May 18, 2020

THE USE OF TERRORIST LISTS IN COUNTERTERRORISM: THE CASE OF THE

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Subject: International Terrorism and Organized Crime 

ABSTRACT

After more than 50 years of armed conflict in Colombia, the Colombian Government
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) reached an agreement and
announced peace on November 12, 2016. One of the largest, complex and resilient
armed groups in Latin America throughout history, announced its abandonment of
violence and establishment of a legal political party. This decision prompted the
European Union to remove the FARC from its autonomous designated terrorist list. The
current research examines the justification behind the initial decision to include, and
later remove, the FARC from this list and assesses the consequences for both the
FARC and the conflict the conflict as a whole.
Introduction

The Colombian history have been affected by a decade long civil war between the
Colombian government and most notably the revolutionary non-state armed group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Throughout history, the FARC
have received various label such as insurgency group, belligerent group and terrorist
organization and the discussion regarding the classification of the FARC still remains
(Elfwering, 2013). The conceptual struggle have made an impact on the organization
itself and the social and political environment of the Colombian conflict. Among the
actors that publicly labelled the FARC as a terrorist group was the European Union with
the inclusion of the organization on its autonomous terrorist list in 2002 (Statewatch
Observatory, 2002).

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conceptual difficulties and rationale behind
the classification of armed groups by looking at the European Union’s inclusion and
subsequent removal of the FARC from its autonomous terrorist list following the 2016
Peace Deal. The first part of the paper will provide a theoretical framework regarding
the use of terrorist lists as a tool of counterterrorism. Due to the nature of the topic, the
definition of terrorism is a central part of this section. This section lays the foundation of
a deeper analysis of the characteristics of the FARC and how these characteristics have
influenced the classification of the FARC. The extensional restraint have limited the
focus to the European Union’s approach regarding the labelling of the FARC. The two
sections aims at answering the guiding research question of this paper: to what extent
was the removal of the FARC from the European Union autonomous terrorist list
justified by the organization’s aptness with the definition of terrorism?

Terrorism: a definitional issue

A theoretical framework concerning terrorism and counterterrorism is essential for

understanding the conduct of labelling of terrorist group as the requirement that these

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actors engage in acts of terrorism is essential for the justification of the classification
(Elfwering, 2013). Justification behind public decisions to include a group on an official
list of designated terrorists is essential in order to receive legitimacy and support for the
decision. However, the definition of terrorism has become subject to debate due to the
fact that there is no universal definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2004). The lack of one
single definition has aroused various interpretations regarding an act of terrorism and
led to the development of separate definitions by various governmental and non-
governmental institutions.

Difficulties regarding the development of one single universal definition can considered
as a result of the complexity and changing nature of terrorism throughout history. New
technology and a changing political and social environment has opened up new
possibilities in terms of engaging in acts of terrorism (Kurtulus, N., K., 2010). David
Rapoport separates the history of terrorism into four so-called historical waves in which
each period is characterized by certain predominant patterns. The four waves have
been labelled the Anarchist wave (1878-1919), the Anti-Colonial wave (1920s-1960s),
the New Left wave (1960s-1990s), and the current Religious wave starting in the late
70s (Rapoport, D. C., 2004). These four waves may have overlapping features,
particularly in terms of modus operandi, but the general pattern makes them
distinguishable to one another. 

