discourse on war demonstrates common denominators
that are called upon by various Muslim thinkers as they form their positions on issues having to
do with war. Most often, these common denominators are related to questions of authority, and
the specific ends the individual or the community is in the business of achieving. These common
denominators are the conceptual building blocks from which the various expressions of jihad
have been interpreted and reinterpreted since the time of the earliest Muslim community.
Demonstrating these theological building blocks is not to make a case for a certain “essence” of
the tradition. Quite the contrary, as it will become quite clear that multiple interpretations of
jihad have been put forward, and continue to be put forward. Rather, it is to argue that there is a

135
cf, Yasir S. Ibrahim trans., Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad: A Translation from the Original Arabic (Lewiston: The
Edwin Mellen Press, 2007). Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and
History,” in Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition,
ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Greenwood Press, 1990), 35-50.

55
loose, yet discernible, framework upon which we may hang the marker of “jihad” 136 and to
demonstrate how it is that this framework drives the al-Qaeda model. My aim in this chapter is
not to discuss al-Suri‟s theological credentials or merits. In other words, my purpose is not to
answer whether or not al-Suri‟s understanding is “real” Islam. Rather, my goal is to
demonstrate the manner in which al-Suri is drawing upon the theological building blocks of a
historical tradition in order to interpret international politics, and to determine a proper – and
novel - course of action in light of the theological commitments of a religious sub-community
that he claims to represent.
Second, is the interpretive lens that al-Qaeda, as an organization, has brought to bear
upon the jihad. Al Qaeda‟s understanding of war, as demonstrated by al-Suri, is a further
expression of the jihad tradition; one built upon the theological building blocks discussed above.
However it has interpreted the tradition in such a manner that its model of war becomes
something quite novel.
This departure is most clear in the categories of “legitimate authority” and
“noncombatant immunity” or more generally, “discrimination.”137 As will be demonstrated, the
jihad tradition has typically identified the authority to wage war with a legitimate and proper
authority – the head of an Islamic state. Furthermore, the jihad was waged for particular
purposes, notably either to expand or to protect the territorial boundaries of the state in which
Islam held sway. In light of this, the use of force was restricted; not only in the ends to be
achieved, but in the means through which force might be used to accomplish those ends.
Categories of discrimination were systematized, indicating classes of noncombatants. In this
way, war, or the use of force, was limited.138
The al-Qaeda model, in contrast, steps outside the confines created by the jihad tradition.
While referencing the history, concepts, and terms of the jihad tradition, al-Suri‟s model does not

136
While a systematic doctrine on war did not develop until the medieval juristic period, this doctrine was informed
by the example of the very early Muslims in critical ways.
137
Comparative work on the just war and jihad traditions demonstrates that such categories may be employed –
with important nuances - for both traditions. See, especially, John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative
Ethics (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), and also, James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in
Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). John Kelsay and
James Turner Johnson (eds.), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in
Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), and John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson
(eds.), Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Traditions (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1990).
138
See John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville:Westminster/John Knox Press,
1993).

56
require that war be declared by an established political authority. Rather, all Muslims may - and
are required – to immediately take up arms against the West. Furthermore, the jihad is to be
waged against the West in any place possible – striking at Western interests in both the Muslim
world and in United States and Europe, and with minimal restriction on noncombatants.
Consequently, its departure from the jihad tradition has served to erode the very clear limits on
the use of force that the jihad tradition has set in place. In other words, its departure from the
historical tradition of Muslim thinking on war – particularly in the areas of legitimate authority
and noncombatant immunity - has imploded these two categories to the point where the use of
force in the al-Qaeda model is virtually unrestricted.
In order to explicate the al-Qaeda model of war, this chapter will provide a historical
outline of the jihad tradition, focusing on the issues of legitimate authority and discrimination.
It provides an analysis of these issues both in the “classical” period of Islam, as well as in the
contemporary era. In order to more fully understand al-Suri‟s placement within this historical
trajectory, his ideas will be treated last. It is important to note that the early Muslims and the
medieval jurists had important things to say about many subjects related to war. However, the
contemporary period, of which al-Suri is a part, departs from this tradition most notably in the
categories described above. Therefore, the analysis provided here will focus heavily on these
issues. When other topics are introduced, it is only in the hope that they shed light on the
categories of interest.

3.0.1 A Note on Sources

The scholar must rely on the early Muslim historian for a significant amount of the
information available on Muhammad and the early Muslims; a great deal of which was not
recorded until several hundred years later, during what is known as the “Juristic period.”
Therefore, I rely on source material written by the Islamic jurists for information on both the
early Muslims community and for ideas regarding the juristic doctrine on jihad. As the reader
will note, I distinguish these two sections in my analysis, treating them as separate (yet related)
moments in the development of the jihad tradition. In light of the state of the source material,
this distinction is somewhat artificial. However in order to demonstrate the manner in which
certain concepts were developed and referenced within the tradition, the distinction must be
made.

57
 Questions related to the historical accuracy of the early sources – specifically al-Al-
Tabari – do not appear germane to this project. The arguments put forward here are not
interested in presenting, or establishing, the experiences of the early Muslims as historical facts,
but in demonstrating how they serve as precedent for later generations in the community.139

3.1The Example of the Prophet

According to the Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad was the ideal Muslim, and his
conduct was understood to be the perfect expression of human behavior. Chosen by God to
receive the final revelation, Muhammad – the Seal of the Prophets - had a unique connection to
the divine; one that granted him a distinctive understanding of God‟s will. In this way,
Muhammad‟s authority, flowing from his position as the Messenger of God, was divinely
sanctioned. Consequently, the words and deeds of Muhammad have served as an authoritative
source of wisdom and guidance for Muslims on questions of both orthodoxy and orthopraxy
throughout Islamic history.
This was certainly the case in the category of war. As the religious, political and
military leader of the early Muslim community, Muhammad‟s conduct throughout the early
period of Islam would play a critically formative role in Muslim discourse on warfare. His
example would establish a theoretical framework for proper warring within the tradition. Quite
critical to note, these foundation concepts were formed within a young and growing community
that was in and of itself in a formative period, while simultaneously engaged quite seriously in
the process of territorial expansion. Understanding ideas about the nature and purpose of war
among the early Muslims, then, requires positioning them within this very specific context.
While a systematic doctrine of war did not develop until the juristic period, Muhammad
and the early Muslims established a framework that influenced and directed discourse on warfare
throughout Islamic history. This framework illumes a community whose experiences were
intertwined with warfare from its early beginnings. War, as understood by the early Muslims,
was a legitimate tool for both protection and expansion. War, however, was at the same time
limited in critical ways. To begin, it was limited in the sense that Muhammad held the exclusive

139
If the reader is interested in discussions relating to the validity of such sources, I direct him or her to the
“Translator‟s Forward” written by W. Montgomery Watt in volume VI of The History of al-Al-Tabari.

58
authority to wage war. As the community grew and developed Muhammad‟s authority was
consolidated further and further, to the point where his leadership in all affairs political,
religious, and military was unquestioned. Therefore, it was Muhammad, exclusively, who held
the authority to wage war. Furthermore, when he executed that authority, he did so for reasons
relating to the protection, or the expansion of the nascent religious polity growing under his
command. In this early framework, war and its conduct were tied immediately to the existence
and authority of the religious polity that was constructed and consolidated under the authority of
Muhammad. In addition, the use of force was restricted in a second sense, as this early
framework also carried precedent for proper conduct in war. Evidence provided by the example
of Muhammad, his commanders, as well as various diplomatic efforts negotiated by the early
Muslims indicate that the early Muslims armies were concerned with categories of
discrimination.

3.1.1 The Religious Polity, Authority, and War

Muhammad was born in 570 C.E., in the western Arabian town of Mecca. This period
was one of economic vibrancy, as Mecca served as a both major religious pilgrimage site, well as
the crossroads for several important trading routes.140 When Muhammad was 40 years old141,
(610 C.E.) he began to receive what he later understood to be revelations from God – messages
about right conduct and belief – that he was instructed to impart to the rest of humanity.
Muhammad‟s message was not well-received by the dominant clans of Mecca; particularly not
by the Quraysh - Muhammad‟s own tribe.142 Despite this resistance, Muhammad was able to
amass a small number of followers in the decade following his first revelations. These early

140
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 154-156.
141
There is discrepancy in the sources regarding Muhammad‟s age at the beginning of his prophecy, with some
sources attesting 40, others attesting 43. See, al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: Muhammad at Mecca Volume VI,
trans. W. Montgomery Watt and M.V. McDonald (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 153-156.
142
There are varying explanations within scholarship as to why this is the case, with the primary theories claiming
either that Muhammad‟s message threatened the economic dominance of the Quraysh, their current religious belief
system, or both. See Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1981), 52-55. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization,
Volume I: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 172-3.

59
converts were also subject to varying levels of persecution, leading Muhammad to seek out a
place for him and his small community to emigrate.143
Such an opportunity presented itself around the year 620, when Muhammad met a group
of men from Medina144 – an oasis town to the West of Mecca that was belabored by intra-tribal
disputes. These men were hopeful that Muhammad, who was known for his diplomatic skills,
could assist in the mediation of these grievances and bring some peace to Medina. In exchange
for his assistance, several delegations entered into a series of political pacts with Muhammad.
The first occurred in the year 621, and the second in 622, and came to be known, respectively, as
the “First” and the “Second Pledge of al- „Aqabah.”
The agreements made at al-„Aqabah are quite telling in regard to the future form of the
religious polity that would develop in Medina, and furthermore, reveal a budding relationship
between Muhammad‟s authority, the community, and war. According to the early sources,
while the First Pledge consisted of a political oath to Muhammad, the Second Pledge involved an
additional oath to engage in warfare in order to protect Muhammad, and presumably, the new
community he was attempting to establish. As stated in al-Al-Tabari,

“They gave him their pledge in the following words: „We are of you and you are of us;
whoever comes to us of your Companions, or you yourself if you come to us, we shall defend you
as we would defend ourselves.”145

A second tradition in al-Al-Tabari states that,

“Those members of the Aws and Khazraj146 who took the oath of allegiance at the second
al-Aqabah took the pledge of war, when, on contrast to the term of the first al-„Aqabah, God
permitted fighting….the second pledge was to wage war against all men.”147

143
Muhammad encouraged some of his early followers to emigrate to Abyssina, a country with which Muhammad –
a merchant by trade – had a commercial relationship. However, the Christian emperor (Negus) did not take to
Islam, and therefore, Abyssina did not become a permanent Muslim sanctuary for the early community. A portion
of the early Muslim emigrants remained in Abyssina until the emigration to Yathrib, while others came back before.
W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 100-136.
144
The original name of the Oasis city was Yathrib, and was changed to Madinat al-Nabiy, (City of the Prophet).
Note that al-Al-Tabari refers to it as Medina.
145
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: Muhammad at Mecca Volume VI, trans. W. Montgomery Watt and M.V.
McDonald (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 136-137.

60
 As is noted in these examples, the traditions signal that permission to wage such warfare
was granted to the early Muslims by God, through a revelation granted to Muhammad. 148 As
established by these traditions, war, in the protection of Muhammad and the community, was a
legitimate and recognized tool of the early Islamic polity from its inception.
With this new political alliance in place, Muhammad commanded his followers to
immigrate to Medina, and reached Medina himself in September of the year 622.149 The
emigration to Medina, or the Hijra, was a pivotal moment in Islamic history, providing a
measure of peace and stability that allowed for the growth of the religious polity under
Muhammad‟s command. Muhammad‟s authority continued to develop, as clearly demonstrated
by a document called the “Constitution of Medina.” This document is an agreement between
the new Muslim emigrants, represented and led by Muhammad, and the eight tribes residing in
Medina whom had accepted Islam. Muhammad was designated the “chief” among their new
federation, and further granted recognition as the Messenger of God. Although it is unlikely that
the document available to historians is the original, it nevertheless demonstrates the formation of
a distinct political-religious community, and is often referenced as the starting point for the
Islamic state.150 Importantly, this political community was taking on a very specific form; one
governed by the dictates of Muhammad‟s religious message, and whose authority was quite
clearly being brought under the fold of his singlehanded leadership.
Muhammad‟s new political position was initially utilized to engage in a series of
expeditions against the Quraysh of Mecca. These expeditions were largely in the form of raids
against Quraysh caravans – perhaps in the hope of interrupting the lucrative trading business that
was foundational to Meccan power and prestige, and perhaps also in the hope of providing some

146
The population of medina consisted of the Banu Quralah (who later became known in Islamic history as the
Ansar). The Aws and Khazraj were a part of this larger tribe. W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 141.
147
The History of al-Tabari: Muhammad at Mecca Volume VI, trans. W. Montgomery Watt and M.V. McDonald
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 138. For an additional description of these events, see also W.
Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 141-149.
148
Al-Tabari claims that verse 8:39, “And fight them until persecution us no more, and religion is all for God” was
revealed during this time. However, the notes to the translation claim that this verse was probably not revealed
until shortly before the conquest of Mecca.
149
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: Muhammad at Mecca Volume VI, trans. W. Montgomery Watt and M.V.
McDonald (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 137-152. Al-Tabari mentions increased
persecution against Muhammad after his followers began moving to Medina, and details a failed plot to murder
Muhammad.
150
W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956), 221-228.

61
form of income for the new Muslim immigrants.151 In the first two years after Muhammad‟s
emigration to Medina, Al-Tabari mentions eight such expeditions.152 Two things are of note.
First, four were led by Muhammad himself and the remainder by men who were “entrusted a
white banner.” 153
The “white banner” is a noteworthy symbolic development in the early
Muslim formulation of war. In one sense it clearly demonstrates Muhammad‟s ability to pass
such authority to one of his commanders. In another sense, it solidifies his authority by
demonstrating that the power of the Muslim armies belonged exclusively to him. More specifics
in this regard may be obtained from the ahadith literature. The sahih of al-Bukhari, a 9th century
Islamic scholar, provide an additional window into matters of authority. The hadith literature
provides declarations by Muhammad stating the obligation of the Muslim to obey his command.
As the Messenger of God, Muslims are to recognize and obey his authority. “He who obeys me,
obeys Allah, and he who disobeys me, disobeys Allah.” 154
Second, with the exception of a raid at Naklah (a location between Mecca and al-Tai‟f),
all of the early expeditions failed.155 However, the Muslims were largely undeterred. Rather,
quite encouraged by the success of Naklah, Muhammad initiated more ambitious expeditions
against the Meccans. The first major victory was the Battle of Badr. This was also the first
151
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 175.
152
For an additional source on the early expeditions, see A. Guillaume, trans., The Life of Muhammad: A
Translations of Ibn Ishaq‟s Sirat Rasul Allah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Note that al-Al-Tabari relies
on Ibn Ishaq for his history.
153
The white banner appears to be a symbol of the expedition, as it is also mentioned in the Sahih of al Bukhari in
the same manner. Entrusting the white banner to another individual appears to be Muhammad‟s manner of
designating the leader of a particular expedition. Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Foundation of the
Community, Volume VII, trans. W. Montgomery Watt and M.V. McDonarld (Albany, State University of New York
Press, 1987), 10-14.
154
He who obeys me, obeys Allah, and he who disobeys me, disobeys Allah. He who obeys the chief, obeys me,
and he who disobeys the chief, disobeys me. The imam is like a shelter for whose safety the Muslims should fight
and where they should seek protection. If the Imam orders people with righteousness and rules justly, then he will
be rewarded for that, and if he does the opposite, he will be responsible for that.” Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume IV
(Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), 128-129, 204.
155
According to Al-Tabari, the Muslims attacked the caravan during the sacred month of Rajab, during which
hostilities were not allowed. In the process the Muslims captured two of the Qurayshi men and killed one.
Muhammad was reluctant to accept the expedition party on their return to Mecca (and his share of the goods they
had captured) until he received a revelation claiming that persecution of the Islamic faith was a greater violation
than that caused by the men at Naklah, and therefore justified breaking the truce of the holy months. Al-Tabari, The
History of al-Tabari: The Foundation of the Community, Volume VII, trans. W. Montgomery Watt and M.V.
McDonarld (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1987), 18-23. Al-Tabari provides two accounts of these
events, the details of which differ to some extent; however, the overall narrative is consistent. Hodgson argues that
the success at Naklah, and Muhammad‟s willingness to accept the spoils despite the Holy Months was the moment
in which the Islamic polity achieved its true moment of independence, and Muhammad‟s leadership was cemented.
See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 175-176.

62
military expedition in which the indigenous Medinan Muslims participated, and the Muslims
were able to achieve a decisive victory over the Quraysh. This battle was, and remains,
particularly meaningful for Muslim history. It raised the morale of the early Muslims
tremendously, as their success (against a much larger party of Quraysh warriors) was understood
156
as a result of divine intervention, and a presage of an eventual Meccan defeat. This increased
confidence was dampened somewhat in their next military engagement with the Meccans – the
Battle of Uhud (which was inconclusive) – shaking the Muslims as well as Muhammad.157 It
was not until two years later, during the “Battle of the Allied Parties” or the Battle of the Trench,
in which the Muslims were victorious in the last Meccan assault on Medina.158
At this point, it is important to note that the early Muslims recognized their military
successes as divinely mandated. For the early Muslims, the growth of the community, and any
victories that were had against the Meccans, were understood as orchestrated by God, and
demonstrative of God‟s favor and approval. Military success was tantamount to a divine
sanctioning of Muhammad‟s prophecy, and of the religious polity emerging. Such notions quite
naturally led Muhammad and the early Muslims to establish links between war, and the
expansion of the geographical boundaries of the community. Therefore, emboldened by the
military success of the Muslims, Muhammad set his eyes on Mecca.

3.1.2 The Taking of Mecca: a Paradigm for the Limit of Force

In the year 628 CE, one year following the Muslim victory at the Battle of the Trench,
Muhammad negotiated a treaty with the Quraysh. This agreement – termed the Treaty of
Hudabiyah - placed a cessation on warfare between the two parties for a period of ten years,
allowing Meccan trade to continue without disruption. In exchange, Muhammad and the
Muslims would be permitted to make the pilgrimage to Mecca the following year, undisturbed

156
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Foundation of the Community, Volume VII, trans. W. Montgomery Watt
and M.V. McDonarld (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1987), 26-73. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The
Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 176-177.
157
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Foundation of the Community, Volume VII, trans. W. Montgomery Watt
and M.V. McDonarld (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1987), 105-138. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The
Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 187-19.1
158
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 187-191. Al-Tabari, The History of al-
Tabari: The Victory of Islam, Volume VIII, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany, State University of New York Press,
1997), 5-27.

63
and unmolested.159 This treat initiated a flurry of diplomatic activity on the part of the Muslim
polity, and signaled clear interest in expansion beyond Arabia on the part of Muhammad.160
Following the treaty of Hudabiyah, Muhammad sent envoys to various foreign rulers
inviting them to accept Islam. While Al-Tabari offers several examples of such documents,
evidence indicates that the letters are literary fictions. 161 Nevertheless, while the documents
provided in Al-Tabari‟s history may have been late additions, Muhammad‟s expansionistic
interests are duly noted through various expeditions sent into the northern regions of Arabia, and
specifically towards Syria.162 In the meantime, the truce negotiated at Hudabiyyah broke down,
and after negotiations with the Quraysh - the terms of which included a general amnesty -
Muhammad entered Mecca in 630.163
This diplomatic activity, and the military expeditions that followed, is quite critical to
forming a clear picture of the early Muslim understanding of war. Within the literature on this
period, one can glean Muhammad‟s guidance regarding proper conduct. In the year after Mecca
was taken, multitudes of tribes around the Hijaz accepted Islam, or came to recognize
Muhammad‟s authority in some other manner.164 Of particular interests are Muhammad‟s
instructions to his commanders. An example is provided by Muhammad‟s instructions to his
general Khalid b. Walid, whom he dispatched to a delegation in the Northern Yemeni town of
Najran. Muhammad‟s instructions to Walid were to invite the people of Najran to Islam for a
period of three day. If, at the end of three days they had accepted the invitation to Islam, Khalid
b. Walid was to accept it fully, and remain with the people there and instruct them in the precepts
of their new religion. If they refused, then he was to embark on a military expedition against

159
Ibn Hisham, termed “armistice” 504.
160
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 193. Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari:
The Victory of Islam, Volume VIII, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997), xi-
xxiii.
161
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Victory of Islam, Volume VIII, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany, State
University of New York Press, 1997), xi-xxiii.
162
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 192.
163
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 194. For Al-Tabari‟s description of this
event, see Volume VIII, 160-188.
164
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Last Years of the Prophet, Volume IX, trans. Ismail K. Poonawala
(Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990), 40. See Ibn Hisham, 627-649.

64
them. 165
This pattern remained Muhammad‟s standard procedure for expeditions against non-
Muslim areas, and was eventually systematized into formulaic legal principles regarding proper
conduct in war.166 The tribes who did not accept Islam recognized Muhammad‟s authority
through a third option: treaties by which the non-Muslim tribes agreed to pay a poll tax (jizyah)
in exchange for peace.167
Of note here is the development of a protected class. These instructions indicate that
only those whom had been given the choice to accept the call to Islam were legitimate and
proper enemies. Furthermore, if they accepted the call, they simultaneously received all the
rights and protections entitled to a Muslim. In addition, those whom negotiated an agreement in
which they consented to pay the poll tax were also among the protected class; entitling them to
freedom from harm and molestation, while also granting them a set of rights (such as the
freedom to practice their own traditions). Military force, then, was limited and restricted.
While it was aimed at certain ends – presumably at the expansion of the state and the spread of
Islam – such ends could only be had through certain means. These restrictions, systematized
and imposed on all commanders, ensure that there was a method to determine whether the use of
force was just.
Turning again to the hadith literature, the sahih of al-Bukhari further indicates restrictions
on the use of force. According to these traditions, obeying Muhammad‟s deputies (those to

165
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Last Years of the Prophet, Volume IX, trans. Ismail K. Poonawala
(Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990), 82-83.
166
The details of such agreements are provided in pages Al-Tabari Volume IX, pages 85-87. Al-Tabari provides
the text of one of Muhammad‟s letters outlining the specifics of such agreements. Tribes that accepted Islam were
to be instructed in the various precepts of the religion, including the nature of god, proper ritualistic behavior (prayer
and dress), as well salvation and the afterlife. Those whom maintained their own religion (Jews and Christians)
were to pay the jizyah tax, which afforded them the “full protection of God and His Messenger, and all the faithful”
(87).
167
See, Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Last Years of the Prophet, Volume IX, trans. Ismail K. Poonawala
(Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990), 58-59. This period demonstrates a clear centralization of
Muhammad‟s authority, as all such agreements were contracted by Muhammad himself, or under the authority
Muhammad granted to his commanders (See for example, Al-Tabari IX, page 88). Furthermore, these new
contracts were administered through a system of agents, chosen by Muhammad – with evidence suggesting
centralized systems o f taxation and legal authority over these new territories coming under the authority of the
Muslims. The superiority of Islam in matters of economy and law was such that by his death, “Muhammad had
established a new state in western Arabia…The prevalence of an overriding concept of law, the focusing of political
authority in God, the umma, and Muhammad, the systematization of taxation and justice, the establishment of a
network of administrative agents to supervise member groups – all these helped lend the new Islamic state a
durability and a degree of centralized control over its subjects hitherto unknown in the area.” Fred Donnner, The
Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 75.

65
 168
whom Muhammad grants authority) is a parallel obligation to obeying Muhammad himself.
However, this authority is limited, and ought to be oriented towards a notion of justice. The
“Imam” (i.e. leader) is only to command of Muslims that which is “within their ability” 169 and
Muslims are only obligated to obey that which does not involve disobedience to God. 170 As is
indicated by Bukhari, “The imam is like a shelter for whose safety the Muslims should fight and
where they should seek protection. If the Imam orders people with righteousness and rules
justly, then he will be rewarded for that, and if he does the opposite, he will be responsible for
that.” 171
The early sources also shed a measure of clarity on a distinct category of noncombatants.
In contrast to the idea of a protected class, noncombatants indicated a category of people whom
may not be harmed, regardless of their submission one way or another to Islam. Muhammad‟s
exhortations to his commanders are instructive on this point. Bukhari‟s sahih dedicates a chapter
to the question of whether it is permissible to “attack the enemies with the probability of killing
the babies and children (unintentionally)?” While the traditions on this subject indicate a general
disapproval on Muhammad‟s part of the killing of women and children in battle, one hadith is
less conclusive. When asked whether it was “permissible to attack the pagan warriors at night
with the probability of exposing their women and children to danger, the Prophet replied, „They
are from them (i.e. pagans).” His reply appears to indicate that the responsibility of the deaths
has shifted to those who refused to submit to Islam.172 While such evidence reveals a complex
notion of noncombatant immunity, Muhammad‟s statements clearly signal sensitivity, as well as
a general acknowledgment, towards the importance of distinguishing between the innocent and
the guilty in war.173
At this point it seems important to comment on Muhammad‟s intentions for the Islamic
polity; a polity which he played a pivotal role in designing. His intentions for Arabia seem
relatively clear, as the consolidation of the Pennisula occurred within his lifetime. The early

168
See Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume IV (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), 128-129, 204.
169
Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume IV (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), 131.
170
Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume IV (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), 128.
171
Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume IV (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), 128-129, 204.
172
See John Kelsay, “Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants” in Cross, Crescent and
Sword, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), 203.
173 173
See John Kelsay, “Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants” in Cross, Crescent and
Sword, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), 203.

66
sources posit him as a determined leader, intent on spreading Islam to all of Arabia. As al-Al-
Tabari records him:

"Woe to the Quraysh! War has eaten them up! What would they lose if they left me to
deal with the rest of the Arabs? If the Arabs defeat me, that will be what they want. If God
makes me prevails over the Arabs, Quraysh can enter Islam en masse; or, if they do not, they can
fight, having regained their strength. What do Quraysh think? By god, I shall not cease to
strive against them for the sake of that with which God has sent me until God makes it prevail or
this side of my neck becomes separated."174

In regard to his intentions for expansion outside of Arabia, the evidence is more
speculative. Scholarship on this period argues that Muhammad‟s primary interests after taking
Mecca were turned north, towards Syria. The evidence of which is demonstrated by his largest
military expedition, for which he amassed an army of 30,000, in order to march against the Banu
Ghassan, a tribe representing Byzantine interests on the Syrian frontier.175 W. Montgomery
Watt further claims that the ideas “Muhammad adopted (like the holy war) and the policies he
inaugurated, were so thoroughly appropriate to the expansion in the twenty years after his death.
Somehow or other, though he thought in terms of religious ideas, he must have been aware of the
political realities.”176
The question of whether or not such expansion was within Muhammad‟s sphere of
intention is, again, one of conjecture. In any case, whether or not he held expansionistic
ambitions of this nature and scale, they were carried out by his successors.

3.2 The Early Caliphate

Muhammad‟s death was an immediate challenge to the religious polity he had
constructed. The young community struggled to determine how it would conduct its affairs in
the absence of Muhammad‟s authority. In the period immediately following his death, the

174
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Victory of Islam, Volume VIII, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany, State
University of New York Press, 1997), 72.
175
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 195. W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad:
Prophet and Statesman (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 218-222.
176
W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 222.

67
community was engulfed in a series of military expeditions as Muhammad‟s successors sought
to maintain (and expand) the territorial integrity of the religious polity, as well as consolidate
their own political positions and authority. Under Abu Bakr and Umar, the Muslims initiated
campaigns against the Persians in Iraq and the Romans in Syria, eventually also capturing
Palestine, Egypt and Iran.177
As Fred Donner notes, few events have marked world history as indelibly as the early
Muslim conquests. Naturally, they have held a place of prominence in Muslim history, with the
Islamic community often attributing their profound military success to divine intervention –
attributing their success as a mark of God‟s favor.178 In light of this, the early conquests have
also, alongside Muhammad‟s example, played a formative role in Muslim thinking on war.
Under the early Caliphs, and through the wars of Expansion, the framework for proper warring
that was established by Muhammad was solidified; further developing ideas of legitimate
authority and the limits of the just use of force into the narrative of the jihad tradition.

3.2.1 A Unified Polity, Authority and War.

According to the traditional narrative, the Muslims gathered at the portico (saqifah) of
one of the Medinan clans to discuss the question of who would lead. Certain segments of the
community were arguing for a political system in which the Ansar (Medinan converts to Islam)
and the Muhajirun (those who came with Muhammad to Medina from Mecca) would split into
two communities, each with their own political leader. The meeting, however, was interrupted
by a delegation of Muhajirun, who argued for unified leadership. As Umar stated, “Absolutely
not; two cannot come to agreement in a joining.”179 As a result of this meeting, Abu Bakr, one
of the first Muslim converts, and a close companion of the Prophet, emerged as Muhammad‟s

177
Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 91-220. 177
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 195-206.
178
As Fred Donner notes, Western scholars have found the Muslim community‟s explanation for the success of the
conquests unsatisfying, and have attempted to find alternative explanations. For an overview of such scholarship,
see the introduction to The Early Islamic Conquests.
179
Laconic phrasing, indicating the community may not be led by two (see translator‟s note).
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Arabia Volume X, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), 6.

68
first successor, symbolizing the Islamic polity‟s decision to continue as a unified political entity
with a single leader at its head.180
This vision of the state, however, did not go unchallenged. Almost immediately
following Abu Bakr‟s ascension, various tribes all over Arabia began to challenge the treaties
they had conducted with Muhammad, arguing that their legal ties and obligations were to
Muhammad only. With his death, they claimed, those agreements were dissolved. In response,
Abu Bakr initiated a series of military expeditions known as the “Riddah” wars, or “Wars of
Apostasy.” In this way, Abu Bakr managed to maintain and expand the religious polity that had
been preserved and legitimated during the Saqifah incident.
Significantly, the Riddah wars were not limited to the tribes that were resisting their
previous agreements with the Islamic community. Abu Bakr, and his successor, Umar,
undertook military engagements against tribes that had only been minimally associated with
Muhammad, or that had never had any contact with the Muslim community prior to the Riddah
wars. As such, the Riddah campaigns initiated a form of warfare that was not only concerned
with the maintenance of the religious polity initiated under Muhammad, but also concerned with
unprecedented levels of territorial expansion.
Notably, military command and with it, the power to wage war, remained unified.
Inheriting Muhammad‟s position as the political leader of the Islamic polity, Abu Bakr, and then
successively, Umar, acquired the exclusive authority to wage the jihad. All military expeditions
were waged under their command, or under the command of those whom they authorized – such
as the famous military generals Khalid b. Walid and Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas, both of whom won
decisive victories for the Muslims in Iraq and Syria.
Al-Tabari recounts a particular tradition in which this authority is in dispute. Abu Bakr,
as caliph, is approached by a tribal representative, who requests some form of economic
agreement between his group and Abu Bakr. Umar, upon seeing this document, refuses to
recognize it. A tribal representative challenged Abu Bakr on Umar‟s behavior, and asked him,
“Are you the commander or is Umar?” Abu Bakr replied, “Umar is, but obedience is owed to

180
The issue of leadership has been critical throughout Islamic history. Its significance is demonstrated in these
early sources. For example, two versions of Ali ( an early companion of the prophet, the fourth caliph, and
arguably the most significant figure for Shi‟a Islam) granting his allegiance to Muhammad are available in al-Tabari,
one demonstrating a clear demonstration of Muhammad‟s favor towards Ali over the other. Furthermore,
discrepancies on the first male convert to Islam (Ali vs. Abu Bakr) are alive and well in the sources, also
demonstrating the manner in which the Muslims scholars sought to grant legitimacy to the early companions.

69
me.” Despite the military command that Umar had been given, Umar‟s authority is quite clearly
traced to Abu Bakr.181
Furthermore, the treatment of “apostate” tribes in the riddah wars is critically important
to the further development of categories of discrimination. This is primarily due to the fact that
the framework constructed under Muhammad was continued, and as such, solidified by the early
caliphs during the Riddah wars and the Islamic conquests. As already mentioned, their
continuation served to reaffirm these restrictions on the use of military force within the jihad
tradition. Furthermore, their affirmation led to the point where the notion of a protected class
was slowly translating itself into a notion of noncombatant immunity.
Of particular interests are three things. First, those whom apostatized from Islam were
treated differently than those whom had never been in contact with the Islamic state prior to the
Riddah wars. As demonstrated by a letter written by Abu Bakr to the Apostates, military
expeditions against the apostate tribes were given instructions detailing two choices: return to
Islam, or be fought. Those who heeded the call were to be accepted as Muslims, with all the
rights afforded to such a position. Those who denied the call were to be fought, and granted “no
respite.” Commanders were instructed to “launch his attack against them [the apostates] until
they acknowledge Him.” According to Al-Tabari‟s account,

“Whoever does respond to God‟s command and acknowledges Him, he will accept that
from him and help him [to accomplish] it in kindness. He should only fight whoever denies God
[so as to make him] acknowledge that which has come from God. So if someone has responded
to the call, [the Muslim] has no cause to get at him; God shall his reckoner thereafter in
whatever he seeks to conceal. Whoever does not respond to the cause of God shall he killed and
fought wherever he may be and wherever he may have come to, as an enemy. [God] shall not
accept from [such a] one anything that he may give, except Islam; but whoever responds to Him
and acknowledges [Him], He shall accept [it] from him and instruct him. (the Muslim) should
fight whoever denies [god]; so, if God lets him prevail over (the unbeliever), he should make

181
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Arabia Volume X, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), 97-98.

