Mechanical Integrity Petronas

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY (MI)
(GUIDELINE)
PTS 60.2202
OCTOBER 2006
1. PREFACE
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication, of
PETRONAS HCU/OPUs.
They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction,
operations and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate, they are based on, or
reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice.
The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by HCU/OPUs
in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical plants, marketing facilities,
or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical and economic benefit from
standardization.
The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and decision to
implement. This is of particular importance where the PTS may not cover every requirement or diversity
of condition at each locality. The system of application and usage for each PTS is expected to be
sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in each PTS to
their own environment and requirements.
When contractors or manufacturer/suppliers use this PTS they shall be solely responsible for the quality of
work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular, for those
requirements not specifically covered, the Principal will expect them to follow those design and
engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected in the PTS. If in doubt,
the contractor or manufacturer/supplier shall, without detracting from his own responsibility, consult the
Principal or its technical advisor.
The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users:
1) PETRONAS and its affiliates.
2) Other parties who are authorized to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.
3) Contractor/subcontractors and manufacturer/suppliers under a contract with users

referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects, materials supplied or -
generally – work performed on behalf of the said users comply with the relevant standards.
Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users,
PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death)
suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use, application,
or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or any part thereof. The benefit of this disclaimer
shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that may issue
PTS or require the use of a PTS.
Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual
arrangements, any PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed by users
to any company or person whomsoever, and the PTS shall be used exclusively for the purpose they have
been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including any copies which shall only be
made by users with the express prior written consent of PETRONAS. The copyright for the PTS vests in
PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for all PTS to be held in safe custody and PETRONAS may at any time
require information satisfactory to PETRONAS in order to ascertain how users implement this
requirement.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Mechanical Integrity 2
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
Objectives
This PTS covering Mechanical Integrity (hereinafter referred to as MI) has been written to provide
the guidance and tools necessary to develop and operate a system for managing mechanical
integrity of facilities and equipment, following and aligning with the principles described in the
PETRONAS Health, Safety, and Environmental Management Systems (PTS 60.0101 : HSE MS)
which incorporates process safety standards and requirements.
This PTS provides:
• a reference for HCU/OPUs’ line managers and senior staff needing guidance in the essential MI
requirements of any area of PETRONAS operations.
• a route map and linkage to more detailed references and cross-references with guidance on their
application.
Structure and Content
Refer to the Table of Contents for an overview of how this PTS is structured.
Format
This PTS is arranged in either hardcopy or softcopy format, which are available on the PETRONAS
intranet for downloading and subsequent reference and usage.
User Base
User of this PTS on MI are expected to be HCU/OPUs and selected contractors. The PTS will
either serve as a reference for others to assist in the development of 'in-house' specific reference
documents, or will be used as a first-line reference in the case of smaller organizations.
2.2 USING THE MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PTS
Language
In this document the recommendations for a course of action are made with varying degrees of
emphasis. As a rule:
‘shall’ indicates a course of action with a required, mandatory status within the HCU/OPUs. The
English language equivalent or interchangeable term of “shall” is ‘must.”
'
‘should’ indicates a preferred course of action.
‘may’ indicates a possible course of action.
In this PTS document the collective expressions of PETRONAS are sometimes used for
convenience in contexts where reference is made to the HCU/OPUs in general. These expressions
are used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular company or companies.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Application
Should any significant deviations be made from the guideline or recommendations in this PTS
document, then users are required to inform PETRONAS of the nature and justification for these if
it is intended that the deviations are to be permanent.
Feedback
This PTS document is not intended as a static set of rules, but a growing collection of HSE
expertise. Users are invited to comment on the PTS to PETRONAS and to suggest changes or
additional material which they consider would be useful for inclusion in future revisions.
2.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SYSTEMS
This PTS has been designed and written so as to link back to the higher level document, the
PETRONAS Health, Safety and Environmental Management System (PTS 60.0101 : HSE MS).
It has been developed to be an integral part and tool to assist in managing integrity and reliability of
facilities or equipment within the overall PETRONAS HSE MS. Figure 1 below illustrates the
elements of the PETRONAS HSE MS and their interactions.
Leadership and Commitment

Policy and Strategic Objectives
Organization, Responsibilities,
Resources, Standards, & Doc.
Hazards and Effects Management

Corrective
Planning and Procedures Action
Implementation Monitoring
Corrective Action and

Assurance
Improvement
Corrective Action and

Management Review
Improvement
Figure 1: The PETRONAS HSE MS
The MI activities covered in this PTS fit into the overall PETRONAS HSE MS, and includes, but is
not limited to, the following examples:
Leadership and Commitment: HCU/OPU Management shall commit and expect all leaders to
proactively lead, establish and maintain MI System, programs and initiatives in their respective
HCU/OPU.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Organization, Responsibilities, Resources, Standards, and Documentation: The roles and
responsibilities for establishing and maintaining an MI System and to ensure that it is effective,
shall be clearly defined within the HCU/OPU’s existing organizational structure. This includes
designation of responsible personnel / custodian(s) to manage all aspects of the MI System;
allocation of sufficient resources to the system; development of standards to ensure suitable,
adequate, and effective performance of the MI System on site; and establishment of both document
and records control management systems to handle MI-related documentation.
Hazards and Effects Management (HEMP): MI processes shall be suitably, adequately and
effectively integrated into the Hazards and Effects Management Process. This commonly and
minimally would require that all MI activities be subject to a relevant and robust risk assessment
process prior to such activities being approved.
Planning and Procedures: All business / HSE planning activities shall consider the potential
effects of practicing MI at site, and the potential effects of NOT introducing MI at site, where a
structured MI System may be necessary. Documented procedures shall be in place to mechanical
integrity.
Implementation and Monitoring: Evidence of the suitable, adequate and effective

implementation of the MI shall be available at the HCU/OPUs.
Assurance: From time to time, and based on planned schedules, the MI system shall be subject to
PETRONAS Assurance activities.
Management Review: The suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the MI System shall be
periodically reviewed by the HCU/OPU Management as part of their formal and periodic
Management Review processes at site.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Amendment Record Sheet
PTS Number: 60.2202
PTS Title: Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Rev. Chapter Description of Date Amended

No. Nos. amendment dd / mm / yy by
0 All First Version 14 / 09 / 06 CHSE
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

3. CONTENTS
1. PREFACE ...........................................................................................................................................................2
2. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................4
2.1 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ....................................................................................................................4
2.2 USING THE MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PTS .......................................................................................4
2.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SYSTEMS ............................................................................................5
3. CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................................8
4. MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ..........................................................................................................................9
4.1 OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................................9
4.1.1 Aim .........................................................................................................................................................9
4.1.2 Expectations ...........................................................................................................................................9
4.1.3 Links with Other System Elements .......................................................................................................10
4.1.4 Basis and Compatibility .......................................................................................................................11
4.1.5 Scope of Mechanical Integrity..............................................................................................................11
4.2 ENSURING EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY.................................................................................................13
4.3 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY MODEL ...................................................................................................14
4.4 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS ................................................................................................15
4.4.1 Controls for Mechanical Integrity........................................................................................................15
4.4.2 Identification of MI-Applicable Equipment..........................................................................................16
4.4.3 Management of Equipment Files..........................................................................................................17
4.4.4 Establishment of Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Programs ......................................................18
4.4.5 Execution of MI Activities ....................................................................................................................19
4.4.6 Documention and Analysis of Results ..................................................................................................19
4.4.7 Managing Deficiencies.........................................................................................................................20
4.5 QUALITY ASSURANCE ........................................................................................................................20
4.5.1 Quality Assurance for Service Providers .............................................................................................20
4.5.2 Quality Assurance for Equipment, Materials and Spares ....................................................................21
4.6 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY DATABASE ............................................................................................21
5. DELIVERABLES FROM MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ...........................................................................22
6. PERFORMANCE MONITORING ................................................................................................................23
6.1 MONITORING.........................................................................................................................................23
6.2 ASSURANCE...........................................................................................................................................24
6.3 ACTIONS TRACKING AND FOLLOW-UP...........................................................................................24
7. RECORDS MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................................25
8. MANAGEMENT ACTIONS...........................................................................................................................25
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY......................................................................................................................................27
APPENDIX 2: ESTABLISH MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ...............................................................30
APPENDIX 3: DETERMINING EQUIPMENT LISTING ...................................................................................33
APPENDIX 4: MANAGING EQUIPMENT FILES...............................................................................................35
APPENDIX 5: PREPARING SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY PLAN (SERP) ..................................36
APPENDIX 6: EVALUATING RESULTS AND CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES ..........................................38
APPENDIX 7:TRAINING AND EVALUATING MI RELATED COMPETENCY OF PERSONNEL ...........40
APPENDIX 8: SELF ASSESSMENT OF MI PROGRAM....................................................................................42
APPENDIX 9: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF MI PROGRAM ..............................................................51
APPENDIX 10: FAILURE MECHANISMS ...........................................................................................................54
APPENDIX 11: MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES .....................................................59
APPENDIX 12: MI INTERVENTIONS ..................................................................................................................60
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

4. MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
4.1 OVERVIEW
The MI System follows and aligns with the HSE and business principles of PETRONAS in
preventing or minimizing the consequence of major incidents involving hazardous substances or
conditions of the operations.
HCU/OPUs shall establish an MI System and review the associated programs and schedules to ensure
a focus on pro-active management of integrity. Facilities used to process, store or handle hazardous
substances needs to be designed, constructed, installed and maintained to minimize the risk of releases
of such substances.
MI is a subset of Asset Integrity within the HSE MS PTS 60.0101 which provides documented
assurance that equipment and structures remain reliable for continued service.
4.1.1 Aim
The aim of MI is to manage the integrity of facilities through the application of effective
inspection, maintenance and operational strategies reflecting predictive, risk-based
assessment of facility deterioration.
For HCU/OPUs, this requires ensuring that the lines of defence, for operating and
maintaining the process as designed and to keep the hazardous substances contained, are
protected by the MI program and strengthened where appropriate.
A well implemented MI System ensures that the people, assets and surrounding
environment of the HCU/OPUs are not adversely affected by inadequate evaluation of
hazards, threats, and other potential undesired events related to failure of facilities.
4.1.2 Expectations
For each HCU/OPU implementing a MI System, there should always be clear expectations
and outcomes as a result of such implementation. As a guideline, HCU/OPU Management
shall ensure that the following expectations, as a minimum, are delivered:
• All process, control and utility equipment and system shall be identified, catalogued
and categorised. The inventory of equipment shall be comprehensive and up-to-date,
and should be focused on the needs of the MI System and not adopted from other
sources such as registers for financial/depreciation purposes.
• Risk-based assessment techniques shall be used to determine the priority of facilities

with regard to the impact on health, safety, environment and business. The methods
used, such as ECA, FMECA, RBI, SIL and extent of the risk based techniques should
be commensurate with the likelihood and severity of potential hazards. These
techniques should be applied comprehensively.
• Effective operation, maintenance and inspection activities shall be carried out by

competent personnel and suitably reported. Whether the activities are preventative or
corrective, the methods used, timing of the activities and competency of personnel
should reflect the identified risk exposures.
• Collected data shall be analysed to identify imminent threats to integrity, and to
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

determine trends of deterioration that shall be used to update risk profiles and set
future intervention programs. The analysis of collected data is vital for improving
performance of the equipment integrity..
• Where failures occur, these shall be investigated to determine the root causes,
recommendations made to prevent recurrence, actions tracked to completion and risk
profiles updated. Learning from unexpected events is essential to ensure that such
events are predicted in future and dealt with in a suitable manner.
• The ongoing quality and technical basis for MI activities shall be monitored and
corrective actions shall be taken where necessary. Continual improvement is a key
requirement of the HSE MS.
4.1.3 Links with Other System Elements
The following HSE MS activities will normally have a direct link to the MI activity. The
MI Custodian is accountable for ensuring that all suitable links are identified for their
relevance on a case-by-case basis, and if affected, appropriate change control measures are
identified, implemented, and monitored. Figure 2 below illustrates the relationship between
MI activities with various stages of equipment lifecycle.
Industry Regulation Company

Guidelines Standards
Project Safety
Review Equipment Design
Package
Project
Equipment File
Fabrication/
Installation Tests
and Inspections
Training
Process Hazards Analysis Preventative

Maintenance Tests Equipment
Incident Investigation and Inspections, and Maintenance File
Management of Change Repairs
Decommissioning
Demolition
Figure 2: Process Equipment Integrity Chart (Source: CCPS Guidelines for
Auditing PSM Systems, pg 74)
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Use of systematic checklists for each change request can help ensure this process is robust
and complete.
• Management of Change (MOC) – MOC may be triggered by MI finding or may

require revisions to MI program.
• Design Integrity (DI) – The design specifications will have significant impact on the
operation, maintenance and inspection of facilities. As such, facilites shall be designed
to optimise the MI burden and permit MI activities to be undertaken.
• Process Safety Information (PSI) – Process Safety Information is essential for

effective MI program.Results of MI program may require updating of PSI documents.
• Operating Procedures (OP) – Operating procedures and practices are necessary to

support the MI programs. Likewise, in developing OP, the input from MI program shall
be considered to ensure equipment are operated within safe operating envelop
• Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) – The HEMP assessment

processes may result in new requirements for the MI programs.
• Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) – The PHA process of hazard identification and risk
assessment (HAZOP, FMECA, etc.) may result in new requirements for MI programs.
• Training and Competency – Trained and competent personnel are required to execute
MI activities.
• Contractor Management – Contractors may be engaged to conduct certain specialised

MI activities.
4.1.4 Basis and Compatibility
This PTS:
1) Supports PTS 60.0101 : HSE MS, which provides “global” HSE management system
guidance for PETRONAS companies,
2) Recognises the need for compliance with corporate and legal regulatory requirements.
3) Is compatible with ISO 14001 : 2004 Standard for Environmental Management

Systems and the OHSAS 18001 : 1996 Specification for Occupational Health and
Safety Management Systems
4) Incorporates internationally accepted “best management practices.”
4.1.5 Scope of Mechanical Integrity
The MI System shall be defined and implemented in line with the HCU/OPU HSE policy.
Strategic elements of the programs include the following provisions:
• Management System: The management of an important activity requires the

implementation of policies, procedures, work instructions and documentation. It is
imperative to ensure roles and responsibilities are assigned, authority is given,
supervision is provided, resources are made available, and people are held accountable
for MI activities.
o The Head of HCU/OPU shall demonstrate leadership and commitment in ensuring

that all reliability and integrity matters are systematically and structurally managed,
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

discussed, implemented, monitored and communicated.
o The Facility Owner is accountable for ensuring that the jurisdictional requirements
relating to MI are met.
o The MI Custodian is accountable for implementing the MI System, and responsible

for coordinating the MI activities and ensuring that the MI programs are being
carried out in accordance with the established procedures.
o Line Management is responsible for ensuring that activities required to support the
application of the MI System are in place and operational, and that the MI System
is adequately implemented in their area of responsibility.
o All relevant personnel are responsible for understanding the requirements of the MI
System, identifying deficiencies in facilities that are outside acceptable limits,
recommending changes of the MI System, and performing MI activities in a safe
manner.
• Applicable Facilities: For the purpose of this program, the term “MI-applicable”
facilities shall apply to all equipment and systems that is managed under the MI
program. See section 4.4.2 for examples list.
• Codes and Standards: There are many industry codes and standards that apply to MI,
particularly for establishing effective testing and inspection frequencies for preventive
maintenance e.g. API, ASME and IEC. All referenced codes and standards shall be
documented.
• Maintenance, Inspection and Testing: Appropriate programs that ensure proper and
systematic maintenance shall be developed using risk-based approaches such as the
RBI and RCM methodologies to establish credible Preventive Maintenance, Inspection
and Test Plan based on criticality assessment, i.e. risk and consequence. There is a
continuous improvement process for defect elimination to avoid business losses.
Specific Equipment Reliability Plan shall be established, and scheduled for execution as
planned; routine or turnaround. See Appendix 5 for guidelines on preparation of
Specific Equipment Reliability Plan.
A combination of breakdown/corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance may

be employed.
• Quality Control of Maintenance Materials and Spares: As a minimum, essential

receiving inspection shall be conducted at the site. System shall be in place to handle
any non-conformance. Where appropriate, vendor quality systems should be assessed
• MI Procedures: Written procedures shall be developed and implemented for MI

activities, covering the lifecycle of the equipment and facilities. The plant operations
and processes are evaluated in terms of the risk to people, asset, environment,
reputation and business interests. The MI program shall include equipment which may
cause or contribute to a loss of containment of hazardous substances. Rationale for
excluding any equipment shall be documented.
• MI Training: All personnel, including contractors, involved in operating, and

inspecting, testing and maintaining the integrity of equipment, shall be competent for
the tasks they will perform. Suitable training and assessment programs covering
relevant procedures and safe work practices shall be defined and implemented.
• Operational Deviation: Critical operating parameters and limits shall be established

and monitored. This should include deviation reporting and investigation.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

• Controlling and Managing Deficiencies: A written process shall be implemented for
identifying, evaluating, and correcting deficiencies in MI-applicable equipment that are
outside acceptable limits. Equipment deficiencies found during tests and inspections
shall be rectified before further use or addressed in a safe and timely manner when
protective measures and continuous monitoring are taken to assure safe operation.
• Quality Assurance (QA): A QA system shall be in place to ensure that process

equipment is suitable for its intended process service. The QA system includes
appropriate activities to verify that equipment design, procurement, fabrication,
construction, and installation is consistent with manufacturer’s recommendations and
good engineering practices. A QA program for management of equipment including
repair and maintenance, materials, and spare parts ensure that such equipment is
suitable for its intended service.
4.2 ENSURING EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY
Requirements
In ensuring the MI program is successful, the MI system is appropriately supported by several

elements.
The following basic elements shall be managed:
• Written Procedures: Types of procedures needed for an MI program shall be identified and
developed, made accessible and cross-referenced. Once these documents are approved, they
shall be implemented and maintained.
• Quality Assurance (QA) : The QA is applied throughout the equipment life cycle, namely
design, procurement, fabrication, goods receipt, construction and installation, in service
operation and decommissioning.
QA is necessary for the handling of equipment, spares, suppliers and contractors. The QA
program shall define roles and responsibilities for managing the QA process.
• Safe Operating Limits (SOL) and Critical Operating Parameters – Never to Exceed Limit
(COP-NEL): In implementing the MI program, it is essential that both SOL and COP-NEL are
known, such that deviations can be monitored and investigated. The limiting parameters shall
be mapped, recorded and communicated to the relevant personnel.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