Despite the changing character of terrorism throughout history and the subsequent lack
of a universal definition, one can find certain commonalities across the various
definitions of terrorism. Daniel Byman (2014) have abstracted some fundamental
characteristics that is consistently repeated in definitions of terrorism. These
characteristics can be summed up as the use of violence or the use of force to produce
fair and create a psychological effect on the targeted society, with a fundamental
political goal (Byman, 2014). At present, most official state and non-state actors include
similar elements as the ones established by Byman. However, some deviations exists,
making the conjunction of the topic problematic. The myriad of various definition is
making it easier for actors to interpret acts of terrorism as they wish (Crenshaw, 2010)

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Terrorist List as Counter-terrorism instruments

Designated terrorist list are official lists entailing actors engaged in terrorism, with the
purpose of harming this organizations by restricting their abilities to operate (Crenshaw,
2010). Financial regulations and concerted international effort aims to restrain the
enlisted entities in order to obstruct their possibilities of revenue, thus also their ability to
operate its violent activities and the first actor to create a such terrorist list of significant
character as part of their strategy of counterterrorism was the U.S. State Department
under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996 (Topaloff, L.K., 2014).
The UN general Assembly later adopted the International Convention for the
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism in 1999 and hands out an obligation to its
members to undergo a process of identification, detection, freezing and seizure of any
funds linked to individuals or groups considered as terrorist, and criminalizes the
provision or collection of funds for the purpose of terrorist acts.

After the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States and the subsequent “war on terror” ,
a large number of countries and other actors followed the path of the United States by
creating autonomous terrorist lists (Topaloff, L.K., 2014). This included the European
Union, in which an autonomous terrorist list was created in 2002. The definitional
problem of terrorism is a central issue of the functioning and efficiency of these terrorist
lists as various actors apply different criteria and procedures when analyzing possible
candidates for their lists (Crenshaw, 2010). Convergence of these procedures is
furthermore difficult as the process is often both secret and excluded from review of
external review. Hence, deviating conduct regarding the use of terrorist lists is likely to
continue being a subject of debate as actors do not always agree on the content of
these lists.

The European Union and designated terrorist lists

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The EU’s definition on terrorism in the Common Position 2001/931 can be seen as a
direct result of the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United
States (Bures, O., 2006). September 11, 2001 constituted a distinctive change in terms
efforts on counterterrorism across the globe. One of these actors was the European
Union, where the perception of terrorism as a threat to the continent got considerably
enhanced in the aftermath of the attack. A new risk assessment was conducted and
procedures implemented accordingly, leading to the adaptation of the Common Position
2001/931.

The Common Position 2001/931/CFS, Article 1, section 3, defined a terrorist act can as
an act aimed to “seriously intimidate a population”, “unduly compelling a Government or
an international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act” and
“destabilizing and destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social
structure of a country or an international organization” by means of violence, kidnapping
or hostage-taking, damaging public property, seizing vehicles, dealing in lethal arms,
release of dangerous substances, threatening with terrorist acts, and directing a terrorist
group or participating in one (Council, EU., 2001). Despite a more lengthy and
descriptive character than the one provided by Byman, there are strong similarities
regarding the fundamental characteristics of this definition of terrorism.

In addition to a formal definition on terrorism, the legislative proposal also encompassed

the creation of a so-called terrorist list. The list ought to include individuals, groups, and
entities involved in terrorist acts in accordance with the definition of terrorism in the very
same legislative proposal (Council, EU., 2001). Inclusion on this list involves restrictive
measures imposed on the respective person, group or entity by the members of the
European Union and the supranational organization as a whole. Examples of such
measures are the freezing of assets and economic means that could possibly benefit
the proclaimed terrorist organization with the aim of limiting the capacity of conducting
acts of violence according to the official website of the European Council. Today, the
European definition of terrorism and the list of terrorism emerging from this Common

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Position is still in place and functioning. Proposals of listing and delisting can be done
by any internal or external actors, but the final decision is taken by the Council itself.