70
slaughter among them by any means, with weapons and fire; then he should divide that which
God bestowed as spoil upon him, except for the fifth part, which he should convey to us.”182

Non-apostates were treated differently, and along similar lines as those Muhammad used
to conduct agreements with the tribes of Arabia during his lifetime. Newly conquered areas
were given three choices: submit to Islam; agree to the terms of a peace treaty with the Muslims
and pay a tax; or suffer the consequences of war.183 While examples of this exist throughout Al-
Tabari, one of the most detailed is in Al-Tabari‟s account of the battle at al Qadisiyyah, when the
Muslim delegation approached Yazadagird, the Persian King and invited him to Islam.
Speaking of Muhammad, a representative of the delegation, by the name of Al-Nu‟man stated,

“We all came to understand the superiority of his message over our former condition,
which was replete with enmity and destitution. Then he ordered us to start with the nations
adjacent to us and invite them to justice. We are therefore inviting you to embrace our religion.
This is a religion which approves of all that is good and rejects all that is evil. If you refuse our
invitation, you must pay the poll tax. This is a bad thing, but not as bad as the alternative; if
you refuse [to pay], it will be war. If you respond and embrace our religion, we shall leave with
you the Book of God and teach you its contents, provided that you will govern according to the
laws included in it. We shall leave your country and let you deal with its affairs as you please.
If you protect yourself against us by paying the poll tax, we shall accept if from you and ensure
your safety. Otherwise, we shall fight you!”184

A communication between Umar and ibn Walid regarding a recent Byzantine conquest
provides further evidence of this claim. It suggests that submission to Islam is a requirement of

182
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Arabia Volume X, trans. Fred M. Donner (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), 59. The text of the Letter to the Apostates is found on pages 55-60.
183
For examples, see Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Challenge to the Empires Volume XI, trans. Khalid
Yahya Blankinship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 4, 6, 7, 29, 31, 45, 96. Al-Tabari, The
History of al-Tabari : The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine Volume XII, trans.
Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 35-8, 68, 69, 167, and Al-Tabari, The
History of al-Tabari: The Conquests of Iraq, Southwestern Persia, and Egypt Volume XIII, trans. Gautier H.A.
Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 9, 16, and 21.
184
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari : The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine
Volume XII, trans. Yohanan Friedmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 36.

71
only those within the Arabian Peninsula, while those outside of it have the option to maintain
their own religions under the imposition of a tax.185

Umar writes, “that rule (which you want to impose upon the Taghlib) is only applicable to the
Arabian Penninsula; there nothing but strict surrender to Islam is acceptable. But leave those Taghlib
be, on the condition that they do not bring up their (newborn) children in a Christian fashion and accept
it when they do not embrace Islam.”

Additional evidence is acquired through the various peace documents arranged by Umar
with the various towns conquered along the road through Iran. According to these documents,
the Muslims would provide a “state of security” in exchange for a tribute paid to the Muslims (a
tax), imposed annually, on anyone who has reached the age of puberty. Muslims were also to be
given safe passage, hospitality, and not to be harmed, or imposed authority over in any way.
Anyone harming a Muslim would be dealt with severely. Those participating in military service
were exempt from the tribute.186 The guarantee of safety would cover “their persons, their
possessions, and their religion and laws.”187
What is made clear in the above is that combatants, those whom could be engaged
militarily, were defined by a common characteristic: choice. They were given the option to
either: 1) accept Islam; 2) pay a tax or 3) undertake a war against the Muslims. Even apostates
had to be given the first and last options. According to the traditions above, the proper use of
force demanded that all potential adversaries were informed of these options. Not only did this
limit the use of military force, but it provided standards by which it might be deemed just or
unjust. Furthermore, it served to thicken the category of noncombat immunity that had
developed under Muhammad. “ Combatancy,” then, was slowly being determined by a notion of
informed consent.
3.3 The Jurists: A Doctrine of Jihad
Beginning around the 8th century CE, figures such as al-Awazai, Malik b. Anas, and Abu
Hanifah, began to reflect on the material provided by the Prophet Muhammad and his
185
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Conquests of Iraq, Southwestern Persia, and Egypt Volume XIII, trans.
Gautier H.A. Juynboll (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 90.
186
See, Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Iran Volume XIV, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994), 9, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 36, 37.
187
Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Iran Volume XIV, trans. G. Rex Smith (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994), 30.

72
companions, and to provide judgments on various questions having to do with right and wrong
living as determined by the sources materials of Islam.188 As noted by Majid Khadduri, Muslim
reflection on war developed as part and parcel of the juristic systematization of Islamic law.
Pulling on the examples provided by Muhammad and the early Islamic polity, the jurists utilized
the various methods of legal reasoning in order to systematize the theological concepts provided
by the period under Muhammad and the early caliphs.189 Taken as a whole, the product of such
reflection is referred to as the Islamic law of nations, or the Siyar – a specific branch of Islamic
law.190 Consequently, while Muhammad‟s motivations may only be conjectured, the juristic
tradition is more explicit in its intentions for war.
The juristic doctrine of jihad construes the notion of war as one intimately linked to the
state. Furthermore, it develops this link to the point where the establishment, maintenance, and
expansion of the Islamic polity is a duty incumbent on the believer. According to the juristic
notion of jihad, the Islamic polity is a necessary component for justice on earth. War, as
understood by the jurists, was a legitimate, and at times a necessary, means of protecting and
extending the Islamic polity. In this way, the juristic period served to firmly establish the
relationship between war and the state. With this increased emphasis, came some notable
developments on ideas of authority; many of which were precipitated by historical
188
Jurists were distinguished by which sources and legal methods (usual al-fiqh), they privileged as most
authoritative. For example, Abu Hanifa depended largely on the use of analogy (qiyas) as a method of legal
reasoning; Malik on using traditions of the Prophet Muhmmad and his companions; while Shafi‟i provided a
systematic method of jurisprudence, by privileging the Quran and community consensus (ijma) while limiting the
use of the sunnah and analogy. See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in
World Civilization, Volume I: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 315-
358. Majjid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 19-41.
189
It is critical to note, however, that while the precedent established by Muhammad and the early caliphs was
foundational, evidence suggests that other sources played a significant role in the development of juristic thinking on
war. Fred Donner notes the influence of the pre-Islamic culture of warring in Arabia, while Abdul Aziz Sachedina
argues that juristic reasoning was affected by the very recent history of conquest. Fred Donner, “The Sources of
Islamic Conceptions of War” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (eds.), Just War and Jihad: Historical and
Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991),
31-69. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History” in John Kelsay and
James Turner Johnson (eds.), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in the Western
and Islamic Tradition (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), 35-50.
190
Majid Khadduri writes, “The Islamic law of nations, or the siyar, as an integral part of Islamic law, was based in
theory on the same sources and maintained by the same sanctions of that law. In practice, however, if the term siyar
is taken to mean the sum total of the principles, rules, and practices governing Islam‟s relationships with other
nations, one should look for evidence beyond the conventional roots (usul), or sources, of Islamic law. Some
principles and rules may be found in treaties and peace agreements made by Muslim rulers with non-Muslims;
others in public utterances and official instructions of the calips to commanders in the field which the jurists
subsequently incorporate into the law; still others in the rules and practices evolving from reciprocity and mutual
relations with other nations or derived from Islam‟s direct experiences with neighboring countries.” The Islamic Law
of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 8.

73
circumstances. With the expansion of the territorial boundaries of the Islamic state, challenges
to its central authority increasingly surfaced. As the jurists allowed for some measure of
decentralization, it is notable that the idea of consolidated authority is retained in the end. The
juristic doctrines furthermore maintained the variety of the restrictions on use of force that
emerged in the period of Muhammad and the early caliphate. In addition, they provided several
of their own devise, with many of them placing restrictions on the use of force for reasons of
commerce and travel. In addition, the jurists continued to demonstrate interest in questions of
noncombatants, placing additional restrictions and parameters on their understanding of the just
use of force.

3.3.1 War and the State

While various figures wrote on the siyar, arguably the most important were Abu Hanifa,
and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. Abu Hanifa was an 8th century jurist who developed
“a system of norms and principles that were to govern the Islamic state‟s interactions with
external – non-Muslim – communities. The details of this system encompassed matters of travel,
trade, marriage, and war (among other subjects.191 Shaybani, Abu Hanifa‟s student, wrote a
treatise which sought to record the body of principles and rulings that was handed down to him
by Abu Hanifa. However, Shaybani‟s own hand is clear in the text. Not only did Shaybani
consolidate the disparate legal materials on the subject, but he made his own individual
contributions to the siyar, noting his disagreements with his teachers, as well as inserting content
into the text where he saw fit.192 Most striking in this text is the assumed state of hostilities that
exists between the Islamic polity, and the non-Muslim world.
Understanding this properly, however, requires an explication of the Islamic theory of
statecraft that undergirds, and developed alongside, the formulation of the siyar. This theory of
statecraft is premised on two basic claims. First, was an understanding of human beings as
social creatures; their happiness and welfare necessitate a society that supersedes the individual
in many ways. Second was an understanding of human beings as governed by, and subject to, a
divine order; one promulgated and made explicit by God and God‟s prophets. Thus, the Islamic
vision is one in which human beings are, in a very real and practical sense, governed by and

191
Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 25.
192
“Translator‟s Introduction” in Khadurri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966).

74
hence, responsible to, God and the laws God has promulgated. Consequently, it was understood
that those who respond to Muhammad‟s call were submitting themselves to God‟s governance,
and accepting the requisite duties associated with this act. Through their submission (which is a
free and willful decision by the individual), Muslims were held accountable and responsible to
God‟s law. 193
These two claims led to an understanding of God‟s law as natural and perfect: Natural in
the sense that the law was the proper inclination of every creature, consequently linking human
welfare to the fulfillment of this law. And perfect in the sense that peace and justice were a real
possibility only through a proper ordering of human beings in regard to their world under the
auspices of this law. These links, between human beings, the law, peace and justice, coalesced
into the conclusion that any proper organization of human life required a state whose role was to
promulgate and uphold God‟s law for human society. The state, according to this vision, was the
only way to achieve peace – understood as the order and justice that would prevail under the
auspices of properly carrying out God‟s commands. Consequently, the existence of “peace”,
within the dominant Sunni opinion, necessitated the prevalence of Islam – as justice necessitated
God‟s law.194 In light of the above, it was understood that protection of the state, or expansion of
its geographical boundaries was, essentially, an expansion of Islam, and consequently, the areas
in which God‟s laws, and God‟s justice held sway.
Historical realities, however, were such that the Islamic polity did not succeed in its goal
of universal expansion. As a result, the juristic tradition divided the world into two spheres: the
Territory of War (dar al-harb) and the Territory of Islam (dar al-Islam). The dar al-Islam was
understood as any territory in which Islamic law held sway; where it might be practiced freely by
Muslims, or in which the members were subservient to Islamic law. 195 In contrast, the dar al-
harb is territory “outside the pale” of Islamic law.196 The doctrines of dar al-harb and dar al-

193
John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics, (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993),
chapter 2, but specifically pages 29-36. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz
Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 45-48. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of
Islam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,1955), 1-18.
194
See: John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics, (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1993) chapter 2, but specifically pages 29-36. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans.
Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 45-48. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law
of Islam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), 1-18.
195
For specific, and varied, definitions of this term, see Khadurri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1955), 155-161.
196
Khadurri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), 170-171.

75
Islam are critical for the development of Muslim thinking on war. Based on a notion of God‟s
providence, the idea of Muslim victory was understood as an eventual certainty. The Islamic
polity was ordained, and in light of this, it was divinely ensured to expand.
This understanding further characterized the duty of jihad, and served to direct its
conduct. Turning to al-Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad,197 Al-Tabari begins with Quranic verses
indicating the mission of the Islamic message. As the supreme and final message from God to
his people, God,

“assured his Prophet that His Religion would be supreme among all other religions, and
His people over all other peoples….Then, He did not make him die until He showed his followers
the ways [of righteousness], cleared to them the roads [to success], and introduced them to the
laws and rules of dealing with peoples of other religions…”198

War, therefore, was conducted under the understanding that its purpose was to extend the
borders of the dar al-Islam, primarily by bringing the dar al-Harb under its fold. In light of this
division, the jihad – as the means to bring about the expansion of the dar al-Islam - was a
permanent and ongoing duty for the Muslim community. As noted by Khaddurri,

“It follows that the existence of a dar al-harb is ultimately outlawed under the Islamic
jural order; that the dar al-Islam is permanently under jihad obligation until the dar al-harb is
reduced to nonexistence; and that any community which prefers to remain non-Islamic – in the
status of a tolerated religious community accepting certain disabilities – must submit to Islamic
rule and reside in the dar al-Islam or be bound as clients to the Muslim community. The

197
This book represents a genre of juristic literature known as “ikhtilaf” (disagreement). This genre complies and
compares the opinions of various jurists on a particular topic, in this case, on the topic of jihad. As noted by Yasir
S. Ibrahim, the position of the compiler (in this case, Al-Tabari), is only evidenced by his choice of material to
include. Al-Tabari, in his Book of Jihad, includes the opinions of the three founders of the Sunni schools of law:
Abu Hanifa, al Shafi‟i, and Malik b. Anas. Also included are the opinions of al-Awza‟i, Sufyan al-Thawri, and al-
Hasan al-Basri, all 8th century jurists. Of notable absence are the opinions of Ahmad b. Hanbal, whom according to
Ibrahim, Al-Tabari may have considered a traditionalist rather than a jurist. See introduction to Yasir S. Ibrahim,
Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad: A Translation from the Original Arabic (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2007).
198
Yasir S. Ibrahim, Al-Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad: A Translation from the Original Arabic (Lewiston: The Edwin
Mellen Press, 2007), 58.

76
universalism of Islam, in its all-embracing creed, is imposed on the believers as a continuous
process of warfare, psychological, and political, if not strictly military.”199

3.3.2 War and Authority

The juristic tradition initiated several marked developments in ideas regarding legitimate
authority. The juristic tradition defined jihad as a community obligation, or a fard kifaya. In
this way, jihad was an obligation imposed on the community as a whole, and the community –
collectively – was responsible. If it is properly carried out by some members of the community,
then the obligation has been met. If however, a sufficient number of people fail to take on this
responsibility and to perform it adequately, the entire community will be held responsible. 200 In
this particular conception the jihad is an instrument of the state, declared and executed by the
proper authority – the caliph or the imam. A second type of jihad emerged, termed the ribat.
Developed during the 12th century, a time when the borders of the Islamic polity were under
attack, the doctrine of ribat, as developed by the Maliki jurists, claimed that if the Islamic polity
was under attack, the jihad transforms to an individual obligation, or a fard „ayn. In such a case,
all believers are under the obligation to take up arms in defense of the Islamic polity.201
Decentralization of authority is further evidenced through military command. By the
time of the Abbassid Caliphate in the 10th century CE, the Islamic polity was further
accommodating itself to the realities on the ground. Provincial governors, among military
leaders and Shi‟i secessionists, were claiming political authority and establishing individual rule
in various parts under the jurisdiction of the Islamic polity. The caliphate was gradually losing
centralized authority.202 In response, the jurists argued for a reinterpretation of this institution.
Two schools of thought emerged. The orthodox position argued for the necessity of a single
seat for the caliphate, while the other claimed that more than one caliph was a legal
permissibility within the doctrines of Islam. The emergent position, understood as a
compromise, and represented by the Shafi‟i jurist al-Mawardi, argued that the Caliph, in order to
maintain the unity of the Islamic polity, ought to recognize the authority of the emerging
peripheral powers, yet insist that these authorities recognize the seat of the caliphate as the

199
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), 64.
200
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), 60-61, 94-95.
201
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), 81-81, 94-95.
202
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume I: The
Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 12-61.

77
ultimate source of rule. This compromise, therefore, sought to preserve at least the image of
unity in regard to the Islamic polity.203
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of such decentralization occurred during the Crusades.
As noted by James Turner Johnson “…the warfare of Nur al-Din and Saladin against the
Crusaders of the Second and Third Crusade established an alternative model for subsequent
Muslim statecraft, that of the collective defensive war for the faith under the command of a local
ruler but authorized by the individual duty of all Muslims.” Importantly, in this model, “…
secular rulers may take a leading role in organizing Muslim forces to take part in such conflict,
but religious authorization for each soldier to fight comes from within his own faith.”204
Saladin‟s career is a testament to the emerging decentralization of the authority to wage war.
From the time he was appointed Vizier of Egypt, Saladin was attempting to establish his
credentials to fight, and eventually monopolize the authority to fight the Holy War. With the
blessing of the Abbasid caliph (which he helped to reinstate), Saladin captured and declared
himself the king of Syria. Furthermore, his military dealings demonstrate a tremendous amount
of latitude and freedom on his part; as Saladin essentially led the Crusades as his own man,
forming his own political alliances, determining his own battles, and even conducting the treaty
that ended the Third Crusade with King Rirchard I (Lionheart) on his own authority.205
While these decentralization trends are significant, it is important to note that overall, the
caliphate remained a significant and primary institution. Any other thesis is difficult to
maintain. Reading, for example, the Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun, a 13th century philosopher
and jurist, one can see that the institution of centralized authority remains alive and well. Ibn
Khaldun defines political leadership as the rule of the few over the many. As Ibn Khaldun
argues, human society is organized in such a manner that a few individuals are chosen by God,
and instructed in his law, such that they may rule over and guide the masses. The responsibility
of the chosen few is to guide the rest of humanity to the good – to their proper end of salvation.
As the individual is imbued with the capacities for both good and evil, they necessitate this type
of instruction. Religion is the proper guide of human beings. It directs them in both their
worldly and other-worldly affairs, and thus it is necessary to ensure that human beings act in

203
The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 21-22.
204
James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005).
205
Malcolm Cameron Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson, Saladin: The Politics of Holy War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982).

78
accordance with religious law. As for the universalizing mission of Islam, the task of making
war is incumbent upon the Islamic polity. It has been mandated with the task of spreading the
Islamic mission. The caliph, as head of the community, has been entrusted with this task of “the
religious duty of war.”206 The authority to undertake this task has been given to Muhammad,
and to the caliphate, as Muhammad‟s representatives.207 As he writes,

“This makes it clear what the caliphate means. (To exercise) natural royal authority
means to cause the masses to act as required by purpose and desire. (To exercise) political
(royal authority) means to cause the masses to act as required by intellectual (rational) insight
into the means of furthering their worldly interests and avoiding anything that is harmful in that
respect. (To exercise) the caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious
insight into their interests in the other world as well as in this world. (Worldly interests) have
bearing upon (the interests in the other world), since according to Muhammad all worldly
conditions are to be considered in their relation to their value for the other world. Thus, 9teh
caliphate) in reality is a substitute for Muhammad inasmuch as it serves, like him, to protect the
religion and to exercise leadership of the world.” 208

3.3.3 War and its Limits

The duty of jihad, however, did not necessitate perpetual military hostilities. Nor did it
absolutely call for violence, as the goal of jihad could be obtained through non-violent means.
Returning to Shaybani‟s text, one notes the tremendous amount of ink he devoted to reasoning
through the arrangements – particularly the commercial arrangements – that were to be
conducted between the dar al-harb and the dar al-Islam. Significant portions of this text are
devoted to the regulation of property of non-Muslims and Muslims (depending on their
geographical location – whether in the dar al-harb, or dar al-Islam),209 as well as determining
under what circumstances the inhabitants of the “Territory of War” might be granted an “Aman”,
or a treaty granting them safe passage and guarantee of freedom from molestation upon entering
206
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989), 183.
207
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989), 70-71, 96-97, 112-113, 116-117, 123-126, 127129, 154-155, 156-160, 164-166, 166-170.
208
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989), 155.
209
Majid Khadurri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 106-129, 136-142, 165-193.

79
the dar al-harb for reasons of commerce.210 Shaybani also notes regulations on peace treaties
conducted with “scriptuaries” as well as those living in the dar al-harb and their political
representatives.211 In short, while such arrangements were, in theory, considered temporary, they
provide models for the conduct of peaceful relations between the dar al-harb and the dar al-
Islam.
Turning once again to al-Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad, it becomes evident that the juristic
deliberations on jihad included clear notions of discrimination. There is a general consensus
that war may not be initiated without an invitation, on the part of the Muslims to the non-
Muslims, to Islam. In other words, those who had not heard the “call” were technically in the
category of noncombatants; they had not yet become citizens of the “Territory of War.” As al-
Al-Tabari writes,

“There is unanimous agreement [among Muslim jurists] that the Messenger of God did
not fight with his enemies from among the polytheists before [first] making the call [to embrace
Islam] and showing proof [of this invitation], and that he used to command the leaders of his
detachments to invite [ to Islam] those whom the calling did not reach.”212

Beyond this general level of consensus, however, lies a significant amount of

disagreement among the jurists. As al-Al-Tabari demonstrates, once the call has been offered to
the enemies of Islam, there is still the matter of determining additional levels of noncombatant
immunity; particular in regard to women, children, and the elderly. The jurists disagree in
regard to the justification, or the reasoning behind, how such individuals within the Territory of
War (once they had refused to submit) were to be accorded noncombatant status. In the section
titled, “The rules concerning the conduct of combatants and the categories of people who are
immune from being put to death and injured” the juristic opinions are navigated through in order
to determine this claim. Malik b. Anas and al Shafi‟i take the position that those in the territory
of war ought to be fought primarily for their disbelief. On the other hand, Abu Hanif and sufan
al-Thawri take the position that noncombatant immunity is accorded to women, children and the

210
Majid Khadurri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 158-194.
211
Majid Khadurri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 142-157.
212
Yasir S. Ibrahim, Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad: A Translation from the Original Arabic (Lewiston: The Edwin
Mellen Press, 2007), 59.

80
elderly in view with prophetic traditions; traditions which indicate that noncombatant status is
accorded based on the individual‟s proximity with the war. Furthermore, while most jurists
agree that those whom have been granted immunity from attack (aman) ought not to be targeted,
there is general agreement that Muslim armies may target enemy territory, even if such territory
contains individuals whom have been granted immunity, and will lead to their unintentional
deaths, or to other unintentional deaths of noncombatants.213 What is clear, however, is that the
issues continued to hold relevance for the juristic doctrines on war, and were taken quite
seriously. In sum, as the Jihad tradition was systematized, it retained a clear sensitivity for the
question of how just and unjust killing were to be determined in war.

3.4 Contemporary Departures

As contemporary events have illustrated, this understanding of war in the way of God‟s
cause – jihad – has taken a more radical turn within certain segments of the Muslim world.
Three basic shifts distinguish the contemporary and radical formulations of jihad. First: an
emphasis on jihad as the most critical duty undertaken by the faithful. Second, and closely
related: a construal of jihad as the most significant mark of an individual believer‟s sincerity to
God and Islam. And third: an important reinterpretation of the proper authority necessary to
legitimate war. These shifts, as a trend, are demonstrated most clearly in the al-Farida al
Gha‟iba, or, “The Neglected Duty”, a pamphlet published by the assassins of Egyptian president
Anwar Sadat in 1981. Often cited as the ideological backbone of the contemporary radical
Islamist trend, the Faridah is presented (by its authors) as a defense of Sadat‟s assassination on
Islamic grounds. In this way, it is one of the most comprehensive and accessible documents on
the ideological commitments that order the radical Islamist trend in the contemporary Muslim
world.214

213
Yasir S. Ibrahim, Al-Tabari‟s Book of Jihad: A Translation from the Original Arabic (Lewiston: The Edwin
Mellen Press, 2007), 19-24, 61-72.
214
Historical background and an English translation of the Faridah are available in Johannes J.G. Jansen, The
Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1986). Although Jansen argues that large portions of Egyptian (and wider Muslim) society
were supportive of the ideas contained in the Faridah, a great deal of his evidence for this claim is speculative and
inconclusive. I argue that the document should not be read as a statement that is representative of general Muslim
attitudes at the time. Rather, it ought to be read as representative of the foundational attitudes of the jihadi elements
that existed in Egypt and wider Muslim society at the time of writing; a segment of the population that should not be
treated as representative of Muslim attitudes in general.

81
 As noted by Johansen J.G. Jansen, the intellectual roots of the Faridah may be traced to
the 18th century, as Muslim intellectuals began to respond to encroaching influence from the
Western world. European military and economic dominance was increasingly preoccupying
Islamic thinkers, as they set about to determine both the causes, and a proper response to what
came to be known as the “thesis of decline”215 – the idea that Islamic civilization had been set on
a course of internal disintegration beginning with the end of the period of the Rightly Guided
Caliphs. This issue was at the heart of intellectual discussions within the Muslim world
throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries, and a variety of responses were put forward in regard
to how the Muslim world ought to respond, or to restructure itself in light of its relative weakness
to the West. Such responses varied from proposals of accommodation, to revitalization, to
confrontation between Islam and various Western ideas and political, economic, and social
216
institutions.
Around the mid to late 20th century, a revivalist element took hold in some parts of the
Muslim world. This revivalist element included a wide-scale rejection of Western institutions
and practices as models for Muslim adoption, and as a result, initiated a search for indigenous –
largely Islamic – institutions and practices that would lift the Muslim world out of its state of
weakness and decline. The most visible expression of this trend was the rise of religiously
based, social-political organizations, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Such organizations
argued that the malaise of the Muslim World could only be eliminated through a large scale
implementation of Islamic tenets into the political and social institutions of the state. In other
words, organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood were arguing for an Islamic state; one that
was wholly organized and directed by the dictates of Islamic law.217
The Faridah represents the radicalization of the reform impulse discussed above.
According to the Faridah, the Islamic state is a duty incumbent on all believers by God. In light
of this, all Muslims are obligated to strive for its implementation by the necessary means. Every

215
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996).
216
For an excellent discussion of these intellectual trends, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age:
1789-193 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also, Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic
Revival London: Zed Books, 2005). Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern
Arab World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
217
The best source, to date, on the Brotherhood is Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

82
 218
Muslim is under the obligation to exert every possible effort to bring about the Islamic state.
This obligation, the Faridah continues, takes on heightened importance in the contemporary
world, as Muslim lands are ruled by corrupt and tyrannical “apostate” regimes. Such regimes,
the Faridah continues, while outwardly clinging to the precepts of Islam are internally committed
to the “tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism, or Zionism.”219 In such a
situation of corruption and tyranny, the Islamic state will only be brought to fruition through the
destruction of the regimes currently ruling in the Muslim world. Consequently, the Faridah
argues, these regimes – the Near Enemy – must be fought and eliminated so that a proper Islamic
state may be constructed, and the Muslim world restored to its former glory.220
The nefarious nature of these regimes transforms the jihad into an immediate obligation
that is of the highest order. The apostate regimes, the Faridah argues, may only be combated and
ultimately defeated through military means. Furthermore, other forms of implementing change
or exerting resistance– education, social resistance, political participation or organization,
nonviolent propaganda or grassroots organizing – are futile under the current circumstances of
control by tyrannical rule. In addition, these alternative methods ultimately misunderstand the
urgency of the believer‟s ultimate obligation to God: the implementation of the Islamic state.221
Jihad, then, is the highest duty, that must be undertaken by all Muslims as a part of their religious
obligation to bring the world into alignment with God‟s will.

3.4.1 The Faridah on Authority

Importantly for our purposes, the Faridah‟s position on authority is markedly different
from the articulations of jihad we have discussed thus far. To begin, according to the Faridah,
the jihad is an individual duty. To be clearer, the Faridah argues that in light of current
circumstances, jihad is a duty that is incumbent upon all Muslims. As the reader will note, the
arguments presented in this regard are referencing the larger jihad tradition. Pulling on Quranic
texts, the example of the Muhammad, as well as the juristic distinction between defensive and

218
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 162-166.
219
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 169.
220
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 192, 172-179.
221
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 182-190.

83
offensive war, the Faridah claims that there are three situations in which jihad turns into an
individual obligation, one of which is when the Muslim nation is under attack. “…when the
infidels descend upon a country, it becomes an individual duty for its people to fight them and
drive them away.”222 As the apostate regimes, living “right in the middle of them [Muslim
lands]” it is the individual duty of every Muslim to rise up in arms, expel the tyrannical regimes,
and bring about the Islamic state that has been mandated by God.223
Furthermore, the Faridah claims, the presence of an authority with the power to wage
jihad – such as the caliph – is not a requirement for jihad. Jihad, the Faridah argues, does not
rely on the existence of the caliphate, and furthermore, the absence of this institution is not a
proper justification to prevent the jihad. Noting Muhammad‟s example, the Faridah argues that
the Prophet himself gave others the power of military command. The Faridah references the
following tradition of the Prophet, “When three of you go out on a journey, then make one of
them the commander (amir)”224 the Faridah argues that command need not be the exclusive
jurisdiction of the caliph. In times of the Caliph‟s absence, such command may go to the best
Muslim. As, the Faridah argues, it is nonsensical to think that the Muslim community would
have been denied the ability (in the sense of authority) to embark on defensive war :

“Whoever alleges that the (proper) leadership has been lost has no case, because the
Muslims can (always) produce leaders from amongst themselves. If there is something lacking
in the leadership, well, there is nothing that cannot be acquired. It is (simply) impossible that
the leadership disappears (from among us).”225

This document, then, is very clearly decentralizing the authority to declare and initiate
war; removing it from the grip of a single leader, and into the hands of all Muslims. As the
reader will note, this understanding of authority is an interpretation of the juristic conception of
the defensive jihad. The jurists arguably had a different notion of defensive jihad in mind; on in

222
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 199.
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle
East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 199-200.
224
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 203.
225
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 203.

84
which Muslim land was under immediate attack by those in the Territory of War. In such a
case, according to juristic construal, defense of Islamic lands become the immediate
responsibility of all Muslims. Any individual believer may feel justified and permitted to take
up arms in defense of the state without a formal declaration of war by the caliph or imam. The
Faridah, however, is claiming this individual authority in such a case where an immediate threat
such as that imagined by the juristic thinkers does not exist. Rather, the Faridah extends the
notion of an “immediate threat” to that that brought on by heads of state and government
institutions they have deemed un-Islamic, and therefore an impediment to the construction of the
mandated Islamic state.

3.4.2 The Faridah on Limits

Despite the decentralization of authority, the Faridah maintains the limits on warfare that
are present within other models in the jihad tradition. In regard to proper conduct the Faridah
draws on the precedent of Muhammad as found in the hadith and commentaries of the juristic
tradition. In this way, it develops a section on the importance of extending the invitation to
Islam before attack, arguing that this summon in an important and recommended part of jihad. 226
Of further interest is the restriction it places on combatants. Placing itself in similar positions as
the juristic tradition, the Faridah claims that while women, dependents, monks and old men may
not be killed directly, it does allow for the permissibility of attacking enemy armies or position at
night, even if the death of the above noncombatant classes is unavoidable.227
However beyond these traditional considerations of discrimination, the Faridah places
restrictions on the use of military force by containing jihad to the war against the “Near Enemy”
– the “apostate regimes.” In this way, the jihad is controlled, as according to the Faridah, force
ought only to be used against the tyrannical rulers impeding the emergence of the Islamic state.
The use of force in this end (if in agreement with the rules of discrimination discussed above) is
a proper use of force. Arguably, then, the use of that does not adhere to these constrictions is an

226
The Faridah quotes the Hadith of Abul Husayn Muslim, as well as commentary on this hadith by Al-Nawawi, in
the attempt to provide evidence for the position, stating that invitation to Islam before attack is necessary n the case
where such an invitation has not been extended in the past (“did not reach them”). In such a case where the
invitation had “reached” the enemy, the Summon was recommended, but not required. Johannes J.G. Jansen, The
Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1986), 216.
227
Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat‟s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 217-218.

85
improper and unjust use of military force. Jihad, then, is limited in both its ends and its means.
There are specific aims to be achieved and right and wrong ways of arriving at them. While
these ends may disconcert the reader‟s modern sensibilities, it is important to here that while
authority has been decentralized, some level of restrictions on the use of force remains in place.
The points above are important to recognize; mainly in the sense that they will further
illuminate the distinguishing features of the al-Qaeda model of war. As will be noted, the al-
Qaeda model, as represented by al-Suri, moves beyond the radical and militant construal of the
Faridah, and produces a conception of jihad that, in the area of authority and discrimination,
disengages itself from the commitments of the jihad tradition as described above. However, as
noted in the introduction, it nevertheless remains quite heavily steeped in the tradition, using the
lens of jihad and its requisite notions of Islamic political ethics to make sense of contemporary
international events. For the al-Qaeda model, it is the lens of Islam - brought to bear upon the
current environment - that brings reason and meaning to world. It is furthermore the lens of
Islam that provides answers, and a sense of direction, from which al-Qaeda formulates a
response to what it understands as an attack upon the faith. In this way the al-Qaeda model of
war is reliant upon the jihad tradition, as it the Islamic discourse on warfare that provides al-
Qaeda with the narrative that makes their model intelligible.
As noted in the introduction, al-Suri provides the most prolific account of the al-Qaeda
model of war. As a systematic thinker, he came to these conclusions based on his assessments
of both past and present jihadi operations, often times ones in which he took some part.
Therefore, in order to understand al-Suri as a thinker, one must be aware of these events, and of
al-Suri‟s assessments of them.