The limiting parameters shall be updated to account for in-service repairs, alterations and
rerating, if required. MOC should be applied in these cases. See PTS 60.2206 : Design Integrity
for more information on SOL and COP.
• Reliability Engineering: Reliability engineering is intended to prevent occurrence of an

equipment failure by identifying equipment that is critical to process safety and predicting its
failure or malfunction.
Various techniques or tools such as FMEA/FMECA, RCM, RBI, LOPA, IPF/SIL etc. are
available to systematically assess the reliability requirements of equipment. Such techniques or
tools are based on risk and the basis is incorporated into the MI decisions.
• Deficiency Management: All deficiencies or defects shall be managed. This includes setting
the acceptance criteria to place a limit on tolerating equipment deficiencies. Further to that, a
method to identify defects is needed and a response process for handling defects shall be
determined. Such a process includes immediate interventions, investigation, communication and
correction activities.
• Training and Competency: The MI training program shall be developed following a needs
assessment linked to the Reliability Engineering activity. Training shall cover new and current
workers, and the training programs should be subjected to verification and documentation of
their effectiveness. Skills training, especially for technical positions, shall be evaluated in line
with the needs assessment and periodic refresher training conducted.
• Maintenance, Inspection and Test Programs: The maintenance, inspection and test programs
include defining the relevant tasks, and applying the correct tools, techniques and competencies
. Once the tasks are defined, they shall be executed, monitored and the results assessed against a
pre-defined acceptance criteria.
The management of maintenance, inspection and test programs include program monitoring,
scheduling and performance reporting.
• MI Planning and Scheduling: The execution of MI System falls under the MI programs
implementation. This requires planning of MI activities in line with business plans for the
HCU/OPUs and taking into consideration available resources. Adequate resources shall be
made available to deliver successful implementation of the MI program.
4.3 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY MODEL
The model defines the means to assure and document that equipment systems, especially those in
highly hazardous services, are designed, installed, and maintained properly through the application
of:
• Inspection
• Testing
• Corrective/Preventive Maintenance, and
• Quality Assurance
The requirements within the model are described in the diagram below and is explained in the
following sections.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

MI System MI Resources MI Process
TOP LEVEL CONTROL: ENABLING RESOURCES: EQUIPMENT FILE:
Mission/Objectives MI Organisation Inventory of equipment, relevant
technical data and historical records
Key Business Activities Human resources
Responsibilities MI Equipment
PLANS:
Record systems
Who, what, when/how often, where,
Databases & IT support needed, techniques to use.
UPDATE/REVISE RECORDS & PLANS

PROCEDURES & WORK Budget and Finance
INSTRUCTIONS
Spares holding & purchasing EXECUTION:
MI SYSTEM REVIEW & UPDATE
Reliability Assessment
Contracting & contractor management Competent application of integrity
MI Planning techniques to gather good quality
Training & competency assurance
data.
Condition Assessment
Execution
ANALYSE:
Deficiency reporting &
tracking Collating results, identifying
deficiencies, action planning and
prioritising.
REFERENCES:
ACT:
Documents, Codes &
Standards Carry out actions for deficiencies
ASSURANCE:
Measuring performance
MI program involves a lifecycle process with multiple checkpoints to verify:
• The equipment complies with applicable codes and standards

• The materials of construction are compatible with the process service
• Manufacturer’s recommendations for installation are being followed
• The equipment specification is appropriate for the process service
• All installations (including spare parts installations) are suitable for the process application
• Personnel involved in installation are qualified to carry out the work
• Systems or equipment are operated within SOP, COP-NEL
• Systems or equipment are inspected and maintained as per SERP
• MI documents updated or revised to allow proper and safe decommissioning of systems or
equipment
The various stages of an equipment lifecycle are depicted below.

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The critical list of typical requirements or issues that need to be addressed in order for the MI
program to function as intended is given in Appendix 2.
4.4 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS
4.4.1 Controls for Mechanical Integrity
HCU/OPU Management shall appoint an MI Custodian for establishing the MI System and
coordinating the MI programs. To ensure MI programs are carried out in accordance with
the established procedures, HCU/OPUs shall form a team to assist in the development of
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

MI programs and theroles and responsibilities of the team shall be defined and include the
following:
• Determine the equipment for MI

• Establish equipment files
• Establish inspection, testing and preventive maintenance programs
• Perform activities
• Updating Plans and Records
• Responding to Deficiencies
These activities are discussed in the following sections.
Personnel shall be given appropriate training to ensure they are competent to carry out the
work. The competency requirements for all MI activities shall be defined by the
HCU/OPUs based on industry standards and best practices
The following aspects govern the MI System and guidance on them can be found in
relevant PTS and other standards:
• Quality Assurance that applies throughout the equipment lifecycle, refer PTS 70.001
Introduction to Quality Management and the other 70.000 series PTS documents.
• Working procedures controlling activities such as inspection, testing and handling of
non-conformance, refer PTS 60.2205 : Operating Procedures
• Guidelines for conducting inspection and maintenance tasks, refer PTS 50.007
Inspection Manual and PTS 50.001 Maintenance Management Philosophy and the
other 50.000 series PTS documents.
• Codes and Standards that shall be applied, refer to PTS 60.2206 : Design Integrity for
information on the identification of correct codes and standards.
The scope and coverage of MI activities are also influenced by applicable local and
international legislations which may apply to specific HCU/OPUs, such as:
• The type and inventory of hazardous substances as defined by CIMAH Regulations

under Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994, Act 514, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under Factories and Machinery Act 1967, Act 139, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under Environment Quality Act 1974 and Act 127, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under the Energy Commission (EC) Act 447, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under the Fire Services (Bomba) Act 1988, Act 341, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under the Atomic Energy Licensing Board Act 304, Malaysia
• Regulations related to Metering and Weighing Equipment, Tele-Communication
Equipment, Navigation Lights and Signals, Transportation of Dangerous Goods by air,
land or sea etc.
4.4.2 Identification of MI-Applicable Equipment
Equipment and systems that need to be covered by the MI System shall be selected with
due consideration to HSE and business losses. Some general guidelines to determine what
equipment is covered by MI are given in Appendix 3.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

During this process, the safe operating limits shall be recorded such that working limits of
the equipment are known and monitored for deviations.
The outcome of the screening will identify the equipment or equipment groups to be
included in MI and these may include:
• Pressure Equipment (e.g. Vessels, Boilers, Heat Exchangers)

• Storage Tanks and atmospheric vessels
• Pipework and Pipelines
• Rotating Equipment (e.g. Pumps & Compressors)
• Flexible connections (e.g. Hoses, Bellows, Expansion Joints or Loading Arms)
• Safeguarding Systems (ESD etc.)
• Pressure Relieving & Venting Devices and Systems
• Electrical Equipment including Distribution, Grounding/Bonding & Cathodic
Protection Systems
• Detection Systems for flammable gas, toxic gas and fire
• Fire Protection Equipment
• Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic Components
• Plant Alarms and Communication Systems
• Secondary Containment Systems
• Isolation Valves, Check Valves and Back-flow Protection Devices
• Ventilation Systems
• Control (monitoring devices, sensors, alarms and interlocks)
• Dry Material Handling Systems
• Buildings, structures and supports
• Dust Collection and Process Vent Systems
• Rigging Devices & Lifting Equipment
4.4.3 Management of Equipment Files
Equipment files shall be established and shall include the following information (where
applicable) :
• Original and current design information.

• Process fluid composition and inventories.
• Location and layout.
• Safe Operating Limits and Critical Operating Parameters.
• Relevant control and safeguarding systems description and operation.
• Maintenance, inspection, test and change history.
MI equipment files shall contain links to the relevant PSI and may summarise it if required.
Information specific to the MI files shall include:
• Predicted deterioration mechanisms, failure modes and timeframes.

• Specific maintenance, inspection and testing activities to be undertaken.
• Quality assurance specifications for materials / spare parts
• Specific equipment reliability plans.
An example checklist for maintaining equipment files is given in Appendix 4.
Specific Equipment Reliability Plans (SERP) shall be created from equipment guidelines,
applicable codes and standards, and references from RBI, RCM, etc. The Appendix 5
provides some guidance to the content to such plans.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

4.4.4 Establishment of Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Programs
Programme(s) shall be developed to ensure adequate inspection, testing and maintenance is

conducted using the systematic approach. To ensure these objectives are met, there is a
need to:
• Understand and identify potential equipment deficiencies for all equipment

(information can be obtained from predictive reliability engineering models using
various techniques)
• Establish procedures for required activities
• Identify suitable inspection, testing or maintenance activities to address the
deficiencies.
• Establish appropriate timeline for the activities
• Establish appropriate acceptance criteria for the activity
• Document the inspection, testing and preventive maintenance plan
Use of predictive technologies in planning MI activities would allow HCU/OPUs to:
• Determine priorities
• Optimise effort and resources
• Balance preventive and breakdown (corrective) maintenance
• Continually evaluate the effect of changes to process materials, operating parameters
and surrounding environment.
This is depicted in Figure 3 below:
1. Develop a model of equipment

and related damage mechanisms
2. Predict the location of each type of

failure
3. Estimate the extent and severity of

Update model
the failure
4. Determine the most effective

means for finding the failure
5. Inspect for the failure
6. Collate and analyse results
Figure 3: Planning MI Activities
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

