Democracy's Time Constraints

Author(s): Juan J. Linz

Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique
, Jan., 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Democracy and Time. Temps et démocratie (Jan., 1998), pp.
19-37
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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International Political Science Review (1998), Vol. 19, No. 1, 19-37

Democracy's Time Constraints

JUAN J. LINZ

ABSTRACT. The present article explores a series of time issues that have
been largely ignored in democratic theory. It begins with discussing a
defining feature of democratic rule: its temporal delimitation. Democracy
is government pro tempore. Parting from this core assumption, the article
discusses, among other things temporal, the timing of elections; the time
requirements of efficient and accountable government; the interaction of
electoral cycles at different levels and their interference with other
societal cycles; the democratic ambivalence of term limits; the time scarci-
ties of both politicians and citizens; the temporal logics of direct democ-
racy; the value of governmental stability; and the complexities of
generational renewal. The article concludes with some reflections on some
neglected themes and pending challenges.

In the process of working on this article I went to the library to fetch books on
"Time." I found philosophical writings, analyses of historiographic concepts, fasci-
nating studies of time in different cultural traditions, a few more sociological analy-
ses, like Georges Gurvitch's La multiplicite des temps sociaux, which explores social
classes and time, and socio-economic-political systems and time. I found few
mentions of democracy and time.

Democracy as Government Pro Tempore

One of the defining elements of political democracy is that it is government pro
tempore.1 The idea of electing someone for life to exercise effective power, or repre-
sentatives for unlimited time (without ever having to stand again for election) does
not fit into our thinking about democracy. It seems however so obvious that in some
of the writings on democracy the temporal character of democratic rule is not
explicitly stated (and the authors would be surprised, if not disturbed, by our calling
attention to this fact).

0192-5121 (1998/01) 19:1, 19-20; 002525 ? 1998 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

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20 Democracy's Time Constraints

The pro-tempore character of democracy is one of the essential defining elements

that allows us to distinguish most democracies from other types of regime.2 In fact,
one of the tricks used by some semi- or pseudo-democracies to claim to be democ-
racies has been that they regularly hold elections (except that they are non-compet-
itive). The case of Mexico since the 1930s with the observance of the sexenio and
no re-election is paradigmatic.
It is this rule pro tempore that represents the maximum limitation to the potential
absolutism of the democratic principle. It is both the basis for the hopes of opponents
of a government in power, and the frustration for those having gained power in an
election to carry out a program facing the prospects of another election in a short
time. The time limit inherent in the requirement of elections at regular intervals is
therefore one of the main arguments for democracy but also one of the main reasons
why those very strongly committed to a particular conception of society, ideology and
program, who at any point in time might have had majority support, reject the incer-
titude that goes with regular elections. Once an opposition fears that there will be no
free competitive elections in a reasonable period of time, at that moment there is no
reason why it should recognize the legitimacy of majority rule, and in that sense the
rigid constitutionally fixed time limits rather than any pragmatic criteria for fixing the
date of elections, become functional and essential to democracy.
The relation between efficacy, the capacity to solve problems, and legitimacy is
modified largely by the time perspective of the citizens. There is the time dimen-
sion defined by the electoral process, but there is another based on expectations
about the future, on varying degrees of readiness to defer gratifications. It is the
"tunnel effect" of Albert Hirschman (1981: 39-58) which allows us to live in a
present of low efficacy with the confidence in that in x number of years things will
be better. In the absence of such a longer time frame the democratic process will
be accompanied by great incertitude, considerable volatility and turmoil or disen-
chantment. In difficult times politicians make an effort to expand the time frame
so that voters do not rush to make them accountable, give them a longer margin
of confidence, extend the "loan" of their votes, rather than recalling it early at the
first signs of failure (Rose and Mishler, 1996).
Democracy means tolerance of a government that one knew in advance would
not be good, or at least not as good as the defeated one voted for. Would that toler-
ance be possible if one expected that undesirable alternative to stay in power for a
very long time? The hope of the reverse of the outcome in a reasonable time, a
framework of a few years, a maximum defined a priori, is important for the accep-
tance of the democratic process (Przeworski, 1991: 10-19, 51).
What therefore are the implications for a dominant party, successful in election
after election for 12 or 16 years and for the opposition leadership and voters?

Authoritarianism as Unlimited Rule

Rule in non-democratic regimes is not defined as limited in time. With the ex

of a dictatorship in the classical Roman sense, which is defined as an eme
government for a limited time (Sartori, 1962), they are expected to last (
changing or alternating democratic governments). It is not accidental that when
are government changes they talk of a "changing of the guard." The fact is th
those regimes who define themselves as dictatorships nowadays do not set the
a time limit, although people may not forget that they originally talked a
undetermined limit. Only a revolutionary provisional government which, even

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 JUAN J. LINZ 21

it commits itself to building democracy, makes the "mistake" of the Portuguese of

promising elections one year hence to a Constituent Assembly, becomes time bound
(Shain and Linz, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996). The same was true for the Pinochet
regime when it institutionalized itself in the 1980 constitution and set a date for a
plebiscite on the extension of the mandate of the nominee of the Junta.
Personalized authoritarian regimes, which establish lifelong offices for their
leaders (such as Franco and Tito) offer the people only the hope of their resigna-
tion. People have the hope or fear-or both-that human beings are not immortal.
Personalized rule, as that in sultanistic regimes, leaves for opponents the hope of
an end, always too far away for opponents, but sometimes too soon catching them
unprepared for the event.3
Totalitarianism in principle defines itself as forever with its utopian vision of
time; the Tausendjahrige Reich or the advent of Communism after socialism. The
question in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR was whether their rule became too
personalized and the utopian or u-chronic perspective, was displaced by the concern
with succession after death. However, as Walzer (1983: 115-116, 119) has stressed,
totalitarianism has elements of exceptionality, of a mobilization difficult to sustain:
Veralltglichung, or day by day routinization, sets in and imperceptibly the faith in
the endless future wanes; detotalitarianization and a transition to post-totalitari-
anism sets in (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 38-65). The future disappears and the only
horizon becomes the present. Post-totalitarianism can last but with a weak legiti-
macy because the initial legitimation by its future orientation becomes hollow.
Collapse is possible. However, the succession crisis, in contrast to many authori-
tarian regimes, does not initiate the transition.
Transition to democracy throws people into the present, although there may be
a utopian moment, that later will explain the desencanto (disenchantment) noted by
Hirschman (1982: 10-45).
In the democratization process, timing has always been decisive: when to hold the
first free and competitive elections, whether to first hold a presidential or a legisla-
tive election, a nationwide or a subunit (such as in federal states) election, to hold
elections for a constituent assembly (unable to give a confidence or no-confidence vote
for a provisional government) or for a regular parliament (with constituent powers),
when to hold municipal elections (early or late), and whether or not to hold elections
after the approval of a new constitution. All those controversial choices have been
debated and are probably influential in the process of transition and perhaps of
consolidation of new democracies. There are examples for each or several of those
dilemmas in the countries of the "third wave." The conclusions we reach are often
based on non-demonstrable counterfactuals (Linz, 1986, 1994a; Shain and Linz, 1995
New democracies face two problems which involve (in my view and that of som
statesmen) two different time perspectives: to build lasting and workable, not ful
ad-hoc institutions, and to respond to immediate problems. Some democrats even
want (in my view, mistakenly) to separate those two tasks by electing a Constituent
Assembly to write a Constitution and a normal legislature (or provisional govern
ment) dealing with the most pressing job of governing. The first presumably
requires consensus building, the second more partisan choices.