3.5 Al-Suri’s Formation

Al-Suri was born in Aleppo, Syria in October of 1958, claiming a family genealogy from
Ali, the fourth Caliph. At the age of 18 he enrolled at the University of Aleppo‟s engineering
department, a time in which tensions were brewing between the ruling Alawite minority (led by
installed military dictator, General Hafaz al-Asad) and the Islamist streams in Syria over a
variety of social and political issues. These tensions eventually led to violent protests and

86
assassination attempts on Syrian officials. Al-Suri claimed to have had a religious awakening
during this period, and eventually abdicated his studies to join an armed jihadi group.228
Crackdowns on the Islamist elements in Syria forced al-Suri to flee to Jordan, where he
joined the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and was eventually sent to Iraq, and subsequently, to
Egypt in order to receive military training. However, the military failures of the MB, coupled
with ideological differences, led al-Suri to resign from their ranks, despite his recent promotion
as a military commander. To be more specific, he was outraged by the leadership‟s willingness
to compromise with secular (nationalist and communist) regimes – such as the Syrian and Iraqi
ruling parties. Deeming these political failures as the main issue behind the military ones, and
the primary factors underlying the failure of the Islamist uprising in Syria, al-Suri claimed that
the MB was not fully devoted to the Islamist cause.229 It was these events that led al-Suri to
believe that a military campaign could not succeed without the theological and ideological base
that would allow for its success. As a result, he decided to abandon the military struggle and
devote himself to obtaining a religious education. He tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain theological
credentials from Medina‟s Islamic University in 1982.230
From Saudi Arabia, al-Suri relocated to France. After two failed attempts to reignite the
Syrian Jihadi struggle, he moved to Amman, Jordan, obtained a BA in history, and then moved
to Spain in 1985 where he lived until 1990. Although he resided in Spain, he spent significant
periods of time between 1987 and 1992 traveling back and forth to Afghanistan. This period
was especially formative for al-Suri, as it was during this particular period in Afghanistan that
his understanding of the Jihad was expanded significantly. Under the influence of Abdallah
Azzam (the father of the Arab-Afghan movement) al-Suri claims that he came to understand the
global nature of the duty of Jihad. For al-Suri, the Jihad was no longer just about Syria, or
reinvigorating the struggle there, but about initiating Jihad and liberating Islamic lands wherever
necessary and possible.231

228
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 35-39. Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri:
Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 3.
229
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 40-48.
230
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 48-50.
231
Brynjar Lia, Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 72-75. Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri:
Architect of the New Al Qaeda” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30: (2007), 3

87
 Al-Suri successfully climbed through the ranks at the Peshwar and Afghani camps.232
During his time in Spain he wrote a book on the Syrian jihad, and it was circulating among the
hard-line segments of leadership. He was a well-known military instructor as well as a lecturer
on strategy, guerrilla warfare and political subjects. Al-Suri claims that he met bin Laden in
1988, and joined al-Qaeda when it was formed that same year.233 Al-Suri was eventually sent to
al-Qaeda‟s Farouqi camp, a training ground established by al-Qaeda to produce high level
leaders and commanders. Furthermore, during this period, al-Suri began to devote himself quite
heavily to his intellectual pursuits, and began to see his role evolving towards that of an
intellectual or an ideologue (not just a military instructor). This evolution in his thinking was
stirred by the failure of the Syrian Jihad, and what he believed was the inadequacy of military
training alone.234 A Pakistani crackdown on the Peshwar camp forced many of the Afghan-Arab
community to flee. The more radical elements fled to Sudan, and coalesced into the group we
know today as al-Qaeda.
Al-Suri fled to Spain, where he remained from 1991-until 1994, and then to London until
1997, at which point he returned to Afghanistan. However, the period between 1992 and 1996
was one of intense travel for al-Suri. He traveled extensively to Afghanistan, Sudan, and Britain
as well as back and forth to Spain,;often in order to work for the Jihadi movement and meet with
Al-Qaeda leadership.235 It was also during his period in London where he served (allegedly) as
bin Laden‟s media advisor. Pressure exerted by the British anti-terror police led to his
relocation back to Afghanistan in 1997 following the Taliban‟s seizure of Kabul and the return of
Al-Qaeda leadership to Afghanistan.

232
See also, Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 4-5.
233
His exact relationship with bin Laden and al-Qaeda is a bit contentious. He claims to have been amongst bin
Laden‟s inner circle, as well as his media advisor until he stopped working for him in 1992. Other sources
(specifically Lia‟s interviews with prominent Islamic figures that were in touch with al-Suri during this period)
dispute his claims of being a close confidant of bin Laden‟s). Al-Suri, however, did not cut ties with al-Qaeda, or
with bin Laden post-1992, as evidence showed he continued to both meet with leading al-Qaeda figures, as well as
attempt to have some influence over their strategies and tactics. Other sources, specifically Lia‟s interviews with
other Islamist figures, dispute such claims.
234
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 87. See page 91 for Azam on the goals of jihad.
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), 110-162. Amongst al-Suri‟s activities during this period: assisting in the establishment of
Jund Allah in Spain, establishing a media centre in London in order to spread the ideological commitments of bin
Laden, and writing extensively on the Algerian “Jihad.”

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 The establishment of an Islamic state under Taliban rule was an extremely formative event for
al-Suri. According to his assessments, Afghanistan under Taliban rule was the first truly Islamic
state in modern history. Specifically because he felt it was the first state of its kind to be based
exclusively on Islamic law, and to be intent on fighting the Jihad. Despite the objections of
many other members within the Arab-Afghan community who insisted on the backwardness of
the Taliban, al-Suri maintained that Talibn Afghanistan was worth fighting for. His ideas on
Afghanistan under the Taliban are important to note, as they further serve to demonstrate the
global (and non-territorial) nature of his ideas. Al-Suri had grandiose ideas regarding the place
of the Afghanistan within the overall framework of the greater jihad. He argued that the Islamic
Emirate in Afghanistan could be a central base from which the jihad could be organized and
spread – through the immigration of young fighters and the creation of camps, media outlets, and
the like. For al-Suri, Afghanistan was to be a base from which the jihad would pour out into the
rest of the world.236 Consequently, he devoted himself to a variety of activities that he hoped
would aid the growing jihadi movement. While in Afghanistan he established a media centre,
and a training camp. He was also working directly with the Taliban‟s ministry of defense,
helping to publish the Taliban paper, and continued to write on the various issues that occupied
his interest.
However, all his activities in Afghanistan were interrupted by the post-9/11 US invasion,
after which al-Suri and the remainder of the Arab-Afghan community fled Kabul. He was now
a fugitive on the run. Al-Suri claims that he spent this time (from 2002-2005) in isolation,
devoted to his writing. This period of isolation produced The Global Islamic Resistance Call, al-
Suri‟s 1600 page treatise on jihad. When in 2004 the US issued an award for his arrest, al-Suri
responded by ending his period of isolation though the launching of his official website.

3.5.1 The Diagnosis

Al-Suri‟s ideas on jihad are articulated in his treatise, The Global Islamic Resistance Call
(here on referred to as, “The Call”). Though the text is widely understood as a tactical manual,
this is a relatively limited view of the nature and purpose of The Call. In this text, al-Suri
provides a diagnosis of the major ills confronting the Islamic world, and prescribes a

Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri, (New York:
236

Columbia University Press, 2009), 230-246.

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comprehensive remedy to lift the Muslim world out of its position of weakness and degeneration.
For al-Suri, both the diagnosis and the remedy are revealed through his interpretation of the jihad
tradition. As noted by The Call, it is the Islamic discourse on war on which al-Suri draws in
order to determine how the Muslim world ought to proceed in the contemporary environment.
This environment, he argues, is defined by what he terms the “New World Order”
( ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬ ‫) ا‬ 237
. While al-Suri does not provide a precise definition of this term, an
explanation of what he means by it may be surmised through his writing; particularly those
focusing on the current ills besetting the Muslim world. While he discusses a broad array of
topics, a majority of his concerns may be traced back to three foundational issues.
The first is the absence of proper religion amongst the majority of Muslims. According
to al-Suri, this is the case in both private and public life. Muslim nations, he argues, have failed
to properly implement God‟s laws into public institutions, and have chosen to organize along the
lines of secular models of political and social organization. As a consequence, Muslim societies
are failing to abide by the laws that God has decreed, and are, rather, living in contradiction to
the laws of God. Furthermore, secular institutions have penetrated the Muslim world,
transporting what al-Suri argues is the moral depravation and decadence of Western society. A
majority of Muslims, he argues, have only superficial loyalties to their religion, and have, for the
most part, abandoned God in their decision to take on Western ways of living. These Western
ways of living – whether political or social - have turned Muslim societies away from the moral
propriety and modesty of Islam, and towards ways of living that have degenerated Islamic ways
of living.238
Second, the abandonment of religion has led to a state of weakness and decline of
Muslim societies; one demonstrated by both their military deficiency and economic depravity.
For al-Suri, the “occupation” of the three holy sites is the most visceral symbol of the
shortcomings of the Muslim world. The presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia, and the
continuing “occupation” of Jerusalem, al-Suri argues, is a testament to its impotence. The lack
of adherence to God‟s law, and the continuing loyalties to foreign systems of government and

237
Al-Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Arabic), pg. 52.
238
While al-Suir is particularly focused on the contemporary issues, he mentions that this process of decline (due to
foreign dominance) was initiated with the fall of the Abbasid caliphate, and has continued uninterrupted until the
present due, save for a reprieve during the Ottoman Caliphate, when the Muslim world once again experienced a
period of strength and regeneration. See Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab
al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 30-47.

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influence have left the Muslim world crippled in its abilities to further resist foreign
encroachment. As additional evidence, an Al-Suri point to the economic depravity that he
argues is widespread among the Muslim world. In light of the material riches of the Muslim
world – oil in particular – such depravity is further evidence of its weakness. Foreign powers
(led by the United States, Europe and Russia), in league with corrupt Arab governments, have
manipulated the oil markets and robbed the Muslim people of the wealth acquired of their very
own resources.239
This leads into al-Suri‟s third concern. Al-Suri argues that the environment described by
the New World Order is a result of a deliberate program on the part of the West, and supported
by the current governments of the Muslim world. The state of Muslims today is a result of
concerted efforts by the United States and Europe to dominate the region, in partnership with
various governments of the region who are more interested in maintaining their power than they
are in promoting the liberation of Islam. For example, al-Suri argues that Saudi Arabia has been
a client, and puppet government of the British, and eventually the United States, since its
inception; leading it to make foreign policy decisions that are contrary to the best interests of the
Muslim people. It was under American influence and pressure, he argues, that Saudi Arabia
allowed American presence on its soil during the First Gulf War, and continues to make
overtures towards the state of Israel.240 According to al-Suri, this program on the part of the
West, and specifically the United States, has magnified in its intentions since September 11th.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Suri argues, have become the new entry points for a
comprehensive occupation of the Muslim world.

“As we established in the first section below the title “The Situation of Muslims Today”,
it has become recognized among the Muslim today, as all the sane have understood, that the
entirety of our lands, from border to border is occupied by the enemies. And on behalf of their
deputies, and the heavy military presence of the crusaders, spreading their bases with complete
economic occupation, that exceeds the economic power of monopolies …And here is America
today reoccupying the Muslim world from anew ( ) in the clear light of day (‫ا‬ ‫ا‬ ).

239
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 30-47.
240
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 30-32.

91
It has occupied Afghanistan directly. It has spread its control to Pakistan and central Asia. And
here is the occupation of Iraq. It has placed hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the Arabian
Peninsula and Turkey and the southern Levant as well as in Egypt and the Horn of Africa and
North Africa …and here is Bush announcing that he will direct onto Muslim lands a “crusade”
( ‫ص‬ ‫ )ح‬and with him are the European NATO allies and in addition to the alliance the
Israeli President whom occupies Palestine, and is preparing to demolish the sacred mosque and
the expulsion of the rest of the Muslims there ( ‫ا س‬ ‫ق ف‬ ‫) ط‬. “241

Furthermore, he argues, under the guise of a “War on Terror”, and with the military
cooperation of the heads of Muslim states, the United States has sought to eliminate any
elements of resistance to its program.242
It is here that we can see the Jihad framework emerging as al-Suri attempts to make sense
of the current conditions encumbering the Muslim world. The world necessitates God‟s law so
that God‟s justice may hold sway. The Muslim world cannot regain its strength until it is able to
implement God‟s decrees – the foremost of which is the proper execution of God‟s law. For al-
Suri, this cannot happen under the New World Order, when foreign, oppressive regimes are
subjugating the Muslim world, further encouraged by the Arab, apostate governments. In such
an environment, he argues the Muslim world must rise up, and wage the jihad; it must resist the
occupation of its lands, and undertake the jihad so that they might bring the world into alignment
with God‟s will. Of critical note here is that al-Suri has shifted emphasis. While the faridah
urges armed resistance against the “near enemy”; al-Suri argues that it is the foundation and
support of the tyrannical regimes that must be resisted – Western, specifically American power.
This, according to al-Suri, is the purpose of The Call. To provide the means, and the
instruction that will construct and direct a large-scale resistance among the Muslim world, and to
liberate it from the occupation of Western forces. This, al-Suri argues, requires building on
lessons derived from the past history of the jihadi movement, in order to determine how such
knowledge may be harnessed, and utilized for the current resistance. 243 He imagines himself to
be writing to the “third generation” of jihadis; one created through the events of September 11 th,

241
Al-Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Arabic), pg. 138, author‟s translation.
242
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 39-47.
243
See also Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 348, 359.

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the occupation of Iraq, and the Palestinian Intifada. As an outshoot of the first (the founders of
the jihadist intellectual stream in the 1960s), and second (the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan)
generation of Afghan fighters, it is the obligation of the third generation to learn, and utilize their
experiences, in order to amend and continue the jihad in the New World Order. 244 This, he
argues, requires a system of “global confrontation” that is capable of responding to the
international character of the confrontation between the Muslim world and the Western powers
245
that are representative of the New World Order.

3.5.2 Al-Suri’s Remedy: The al-Qaeda Model on Authority

Two points ought to be noted here. First, along the lines of the Faridah, authority is
granted to the individual Muslim. According to al-Suri, the jihad against the forces of the New
World Order is a defensive one, imposed upon the Muslim nation as a result of foreign
occupation and influence. In the case of a defensive jihad, he argues, permission from an emir
or other such authority to participate is not necessary. Today, according to al-Suri, the Muslim
world is under attack, and subject to immediate danger. In this way, a defensive jihad is
imposed upon the Islamic nation as a religious and individual duty. The individual Muslim, he
246
argues, is obligated to participate in the jihad. In this situation, where the life of the tradition
is at stake, the duty to fight is mandated; and the permission of the emir is no longer a
requirement to wage the resistance.247 Therefore, it is subsequently under an immediate
obligation to resist

“And this is the truth: A national resistance to this foreign infidel occupation and the
apostate forces collaborating with it, and plying into the chests of Muslims is a required duty
( ‫ا‬ ‫ )ف‬determined by the Islamic Sharia, and is a truth, furthermore, that is perceived by a
sound mind.”248

244
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 11-12.
245
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 16.
246
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 25-26. Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida
Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 428.
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 175-176.
248
Al Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, (Arabic) pg. 137. (Author‟s translation).

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 Al-Suri goes to significant lengths to establish a theological foundation for a defensive
duty of jihad. Although he does not characterize himself as a theologian, it is clear that the
textual evidence – through the Quran, the hadith, and various commentaries on both by Islamic
jurists – is a critical factor to establishing his case. A sample of his writing will demonstrate the
manner in which he references the tradition. Al-Suri writes,

In short, we believe that the Sharia laws determine that the jihad is an individual duty
(fard aiyn) on every Muslim in a situation of this kind today. This is what the Sharia laws
determined… The Sharia‟s proof on that, it is clearer than the eye of the sun, as we will show,
by God‟s will (if God so wills it). That the Jihad is an individual duty today (incumbent) on all
the Muslims…as is the case, all evidence is consistent with correct Islam as well as the demands
of reason, in all times and in all places.249

Quoting Azzam‟s narration of the duty of the jihad:

“Then spoke the Sheikh…on the first case on the descent of apostasy in to the land of the
Muslims. And he said: „In this situation, those who preceded and succeeded us, and the jurists of
the four schools, and the narrators, and the expositor in the entirety of the Muslim age without
exception, agreed that the jihad in these circumstances is clearly an individual duty [imposed]
on those whose lands are being attacked by infidels and those who are near them [in
geographical proximity]. Wherein the son will rise up without the permission of his father, and
the wife without the permission of her husband, and the debtor without the permission of his
creditor. And if people are insufficient in number, or if they fall short, or if they are idle, the
individual duty transfers to those who are closest in proximity, and then to the next, and the next.
And if they are not sufficient, or if they fall short, it is effective on those who come after them,
and those following, until the individual duty prevails throughout the land. ( ‫ل‬ ‫) اا‬.‟ ”250

Quoting Ibn Taymiyyah,

249
Al Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, (Arabic) pg. 137. (Author‟s translation).
250
Al-Suri continues by providing what appear to be Azzam‟s summaries of the positions of the Hanbali, Shafii,
Maliki, and Hanafi schools on the concept of individual authority to jihad. For further detail, please see the index.
Al Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, (Arabic) pg. 139. (Author‟s translation).

94
 “If the enemy enters into Muslims lands then undoubtedly it is incumbent upon those
whom are most near in proximity…to expel them, as the Muslim land in its entirely is one land
united, and one is required to answer the call to arms, without the permission of one s father or
creditor. On this matter the texts are explicit.”251

Referring to the Quran252, al-Suri writes,

“And the Great and Almighty [God[ stated, „And fight them on until there is no more
tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith in god altogether and everywhere.‟ (Sura
Anfal: K 8:39). The oppression and tumult [referred to in the verse] is polytheism. This was
states as so by Ibn Abbas al-Saadi. Qurtubi said the same. And the attack of the infidels, and
their seizure/occupation of homes and the nation is threatening to [our] religion…and requires
fighting in defense of the religion…”253
“As stated by God, Great and Almighty, „If two parties among the believers fall into a
quarrel, make ye peace between them. But if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against
the other then fight ye against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of
God; but if it complies then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for God lives
those who are fair (and just)‟. If god prescribed categories of combat against Muslims to
preserve the unity of the Muslims and their religion and the protection of their land and their
resources. Then how must it be that the laws in regard to combat of the nation of the aggressive
infidels? Is it not the first and more likely [obligation]?”254

3.5.3 The Tactical Model

In this sense, al-Suri has not yet strayed from Faridah reasoning. However, it is the
application of the notion of decentralized authority to a tactical model that distinguishes al-Suri‟s
(and al-Qaeda‟s) model from others discussed thus far. Al-Suri was concerned to construct a
new tactical model of jihad for the global confrontation; one capable of responding to an

251
Al Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, (Arabic) pg. 140. (Author‟s translation).
252
English language translations of quotes from the Quran are from the Abdullah Yusuf Ali translation.
253
Al Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, (Arabic) pg. 141. (Author‟s translation).
254
Al Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, (Arabic) pg. 141. (Author‟s translation).

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environment characterized by a deep power asymmetry between the Muslim world and the West.
In this end, al-Suri provides a historical analysis of jihadi operations (beginning in the 1960s) in
order to articulate an operational framework for the new environment.
In his analysis of the history of jihadi operations, he categorizes them into “three
schools”, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses. The first is the “school of secret military
organizations” - the regional, secret and hierarchical organizations constructed in places such as
Algeria (the Islamic State Movement), Egypt (al-Jihad) and Morocco (The Morrocan Youth
Organization). According to al-suri, these organizations failed on all levels (military, security,
agitation, education, political) in light of the ease of finding, disbanding, and destroying them.
The second are the “school of open fronts and overt confrontation”, places where there are open
hostilities between the regime and the organizations. Al-Suri mentions Afghanistan, Bosnia and
Chechnya as examples of “open fronts.” According to his analysis, while the open front
organizations enjoyed military, security, agitation, and some level of education success, they
failed in their ability to bring about an Islamic state (except for the short lived example of
Afghanistan). The third school is that of “individual jihad and small cell terrorism.” These,
according, to al-Suri, amasses military, security, and agitation success, but were unable to
implement education programs, or to bring about any form of political transformation due to the
255
absence of a unified or systematized program on both fronts.
In the post-September 11th environment, one characterized by the New World Order, the “old
ways” of secret, regional and hierarchical jihadi organizations are no longer possible. Pointing
to examples like Egypt, Syria, an Algeria, he argues that government intelligence and anti-terror
initiatives make such hierarchical models too easy to find, dismantle, and to destroy. In
addition, the West‟s (specifically) America‟s military superiority has made the previous models
ineffective and untenable.

The times have changed, and we must design a method of confrontation, which is in
accordance with the standard of the present time. So I repeat again…the main weakness is not
in the structure of the secret organization or their internal weakness, although they were
underlying reasons. The main weakness is caused by the fundamental revolutionary change of

Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
255

Columbia University Press, 2009), 347-368.

96
the times and the current premised, which has altered the course of history, the present, and the
future.”256

In light of this, the military theory of al-Suri‟s global resistance calls for the application
of two forms of jihad. The first is that of “individual terrorism jihad” and the second of
participation in the “jihad at the open fronts.”
The individual jihad is a key component of al-Suri‟s theory, and a primary development
and the most drastic departure from the classical Islamic tradition on war. Here, al-Suri states
that the jihad is to be conducted by highly decentralized cells, consisting of one to ten
individuals, who then in turn participate in exceedingly disconnected method of training and
recruitment, such that most members are never aware of each others existence. Their operations
include “light guerrilla warfare, civilian terror, and secret methods…and small Resistance Units
completely and totally separated from each other.”257 The underlying motivation for this type of
jihad is the manner in which it not only decentralizes it, but expands its reach. As al-Suri writes,

“It opens up the possibility to participate for thousands, say hundreds of thousands or
millions, of Muslims sympathizing with jihad and with their Islamic Nation‟s causes. The
constricted jihadi secret organizations did not have room for all of them. Moreover, most of
them do not want to be linked to this commitment with all its security-related personal
consequences…Also they are not able to, or they do not want to get burned security-wise, by
joining the Open Fronts which also have limited capacity to absorb them.”258

Furthermore,
Creating a method for transforming excellent individual initiatives, performed over the
past decades, from emotional pulse beats and scattered reactions, in to a phenomenon which is
guided and utilized, and whereby the project is advanced so that it becomes the Islamic nation‟s
battle, and not the struggle of the elite.

256
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 359.
257
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 373.
258
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 419.

97
 In addition, as al-Suri notes, the decentralized component of this method makes it
extremely difficult to combat. Focusing on a theory of “System, not secret organization”, al-
Suri determined that minimizing the organization bonds between members – to those of “beliefs,
a system of action, a common name, and a common goal” would also minimize the security
risks, and the potential of destruction of these organizations., while maintaining the ability to
unite those with a common cause, and the desire to engage in the global resistance against the
West.259 Therefore, “…any Muslim, who wants to participate in jihad and the Resistance, can
participate in this battle against America in his country, or anywhere, which is perhaps hundreds
of times more effective that what he is able to do if he arrived at the open area of
confrontation.”260
The second method of jihad is that of the “open fronts.” This type of jihad, according to
al-Suri, is much more limited as success in open fronts requires a certain set of conditions.
Some of these are related to spaces, borders, terrain, natural supplies, as well as the support of
the indigenous population. Therefore, according to al-Suri, participation in the jihad of the open
fronts affords limited opportunities, and is only available in unique geographical and historical
moments.261 However, the open fronts must be taken advantage of when the opportunity is
afforded to the Muslim world, as they represent a further step in the confrontation with the West,
as it is the open fronts which will eventually lead to the liberation of Muslim lands.262
Furthermore, they exist in an important relationship to the jihad of individual operations.
Those participating in individual operations may benefit from those engaged in the open
fronts in a variety of ways. To begin, they may immigrate to the open fronts for periods of time
for training. Those in the open fronts may be recruited for individual jihadi operations. Open
fronts may provide asylum for those who are on the run as.263 Interestingly, al-Suri compares the
two modes of Jihad to Mao‟s first two stages of guerrilla war (discussed in chapter II).

259
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 422-423.
260
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 370.
261
See his analysis of Afghanistan, Chechneya, and Bosnia. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-
Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 374-382.
262
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 373.
263
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 436-437.

98
According to al-Suri, the Muslim world, by engaging primarily in individual terrorist operations,
is currently in stage one, or the “stage of exhaustion. In this stage the guerillas,

“which are small in numer, rely upon the methods of assassination, small raids and
ambushes, and selective bombing attacks to confuse the enemy, regarless of whether the enemy is
a colonial power or a despotic regime. The aim is to reach a state of security exhaustion,
political confusion, and economic failure.”264

In the second stage,

“the guerrillas move to the stage of large, strategic attacks, and the regular forces are
compelled to enter decisive battles which might lead to the disbandment of some of their units,
and that part of their cadre, officers and soliders join the guerrilla forces.”

The third stage, he argues, liberates the country. Currently, the resistance finds itself in
the first stage. In places where there is some level of open confrontation, the resistance has
entered the second stage (such as Afghanistan and Iraq).265

On the road to the second and third stage, al-Suri claims, both methods must be used in
order to move the jihad out of the camps, and into the rest of the Islamic nation. He writes,

Thus, this is the opposite of the trailing theory one had in jihadi circles during the last
two decades, which was based upon calling the Islamic Nation into the camps. In our
Resistance Call, the training theory is based upon moving the camps inside the Islamic
Nation.266”

264
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 471-472.
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), 473.
266
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 477.

99
 How is this to be done? Primarily by multiplying the theatres in which jihad is to be
waged. Again, al-Suri decentralizes the jihad. Rather than focusing on the Near Enemy, al-
Suri argues that priority of targets is determined by 1) wherever the enemy is afforded the most
damage; and 2) wherever a target might have the effect of galvanizing the Muslim spirit of
resistance.267 For al-Suri, then, the top priority is to strike at Western interests, wherever
possible. For example, his list is topped with the “countries of the Arab Peninsula, the Levant,
Egypt, and Iraq” as they contain Western military presence and oil. He then lists North Africa,
and Turkey, Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia, the “rest of the Islamic World” and then
“The American and Allied Interests in third world countries” all the while highlighting that the
targets in each place are Western interests.268 As for the listing specific targets, American
cultural, political and economic interests once again top al-Suri‟s list: missionary centers,
diplomatic institutions, military bases, tourist companies, American companies, etc. 269 although
he does not fail to leave out political figures, security leaders, military bases, as well as media
personalities and various political and security buildings.270 As he writes,

The goal of Operations of the Resistance and the Individual Terrorism Jihad is to inflict
as many human and material losses as possible upon the interests of America and her allies, and
to make them feel the resistance has transformed into a phenomenon of popular uprising against
them…271

3.5.4 Al-Suri on Limits

While noting that the goal of military operations in both Muslim and Western countries is
maximal material and human losses, al-Suri does present certain categories of noncombatant
immunity. The most clear is his discussion on places of worship. He argues that all places of
worship – Jewish, Christian, or otherwise – ought to be avoided. Furthermore, jihadi operations

267
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 393.
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), 394-395.
269
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 397.
270
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 411.
271
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 398.

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ought avoid harming civilians who are citizens of nations – even non-Muslim citizens - that are
not affiliated with the ongoing struggle with the West.272 As for the killing of women, children,
and the elderly, al-Suri begins by presenting two opinions. The first states that the killing of
such classes of people is restricted in all cases. Even if the enemy were to use women and
children as human shields, they should not be fired upon. The second opinion argues that when
these classes are mixed in with the population, there is no way to avoid their death in a war
against the enemy. Furthermore, they aid in the cause against the Muslims, and for al-Suri,
anyone aiding in the cause against the Muslims may be killed. His thoughts on the matter are
worth quoting at length:

To summarize the issue: Whoever is useful for the unbelievers of others should be killed –
whether e is an old man, a monk, or a crippled person. The assembly of Muslim scholars
agreed that whatever is useful for Muslims and harmful to the infidels during war or when
preparing for it is permissible whether it means killing a human being or an animal or
destroying buildings. War means the start and finish of eliminating disorder and spreading the
call to raise Allah‟s religion.
Killing Communist Women in Afghanistan -As for the communist women in Afghanistan,
they should be killed whether they participated in the war, provided advice, did not participate,
whether they separated or mixed, or whether they were one or a group, because they have beliefs
against Islam and they harm Islam and Muslims.
Using guns, plans, Mortars, and Rockets in Shelling – We indicated that fighting for
Islam is intended to eliminate the hurdles that obstruct its call and to destroy the political
regimes that prevent Islam from reaching the people. If we can deliver this without killing or
fighting, then this is what Muslims wish. However, if this cannot be accomplished, then all
barriers should be removed by any means possible. And if we cannot reach the tyrants that rule
the earth unless we kill humans and demolish installations, then we should do it! Because we
have been forced to do this!273

272
Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 413.
273
Jim Lacey, A Terrorist‟s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri‟s Islamic Jihad Manifesto
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 178-179.

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 3.6 Concluding Remarks
Al-Suri‟s understanding of jihad, and the world it seeks to reform, reflects the deeply
engrained relationship between religion and politics in Islam.274 It is rooted in an Islamic theory
of statecraft, encompassing ideas about human responsibility, God‟s providence, and a specific
understanding of the connection between peace and justice. As noted, while it remains faithful
to certain elements of the juristic, and post-juristic understandings of war waged on the part of
the Islamic state, al-Suri‟s thinking on jihad also demonstrates a distinct evolution from the
historical jihad tradition. Most pressing is the manner in which the tradition no longer serves to
constrain the use of force in the al-Qaeda model.
Of particular concern is the influence of the al-Qaeda model. Evidence suggests that al-
Suri‟s tactical framework has influenced both Al-Qaeda proper and its affiliated movements, as
well as the growing line of “lone wolf” jihadists: notably Richard Colvin Reid (the “shoe
bomber”), Umar Farouq Abdulmtallab (“Christmas Day Attacks”) and, most recently, Faisal
Shahzad (“Times Square Attack”). There is a remarkable affinity between Faishal shahzad‟s
story and al-Suri‟s recommendations for the necessity of utilizing the model of individual jihad.
According to media reports, Shahzad asked his father‟s permission to fight in the jihad (his father
refused). He consequently spent five months in Pakistan and claimed that it was during this
period that he received the necessary training from the Pakistani Taliban for the Times Square
attack. He then returned to the United States (leaving his wife and family in Pakistan),
presumably with the express intent of coordinating and executing the attack.
Perhaps most telling is Tariq-i-Taliban‟s initial response to the Times Square Attack.
Shahzad‟s terror attempt was a failure; yet Tariq-i-Taliban claimed responsibility (at least for a
while). This indicates some level of acknowledgment that lone jihadi operations are productive.
Shahzad‟s botched attempt generated publicity - and perhaps sympathizers – for the Pakistani
Taliban and its cause. Furthermore, even while distancing itself from Shahzad, Tariq -i-Taliban
claims to have other lone jihadis in the United States who are simply waiting for the right
opportunity to strike. Whether such claims are accurate or not is not nearly as important as their
ability to demonstrate some vested interest, on the part of such groups, in a “global” jihad and
the importance of individual jihadi operations to its success.

274
See James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005).

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 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the ability of al-Qaeda to move the
resistance out of the camps, and into the international arena. Iraq and Afghanistan have
furthermore demonstrated the difficulties involved in combating an organization like al-Qaeda
and its model of war. So, how are we to move forward from here?

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 CHAPTER FOUR

JUST WAR REASONING IN THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA

4.0 Introduction

In the effort to impose its vision of an Islamic order, Al-Qaeda‟s ideologues argue that
the Muslim world must wage a “defensive” war against the West through the use of asymmetric
means. Guided by its specific interpretation of the historical jihad tradition, al-Qaeda has put
forward a model of warfare that is decentralized in authority, global in reach, and minimally
interested in placing limits on the use of force.
The peculiar combination of al-Qaeda‟s military tactics renders it an organization that
defies straightforward categorization. While it displays certain elements typically attributed to
insurgency groups, its global reach makes the insurgency category problematic. And while it
privileges the use of terror as a tactic in its military arsenal, its penetration into Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan (among others) - in other words, its global agenda - lend it qualities that make the
terrorist label appear too restrictive.275 This ambiguity has affected the proposed military
responses put forward by major analysts and decision makers. As noted in chapter two, the
counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan remain the most visible elements in the
United States‟ efforts in the Long War. However, the increased employment of drone
technology, coupled with policy statements advocating for the preemptive use of military force,
have simultaneously maintained the feasibility of alternative methods within the policy world
and the public eye. Consequently, the question of how the United States and her allies ought to
respond to the al-Qaeda threat remains a subject of debate. The proposed military frameworks
fall along two lines.276

275
Additionally, the use of the term “terrorism” or “terrorist group” appears restrictive in a second sense. While it
indicates the use of particular types of tactics, it is not helpful in categorizing a group in regard to its structure or
aims.
276
It is important to note that while the policy questions occur in the form of a debate, both frameworks are being
applied in the Long War. Both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism methods are currently incorporated into
overall “counterterrorism” methods.

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 The first is counterinsurgency. As noted in chapter two, this framework begins by
construing al-Qaeda as a world-wide militant Islamist insurgency, headed or inspired by Osama
bin Laden and his network. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are understood as
component elements – “open fronts” – that are part of the larger insurgency war. Proponents of
this framework argue that a military response to al-Qaeda‟s insurgency requires the application
of counterinsurgency doctrine. This theory is premised on two elements: sanctuary denial and
nation building. Proponents of the counterinsurgency framework argue that both Iraq and
Afghanistan must be denied to al-Qaeda as safe havens and grounds for training and recruitment.
Furthermore, securing Iraq and Afghanistan may only be done effectively through the
construction of legitimate governments in both regions.
Such arguments are premised on the relationship between sanctuary denial and
legitimacy within classic counterinsurgency doctrine; as counterinsurgency theory argues that a
particular territory may only be secured – in other words, denied to the insurgents – if the
indigenous government is perceived as efficient and responsible in the eyes of its citizens. It
understands the root causes of insurgency as economic, social and political. Therefore, the focus
of counterinsurgency is to respond to local needs and grievances through the construction of
governments that are subject to the rule of law and capable of providing basic services and
protection to its citizens.
Counterterrorism, on the other hand, understands the al-Qaeda network through a legal
lens. While it remains sensitive to the importance of legitimate governments in the overall War
against al-Qaeda, this framework implicitly or explicitly rejects the necessity of large scale
nation-building efforts such as those called for by the advocates of counterinsurgency. Rather,
proponents of this framework argue that terrorist acts (such as those undertaken by al-Qaeda) are
violations of domestic and international law, and therefore ought to be responded to as such.
The nature of al-Qaeda however, has spurred critical changes within the counterterrorism
framework. Traditional counterterrorism methods have typically involved the use of law
enforcement tools – such as arrests, detentions and due process – in an effort to target the
terrorist or terrorist network directly. Applying these methods to al-Qaeda, however, has proved
problematic. According to both the Bush and Obama administration, the diffuse and global
nature of al-Qaeda has imposed severe restrictions on the efficacy of traditional counterterrorism
approaches. These difficulties have led to what may be termed the use of “extraordinary”

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counterterrorism methods: an increased reliance on drone technology and arguments invoking to
the right to preemptive self-defense. Appealing to both domestic and international law,
proponents of the counterterrorism approach argue that the United States is involved in an
“ongoing armed conflict” against the al-Qaeda network. In light of this, the use of force -
including lethal force through targeted killings - against al-Qaeda operatives is legitimate and
authorized under the United States‟ inherent rightsof self-defense.
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate both proposals, and to assess the moral and
ethical implications of each in light of the just war tradition. It is premised on the argument that
a legitimate military response ought to be firmly rooted in America moral traditions on the use of
force. Such a response is “legitimate” in the sense that it adheres to, or is guided by, the values
and commitments that are a part of the American ethos, and likewise, is therefore more likely to
be received as legitimate by those beyond the immediate circles of decision making. As noted
by Alex Bellamy, the War on Terror needs “moral anchorages” which ought to “guide political
decision makers and the way that democratic societies debate and evaluate what is done in their
name.” 277 In this task, the aims of this chapter are twofold: First, to apply the tradition‟s moral
and ethical guidance on the subject of irregular war to the current frameworks; and second, to
indicate the additional issues that are triggered through a just war analysis of both
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as they apply specifically to the War against al-Qaeda.
In this task we turn to the tradition‟s discussion of irregular war. As will be
demonstrated, just war thinking on this issue has proceeded primarily through discussions of
authority, and jus in bello considerations of proportionality and discrimination. In short these
are: the authority of irregulars to incur a right to war; and the jus in bello considerations imposed
upon regular forces in battle against an adversary that problematizes the distinctions between
combatants and noncombatants. However, as demonstrated in chapters two and three, the nature
of al-Qaeda presents moralists with a novel and complex model of war; one that ought to
engender additional considerations. While questions of authority and jus in bello considerations
remain significant, understanding the range of ethical and moral implications of both
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism requires that a larger spectrum of just war reasoning be
brought to bear.