The supranational character of the European Union is one of the reasons why the
organization’s terrorist list has a larger impact on the enlisted individual, group or entity
opposed to many other terrorist lists established by governmental authorities (Topaloff,
L.K., 2014). The EU’s primary and secondary legislation is superior to domestic
legislation and cannot be applied based on the individual interpretation of each state.
The inclusion of an entity on this list consequently entail a joint action towards the
respective party by all member states. Today, the EU got one specific list for the al-
Qaeda and the Taliban and one so-called autonomous list for other terrorist actors that
are both founded on the UNSC Resolutions (Topaloff, L.K., 2014). The former is
connected to the UNSC Resolution 1267 of 1999 and the latter is connected with the
more comprehensive UNSC Resolution 1373 following the events of 9/11.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was Latin America’s oldest,
largest and most capable armed group in the 20 th century (Post, J.M., 2009). This
section of the paper will be taking a deeper look into the main characteristics of the
FARC guerilla in order to develop a contextual background. A broad understanding of
the specific features of the FARC guerilla is essential when analyzing the inclusion of an
armed group on national and international terrorist lists as these lists are justified by
some of the main characteristics of these groups. By analyzing some important
elements of the FARC, we obtain a better understanding of the motivation and capacity
of the group which determines their actions.

3.1. Origin and ideology 

The revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was created in 1964 as a left-wing armed
organization influenced by a Marxist-Leninist orientation in the midst of the Cold War

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(Post, J.M., 2009). Its emergence came as a response to the social inequalities that had
already been an issue leading to violent clashes between the left-wing and the right-
wing of Colombia. Only six years before the creation of FARC, the civil war between
Liberals and the Conservatives, often referred to as “La Violencia” due to its high
number of casualties, ended (Post, J.M., 2009). Despite the end of the civil war, social,
political and economic disorder continued to shade the country. The continuance of the
class struggle prompted the unification of peasants workers and landless rural workers
who had been largely affected by the civil war and the establishment of these rural
communities was the beginning of the FARC.

The groups ultimate goals was initially to seize control in Colombia by overthrowing the
government, however, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a significant
impact on the ideological foundation of the FARC. Communism lost a huge deal of its
appeal and influence across the world, including within the borders of Colombia.
However, the fall of the Soviet Union did not put a stop to the activity of the FARC.
Rather than fully abandoning the leftist ideology, the FARC resolved to the Bolivarian
ideology as an alternative to the Communist ideology. The Bolivarian ideology builds on
the idea of establishing an alternative government that is deemed more legitimate than
the official government and paved the path for its strategy to gain power at the
municipal level. More specifically, the Bolivarian ideology of the FARC was aimed at
providing social protection for the lower classes, agrarian reform, greater equality,
protection of human rights and a general protection of human rights according to the
organization itself (Rochlin, J., 2011). In spite of its divergence from the Marxist
ideology, change through revolutionary means was still considered as the only option to
transform economic and political structures in Colombia.

In tandem with the growth of FARC as a revolutionary organization in Colombia, the

organization began to provide various functions that is normally considered to be a task
of the government in territories in which they had seized control (Rochlin, J., 2011). This
functions entailed for instance health facilities, education and other public order
functions such as security and control. In other words, the FARC began governing part

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of Colombia in parallel with the democratically elected government. The strategy behind
the establishment of this governmental functions was a to increase the support of the
organization by increasing its own legitimacy on behalf of the government.

However, despite its efforts to take on state-functions and to delegitimize the

government, the organization struggled to convince the broader public and the
international community about its abilities to govern Colombia (Rochlin, J., 2011). Its
commitment to military strategies and finance through illegal activities such as
revolutionary taxation, kidnappings and involvement in organized crime, delegitimize the
group in the eyes of most citizens with the exception of those living in areas of
prominent coca cultivation. 

Modus Operandi: financial or political objectives?

The FARC utilized a combination of legal and illegal activities to finance its operations in
order to reach its objectives. Illegal activities involved actions such as revolutionary
taxation, kidnappings, extortion, armed robberies and organized crime (Sommer, D.,
2010). Drug trafficking have been considered as the most crucial element of the
organization’s funding and became predominantly extensive in the 1990s as a mean to
diversify the organization’s sources of revenue (Bagley B. M., 2005). The increasingly
comprehensive cocaine business in the bordering areas of Ecuador and Venezuela in
the 1990s, was in fact one of the main reasons why the FARC managed to expand
significantly and establish a high degree of independence in this period. 