The basic requirements for Specific Equipment Reliability Plans are:
1. Define the purpose of the activities to be completed.
• Serve as a record of the intended plan for the equipment, and is documented and
maintained
• Help the Planner to schedule the activities
2. Describe in detail the activities to be completed.
• Define the inspection, testing, and preventive maintenance activities that will be
performed on equipment
• Plan should be prepared for each equipment item or groups of similar items in
similar service
3. Highlight the contents of the plan.
• Contain the description of the activities to be performed

• Describe how often the activities will be performed
• Specify the competency required to perform the activities
• State the acceptance criteria
4. Comply with applicable regulatory requirements, corporate and sie requirementsand

industry standards
4.4.5 Execution of MI Activities
The execution of planned activities shall utilise a planning/scheduling system to ensure that
activities happen and are monitored for progress and quality.
The execution of MI activities is the responsibility of the relevant disciplines within the
HCU/OPU organisation. It is the responsibility of the MI Custodian to ensure that MI
activities are performed in a manner as prescribed by the procedures, competent personnel
are assigned for the tasks, proper recording and evaluation of the activity results, and
changes to the Specific Equipment Reliability Plans are initiated as appropriate.
4.4.6 Documention and Analysis of Results
HCU/OPUs shall demonstrate the effective implementation of the MI program through the
creation and maintenance of documentation and records. This means that formal
documentation exists describing the activities defined in the MI program and that records
are created regarding the results of the activities, analysis of those results, and decisions
taken in light of that analysis.
HCU/OPUs shall verify compliance with documentation requirements, through the

application of Assurance processes. Any deviations from the MI program shall be reported,
tracked, resolved, and documented. All records shall be updated and maintained.
Considerations for documenting MI activities include:
1. Establishing minimum requirements for reporting

2. Establishing process for reviewing activity results
3. Establishing mechanism to manage and correct deficiencies in a safe and timely manner
4. Updating MI plans and equipment record
The results from conducting the SERPs shall be analysed. From the results, it is considered
that a deficiency exists when equipment conditions are outside acceptable limits.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Deficiency may have an effect on the integrity of the equipment and would need timely
response from the HCU/OPU. See section 4.4.7
There are several tools and methodologies available during the review process to determine
the interval of MI activities in relation to relevant equipment:
1. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) (Reference : PETRONAS Risk Based Inspection, API
580)
2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
3. Fitness-For-Service (FFS) (Reference : API 579)
4. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
5. Consequence Analysis (CA)
6. Instrumented Protective Function / Safety Integrity Level (IPF/SIL) (Reference : PTS
32.80.10.10 Classification And Implementation Of Instrumented Protective Functions,
IEC 61508/61511)
7. Reliability Centred Maintenance
For statutory pressure vessels, there may be an option to follow a risk based approach for
setting inspection intervals, such as the Special Scheme for Inspection (SSI) introduced by
Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) in Malaysia.
4.4.7 Managing Deficiencies
A deficiency exists when equipment conditions are outside acceptable limits. These limits
are defined by acceptance criteria.
Appendix 6: Evaluating Results and Correcting Deficiencies provides suggested procedures

to apply under the circumstances of comparing the activity results in relation to the
acceptance criteria or when a field observation identifies an equipment deficiency.
Typically the deficiency management process is as follows:
• Review inspection results by comparing the result to the predetermined acceptance

criteria
• If a deficiency is identified, log the deficiency in a tracking system
• Determine the criticality level of the deficiency
- emergency (immediate attention)
- continue operations (continue to operate, but monitor)
• Decide on proper action i.e. whether to re-rate, repair, replace or remain (as-is
condition)
• Apply Management of Change where required
• Plan and schedule deficiency corrective action plan
• Track deficiency until resolution and retain history in the equipment file
• Revise SERP if necessary
4.5 QUALITY ASSURANCE
4.5.1 Quality Assurance for Service Providers
The MI System shall ensure competent service providers are engaged to perform spcialised
MI activities either on-site or off-site. Examples of specialised MI activities may include :
• Specialised preventive maintenance activities such as Condition Based Monitoring

(CBM)
• Corrective actions from deficiency correction plans
• Statutory inspection of equipment
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

• Meter proving/calibrations
• Function testing of fire prevention and protection equipment
• Shop testing of pressure relieving devices (rebuild/retest)
• Non-destructive testing
4.5.2 Quality Assurance for Equipment, Materials and Spares
The MI System shall ensure that equipment, materials, and spare parts are suitable and
comply with relevant standards.
This applies to both replacement-in-kind and replacements of an alternative design which

have previously been authorized through the MOC process. The replacements may be:
• Materials (e.g. fuels, lubricants, catalysts)

• Spare parts
• New or replacement equipment
QA process for equipment, materials and spares should include the following activities:
• Approval of vendors and suppliers

• Creation or amendment of purchasing specification
• Purchase of materials
• Receiving inspections
• Storage, handling and protection
• Evaluation of vendor and supplier QA systems
These requirements shall also apply to projects where new equipment is being specified and
delivered.
4.6 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY DATABASE
To facilitate the implementation of MI System, it is highly recommended that a suitable

computerised software be used to provide :
1. Equipment Database
• With asset hierarchy that allows for comprehensive cataloguing of equipment/equipment
types
• Provide standard datasheets that include information on design, materials and
manufacturing and operation parameters for each equipment
• Search function to allow search of specific equipment by key words
2. Document Link
• Allows PSI, such as technical documents, images, scanned files, pictures and site drawings,
to be attached for online reference and viewing
• Provide information about the design and construction of the equipment including details of
orignal vendors, and suppliers of consumables.
• Record information of technical and work history such as findings, recommendation and
work done with reason and date, and view of change history
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

3. Scheduling and Execution Tool
• Compute fitness for services calculation and provide basis for MI plans using accepted
approaches
• Establishing standard work items for MI schedules and register tags for MI activities by
generation of automatic work-list and next inspection, testing and maintenance date based
on schedule
• Recording of MI work history on job done and creates management reports to analyse
technical results
4. Monitoring Data
• Define measurement points and allows transfer of bulk data from monitoring devices
• Produce customised reports for management, technical specialists and field engineers
5. Technical Software Interface

• Interface with risk assessment packages to automatically update asset, degradation rates
information
• Allow reports and graphics from interfaced software packages to be viewed by all
authorized users online
6. System Administration and Security

• Define organization and provide level of access by user groups by only permitting access to
user related work items, working content and operating menus
• Provide capability for users to define additional fields for local customisation.
• Provide multiple language user interface if required
5. DELIVERABLES FROM MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
The deliverables from the MI process are both tangible and intangible, but both forms are important
because they support other activities within the HSE MS and other management systems. The main
purpose of the deliverables is to demonstrate good governance of the equipment integrity and
provide assurance of the same to management and relevant stakeholders. Key deliverables include:
• Equipment Inventory This is an important document for understanding the extent of

risk exposure as it will include the type, service and age of
equipment. It will be useful in supporting studies under HEMP
(such as RBI, PHA, HAZOP) by defining the extent, nature and
identity of equipment on site. It also supports the financial
management function in determining capitalisation and
depreciation of equipment of insurance purposes.
• Condition Assessment These results give management an understanding of exposures

Results and support strategic and tactical decision making on ongoing
equipment operation, budgeting and resourcing, risk mitigation
options, product reliability and quality, future expansion,
construction of similar facilities, etc.
• Reliability Analyses This sets a standard for the expected, achievable, reliability of
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

equipment. This helps define intervention activities – e.g.
inspection & maintenance – but also assists in completing the
Hazards and Effects Register as part of HEMP by assessing the
risk exposure due to the failure of equipment.
• Improved Plant A good MI program should enable the prediction and prevention
Availability of equipment failures. This improves the availability of the plant
and equipment and supports business success.
• Increased Awareness The MI program should support the development of competency

within key functions of the organisation. However, it should also
build a general awareness of MI issues throughout the
workforce.
• Equipment Performance The consistent, comprehensive, competent and timely collection

History of data provides a clear picture of the performance of the
equipment. This demonstrates good management of the
company assets and supports other processes such as purchasing,
operational planning and risk assessment.
6. PERFORMANCE MONITORING
HCU/OPUs shall establish mechanisms and procedures to measure, monitor and provide assurance
with respect to performance of MI implementation.
6.1 MONITORING
HCU/OPUs shall set clear indicators to allow tracking of the performance of the MI System. These
shall be monitored on a regular (e.g. monthly) basis by the HCU/OPU Management.
Indicators should be specific and measurable, have realistic targets and delivery timeframes and be
achievable with the resources available. Following are examples of indicators which would allow
HCU/OPU Management to monitor performance of the MI System :
• Number of loss of containment events due to MI System failure

• Number of loss of production events due to MI System failure
• Number of remedial maintenance activities
• Number of inspection on critical items
• Number of outstanding failure investigations
• MI activity backlog
• MI competency program completion
• Number of non-standard repair
• Number of Assurance conducted on MI System
• Number of NCR raised against MI procedure
The results of monitoring the indicators will help identify the needs for resources, training and
focused Assurance activities.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