277
Alex J. Bellamy, Fighting Terror: Ethical Dilemmas (London: Zed Books, 2008), 2.

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 According to the tradition, a just war is one which exhibits thorough and well-intentioned
reflection not only on the means used in warfare, but also on the ends. The jus ad bellum criteria
demonstrate that proper just war thinking is premised upon determinations of the circumstances
in which it is justified to resort to force, as well as reflections on the aims and the ends to be
achieved. Therefore, in addition to the criteria of legitimate authority and just cause, a just war
must demonstrates right intention, reasonable hope of success, timely response (last resort),
proportionality of ends and aim of peace. These criteria, taken together, reflect the tradition‟s
emphasis on the notion that force must be guided by, and directed towards, the just and proper
ends of good statecraft. While each require separate consideration and analysis, the just war
criteria work together to inform of the overall character of a particular use of force. In this way,
the use of force must not only answer to the jus in bello considerations of discrimination and
proportionality. It must also speak to the jus ad bellum considerations to ensure that – also in the
name of justice – it is capable of doing so in a way that does not transgress the moral values
undergirding the tradition.
A proper assessment of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism frameworks through
the lens of the just war tradition must take account not only of the jus in bello criteria, but of
others that come to the forefront in light of the application of these frameworks to the specific
case of al-Qaeda. While the planning of strategy and tactics must certainly be in accord with
discrimination and proportionality of means, the just use of force must make a sincere and
conscientious effort to attend to the feasibility and efficacy of war planning and conduct, as
required by the criteria of proportionality of ends and reasonable hope of success.
This is particularly the case in a War against al-Qaeda, where the complexity of the
adversary further complicates the current military frameworks. This is not to argue that war
planning must ensure victory or make prophetic determinations regarding the development of
events. But it is to say that any framework for the use of force must be reflective of the ends and
aims to which it has been tasked, and that furthermore, proper war planning must be capable of
making determinations regarding whether the proposed use of force is capable of achieving its
proper ends in a way that is both prudent and legitimate.
Therefore, this chapter argues that both frameworks ought to be assessed by means of a
more robust application of just war thinking, through the incorporation of the additional criteria
discussed above. This evaluation will demonstrate that neither of the standard frameworks

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proposed are particularly successful in characterizing al-Qaeda, or determining a proper
application for the use of force. While both frameworks take note of jus in bello considerations,
the nature of al-Qaeda is such that neither counterinsurgency nor counterterrorism has
successfully constructed a military framework that is capable of applying force in a manner that
is both proportional, and (likely to be) effective.
In the attempt to fight what has been construed as a global insurgency, the United States
is engaged in two large scale counterinsurgency campaigns that are heavily embroiled in the
domestic political, social and economic issues of Afghanistan and Iraq. This has led to a set of
circumstances in which the United States is fighting an indirect war against al-Qaeda, leading to
serious questions regarding the ability of either government to sustain the level of legitimacy
required to secure their territory against the threat posed by terrorism. In the attempt to engage
al-Qaeda through the lens of counterterrorism, the United States has resorted to what are,
arguably, extraordinary uses of force which require the aid and cooperation of multiple states. In
light of the global nature of al-Qaeda, sustaining such a policy – particularly on a broad scale –
appears highly problematic.
This chapter proceeds by detailing the arguments behind both frameworks. Section two
discusses the just war tradition and its applicability to contemporary war. Section three
examines the tradition‟s historical stance on the criterion of legitimate authority. Section four
highlights contemporary discussions of insurgency war as foundations for sections five and six,
which discusses both the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism frameworks through the
incorporation of the jus in bello criteria, in addition to the set of considerations linked to overall
proportionality and reasonable hope of success.

4.1 The Frameworks: Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgency framework may be explicated through the work of those who
have, in one way or another, been its advocates. General Stanley A. McChrystal and
counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen have been among its most prominent supporters.
Although Kilcullen‟s later work displays much more tentative levels of support for the
counterinsurgency approach to al-Qaeda, his framing of the issue has played a profoundly
influential role in directing the counterinsurgency discussion.

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 In his book, The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen argues that al-Qaeda is a transnational
militant Islamist insurgency. In contrast to a “traditional terrorism problem,” Kilcullen‟s model
defines the al-Qaeda network as a transnational organization attempting to overthrow various
local governments through the use of insurgency tactics (including terrorism).278 Therefore, al-
Qaeda fighters ought to be understood as insurgents taking part in a global jihadist movement,
headed by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and linked through a series of social factors and
interactions. As Kilcullen notes, while the various groups under the al-Qaeda network are
separated by various geographical borders, they remain linked through shared language,
ideology, schooling, and other cultural factors. These social ties are coupled with material
publications and other media outlets which serve to distribute and disseminate the al-Qaeda
message in the attempt to move the aims of this global insurgency forward. In this sense,
Kilcullen‟s model defines al-Qaeda as a diffuse network and not a hierarchical organization.
Bin-Laden, as described by Michael Scheuer, is “inciter-in-chief” not “commander-in-chief”
imposing “only a few clear and simple rules.”279 Bin Laden, then, does not issue directives or
orders for insurgent activity down a clear chain of command. Rather, al-Qaeda, and the various
groups under its umbrella, provides assistance and cooperation through a sponsorship system in
which either material or “inspirational” assistance and guidance is provided.280
Kilcullen further argues that al-Qaeda‟s military strategy draws on traditional insurgency
practice. Employing a four-part process of provocation, intimidation, protraction and
exhaustion, al-Qaeda utilizes these tactics - on a transnational scale - to bleed the United States
and her allies through an exhaustive war of attrition. Described by Kilcullen as the “accidental
guerrilla” phenomenon, al-Qaeda, “moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local
traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention, and then exploits
the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support for its takfiri 281 agenda.”282

278
David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 28, No. 4, August
(2005): 597-617. Kilcullen described the War on Terror as one against a globalized Islamist insurgency. In The
Accidental Guerilla, (2010), Kilcullen advances the globalized insurgency concept as one of four models through
which to understand the current security environment. However, in light of the fact that Kilcullen argues that al-
Qaeda uses the same tactics as those used by all historical insurgencies– provocation, intimidation, protraction, and
exhaustion – through with greater “scope and ambition”, one can deduce that the insurgency model remains highly
relevant to his work. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12-16.
279
Michael Scheuer, “Coaltion Warfare: Part I,” Terrorism Focus 2, no. 8 (2005).
280
David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597-617.
281
Kilcullen prefers this term over “jihadi” or “mujahideen”, see David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xviii-xix.

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Through phases described by Kilcullen as “infection,” “contagion,” “intervention,” and
“rejection” (see chapter two), al-Qaeda seeks to embroil American forces in a complex and
costly network of conflicts, in the hope that the United States and her allies will, ultimately,
withdraw – not only defeated, but exhausted and financially depleted.
Simultaneously, al-Qaeda hopes that this war of attrition will expand its demographic
base of support, ultimately culminating in a broad-based Muslim uprising against the “apostate”
Arab regimes supported by the United States. This revolution will then reinstate the caliphate,
and in the process, re-establish the former strength and glory of Islam. Finally, the revolution
will create the launching pad from which al-Qaeda will initiate an offensive jihad against the
remainder of the non-Muslim world.283 Its desire, according to Kilcullen,
“is to become the leading player in a loose coalition of takfiri extremist movements, to
become the vanguard of the world‟s Muslim population, the ummah, and to act as a propaganda
hub and center of excellence from which other movements can draw expertise, while exploiting
the actions and aggregating their effects into a unified propaganda offensive against the United
States and the broader international community.”
According to Kilcullen, current conflicts require the application of amended
counterinsurgency doctrines that have been reconstructed with the distinguishing features of
modern insurgency in mind. Kilcullen‟s recommendations, it ought to be noted, draw on classic
theory, but attempt to apply it to the larger and broader geographical “scope and ambitions”
displayed by al-Qaeda and the accidental guerrilla syndrome. For example, in 2005 Kilcullen
wrote that effective modern counterinsurgency must take note of the fact that through
transnational networks of influence, support, and funding, the insurgents‟ “area of interest” and
“influence” is not only regional, but global. In light of this, modern counterinsurgency is no
longer aimed solely at defeating the insurgents, but at “imposing order” on a “complex
ecosystem” composed of a network of cooperative, and at times, competitive groups.
As noted above Kilcullen‟s most recent assessments of counterinsurgency are much more
tempered in comparison to his earlier work. Writing (in 2010) that counterinsurgency is
“feasible,” he further notes that conducting it on a global scale is such it is “not recommended”

282
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 34.
283
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 28-32.

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or “not preferred.”284 Instead, he calls for an approach to terrorism that is focused on “risk
management”285 and prioritizes international partnerships, civilian and local agencies, and “the
lightest, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention that will achieve the necessary
affect.”286
Despite this tempered support, Kilcullen‟s framing of the current security environment,
and his construal of al-Qaeda in particular, has taken firm root within the military and policy
world. While multiple examples are available, three will suffice to demonstrate this point. The
first, by Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, argues that al-Qaeda is a new form of insurgency
“featuring Salafist theology which appeals to significant portions of Muslim believers and which
sanctifies terror.”287 Countering the idea that al-Qaeda is a transnational terrorist movement,
Morris argues that its broad support base and revolutionary ideology ought to place it within the
insurgency category. This categorizing activity, he argues, is important, as it plays a critical role
in how the military constructs a response. Insurgency groups, he argues are structurally different
than terrorist organizations. Insurgencies, he argues, typically enjoy much larger numbers of
fighting forces that are hierarchically organized; therefore suggestive of a more traditional army.
288
Terrorist cells are usually much smaller and not organized into formal chains of command.
More importantly, however, insurgencies display a political strength that terrorist groups do not
possess. Terrorists groups, he argues, “remain isolated from the social movements from which
they sprang and their political goals become …more and more divorced from reality.” In
contrast, insurgencies represent “both a political and military challenge” insofar as they
“combine ideologically motivated leadership with an unsatisfied citizenry into a challenge to
existing governments.”289 In this way, successfully countering an insurgency – like the one
represented by al-Qaeda – requires a program which allows the indigenous government to win

284
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 264, 271.
285
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 277.
286
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 283.
287
He further notes that the National War College student report, “Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World”
which inspired the Global War on Terrorism Strategy Paper defined al-Qaeda as a “pansurgency” – “an organized
movement of nonstate actors aimed at the overthrow of values, cultures, or societies on a global level through the
use of subversion an d armed conflict, with the ultimate goal of establishing a new order.” Lieutenant Colonel
Michael F. Morris, United States Marine Core, “Al-Qaeda as Insurgency” United States Army War College Strategy
Research Project March 18th, 2005, 10. See also National War College Student Task Force on Combating
Terrorism, “Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World,” Washington, D.C.: National War College, (2002), 10.
288
Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, United States Marine Core, “Al-Qaeda as Insurgency” United States Army
War College Strategy Research Project March 18th, 2005, 2.
289
Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, United States Marine Core, “Al-Qaeda as Insurgency” United States Army
War College Strategy Research Project ,March 18th, 2005, 6.

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the allegiance of its citizens by offering them a more appealing structure of government than that
put forward by the insurgency. Consequently, the war against al-Qaeda must take on the
political challenges that al-Qaeda presents.
Second, is an article by Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo, who argues that counterinsurgency
lessons from Vietnam may assist in the effort against al-Qaeda. Tovo is specifically thinking of
the Phoenix Program, an American initiative aimed at combating the infrastructure of the
Vietcong – the component of North Vietnamese guerrillas who were sent to South Vietnam to
mobilize political support for Ho Chi Minh. “Infrastructure,” according to Tovo, refers to those
who “performed support roles, such as recruitment, political indoctrination, propaganda, and
psychological operations, intelligence collection and logistical support.”290 In the same way,
Tovo argues, the current “militant Islamic Insurgency” is a “loosely coordinated effort of
multiple groups with nearly coincident goals and objectives.”291 The Islamist insurgency is also
supported by “infrastructure” consisting of religious and secular personalities and institutions
which serve to grant it legitimacy and support (religious clerics, religious schools, and
nongovernmental institutions soliciting funds in support of al-Qaeda). In light of the importance
of “infrastructure” to the political aims of counterinsurgency, he argues, al-Qaeda‟s
infrastructure must be taken into consideration, and “neutralized to defeat the insurgency.”292
The most significant and influential example is General Stanley A. McChrystal‟s August
2009 assessment of Afghanistan. In the “Commander‟s Summary”, McChyrstal writes that the
United States faces a “resilient and growing insurgency” that is coupled with a “crises of
confidence among Afghans – in both their government and the international community – that
undermines our [American] credibility and emboldens the insurgents.” This assessment, he
argues, requires a “redefining of the fight.” It requires conducting “classic counterinsurgency
operations in an environment that is uniquely complex” (emphasis mine). Therefore, he argues,
the intentional objective must be the population. The war must be understood as a “war of ideas”

290
Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo, “From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency
Operations” Strategic Challenges for Counterterrorism and the Global War on Terror, Strategic Studies Institute
September (2006): 20-21.
291
Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo, “From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency
Operations” Strategic Challenges for Counterterrorism and the Global War on Terror, Strategic Studies Institute
September (2006): 25.
292
Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo, “From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency
Operations” Strategic Challenges for Counterterrorism and the Global War on Terror, Strategic Studies Institute
September (2006): 28.

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where “perceptions derive from actions” and the goals center around a population-centric
approach that seeks to regain the trust and legitimacy of Afghans in their government. 293
As is clear from the examples above, Kilcullen‟s conceptualization of al-Qaeda as
insurgency has clearly taken hold. In this way, the counterinsurgency proponents argue that an
effective strategy to al-Qaeda must privilege the nation building efforts that are at the heart of
classic theory.294

4.2 The Frameworks: Counter-Terrorism

The work of Stephen Simon (and co-authors) illustrates the elements of the
counterterrorism framework. Simon‟s work is particularly helpful insofar as it directly engages
the counterinsurgency framework proposed by both Kilcullen, McChrystal and others discussed
in the section above. As noted in the introduction, the counterterrorism position begins from
arguments that aim to counter the necessity and efficacy of counterinsurgency. While
counterterrorism does not directly, or even necessarily, contests the “global Islamist insurgency”
model of al-Qaeda, it directly challenges the necessity of large-scale national building efforts as
part of an effective approach to the Long War.
According to proponents of this framework, if American strategic interests are to contain
and ultimately debilitate al-Qaeda, the extensive and burdensome task of rebuilding the Afghan
state is not required. As Simon argues, while al-Qaeda remains a critical part of national security
and foreign policy concerns, the core of the threat has shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
Through the support of the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has managed to
rebuild its camps, and to reconstruct a safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Insofar as the
thrust of the threat has shifted, Simon claims, American policy must shift along with it. This
requires incorporating Pakistan into the counterterrorism framework, particularly in the strategic
imperative of containing radicalism in the region. The real threat, Simon writes, is the
establishment of “mini-Afghanistans” in Pakistan.295
Such considerations ought to fundamentally change the nature of American policy in
Afghanistan. Of particular concern is the “spillover” effect of militants from Afghanistan to

293
Stanley A. McChrystal, “COMISAF‟S Initial Assessment” Headquarters, International Security Assistance
Force Kabul, Afghanistan June 26th, 2009, 1-1-1-4.
294
For further details of counterinsurgency theory, see chapter two, section 2.1.4.
295
Steven Simon, “Can the Right War be Won?” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 July-August (2009): 135.

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Pakistan in response to greater military pressure on Afghanistan by the United States. 296 Of
further note is the difficulty which the increased military presence of the United States would
place on Pakistan. Such pressure would ultimately impede Islamabad‟s ability to cooperate with
the United States by intensifying popular perceptions of American military presence and
involvements as “occupation” and Pakistan‟s cooperation as “complicity.” As Simon writes,

“Ultimately the United States is caught in a vicious circle. In the face of a threatening al-
Qaeda hosted by the Taliban, the United States depends on its involvement in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Al Qaeda and the Taliban respond to the U.S. Presence with destabilizing violence
and insurgent activity. The United States, in turn, responds by applying more intense pressure,
increasing civilian casualties and general instability – and thus weakening the governments in
Kabul and Islamabad, which benefits al-Qaeda and the Taliban.”297

In light of this, American policy cannot focus on guaranteeing the political legitimacy
and integrity of Afghanistan while simultaneously containing al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Pakistan – which, Simon argues, are not realistic objectives. Rather, the United States‟ aims
“should be merely to ensure that al-Qaeda is denied both Afghanistan and Pakistan as operating
bases for transnational attacks on the United States and its allies and partners.”298
Taking the above into consideration, proponents of counterterrorism argue that a
counterinsurgency framework is not only unlikely to lead to the containment and neutralization
of al-Qaeda (in light of the threat from radical elements in Pakistan) but also requires a
commitment on the part of the United States which is unnecessary and overly burdensome in
light of the strategic objectives. They argue that a different policy is needed; one that caters to
American strengths and that directly targets the al-Qaeda network.

4.2.1 Drone Technology

While official policy states that the preferred methods of counterterrorism are law
enforcement tools – arrests, detentions and due process - the nature of al-Qaeda, as well as the

296
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival vol. 15. No. 5 October-
November (2009): 50-52.
297
Steven Simon, “Can the Right War be Won?” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 July-August (2009): 136.
298
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival15, No. 5 October-
November (2009): 50.

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limits of such procedures, has led to an increased reliance on drone technology. At least this has
been the interpretation of the Obama‟s administration increased reliance on a policy of targeted
killings.299 Since 2004, there have been a total of 234 strikes and 129 civilians killed (note that
data for 2004 and 2005 were not available at the time of writing).300
Proponents point out that targeted killings have eliminated an impressive list of high-
level al-Qaeda operatives. Since January 2008, American air strikes in Pakistan have killed 15
high level al-Qaeda militants, including Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi, Abu Zabair al Masri, Abu
Jihad al-Masri (al-Qaeda‟s intelligence chief), Khalid Habib (in charge of Pakistani operations)
and Abu Khabab al-Masri (explosives expert), Abu Laith al-Libi (commander in Afghanistan).
This is in addition to 16 “mid-level al Qaeda and Taliban commanders and operative” killed
since 2008.301 The logic of drone technology as an “operational tool” within a wider
counterterrorism framework is relatively straightforward. Simon quotes one unnamed senior
counterterrorism official:
“In the past, you could take out the number 3 al Qaeda leader, and number 4 just moved
up to take his place….Well if you take out number 3, number 4, and then 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, it
suddenly becomes a lot more difficult to revive the leadership cadre.”302

The drone campaign has another stated objective, which is to “interrupt al-Qaeda‟s
external network and prevent the group from striking at the US and her allies” and “to disrupt the
Taliban and al-Qaeda‟s operations in Afghanistan.”303 While disrupting the overall command of

299
Simon and Stevenson write, “While he [President Obama] would prefer to fight transnational terrorists with law-
enforcement tools, he understood that could not always be done effectively. In particular, he realized that the United
States could not, practically speaking, dispatch FBI special agents to Pakistan‟s anarchical tribal areas and other
ungoverned spaces in an unmarked ford Crown Victoria and bring them back to federal district court in Washington
for trial, so measures like targeted killing from drones were needed.” Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson,
“Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival vol. 15, No. 5 October-November (2009): 53. The Obama
administration, for its part, has ramped up the use of drone technology. Out of the 234 strikes undertaken since
2004, 224 of them have taken place since January 2008, “Charting the Date for US Airstrikes in Pakistan” The Long
War Journal, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
300
“Charting the Date for US Airstrikes in Pakistan” The Long War Journal, available at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
301
The Long War Journal, “Analaysis: U.S Air Campaign in Pakistan Heat Up” The Long War Journal available at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/analysis_us_air_camp.php. For a list of al-Qaeda operatives killed
by predator strikes inside Pakistan see “Senior al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders Killed in US Airstrikes in Pakistan”
The Long War Journal available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php.
302
Steven Simon, “Can the Right War be Won?” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 July-August (2009): 135.
303
The Long War Journal, “Analaysis: U.S Air Campaign in Pakistan Heat Up” The Long War Journal: 4 available
at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/analysis_us_air_camp.php.

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al-Qaeda remains a primary consideration, the drone strikes are furthermore meant to impede the
ability of al-Qaeda to undertake another terrorist attack by targeting and destroying its material
network – camps, safe houses, as well as the material means of Taliban leaders offering financial
and logistic support to al-Qaeda.304
Proponents of counterterrorism, furthermore, argue that such a framework avoids the
dangerous pitfall articulated by al-Qaeda‟s “war of attrition.” A stated above, al-Qaeda‟s
military strategy seeks to draw the United States and her allies into a prolonged conflict that
engages its military on a global scale, and ultimately, drains the United State financially and
weakens public support for its military policies. In this way, al-Qaeda seeks to gradually
debilitate the United States‟ in the hopes that it will eventually withdraw its forces. The
counterinsurgency framework, its proponents argue, will only serve to draw the United States
deeper in regard to its material commitments – particularly if the United States must continue to
carry the burden of the precedent it has set in Afghanistan in other vulnerable areas.
Furthermore, a counterterrorism framework, proponent argue, drastically reduces the size of the
American military footprint in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, reducing al-Qaeda‟s abilities to
capitalize on American military presence for recruitment.305

4.2.2 Preemptive War

The threat posed by al-Qaeda has initiated additional developments within the
counterterrorism framework. Under the premise that American use of force must be capable of
responding to the contemporary security environment, various figures within the policy world
have argued for the right of anticipatory and preemptive self-defense. The paradigmatic
expression of this policy was the expansive National Security Strategy of 2002 - better known as
the “Bush Doctrine.” In the case of a possible terrorist attack, the Bush administration argued
that “if necessary” it would “act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense.”
Furthermore, in light of the devastative effects of such an attack, the administration argued that it

304
For example, a Taliban-run training camp in Kurran was hit in Feb, 2009. The Long War Journal, “Analaysis:
U.S Air Campaign in Pakistan Heat Up” The Long War Journal: 4 available at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/analysis_us_air_camp.php.
305
Charles A. Kupchan and Steven Simon, “Pull the Plug on the Afghan Surge” Council on Foreign Relations
available at http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/pull-plug-afghan-surge/p20671. Originally in the Financial Times
October 3, 2009. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival 15, No. 5
October-November (2009): 63-64.

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was justified in taking military action even if “uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy‟s attack.”306
While international law has long recognized the right of nation-state to strike against an
imminent threat, the right of states to anticipatory self-defense, or alternatively, to use force in a
preemptive measure against a threat that is emerging but not yet imminent, is contested. The
implications of the “Bush Doctrine” have been disconcerting to a variety of figures across the
political spectrum.307 Such criticisms have continued as this policy has been maintained by the
Obama administration‟s handling of the Long War. However, the proponents of preemptive
force308 argue that American military planning must reflect the changing nature of the security
environment.
Mark Totten and Alex Bellamy both argue that the American conviction against a first
strike must be reexamined in light of the capabilities boasted by al-Qaeda. As Totten writes,
“With the fall of the twin towers came the ability to imagine that using force against a less-than-
imminent threat might be a last resort to prevent a coming attack of unacceptable harm.” 309 For
both Totten and Bellamy, the particular type of threat posed by global terrorism challenges
current convictions regarding defense and imminence. The threat of terrorism is posed by an
adversary that not only lacks a sense of “measured risk”, but also seeks to impose maximum
levels of damage. Additionally, terrorist networks can easily evade detection. In light of the
above, the type of “warnings” typically folded into current understandings of “imminent threat”
– such as troop movements - may never transpire. Preparing for an adversary that has, or is
seeking, the means necessary to impose levels of damage such as those demonstrated on
September 11th, requires revising the interpretations of imminence that have traditionally
undergirded the moral and ethical framework of preemptive war.
Consequently, for both Totten and Bellamy, a critical part of revision requires the
alignment of the concept of imminence with the new threat posed by global terrorism. In the

306
“Prevent our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
Text available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html
307
For a book-length example, see Albert L. Weeks, The Choice of War: The Iraq War and the Just War Tradition
(Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, LLC, 2010).
308
Mark Totten is exceptionally clear in his use of these terms. He defines “anticipatory force” as any act of using
force first against a potential attack; “preemptive force” as force which responds to an imminent threat; and
“preventive force” as force which responds to a threat that is emerging or not-yet-imminent. Mark Totten, First
Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 5-6.
309
Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),
149.

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attempt to provide a revisionist doctrine of anticipatory force, Totten claims that under a set of
very specific circumstances, the United States may wage a first strike in a preventive war of self-
defense against an emerging threat. In Totten‟s framework, the imminence criterion is satisfied
through demonstrations of intention, means and preparation on the part of the terrorist
adversary.310
This framework is echoed in Bellamy‟s work. Also arguing for an expanded right of
preemptive self-defense, Bellamy argues that “it is fair to conclude that in situations where a
state can demonstrate an actor has the intent and means to conduct terrorist attacks against its
citizens or allies, it is reasonable to suggest that the imminence test is satisfied.” 311 What
becomes imperative at this point is the “demonstrability” of the means. The state in question
must present evidence to the world community (as well as its own citizens) that confirm both the
intent and the capability to impose an injury.
Both Totten and Bellamy also contend that the use of preemptive force in self-defense
against an emerging threat must be in alignment with the just war criteria of necessity (last
resort) and proportionality of ends. A just and legitimate use of preemptive force must be
proportional to the perceived threat. While calculating the magnitude of harm of an emerging
attack is difficult, Totten argues that reliable intelligence can provide reasonable estimates of
such things. Furthermore, under the requirements of necessity, force may only be used if other
312
reasonable methods have been rejected as unfeasible or have been exhausted. As Bellamy
notes the necessity criterion is satisfied when the use of anticipatory violence is the only
“reasonable” means through which the threat may be quelled. The necessity criterion, he writes,
“does not require that all other means be exhausted first, but we are entitled to are whether those
who use preemptive force had reasonable alternatives.”313

4.3 The Just War Tradition

As noted by Mark Totten, the just war tradition provides the “grammar” for American
debates on warfare insofar as its values and commitments structure the way that Americans think

310
Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),
168-175.
311
Alex J. Bellamy, Fighting Terror: Ethical Dilemmas (London: Zed Books, 2008), 84.
312
Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),
168-175.
313
Alex J. Bellamy, Fighting Terror: Ethical Dilemmas (London: Zed Books, 2008), 85.

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and debate major policy decisions on the use of force. It further serves to “shape our intuitions
and explain our experiences”314 in the sense that the tradition‟s understanding of the role and
purpose of war - as sometimes necessary but always limited – reflects and constructs the broad
American consensus on the relationship between war, morality, and statecraft.315 All this is not
to say that there is extensive agreement on the relevant debates within American foreign policy.
Rather, it is to make the point that Americans are persuaded by the idea that force ought to be
guided by morality and ethics, and that furthermore, the terms of such guidance have been
provided largely by the body of moral wisdom referred to as just war tradition.
As a historical tradition, the just war “refers broadly to a body of moral, legal and
political wisdom that has developed over the history of western culture on the justification of
armed force and the limits of justified use of force.”316 The tradition is traced to the ancient
world, and its foundational concepts developed over centuries of discourse and through the input
of both religious and secular sources as well as the modern contribution of international law.317
Understood as such, the tradition demonstrates a general agreement on the relationship between
proper statecraft and the use of war. Positioning itself against pacifism and realism, the just war
argues that war is a moral activity and furthermore is subject to ethical restraints. In this way,
the tradition states that war is sometimes a necessary element of just and proper statecraft, and as
such, it is at all times limited. This conceptualization is, additionally, structured by a set of
conceptual categories that developed over the course of its history. 318 These serve to highlight
the values contained in the just war tradition, as well as to provide parameters which guide
decision-making on the use of force. They are organized into two distinct, yet interrelated
branches: the jus ad bellum, and the jus in bello. They have to do, respectively, with the

314
Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),
80.
315
Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),
80-83.
316
James Turner Johnson, “Just War in the Thought of Paul Ramsey” The Journal of Religious Ethics 2, No. 19, Fall
(1991), 183.
317
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
318
See, James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). James Turner Johnson, The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions
in Western Cultural History, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987). James Turner Johnson, Morality and
Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust
Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).
Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers,
1983). Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

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questions of when it is just to resort to military force, and what is justified to do once force has
been determined to be the proper course of action. In more detail, these are:

Jus ad bellum
Proper/Legitimate Authority: War must be declared and authorized by the legitimate authority of
sovereign political entities. This requirement attempts to limit the right to use force only to those
who have been entrusted with the responsibility for the state, its protection, and the maintenance
of peace and justice.

Just cause: Stephen E. Lammers notes that in the classical period, just cause - as defined by
Augustine, Aquinas, and others of that era - existed “if the war in question were to punish
evildoers, to repulse an injury that was in the process of being committed, or to recover property
that had been unjustly taken previously.” As Lammers notes, in positive international law, just
cause is restricted to the idea of self-defense. However, in practice the interpretation of self-
defense has been stretched to accommodate acts encompassed in the classical notion of just
cause.

Right Intention: This criterion notes that war must not be fought for unjust means, defined most
clearly by Augustine as, “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an
unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these
are rightly condemned in war. It encompasses the requirements of just cause, as well as securing
the multiple political and social goods that the state serves to protect; the most notable of which
is a just and lasting peace (discussed more below).

Reasonable Hope of Success: this criterion states that a just war is one in which conscientious
deliberations have been made by the relevant authorities to determine whether there is a realistic
chance of attaining victory. It does not require prophetic assurances of success, but it does call
for prudent decision making that is based on a sound assessment of risk.

Proportionality of ends: The proportionality criterion requires that the overall goods anticipated
by the resort to force be greater than the expected harm. Thus, while an injury incurred may

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imply a just cause for the use of force, the decision to use force is just only if the expected harm
does not exceed the anticipated good. While such language implies cost-benefit reasoning, it is
important to note that such estimates are often not subject to straightforward calculations. As
Michael Walzer notes,
“Certainly we want political and military leaders to worry about costs and benefits. But
they have to worry; they can‟t calculate, for the values at stake are not commensurate…How do
we measure the value of a country‟s independence against the value of lives that might be lost in
defending it? How do we figure in the value of defeating an aggressive regime…or the value of
deterring other, similar regimes?”319

Last Resort: This criterion requires that a decision to use force be made under the understanding
that other means are not capable of achieving the (just) ends that are sought. The condition of
“last resort” does not necessitate that all other means be exhausted prior to the decision to use
force. Such an interpretation would, “make war morally impossible. For we can never reach
lastness, or we can never know that we have reached it.”320 Rather, the criterion requires that, if
there are effectual means of avoiding actual fighting and still achieving the justified ends, they
ought to be employed.

Jus in bello
Proportionality of Means: This criterion requires a calculative judgment between a particular use
of force (against a target) and its stated purpose. Proportionality of means states that force must
be used in proportion to the ends sought, such that no more force than necessary is to be applied
than that needed to achieve the stated and justified ends. It further requires the avoidance of
force that causes unnecessary harm or injury.

Discrimination: The discrimination criterion is often referred to as “noncombatant immunity.” It

requires the avoidance of direct and intentional harm to those who are not a part of the war
effort. It also applies to attacks against places and buildings not directly related to the conflict,
such as hospitals, museums, etc.

319
Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 89-90.
320
Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 88.

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4.3.1 Applying the Tradition to Contemporary War
It is important to understand that while these criteria play a significant role in just war
reasoning, they are not conceptual boxes that may be “checked off” a list in the attempt to
determine the just or unjust use of force. Rather, they ought to serve as critical guidelines,
illuminating values and commitments that have been maintained through religious and secular
discourse on the proper means and ends of warfare. In this way, the tradition, as represented by
the criteria, must be engaged in the attempt to apply its moral wisdom to contemporary
conditions. It is this particular characteristic which facilitates the tradition‟s continuing
relevance to the shifts and changes of contemporary war, and to the War against al-Qaeda in
particular.
To gain a clearer understating of this point, we turn to James Turner Johnson, whose
conceptualization of the just war provides significant insight on its ability to provide guidance in
the contemporary international arena.321 The foundation of Johnson‟s work is his
methodological approach. He describes the just war idea as a historical moral tradition,322
constructed through a relationship between “historical reflection and moral valuing.” 323 What he
means here is multifaceted, and best approached through his ideas concerning historical
reflection and moral reasoning. Johnson argues that moral values are “derived” from a
community‟s historical experience. Thus, when an individual or a community is engaged in
historical reflection, they are engaged in a normative act. He argues that historical reflection,
through memory¸ serves to guide moral reasoning and action in the present. Through the act of
remembering, a community gazes down upon the “unconscious imprint of the past upon the
present” and intentionally and significantly determines what aspects of this imprint are
significant for the present circumstances at hand.324
It is through this process of historical reflection that moral wisdom and insight is gained
and moral communities are forged. By linking moral wisdom from the past to the present, a

321
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981). James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999).
322
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: a Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1981), 19.
323
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: a Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1981), 19.
324
James Turner Johnson, “On Keeping Faith: The Use of History for Religious Ethics” Journal of Religious Ethics,
7.1, Spring (1979): 104.