Intensified efforts by the US under President Ernesto Samper to struck down of

narcotrafficking led to the destruction of the Cali Cartel as the most important drug cartel
in Colombia, created a vacuum in the criminal network in the 90s that was rapidly filled
by small-scale farmers involved in the production of illegal drugs (Crandall, R., 2001).
The FARC took advantage of the situation as these farmers were usually not in a
position to reject forced taxation imposed by the organization (Bagley B. M., 2005).
Financed by the increasingly growing drug business, FARC increased its relative power
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and could advance on other objectives such as seizing control over strategic territories.
Their strengthened position in Colombia made the peace negotiation of 1999 severely
difficult, or even counterproductive, as the FARC had little to gain from negotiating at
the time (Pecency, M., Durnan, M., 2006).

The successful involvement by the FARC in drug trafficking in terms of profit from
taxation spurred increased involvement in other illicit activities. As their revenues
increased, more money was invested in both legal and illegal projects (Bagley B. M.,
2005). This development was particularly significant as it reduced the level of
asymmetry between the FARC and the Colombian Government due to FARC’s
enhanced capacity in terms of personnel, training, and armament. FARC’s enhanced
capabilities resulting from increased revenue therefore significantly transformed the
Colombian battlefield and the first traditional combat is often considered to be the attack
at Las Delicias in 1996 in which a Colombian military base belonging to the state was
seized by FARC members and 60 soldiers were taken as hostages (Molano, 2000). The
enhanced involvement of the FARC in the narcotics business consequently had a
significant impact on the relationship between the FARC and the government.

The separation of illegal activities done with the purpose of profit and illegal activities
done to achieve a political goal have not been easy to determine in the case of the
FARC. In Dan Sommer’s book in which the modus operandi of different armed groups
are analyzed, Sommer argues that statistics implies that the acts of FARC are not
inconsiderate and only carried out in the sake of terror (Sommer, D., 2010, p.101).
Instead, they can be seen as attacks carried as a political statement or as a mean to
raise money. However, other scholars have had another perception of the attacks and
considered the FARC to be carrying out a large amount of indiscriminate attacks against
civilians (Gutiérrez, 2002).

Regardless of the purpose of the attacks, the target base of the FARC has been very
diverse and evolved over time. Public servants such as politicians and law enforcement
personnel, as well as civilians and public property, have been subject to attacks

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conducted by the organization (Latin America Studies, 2008). Civilians have also often
been the target of kidnapping for ransom to increase revenue, whereas public servants
have been kidnapped for political leverage. Advancement and specialization has been a
striking trend of the FARC over the decade long course of the conflict and the modus
operandi of the organization have thus been a subject of change.

Separation between armed groups: a definitional problem

The FARC have been given various labels such as insurgency group, belligerent group
and perhaps most prominent among the international community, terrorist group. The
difference between terrorism, insurgency and belligerent is not always clear as the
respective groups may have characteristics that fit in various classifications (Gupta,
2014). The use of terrorism have also become increasingly popular for non-state armed
groups such as insurgencies or belligerent groups in their overarching objective, and
groups may transform from being classified from one group to another. This trend have
made the separation between acts of terrorism and other types of warfare more
problematic. Despite the overlapping characteristics of such groups, the consequences
of the different classification may have dramatic consequences in terms of the rights
and duties of the organization under international law (Gupta, 2014). This is a significant
reason why there have been a great deal debate regarding the labelling of the FARC.

Insurgencies are commonly involved in what we call guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare
can in broad terms be defined as a set of tactics practiced by a minority group in order
to oppose the government or foreign occupying forces within a state (Schmid, 2004). A
central element is the asymmetric relationship between the combating forces in which
the non-state actor is much weaker than the confronting force. Rather than direct
confrontation, the guerilla group aims at psychologically and physically exhaust the
enemy. Guerillas also commonly establish military units and liberated zones that is used
as safe havens. One can easily withdraw certain commonalities between the definition
of guerilla warfare and the warfare of FARC against the Colombian government.