6.2 ASSURANCE
HCU/OPUs shall assess the suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of the MI System through
Assurance process. The purposes of the Assurance are to:
• Determine whether HCU/OPU’s MI procedures and practices are complete, up-to-date and
compliant with applicable governmental regulations, policies and good HSE management
practices.
• Determine whether MI processes are implemented, effective, apply good engineering practices
and meet the requirements of the MI System.
• Determine the status and quality of MI activities versus identified objectives, goals and/or other
targets.
.
HCU/OPUs shall develop checklist or protocol for the MI Assurance, example of which can be seen
in Appendix 8.
Assurance on MI may be conducted as part of the overall HSE MS Assurance activity at the
facility (as per PTS 60.0102 and PTS 60.0301), or specially organized such that the scope only
cover the MI System.
The Assurance shall be undertaken in three tiers as follows :
1. Tier 1 Assurance, normally conducted in the form of site inspection, will provide evidence of
the compliance to the MI procedures and practices within the respective unit/area/department.
This shall be conducted at a periodic interval as determined by the HCU/OPU Management
and shall be undertaken by the relevant personnel within the HCU/OPU. The results of
Assurance activities shall be presented to the relevant Management of the facility.
2. Tier 2 Assurance is aimed at ensuring that the overall MI System is effective, adequate and
implemented in all areas. This Assurance activity shall be led by the relevant senior
Management within the HCU/OPU and supported by technical specialists on at least a yearly
basis. The results of the Assurance activities shall be presented to the relevant Management of
the facility for review.
3. Tier 3 Assurance is aimed at confirming the compliance of the MI System to corporate

requirements and to assess its performance as part of the wider HSE Management System. It
can be conducted as part of the overall HSE MS Assurance activity at the facility, and is
normally carried out by independent external parties, such as representatives of the
PETRONAS Corporate HSE Department or other HCU/OPUs and supported by relevant
technical expertise.
6.3 ACTIONS TRACKING AND FOLLOW-UP
HCU/OPUs shall ensure that an action tracking system is established and maintained to manage all
follow-up requirements from the MI System.
Action tracking, as a minimum, requires the establishment of a formal system and procedure for :
1. Tracking the status of, and following-up on, key milestones and performance indicators
identified in MI Plans, i.e., the implementation life cycle of the change.
2. Tracking the status of, and following-up on, identified corrective and preventive action items
during the monitoring of MI Plans, i.e., the implementation life cycle of the change.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

3. Tracking the status of, and following-up on, identified corrective and preventive action items
arising from Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 Assurance activities and their respective Assurance
Reports.
The following components shall be considered to ensure suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of
the above :
Time frames and functional accountabilities for reporting, implementing follow-up, verifying
the effectiveness of follow-up and closing-out follow-up items are clearly defined.
There are periodic reviews of the status of outstanding / overdue actions.
Adequate attention is given to coordination among various areas of functions / personnel
affected by follow-up actions.
Information about problems and progress is communicated adequately to all personnel
concerned.
7. RECORDS MANAGEMENT
MI programs will result in a large volume of records as required under sections 4.4 and 4.5
covering “Mechanical Integrity Process” and “Quality Assurance” respectively.
HCU/OPUs shall develop a system for generating, collating and indexing records in a consistent
and accurate manner. The HCU/OPU shall manage the storage and retrieval of records in a similar
manner. The accessibility and period of retention of records shall be determined on the basis of the
criticality of the information, the frequency with which it is required, the lifecycle phase it supports,
legal requirement and industry/company practice.
The records management system shall be formally described and an Assurance process put in place.
8. MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
The following RACI1 Chart describes the list of the actions and associated responsibilities with
regard to developing and operating a MI System. These are high-level actions and are intended to
provide guidance about the extent of accountability and responsibilities for the main roles.
Support Function
HCU/OPU/ Corp
MI Custodian
Management
Maintenance
Engineering
HCU/OPU
Inspection
HSE Unit
Function
Function
Sec
Action Ref Comment
Determine role of MI within HCU/OPU 4.1 A/R This will involve defining the goals for
the MI program within the existing
HCU/OPU Management systems,
and defining key interfaces.
Appoint responsible person 4.1 A/R I The MI Custodian needs to be
empowered to work with the various
supporting functions in delivering the
MI goals.
Develop structure of MI System 4.3 A R C C C The MI System needs to be aligned
with the existing HCU/OPU
Management systems and to
interface in an effective manner. The
1
RACI – Responsible, Accountable, Consult, Inform
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Support Function
HCU/OPU/ Corp
MI Custodian
Management
Maintenance
Engineering
Inspection
HCU/OPU
HSE Unit
Function
Function
Sec
Action Ref Comment
supporting organisation and
competencies need to be defined at
this time.
Define scope of MI System 4.4.2 A R C C C The types of equipment covered by
the system needs to be defined.
Develop the MI management system 4.3 A/R C C C Create high-level management
system documents and plan for
development of procedures and
practices
Implement MI Process 4.4 A/R R R R Each function further develops and
implements the MI program in its
area. Communication and training will
be key components. The MI
Custodian provides an overview
function.
Develop Quality Assurance processes 4.5 A/R C C C The management of quality may
require its own function.
MI Database Systems 4.6 A/C R C C C MI will require IT systems to support
its programs, models and systems.
This will be a key component of the
operational system.
Performance Monitoring and Assurance 6 A/I R C C C R Monitoring ongoing performance is
the responsibility of the MI Custodian,
but HCU/OPU HSE Dept provide Tier
2 Assurance and the C-HSE Unit
provides tier 3 Assurance.
Accountability lies with the HCU/OPU
Management.
Records Management 7 A R R R The management of records needs to
be coordinated and consistent, but
responsibility lies with each function.
Review and Improvement A/R C C C C HCU/OPU Management review the
MI System on a regular basis to
ensure it remains adequate and
effective.
Key: R - Responsible, A - Accountable, C - Consulted, I - Informed
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY
Term Definition
Activity A test, inspection, or maintenance process on a type of equipment.
Activity Procedure Controlled Operating Documents that establish responsibility, authority, and the
acceptable methods for performing a test, inspection, or maintenance activity.
Activity Procedures are used within a department and give an individual or group
the steps, information, and safety requirements needed to perform the task.
Activity Report Documentation of activity results.
Activity Result The information gained or outcome of an activity.
Assigned Person's The person ultimately responsible for the performance and initial review of
Supervisor activities.
Assigned Person The qualified person who performs a test, inspection, or maintenance activity. The
Assigned Person may be referred to as an Examiner, Mechanic, Technician, etc.
by different work groups, and may require certification by API, ASNT or other
agencies to perform certain tasks.
Best Practices Method/approach/practice of managing synergistically of people, business and
technology for maximum effectiveness of overall business performance.
API American Petroleum Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASNT American Society For Non Destructive Testing
Cause and Effect A diagram used to collect ideas about possible causes of a problem, The problem
Diagram (effect) is listed on the right, and possible causes are listed by categories on
branches of limbs that lead to it.
Certification The process of proving the accuracy of a Shop Standard in a manner which can be
traced to NIST standards, and of calibrating Test and Calibration equipment
against the Shop Standard.
CIMAH Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards, Occupational Safety and Health
Regulations 1996 (OSH Act 1994, Act 514), Malaysia
Company PETRONAS (also referred to as the Principal) or any duly appointed party
authorized to act for, and on its behalf.
Compliance A formal investigation to verify compliance by assuring that the procedures and
Assurance practices are adequate and are being followed.
Competent Person Competent Person. An individual who, through training or experience, has
technical and/or practical skills in equipment design, fabrication, installation,
inspection, or maintenance.
Confidential, Records which could place the company at a competitive disadvantage or could be
Sensitive, or used to defraud the company in the hands of an adversary or competitor.
Proprietary Records
Contractor A party to a contract with the Company that is responsible for the supply of all or
part of any facilities, product or service to perform the duties specified by the
Company. The Company may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor.
Database A set of data elements, consisting of at least one file or a group of integrated files,
usually stored in one location.
Deficiency Activity results that are outside acceptable limits.
Deficiency Tracking The management report generated by the MI Custodian which gives the status of
Report all outstanding corrections of deficiencies.
DOSH Department of Occupational Safety and Health
ECA Equipment Criticality Analysis