Democratic Time Budgets

The pro-tempore character of democratic government makes it essential that
elections should take place with reasonable frequency.4 To make sure of that

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22 Democracy's Time Constraints

"reasonable" time limit, constitutions establish a maximum period anyone can

claim democratic legitimacy without holding an election (and thereby risking a loss
of power). That period may be shortened but not extended except under excep-
tional circumstances, such as in wartime.
Time, therefore, for the democratic politician is both a resource, since he is given
power independently of the changes in public opinion for a period of time, and an
extremely confining and limiting condition. It is therefore a scarce resource. There
can be little doubt that under the expectation of alternation, governments will have
to give up policies whose success, if at all, will come after the next election or will
have to try to carry out major policies in a hurry, very often without adequate prepa-
ration and even less adequate implementation. There are for democratic parties
and governments, not to mention for a president elected for one term only, ineli-
gible for reelection, certain pressures to carry out their policies within the limited
time span granted to them, encouraging what Albert Hirschman (1965: 313-316)
has described as the rage of vouloir conclure, the haste and ambitiousness of policy
formulations under the pressure of limited time.
The confining character of time in democratic politics is certainly the most effec-
tive and important limitation to democratic absolutism, the basis of freedom for
the citizen, but also almost inevitably a source of frustration and failure of
democratic leadership and of difficulty in making the governing majority account-
able to the electorate in a way that would be fair. The time bound character of
democratic power, the reduction of that time by increasing democratization and
politicization, particularly at the sub-national level, is likely to be one of the sources
of instability and inefficiency of democratic governments. Ultimately, at the core of
any analysis of contemporary democratic government and politics is the timing of
elections: either the rigid timing within the constitution, or the government's free
choice of the most opportune moment for an election, or the decision by an outside
authority such as a president to dissolve an assembly.

Timing Elections
How often should there be elections so that we could consider the government
democratically legitimated between elections? In a representative democracy one
solution would be to say whenever the government is defeated in a vote of confi-
dence, presumably because members of the legislature change their minds, reflect-
ing a change in public opinion in the society at large. That rule would have worked
before party discipline became so strong (as it is today) where only a revolt in the
ranks of the majority party is likely to have any effect, although it might still work
for coalition and minority governments.
However, principles like those of the Bonn Constitution that make the vote of
no-confidence dependent on the availability of an alternative majority, could in
theory lead to a perpetuation of a particular parliamentary majority, although not
of the government, until the date at which new elections would be imperative.
Certainly the principle of accountability of governments and representatives
requires frequent elections, but how frequent is then the question.
The rules of contemporary democracy fix an arbitrary time limit, sometimes
allowing for anticipated elections, but is there any possibility of justifying that time
limit on some pragmatic base? Presumably the need for efficient and effective
government which underlies the Schumpeterian theory of democracy should be the
basis for determining that time limit.

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 JUAN J. LINZ 23

Using these principles we would have to analyze the process and activity of a
democratic government to come up with a reasonable criterion that would assure
both accountability and efficiency. An analysis of the process of government would
suggest that the time given to the majority emerging from an election to govern
should include the following: (1) time to familiarize itself with the problems and
the operation of government, since we cannot assume that those elected would
already have experience in governing and be familiar with all the major problems
and the machinery of the state to deal with them; (2) time to formulate basic
policies; (3) time to enact the necessary legislation in the regular legislative process,
rather than by emergency legislation; (4) time to prepare and approve a budget
that would include funds to implement those policies and norms; (5) time to imple-
ment effectively those policies through the necessary administrative structures, to
make the necessary expenditures, etc.; (6) an opportunity to observe the results of
the implementation of those policies and time to make some corrections as a result
of the experience of the implementation of the decisions made; and (7) in the case
of symmetric bicameralism (as in many federal states) we would have to add the
time required for approval in the second chamber. In case of disagreement (as it
is likely when different parties are in the majority in each chamber) the concilia-
tion in committees or bodies like the German Vermittlungsausschuss would require
additional time.
It would make sense and be fair that only at this point the electorate would be
called back to the polls to express its approval or disapproval of the performance
of the majority that came to power in the previous election. In fact, to the time we
have added up on the basis of the political process of formulation, enactment and
implementation of policies, we would have to add sufficient time to prepare for new
elections and the campaign period itself.
It would be interesting to study on the basis of empirical cases how long govern-
ments should be granted power by the electorate to satisfy those criteria, and it is
not unlikely that it would exceed quite often the limits most constitutions estab-
lish. The criterion of efficiency probably would turn out to be in conflict with the
demand for relatively frequent accountability and participation of the electorate in
the political decision-making.
Given the complexity of issues, the technical problems involved in governing and
the need to wait to see the results of the implementation of any policy before allow-
ing the electorate to express judgment about it, it could be argued that that time
period should be extended.
The vote for a party or a candidate is, as Talcott Parsons (1969: 352-404)
highlighted, like the extension of credit by a bank, subject to the vagaries of infla-
tion and deflation. Using that analogy, we might say that before repaying that credit
there should be time to use it productively-producing positive policy returns-and
as in the case of too short terms, early withdrawal of the credit would frustrate the
purpose. As we consider seriously the time dimension in relation to the investments
we intend to make and the income expectations we have, when asking for credit at
the bank a politician has to develop a time frame for the policies he intends to
formulate and implement. This, except in the case of parties or stable coalitions
with expectation of long-term electoral success, may mean that short-term consid-
erations or a limited agenda will prevail.
Our analysis has basically focused on parliamentary government since it provides
for greater flexibility in the use of time, fewer constraints and greater potential for
continuity should the voters endorse it. Presidentialism, in addition to popular