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The two most important elements that differentiate terrorism from other types of
violence is, however, that terrorism is directly targeting innocent people and that it
deliberately resorts to extreme violence against defenseless targets with the objective of
spreading terror among the targeted population (Schmid, 2014) These acts do not
coincide with the definitions of insurgency or belligerent groups as the perpetrators
follow the laws of war and the main target is considered combatants of the conflicting
party. The nature of the act is thus fundamentally different.  The systematic targeting of
civilians can be deemed as the tipping point in terms of the labelling of FARC as a
terrorist organization by the broader international community.

The FARC and the European Union

Strong disagreement within the European Union emerged when the proposal of adding
FARC guerilla to the European Union autonomous terrorist list entered the surface in
May 2002 (Vranckx, A., 2005). This discussion arose in spite of the noticeable
resemblance between the actions of FARC and the EU’s definition of terrorism. The
official definition of terrorism by the European Union included modus operandi such as
kidnappings, hostage taking, damaging public property, seizing vehicles and dealing in
lethal arms, which could all be considered as part of the FARC’s strategy. One could
also see a clear resemblance between the FARC and other groups that were already
included on the list in terms of modus operandi.

France and Sweden initially vetoed the proposal to include FARC on the European
terrorist list, arguing that its inclusion would aggravate the possibility of future peace
negotiations (Vranckx, A., 2005). However, the opposition by the two respective
countries switched resulting from one of FARC’s most lethal attacks against the civilian
population, on the 2nd of May 2002 in the Bojayá municipality. The incident is often
referred to as the Bojayá massacre as more than more than 100 people seeking shelter
in a church were killed (Vranckx, A., 2005). The Bojayá massacre changed the
perception of the Swedish government regarding FARC’s inclusion on the terrorist list.
FARC was officially included on the common European Union terrorist list on the 13th of

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June 2002 at the following Council meeting in Luxembourg. After the terrorist attack in
Madrid in 2004, the ELN was also included on the terrorist list after a prolonged period
of discussions as a response to the direct attack on European soil and its subsequent
enhanced focus on counterterrorism. With the inclusion of the ELN in addition to the
AUC and the FARC, the European Union’s terrorist list included the three largest non-
state armed actors in Colombia

Consequences of including FARC on the EU’s terrorist list

Being labelled as a terrorist organization has dramatic consequences of the legitimacy

and support of an armed group. Such labelling influence the perception of the group
changes as terrorist groups are generally associated with unjustified attacks against
civilians, and the public and their attitudes towards the group and its political goals shifts
accordingly (Kovacs, M. S., & Svensson, I., 2013). In the case of FARC, its recognition
as a terrorist organization was seen as a devastating decision as it delegitimized the
organization’s self-proclaimed status as freedom fighters. The delegitimization of the
FARC was, as explained in the former section, part of the EU’s intent to scrutinize the
support of the group. The organization’s inclusion on European terrorist list also has an
impact on the diplomatic relations between the countries of the European Union and the
FARC. Various countries had intended to provide political and diplomatic support in
order to facilitate peace negotiations between the Colombian government and illegal
armed groups prior to its inclusion on the list (Vranckx, A., 2005). The inclusion of FARC
in 2002 marks a visible decline, or almost stop, of these effort due to the prohibition to
engage with the FARC under EU law.