Equipment Data A data sheet which contains design and operating information needed as reference
Sheet for developing an effective Equipment Plan. A blank data sheet which identifies
the necessary data is included with each Equipment Guideline.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Term Definition
Equipment Files A file system which is part of the MI program. This file contains copies of the
Equipment Data Sheet, Equipment History, Equipment Plan, and Activity Results.
Equipment File A checklist which identifies documentation and data required or recommended for
Checklist build-out of an equipment file.
Equipment Guidelines Documents which describe recommended inspection and test requirements
needed for developing Equipment Plans.
Equipment Plans Plans that match appropriate inspection, test, or maintenance activities with
identified potential failure mechanisms of a piece of equipment. These plans
define where the activities are to be performed, extent, and timing for the activities,
preparations which may be required, personnel assigned, responsibilities, and
acceptance criteria.
Equipment Specifications furnished to the equipment fabricator which describe in detail
Specifications requirements for fabrication of the new or replacement equipment, administration of
the purchase order, and delivery of the equipment to the job site.
Examiner A person who assists the Assigned Person to inspect fixed equipment by
performing specific nondestructive examination (NDE), but does not evaluate the
results of those examinations in accordance with API standards, unless specifically
trained and authorized to do so by the owner or user.
Facility The buildings, containers or equipment which contain a process.
Function A group within a Manufacturing site (e.g. Operations, Planning, HR, etc.)
FMA Factories and Machinery Act 1967
FMEA/FMECA Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
Hazardous Substance A substance, owing to their physical and chemical properties, are capable of
producing major accident hazards either falling within the criteria laid down in
Schedule 1 or listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Occupational Safety and Health
(Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulation 1996.
Hot Work Permit A written and authorized permit which lists the detailed requirements which must
be met prior to initiating an activity which could generate a spark or other energy
source sufficient to ignite process or other flammable materials which may be in the
work area.
HCU PETRONAS Holding Company Unit - A business entity operating under the control
of a PETRONAS Group Holding Company.
In-Service Fixed equipment that has been placed in operation, as opposed to new
construction prior to being placed in service.
Inspection and Test A management report generated monthly from data in the MI System which shows
Status Report the test and inspection due date and the inspection status of each piece of
equipment within a plant area.
IPF Instrumented Protection Function
ISO International Organization of Standardization in Geneva, Switzerland. ISO, which
is made up of national standard institutes from all regions of the world, develops
voluntary technical standards that add value to all types of businesses
KPI Key Performance Indicators
LOPA Level of Protection Analysis
Management of A formal work process to assess the impact of changes in process chemicals,
Change (MOC) technology, equipment, and procedures on employee safety and health.
Mechanical Integrity The tests, inspections, and maintenance procedures to assure that equipment has
(MI) been designed, constructed, installed, and maintained in a way which minimizes
the risk of releasing highly hazardous chemicals.
MI Custodian The individual who has been assigned the responsibility and given the authority to
establish, implement, maintain and oversee the MI System and its performance
MI Program The proactive management system that defines the tests, inspections, and
maintenance procedures to assure that equipment has been designed,
constructed, installed, maintained, and continuously improved in a way which
minimizes the risk of releasing highly hazardous chemicals and maximizes
equipment and process reliability.
MI System Mechanical Integrity System
mpy Mils per Year
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Term Definition
NBIC National Board Inspection Code
Operating Procedures Written operating procedures, consistent with the process safety information, that
(OP) provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the covered
process.
OPU PETRONAS Operating Unit - A business entity operating under the control of the
PETRONAS Group
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA Process Hazard Analysis
PM Preventive Maintenance
Policy Statement from Management indicating commitments and strategic direction.
Process Safety A compilation of written information pertaining to the hazards of highly hazardous
Information (PSI) chemicals, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information
pertaining to the equipment in the process.
PSM Process Safety Management
PTS PETRONAS Technical Standard
Quality Assurance A gathering of procedures that document what is supposed to occur in work
(QA) processes.
QA Procedures Documents which describe the methods used to fabricate and install new or
replacement equipment and to assure that incoming materials meet requirements.
Quaility Control (QC) A measurement process, a gathering of statistics that evaluate the compliance of
work by sampling its flow
RACI A technique used to identify and document roles and responsibilities by assigning
RACI codes (Responsible, Accountable, Consult, and Inform) to the individuals or
groups involved in a specific activity or decision, according to the following
definition; clarifies roles and identifies breakdowns that keep us from working
efficiently. Responsible (R) the person(s) actually working on the activity -the
"doer”. Accountable (A) the person with yes/no authority--where "the buck stops".
Consult (C) those who should be involved prior to decision or action; stay "in the
loop". Inform (I) those who need to know of the decision or action after the fact--
keep "in the picture". There can only be one "A" for any activity or decision, but
multiple "Rs" and "Cs" and "Is" are appropriate.
RBI Risk Based Inspection
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
Records Written or electronic format that describes a history (data, descriptions); cannot be
revised.
Reference Supporting information of external or internal origin. Reference information must
be maintained current.
SIL Safety Integrity Level
Standard Established overall requirements and is directive in nature. Describes what "good"
looks like.
System A description of interdependent processes and procedures, with narrative text
endorsed by management, that describes the organization, policies and principles,
and how it is organized to manage either core values, operating units, or functions.
Template A template provides guidance on formatting, content, etc. for controlled documents
and is the shell of the document.
ULPO Unexpected Loss of Production Opportunity
Verification Plan A plan which defines the activities to be applied to verify that replacement
maintenance materials, spare parts, and equipment meet requirements. The
Verification Plan is normally a part of purchasing documentation.
Work Details “how” a work step or process is performed specific to a piece of equipment
Instructions/Task Lists or unique task. These are usually site specific and only required as needed for risk
reduction / local optimization.
Work Processes Supports the Standard with details of “who”, “what”, “when”, “where” (and
sometimes in a very broad sense “how”) a process is to be accomplished to meet
the customers needs.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 2: ESTABLISH MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM
The following table summarizes typical requirements or facilities that must be in place before or during
implementation of the MI program. In order for the MI program to function as intended, the overall
Process Safety program must be defined and the corresponding data and document management
systems must be in place to support the activities. This attachment identifies typical requirements or
issues that need to be addressed early in the MI program implementation.
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PROGRAM SUPPORT ISSUES

Item Assigned To Due Date Done
1. Verify that piping and instrument diagrams are
complete and correct
2. Verify that process flow diagrams are complete and
correct
3. Complete the Process Hazard Analyses
4. Establish or verify the plant policy on equipment
numbering and identification
5. Tag or otherwise uniquely identify equipment in the
field
6. Verify/define electrical classifications
7. Complete/verify relief system design validation
8. Verify that the MOC process addresses changes to
maintenance/MI procedures
9. Verify that the MOC process includes provisions for
training on new or revised maintenance/MI
procedures
10. Verify that a written description for managing
projects is in place. This description will be
referenced by the Quality Assurance Procedures.
11. Verify that a written process is in place for
engineering design specification.
12. Confirm that equipment specifications are in place
(e.g. piping specification) as appropriate.
13. Prepare training modules for MI program awareness
training
14. Verify that adequate training facilities and training
tools exist.
15. Consider providing external training/certification for
appropriate Competent Persons (e.g. CWI or API
certifications.)
16. Identify existing Vendors that need to be included in
the vendor assessment program.
17. Verify that records of vendor approvals or
assessment are retained and managed
18. Verify that the Plant Safety Program has an
established program for Safe Work
Procedures/Practices
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

19. Verify that the stores warehouse facilities are
suitable and have adequate controls.
20. Verify that purchasing procedures and policies are
in place for purchase order processing, standard
material receiving, and vendor appraisal.
21. Establish physical location for paper equipment
files.
22. Ensure that equipment history is compiled, correct,
and current
23. Ensure that equipment data (including Process
Safety Information) is compiled, correct, and current
24. For operator-performed activities, ensure that the
operating procedures include sufficient detail for
conducting inspection/tests
25. Verify that appropriate scheduling tools are in place
to ensure that operator-performed activities are
triggered.
26. Obtain adequate file cabinets, files, duplication
equipment, etc. to support the file room.
27. Verify that electronic equipment files (if intended)
can be managed by the computer system.
28. Verify that the plant policy for Contractor Safety
Program is in place.
29. Identify and obtain access to codes or standards
that will be required to support implementation
efforts.
30. Verify that the MI System is functioning as intended.
31. Establish or define special progress reporting
templates in the MI System
32. Verify that planners are trained in use of the MI
System
33. Obtain OEM manuals as needed
34. Verify that electronic equipment files have a backup
policy.
35. Verify that the Process Safety Information is current
and subject to a data management program.
36. Compile a master list of all equipment.
37. Verify that data management tools (such as
vibration monitoring software) are initialized
38. Verify that users of data management tools are
adequately trained in it use and capabilities.
39. Validate existing mechanical drawings
40 Validate existing electrical and instrumentation
drawings
41 Verify that electrical classification is established
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

42 Verify that operating procedures are in place and
controlled
43 Verify that safe operating limited are defined
44 Verify that work permitting and lock-out tag-out are
in place
45 Verify that Process overview training is in place
46 Verify that Hot work permit practice is in place
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 3: DETERMINING EQUIPMENT LISTING
This methodology defined below, applies to evaluation of all process facilities and associated equipment.
Guidance for Determining MI-Applicable Equipment
By definition, a covered process is a process which;

Might contribute to or cause a catastrophic release of hazardous chemicals, and critical facilities
are those that serve to prevent or mitigate catastrophic release.
On that basis, equipment within a covered process (including most utilities), connected to a covered
process, or adjacent to a covered process is considered a single covered process. When equipment is
excluded from the MI program, the justification for the exclusion must be documented. The best
mechanism for excluding equipment is a Process Hazards Analysis (see PTS 60.2204 : Process Hazard
Analysis). A Process Hazards Analysis is a study which addresses:
• the hazards of the process