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24 Democracy's Time Constraints

elections of the president and the Congress-a dual democratic legitimacy-has a

second defining characteristic: that both institutions are elected for fixed terms and
independent of each other. Time rigidity is one of two defining elements. In fact,
in many presidential systems, the prohibition of reelection makes the time limit
even more confining for a president. Since I have (Linz, 1994b) discussed the impli-
cations of this at length, I am not going to develop this point further.

Multiple-level Elections and the Time to Govern

Many contemporary democracies, particularly federal democracies, do not hold only

national parliamentary or presidential elections, but also a number of other
elections. The division of "political time" by the holding of national, regional or state
(in federal states), local (and now European) elections at different dates has impor-
tant implications for democratic government. Presumably in different elections the
voters are called upon to make judgments about different issues, the performance
of different bodies, and to choose between different candidates and even different
parties. Indeed, as some of the returns indicate, citizens make quite different
choices. Even so, sub-state and supra-state elections have an effect on governance at
the state-national level. The national leaders perceive them as indicators of the
support they enjoy or the loss of it, and therefore engage themselves in devoting
time and energy devising strategies and campaigning. The voters on their part,
irrespective of many other considerations, often use their vote to "send a message"
to those in power, to express a vote of "no-confidence" until another election that
might be years away. Some of those elections are particularly open to be used as a
protest vote, since there is not much at stake. The media are likely to interpret the
defeats of the government party or parties as a rejection of the government and its
policies, amplifying their significance beyond even the actual vote differences. This
means that after each of those elections, those in power have to spend time analyz-
ing their meaning and presumably thinking about charting a different course.
All this can be seen as useful to make government-at the state-national level-
more accountable, offering citizens an opportunity to express frustrations or aspira-
tions before being called to vote on the national government. However, this means
that the specific issues of the election, the candidates and their accomplishments,
failures or qualifications, are largely ignored.
A number of alternatives have been and are being discussed: put presidential and
congressional elections on the same date, do away with midterm elections, put all
elections on the same date. This is probably difficult with the European elections,
but also in parliamentary systems at the state-national level and the substate level,
where the respective dissolution or renewal dates are likely to make this impossi-
ble. Would it be desirable? One can argue that the breaking up of "political time"
between general elections allows for a greater input by the citizens and the making
for greater accountability. Does it ensure more efficient and stable government?
One could argue not.
Moreover, putting all the elections on the same date would probably amplify the
swings of the political pendulum even more, and leave the minorities more under-
represented (making the recovery after defeat more difficult in the absence of local
bases of strength, patronage, resources, opportunities to launch a new leadership,
etc.). Political pluralism and competitiveness could suffer. Local successes in federal
states can serve to reverse the downhill trend or the mood of defeat of a party, by
concentrating efforts even on a small unit. This was the role of the Lippe elections

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 JUAN J. LINZ 25

for the Nazi Party after its losses between the two 1932 elections. The importance
of the January 1933 Landtag election in Lippe is reflected in the attention paid to
it by the Nazi leadership and is analyzed by Turner (1996: 53-78) and Bracher
(1957: 701-703). Goebbels wrote: "Everything depends now on the results of the
Lippe election. If we manage to be successful there, the government will fall."5
Again, another example of the importance of timing in the democratic political
process.

Timing Elections in the United States and Other

Presidential Regimes
The United States presents a unique pattern (that unfortunately may extend t
other countries) which generates an electoral climate of politics long before t
elections are held. The holding of presidential primaries in different states at differ
ent dates long before the conventions and the electoral campaign itself must h
many consequences deserving analysis. The highly personalized competition in
contexts more or less favorable to one or another candidate stacks the cards for
subsequent primaries and the ultimate candidate's selection. The concentratio
financial resources in an early primary may have important implications t
reduces the opportunities for some candidates, and may eliminate early on so
them (who otherwise and elsewhere may have had appeal for the voters
primaries allow a relatively small number of strategically located voters, not
sentative of the population or even the sympathizers of the party, a decisive
Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey have analyzed both theoretically and
reference to particular cases the importance of timing of congressional electi
presidential systems, not only the distinction between concurrent and non-co
rent electoral cycles, but between honeymoon, counterhoneymoon, mid
elections and mixed cycles (Shugart and Carey, 1992: chaps. 11, 12). The
discuss the engineering of electoral cycles and the implications for the comp
ity between president and assembly. Nothing could better illustrate the impo
of timing or time constraints and politics in democracies.

The Ambivalence of Term Limits

An interesting paradox in parliamentary systems is that the possibility of one pe
occupying the office of prime minister over a prolonged period of time, th
successive legislatures, does not generate the hostility with which the possibi
reelection is seen in many presidential systems. In many presidential syste
reelection is unconstitutional, in others only two consecutive terms are allowed, a
in one (Venezuela) reelection is possible only after vacating the office for one
(Linz, 1994b) The proposal to change the no-reelection norm has generated v
protests, even riots, and been one of the arguments in support of coups d'eta
Why this different response? Foremost is the fact that a prime minister s
only as long as his party, or the coalition supporting him, has a majority in p
ment. In addition, the coalition in a crisis might disintegrate, or the party
question his or her leadership at any time. This produces a psychological fe
that no one is assured a priori to stay in power for a fixed time of eight or
years. The people and competing leaders can entertain the hope that the in
bent might fail and be substituted, something impossible-except in the cas
impeachment-in presidential systems. The fact of prolonged stays in offic