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moral tradition is built and maintained.325 The construction of a tradition, according to Johnson,
occurs through the incorporation of the historical moral wisdom – gained through reflection –
into contemporary moral reasoning. For Johnson, it is the continuity of moral insight between
past and present- or the emphasis of the significance of these past links with and for present
moral reasoning – that is the defining feature of what he terms a “tradition.”326 The Just war,
then,
“…carries conceptions of statecraft and the role of armed force in good government that
take various specific forms over time but remain fundamentally stable. This tradition is, as a
whole, a repository of the way in which Western culture has come to think of the values which
political life exists to support, protect, and foster; the role of military force in the service of those
values; and the limits on the use of such force. From this perspective, the question of the just use
of military force today is one the may rightly be approached by looking at earlier historical
reflections on the same question, so that the answers both reinforce the core values carried by
the tradition and reveal wrong turns in past and present arguments about the place of the use of
force in statecraft.327”

This becomes particularly important in regard to contemporary interpretation and

application of just war ideas. According to Johnson, just war thinking, as a form of moral
reasoning, must align itself with the historical tradition out of which just war thinking emerged.
He argues that the just war idea “is not free-floating, to be given whatever content one may think
appropriate in whatever context.”328 Rather, for Johnson, understanding the meaning of the just
war idea requires engaging “the tradition out of which it comes and entering into dialog with the

325
Johnson specifies his comments on this matter to the Christian and Jewish traditions. See: James Turner
Johnson, “On Keeping Faith: The Use of History for Religious Ethics” Journal of Religious Ethics 7.1, Spring
(1979).
326
James Turner Johnson, The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History, (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1987), 284. He further argues that historical reflection on just war thinking, conceived
as a tradition, provides what her terms a “classical” interpretation or model of just war thinking. Johnson refers to
the “classical” just war tradition in a number of places: James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary
Warfare, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), xxxi; James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam
Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 35-36.
327
James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 51.
328
James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 35;

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classical statement of the just war idea within that tradition.”329 According to Johnson, it is by
way of such engagement that one arrives at the tradition‟s underlying values and concerns; the
values and concerns that he argues just war thinking is ultimately founded upon, and which it
seeks to express through the continuation of the tradition. As he remarks, just war tradition

“…is not fully defined at any time by these criteria understood as principles or by a static
understanding of their meaning as developed in past wisdom, reflection, and precedent. Rather,
the meaning of the tradition or any part of it at any given time and with reference to any given
context or problem must be developed in dialogue with the principles it expresses, the precedents
it embodies, and the moral wisdom it reflects. Thus, besides providing a broad and deep
foundation for moral reflection on statecraft, this tradition also provides a proper forum for
exploring the implications of that reflection for policy choices and actions taken in the
international sphere. In turn, the tradition itself is thereby expanded and renewed.”330

Returning to the concept of “moral anchorages”, Johnson‟s work clarifies how just war
thinking, as a process of historical reflection, has arrived as the values and commitments
underlying Western ideas about war. These values – as anchorages – both guide and bracket
moral reflection on American use of force. They guide moral reflection in the sense that they
point to values and commitments that, through processes of reason and deliberation, define the
political and social goods of just and proper statecraft. In the same way, they place restrictions
on the use of force by erecting limits beyond which we may not tread without jeopardizing our
obligation to these principles. In thinking about the frameworks of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism, then, the just war tradition distinguishes the manner in which each framework
may serve to protect or transgress the values and commitments – right intention, noncombatant
immunity, aim of peace, etc - that are integral to western thinking on war.
As noted in the introduction, evaluations of irregular war within the just war tradition
have primarily focused on the issues of authority and jus in bello considerations. Therefore, it is
to these that we first turn.

329
James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 35;
330
James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 39-40.

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4.3.2 The Just War Tradition on the Authority of Irregulars
The question of legitimate authority has, historically, been a prominent consideration
within just war thinking. As noted by James Turner Johnson, “the just war tradition of the West
represents on culture‟s attempt to determine when and how violence is appropriate.” In light of
such considerations, those interested in imposing limits and regulations on war sought to
determine who could legitimately declare that the use of force was appropriate for the settlement
of disputes. In the end of placing appropriate limits on the use of force, the criterion of
legitimate authority plays a vital role. It serves to delineate which members of a political
community have the necessary authorization to utilize the military resources of the society in
question, under the determinations (and further limits imposed) by the criterion of just cause. In
this way, the criterion of legitimate authority is intentionally restrictive.
For significant periods of its history, there was general agreement that just war limits did
not apply to cases of rebellion - or for the purposes of this discussion – what may be termed
irregular war. As a starting point we turn to the work of Thomas Aquinas.331 Aquinas lists three
conditions for a “just war.” These are sovereign authority, just cause and right intention. As
discussed by James Turner Johnson, Aquinas‟s criterion of “right intention” has two
components. The first is “positive” stating that right intention in war requires the aim of peace.
The second is “negative” stating that right intention further requires the avoidance of “motives of
aggrandizement or cruelty.” Aquinas lists the conditions for the criterion of just cause as:
defense against attack, punishment of evil, and recovery of that which has been wrongly taken.
Johnson further notes that the conditions listed for just cause are directly connected to protection
of the political community, understood as the prevention of evil and promotion of the good. As
noted by Johnson, Aquinas‟s understanding of the criteria of just cause and right intention are
focused, then, on the responsibilities granted to the good ruler in his charge as the sovereign of
the political community.332 It is this connection which then clarifies Aquinas‟s understanding of
legitimate authority, as defined by the statement below:

331
In the following discussion on Aquinas, Luther, and the history of legitimate authority in the just war tradition, I
am indebted to James Tuner Johnson.
332
James Turner Johnson, “Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed
Force” Journal of Religious Ethics 31.3 Spring (2003):7-11.

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 “For it is not the business of the private individual to declare war, because he can seek
for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover, it is not the business of a
private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the
care of the common weal is committed to those who are not in authority, it is their business to
watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is
lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal
disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the world of the Apostle (Rom. Xiii.4):
he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God‟s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
that doth evil; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the
common weal against external enemies.”333

Taken on its own, Aquinas‟s statement is quite influential. Noting that the sovereign is
the only authority entrusted with the responsibilities of protecting the political community –
“defending the common weal” - Aquinas thereby argues that it is only the sovereign, then, who
may undertake the use of force. As noted by Johnson, the sovereigns right to wage war flow
directly from his “positive responsibilities as the one given charge for the common weal.”334
Individuals are not granted this right of redress. First, as Aquinas points out, the individual is
lacking the positive responsibilities requisite to the protection of the political community. And
second, the individual has other recourse for their grievances, insofar as they may raise them
with those who have been entrusted with the political authority which then leads to the positive
responsibilities of statecraft granted to the sovereign.
However, it is the reasoning behind this statement which is particularly significant for the
understanding of legitimate authority in the tradition, and its intentions to not only limit force but
to direct it towards the good. The sovereign‟s responsibilities were understood such that they
were not only to uphold the good, but also to point the political community‟s use of force in such
a way that it serves the good. This, according to Johnson, was motivated by “a fear of the
injustice of chaos, the free rein absence of political order gives to individuals to pursue their

333
ST II/II, Q. 40, A. 1 cited in James Turner Johnson, “Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority
and the Use of Armed Force” Journal of Religious Ethics 31.3, spring (2003): 9.
334
James Turner Johnson, “Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed
Force” Journal of Religious Ethics 31.3, spring (2003): 9.

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private selfish ends to the detriment of others.”335 Aquinas worried about the use of violence in
the service of unjust ends – the intentions of those whose motivations were individual and
private, and not subject to the instructive capabilities – specifically the abilities to determine just
cause and right intention - that were the inheritance of those in a position of authority.
These points are illustrated by two historical examples. The first is the German Peasants‟
Rebellion of 1524-1525. The revolt was in response to the social and religious climate of the
time. Martin Luther, whose writings are credited with initiating the religious Reformation of the
16th century, challenged the hierarchical rule of the church by arguing that the intermediaries – as
represented by the church – were not a necessary to the individual‟s salvation. While Luther‟s
message was fundamentally religious, a great deal of political momentum was garnered as a
result of his ideas. Such momentum was the underlying feature of what came to be known as
the German Peasants‟ Rebellion. Those who advocated for revolt argued that Luther‟s
challenges to the hierarchy of the church extended also to the individual‟s right to challenge the
sovereign‟s authority over the political community in the case where the temporal ruler was
found to be unjust.336
In response, Luther countered that regardless of the justice of their cause, or the
particularities of their condition (to which he had some sympathy), the peasants did not have the
authority to wage an insurrection through the use of force against the state. Under Luther‟s
understanding of proper statecraft, the peasants had fundamentally misunderstood their role, as
well as their responsibilities. As Johnson writes,

“The state, for Luther, is ordained by God and given to individual men as a fact of life.
Christians may not despite it; they must accept it as a condition of their earthly existence. Those
in authority in the state are like gods under God, who has given them their positive of
sovereignty and who holds them to account for fostering and maintaining peace and order in the
world and the suppression of anarchy and disorder. Christians are to obey their temporal
superiors, not to resist them or attempt to usurp their power and authority. If rulers govern
unjustly, God will punish them for it. Such punishment is not the right of other individuals within

335
James Turner Johnson, “Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed
Force” Journal of Religious Ethics 31.3, spring (2003): 11.
336
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981): 50-53.

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the state; an unjust government may not be rebelled against. The Christian may be called to
suffer under such an unjust rule, but that is the lot given him by God; he may not revolt even to
seek a better social order.”337

This strain of conservatism is echoed in a second historical example, the Catholic

rebellion in Elizabethan England during the 15th and 16th centuries. The more or less continuous
Catholic campaign to deny the legitimacy of the reigning Protestant English Monarch
demonstrates the tradition‟s emphasis on the connection between legitimate authority, just cause
and right intention. The Catholic opposition argued that their resistance to Protestant rule was
justified through the authority of the Pope, whose spiritual authority granted him the temporal
authority to depose the monarch. However, as noted by Johnson, even the staunchest advocates
of this position - such as English cardinal William Allen - argued that such authority was
specifically granted only to the Pope. Furthermore, such authority was explicitly denied to the
individual Catholic subject, who must submit to the reigning authority. Only one legitimate
authority could wage war against another. The Catholic (or Protestant) subject, in their action of
rebellion, would not be seeking justice but rather fomenting chaos and destruction in light of
their inability to properly and responsibly take on the task of defending the political community.
The individual citizen, in light of their hierarchical position in the political order, was simply
lacking the proper attributes to properly determine the necessary criteria of right intention and
just cause.338
There is a direct connection between determinations of the jus ad bellum criterion of
authority and jus in bello critera of discrimination and proportionality.339 Explicit in the above is
the notion that a just war is one that is authorized by a legitimate authority - or more specifically
by a sovereign ruler. Only these wars involving what we would today term legitimate combatants
– those owed the protections that are called for through the moral categories of the just war and
international law. Wars in which those taking up arms did so without such proper authorization
were illegitimate – and hence not afforded the protections described above. In the historical

337
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981): 52.
338
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981): 53-9.
339
Note that these terms were coined by Paul Ramsey, and as such, the thinkers discussed above would not have
thought through these issues through the use of these specific terms.

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examples outlined, the irregulars rising up against the established authority were deemed
criminals and bandits fomenting chaos and insurrection. Consequently, in both cases, they were
put down with indiscriminate force.
This position on rebellion, or irregular war, was maintained in the tradition until the turn
of the 20th century. It was not until the publication of the United States Army‟s General Orders
no. 100 that attempts were made to recognize the rights of irregulars. Published in 1963, this
document recognized confederate forces as legitimate belligerents (as opposed to rebels or
criminals) and granted them the associated rights of soldiers. The next major development
toward the recognition of irregulars did not occur until 1907, when the annex to the Hauge
Convention IV, Laws and Customs of War on Land, stipulated that the “laws, right, and duties of
war” were not just the purview of armies but also extended to “militia, and volunteer corps” who
demonstrated the following provisions:

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly;
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

And,
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are
included under the denomination "army."340

While these documents were significant contributions in the tradition‟s understanding of

irregular forces, it is important to note that these documents recognized the legitimate status of
irregulars insofar as they were understood to be authorized by a legitimate authority. Irregular
forces, in both the documents outlined above, assumed belligerents to be acting in support of
regular forces or to hold some concept of statehood (discussed further below). Consequently,
despite these developments, irregulars continue to maintain an uncomfortable position within just
war tradition.

340
These are provided here exactly as they are listed in Hague Convention IV (1907), Annex, Section I, Chapter I,
Article I. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp

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4.3.3 The Just War Tradition on Jus in Bello and Irregular War
As noted in the introduction, contemporary discourse on irregular war has proceeded
through the frameworks of the jus in bello criteria of discrimination and proportionality.
Throughout significant periods of its history, jus in bello considerations were connected to
questions of authority. At least this was the case at the first level of analysis. As demonstrated
by the historical examples above, authority was the determining criterion for considerations of
how to undertake force. Whether or not belligerents were afforded the protections granted to
regular soldiers was based upon determinations of their status, understood through the question
of whether or not the belligerents had the requisite right to wage war. Twentieth century just war
thinking began to broaden the tradition‟s understanding of legitimate authority. Likewise, the
rights afforded to irregulars were expanded as well. However, the tradition‟s emphasis on the
necessity of authority remains in place. And while we now turn to these issues, as demonstrated
through the works of Paul Ramsey and Michael Walzer‟s discussions on the proper jus in bello
considerations for fighting irregulars, it will be noted that questions of authority continue to
preoccupy the conversation.

4.3.3.1 Paul Ramsey. Ramsey argues that protection of innocents is a foundational

moral requirement of the just war. For Ramsey, just war thinking begins from “the interior
ethics of Christian love” or “social charity.” The notion of divine love requires that the
individual come to the aid of those suffering oppression or injustice. As he writes, “It is the
work of love and mercy to deliver as many as possible of god‟s children from tyranny and to
protect from oppression, if one can, as many of those for whom Christ died as it may be possible
to save.”341 At times, he argues, coming to the aid of the innocent requires the use of force.
Therefore, the justification for warfare, as he understands it, flows directly from the need to
protect the innocent neighbor in the circumstances where “the enforcement of an ordered
community is not effectively present” such that “it may be a work of justice and a work of social
charity to resort to other available and effective means of resisting injustice.”342
These considerations, for Ramsey, also place restrictions on the use of force. As war is
justified for protection of the innocent, it cannot be that some innocents may be killed in order to

341
Paul Ramsey, “Justice in War” The Just War (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1983), 143.
342
Paul Ramsey, “Justice in War” The Just War (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1983), 142-143.

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protect others. For Ramsey, the moral standing of an act is based not only on the considerations
of its consequences (group x of innocents are protected), but also on the moral permissibility of
the act itself (but through what means?).343 As he writes, “Morality, including political morality,
has to do with the definition of right conduct, and this is not simply by way of the ends of
actions. How we do what we do is as important as our goals.”344 For Ramsey, then, the
circumstances which justify resort to arms also produce a clear distinction between combatants
and noncombatants. He describes this as a “twin born” justification of both war and its limits,
which serve to provide “noncombatants with moral immunity from direct attack.” Furthermore
this distinction, he argues, determines the division between legitimate and illegitimate military
objectives. In light of the moral imperative of noncombatant immunity, legitimate military
objectives may never include intentional and direct attacks upon noncombatants.
It is important to note that Ramsey takes care to emphasize that legitimate military
objectives do not categorically preclude the deaths of noncombatants. As he writes, the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants did not “suppose that the latter were to be
roped off like ladies at a medieval tournament.” He continues, “Moreover it was never supposed
that non-combatants were immune from all damage but only from direct, intended attack.”345
For Ramsey, determining the “justice of War‟s conduct” proceeds through the principles of
discrimination and proportion. Discrimination, is

“…shorthand for „the moral immunity of noncombatants from direct attack.‟ This does
not require that civilians never be knowingly killed. It means rather that military action should,
in its primary (objective) thrust as well as in its subjective purpose, discriminate between
directly attacking combatants or military objectives and directly attacking non-combatants or
destroying the structure of civil society as means of victory.”346

343
See chapter 1of Paul Ramsey‟s Just War and the Christian Conscience (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961).
344
See chapter 1of Paul Ramsey‟s Just War and the Christian Conscience (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961),
6.
345
Paul Ramsey, “Justice in War” The Just War (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.,1983) 145-146.
346
Paul Ramsey, “How Shall Counter-Insurgency be Conducted Justly” The Just War (Boston: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1983) 428-429.

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Proportionality, the second test, states that, “nations, statesman, and citizens, are acting
responsibly when they choose and vigorously support the policies and decision which are likely
to secure the lesser evil (or the greater good) among the mixed consequences.”347
These criteria – discrimination and proportionality –structure how Ramsey understands
and evaluates insurgency tactics. He argues that insurgency is an “inherently immoral plan of
war, no matter how many benefits are supposed to accrue from it.” Insurgency tactics –
terrorism and military decisions that aim to illicit reprisals against civilians – are so egregious
that no cause may justify them. For Ramsey, then, the relevant questions of counterinsurgency
are not those related to just cause or legitimate authority – as the indiscriminate nature of
insurgency tactics shelve these considerations in lieu of others. Rather, the just war theorist is
tasked to determine how a counter-insurgency war may be fought justly, without falling prey to
the ethical pitfalls initiated by insurgency war.
The “two rules of practice” - discrimination and proportionality – also set the terms for
legitimate counterinsurgency. These criteria require that military operations are aimed directly at
the insurgent forces. Noting that this does not requires the complete avoidance of all civilian
deaths, Ramsey writes that proper counterinsurgency demands “the withholding of direct
attacks” against noncombatants. The phenomena of insurgency war, however, probelmatizes the
criterion of discrimination. This is largely due to the fact that insurgency war obfuscates the
distinction between civilian and combatant. Ramsey argues that the importance of this
connection establishes a further condition in a counterinsurgency. The insurgent, Ramsey
argues, by living among the masses - civilian by day, combatant by night – has implicated the
larger population in the insurgency struggle. “The insurgents themselves have enlarged the
target; it is legitimate for counterinsurgents to attack, so far as the principle of discrimination is
concerned…”348 In such a situation, where combatants are blurred with citizens whose
complacency in the armed struggle is implicit – the principle of discrimination is not the
overriding one. Rather, it is the jus in bello principle of proportionality that ought to be
privileged in determining how to conduct a just counterinsurgency war.349

347
Paul Ramsey, “How Shall Counter-Insurgency be Conducted Justly” The Just War (Boston: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1983) 429.
348
Paul Ramsey, “How Shall Counter-Insurgency be Conducted Justly” The Just War (Boston: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, INC.,1983) 435.
349
Paul Ramsey, “How Shall Counter-Insurgency be Conducted Justly” The Just War (Boston: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1983), 432-438.

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 4.3.3.2 Michael Walzer. Michael Walzer, in his book, Just and Unjust Wars, makes a
different claim. For Walzer, the question of legitimate counterinsurgency begins with an
evaluation of what Ramsey would refer to as the “program of national liberation.” Walzer
argues that the relationship between the guerrilla fighter and civilian support is a critical element
in considering how to fight a just counterinsurgency war. For Walzer, a soldier acquires war
rights in light of their status as “political instruments” as members of a community that live in a
reciprocal relationship with the citizenry. Therefore, these rights – the war rights of soldiers –
may be extended to the guerrilla fighter under the determination that specific conditions exist.
Specifically, such rights might be extended under the determination that the guerrilla fighter
exists in the same type of reciprocal relationships - living as a member of the citizenry and
fighting as a military representative. Therefore, if the guerrilla fighters, or the insurgency army,
are not accorded support and recognition by the masses, they do not acquire the rights of war.
However, under the determination that such support and recognition is apparent, and is
freely given by the citizens, the guerrillas ought to be guaranteed certain rights and treatment –
like benevolent quarantine in the case of capture. Significantly, Walzer argues the burden of
determining the level of support and recognition accorded to the insurgency army is placed upon
the conventional troops. Here, Walzer differs from Ramsey in an important respect. Walzer
argues that if the political support for the irregulars is determined to be such that the “guerrillas
cannot be isolated from the people” then a counterinsurgency war can no longer be fought on
moral grounds. He writes that, “It cannot be fought because it is no longer an anti-guerrilla but
an anti-social war, a war against an entire people, in which no distinctions would be possible in
the actual fighting.”350
Under the determination, however, that a counterinsurgency may (morally) be conducted,
Walzer agrees with Ramsey‟s judgment that the insurgents have “enlarged” the category of
legitimate combatants. As he notes “intimacies” of counterinsurgency war are such that notions
of discrimination are different than what appears appropriate to conventional combat. As Walzer
writes,

350
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books,
1977), 187.

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 “Anti-guerrilla war is a terrible strain on conventional troops, and even if they are both
disciplined and careful, as they should be, civilians are certain to die at their hands. A soldier
how, once he is engaged, simply fires at every male villager between the ages of fifteen and fifty
(say) is probably justified in doing so, as he would not be in an ordinary firefight.”351

This, however, does not preclude the conventional army from demonstrating the clear and
352
positive commitment to save civilian lives as required by the doctrine of double effect.
Conventional forces must demonstrate the utmost consideration for discrimination and in the
effort to wage a counterinsurgency war.

4.4 The Just War Tradition on Counterinsurgency

4.4.1 Al-Qaeda and the Question of Authority
The distinction between Ramsey and Walzer on the question of authority highlights an
important point. As noted above, while the just war tradition has only accorded irregulars the
status of legitimate combatants within the last century, its gestures in this regard are a significant
development. In particular, the status accorded to irregulars through the stipulations outlined in
the Geneva Conventions demonstrate that contemporary just war thinking is willing to at least
consider the possibility that irregulars may hold a right to legitimate authority, and the
accompanying right to determine just cause. Any assessment of the moral and ethical standing
of the counterinsurgency framework, as it applies to al-Qaeda, then, must begin by reflecting on
the question of whether al-Qaeda has incurred the authority to wage war.
The questions posed by al-Qaeda‟s authority are not new. Issues of authority were
brought to the foreground during the 20th century wars of liberation, further igniting an interest in
examining the just war‟s applicability to the ethical issues of irregular war and substate actors.
However, as noted by Cian O‟driscoll, the transnational nature of al-Qaeda poses new challenges
for the just war theorist. As he argues, the tradition‟s understanding of authority has been
challenged both “from above” and “from below.” The challenge “from above” is that acquired
through the conception and emergence of intergovernmental and international organizations,

351
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books,
1977), 192.
352
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books,
1977), 156.

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such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and the various international documents
seeking to provide collective notions of defense and right to war. The challenge “from below” is
that incurred from the twentieth century wars of liberation in which irregulars have claimed the
right to war.
As O‟Driscoll notes, however, neither the challenge from above nor below have
“contested the idea that war is an interstate phenomenon in any meaningful way.” 353 In lieu of
collective security models, states have claimed the right to determine what circumstances call for
national defense. And while substate actors challenge the authority of a particular state, through
their desire for a different version of the governing order they simultaneously serve to reinforce
the concepts of the Westphalian system. This, however, is not the case with an organization like
al-Qaeda, as the phenomenon of transnational terrorism and warfare poses more pressing
questions. As O‟Driscoll writes, al-Qaeda presents a “hard case” for just war theorists.
O‟Driscoll argues that al-Qaeda, unlike the IRA or the ETA, does not claim to represent a
nation that is in quest for statehood, or a group seeking self determination. Rather, it acts on
behalf of the “ummah”, a community which does not correspond to any specific geographical
space. Neither, in that case, is its membership tied to any geographical area nor does its
membership self identify in this way. In addition, its objectives are defined in global (as opposed
to national) terms. Furthermore, al-Qaeda essentially ignores the state system.354 In short, it is
unclear what political community al-Qaeda represents, if any at all, or how such a determination
might be made.
O‟Driscoll proposes that the tradition “adapt so that it might achieve some purchase on
the challenge posed by de-territorialized, non-spatial political actors. In particular this will
require contemporary theorists to reconsider traditional assumptions regarding the character of
political community.”355 O‟Driscoll is right to claim that notions of political community are
changing. The effects of immigration, disapora and globalization have all served to affect

353
Cian O‟Driscoll, “From Versailles to 9/11: Non-state Actors and Just War in the Twentieth Century” in Eric A.
Heinze and Brent J. Steele (ed.) Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition (New
York: MacMillan Palgrave: 2009), 37.
354
Cian O‟Driscoll, “From Versailles to 9/11: Non-state Actors and Just War in the Twentieth Century” in Eric A.
Heinze and Brent J. Steele (ed.) Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition (New
York: MacMillan Palgrave: 2009), 37-38.
355
Cian O‟Driscoll, “From Versailles to 9/11: Non-state Actors and Just War in the Twentieth Century” in Eric A.
Heinze and Brent J. Steele (ed.) Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition (New
York: MacMillan Palgrave: 2009), 37-38.

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notions of political identity. However, the ramifications of granting the right to war to non-
spatial political communities must be carefully considered. As noted in the discussion above, the
history of the just war tradition sought to limit authority to wage war to the sovereign as a way to
place restrictions on the use of force, and to protect against the chaos of violence and
insurrection waged for unjust means. It did so by claiming that only those who were granted
with the responsibility of statecraft may incur the right to war. Only these individuals - the
tradition claimed – had the necessary vantage point from which to make such determinations.
While gestures toward the legitimacy of irregular actors have been made, they have been done
under a line of reasoning that seeks to grant legitimacy to those who are discernibly representing
the just grievances of a political community (often in opposition to a constituted state authority).
The underlying reasoning behind the criteria of legitimate authority is limiting. If we
follow Walzer‟s line of thinking it becomes clear that al-Qaeda does not claim the type of
support and recognition through which it may acquire the status of legitimate authority.
Accommodating groups like al-Qaeda, whose claims of political representation cannot be
determined in any reasonable way - undercuts the tradition‟s attempts to ensure that force is a
tool whose use is limited only to those responsible for the political community.

4.4.2 Al-Qaeda and Jus in Bello

Regardless of this determination, however, as both Ramsey and Walzer argue, the jus in
bello considerations still apply. A just counterinsurgency campaign, both thinkers argue,
requires consistent and serious attention to discrimination and proportionality of means.
As currently practiced, the counterinsurgency framework is attuned to jus in bello
considerations. In fact, as currently practiced, noncombatant immunity is privileged in
determinations of proper military conduct. As noted by the United States Army and Marine Core
Counterinsurgency Manual, noncombatant immunity is at the heart of the current
counterinsurgency framework. Emphasizing the dual importance of legitimate government and
sanctuary denial, the manual takes a “population-centric” approach, noting that the proper focus
of counterinsurgency is protection of the civilian, rather than direct engagement with the
insurgent. Insofar as the battle is for the allegiance of the civilian population, “killing the civilian
is no longer just collateral damage. The harm cannot be easily dismissed as unintended. Civilian
deaths affect popular attitudes, which are crucial for the war.” The civilian population is the

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“center of gravity”; it is the determining factor in the war to which all efforts must be directed in
order to attain victory. Therefore, the real battle, the manual argues, if for civilian support – both
in their support for the counterinsurgency effort and the government of the host nation. As the
manual writes, the “population waits to be convinced.”
While the current counterinsurgency efforts are in alignment with the jus in bello
considerations of irregular war, the incorporation of additional just war criteria into the analysis
highlight other issues that ought to be considered in the overall evaluation of this framework. To
begin, the demands of successful counterinsurgency raise serious questions of overall
proportionality. As noted in the section above, proportionality of ends criterion leads to
reflection on the harms and benefits on the use of force. It requires that the overall goods
anticipated by the resort to force be greater than the expected harm. Working under the
understanding that straightforward calculations of harms and benefits are usually out of reach,
this factor in just war reasoning calls for serious, conscientious, and deliberate reflection on the
anticipated (and possible) ends to be achieved.
This requires taking into account the multiple factors and considerations involved in a
counterinsurgency war against al-Qaeda. The first is a protracted military commitment to the
areas in question. As demonstrated by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan,
counterinsurgency is “messy and slow” and requires long-term pledges of support in order to
maintain any levels of progress that have been obtained. As noted by the Counterinsurgency
manual, a population-centric approach requires the development of local community partnerships
that will assist in locating and understanding the insurgency, as well as local civilian problems
and grievances. In this way, a significant amount of counterinsurgency involves troops who are
out and about among the people, attempting to gather intelligence, all while restricting the use of
356
fire power. The construction of these relationships is a task that is time consuming, and
subject to the difficulties (and frequent disintegration) that are inherent to any political form of
negotiation.
In the same way, proper counterinsurgency requires the expenditure of significant
resources on the part of the counterinsurgents. It requires an understanding of indigenous social,

356
General David H. Petraeus, Lt. General James F. Amos, and Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl, United States Army and
Marine Coure Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxix. See also David
Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal,
March (2006).

137
political and economic structures and issues. As the manual argues, “Soldiers and marines are
expected to be nation builders, in addition to warriors.”357 The counterinsurgent must have a
grasp of both local interests and local grievances. They must understand how the society works,
and what it is seeking. They must further recognize how power is distributed, shared or
negotiated, which involves knowledge not only of contemporary conditions but of the historical
events which continue to impose their hold on the population. As Kilcullen notes, the local
counterinsurgents is tasked with “becoming the world expert on your district.”358 Furthermore,
in light of the protracted nature of counterinsurgency campaigns, successful operations further
requires that the trust and initiative gained through these personal relationships are transferred
through various generations of troop deployments.
The transterritorial nature of al-Qaeda raises questions about the efficacy of this
approach. American forces are embroiled in the local and indigenous conflicts of both
Afghanistan and Iraq. Troops are responding to local issues and problems, exerting tremendous
material resources and energy, all while taking on increased levels of risk as a result of the
restrained fire power policy of counterinsurgency. The cumulative effect, however, is that the
United States is involved in two complex, expensive and material-laden wars to “secure” Iraq
and Afghanistan. As a result of the counterinsurgency approach, the United States is exerting
serious levels of energy and resources in order to indirectly fight al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda
fighters are unquestionably involved in both campaigns, counterinsurgency appears to be directly
focused on the local politics of Iraq and Afghanistan, as opposed to the al-Qaeda network.
These points are echoed by Bing West, a military veteran and expert on
counterinsurgency. Through a recent assessment of the war in Afghanistan, he provides a
window into the efficacy of counterinsurgency strategy. He argues that American forces,
organized and directed by the tactical strategies of counterinsurgency doctrine, have spent a
significant portion of their efforts building schools, roads, infirmaries and the like in the attempt
to respond to the economic and social needs of the Afghan people. In an attempt to win over the
population, American soldiers have engaged in the necessary nation-building efforts. However,
he argues, such efforts have been met with low levels of “success.”

357
General David H. Petraeus, Lt. General James F. Amos, and Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl, United States Army and
Marine Coure Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxix. xlvi
358
David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars
Journal, March (2006), 2.

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 As Bing notes, such efforts have not had the effect of winning over the population to the
side of Coalition forces, or aggregating political support for the government of Hamid Karzai
government. Rather, he argues, while local actors accept aid, and even develop levels of
working relationships with Coalition forces, most remain neutral (or turn hostile). The
population, Bing notes, is sitting on the fence; waiting to see who will prevail at the end of the
war.359
Furthermore, questions about the capabilities of counterinsurgency for long-term success
are rampant. As noted, the criterion of reasonable hope of success highlights that a just war is
one in which conscientious deliberations have been made by the relevant authorities to determine
whether there is a realistic chance of attaining victory. It does not require prophetic assurances
of success, but it does call for prudent decision-making that is based on a sound assessment of
the facts at hand.
Such assessments will note that successful counterinsurgency requires that the indigenous
government is capable of maintaining or acquiring certain levels of support and legitimacy from
the population. It also requires that such support evolves into an overall national interest that can
supersede local and diffuse power structures. The political instability of both Iraq and
Afghanistan are not amenable to successful counterinsurgency. As noted by a 2007 Brookings
Institution and U.S. Army War College Colloquium Brief, “The state centric approach to COIN
works when there is a viable partner government truly committed to economic, political, and
security sector reform and willing and able to make difficult decisions to see it through. In the
21st century, this is increasingly rare.”360 Iraq, Afghanistan, and other regional governments have
yet to display the degree of legitimacy required for effective long term counterinsurgency. Iraq
and Afghanistan, for example, remain fraught with ineffective and divided central governments.
Furthermore, their authority is limited, rarely extending throughout the country, as indigenous
power structures take over in their absence.
As the emphasis of the Long War shifts to Afghanistan, its potential for legitimacy
appears particularly acute. Current perceptions of the Karzai government as corrupt, ineffective,
and undependable severely raise the necessary material costs of nation building as well as limit
the expected outcomes. Furthermore, the factionalism among the Taliban – and politics in

359
Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan (New York: Random House, 2011).
360
Are we Getting COIN Right?