Finally, the inclusion of FARC on the EU’s terrorist list, also had direct economic
consequences for the FARC. Article 4 of the Common Position require members to
prevent the public from offering any form of support to the enlisted organization
(Council, EU., 2001). In other words, the inclusion of the FARC made it illegal under EU
law for any actor of the EU to make funds or economic resources available to the FARC
or to have any type of diplomatic relationship with the group. This entails that not even

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private corporations can trade or conduct any other form of legal transaction with the
organization. Opposed to profit coming from the illegal activities of the FARC, the
restricted access to economic resources by the European Union constituted a small
fraction of the overall revenue of the FARC. The enlistment of the FARC also restricted
the movement of group within the European borders. However, due to the geographical
distance between the European Union and Colombia and the largely local operational
scope of the FARC, these measures had a limited effect on the FARC as the case of
the freezing of economic funds and assets.

Rejection of the FARC as a terrorist organization

Despite the general understanding of the FARC as a terrorist organization in the first
decade of the 21st century, arguments rejected the classification continued to enter the
surface. A prominent opposer of the designation of FARC as a terrorist organization is
the former Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, in addition to the organization itself
(Staff, 2008). In January 2008, Chávez urged the government of Colombia under
President Uribe to recognize FARC as lawful combatants rather than a terrorist group in
accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and that the FARC was an army
with legitimate political objectives. The labelling of FARC as a belligerent group through
would entail that the FARC would be governed by the provisions of the Geneva
Convention, including distinct regulation of warfare such as the prohibition of targeting
civilians (Gupta, 2014) . This line of reasoning was further utilized by Chavez as an
incentive to recognize the FARC as a belligerent group. He believed that recognizing
FARC as such would restrain its violent acts such as the targeting of civilians, which
could be considered as terrorist acts due to their illegal character in accordance under
the Geneva Convention.

The proposal by Chávez to remove the FARC from designated terrorist list was rejected
by both the Colombian Government and the European Union in 2008 (Staff, 2008).
Obtaining the status as a belligerent group has numerous advantages as the

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organization would have to be treated as prisoners of war according to the 1949
Geneva Convention. The idea of considering the FARC as prisoners of war was
unacceptable for the Colombian President Uribe that blamed FARC for a large deal of
the social and economic suffering in the country. European Foreign Policy Chief, Javier
Solana, also swiftly rejected the proposal. Furthermore, the Washington Post wrote an
article in 2008 in which they criticized the justification of labelling FARC as a belligerent
group due to the fading role of the Marxist ideology (Weisbrot, 2008). Chávez argued
that the FARC had a legitimate objective, however, as we could see in the ideology part
of this paper, the Marxist ideology and ideological foundation as a whole became
relatively obscure with time. The Washington Post (2008) argued that the activities of
the FARC was no longer justified by ideological motives but by economic gain through
illegal means. The broad international understanding of FARC as a terrorist organization
also further reduced its chances of achieving the status of a belligerent or insurgency as
these labels cannot be combined with the label of terrorist organization.

The 2016 Peace Deal and the changing nature of the conflict

The Council of Europe officially suspended its restrictive measures against the FARC
on September 27, 2016 (European Union 1, 2016). This decision came after the formerly
Colombian President Santos’ request of its removal and only one day after the
Colombian peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC was
signed. The official decision to remove the FARC was justified by the fact that the group
had not engaged in acts of violence since the Colombian Government and the FARC
reached an agreement on 25 August 2016.

This decision to remove the FARC from the autonomous terrorist list of the EU took
place at a time when FARC members were still sitting on a large amount of weapons
and the outcome of the national plebiscite was yet to be determined. Hence, it is natural
to start questioning the justification behind the speedy removal of the FARC from
European Union terrorist list. Months without any violent attacks against civilians or

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government official, removed the most important feature of the FARC that had classified
the group as a terrorist organization in the first place.
However, the fact that it was a great deal of insecurity regarding the deal itself and
FARC’s compliance with its provision, was undeniable. Thus, the decision to remove the
terrorist designation imposed on FARC after only a few months of peace may be seen
as a premature decision for a group engaged in violent activities in more than 50 years.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at present,
Federica Mogherini, presented the removal as a symbol of the EU’s commitment and
support for the Colombian Peace Process (European Union 2, 2016). Mogherini further
stated the EU’s willingness and readiness to contribute in Peace Process through
financial and diplomatic support.