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26 Democracy's Time Constraints

not change the psychological time perception. The frustrating expectation of no

change in eight years does not arise. We might wonder if the constructive vote of
no-confidence assuring stability in office does not create a similar frustration in
some parliamentary systems.
This interpretation might be challenged by noting that presidentialism (with the
exception of the United States) is the form of government in countries where people
distrust the power of one-person rule, after many years of dictatorial rule.
Continuismo is perceived as a step toward dictatorship even when legitimated by
election. Perhaps a distrust of the fairness of elections enters the picture.
The same fear of excessive continuity in office-as a step to dictatorship-has
led to the advocacy of term limits for legislators, a debate in which both theoreti-
cal and pragmatic considerations are invoked by both sides. On the theoretical side
it can be argued that term limits are anti-democratic. They deprive citizens of the
right to compete for votes of fellow citizens-that is, of a citizen's right-disquali-
fying someone because he has occupied public office. It also deprives the citizens
of the right to vote freely for whoever they want, and of the opportunity to express
their approval of someone who already has established a record in office, eliminat-
ing the opportunity to hold politicians accountable.
On a more practical side, it represents the loss of persons that have gained
experience in office, persons likely to be more effective in committees, in striking
compromises and convincing others. One can also wonder who would make politics
a vocation if the opportunity for office is limited to one or two terms. Democratic
politics is an activity of amateurs-not specialists or technocrats-but of amateurs
who become pro's in the political game. How amateurish do we want politics to be?
The underlying premise of term limits is that voters cannot judge those they
elect, that incumbency is an unfair advantage difficult to overcome, excluding the
possibility that incumbents are also likely to be made responsible for their policies.
Does the candidacy of someone new-of unknown record-assure a more rational,
informed and independent choice?

Democracy without Time Constraints

There is an abstract model of democracy which attempts to eliminate all time
constraints. A participating assembly, rather than a representative body, acting as
a continuous body, with no agenda, where at any moment motions can be intro-
duced and voted, previous decisions be reversed with no time requirements (for
submission, discussion, or voting), no quorums (since anyone is free to attend or
leave), and where only the vote of those present and voting counts. Anyone elected
by such a body is subject to immediate recall and the actions taken by them to
immediate debate and reversal. The absence of a quorum is justified by the contin-
uous and open character of the body and the freedom to participate or leave,
presumably to ensure that only those really interested participate, and no one can
limit the freedom of the members to make decisions responding to changing condi-
tions at any point in time. Such a model of democracy presumably assures total
freedom to the "participating" demos, is incompatible with any large scale demos
and therefore has existed only in relatively small constituencies. It has been typical
of moments of revolutionary "effervescence"; in fact, in modern times probably only
during the 1968 student revolutions in the universities.
The continuous meetings, the open agenda and the absence of a quorum, are
likely to end in reducing the number of participants, generally due to the leaving

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 JUAN J. LINZ 27

of the moderates, and of those with other commitments or obligations. The

decision-making is left to an activist, self-selected (often highly coordinated) minor-
ity more often than not assembled at weird hours of the night. The lack of a clear
definition of time at the beginning and end of the meeting, or of an agenda and
rules governing the introduction of motions and votes, ends in frustrating its alleged
purpose-making decisions more democratic and open.

Direct Democracy and Irreversibility

The time-bound character of the outcome of elections explains the relatively easy
acceptance of representative democracy. It also accounts for the use (and resistance
to use) of referenda to decide democratically fundamental issues; the existence of
a state, secession and independence, territorial devolution, monarchy vs. republic,
even approval of constitutions. One of the reasons is that the decisions to be made
are not pro tempore but have irreversible (or almost irreversible) consequences.
The feelings supporting the nation, as Renan put it, are a daily plebiscite (plebiscite
quotidien) but a plebiscite on secession takes place only once and if it is won by 50.6
percent vs. 49.4 percent or with a participation of 40 percent of the voters, those
who afterwards may change their minds do not have a chance to do so four years
hence as in a parliamentary election.
That is probably one of the main reasons for the many obstacles to the use of
direct democracy and simple majority of voters' decisions by referenda. The many
requirements for initiatives, the demand for previous debate and decision by repre-
sentative institutions, their decisive role in the formulation (and manipulation) of
the questions to be placed on the ballot, the demand for special quorums (minimum
participation, majority not of voters but of eligible voters) and of more than winning
simple majorities, are reflections of the irreversibility of the decisions. It is not the
electorate over a long time span that is called to decide but the electorate at one
specific point in time. The simple majority of voters can be right in the long run
even if it is wrong today, but when the decision is irreversible in the future, do we
want a simple majority of those voting to decide?
One difference between referenda and elections is that in principle in referenda
those defeated could raise the question again at any time, rather than like the losers
in an election who will have to wait a number of years. This means that the results
can be seen as non-binding although they may deal with a fundamental question
like secession. Some constitutions and legislation have foreseen this consequence
and established that the issue cannot again be brought to a vote until a significant
period of time has elapsed.6

Timing Democratic Decisions

One interesting dimension of time in democracies is that constitutions, laws, rules of
parliamentary procedure establish norms about the "timeliness" of certain actions:
when they can be taken and when not, lapses of time between them, deadlines beyond
which they cannot be initiated, etc. All those rules limit the sovereignty of the demos,
the elected representatives, the governments. All of them can be considered anti- or
at least a-democratic. They assume that similar actions would have different conse-
quences if they were taken at a different point in time or that they would not take
place without the constraints of a timetable (often set up to force a resolution one
way or another). They very often aim (like quorums) at making impossible any hasty,

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28 Democracy's Time Constraints

ill-thought-out, or surprise decisions, setting up a period of time to reconsider, allow-

ing those threatened to rally support, making possible negotiations and compromises,
and thereby reducing unpredictability. Generally the rules aim at protecting those in
power against the whims of their opponents, to ensure some continuity in govern-
ment, giving it a chance for reconsideration or compromise. They all tend to dimin-
ish that incertitude about outcomes that Adam Przeworski has rightly stressed as one
of the defining characteristics of democracy.
The regulation of the use of time is essential in the decision-making of
democratic bodies, and it can range from extreme rigidity to the radical utopia of
some form of assembly (when any resolution can be introduced and voted on at any
time by a "continuous body" permanently in session).