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Afghanistan in general – prohibit the coalition building requires for sustainable and legitimate
government. Power structures – in the form of political and civil institutions - are not
centralized, but rather “devolved” among a rural and scattered population.361 As Simon notes,

“Regrettably, there is no gap yet between the „good‟ and „bad‟ Taliban and the „bad‟
militants to exploit…an array of warlords compete with tribal authorities; the structure of the
tribal system makes it unlikely that coalitions can be assembled to fight al Qaeda; and, if there is
to be bandwagoning, it is likely to be against foreigners.”362

4.4.3 The Just War Tradition on Counterterrorism

As demonstrated in the sections above, the nature of al-Qaeda has led to marked
developments in the use of force. Both the Bush and the Obama administrations have argued
that the transnational nature of the al-Qaeda network imposes severe limits on the efficacy of the
traditional tools of counterterrorism. As noted, The War against al-Qaeda, as understood
through the lens of counterterrorism, has resulted in what may be termed “extraordinary” tools.
In the attempt to directly target the al-Qaeda network, American forms of counterterrorism have
necessitated tactical and strategic military planning that attempt to effectively respond to its
transterritorial nature. As a direct consequence, both administrations have chosen to rely more
heavily on drone technology, and have made serious gestures towards the use of preemptive
force. Such gestures have, additionally, been reinforced by just war thinkers who, drawing on
the tradition, have put forward formal arguments for the necessity of revised understandings of
imminence and preemption.
Ethical evaluations of both drone technology and preemption ought to take serious
consideration of jus in bello restrictions. Of particular concerns is the question of civilian
casualties. The research available on drone strikes places the number of civilian casualties at
approximately 130 to date. Jus in bello proportionality asks that one consider the question of
whether the specific application of force used is in proportion to the ends sought, such that no
more force than necessary is applied than needed to achieved the stated (and justified) ends. In

361
Steven Simon, “Can the Right War be Won?” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 July-August (2009). Steven Simon and
Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival 15, No. 5 October-November (2009).
362
Steven Simon, “Can the Right War be Won?” Foreign Affairs 88 no. 4 July-August (2009): 135.

140
this way it requires the avoidance of force that causes unnecessary harm or injury. Reasoning
through these issues, then, necessitates an understanding of the threat at hand.
The increased reliance on drone technology is a result of “the reality that full due process
cannot always be afforded terrorists owing to the immediate threat some pose, and the
operational impracticality of subjecting purportedly actionable intelligence to quasi-judicial
review in very tight time frames.”363 Under such conditions, the ethicist would move to consider
the acceptability of the damage imposed in light of two additional factors. First, is the danger
posed by the military target, or its function (how critical it is) to the war. And second, the
ethicist would consider whether there are conceivable and effective alternatives to obtain the
same ends (removal of the threat).
The covert nature of drone strikes makes accurate assessment of both these questions
difficult to make. Review processes for assessing the accuracy of intelligence and calculating
the projected collateral damage (in terms of civilian deaths) have been developed. However, the
details of the procedural systems are tightly guarded by the military and CIA and are not privy to
those outside the immediate decision making circles. Other factors remain disconcerting. There
is evidence that drone strikes have been ordered without going through the proper chain of
command. Furthermore, the deployment of drone strikes by private military contractors has led
to increased uncertainty on the overall “integrity” of the review processes for drone
technology.364
It ought to be noted that official policy statements by Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to the
United States Department of State, have noted that drone targeting is consistently conducted in
accordance with the “principle of distinction” and the “principle of proportionality.” 365 Koh
argues that targeting procedures take care to ensure that attacks are limited to military objectives,
do not directly target civilians, and do not cause excessive collateral damage. However, as such
procedures remain covert, a more accurate understanding of the risks and benefits of drone
strikes – as well as the questions of their necessity - requires an increased level of transparency
in the decision-making process.

363
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival 15. No. 5 October-
November (2009): 55.
364
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is enough?” Survival 15, No. 5 October-
November (2009): 55.
365
Harold Hongju Koh, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, March 25, 2010, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm

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 This would also serve to answer questions regarding noncombatant immunity. As noted
earlier, the criterion of discrimination prohibits the direct targeting of civilians, and an
intentional effort to minimize civilian casualties. It requires a positive demonstration to protect
civilian life. In this end, some level of civilian casualties may occur. However, determining the
level of collateral damage appropriate to drone strikes requires, again, accurate assessments of
the risk. In light of this, proponents of targeted assassination policies ought to publicly explicate
the necessity of this technology to the War against al-Qaeda. Such procedures ought to clarify
the risk that the targeted terrorists pose. Without such information the moral questions
surrounding the use of this technology are impossible to assess. Furthermore, the procedures
used to determine and authorize drone strikes ought to be clarified, and subject to some level of
public scrutiny so that they may be discussed and debated among policy and military decision
makers in an open public forum. While the need for secrecy remains a consideration that may
not be side-stepped, the legitimacy of drone technology requires that some effort is made to
clarify the conditions under which these decisions are made.
The same questions must be considered in evaluations of preemptive force. As detailed
in the discussions above, both Totten and Bellamy focus on determining the circumstances under
which a preemptive use of force may be justified. Both of their frameworks seek to demonstrate
intent and capability on the part of an adversary seeking to undertake a terrorist attack. For
Totten and Bellamy evidence of intent and capability, under the threat posed by terrorism, ought
to meet the moral guidelines imposed by notions of imminence. Missing from their guidelines,
however, are questions which seek to determine whether a just use of preemptive forces - as
determined by the criteria of discrimination – is possible under the circumstances presented.
The use of both drone technology and preemptive force against al-Qaeda operatives
raises additional questions. As the United States has categorized this war as one specifically
against al-Qaeda, how might the use of force be legitimately employed against combatants who
status is exceptionally complicated by a transterritorial nature? In other words, under what line
of reasoning are al-Qaeda operatives, training camps, or infrastructure defined as legitimate
targets?
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, described the United
States Government‟s legal justifications for targeted killings during a talk given at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law on March 25th, 2010. He argues that

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American use of force against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and “its associated forces” is a direct
response to the events of September 11th. This conflict, he argues, is “ongoing” as al-Qaeda
continues to demonstrate its intent to attack the United States. In the “ongoing armed conflict”
the United States has both the authority and the legitimacy to use force in the defense of its
citizens.
Under this understanding, Koh claims that American use of force is justified and
legitimate under its inherent right of self-defense, as granted under international law.
Furthermore, this authority is buttressed by domestic law, as Congress authorized the use of all
necessary and appropriate force thorough the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. 366
Within the context of an armed conflict fought in self-defense, al-Qaeda operatives, Koh
argues, are “belligerents” and “lawful targets under international law.” In much the same way,
he argues, the United States is not required to provide al-Qaeda operatives with due process.
Targeting, in this sense, does not violate the domestic ban on “assassinations” as the use of
weapons systems for targeting high level targets in an act of self-defense during an armed
conflict is not a violation of domestic law.367 Additionally, he argues, the procedures
surrounding targeting adhere to principles of distinction and proportionality, as care is taken to
ensure that civilians are not attacked directly and that the collateral damage incurred is
minimized to the greatest extent possible. Koh argues that in order to adhere to these principles,
targeting decisions are made upon “considerations specific to each case, including those that
related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the
willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses.”368
The Koh line of reasoning was addressed directly by Philip Alston in a United Nations
General Assembly study on targeted killings. He contests that line of reasoning that presents
targeted killings and preemptive rights of self-defense as legitimate responses to the danger
posed by terrorists and asymmetric warfare. Drawing on the authority of international law,
Alston argues that both tactics, as they have been construed in response to contemporary threats,

366
Harold Hongju Koh, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, March
25th, 2010, section B. Available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm
367
Harold Hongju Koh, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, March
25th, 2010, section B. Available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm
368
Harold Hongju Koh, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, March
25th, 2010, section B. Available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm

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either “expanded who may be legally targeted and under what conditions”369 or violate what he
argues are straightforward dictates on the issues in question.
As Alston notes, the legality of targeted killings is directly dependent on a legitimate
claim of armed conflict.370 Mentioning the case of the United States specifically, Alston argues
that under the current stipulations of international law, the Unites States will have a difficult time
demonstrating that,

“outside the context of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq – it is in a transnational

non-international armed conflict against „al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other associated forces‟
without further explanation of how those entities constitute a „party‟ under the IHL of non-
international armed conflict, and whether and how any violence by any such group rises to the
level necessary for an armed conflict to exist.”371

Both treaty and customary international law require that the group in question be engaged
in “collective, armed, anti-government action.”372 Alston notes that while al-Qaeda and its
entities have operated in various countries around the world, none of these states (with the
possible exception of Pakistan) have “recognized themselves as being part of an armed conflict
against al-Qaeda or its „associates‟ in their territory” nor have the attacks risen to the level
necessary to reach the criteria of an armed conflict. Furthermore the affiliations between al-
Qaeda and its affiliates are loose, such that,

“…they appear to not even be groups, but a few individual who take „inspiration‟ from
al-Qaeda. The idea that, instead, they are part of continuing hostilities that spread to new

369
Philip Alston, “Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United
Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, Agenda item 3, distributed May 28 th, 2010,
1.
370
Targeted killings that are conducted outside of the armed conflict context are legal under international law only if
they are required to protect life and no other means are available to achieve the same ends.
371
Philip Alston, “Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United
Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, Agenda item 3, distributed May 28 th, 2010,
18.
372
Philip Alston, “Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United
Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, Agenda item 3, distributed May 28 th, 2010,
17.

144
territories as new alliances form or are claimed may be superficially appealing but such
„associates‟ cannot constitute a party as required by IHL…”373

According to Alston, if the United States were to define its current state of hostilities with
al-Qaeda as an “ongoing armed conflict” the dangers involved are magnified. This is particular
the case, he argues, because drones drastically reduce the risk to a state‟s armed forces while still
yielding significant targeting capabilities. They pose temptations for policy makers and military
commanders who may, he writes, “be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be
killed and under what circumstances too broadly.”374 He concludes, therefore, that while the

“…appeal of an armed conflict paradigm to address terrorism is obvious, so too is the

significant potential for abuse. Internal unrest as a result of insurgency or other violence by
non-state armed groups, and even terrorism, are common in many parts of the world. If States
unilaterally extend the law of armed conflict to situations that are essentially matters of law
enforcement that must, under international law, be dealt with under the framework of human
rights, they are not only effectively declaring war against a particular group, but eviscerating
key and necessary distinctions between international law frameworks that restricts States‟ ability
to kill arbitrarily.”375

Whether Alston accurately characterizes the state of hostilities between the United States
and al-Qaeda is a matter of debate. In addition, it appears that a significant number of his
concerns could be addressed through greater levels of transparency within the targeting process
(as described above) - as he suggests in his final recommendations. However, Alston‟s
statements do gesture towards the difficulties in applying targeted killings as a broad-based
policy in counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda.

373
Philip Alston, “Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United
Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, Agenda item 3, distributed May 28 th, 2010,
18.
374
Philip Alston, “Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United
Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, Agenda item 3, distributed May 28 th, 2010,
18.
375
Philip Alston, “Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United
Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, Agenda item 3, distributed May 28 th, 2010,
16.

145
 The most recent use of drone technology brings these issues to the surface. In April of
2011, Pakistan demanded that the United States both reduce the number of intelligence personnel
on its territory as well as put an immediate halt to drone strikes in the northwest region.376 The
reduction in personnel were drastic enough (approximately 25- 40 percent) to severely hamper
American efforts. More importantly, however, they were a signal of a deteriorating cooperative
relationship between Pakistan and the United States; a relationship that is critical to the
continued use of targeted killing policies.377
The reluctance or inability of Pakistan to root out militants has led American officials,
despite Pakistani demands, to continue to rely on the use of drones. Later that month, an
American drone attack in North Waziristan, aimed at Pakistani irregulars who cross the border
and fight NATO and American forces, killed 23 civilians. The attack was met with high levels
of public protests. It also demonstrates the reluctance of Pakistani officials to support a
counterterrorism policy that uses force in this way, and particularly in its own borders. As in
response to the attack, the Pakistani government allowed protestors to stage NATO protests, and
to block supply routes into Afghanistan.378
These issues at stake are further illumed when the United States policies of targeted
killing are juxtaposed with those of a state like Israel – who has also chosen to rely on a policy of
targeted assassinations. As noted by Daniel Byman, despite the difficult questions raised by
policies of targeted killings, countries like Israel continue to conduct targeted killings because
they “believe that the benefits outweigh the costs.”379 He argues that the killings appear to have
only a short term effect on Palestinian public opinion, and have served to reduce the operating
capacities of Hamas – as demonstrated in the second Intifada of 2002. And while the
assassination of Hamas leaders has drawn increased numbers of recruits, it is not clear the
popularity of Hamas has been impacted in any appreciable way. Furthermore, there is evidence
to suggest that targeted killings have severely decimated the talent level within Hamas‟s ranks.
A factor noted by the organization itself. Contrary to the perception of critics, Hamas did not

376
According to American officials, these demands were the results of a CIA official who had killed two Pakistani
men. The CIA agent claimed that he acted in self defense, as he thought he was being robbed.
377
Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Pakistan Tells U.S. it Must Sharply Cut CIA Activities,” New York Times, April
11th, 2001.
378
Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Deadly Drone Strike in US May Fuel Anger in Pakistan,” The New York Times,
April 22, 2011.
379
Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, March/April (2006): 101.

146
welcome the strikes in an attempt to foment support. Rather, their leaders conceded to the fact
that the killings had interrupted their organizational and tactical abilities. As he writes,

“Contrary to popular myth, the number of skilled terrorists is quite limited. Bomb
makers, terrorism trainers, forgers, recruiters, and terrorist leaders are scarce; they need many
months, if not years, to gain enough experience to be effective. When these individuals are
arrested or killed, their organizations are disrupted. The groups may still be able to attract
recruits, but lacking expertise, these new recruits will not pose the same kind of threat.”380

Yet, Byman is quick to note the marked differences between American and Israeli
circumstances; Circumstances that would have significant impact on the ability of the “benefits
to outweigh the risks.” While Israel is conducting strikes in territories that are immediately
across its own borders, American Counterterrorism efforts depend on the goodwill of a number
of allies (Pakistan, Germany, and Switzerland). As both drone technology and preemptive
strikes require the use of force within the boundaries of other sovereign nations, under what
circumstances may such use of force be legitimated? How may the United States feel justified in
using military force in sovereign territory with which it is not officially at war?
While international law is fairly clear on this issue,381 the practical application of these
policies imposes additional questions. As demonstrated by Alston‟s study, targeted killings are
not widely accepted as “legitimate instruments of state.” The adoption of drone technology as a
wide-scale policy may have significant consequences on the legitimacy of such a policy, as well
as its ability to be received as legitimate by the allies on which the United States depends. This
goodwill is further dependent on the capability of the United States to maintain the trust and
confidence of its allies in its policies. The United States is thus dependent on the support of its
allies in a way that Israel is not.382 Therefore, while the case may be made for drone strikes
against certain high-level targets, an increased reliance on drone strikes or preemptive force is

380
Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, March/April (2006): 103-4.
381
The use of force by one state on the territory of another may be conducted without a violation of sovereignty if:
1) the second state (whose territory is being used) provides its explicit consent; or 2) the targeting state has a right
under intentional law to self-defense (under article 51 of the UN charter). In the second case, the targeting state may
incur the right to self-defense in the case that either the second state is responsible for an “armed attack” against the
targeting state or the second state is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks, launched from its territory, against
the targeting state.
382
Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, March/April (2006): 108.

147
certain to be met with resistance; particularly when the use of force involves civilian casualties
that must be justified to Germany or Pakistani citizens.
In addition, even in the ideal circumstances where the United States was able to clarify its
targeting procedures and accountability mechanisms as well as obtain the cooperation of its
allies, serious questions remain as to whether counterterrorism efforts that rely on drone
technology and preemptive use of force are sustainable. In addition to procedural clarification
and accountability, the use of extraordinary measures of force to successfully avoid collateral
damage relies on accurate intelligence. Insofar as al-Qaeda is operating in multiple countries
around the world, the ability of the United States to obtain the required intelligence as well as the
rapid strike capacity are questionable.

4.5 Concluding Remarks

The structure of al-Qaeda has complicated traditional frameworks for the use of force.
An assessment of these, through the lens of the just war tradition, demonstrates that neither
counterterrorism nor counterinsurgency, applied specifically to al-Qaeda, is particularly
successful in determining the proper application for the use of force. While both frameworks
make efforts to observe jus in bello considerations, the war against a highly irregular and
complex entity has initiated additional questions that ought to be taken into consideration in an
evaluation of these frameworks.
Construing al-Qaeda as a worldwide insurgency has drawn the United States into two
complex and taxing counterinsurgency wars. Both have required American military forces to
take on the difficult (and perhaps impossible) task of constructing legitimate and self-sustaining
governments in both regions. In the attempt to “deny” Afghanistan and Iraq to al-Qaeda,
Coalition forces have been absorbed into the local politics of both states. Through the lens of a
“population-centric” approach, soldiers have engaged in the tasks of nation-building and
diplomacy – building schools, roads, infirmaries, and supporting local elections and
referendums. The counterinsurgency approach has been appropriated in the hope of fomenting
local support for both Coalition efforts as well as political support for emerging local
governments. The results of these efforts, however, have been volatile at best. Furthermore, the
cumulative effects of counterinsurgency against al-Qaeda are highly uncertain. Investigations
into the authority of al-Qaeda demonstrate that its claims to represent any form of political

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community are questionable. While it has interests in both “fronts,” it is not particularly invested
in the local grievances or politics of either state. Therefore, while al-Qaeda fighters are involved
in both campaigns, it is unlikely that securing either Afghanistan or Iraq will eradicate al-Qaeda.
The counterterrorism framework does not demand the same levels of material resources,
or the large scale military footprint of counterinsurgency. However the practical considerations
involved in implementing the tools of counterterrorism to al-Qaeda are such that, as it is
currently practiced, it is unlikely to lead to a broadly effective and sustainable approach to al-
Qaeda. As both drone technology and preemptive strikes require the use of force in the territory
of other sovereign nations, a reliance on either practice for effective counterinsurgency appears
impractical. The most recent drone strikes in Pakistan demonstrate increasing resistance by
Pakistani officials to continue the policy of targeted killings on their soil. The United States
increased reliance on drone technology, furthermore, has increased the suspicion of the United
States on the part of the Pakistani government, and deteriorated a cooperative relationship that is
necessary for the continued use of drone technology – particularly in a way that makes every
effort to abide by the criteria of discrimination and proportionality. These interactions
demonstrate the difficulties of applying drone strikes as a wide-scale policy in the War against
al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda‟s decentralized form of war poses serious challenges to the notion that it might
be successful eradicated solely through military means. Noting the al-Qaeda has penetrated
Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, Great Britain, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States (among
others), any policy that seeks to “disrupt, defeat, and dismantle” the diffuse al-Qaeda network
requires an approach that is not beyond American military capabilities.383 For this, we must turn
to the source of al-Qaeda‟s authority; the source which gives it meaning, structure, and purpose.
As demonstrated in chapter three, it is the historical jihad tradition which structures the al-Qaeda
model of war. Therefore, any long-term, and hence effective, solution must make appeals to the
tradition.

383
See for example, Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The
Free Press, 2001).

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 CHAPTER FIVE

THEOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES: A DEBATE WITHIN THE

TRADITION

5.0 Introduction

A major thesis of this dissertation is that understanding al-Qada‟s aims and tactics
requires an investigation into the theological underpinnings that give al-Qaeda both structure and
meaning. Its understanding of Islam provides both the interpretative lens by which it reads
contemporary events (causes leading to the decline of the Muslim world) and the appropriate
solutions (a defensive jihad as an individual obligation). Therefore, in addition to a military
solution, the struggle against al-Qaeda requires responding to its conceptual infrastructure; to the
interpretation of Islam that has led its ideologues to argue that the use of indiscriminate force and
terrorism are both justified and necessary for the revitalization of Islam and the restoration of the
Muslim people. Combating al-Qaeda, then, requires a direct engagement with the theological
arguments through which it understands the contemporary environment, and by extension,
through which it determines the proper military course by which it (and the Muslim world) ought
to proceed.
This task has been taken on by figures within the Islamic tradition. A number of Muslim
scholars - notably Abdulaziz Sachedina, Bassam Tibi, Abdullahi An-Na‟im, and Khaled Abou
El Fadl - have tackled issues of “radicalism”, “militancy” and “extremism” in Islam by offering
alternative interpretations of the textural tradition on matters related to Sharia, the Islamic state,
and religious tolerance and pluralism. Their arguments demonstrate common themes and
concerns, which, taken together, may be loosely referred to as the “moderate” interpretation –
one positioning itself as a direct alternative to the militant interpretation espoused by al-Qaeda.
While I reference individual thinkers at different points as evidence for the ideas that I am
explicating, presenting the arguments of the moderate thinkers as a “position” (as opposed to
detailing the work of each individually) will more clearly demonstrate an intellectual debate
within the Islamic tradition on issues of militancy. The point here is not to minimize the
differences between the thinkers discussed, but to demonstrate that while this exchange may not

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be happening in a formal manner, there is clear evidence that the thinkers discussed above are
writing in response to the militant streams.384
Before introducing these common themes, however, it is important to note that the
thinkers listed above understand their positions to proceed in light of what Abou El Fadl has
termed a “crisis of authority” in Islam. He argues that contemporary changes to the traditional
training and institutions of the juridical class in Islam (the ulema) removed their singular
authority to interpret the textual tradition. As a consequence, such authority was placed into the
hands of individual Muslims, and was increasingly asserted by a rising professional class who
claimed the right to interpret Islamic law without the customary credentials or training. This,
argues Abou El Fadl, is leading to elucidations of the tradition that are at odds with the history
and the ethical and moral principles of Islam. His chief concern is that such developments have
led to the construction of “fringe” elements that are arguing for literal and static interpretations
of the texts. This, he argues, is in clear contradiction to a tradition that has historically
demonstrated and allowed for plurality. Such changes in interpretive authority, he argues, have
led to what he terms a “puritan” stream in Islam that is misconstruing the tradition in a manner
that is critically at odds with its commitments to peace and justice. It is in direct response to the
“puritan” stream that the thinkers listed above have put forward their alternative understanding
of Islam, and the continuing application of the tradition to the issues and problems that
contemporary Muslims are facing.
As mentioned their positions are held together by a set of conceptual themes that provide
demarcating points by which the moderate interpretation may be explicated and contrasted with
those of the militant elements.385 To begin, the moderate position is characterized by a distinct
hermeneutical approach. The main procedural elements of this method are twofold. First, while
the militant thinkers argue that history is not only authoritative, but also categorically normative
for Muslim self-understanding, the moderate position argues that history ought to have a more
limited scope of authority. In the attempt to determine how the Islamic tradition can provide
guidance on changing and contemporary conditions, the legal rulings and institutional
arrangements of the past ought to be examined and consulted, but not treated as static and

384
While these figures use the terms “fundamentalist”, “extremist” “puritan” etc. to describe a strain of intellectual
thought and praxis in Islam, I will retain the term “militant”, as I argue that it captures the characterizing features of
al-Qaeda‟s nature: the insistence on the use of force in the achievement of its goals.
385
The militant position has been explicated throughout chapters two and three, so it will only be summarized, when
needed, in order to contrast the arguments of the moderate thinkers.

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universal models that must be emulated in all their particularity. Second, the moderate position
grants a prominent role to human agency and human reason in the hermeneutical process. While
the militant position argue for “literal” readings of the text that they contend are not open to
discussion or dissenting viewpoints, the moderate position emphasizes the role of human reason
in any attempt at interpretation. Sharia, they argue, is a human construction. While it is bound
by the textual tradition, it is a function of human thinking and historical circumstances.
Therefore, there are no prohibitions on thinking that, in light of new circumstances and through
the use of human agency, the Sharia is capable of determining new rulings that speak directly to
contemporary conditions.
The last point is an important one for the moderate position. The thinkers listed above
argue that any attempt to apply Islamic injunctions to contemporary conditions must face
squarely the realities imposed by an international order organized under a system of the nation
state. In this order, Muslim countries share equal membership with non-Muslim countries, and
juridical decision of the past must be reexamined, and perhaps redefined, in order to shed light
on how Muslims might position themselves within the international system. While the militant
position rejects the nation state and the contemporary international order, the moderate position
argues that the Islamic textual tradition contains the necessary tools through which Muslims can
be, and ought to be, full participants.
As evidence, the moderate thinkers offer readings of the Quran and the traditions of the
Prophet that demonstrate an emphasis on religious liberty and peaceful coexistence with other
religious traditions. Critically, they reject the idea that the Islamic state is necessary, or
incumbent on the believer. Arguing that a structure for an Islamic state was not systematized by
the historical tradition that the militants reference, they claim that political Islam, and its
insistence on an Islamic state is a modern construction; one that lacks substantial basis in the
texts. And instead, they argue that true and unfettered religious expression, as demanded by their
interpretation of the textual tradition, prohibits the construction of a state that forcefully imposes
Sharia law.
The question, however, is to what extent the alternative interpretation of Islam put
forward by the moderate thinkers is capable of discrediting al-Qaeda and the militant stream it
represents? In other words, to what extent does the work of these thinkers directly contest the
authority and legitimacy of al-Qaeda, and to those whom may lend it support or may be

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encouraged to join its ranks? The moderate position rests on a hermeneutical method that
disputes a relatively established understanding of history and its normative claims within the
Muslim world. Therefore the attempt to contest the militant interpretations of al-Qaeda must
also include figures who maintain an emphasis on traditional understandings of history and its
influence on contemporary hermeneutics. For an example of such an approach, we turn to the
work of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent and popular Egyptian jurist who has written on the
subject of extremism in Islam. The work of Qaradawi is important to this discussion, as it
demonstrates how a traditionalist may contribute to the modernist position.
Qaradawi also argues that the erosion of the ulema‟s authority has led to
misinterpretations of Islam. For this reason, he argues that those who seek to understand and
apply the Sharia must consult the experts, the jurists who have been trained in the complex task
of interpreting the textual tradition. A proper understanding of the texts, he argues, clarifies that
Islam endorses balance and moderation in all things. While, in contrast to the thinkers listed
above, he argues that the implementation of Islamic law is a necessary element of a just Islamic
polity, he argues that a proper reading of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet demonstrate
the Islam condones moderation and gradation in the achievement of religious goals. Those who
adopt the extremist position, he argues, have been led astray by individuals who lack the proper
training and experience to properly interpret the textual tradition. Not only, then, do they suffer
from a lack of insight into the true and proper teachings of Islam, but they also fail to understand
the realities of contemporary Muslim societies. He contends that while the ends – the
implementation of Sharia into society - sought by the militants have a foundational basis in the
Islamic tradition, their means are unacceptable, and must be challenged.
In light of the above, this chapter proceeds by outlining the contours of the debate
discussed above. It highlights the elements of the moderate position, and investigates the
implications of this debate for American efforts in the Long War.

5.1Abou El Fadl and the Crisis of Authority

Islam, like other religious traditions, has historically been interested and invested in
determining questions of right and wrong, good and evil, justice and injustice. Furthermore, it
has been interested and invested in examining how such determinations may be used to guide the
individual and the community towards the good and proper way of living. While the Islamic

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tradition has developed several modes under which such questions may be examined, the most
prominent - in both duration and influence – is Sharia law.
Traditionally, the determination of Sharia law involved a process where the normative
sources of authority – the Quran, and the traditions of the Prophet and the early community–
were referenced in order to determine how they might guide the believer in regard to a specific
question posed. This process led to the development of multiple hermeneutical methods as well
as a class of scholars trained in the interpretive methodology. This class of scholars – the
Ulema- were jurists; specialists in Islamic law. Through a rigorous process of training in
institutions specifically dedicated to the task, the ulema were the sole class of society that
engaged in the production and interpretation of Islamic law. While the existence of multiple
schools of law ensured a plurality of opinions and rulings, the exclusive authority to engage in
Islamic jurisprudence was retained in the hands of this class of specialists. In this way, the
questions of who had the authority to determine Sharia, and how it was to be done, were subject
to a relatively clear set of limits.
As Abou El Fadl explains, by the mid-20th century, the relatively clarity of questions
regarding the authority and method of the system above were in question. Through a series of
social, political and economic reforms instituted into the Muslim world, the foundational system
of the traditional methods of Sharia authority were eroded.
To begin, the role of Sharia was gradually narrowed through its replacement by Western-
based legal systems. The Ottoman Empire‟s adoption of Western codes and systems of
administration had a determinate effect on the role of the Sharia in Islamic society; not only
because of its effects on Sharia law in general, but also because it became the model for the
Muslim world in the 20th century. The Ottomans, in the attempt to implement European
administrative models, codified certain aspects of the Hanafi School. This codification process
consequently transformed Sharia – a process that, traditionally, entailed fluid processes of legal
reasoning - into positive law. Notably, while the system was Hanafi based, it also incorporated
provisions from other sources. While the process of “selectivity” was already accepted, the
Ottoman model was the first to apply it on a systematic and formal scale. As argued by An-
Na‟im, “the trend towards increased eclecticism in the selection of sources and the synthesis of
Islamic and Western legal concepts and institutions” was transformative. It led to the
determination that incorporating Sharia into the emerging Muslim nation states could not be

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done without selection, adaptation, as well as consideration of the needs of modern Islamic
societies. Such a development also unlocked the Sharia to various government officials who
were responsible for the legislation of positive law.386
Furthermore, the institutions that had trained and produced the clerical class were either
closed, or nationalized and made subjects of the state. Abou El Fadl also notes that changes to
the curriculum in these institutions had serious consequences. The training of the students
shifted, limiting their ability to “provide intellectual leadership” and training them rather, to take
on much more limited roles, “such as leading prayers in mosques, delivering Friday sermons,
and at most, serving as judges in personal law courts.”387 The curriculum was no longer geared
towards material of legal jurisprudence and theory, and as a consequence, the ulema were no
longer effectively trained as legal experts in the same sense as they had been in the past.388
Increased literacy rates also affected these changes to the authority of the ulema. As
opposed to the extremely limited degree of literacy in traditional Islamic societies, growing
levels of literacy were such that Muslims increasingly had access to the textual foundations of
Sharia law. The cumulative effect of these changes was such that the legitimacy and prestige of
the Ulema was called into question, opening the door for an emerging professional class to claim
the right to interpret the textual tradition and Sharia law. As Abou El Fadl writes,

“The vacuum in authority meant not so much that no one could authoritatively speak for
Islam, but that virtually every Muslim with a modest knowledge of the Qur‟an and the traditions
of the Prophet was suddenly considered qualified to speak for the Islamic tradition and Shari‟a
law – even Muslims unfamiliar with the precedents and accomplishments of past
generations.”389

Some of the moderate thinkers discussed consider this to be a positive change. For
example, An-Na‟im argues that the corrosion of ulema authority has opened the door for

386
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‟im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‟a (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2008), 16-20.
387
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco,
2005), 36.
388
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco,
2005), 36.
389
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco,
2005) 38-39.

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individual Muslims to participate in the process of interpretation, and in this way, to determine
the present and future application of Islamic law in the international order as well as to matters of
public concern. Others, however, are more qualified in their assessments of such developments.
As Abou El Fadl argues, the vacuum of authority has allowed for the rise of what he terms
“puritanical” streams within Islam. Groups that are uncompromising in their beliefs and that are
willing to resort to militant means to impose them not only on other Muslims, but also on those
outside the Muslim fold. It is in response to the puritan stream, he argues, that Muslims today
must understand that they are in the midst of a decisively formative moment in the history of
their tradition.
Both the moderates and the puritans are claiming to represent the true and authentic Islam
– one rooted in a proper interpretation of the texts. And furthermore, both are attempting to
impose their interpretation of the tradition as the authoritative one. He argues that the moderates,
in order to “save the soul and reputation of Islam” ought to “consider themselves in a state of
defensive jihad to protect their religion from the onslaught of deformed interpretations and
disinformation perpetuated by the puritans against Islam.” In order to win this “very real war”,
the moderates must “declare a counter-jihad against puritan heresy;” One that must “reclaim the
truth about the Islamic faith and win the hearts and minds of Muslims and non-Muslims around
the world.”390
Abou El Fadl‟s call has been taken seriously by various thinkers, and has led to the
development of what I term the moderate position.

5.2 The Moderate Position: Conceptual Foundations

Structuring the divide between the moderate and the militant positions are disagreements
regarding the proper approach to the textual tradition. The foundational roots of this divide are
marked divergences on the correct methods of interpretation, and by extension, the appropriate
means of applying the wisdom and guidance contained in the normative sources to contemporary
issues and problems. Both militant and moderate arguments attempt to give form to the Divine
Will by seeking out the guidance and injunctions provided in the normative sources. And while
both the moderate and militant positions consider the knowledge and counsel contained therein

390
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco,
2005) 286.