• previous incidents which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the workplace
• engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as
appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases (Acceptable
detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and
detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors)
• consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls
• facility siting
• human factors
• a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls on
employees in the workplace
Following are some general guidelines to be used to determine which equipment is covered under MI:
Process Containing Equipment (Pressure vessels, storage tanks, piping, rotating equipment, relief
devices and vent systems)
• All process equipment which contains highly hazardous chemicals above the threshold quantities as
defined by the HCU/OPU or relevant regulations, codes or standards, is MI-applicable.
• Process equipment which does not contain hazardous chemicals but is connected to MI-applicable
equipment is also covered. It may be possible to exclude the connected equipment, or a portion of
the connected equipment, if it can be shown that highly hazardous chemicals will not migrate into the
connected equipment or that failure of the connected equipment could not affect the covered process
and cause a catastrophic release.
• Process equipment adjacent to but not connected to a covered process is included unless it can be
shown that the equipment cannot affect the covered process and cause a catastrophic release. The
Process Hazards Review should include the effect of flying debris (thus becoming a siting
consideration).
• A boiler used to supply heat to a covered process or a furnace or process heater receiving
condensate returned from a covered process is considered part of the covered process. By extension,
if the boiler is covered, processes to which a covered boiler is connected may also be covered.
• A boiler is covered if a portion of its fuel is from a covered process.
• A non-stationary vessel or tank (such as a rail car or tank truck) is MI-applicable if it is directly
connected to a covered process and used as a storage container. Such equipment may be regulated
by another standard (e.g. Department of Transportation) and subject to specific inspection, test, and
maintenance requirements. The MI program must ensure that the connected equipment is suitable
for its service; however, since non-stationary equipment may not be owned by the facility, the MI
program should specify the appropriate level of scrutiny given to equipment which is regulated by
another entity.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Process Controls Systems (Including emergency shutdown systems)
• All instrumentation which was installed for the purpose of taking the process, or specific equipment in
a process, to a safe state is MI-applicable. This does not include instrumentation and controls
installed for non-emergency shutdowns or routine operations, but does include instrumentation which
is backed up by secondary measures such as pressure relief devices. A Process Hazards Analysis
should be used to determine if questionable instrumentation should be included.
• Instrumentation on utilities and non-MI-applicable equipment is covered if failure can affect the
covered process and cause a catastrophic release.
• Electrical Systems
• Electrical systems connected to MI-applicable equipment are covered if failure of the electrical
systems would contribute or cause a catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals. Thus, the
electrical supply to motors, instrumentation, etc. is covered unless it can be shown, under a worse
case scenario, that failure of the electrical supply cannot affect the covered equipment and cause a
catastrophic release.
• Uninterruptible power supply systems and emergency power supply systems (emergency generators)
supplying a covered process are covered unless it can be shown that, under a worse case scenario,
failure cannot affect the covered process and cause a catastrophic release.
Prevention, Mitigating, and Alarm Systems
• Fire water and foam systems, including water and foam storage, pumps, headers, deluge, sprinkler
systems, and their controls are covered.
• Detectors such as flammability monitors and their alarms are covered.
Utilities
• Utilities are covered if they are required for the proper operation of covered equipment. For example,
the instrument air supply to covered pneumatic instrumentation is covered. This would include the air
compressor, dryer, headers, etc. The electrical supply to electronic instruments would likewise be
covered.
• Utilities such as cooling water, condensate, nitrogen, etc. which are connected to covered equipment
are covered.
• Utilities within a covered area but not connected to covered equipment are covered unless it can be
shown that failure of the utility cannot affect the covered process in a way that could cause a
catastrophic release.
Mechanical Material Handling Equipment and Rigging Devices
• Rigging devices, such as cranes and hoists, are MI-applicable if failure of the rigging device could
contribute to a release of highly hazardous substance. Overhead cranes which routinely maneuver
equipment or product over a covered process may be MI-applicable.
• Mechanical material handling equipment (such as bucket elevators, pneumatic conveying systems, or
conveyors) are covered if failure of the equipment could contribute to or cause a release of highly
hazardous substance.
Vendor Supplied Equipment
• All equipment supplied by Service Providers shall comply with the requirements of the MI System.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 4: MANAGING EQUIPMENT FILES
The equipment checklists provided a standardized approach for maintaining equipment files for MI-
applicable equipment. As the equipment files are established, the MI Custodian at HCU/OPU sites is
accountable to ensure the files are manages and maintained by the respective plant functions e.g.
maintenance, inspection and engineering.
An EXAMPLE Equipment File Checklist
Description: Pressure Vessels / Storage Tanks Equipment No:

PEFS No:
Content Description Doc/Drawing No. Date Rev. File Status Comment

Construction Records or
Design Information
*Design Calculations
*Date Put In Service
*Pertinent Process Conditions
Equipment Spec Sheet
Vendor Drawings
OEM Manual
Material Test Reports
Fabrication Records
Name Plate Rubbing
Inspection, Test, and PM History
*Specific Equipment Plan

*Corrosion Rate Timing Calc
*Records Of All Examinations
*Potential Modes Of Failure
*Base Line Readings
Certified Test Reports
Hydrotest Records
Repair/Alteration History
*Repair Alteration Forms

Service Changes
Maintenance History
Comments and associated equipment
FILE STATUS CODES

C - Complete NA - Not Applicable
P - Partial M - Missing
D - Discrepancies
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 5: PREPARING SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY PLAN (SERP)
This procedure applies to new or revised Equipment Reliability Plans for equipment covered under MI and
requires use of the equipment guidelines, equipment files, and applicable codes and standards.
Tools that employs Reliability Engineerning such as RBI and RCM are recommended for this purpose.
Specific Equipment Reliability Plan Contents
The following text provides guidance on the Equipment Plan.
1 Master Plan No. A “master” plan number assigned to Equipment Reliability Plans that may be used for
referencing purposes. Such master plans may be assigned to equipment items in
identical service that will have an identical Equipment Reliability Plan. The list of
equipment must be listed in the block provided or attached to the Equipment Reliability
Plan
2 Performance The function of an equipment in operation to deliver maintenance management

strategies, e.g. to achieve low maintenance costs, high reliability and high availability
etc.
3 Significance of A significance of failure is defined as the inability of an item to perform a specific
failure function within the specified limits such as causing a complete shutdown, slowdown or
maintenance costs only. May be classified as effecting HSE and/or ULPO
4 Consequence of Specific cost penalty for failure is defined as the inability of an item to perform a
Failure specific function within the specified limits such as causing a complete shutdown,
slowdown or maintenance costs only.
5 Equipment Type Type of equipment used for the service.
6 Can Be Bypassed Definition if the equipment can be bypassed
7 Maintenance Standardized priority level used for the equipment.

Priority
8 Equipment Target level for the equipment.

Throughput Target
9 Quality Target: Target level for the equipment.
10 Availability Target Target level for the equipment.
11 Reliability Target Target level for the equipment.
12 Scheduled Target level for the equipment.

Shutdown Target
13 Other S/D Targets Target level for the equipment.
14 LPO of Unit Monetary penalty for the unit shutdown.

Shutdown
15 Failure Cause / Description of the potential problem which has been identified. More than one
Potential Problem potential problem is likely and each is addressed separately.
16 Failure Mode A failure mode is a specific physical condition that causes a functional failure. The
failure mode statement should include a description of the failure mechanism (e.g.,
fatigue) whenever possible. Many failure modes could be listed, but only failure modes
that are “reasonable” will be considered.
17 Degradation Rate Rate of system performance degradation or failure through simultaneous deficiency in
several system components, due to occurrence of a single event such as increased
corrosion, design error or human error
18 Risk Risk is the measure of the potential for harm or loss (i.e. hazard) that reflect both the
likelihood (e.g. frequency) and severity of an adverse effect to health, property, or
environment.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

19 Action An element of an operation and / or maintenance event. One or more tasks (i.e., fault
localization, fault isolation, servicing and inspection) necessary to retain an item in or
restore it to a specified condition.
20 Activity Procedure A procedure which provides instruction on how to perform and document an activity.
Title and Number The activity is selected to measure or detect the potential problem. Sometimes more
than one activity could be selected to investigate a potential problem. The Competent
Person should select the activity that will give the required data at minimum cost
including the cost of interruption to operation.
21 Activity Timing The timing at which the activity is to be repeated. Such timing should be established
through use of the Equipment Guideline, and must be based on sound principles.
22 Timing Start A date upon which the activity schedule should be based. This may be the date of a
baseline inspection or other previous work. In the event that the activity has never
before been carried out, enter the date by which the activity must be performed
23 Acceptance The specific limit of test or measurement results which can be accepted based on the
Criteria design of the equipment, operating conditions, and recognized and generally accepted
good engineering practices.
24 Location The location on the equipment where the test or inspection is to take place. In most
cases, it will be necessary to attach a drawing or sketch to clarify the location.
25 Extent The area of the test or inspection around the identified location.
26 Equipment The operating status of the equipment when the activity is performed.
Availability
27 Preparation A list of preparations which are needed before the test or inspection activity can be
Required performed.
28 Performed By The person, qualification, or certification required to perform the test or inspection
activity.
29 Estimated Hours The hours or costs associated with execution of the activity. The amount entered
should not take into account the hours or costs associated with the preparations
required for the activity (e.g. blinding, decontamination, etc.)
30 MMS Plan Number A reference to associated job plan numbers assigned by the Maintenance
Management System.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 6: EVALUATING RESULTS AND CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES
This procedure applies to all activities related to ensuring the integrity of MI-applicable equipment. This
procedure must be applied in the following circumstances:
• Upon completion of reporting the results of activity performed, i.e. the results in-relation to the
Acceptance Criteria.
• When a field observation identifies an equipment deficiency
Deficiency Corrective Action Plan (Guideline)
The corrective action plan describes how deficiencies will be corrected in a safe and timely manner. This
attachment addresses some of the key issues to consider while preparing corrective action plans. The
issues presented in this attachment apply to all deficiency corrections.
Correction Method
Correction of a deficiency may involve repair, re-rating, or replacement of equipment components. Those
responsible for the corrective action plan must determine the best method to correct the deficiency.
Rerate - Establish new operating conditions and determine other required modifications, such as new
relief valve settings, new alarm or interlock settings, etc., to assure that the rerated equipment cannot be
operated in a manner which could result in loss of containment of hazardous substances.
Repair - Define the maintenance repairs to be made to restore the equipment to acceptable condition.
Example repairs to damaged equipment are shown Attachment D.
Note:
If the repair does not restore the equipment within the design intent, the change must be authorized by
the Management of Change process.
Replacement - The replacement materials, spare parts, or new equipment must be managed in
accordance with the QA for Materials and Spares.
Note: Detailed calculations (e.g. Fitness for Service API510) may be used to demonstrate that continued
operations is acceptable.
Influence of Codes, Standards and Statutory Requirements
Industry codes, standards, statutory requirements, or other regulations may influence the content of the
corrective action plan. Provision for hold points, inspections or tests, or special personnel requirements
should be considered in the plan. Example considerations include:
• Repair of pressure retaining items in accordance with an approved ASME R-Stamp program.
• Alteration of pressure vessels that requires involvement of DOSH, Bomba and JBE Inspector.
• Engineering Fitness for Service evaluation.
Temporary Operation with Deficiencies
If the equipment is to be operated temporarily with an identified deficiency, define operating conditions
and/or put in place controls such as tracking or monitoring system which will assure that the equipment
will be operated in a safe manner.
Acceptable safeguards for temporary operation of equipment with an identified deficiency include: New
temporary operating limits, such as reduced temperature, pressure, or flow, which will prevent loss of
containment of the process material in spite of the deficiency.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