Instability and Continuity in Office

Government instability, or short duration of cabinets, is perceived by the public
(and most scholars) as something negative, as an indicator of regime crisis and a
contributing factor in the breakdown of democracies (Linz, 1978: 110-112). The
main argument is that it prevents the formulation and consistent implementation
of public policies. This may be true but it is also possible to see it in another light:
the withdrawal of confidence by parliament may prevent ill-advised policies, allows
the sanction of politicians not deserving support, and permits coalition partners who
have supported one policy or set of policies to withdraw when other policies with
which they disagree are proposed. It allows prime ministers to shift alliances to
pursue different policies, as it has frequently been the case in Belgium with the
"Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit" (coalition-making capability of major parties) or
often in the French Fourth Republic cabinet crises. Government instability may
allow the cumulative and consecutive solution of problems that a single, stable coali-
tion or minority government without partners could not pursue (Williams, 1964:
426-427). We may ask, therefore, if stability and continuity of leadership and
cabinets in coalition governments, and long terms in office by the same people,
necessarily mean better government in terms of policy outputs. Is not cabinet stabil-
ity a fetish, something valued in and of itself? Alternation within a coalition may
be as good as alternation as the result of an election.
Voters in democracies seem to share both a desire for continuity and stability
and a readiness for weariness with too much of it and a yearning for change.
Remaking a government often generates new hopes and renewed trust in govern-
ment and leader.
There are (we suspect to some extent without much analysis of the output)
psychological predispositions both in favor of continuity and against change an
discomfort with too much continuity. This is reflected in responses to the appe
"It is time for a change," without necessarily asking too many questions abou
change toward what or in favor of what policies. These psychological predispositions
have the advantage to generate the conditions for competitive politics, and to make
possible for those defeated in the elections to look forward to a future victory, one
essential incentive to stay in the democratic game. It is the lack of any such expec-
tation or hope of those defeated by a non-democratic regime that makes the
either so frustrated, alienated, and radicalized, or so passive and defeatist. The logic
of alternation is not based on the fact that alternation is necessary for better publi
policies, but to allow accountability for past policies, as well as for major actors' or
capable and ambitious individuals' hopes and expectations to stay in politics.

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 JUAN J. LINZ 29

The search for government stability after the Weimar experience contributed to
one of the most important innovations of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal
Republic: the constructive vote of no-confidence in Article 67.
The norm, however, has unanticipated, undesirable consequences when a discred-
ited government resists pressures from public opinion to dissolve and hold new
elections, and no alternative majority to form a government is available. This was
the case in Spain with the government of Felipe Gonzalez. To assure continuity,
efforts to exhaust the time won by an election, therefore, is no unmixed blessing,
and dubious from the perspective of democratic accountability. To try and govern
against the whims of parliament can mean time wasted and deterioration of the
political process.

Searchingfor Stability in the Uncertain World of Democracy

The partisanship, the articulation of different values, programmatic conflicts and
choices between them, comprise the essence of democracy. Therefore the possibility
of alternation, though not necessarily its attainment, is essential to democratic politics.
People, however, also need the assurance of what unites them: non-controversial
values, as well as institutions and persons above partisanship seen to be neutral in
conflicts. In democracies, this accounts for offices not subject to the vagaries of
election: unremovable judges, lifetime senators, irremovable members of certain
bodies, tenure, all aimed at ensuring impartiality and independence. It accounts
also for the surprising prestige of those symbolizing continuity, rather than change,
like monarchs, supreme court judges and long-term presidents in republics in
democracies (Linz, 1991, 237-238). The 1978 Spanish Constitution, in its Article
56, reflects this when it says: "The King is the Head of State, the symbol of its
unity and permanence." The role of some long-term presidents in parliamentary
democracies and their continuous prestige would deserve further analysis. It even
helps to explain their increase in power during crises (Linz, 1978: 69-71).

The Use of Time as an Indicator of Power

An interesting indicator of the power of different groups and instit

democratic polity is the frequency and duration of their meetings. How oft
how long do legislative bodies, party caucuses or factions, cabinets and nowada
inets, party executives, party congresses, etc., meet? Infrequent and short m
suggest limited debate and limited input by the members and make it u
such a body can exercise much power or influence. A party congress planned
days, with much ceremonial activity (partly due to cost considerations, like
an expensive hotel), even when sessions extend over the whole night, does n
a serious consideration of the issues. Decisions have to be made before the solemn
closing ceremonies, some of the most important issues are brought up before exha
members at 6:00 a.m., when everybody wants to come quickly to a vote. Certainly
does not contribute to the quality of democracy, although it may contribute to effe
decision-making and support for the leaders (just as gag rules do).

Democratic Politicians-a Harried Elite

The scarcity of time in relation to things to do is a problem that all

elite positions face. Involvement is not the result of obligations or d

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30 Democracy's Time Constraints

calling, a pleasure based on creativity, exercise of power, or some similar reason. It

demands more time than work for many people with a reasonable job. It is not
different for the political elite.
We have interesting data on time budgets of the population from different
studies, including survey data, but little on those of elites. We would need to know
more about how different types of politicians, in different countries, of different
types of parties, spend their time. Top political leaders in office have to spend time
on: (1) business connected with their office; (2) affairs connected with party offices,
executive committees, party congresses, etc.; (3) activities connected with
constituencies, interest group representatives, and even individual citizens, and (4)
representative functions. Ideally we would like to have samples of the appointment
calendars to analyze the time budgets systematically. We would probably discover
the intrusion of public life in the time left for private and family life; working
dinners substitute for dinners at home.
The contrast between the schedule of a nineteenth-century cabinet or prime
minister who went for a few hours in the morning to his office, spent part of the
afternoon in parliament when it was in session, attended some pleasant social
events, took prolonged vacations to one of the European spas (and, on the side, took
time out for private law practice, teaching or business) and our contemporaries
(Switzerland being one of the few exceptions) could not be greater. Today, a prime
minister may jet to an international meeting for two days and, before recovering
from the jetlag, be attending long cabinet meetings, receiving experts, trade union
leaders threatening a strike, lobbyists of a whole range of interest groups, going to
the meeting of the executive committee of his party and perhaps to a session of
parliament, and a few days later campaigning in a regional election or making a
TV appearance. Paradoxically, for the us president, the brief vacations at Camp
David or a cruise on a presidential yacht may be the only time for reflective think-
ing.
Is this different in democracies from other regimes? We do not know. We suspect
that the nature of democratic politics (the intersection of the state, political organi-
zations, and civil society, the need to be responsive and ultimately answerable to
all those sectors) puts greater time demands on democratic politicians than on
authoritarian rulers (unless the latter want to act otherwise).
How can a politician in a democracy combine the awareness of the limited time
he has to implement a program with a vision of the future? In large part by self-
deception: having the confidence that he will be reelected even when omens show
the opposite. Or, by the certainty that the voters for his opponent will be disillu-
sioned and return him to power after an interlude. Or, by having, like de Gaulle,
the confidence that the day will come when the crisis within the system will lead the
people to ask for him. Therefore, contrary to what they may know, politicians do not
think of the time constraint inherent in the democratic time definition. Nor do the
voters give their support just for four years or five but expect to continue giving it
unless very seriously disappointed. Loyalty is still strong and puts limits on exit.