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as eternal, the question of how such instruction is affected or influenced by history is the cardinal
factor that differentiates between their respective understandings of Islam and its contemporary
applications.
The militants argue that the application of Sharia law into all matters of state and society
is necessary for the strength and flourishing of Muslim communities. As evidence for their
claims, they reference the example of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Islamic polity,
arguing that the Prophet‟s example establishes that Islam was to rule all facets of the life of the
believer. This requires, they argue, the construction of political mechanisms dedicated to
instituting God‟s law – Sharia law – into political life. Furthermore, the militant understanding
of history is such that the mechanisms established by the earliest Muslims have a normative
claim on the present. The earliest Muslims, in light of their proximity to the Prophet – the
ultimate interpretive authority of the tradition – are thought to have understood and expressed
God‟s mandates most fully and most perfectly. Therefore, the manner through which the early
Muslims arranged their political communities as well as their social and civic institutions are
considered to be the ultimate models through which God‟s law is to be given form on earth. In
short, for the militants, the social and political models established by the early Muslim
communities have critical and enduring purchase on contemporary conditions. History, for the
militants, must be referenced for the negotiation and settlement of contemporary issues, as these
historical precedents carry normative weight.
The moderate position understands the role and authority of historical models and
precedents in a different way. It is important to note that the moderate position argues that
Islamic interpretation and expression is constricted in specific ways. Understanding the values
and commitments of the tradition requires that one reference the authoritative sources – the
Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet and the early community. In this way, they argue,
determining the proper form of Islamic values is performed within certain parameters. However,
unlike the militants, the moderates argue that the guidance contained in the authoritative sources
may be given expression in a variety of ways. The proper expression of these values is not
contingent upon, nor fully contained, within the forms they took in the past. As such, while the
moderates contend that the guidance contained in the normative sources remains relevant to the
present, they argue that the form through which such guidance takes shape may change in regard
to the challenges and conditions of the contemporary period. Therefore, while moderate thinkers

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reference and investigate the institutions and political mechanisms of earlier Muslims, these
models - in all their specifics and particularities – are understood as historically contingent, and
thus not categorically binding on Muslim communities of today. The past is referenced for
guidance, but not for categorical authority. Rather the moderates, in their approach to the past
seek to, “remember it, retrace its path, interpret it, reconstruct it, and make it relevant to the
present.”391
Bassam Tibi explicates this point by stating that Islam is a “…pure system of symbols
offering a model for reality.” Leaning heavily on Geertz, Tibi argues that this system of symbols
may be thought of as an “Islamic canon” that is “binding on all Muslims.” This pure system of
symbols, he argues, produces actual existing symbols that are derived from the pure system of
symbols as determined by time and place.392 While Tibi does not provide an elaborate
discussion detailing his understanding of what is contained within the “Islamic canon,” he does
note, that the “core” of Islamic beliefs include, “…submission to God and unconditional
recognition of his messenger (rasul) Muhammad as arbitrator. Since that time is has also
entailed acknowledgment of the Koran as the ultimate, definitive word of God, and the Sunna
(tradition) of The Prophet and Messenger of God.”393 However, beyond this, Tibi argues, the
existing symbols are derived ones, brought into existence through a process of human
construction. Tibi is particularly insistent on what he terms the “post-Koranic” status of the
hermeneutical methods of the early jurists (Qiyas, Ijma, Ijtihad) whom, in their attempt to
construct Sharia law, “attached a law to the revealed word of God, the Koran.” 394 In this way, he
argues, Sharia law was deemed immutable, and its interpretation ignored social change.
In contrast to this, the moderates argue that Sharia is neither fixed nor immutable.
Rather, it is an evolving human construct that is a product of the efforts of human beings to
understand and properly apply the Divine Will. In order to lend clarity to this point, Abou El
Fadl argues that the moderate position distinguishes between Sharia and Fiqh. Sharia, he argues,

391
Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11.
392
Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 24-68.
393
Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57. The idea that the
Islamic tradition is based upon a set of shared beliefs is also supported by Abou El Fadl, and An-Na‟im. Abou El
Fadl argues that the Five Pillars provide an “essential” understanding of the tradition, and its requirements. Khaled
Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco, 2005) 113-
125. An-Na‟im argues that generational consensus around the authoritative sources demonstrates that they
represent the “authentic content of the fundamental sources of Islam.” Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‟im, Islam and the
Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‟a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 12.
394
Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 65.

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is the eternal law of the Divine Will. Fiqh, he argues, is the human law that is a product of a
human struggle to realize the eternal law. In light of this, Sharia is inaccessible in its full and
perfect form to human beings. While Muslims are required to strive to fulfill the law, “…it is
arrogant and offensive to claim that human being could be certain that they have successfully
comprehended eternal law.” Therefore, fiqh, a human product, is “subject to error, alternation,
development, and nullification” through the continual (and fallible) efforts of human beings to
appropriately affect God‟s will.395
This understanding of the law creates a wide and deep space for the role of human agency
in the hermeneutical method. To make this point, An-Na‟im argues that in light of the fact that
the Divine Will is not fully accessible, human reason has always been a necessary part of the
interpretive process. Human beings, under their requirement to strive and exert to understand the
eternal law, have always been a primary and directive element in the process of its construction.
He notes that the methodological processes of determining Islamic law – usual al Fiqh – were
developed by Islamic scholars. In this way, both the interpretive tools that are applied, as well as
the decisions regarding who may interpret the law all have been a product of human reasoning
and reflection. Therefore, he argues, while the texts that Muslims reference cannot change, the
history of the interpretive tradition, as a human tradition, demonstrates that, “…there is nothing
to prevent the formation of a fresh consensus around new interpretive techniques or innovative
interpretations of the Qur‟an and Sunna, which would become a part of Shari‟a, just as the
existing methodologies and interpretations came to be a part of it in the first place.”396 Why, he
asks, should a process clearly driven by human reasoning and reflection preclude successive
consideration?
As noted in the introduction, the moderate thinkers argue that the application of Islamic
tradition squarely face the realities of contemporary political conditions. As noted by An-Na‟im,

“Any and all proposed possibilities of change or development must therefore begin with
the reality the European colonialism and its aftermath have drastically transformed the basis
and nature of political and social organization within and among territorial states where all

395
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco,
2005), 150.
396
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‟im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‟a (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2008), 13.

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Muslims live today. A return to precolonial ideas and systems is simply not an option, and any
change and adaption of the present system can be realized only through the concepts and
institutions of this local and global postcolonial reality.”397

For this reason, the moderate position categorically rejects the militant insistence on the
necessity of an Islamic state. They argue that the demand of a state which imposes Sharia law
through political institutions is untenable in light of the modern system of international relations.
The notion of an Islamic political state, particularly as imagined by the militants, would include
Sharia rulings on women, non-Muslims and other classes of individuals that, the modernists
argue, are not only objectionable, but unthinkable in a public international order in which
Muslims states are interacting as shared members. Furthermore, their participation in this order,
at the very minimum, implies a commitment to values of equality and liberty that such a state
does not provide.
In addition, the moderate thinkers argue that the construction of an Islamic state that
imposes Sharia law flies directly in the face of Islam‟s commitment to religious liberty,
pluralism, and peaceful coexistence with other traditions – values, they argue, that are enjoined
on believers by God. Such commitments, they argue, not only allow Muslims to be full
participants in the current international order, but direct them to do so.
In light of the above, An-Na‟im argues that a secular state, or one that is religious neutral,
is critically important to contemporary Islam. He argues that while Muslims, as a matter of
responsibility to the Divine Will, are required to observe the eternal law, such observance may
only be done freely – and therefore properly – under the circumstances that the state does not
enforce its own understanding of Islamic law. In light of the constructed nature of Sharia, and
the primary role of human interpretation that is qualified by time and place, An-Na‟im argues
that any attempt to determine the content of Sharia is subject to change and individual reflection.
Therefore, true religious piety, done with honesty and conviction, cannot be a product of the
state‟s claims to propagate and enforce its own understandings of religious law. True
compliance cannot be coerced by government mechanism and the power of the state which
enforces them.

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‟im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‟a (Cambridge:
397

Harvard University Press, 2008), 31-32.

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 An-Na‟im‟s argument is based on what moderate thinkers contend is the Quran and
Sunnah‟s commitment to freedom of religion and conscience. As argued by Sachedina,

“…without recognition of freedom of religion, it is impossible to conceive of religious

commitment as a freely negotiated human-divine relationship that fosters individual
accountability for one‟s acceptance or rejection of faith in god, commitment to pursue an ethical
life, and willingness to be judged accordingly.”398

As Sachedina outlines, within the Islamic tradition, the acceptance of faith and the pursuit
of the ideal life is made possible through an innate human capacity that directs the human being
to the good. This innate capacity – the fitra – is part of individual human nature as designed by
the Divine Will. This innate spiritual disposition imbued into human nature is further assisted by
prophetic revelation. Therefore, it is fitra that grants human beings the ability to see and
understand the proper path determined by God‟s universal guidance. However, despite the fact
that human beings have been divinely engineered with such natural capacities and inclinations
towards the good, Sachedina argues that the Koran is clear on the fact that accepting or rejecting
God‟s revelation and submitting to the Divine Will is an individual choice. For example, he
provides the following as evidence:

How shall god guide a people who have disbelieved after they believed…God guides not
the people of evildoers. (K. 3:86)

Surely those who disbelieve after they have believed and they increase in unbelief – their
repentance shall not be accepted; those are the ones who go astray. (K. 3:86)

Sachedina argues that verses such as these imply human responsibilities for being led
astray, and as such, imply responsibility for accepting or rejecting the Divine will and the
requisite responsibilities. The concept of fitra, then, ought to breathe new life into the Koranic
verse, “No compulsion is there in religion”399 If the role of revelation is to provide guidance,

398
Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 84.
399
K. 2:254.

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such an idea presupposes that both faith, as well as the acts that flow from it, are the result of an
active and deliberate act made possible only be sincere, individual, and unfettered submission to
God. Such an act of submission, Sachedina argues, cannot be coerced or enforced, but only
evolves from personal reflection and willful decision making. Faith, he argues, “…is freely and
directly negotiated between God and the human being and cannot be compelled.”400
Under this understanding of individual religious liberty, Sachedina argues, the Koran‟s
commitment to religious pluralism and peaceful coexistence are clear. He argues that a reading
of the authoritative texts that removes the historical and political contingencies of the juristic
tradition demonstrates that Islam, as expressed by the Koran and the Sunnah, was not only aware
of the existence of other traditions, but also sought to manage such interactions in a way where
they were, perhaps, subjected to a critical lens, but were not, as he argues “rejected as false.”
This interpretation of Islam‟s relationships to other religious traditions, he argues, was
obscured by the juridical interpretive method of suppression, or naskh. In the attempt to
determine Islamic law, and to reconcile verses within the Koran that were seemingly
contradictory, the classic jurists argued that the principle of abrogation, or naskh, determined that
certain verses in the Quran - those that were revealed later - abrogated earlier verses. In response
to a change in circumstances or conditions, a later verse (and its ruling) was thought to have
superseded one that was revealed prior. Sachedina, however, argues that interpreting the
Koran‟s message in this manner was the result of political and social circumstances, in which the
jurists were demanding unquestioning acceptance to the new faith and the political orders
established by the early caliphs. A proper understanding of the Koran, he argues, one removed
from the principle of naskh, demonstrates a clear commitment to religious liberty, toleration and
justice.401
As evidence, Sachedina provides a reading of various texts that admonish Muslims to
build a just political order while remaining commitment to notions of pluralism; particularly the
freedom of human conscience and the ability to negotiate one‟s own spiritual destiny. For
example, he references the following:

400
Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 90.
401
Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22-
63.

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 “We have revealed to thee as We have revealed to Noah, and the Prophets after him, and
We revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, Jesus and Job, Jonah and
Aaron and Solomon, and We gave to David Psalms, and Messengers We have already told thee
of before…Messengers bearing good tidings, and warning, so that humankind might have no
argument against God, after the Messengers;” (K. 4:163)402

“Say: We believe in God, and that which has been send down to us, and sent down on
Abraham and Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, and the Tribes, and in that which was given to Moses
and Jesus, and the Prophets, of their Lord; we make no distinctions between any of them, and to
Him we surrender.” (K. 3:84)403

Sachedina, then, argues that in light of the recognition of a “common ground” that
Muslims share with the people of the Book, Islam does not deny other religious traditions
salvation, nor does it claim sole proprietorship over divine guidance. Here, Sachedina argues that
the Koran recognizes the existence and particularities of other traditions. Furthermore, it
recognizes the intrinsic value of other traditions in clear terms. It is only by appealing to the
controversial hermeneutical tool of naskh, he argues, that the Koran‟s inclinations towards
pluralism may be denied.
Abou El Fadl, in the same line of thinking, directly contests the militant interpretation of
the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation, referenced by Ayman al-Zawahiri as evidence for a
continuing militant posture towards non-Muslims.404 This doctrine states that Muslim
engagement and alignment with non-Muslims is only to be done in situations where the Muslim
party is in a state of weakness, and must only be carried out for limited periods of time (until
Muslim power is regained). In contrast, Abou El Fadl argues, the Quran “not only accepts, but
even expects, the reality of difference and diversity within human society.” As evidence, he
discusses the following verse:

402
Quoted in Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 37.
403
Quoted in Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 39.
404
See chapter two, section 2.4.

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 “O Humankind, God has created you from male and female and made you into diverse
nations and tribes so that you may come to know each other. Verily, the most honored of you in
the sight of God is he who is the most righteous.” K 49:13

This verse, Abou El Fadl argues, not only affirms diversity as a purposeful and
intentional component of God‟s providence, but demonstrates the overall inclination of the
Quran towards coexistence and cooperation. The command of human beings to “know each
other,” he argues, “places an obligation on Muslims and non-Muslims alike” to negotiate their
interactions in a way that takes note of, and accords respect and recognition towards, difference
and plurality. Human beings, then, must “work together in pursuit of goodness.”405
This has serious implications for militant understanding of war and enmity. Abou El
Fadl notes that, “The net effect of the moderates‟ Qur‟anic analysis is that, contrary to the
puritans, they do not believe that God intends or desires that Muslims dominate non-Muslims.”
While Muslims are, indeed, advocated to call people to Islam “in kindness,” the moderate
position argues that, in light of a divinely created order of plurality, “people will never all follow
one faith.”406 What then, are the implications of the moderate position in regard to the militant
position of an armed struggle against the West?
Abou El Fadl argues that the juristic division of the world into two realms – dar al harb
and dar al Islam – is a product of historical circumstances. This state of permanent war was a
result of the then prevailing norms of international relations. He writes that “unless there was
affirmative agreement to the contrary, every nation or empire in existence assumed itself to be in
a belligerent relationship with the rest of the world.” While this division was formative for the
Islamic law of nations, Abou El Fadl argues that it is not supported in the textual sources. As he
argues, “Both sources do mention that all Muslims should think of themselves as a single people
belonging to one nation, but they do not divine the world into two abodes, and they do not say
that Muslims should be in a perpetual state of war with non-Muslims.”407 As a product of
Islamic history, contingent on time and place, Abou El Fadl argues that this system no longer has

405
Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco, 2005),
208.
406
Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco, 2005),
213.
407
Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco, 2005),
226.

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relevance. While it may have served a purpose in a particular historical moment, it no longer
reflects the current international order, and furthermore, its implementation today would lead to
“disastrous consequences.”408

5.3 The Moderate Position: A Critical Issue

Responses to the work of the moderate thinkers have focused on at least two issues.
First, the moderate position is charged with not ascribing enough weight to the effects of
colonialism on the emergence of Islamic militancy. Second, the authority of moderate thinkers,
specifically in regard to the ability of their arguments to gain a foothold in Muslims world, is
called into question. The present section will examine the latter response, and the former will be
the subject of the last section of this chapter.
Directly in response to Abou El Fadl, Stanley Kurts writes Abou El Fadl‟s work is

“…calling on Muslims to bring the sensibilities of an historical sociologist to their

reading of the Quran. That sort of approach may be popular at liberal divinity schools and
departments of religion at American Universities, but I wonder how much appeal it will hold for
Middle Eastern Muslims.”409

He goes on to argue that while Abou El Fadl‟s position is admirable, the appeal of such
reform, and the chance that it will be adopted, will be limited to “those who have already
accepted modernity, chiefly assimilated and highly educated Muslims in the United States, as
well as the relatively small number of highly modernized Muslims in the Middle East itself.”410
Kurtz, then, argues that wide-scale adoption of the type of reform called for by Abou El Fadl,
and presumably others who are like-minded, requires foundational social changes. Only in this
way will the textual interpretation he calls for be accepted.
The strength of Kurtz‟s argument lies in its ability to gesture towards a critical issue in
the moderate position. The moderate thinkers rely on a hermeneutical method that limits the
normative claims of history. They claim that juridical rulings and decisions must be interpreted

408
Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanfrancisco, 2005),
231.
409
Stanley Kurtz, “Text and Context” in The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 51.
410
Stanley Kurtz, “Text and Context” in The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 52.

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and deconstructed within culturally and historically contingent circumstances. They further
argue that current historical and cultural circumstances must be taken into consideration in any
interpretation of the authoritative sources. In this way, the moderate position is confronting
notions of history, and its role, that are relatively established (and entrenched) within the Muslim
world.
For example, An-Na‟im states that the “conflation” model of an Islamic state is untenable
in light of the fact that, as it was established by the Prophet Muhammad, it has never been
replicated successfully in Islamic political history. He argues that the attempt by subsequent
caliphs to “conflate” religious and political leadership resulted in wars of insurrection and
serious political and civil strife in the early periods of Islam (he notes the Mihna, and the Ridda
wars as examples). The Prophet‟s combination of religious and political authority was unique,
and is not replicable. As Muslims do not accept the possibility of prophecy after Muhammad,
the attempt to reproduce a model of the state premised on the conflation model of Muhammad is
unmerited and lacking the necessary foundations for success.411
While it is generally accepted that revelation ended with Muhammad, An-Na‟im‟s
reading of Islamic history does not erase the rule of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali, and the
achievements of Islamic civilization under the Umayyads and the Abbasids from the Muslim
imagination. This history continues to have a significant hold on Muslim self-understanding. As
noted by W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic political thought references the past as if it were
political theory. In this way, the critique that the moderate position may not be intellectually
viable is one that ought to be considered. Abou El Fadl himself argues that it is through
consensus that reasoning has proceeded since the seventh century. It is through the common
belief among Muslims that the normative texts are authentic and authoritative, and that the
interpretive methods applied are, in fact, legitimate, that the process of Sharia reasoning has been
carried on. While the moderate thinkers are, in fact, thinking historically, they are also
confronting traditional interpretations of the texts which appeal to history in a different manner.
In this way, the weight of tradition is a clear burden on the arguments of the moderate thinkers.
Therefore, the critique that the moderate position may not be intellectually viable is one that
ought to be considered.

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‟im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‟a (Cambridge:
411

Harvard University Press, 2008), 53.

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 In addition, it ought to be noted that the militant position is being contested by traditional
elements within the Muslims world; elements that retain the normative claims of history that the
thinkers discussed above have contested. For an example of contestation of the militant
argument from this perspective, we turn to the work of Yusuf Qaradawi.

5.4 Yusuf Qaradawi: A Traditional Contribution to the Moderate Position

Qaradawi is concerned with the manifestation of extremism in Islam, and especially as it
has taken hold among the youth. He does, however, want to make clear differentiations between
those who have, in their desire to please God, committed themselves to a conservative
interpretation of an issue, and those who manifest signs of extremism. The former, he argues,
insofar as their intention is to please God, and live out their understanding of the proper Islamic
life, ought not be treated as extremists. Qaradawi points to the fact that within the Islamic legal
school there has always been a plurality of interpretations on a variety of issues – all of which
fall on a spectrum. Adhering to the rigid end of the interpretive stream is to live out the dictates
of the Divine Will as understood by a particular type of interpretation of the texts; it is not
extremism.
Extremism, rather, has other identifying characteristics. The first is a type of bigotry and
intolerance that deprives a person of “clarity of vision regarding the interests of other human
beings, the purposes of the Shari‟ah, or the circumstances of the age.”412 The second is a
commitment to excessiveness and the continual imposition on others to do likewise. Third, is the
overburdening of others - both Muslims and non-Muslims - in the way with which the extremist
zeal is applied and forced onto other people. Fourth is the excessively harsh treatment of others,
especially in the manner through which the extremist attempts to call others to Islam, or to
impose his or her understanding or interpretation of the tradition.413 The most clear
distinguishing factor of extremism, he argues, is when “a single group deprives all people of the
right to safety and protection, and instead sanctions their killing and the confiscation of their

412
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 33.
413
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 33-46.

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lives and property. This, of course, occurs when an extremist holds all people - except those in
his group – to be kuffar (those whom have rejected the faith).”414
For Qaradawi, then, extremism is a manifestation of rigidity and excess. It is the product
of a group of individual who refuse to acknowledge the tradition‟s history of juristic plurality
and multiplicity of interpretation. While he argues that the causes of extremism are multiple and
complex, he focuses on two that he believes are of critical importance for both understanding and
treating extremism in Islam. His identification of these issues maintains the authoritative role of
history and precedent, and serves to highlights the manner in which Qaradawi‟s position differs
from what the moderate thinkers are proposing.
To begin, he argues that the extremist elements have identified an important point.
Muslim countries have failed to properly apply the Sharia, and have replaced it with “imported
systems and alien ideologies.” Present day Muslims societies are characterized by chaos and
inner contradictions, all due to the rejection of Islam. The extremist elements have witnessed the
clear disparities between the wealthy and the poor and live under corrupt governments whose
legislation transgresses the values embodied in Islam. The extremist elements also watch the
same governments stand by submissively as the Muslim world is attached by the powers of
“Zionism, Christian, Marxist, [and] Pagan” forces, destroying not only the geographic territory
of Islam, but eroding the moral fabric of society. In response, the extremist elements have
become frustrated. Unable to bring real change they have resorted to violence.415
Second, the turn towards extremism has been exacerbated by interpretations of the textual
tradition that lack proper insight. Like the moderate thinkers discussed above, Qaradawi is also
concerned with the erosion of the ulema‟s authority in the tradition, as he argues it has led to
interpretations that are misguided. He writes that,

“Many of them [the extremists] have never been taught by reliable Muslim ulama
specialized in the field. Rather, they have received semi-knowledge directly from books and
newspapers without any opportunity for revision or discussion which could test the learner‟s

414
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 43-44.
415
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 83-95.

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understanding and analyze the depth of his knowledge…their reading, understanding, and
deduction may well be wrong or deficient.”416

“A person may presume – and sometimes genuinely believe – that he knows all there is to
know; that he is a scholar, a faqih. But actually he has no more than a hodgepodge of
undigested and unassimilated „knowledge‟ which neither enhances insight nor clarifies vision. A
person possessing such „knowledge‟ concentrates on marginal and trivial issues only and
thereby fails to see the relationship between the parts which form the whole (or the whole itself)
or between the categorical and the fundamental texts vis-à-vis the allegorical ones.417

An authoritative and proficient understanding of the textual tradition, he argues,

demonstrates that Islam, while open to multiple interpretations, clearly rejects extremism and
enjoins a path of moderation on the believer.418 Qaradawi, as evidence, cites a variety of hadith
demonstrating that the prophet condemned any form of zealotry in Islam. As Qaradawi argues,
the Prophet was disinclined towards excess, as it overburdens the individual and is “too
disagreeable for ordinary human nature to endure or tolerate.”419
Qaradawi appears to especially favor one Hadith. He argues that the prophet not only
condemned others for prolonging the duration of prayer (and in the process, overburdening
them), but also stated that when he, himself, led the prayer, he was often inclined to shorten it in
order to refrain from overburdening others.420 In this way, Qaradawi argues, while the individual
Muslim may chose to take on the more burdensome task of longer prayer on her own, she may
not overburden others, by claiming that it is necessary and incumbent on all Muslims to engage

416
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 50-51.
417
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 50.
418
Qaradawi‟s views on Jihad are elaborated in a recently published book. He argues that while jihad in self defense
(i.e. the jihad of the Palestinians) is Islamically appropriate, the jihad of al-Qaeda, particularly in light of its
indiscriminate targeting of civilians and lack of established authority – is forbidden on Islamic grounds. This book
has, as of time of writing, been translated into English. For a short review, see
http://attahawi.com/2009/08/30/book-review-of-shaykh-yusuf-qaradawis-recent-book-the-jurisprudence-of-jihad/
419
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 25.
420
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 25-26.

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in lengthy prayer. As Qaradawi argues, it is clear that when the Prophet was faced with two
choices, he “always chose the easiest [least burdensome], unless it was a sin.”421
This reading of the tradition is supported by what Qaradawi argues are the tradition‟s
underlying approaches to religious change and development. He contends that God‟s actions in
the world (including God‟s dealings with human kind) demonstrate an approach that institutes
change in stages. “Gradation,” argues Qaradawi, is God‟s preferred approach. Whether it is in
relation to the creation of the universe or the transition from paganism to monotheism, God‟s
work demonstrates a clear preference towards gradual change. As he writes, God‟s design and
action in the world demonstrate that, “…everything has an appointed term during which it
reaches ripeness and maturity. This applies to the material as well as the moral. Nothing should
be harvested before its appointed time…”422
In light of this, while Qaradawi concedes that the call for an Islamic state among the
militant elements of Islam is appropriate as determined by the dictates of the tradition, he argues
that the extremist elements have resorted to means that are contrary to the inherent teachings and
values of Islam. Their demands on other Muslims exceed the Prophet‟s injunctions for
temperance and balance, and overburden the believers who are not able to adhere themselves to
the rigid interpretations of the militant streams. While Qaradawi sympathizes with the extremist
call for the injection of Sharia rulings into all areas of Muslim society, he takes serious objection
to the use of extreme and militant measures for the realization of an Islamic state.423
For Qaradawi, the imposition of an Islamic state, particularly through militant means, is
premature, and will impose undue demands on a society that is not yet ripe to raise the
institutions. Rather, Qaradawi argues, the extremist elements ought to realign themselves with a
proper understanding of what God has required of them. This, he argues, demands that the
extremist elements return to, and respect, the juridical class that specializes in providing the
interpretation of the Shariah; interpretations that, through their balance, exhibit a serious and
learned engagement with the authoritative texts.424 Even the Rightly Guided Caliphs, he argues,

421
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 156.
422
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 82.
423
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 50-51.
424
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 150-151.

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respected the expertise and specialization of a learned class, often consulting “their learned
Companions when confronted with critical issues.”425
In addition, the extremist elements must revise their approach in light of the Quran‟s
emphasis on gradation. They ought to focus on the type of activity that will ready the ground for
the Islamic state, as opposed to enforcing it on a society who, at the current moment, would be
overburdened by its implementation. He writes that,

“The establishment of an Islamic state which applies Shari‟ah and strives to unite all
Muslims under the banner of Islam is, of course, the duty of the whole Ummah. All du‟ah must
do their utmost to achieve this objective, employing in the process the best means and methods.
But the realization of this is conditional upon a number of imperatives, some of the most
important of which are: to unite all efforts, to remove all obstacles, to convince the suspecting
minds of the nobility of the cause, to bring up Islamically oriented youngsters, and to prepare
local as well as international public opinion to accept their ideology and the state. All this
requires time and, indeed, perseverance. Until that dear hope is realized, Muslims must unite
efforts in order to serve their communities and to improve their societies.”426

5.5 Concluding Remarks: Implications for the Long War

Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated the outlines of an ongoing and critical debate
within the Muslim world. The question to pose at this point, is what part might the United States
have (if any) in regard to promoting the moderate position?
On a first level of inquiry, might the United States have a hand in directly assisting the
moderate theological critique of the militant al-Qaeda position? This would, presumably,
involve some method of direct assistance to the moderate thinkers in promoting their message –
perhaps through material assistance or direct working relationships. Answering this question
requires thinking about whether the United States might have any working partners in this
request. The options are two-fold. The first are the thinkers who fall into the camp of
Sachedina, Abou El Fadl, and An-Na‟im. It is important to note that some work of this kind has

425
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 151.
426
Yusuf Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (Herndon: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1991), 163.

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already been established. For example, Abou El Fadl was appointed by President Bush to serve
as the commissioner for the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.
Such recognition by high level officials certainly demonstrates a desire to support the work of
these thinkers. However, as demonstrated by the critiques of their positions, it is unclear as to
whether these figures will hold intellectual traction in the Muslim world.
In light of this, American decision makers may choose to support the work of those who,
like Qaradawi, take a more traditional approach to the textual tradition. Yet, while Qaradawi‟s
thinking may hold more popular appeal, his stance on other foreign policy issues makes a
working relationship between him and the United States improbable. His support for Palestinian
suicide bombers, as well as an intransigent position towards Israel, renders direct support of
figures like Qaradawi difficult for policy makers. It appears then, that those most amenable to
American interests in the Long War are faced with the problem of intellectual viability; while
those not facing these problems are unlikely functional allies.
In light of this, it appears that any direct support on the part of the United States to the
moderate position is lacking the necessary foothold. However, as demonstrated by the second
type of critique leveled against the moderate thinkers, the United States – while not directly
intervening in the particularities of the debate – continues to have an influencing role. As noted
in the previous section, critics of the moderate position charge that the thinkers proposing
alternative interpretations of Islam do not give enough weight and influence to the contributing
role of American intervention and foreign policy to the rise of extremism in the Muslim world.
Responding directly to Abou El Fadl, Abid Ullah Jan writes that,

“Closer analysis of the facts, however, reveals just how many global crises have a
different source: In efforts by the United States and its allies to achieve economic and cultural
hegemony by dominating or destroying all opposition…When he seeks to assign responsibility
for intolerance, Abou El Fadl should look no further than the Western question for dominance.
Did supremacist Muslim „puritans‟ initiate the troubles in Algeria? Are the Muslim
„fundamentalists‟ occupying non-Muslim lands?...Do „supremacist Muslims‟ dominate the
United Nations and define rights and rules for the rest of the world to follow?...”427

427
Abid Ullah Jan, “The Limits of Tolerance” in The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 43.

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 In support, Akeel Bilgrami writes that,
“Contemporary discussions of Islam and the Qur‟an needs to be carried out with a full
understanding that the real issue is only secondarily about a doctrine and a book, and primarily
about Muslims as a people and their political life, a life that to a considerable extent is defined
by a legacy of colonial rule that continues to this day in disguised and implicit forms that are
well known, and denied only by insular Americans and (much more culpably) by intellectual
mandarins in the media and universities.428

Such critiques demonstrate that the reception or, perhaps more accurately, the perception
of American actions in the Muslims world is a major point of consideration. In light of this, it
appears that it is through the construction of American foreign policy and military action that the
United States may be able to exert some level of support to the moderate position, and the
trajectory of the debate detailed above. This requires sensitivity to the manner in which al-
Qaeda‟s framing of contemporary circumstances and events may be affected by American
responses to developments in the Muslim world, and a clear focus on the moral tradition
undergirding American use of power. In an attempt to lend some initial clarity to these
questions, I conclude this project with a discussion relating the primary arguments of this
dissertation to current political developments in the Muslim world.

Akeel Bilgrami, “The Importance of Democracy” in The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press,
428

2002), 65.

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 CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD IN THE LONG WAR

6.0 The Narratives

In this project, I have argued for an account of the al-Qaeda network that pays particular
attention to its religious foundations. More specifically, I have argued that a coherent
understanding of al-Qaeda necessitates paying attention to the way in which its interpretation of
Islam both construes its worldview, as well as guides its actions in the world. As demonstrated,
al-Qaeda is directed by a narrative of Islam that understands the contemporary condition as one
in which Muslims have suffered at the hands of the West. As its ideologues search through the
vestiges of the Muslim past for counsel and guidance, they have determined that it is only
through an armed and militant resistance to the current international system that the Muslim
world may be restored. As the titular head of the contemporary system of nation states, the
United States is al-Qaeda‟s primary target. By combating the United States, they argue, the
Muslim world will be called to a global uprising, revolting against the comprehensive power of
the United States, and ushering in a revolution that will reinstate the House of Islam.
The difficulties of fighting a war against the United States are not lost on al-Qaeda. As
noted by al-Suri, it is only through asymmetric tactics that the Muslim people may triumph in
their resistance. In light of the clear power disparities between itself and the West, al-Qaeda has
intentionally constructed a model of warfare that is global, diffuse, and decentralized in
authority. Referencing the jihad tradition, al-Qaeda argues that historical precedent has
determined that in the case of defensive war, all Muslims are required to take up arms in
protection of the religion and Muslims lands. Additionally, as al-Suri contends, the authority to
wage war is such that every individual believer may take up arms against Western – and
specifically American - interests in any place that they are able. The individual authority to
wage jihad has been radicalized by al-Qaeda, further decentralizing the model of war that they
have put forward.

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 I have further argued that this investigation into al-Qaeda‟s theological foundation
demonstrates that military and policy decision makers have been presented with a new model of
war; one that poses novel challenges for those invested in the just application of force.
Consequently, the standard military frameworks ought to be evaluated as they apply specifically
to al-Qaeda‟s nature, structure, and tactics. Turning to the moral and ethical guidance provided
by the just war tradition, an evaluation of these frameworks demonstrates that neither
counterinsurgency nor counterterrorism has been able to construct a use of force that is both
proportional and effective.
As a result, this project argues that the War against al-Qaeda, in addition to the use of
force, must take note of the theological alternatives within the Muslims world proposed by those
within the tradition. I have outlined the work of such thinkers, and noted how their interpretation
of the textual tradition positions itself in direct opposition to the militant stream that is advocated
by al-Qaeda. However, as noted in the conclusion of chapter five, the ability of the United States
to influence the moderate position is directly tied to how its foreign and military policy is
received.
Al-Qaeda‟s ideologues present a narrative of contemporary events that construes
American actions in the world as aggressive and tyrannical. They argue that Muslims are
fighting a defensive war against American oppression and violence. The strength of al-Qaeda is
its ability to reference an authoritative tradition in its interpretation of current events, and to
argue that within the arsenal of this tradition is a remedy – militancy – that will lead to the
restoration of the House of Islam. How then, might American foreign policy be mindful of not
playing into – or reinforcing – this story?

6.1 The Framing of American Policy

Current developments provide a relatively clear starting point for an investigation of this
question. To begin, major decision makers might think about the framing of American foreign
policy, and the way that it serves to position the role of the United States vis-à-vis the Muslim
world. Initiatives along these lines have already been made by American officials at the highest
levels. President Bush, in his declaration of the War against al-Qaeda, took pains to emphasize
that this was not a war against Islam. In addition, he noted that the place of both Islam as a
tradition, and Muslim Americans as citizens, within the United States is clear and established.

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 President Obama has also emphasized that, while the War against al-Qaeda continues, it
is not a war with Islam. He has continually argued that the United States must remove the
colonial discourse from its foreign policy initiatives and attempt to form allies in the Muslim
world through diplomatic efforts that undergird military ones. In his Cairo speech, the president
stated that he had,

“…come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims
around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the
truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they
overlap, and share common principles -- principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the
dignity of all human beings.”429

While it is difficult to ascertain the direct effects of the President‟s speech on the
construction of American foreign policy and military planning, his initiative was met with broad
enthusiasm and support. Arguably, initiatives such as these may help deflate the militant
argument that the United States is seeking the oppression and subjugation of the Muslim world.
While the militant elements may be incontrovertible, it is the majority of Muslims who need to
be convinced, and may be convinced by high profile speeches such as these.