If FARC had remained on the EU’s terrorist list, it would pose a significant obstruction to
the intent of EU as a whole, and its members, to facilitate the peace process in
Colombia. Both Norway and Cuba played the role as mediators in the negotiation that
took place between 2012 and 2016 as they were not restricted by a designated terrorist
list such as the members of the European Union. The Norwegian involvement in various
peace negotiations worldwide has been made possible due to the fact that it is not a
member of the European Union and is not restricted by the EU’s laws regulating
relationships with terrorist organizations (Haspeslagh, S., 2013). Both countries were
later portrayed as significant actors in the process, in particular for the establishment of
trust between the conflicting parties.

Martha Crenshaw (2010) argues that terrorist designation lists includes various
drawbacks and unintentional consequences. Although its goal is to delegitimize the
organization, the stigmatization may have a dual effect. Apart from weakening the
legitimacy or credibility of the organization, it also destabilize the potential foundation of
negotiation (Crenshaw, 2010). The stigmatization that comes with the label of a terrorist
organization, may lead to a development in which the conflicting party will be less
inclined to negotiate with this actor as it entails a risks of delegitimatizing oneself.
Furthermore, the inclusion of groups on designated terrorist lists also limits the

15
possibilities of external state actors as this decision also freezes policy positions
(Crenshaw, 2010).

In the case of Colombia, this tendency became evident by looking at the external
influence in the conflict. The EU’s decision to include the FARC on its autonomous
terrorist list restrained the possibilities of facilitating future peace negotiation.
Simultaneously, it objective to harm the organization by freezing assets and restricting
the movement of FARC members was to a small extent efficient due to the
organization’s comprehensive local revenue base and local scope of the organization.
Based on this findings, the decision of the European Union can be seen as a result of
the lack success in their approach regarding the handling of the FARC rather than a
decision prompted by the changing character of the organization.

Conclusion

The disagreement regarding the FARC’s inclusion on the EU’s terrorist list and the
hasty decision to remove the FARC from the EU’s terrorist list is a clear indication of the
political character of terrorist lists. As these lists are often produced by government
official, they also represent national interest. The rejection of the first proposal to include
the FARC by Sweden and France was not justified by arguments stating that the FARC
did not fit under the organization’s definition of terrorism but rather than the inclusion of
organization would obstruct future peace negotiations. This line of argument was also
used when the EU decided to remove the FARC from the autonomous terrorist list of
the EU. Consequently, this findings indicates that the inclusion of exclusion of
individuals, groups or entities on the European Union list of designated terrorists is
largely influenced by political forces rather than the definitional ramifications. The lack of
one single definition of terrorism and commonalities with other types of armed attacks,
have created various labels when it comes to the classification of the FARC, fueling the
politicization of the inclusion and removal of entities or individuals on designated
terrorist lists. The trend is evident in the case of FARC in which various state and non-

16
state leaders have urged state or non-state actors to both include and remove the
FARC from various lists.

The purpose of the EU’s autonomous terrorist list can be deemed to restrict the capacity
of terrorist organization for the greater common good. However, empirical evidence
from the Colombian case and the inclusion of the FARC on the EU’s terrorist lists
demonstrate that these lists do not always function as they ought to. A prohibition
under law to obstain from dealing with terrorist organization increase the obstacles for
the funding and support of the organization but it may also constitute an obstacle for
future peace negotiation. In the case of FARC, the involvement of external actors
seemed to be the solution in order to achieve a breakthrough in the decade-long conflict
rather than the listing of the FARC on terrorist organizations. This development
indicates that the solution to restrain terrorist organization through designated terrorist
lists may vary tremendously depending on the context of the conflict.

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