How Much Time Do Citizens Have for Politics?

One of the assumptions of democratic politics is that the ordinary citizen

does not hold or aspire to political office nor is employed by a politica
tion) would devote time to become an informed voter, perhaps do some
work, ideally be an active party member.

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 JUAN J. LINZ 31

If he does not, the fault must be that of the politicians, or the parties, that do
not stimulate those activities, the low quality of the political message, or the banal-
ity of the media, which all produce alienated or at least passive citizens.
But have those contrasting the ideal democratic citizen and the real citizens in
our democracies asked themselves, how does politics fit into the time budget of
ordinary citizens? We know that supporters of extremist and antidemocratic parties
often were more ready to sacrifice time to politics, attending meetings of party cells
and demonstrations or marching in squads and taking part in party rallies. The
ethnographic record of politics in small towns in the 1930s gives us a description
of the crowded political calendar of large numbers of activists (Allen, 1965).
Obviously, that involvement did not contribute to democracy. It is likely that after
World War II and in many stable democracies people devoted less time to partisan
politics. Many activities, like putting up posters, distributing leaflets, organizing
local rallies, have been replaced by professional advertising agencies, mailings and,
above all, TV. Traditional activity-time devoted to politics-is at best substituted
by monetary contributions and might be replaced by checking the income tax form
to allow the state to devote part of the tax (or add to the tax) a sum to keep the
democratic process going. A process of substituting money for volunteer work that
Robert Putnam has also noted for many charitable activities. Certainly, the tradi-
tional time-consuming political activity contributed to a different, more partisan,
emotional involvement and personal interaction with party organizations and
likeminded individuals. Did it produce a more informed electorate? We probably
will not know. We have moved from "time is money" to "money is time."
Survey data allow us to know with some approximation-and probably overstate-
ment-how much time people spend on politics, but we lack a systematic compar-
ative analysis between countries and parties. What we also do not know is how much
politics has been and is a form of entertainment: the Festa dell'Unita, like the fairs
around the chapel of the patron saint, was for Italians a chance to have fun with
the family but also to transmit a message, express a loyalty. Does it have much to
do with the citizen interested in knowing the issues and the candidates of the
democratic theorists?
The issue that democratic theorists have not faced is how much priority in the
life agenda and consequently the time budget the average citizen is willing to assign
to politics. Radical democrats think that more meaningful debate, more opportu-
nity to participate in more settings, or the extension of democracy to more realms
of society, will increase the time devoted to politics. This might be true for a minor-
ity. The media and advertising consultants have an alternative answer: make it
more attractive, simple, and entertaining if not adversarial and nasty. Both might
miss the fact that people have many things to do and that in a relatively stable
democratic society politics is not as central as we democratic social scientists want
to believe.
Time for politics is limited and the question is how to use it best, not necessar-
ily demand more time from citizens. The sociologists of leisure saw in the future a
society with less time devoted to work (that has become in part true for th
unemployed, the retired and perhaps the students but not for the productive age
cohorts). Democratic theorists hoped that the new free time would produce a more
civic and participatory society. I do not see the evidence for that conclusion. People
in a free democratic society, in contrast to a totalitarian society, can decide how to
spend their time and they are busy doing many things, and politics is not always
one of them, perhaps because the heat of politics is lower. The sign one found in

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32 Democracy's Time Constraints

some bars in the past: "To talk [argue violently was meant] politics is forbidden,"
fortunately (or unfortunately) is gone.
There is a paradoxical relationship between the limited time citizens are willing
to devote to politics, just being informed, and even more active participation, and
the demand for democratization (often politicization) of many institutions and
participation in decision-making.
In every democracy there are minorities demanding further democratization and
the opportunity to participate, but they do not demand it for themselves as a minor-
ity but in principle and for all citizens. When that opportunity is granted (except
in serious crises, sometimes provoked by anti-democrats) actually only a minority
is likely to make use of the opportunity. Expanded democratization and opportu-
nity for participation may in practice mean minority veto power or rule, or further
penetration by the parties resulting in partitocrazia (often followed by lotizazione,
proporz, patronage and clientelism). In any case, we may ask how representative of
the citizenry are the activist minorities?
Those favoring these tendencies in modern democracies may retort that it is the
fault of those unwilling to use the opportunity to participate, too lazy to go to
meetings, hearings, vote in different types of elections, etc., and that they should
be bound by the decisions made by the active (but not representative) minority in
their absence. Others will argue that representation to make decisions on a large
range of issues ultimately may assure greater accountability in the medium run.