The same points may be made regarding President Obama‟s speech on what has been
termed the “Arab Spring” – a series of political uprisings across the Muslim world. Stating that
we are now faced with an “historic opportunity” 430 the president emphasized that American
interests in the region may be pursued while simultaneously encouraging the advancement of
what he termed the, “self-determination of individuals.” According to the president, American
interests in the Muslim world – “countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear
weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region;
standing up for Israel‟s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace” must continue in a manner
where the broader aspirations of the citizens of these nations are taken into consideration. The
crux of President Obama‟s message on this issue was to emphasize that American interests are
429
Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09
430
All quotes in this paragraph are taken from the text of President Obama‟s speech, delivered at the state
department on May 19th, 2011, Washington D.C. Transcript available at,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/05/19/text-of-obamas-speech-on-the-middle-east/?mod=google_news_blog

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not in direct contradiction to those of the Muslim world; rather they are in alignment, as both
Americans and the Muslim world stand to benefit substantially from stability, prosperity and
fruitful diplomatic relationships.

6.2 The Uprisings in the Muslim World

The recent uprisings across the Muslim world provide another opportunity for the
construction of American foreign and military policy that reflects on the issues described above.
Uprisings in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria have forced the United States to
consider the question of whether it ought to intervene in the affairs of these states, and if so, in
what capacity. Deliberations on Libya and Egypt were particularly important, as both have long
been considered “allies” of the United States in the fight against extremism. As these revolutions
erupt across the Middle East, the American response is critically important, and provides an
opportunity for decision makers to reflect on the way American force and power is perceived.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not only given clear lessons in the material costs
of war, but have also served to strengthen al-Qaeda‟s position. Al-Qaeda has continuously
interpreted both campaigns as sign of a colonial American foreign policy that is interested in
capitalizing on the resources and institutions of the Muslim world for its own economic gain. In
light of this, American military policy would be well-served if it were to reflect on the prudence
provided by the ethical frameworks of the just war tradition, and to commit American use of
force to the „moral anchorages” that are necessary for legitimacy both within the United States
and abroad.
In light of the just war criteria, a variety of questions and considerations might organize
an American military response. To begin, by what authority and in light of what cause might the
United States determine that it is justified in using military force in another sovereign nation?
The cries for democratic reform that have accompanied these revolutions are a notable
possibility. The United States - in its position as the leading advocate of democracy – will
certainly be moved to lend support in this cause. The principles and values that structure
American life are inclined towards the efforts of other communities struggling for self-
determination. The tension, then, is one between the support of what are, perhaps, democratic
revolutions and the liberal doctrine of non-intervention. Might the United States negotiate this
tension in such a way that its involvement is not construed through the colonial discourse?

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 This question calls us back to the prudence of the just war criteria. Determining military
force in such a case involves a serious examination of the circumstances at hand. The Libyan
case poses an interesting set of factors. To begin, the details of the struggle are unclear, as
relatively little is known about the Libyan Rebels who have opposed the rule of Mummar
Gaddafi. In addition, the level of popular support granted to the Libyan rebels among the greater
population remains obscure. The form of political program they seek to impose if they are able
to acquire power with foreign assistance is ambiguous at best. In this case, how is the United
States to determine the authority of the rebel forces?
At the time of writing, the United States has taken a “back-seat” role in the NATO
military response in Libya in the hopes of avoiding perceptions in the Muslim world that the
United States is directing and commanding military involvement in the region; particularly as
American troops remain in Afghanistan and Iraq. While Congress recently vetoed
(overwhelmingly) the sending of ground troops into Libya, President Obama has continued to
call for regime change, insisting the Ghaddafi step down. Such statements, on the part of the
President, presage a large-scale commitment to Libya. One that has been backed by various
diplomatic initiatives made on the part of America‟s NATO partners. The Rebel‟s National
Transitional Council has been recognized by seven European countries, including France, while
all European Union members have frozen their diplomatic ties with Tripoli. In addition,
Catherine Ashton, the EU‟s top foreign policy chief, opened an office in the rebel capitol.
While these diplomatic efforts have not led to increased military action, it is worthwhile
to consider the long-term effects of recognizing, funding, or supporting the opposition in Libya
or elsewhere in the Arab Spring. While the United States has not yet extended the same type of
recognition, its military and diplomatic relationship to EU and NATO countries may lead the
United States into a deeper military commitment. The president has also made public statements
to this effect, by insisting that France and the United States will “finish the job.”
The ability of the militant stream to capitalize on such developments ought to be an
additional factor in considerations regarding military intervention on the part of the Libyan
rebels. The American response during - what is being depicted as - a formative period in the
history of the Middle East will leave a mark on the greater Muslim imagination. If the United
States is brutal in its measures, it may confirm the al-Qaeda‟s narrative. “Brutality” may entail
either direct military intervention without a clear understanding of the facts on the ground, or not

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providing military aid in the case of clear targeting of civilians (if this is, indeed, happening on a
large scale). In addition, it appears necessary to lend some clarify to the questions of what
application of force is likely to be effective and successful, and what are the desired outcomes?
Clarifying the American position on these issues, and presenting them to those beyond the
immediate circles of decision making would greatly aid in the ability of the United States to
frame its response in a way that does not reify al-Qaeda‟s calls for militancy.
Of further consideration is the effect that the Arab Spring will have on al-Qaeda‟s
popularity and appeal. Some analysts have noted that the largely secular and pro-democracy
revolutions dealt a fatal blow to al-Qaeda and its calls for militancy. However, it is clear that al-
Qaeda is attempting to determine its own position within the uprisings, ultimately hoping to
capitalize on what is broadly understood to be a formative historical moment. One can certainly
imagine that al-Qaeda may shift fighters to Yemen, hoping to capitalize on the instability and
open borders that have resulted from this conflict. However, whether or not al-Qaeda will be
successful in galvanizing broad popular support – or of finding a serious position in the
revolutions - will not become clear until the long-term effects of the Arab Spring are revealed.

6.3 The Death of Osama bin Laden

On May first, 2011, President Barak Obama announced to the nation that Osama bin
Laden had been killed, and that his body was in American custody. His death was the result of a
raid carried out by American operatives on a large compound in the remote tribal areas of the
Pakistan-Afghan border in the city of Abbottabad, a short distance from the capital city of
Islamabad. According to senior administration officials, Bin Laden resisted, and was shot in the
head as a result of a 40 minute gun battle.
Analyses of bin Laden‟s death are tending towards the position that, while his demise
does not signal the end of the War against al-Qaeda, it is a symbolic achievement. American
forces, they argue, have penetrated the heart of the al-Qaeda network and eradicated its spiritual
figurehead. Killing bin Laden, they contend, demonstrates that “no one is beyond our reach.”
It also demonstrates, they argue, the enduring capabilities of American power. Furthermore, it is
a sign to the al-Qaeda network that even those who have eluded capture will be found. As
remarked by President Obama, “Justice has been done.”

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 Analyses of bin Laden‟s death have also asked what sort of affect this will have on the al-
Qaeda network. While only time will provide an answer to this question, a few remarks may be
made. To begin, it is likely that someone else will step in to fill bin Laden‟s position as the
figure-head of al-Qaeda. While Ayman al-Zawahiri lacks the charismatic appeal of bin Laden,
it is likely that al-Qaeda prepared for the death or capture of bin Laden, and had appointed
someone as his successor. Rumors have circulated that Saif al-Adel has been officially
appointed as bin Laden‟s successor, although it is unclear as to whether he will occupy the
position indefinitely or in the interim.431 Furthermore, al-Qaeda has demonstrated an ability to
evolve, and to replace leadership relatively quickly, consequently muting assertions that the al-
Qaeda network may have been dealt a fatal blow with the killing of bin Laden.
Regardless of this, al-Suri‟s treatise demonstrates that al-Qaeda is evolving towards a
model of jihad that is independent of hierarchical organizations. Al-Suri‟s call for individual
operations – carried out by single members or small cells – has materialized in the growing list
of lone jihadists. Al-Qaeda has intentionally constructed an organization that is not dependent
on hierarchical institutions. As demonstrated in this project, al-Qaeda‟s aims and tactics have
moved toward a network that does not necessarily depend on the presence or institutional
integrity of any one entity.
The recent arrest (May, 2011) of three young men in Germany appears to add some
validity to these claims. According to media sources, these men were arrested as part of a
conspiracy to attack a German city. They were overheard (though electronic eavesdrop) making
a bomb and discussing their planned target, attempting to decide where it is that they might
affect the largest number of civilian casualties. The leader of the group- A Moroccan who had
lived in Germany for all of his life - was thought to be under order from al-Qaeda. This man was
recruited to an Al-Qaeda training camp along the Afghan-Pakistan border to receive training. He
then re-entered Germany and recruited the other two members of the cell. German officials,
after releasing some details of the investigation, noted that they believed that the aborted attack
was reflecting of a deliberate and wide-scale policy by al-Qaeda to encourage “home grown”
terrorism. The echoes of al-Suri‟s treatise ring loud and clear.

431
Al-Adel is a top al-Qaeda military commander still wanted by the FBI for his alleged involvement in American
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. He may also have been involved in the assassination of Egyptian
president Anwar Saddat.

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 The militant Islamist community has responded to bin Laden‟s death with both disbelief,
and calls for revenge. A recent post on a jihadi website noted:

"America and the community of disbelief must know that Osama's soldiers and religion
did not and will not die, Allah willing. We are determined, Allah willing, [to take] revenge,
revenge, revenge. If he is alive, we will take revenge, and if he is a martyr, we will take revenge.
We will not forget our religion, which you have insulted, and our prophet, whom you have
mocked... We are your soldiers, O Osama! By Allah, how good you are, dead or alive."432

At this point, the al-Qaeda narrative continues. As noted by Robert P. Asprey, “but,
victory is an illusory word.”

432
The Middle East Media Research Institute, May 5, 2011.

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 APPENDIX A

TRANSLATION OF THE GLOBAL ISLAMIC

RESISTANCE CALL; CHAPTER TWO, SECTION 1

Chapter two: the sharia laws under the current circumstances

Section two: The Sharia laws in this reality/situation

Summary: In short, we believe that the sharia has determined the jihad is an individual
duty ( ‫ )ف‬on every Muslim in a situation of this kind today (under the current
circumstances). This is what the Sharia laws have ruled.

And , the Sharia‟s proof on that, it is as clear as the light of day, as we will show, by
God‟s will (if God so wills it). And the Jihad is an individual duty today [that is
incumbent] on all the Muslims from many faces (from every dimension). And we
provide the logical and intellectual proof/evidence on this [issue/matter] and intend to
impress even those for whom the Shariah is not enough to convince. There is no choice
besides God‟s choice. It must come from (be based on) the basics of the creed (basics of
faith) and not the just opinion after opinion.

And this is the truth: A national resistance to this foreign infidel ( ‫ ) ا ف‬occupation, and
the apostate power/forces ( ‫ )ا ق‬collaborating with it, and plying into the chests of
Muslims, is a required duty ( ‫ا‬ ‫ )ف‬determined by ( ‫ ) ق‬the Islamic Shariah, and
is a truth that is perceived by a sound mind ( ‫)ا ق ا س‬.

As is the case, all evidence is consistent with correct Islam as well as the demands of
reason, in all time and all places.

There are important shariah rulings ( ‫ )اح‬relating to the situation of Muslims today
incumbent on ( ) the Islamic scholars (Ulema) ( ‫ء ااسا‬ ) and the leaders of

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the awakening and the jihad which the sharia declares for the people, we will recall here
their importance in short order (in short cut) ( ‫“ ) غ ااخ‬in the interest of time” , and
we leave the details of its execution/performance/carrying out ( ‫ )ا اء‬until the second part
of this book.

And among that which the legitimate evidence that has been determined ( ‫ ) ق‬to be the
most important among the rulings in the current situation of the Muslims
( ‫) اق ا س‬, are the following:

First: The lands of Islam today are under direct or indirect occupation from enemies.
And jihad is the individual duty (required duty of all) ( ‫ )ف‬of all Muslims as a unit
( ‫ا‬ ‫)ا س‬.

Second: The governments of the lands of Islam today are such that they are apostates and
infidels. They have changed the laws and their rulings with other than what God has
revealed ( ‫ا‬ ‫) ا‬. They are infidels, and they have betrayed God and his Messenger
and the believers.

Third: The revolt against the ruler that is in retreat against Islam or is an apostate is a
collective obligation of all Muslims ( ‫ف‬ ‫ا‬ ‫)ا س‬.

Fourth: The rulings of the Islamic Shariah have determined definitively ( ‫ ) ا‬that
those whom cooperate with the apostates are apostates and unbelievers, and requires that
they be combated.

Fifth: The rulings of the shariah have determined the necessity or the legality of
combating apostasy against the Islamic religion, over their spirit, honor, and money.

And we shall address the evidence of these rulings in some detail.

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First: the lands of Islam in the situation of occupation ( ‫اح ا‬ ‫ )ح‬and assault ( ‫ا‬ )
and invasion ( ‫ )غ‬by the enemies, and jihad of the invaders today is an individual duty
imposed upon all Muslims today in concert ( ‫ا‬ ‫ا س‬ ‫)ف‬.

As we have established in the first section below the title “The Situation of Muslims
Today”, it has become recognized among the Muslim today, as all the sane have
understood ( ‫ق‬ ‫ل‬ ) , that the entirety of our lands, from border to border is
occupied by the enemies. And on behalf of their deputies, and the heavy military
presence of the crusaders, spreading their bases without deferment with complete
economic occupation, that cross the economic power of monopolies and the spread of
intelligence ( ‫ )اس‬networks and security position ( ‫اا‬ ‫) ال‬. And here is
America today reoccupying the Muslim world anew /again ( ) in the clear light of
day ( ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬ ). It has occupied Afghanistan directly. It has spread its control to
Pakistan and central Asia. And here is the occupation of Iraq. And they have distributed
( ) hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey and the
southern Levant and in Egypt and the Horn of Africa and North Africa. And here is Bush
announcing that he will direct onto Muslim lands a crusading campaign/ “crusade” ( ‫ح‬
‫ )ص‬and with him are the European NATO allies in addition to the alliance the Israeli
President whom occupies Palestine, and is preparing to demolish the sacred mosque and
the expulsion of the rest of the Muslims there ( ‫ا س‬ ‫ق ف‬ ‫)ط‬.

And? What did the Sharia rule for conditions such as these? And what do the rulings of
the religion impose on every Muslim? The jihad is devotional and a duty that God
imposed on Muslims and it is a constant (enduring/fixed) ( ‫ )ث‬reoccurring ( ‫ ) ا‬in the
Quran and the Hadith during the time of the Prophet (God‟s blessing and peace upon
him) …

The following was included in the book of sheikh Mujahhid Sahid Abd Allah Azzam,
sheikh of the Arab Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the Russian Jihad – may god‟s
mercy be upon him – we excerpt the following from it:

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The Jihad against the infidel ( ‫ا ف‬ ) is of two types:

The jihad of the student (the student of the apostates in their land, those who study the
apostates in their own land?) ( ‫ا‬ ‫ا ف ف‬ ‫( )ط‬voluntary jihad) wherever apostasy
exists, because the apostates are not congregating to fight the Muslims. And the fighting
is an obligation (on the community as whole) ( ‫لف‬ ‫ )ف‬and the minimum of this
obligation is …. Then God‟s Mercy claimed that he is in the place of Martyrs.:

The Jihad of repulsion ( ‫ا ف‬ ) (the repulsion, driving away – ‫ – ف‬of the apostasy
from our lands) and this becomes an individual duty/obligation ( ‫ )ف‬- the most
important duty. It applies in the following situations:

The first: if the infidel has entered Muslim lands.

The second: if the apostasy descends into Muslim lands
The Third: if the Imam mobilizes the individuals, or a “people of God” whom are present
among them.
The fourth: If the infidel captured ( ‫ )اس‬a group of Muslims

Then spoke the Sheikh, the son of God, the mercy of God, on the first case on the descent
of apostasy into the land of the Muslims. And he said:

“In this situation, those who preceded and succeeded us ( ) ‫ ا ف ا س ف‬and the jurists of
the four schools, and the narrators, and the expositors in the entirety of the Muslim age
without exception, agreed that the jihad in these circumstances ( ‫ ) ح ا ح‬is clearly an
individual duty [imposed] on those whose lands which are being attacked by infidels,
and those among whom are near them. Wherein the son will rise up without the
permission of his father, and the wife without the permission of her husband, and the
debtor without the permission of his creditor. And if there are not people of this land,
or if they fall short, or if they are idle the individual duty transfers ( ‫ ) س‬to a circular
form ( ‫ائ‬ ‫ )ش‬, onto the closest, to the next most closest. And if they are not sufficient,

185
or if they fall short, it is effective on those whom come after them, and those following.
Until the individual duty prevails throughout the land ( ‫ل‬ ‫)اا‬.”

And then the Sheikh, the Mercy of God, {Azzam} summarized an outline ( ) of the
evidence on this [matter] in the Sunni schools and their jurists, and said:

First: The Hannafi Jurists

B. „Abdeen stated in his commentary, “that it is an individual duty if the enemy mounts
an attack on the mouths of the mouths of Muslims, and it becomes an individual duty on
those whom are near the enemy. So that those whom are far away from the attack, it is a
community duty if it is not invoked (specifically) upon them. It is invoked upon them if
there is a shortage in those whom are near the resistance against the enemy. And if there
is not a shortage, but nevertheless they are lazy and do not strive, then the individual duty
is assumed ( ‫ ) ف‬onto those who follow them like prayer and fasting. They are not
permitted to leave, and then, that [the individual duty] is assumed on to all the Muslims
East and West at this stage ( ‫اا‬ ).”

Further evidence is ( ) this Fatwa issued by Kassani and likewise Ibn Najeem …And
furthermore by ibn Alhmam

Second: The Maliki‟s

It is reported in a footnote, in the second section, page 174. “And the jihad must surprise
the enemy: This is an order that is incumbent on every individual (man?) ( ‫ ) اح‬women
and slave and youth. And they ought to migrate there (to the place of jihad) and they will
not be prevented by their guardians, their spouses or the imam ( ‫ا‬ )

Third: The Shafii‟s

It is reported in the conclusion of ‫ا ح‬, in the eighth section on page 58, “If they
enter our lands, and there became between them and us limited space, even he who owes

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a payment must wage the jihad. The jihad is incumbent upon the poor the young, the
enslaved, those in debt, and women.”

Fourth: The Hanballis

It is reported in Ibn Qaddamah in section 8, page 345: “The Jihad is necessary/incumbent

( ‫ا‬ ) in three situations:

1. If the armies have engaged.

2. If the infidels enter into a land, it is incumbent/necessary unto its people (the land‟s
people) to fight and drive them out.
3. If the Imam mobilizes the people they must [respond to ] the call to arms.”

The Sheikh of Islam, Ibn Taymiyyah stated: “As for the fighting to push out [the enemy]
( ‫ا ف‬ ‫ )ق‬it is the most intense type of fighting on the sacredness and the religion, so it
is necessary ( ‫ ) ا‬to have consensus ( ‫ )ا‬that the aggressor enemy corrupts the
religion and the land, and this is something that must be done, and does not require
certain conditions. Rather, to push out [the enemy] to the extent/degree that is possible
[as much as possible] and our scholars stipulate for this.

And Ibn Taymiyyah stated in the fourth section of the fatwa on page 608: If the enemy
enters into Muslim lands then undoubtedly it is incumbent upon those whom are most
near in proximity (the closest and the next closest, ‫ف اق‬ ‫ )ااق‬to expel them, as the
Muslim land in its entirely is like one land (united) ( ‫ا اح‬ ‫) ا‬, and one is required to
answer the call to arms ( ‫ا ف ا‬ ‫) ا‬, without the permission of one‟s father or
creditor, on this [matter] the texts of Ahmad are explicit.

Moreover, Sheikh Abd Allah Azzam supplemented [the above] with the following
evidence, which states: “And that is known as the general/communal/universal
(communal?) ( ‫ )ا ف ا‬call to arms, moreover, the evidence for the

187
general/communal/universal call to arms is stated: God said, ( To whom belongs Might
and Majesty): “Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and
struggle, with your goods and your persons, in the cause of God. That is best for you, if
ye (but) knew.” { Quran 9:41; “ ‫ا‬ ‫} )" ا س‬

And the verse before it came in order to regulate the agony/torment and displacement
through a sanction for [those whom] abandon the call to arms. And no torment but to
leave their duty is forbidden ( ‫)ح ا‬, as stated by God in chapter 9 ( ‫ا‬ ‫ )ا س‬of the
Quran, in verse 39: “Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and
put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least For God hath power
over all things.”

As stated by Ibn Kathir (God‟s Mercy be Upon him): God (the Exalted) commanded the
General/communal/universal call to arms ( ‫ ) ا ف ا‬on His prophet (God‟s Mercy and
Blessings Upon Him) during the time of the Battle of Tabuk to fight God‟s enemies from
among the infidels of Rome from among the people of the book {protected minority
religious classes} which led al-Bukharri (God‟s Mercy Upon him) to the
classifications/categorizations (A section on the necessity of the call to arms and what is
obligated from the jihad and its intention).

And he cited the following verse, and there was a general/communal/universal call to
arms because it came to the knowledge of the Muslim‟s ears (The Muslims heard/came to
know) that the Romans were preparing on the border of the peninsula for an attack on the
land, just imagine how much more so if the infidels entered Muslim lands, does the call
to arms not take on even more primacy/urgency ( ‫ا ف ا‬ ‫?)أفا‬

As stated by Ibn Talha (may God be pleased with him) in his important/exalted
explanation (as neither did he nor the youth who heard Allah give any excuse) of the
second section of page 144. Ibn Katheer shortened the explication, and Hassan al-Bassri
stated: “In hardship and ease.”

188
And Ibn Taymiyyah stated in section 28 page 358, “If the enemy intends an attack on the
Muslims, It becomes incumbent to expel them/drive them back, as stated by the
Almighty, in Q 8: 72. “But if they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them.”
As ordered/instructed ( ‫ )أ‬by the Prophet (God‟s Blessings and Peace Upon Him) to aid
the Muslims (or Muslim victory) is the same (even if) as if the men were mercenaries
hired to kill, or if they weren‟t?

That is required to the greatest extent possible ( ‫حس اا‬ ‫ ) ا‬of every individual
person ( ‫فس‬ ‫ )ل اح‬who ought to align himself with the many, the few, those who are
walking and those who are riding [to the battle] just as the Muslims were at the time they
were besieged by the enemy at the battle of the Trench. God did not give permission for
anyone to leave.”

Al Zahri stated : Saiid bin Ilmaseeb went out and revolted and in the process lost one of
his eyes And he was told that he was defective, and he replied, “God mobilized the weak
and the strong ( ‫ )ا ف ف ا ق‬so I cannot (sit out of the hostilities) as the war has extended
mourning ( ‫ )ا س ا‬and …? Narrated by al-Qurtubbi according…

Sheikh Abd Allah Azzam (The Mercy of God) with evidence of the universal call to arms
and says:

1. God (Great and Almighty) stated, “…and fight the Pagans all together as they fight
you all together. But know that God is with those who restrain themselves.” (K 9: 36).

Ibn al- Arabi Stated: All means of the people around them from every corner and
situation.

2. And the Great and Almighty [God] stated, “And fight them on until there is no more
tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith in God altogether and
everywhere.” (Sura Anfal: K 8: 39). The oppression and tumult [referred to in the verse]
is polytheism. This was stated as so by Ibn Abbas al-Saadi [Muhammad Alawi al-
Maliki]. Qurtubi said [the same] in section 2- 203. And the attack of the infidels, and

189
their seizure/occupation homes and the nation, is threatening to [our] religion. And the
demonstration of doubt in the creed requires fighting in defense of the faith/religion and
the self and honor and treasure.

As stated by the Prophet (God‟s Blessings and Peace be Upon Him), “There is no Hijrah
after the conquest of Mecca (‫ )ا ف ح‬but rather Jihad and intentions/resolve therefore
mobilize yourselves (respond) if you are called to arms (narrated by Bukhari).

Therefore, if the nation is mobilized the jihad is required ( ). Or: If the nation is
mobilized the jihad is required. And in the situation where the infidels attack the nation
mobilizes for the defense of its religion.

And if the nation is mobilized, and there is a shortage of Muslims, the duty extends
outward. As stated by Ibn Hajr in the commentary of this Hadith, which came during the
opening of Barii, Part 6 page 20. Qartubbi Stated, “Whoever learns of a weakness of the
Muslims against/in relation to their enemies and learns that he is able to reach them and
he can help them to draw back, he also bears [the duty] to expel them ( ‫ا‬ ‫)ا‬.

“We are not aware (have knowledge of) the any controversy/disagreement in any law
prohibiting the killing of a man not keeping watch over his sword by another man. That
the Muslims (may) kill him.” And in this situation, - the aggressor - if he is killed, then
he is in the fire (in Hell) then he will be in hell, even if he was a Muslim. And as for the
just, if he is killed, then he is a martyr. These are the rulings of Sael. And if the infidels
Muslim ground/territory, wherein/such that the religion and the land and the
soul/person/self and the treasure is exposed [to danger] or may disappear. Isn‟t it is
required/incumbent on Muslims in this situation [of attack on Muslim territory] to expel
infidels and the infidel nation.

4. The categories of oppressive/unjust combat: As stated by God, great and almighty: “If
two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if
one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other then fight ye (all) against the
one that transgresses until it complies with the command of god; but if it complies then

190
make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for God loves those who are fair (and
just).” (K 49: 9). If god prescribed/obligated categories of oppressive/unjust combat
among the faithful to preserve the unity of the Muslims and their religion and the
protection of their land, and their resources, then how must it be that the laws in regard to
combat of the nation of the aggressive/tyrannical infidels? Is it not the first [obligation?]
and more likely obligation?

5. On the limits of banditry, stated the almighty: “The punishment of those who wage war
against God and His Apostle, and strive with might and main for mischief through the
land is: execution and crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides
or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and as a heavy punishment is
theirs in the hereafter.” (Maida. K 5: 33).

This is the law regarding those who wage war against God and His Apostle ( ‫)ا ح‬
amongst the Muslims, who intimidate the Islamic nation and who [spread] corruption (
‫ ) فس‬among the earth and tamper? ( ) with the people‟s money and property. So
how can it not be an obligation among the Muslims to fight the infidel nations that
corrupt the people, their religion, and their money and property? And isn‟t it more likely
that this is so?

This is the evidence and justification for the universal call to arms ( ‫)ا ف ا‬: if the
infidel enters Muslim land, to expel the enemy is the most important obligation after the
faith. And if we consider the Muslims today, we would find that the jihad has to come
from all directions on the earth. And this theory is the first door (and it applies to the
enemies in most Muslim countries).

There is Muslim country after country today, occupied by infidels, from the Jews as
demonstrated in the country of Palestine, and parts of the Levant, or from the Crusades,
the lands of Bosnia and the Balkans, and Chechnya and Caucasus…

191
And the Muslim republics in central Asia and the Philippines, among others. Or by
Pagans, as in the case of Cashmere, which is occupied by Hindus, and East Turkistan and
parts of south east Asia that are occupied by the Chinese, among others. And if all of
these countries were to adjoin…

As for the rest of the Muslim and Arab countries, within them the House of Islam and its
Kaaba, and the Mosque of the Prophet (God‟s Blessings Upon him). These are occupied
in an indirect manner through the sanction of the Crusaders and the Jews, on behalf of the
apostate rulers, and their hypocrite agents who put their armies in the service of the
infidels. Led by America and her friend (Ally) Israel and their Crusader Alliance and
their crusader Allies, who have filled the country‟s military bases – both air and sea. And
through this manner alone, they occupied the land. They assemble their troops in
centralized military bases, without deployment, and are satisfied with the deployment of
the apostates and hypocrites to their armies who act on behalf of the occupier. Then the
crusaders emerge their forces from the central bases in a time of need. And it is
sufficient that we learn America and its Crusader Allies prefer the Arabian Peninsula
above two hundred thousand soldiers and weapons and our disgrace is equal to (or
worth?) a million soldiers, who can be transferred within weeks of the time they are
needed.

And in this evil/cancerous manner, the military forces congregate within central bases.
And the reliance on these apostate forces precludes the Muslims. And they permit the
apostate rulers in their claims/alleged of independence. And the scholars of the Sultans
(ulema?), to distract the people from jihad, and call them to obedience to the apostates.
Resources and country are occupied, revolutions looted, and the infidels recognize the
believers …

And God‟s law is disabled, and the world of the infidels is the highest, the righteous are
in prisons and torture chambers, and the observer studies the conditions of the land of the
Two Holy Sites and the Levant and Egypt and north Africa and Turkey and Pakistan and
African and the cause of their conditions appears in this way an afflicted picture.

192
And if we come to the second item of the categories of obligatory jihad, and it is: the
convergence of the believers against the infidels. If we do not achieve it in every Muslim
land in its very roots of its understanding, and if in a way that is very injurious, as the
crusader infidels have spread themselves wide, and the infidel apostates, their forces and
ranks are confirmed to be in every inch of Muslim lands. Through hundreds of thousands
of deaths of soldiers and police and intelligence and security officers and spies and
informers…not to mention the thousands of crusader soldiers in the central bases, which
is a reminder in every country. So that a Muslim may stand to defend and abide by his
religion and only to snatch it from the hands of the soldiers and to monitor the eyes of the
spies!!

Will this confrontation between the ranks of the infidels against the ranks of the
believers, or not yet? If we need our sheikhs to understand/perceive this and to be moved
by it, that congregated all those soldiers, and the intelligence officers and spies through
one united front standing before the mosques and standing before the doors of their
homes.

And if we come to the third item and it is, the alert/call of the Imam .

And there is not on the whole face of the earth today a single Imam who is legitimate, but
what there is available today are those who wage war (rebel) against God and his prophet
in a land of corruption. And they all support the colors of the infidels from the Jews, the
Crusaders and the pagans…

And there is not a legitimate imam to call the people to arms for the jihad. But the Imams
of Apostasy and the unbelief continue to call people to arms against the believers. So has
the jihad, in the absence of a legitimate Imam, been quenched?

For who else will expel the aggressor otherwise?

193
The truth is that God has enjoined all his believers in the entire world. There is not a
Muslim country that does not have standing within it advocates for guidance. From
believing Ulema, or honest missionaries, or those who are leading the jihad faithfully.
They have called the people to Jihad and to the promotion of virtue and the prevention of
vice, and have called them to arms. And even if every Muslim land was missing the
example of these Imams and righteous leaders of the jihad, it remains to say that in regard
to this obligation, the Islamic nation is one. And, from an Islamic viewpoint, it does not
recognize the borders drawn by the crusaders between our nations, and the way they have
culled between our nationalities, and their constructed flags and passports. The Islamic
nation is one and remains one. And it will not abandon the leaders/commanders of the
jihad that have preached the people to their religion and called them to arms. And it is
required that the Muslim nation respond to their call to religion and to arms to expel the
attacker. As was done during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan by the Sheikh
Abdallah Azzam (God‟s Mercy Upon him). And those who stood with him in the
Universal call to arms of the jihad were from the scholars (Ulema) of Pakistan and
Afghanistan and others. And among them were all of the Sheikhs (prominent leaders)
and commanders of the groups? And the calls for Jihad spread out among all of the
Muslim lands. And the best example today is that of Sheikh Osama bin Laden (May God
Keep him) who is calling the Muslims to jihad against the Americans and the Jews today.
And likewise many from the ulema and the advocates of the jihad came to resist??? From
Arab lands and the Persians in Iraq and Chechnya and Palestine and the Philippines and
Indonesia, among others. And the Muslims are required to respond.

And if we turn to the fourth item of the obligatory jihad, and that is: if the enemy has
imprisoned some of the Muslims. What can be said, and how will we respond, and for
what reason?

 The number of Muslim youth who are kidnapped from countries around the world
and placed in the American Guantanamo prison has exceeded 700 prisoners from
different nations, and this is according to American sources. And there is a
similar number that are in American prisons in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

194
 And an even greater number are Muslim youth are prisoners in European prisons
(Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Belgium and Italy).
 And in Russia, their numbers are in the thousands. And like them there are those
in Cashmere and the Philippines, Eretria, the countries of Africa, and lands in
central Asia and the land of Turkistan.
 And as for the prisons of the Tyrants, the Arab and Muslim countries, like Saudi
Arabia and Egypt and North Africa and Turkey and Pakistan. And the figures
published by human rights organization, and amnesty international reports that
tens of thousands within one country alone!! And this is a truth that is published
and not an imagined exaggeration.
 And as for Palestine, we see in the world news every day of the death of hundreds
and the imprisonment of thousands. And the Jews imprisoned, in only one day
of the Intifada more than a thousand prisoners. And in this way the imprisonment
has also reached the women, girls, and in fact, the children????
 And incidents of killing, and torture, and rape and dishonor to all men and
women. There is no country that is free of this! And for this reason the jihad is
incumbent, or is this still obscure?

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 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. New York:
HarperSanfrancisco, 2005.

Ahmed, Farook and Oubai Shahbandar, “Improving Information Operations in Iraq and the
Global War on Terror.” Small Wars Journal (June 28th, 2008): 3.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/print/improving-
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 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Nahed Artoul Zehr was born in Rehovot, Israel in 1981 and immigrated to the New York City,
New York in 1989. After two years in America‟s “Big Apple” she spent the rest of her
formative years back and forth between Israel and Fort Dodge, Iowa, and graduated from Fort
Dodge Senior High in 1999. She attended the University of Iowa, earning a B.A. in both
religious studies and political science. In 2010, she completed an M.A. in Religious Studies, also
at the University of Iowa. She received a PhD in religion from Florida State University in the
summer of 2011, and is a Minerva Research Fellow at the United States Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island.

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