Generational Renewal

A difficult theme is the relationship between democratic time and the

generational structure of the political classes. Does the time perspective of
racy mean the same thing to people entering politics when they are thirty an
just left university, particularly when they reach the height of political power
afterwards, and to someone who reaches power with a long political life behin
destined to be an elder statesman like Adenauer or de Gasperi? This age d
sion is closely linked to the generational renewal that goes with deep cri
political change (Linz, 1993: 141-186).
In continuous and stable democracies the renewal of the political elite sit
parliament or congress is likely to be a slow but continuous process. It is poss
speak of cohorts, or "the class of 19-," but the Mannheimian concept of gener
is less likely to be applicable. In new democracies, after a prolonged period of
democratic rule with the displacement of the elite of the regime, we will proba
that those entering politics are recruited from a relatively narrow age range an
common formative experiences (not necessarily the same) so that we might th
them as a generation. This might create a problem in that relatively young pe
will assume power, sometimes with limited experience outside of politics. The
find it difficult to open their ranks to newcomers and will attempt to hold on t
In a sense, generational experience becomes more important than a cursus honoru
characterizes stable democratic politics. The sudden and massive renewal of th
must create a different conception of time: past, present and, above all,
Utopian-or better u-chronic-politics helps to overcome the shortened time per
tive of democratic politics, but it can also lead to the demand for hic et nunc so
voluntaristic action, incompatible with democratic political processes. It also ca
to the devaluation of any present gain as ultimately irrelevant. This was in pa
Austromarxist response to democracy in the 1920s (Leser, 1968).

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 JUAN J. LINZ 33

We know that retirement can be difficult and painful, but our societies have
tended to regulate it, prevent discrimination on the basis of age, and encourage
people to prepare for it. Politicians, on the one hand tend not to think of it and,
on the other, are aware that the voters might at any time decide to retire them.
The first perspective encourages them to hold on to power when authority is lost,
the second can lead to the search for security outside of politics associated with
pantouflage (the practice of giving a cushy job in the private sector to ex-civil
servants) and certain forms of corruption. We might ask if some sinecures for aging
or failed politicians are not functional mechanisms to solve those problems: a seat
in the House of Lords, and lifetime senatorships, were among those devices.
What role does age play in the recruitment of democratic leadership? Is there an
advantage in appealing to different electorates to be youthful or an older person, at
what point is aging or youth a handicap? Do voters of different ages respond differ-
ently to the age of candidates? The response is likely to be different in stable democ-
racies than in new ones. In the latter there is an interesting crossing of generational
factors with age; those of a certain age are likely to have played different roles in
changing societies, before a critical event, in a critical period, under the non-
democratic regime and in the transition to democracy and its consolidation (inciden-
tally, the same would be true in the case of some non-democratic regimes). The
accelerated turnover of elites in unstable societies might contribute to the appeal of
a youthful leadership unburdened by the past. However, we also have the case of Italy
and Germany after Fascism and Nazism in which societies trusted elder statesmen
who represented a continuity with a pre-totalitarian past: de Gasperi, Orlando, Sforza,
Einaudi, Adenauer, Schumacher, Heuss. Nothing of the like happened in Spain after
Franco, with the exception of Santiago Carrillo (the Communist Party leader) and
Tarradellas (a non-elected Catalan leader) (Linz, 1993). Why was this so?

Political and Other Cycles

Time in democracies is only in part controllable by democratically elected leaders;
it is not in presidential democracies (particularly with no reelection). A president
has four years (cut short by the time after the election before his successor is
inaugurated, unless, like Alfonsin of Argentina, he resigns before to shorten the
ordeal of a lame or is it a dead-duck presidency?). A parliamentary system intro-
duces at least some flexibility with the possibility of a vote of no-confidence, disso-
lution and anticipated elections, or changes in leadership. An interesting device in
many democracies to overcome the discontinuity potentially inherent in elections
is the use of staggered elections to the upper house, partial renewal of some bodies
like constitutional courts, and a variety of commissions. Another cycle that affects
democratic politics is the budgetary process. A government may come into power
to operate at least until the next budget making process within the constraints
decided by its predecessor and it might leave its successor with the budget designed
for continuing in power. The budgetary cycle-determining revenues and expendi-
tures-is another cycle cutting into the electoral-democratic process.
In addition, there are a number of cycles-economic, social, symbolic, and inter-
national-which intersect with the democratic cycle. Some of those other cycles, to
which we shall turn now, have a fixed calendar, crucial dates which cannot be
changed, which affect democratic governance.
The rigidity of the political cycle does not coincide with the economic cycles, the
fluctuations in prices, unemployment, exchange rates, or economic growth, but we

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34 Democracy's Time Constraints

know that those fluctuations affect more or less decisively the approval or rejection
of governments and thereby the outcome of elections. There is an element of unfair-
ness since electoral success does not depend only on government performances,
programs and appeal of the opposition, but on circumstances beyond anyone's
control. But are they really beyond control? Largely yes, but in the short term some
government policies, particularly in the monetary field, such as taxation and price
supports, they may be modified. It is logical to assume that those in power will try
to modify them in their favor in view of forthcoming elections. If they can decide
the date of elections, as in parliamentary systems, they will hold them at the most
favorable moment they can see in the economic cycle. This gives an advantage to
incumbents. An advantage which, in the longer run, may be detrimental to the
country and even to those who have postponed hard decisions until after the
elections. Here the question is, what is the memory span of voters? Will they
remember after the passing of time when they are called again to the polls? Time
and timing are again the essence of the democratic process.
One example of the implications of the coincidence or divergence of the politi-
cal-the electoral cycle-and the economic cycle were the elections during the
Great Depression and the 1930s in Europe. The success or failure of the Fascists
was dependent on when elections were held in the different countries, again timing.
It could be argued that the policies of a governing party should not be judged
unless they have been applied in both periods of depression or recession and in
periods of prosperity, since otherwise the responses of the electorate will not be so
much to the particular policies but to the consequences of the business cycle which
today is increasingly worldwide and escapes the control of any national government.
That would mean probably periods between elections far beyond those customarily
established in democracies.
In many industrial capitalist democracies there is a cycle of labor-management
contract negotiations. In corporatist systems these have nationwide macro-economic
policy implications which affect the perception of government policy and therefore
the accountability of elected officials. Something similar happens with the cycle of
elections for trade-union worker representatives in the plants, which in multi-union
societies, with trade unions linked to political parties, are also highly political.
These two cycles therefore again cross the apparently simple cycle of elections
providing support to governments for a specific time period.
Internationalization introduces other cycles. The rotating presidency of the
European Union gives a responsibility and boost to the incumbent in the host
country and is a reason-or an excuse-not to respond to internal democratic
pressures in the interim (as the Gonzalez government in Spain in 1995-96
showed).
Societies have their historical calendar of events to commemorate, some glori-
ous, some tragic, sad or shameful, all of them falling on dates fixed by time spans
like the 10th, 50th, or 100th anniversary. That historical calendar does not coincide
with the political calendar of democracy, those symbolic dates fall sometimes on
inauspicious or inconvenient times. Politicians have to decide whether to celebrate
them, ignore them, or what to do and say; making for difficult and often divisive
decisions that provide an opportunity to legitimate or delegitimate political actors.
The mistakes and tragedies of the first half of the twentieth century have
confronted democratic politicians of the last quarter century with this problem,
providing interesting examples of the politics of historical memory.
There are a number of social time cycles which constrain some of the choices of

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 JUAN J. LINZ 35

politicians: certain holiday periods, as the summer holidays in Europe, which would
be incompatible with holding elections. During such periods in which social activ-
ity decreases, people are less inclined to be interested in politics, mobilization for
protest is more difficult, other political actors are absent. All this provides the
opportunity for some difficult decisions. The legalization of the Spanish Communist
Party by Adolfo Suarez on the Saturday of the Easter vacation in 1977 is a classic
example of such timing.

Concluding Considerations
Without including in our analysis of democratic government the time dimension,
the opportunity and confining character of time, many problems of democratic
government would be difficult to understand. Unfortunately, we have too little
information on the time budget of the political process, or on the perception of time
by political leaders, or on the phases through which a democratic government goes,
beginning with the honeymoon period that so many describe as characterizing the
start of a new government, or on the importance assigned by so many commenta-
tors to the first hundred days of a new president or prime minister in power, or on
the impact of the closeness of new elections (Jones, 1995: 140; Fiorina, 1996;
Mayhew, 1991).7 They are all aspects that have not been systematically and empir-
ically studied, in spite of the fact that government pro tempore is an essential and
defining characteristic of democratic governance.
Let me conclude with some more general considerations on time-past, present
and future-in democratic politics. Democratic politics breaks time and its percep-
tion in segments of relatively short duration. For revolutionary non-democratic
regimes the present (and in some of them, the future) is clearly defined as a break
with the past, the past presented as a period of oppression, decay or chaos, or
foreboding, except some utterly remote ur-past. The democratic process, once insti-
tutionalized and consolidated, does not allow such a clear, dramatic, ideologically
charged, dichotomization of past and present. The past is the most recent segment
(or the sum of continuous segments) in which the party in power has realized a
positive, or for the opponents, a negative policy. Only in new democracies is it possi-
ble to appeal to a remoter past of authoritarian rule, to attempt to link the
opponents to that negative past, but with the passing of time and the incorpora-
tion of new generations, that reference cannot serve to displace questions about the
present contenders. Indeed, it might be perceived as diversionary, manipulative or
irrelevant.
With the coming of the millennium, and the millenarian apocalyptic visions of
the demographic explosion and environmental doom, there can be little doubt that
the short-term time perspective of politics-from election to election-will be
questioned. One answer of politicians trying to escape the short-term perspective
that regular elections in democracies impose is to introduce constraints on their
own freedom (and responsibility to decide) by devices like a "balanced budget"
amendment (recently debated in the United States), transferring decisions with
implications for the future to bipartisan commissions (such as the reform of social
security) or to independent agencies (like the central banks), or delegating power
to (and blaming) supranational decision-makers.
Paradoxically, in an age in which responsiveness to the electorate is sacrosanct,
we are more dependent than ever on leaders who try to lead the voters and even
stand up to them, thinking of the future beyond the next election.

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36 Democracy's Time Constraints

Notes

1. This article complements an earlier one on time and timing in democracies and reg
change (Linz, 1986, 1994a). That long article in turn was expanded into a book co-edite
by Shain and Linz (1995) which includes a theoretical part (pp. 1-124) on "interim
governments-provisional, power-sharing, caretaker and international-and seven ca
studies.
2. The argument why an electorate cannot abolish by a free democratic decision-making
process the need for periodic elections is developed by Linz (1986, 1994a,b).
3. Let us remember the story of the person who every day went to buy a newspaper and
then threw it away. Asked about it, he said, "I am only interested in the death notices."
The dealer said, "But you don't leaf through the paper." The answer was, "The one I
am looking for will be on the front page." An undefined time, a sudden present, and then
incertitude.
4. Let me make clear from the outset that when I use "pro tempore" I do not endorse term-
limits. I will discuss this point later. I only mean that office holders have to submit
themselves to the decision of the electorate after a reasonable time.
5. At the time of the Lippe Landtag election, Goebbels wrote: "We shall concentrate all
[our] force on this small Land to achieve a prestige-success. Now the party must show
again that it still can win." The vote on 15 January 1933 represented the first success
after the setback inJuly 1932. In this last election of the Weimar Republic 85.1 percent
voted, 3.5 percent more than in the Reichstag election of November 1932, with 39.5
percent going to the NSDAP, compared to 34.7 percent in November. The gain of the Nazis
was 13.8 percent, while the DNVP lost 38.4 percent, the KPD lost 27.3 percent (with the
SPD gaining 11.1 percent). The results in reality showed the democratic parties making
the greater gains, but the Nazis managed to give an interpretation favorable to
themselves. On 30January, Hitler became Chancellor (see Bracher, 1957: 701-703).
6. One example is the setting of a time limit for repeating initiatives for "self government
within the Spanish state of autonomies of the 1978 Constitution is the transitory provi-
sion number 4 in connection with Article 143 on the accession of Navarre to Euskadi
(the Basque Autonomy).
7. Lyndon Johnson was extraordinarily anxious about moving quickly early in his term. I
his memoirs he wrote: "The president and the Congress run on separate clocks. Th
occupant of the White House has a strict tenancy .... A president must always reck
that his mandate will prove short lived . . ." (Jones, 1995: 140).

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Biographical Note
JUAN J. LINZ is Sterling Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale University. Among
his most recent books are The Failure of Presidential Democracy, (co-edited with A. Valenzuela,
1994), Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transition, (co-edited with Yossi Shain,
1995), and Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, (with Alfred Stepan, 1996).
ADDRESS: Yale University, Department of Sociology, Box 208265 Yale Station, New Haven,
CT 06520-8265, USA.

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