• Standby personnel to monitor the equipment with instructions to follow in event conditions change
toward conditions which could result in a release. This technique can be used, as an example, in the
event of a deficiency in the emergency shutdown system or if a relief valve is removed for repair.
• New temporary safety device settings (such as relief valve or safety shutdown settings).
• Special monitoring activities, such as daily vibration monitoring or weekly measurement of thickness
to assure that deterioration does not progress into an unsafe condition. These would be added to the
Specific Equipment Plan as a temporary activity.
• Temporary repairs such as a welded patch or additional supports for corroded piping.
Content of a Corrective Action Plan
A corrective action plan should contain the following items:
a) Equipment Tag Number and Service

b) Equipment description
c) Activities which will be required to correct the deficiency, including temporary safeguards. The
activities may include engineering evaluation work performed off-site.
d) Special skills or resources needed to complete the work in accordance with good engineering
practices
e) Define the recommended due date for work to ensure that the deficiency is corrected in a safe and
timely manner
f) Proposed verification activities that will be needed to evaluate whether the corrective work was
performed satisfactorily including QA/QC plan.
g) Names of the deficiency evaluation personnel
h) Reference to Work Order(s) associated with the deficiency
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 7:TRAINING AND EVALUATING MI RELATED COMPETENCY OF
PERSONNEL
To define the specific training requirements to gain competency, including refresher training for personnel
involved in MI activities e.g. in maintaining the mechanical integrity of process equipment. The categories
of training are:
• Process Overview
• Process Safety Management
• Safe Work Procedures (e.g. Core HSE procedures)
• Maintenance Procedures (MI System)
• Inspection and Test Procedures (MI System)
• Job Skills and Knowledge (MI System)
Contract employees involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of covered process equipment must
meet the same requirements for safe and effective performance of their job tasks. Contract employers are
responsible for training their own employees in job skills and knowledge.
All the training records are stored and maintained in a central database.
Responsibility
The Site Management is accountable for managing the MI training program.
The MI Custodian is responsible to assure that each person has received the required training as
scheduled and is competent to perform the assigned task.
The Training Function and Competent Person are responsible for detailed planning, locating training
materials (Competent Person), and developing the training schedule.
The person performing the training is responsible for assessing the trainees’ understanding of the subject
matter and for documenting the training.
Attachment A Overview of Required Training for Affected Personnel
Training Initial Training Refresher/ Scope of Training

Category Ongoing Training
Frequency
Process All new When new process General Requirements

Overview Maintenance or added or three • Plant processes and
Inspection years, which ever chemistry
employees who did is less
not have this • Hazards exposure and
training in other control measures
departments • Personnel protective
equipment
• Emergency response
HSE MS All new When new Requirements focus on

Maintenance or procedures are process safety aspects
Inspection issued or old • Safety compliance and
employees procedures are management
revised
• Emergency planning and
response
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

• Safe working practices and
training
• Change management
• Incident investigation
Safe Work All new Annually Requirements cover

Procedures Maintenance or • Safety and medical policies
Inspection
employees • Corporate and plant safety
procedures
• Safe working practices and
training
• Hazardous substance
handling
• Personnel protective
equipment
Mechanical All new When new MI System requirements cover

Integrity and Maintenance or procedures are • Level I: Overview of MI
Maintenance Inspection issued or old program
Procedures employees procedures are
revised • Level II: Detailed MI
procedures
• Level III: Specific
procedures for the
performance of MI
activities
MI Procedure requirements
cover
• MMS
• Tool use qualification and
tools handling
• Scaffolding and rigging
• Working from height and
mounted platforms
Job Skills and All new Required As necessary to meet craft or

Knowledge Maintenance or frequency to match inspector skill or certification
Inspection needs for needs
employees certification to code
or to maintain skill
proficiency.
Training to be
scheduled per
agreement
between
Maintenance /
Inspection Line
Manager and
Training
Coordinator
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 8: SELF ASSESSMENT OF MI PROGRAM
To provide a process for self-assessing the MI program under each discipline group periodically and
identify improvement opportunities.
Attachment A Self-Evaluation Checklist for MIP
PETRONAS HCU/OPU
Date Evaluation Performed By:
Prepared By
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments
MI Policy Has management communicated

a commitment to MI?
Does the commitment satisfy the

Policy as written?
Do employees understand the

policy?
Are responsible persons informed

and aware of responsibilities?
Has ownership of the system

been accepted by all employees?
MI System Have new or changed processes

Description undergone evaluation for MI-
applicable equipment?
Have there been new or revised

site procedures and policies,
regulations, codes, or standards
that affect the scope of MI?
Have policy changes affected

inspection priorities?
Are acceptance criteria adjusted

appropriately?
Has organizational changes

affected the basic MI Structure
that may impair the effectiveness
of MI implementation and
execution?
Integrating MI Is there evidence of employee

into HSE MS participation at all levels?
Has MOC been effective to

ensure that MI procedures and
equipment data is up-to-date?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Is Process Safety Information

maintained to support MI efforts?
Have Process Hazard Analyses

been performed since the last
evaluation?
Are there outstanding PHA

actions requiring disposition or
resolution?
Are there overdue PHA/MOC

actions that require resolution?
Has outcome of PHA that affect

MI activities been communicated
to the MI Leader?
Definitions and Do changes to codes or standards

References affect definitions?
Have definition changes been

reflected in all MI documents?
Have organizational changes

occurred that would require
modification of definitions?
Determining MI Is the covered equipment list

System reviewed periodically?
Equipment
Has the status of equipment
coverage been consistently
evaluated in the MOC process?
Have changes to MSDS data

been reviewed for the effect on
the covered equipment list?
Has all equipment been identified

and a master list of equipment
been maintained?
Has all equipment been evaluated

for MI coverage?
Has equipment undergone

changes that would affect the MI
coverage status?
Is there any equipment type that

may be added to the existing MI
program?
Document Are MI procedures available to all

Control workers who need them?
Has the MI System documentation

been reviewed on an annual
basis?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Do all MI-system manual holders

have the current revisions of MI
procedures?
Are procedure change requests

verified and followed up to
completion?
Have MI document revisions been

managed and hardcopy versions
been issued?
Have document revisions been

made on a timely basis?
Document Are all procedures conforming to

Format the format defined by the MI
procedure?
Measuring Has a self-assessment schedule

System been defined?
Effectiveness
Have self-assessment been
completed on a timely basis?
Have results of the plant-wide

assessment been used to prepare
action items for improvement?
Have results of the assessment

been used to prepare action items
for improvement?
Are self-assessment action items

dealt with in a timely manner?
Are self-assessment questions

reviewed and prepared in
advance?
Are MI program evaluations on

schedule?
Have MI program evaluations

been performed?
Have benchmarks or key

performance indicators been
defined to measure effectiveness?
Has a strategy and timeline been

defined to reduce reactive
activities?
Is there a need to manage

reactive tasks (routine
maintenance work) under the MI-
system?
Have improvement actions been

acted upon and resolved?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Training Has each employee’s training

Maintenance requirements been reviewed
and Inspection annually?
Personnel
Are all personnel (employees and
contractors) requiring training
identified?
Have contractor training programs

been evaluated, approved and
documented?
Is there evidence that the training

has taken place as scheduled?
Does training documentation

include all the records required by
this procedure?
Has the training program been

updated for training on
new/revised procedures?
Have personnel requiring training

been identified?
Has training schedule been

updated for training on
new/revised procedures?
Have there been changes in

employee function, or have new
employees been added?
Has required refresher training

been placed on training schedule?
Has required refresher training

been carried out on schedule?
Is competency certification forms

part of the training program
requirements?
Have provisions been made for

training personnel in preparation
for vacation coverage?
Have project managers informed

or trained engineering and
construction companies of project
deliverables and requirements?
Training Have training materials and

Maintenance modules been archived as a
and Inspection record of training purpose and
Personnel scope?
If a report of training is required, is

it in place and reflect the current
level of training?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Have Subject Matter Expert

attended technical seminars or
conferences?
Have inspectors been adequately

trained and certified to satisfy role
as a Lead Person?
Vendor For new and replacement

Fabrication fabricated equipment:
Quality
Assurance a) Were written specifications
prepared?
b) Were written inspection plans

prepared and carried out?
c) Did site personnel participate

in inspection and testing in
accordance with the
inspection plan?
d) Were design calculations

prepared and included in the
job file?
e) Were in-service failure

mechanisms taken into
account during the design
phase?
Does the project manager hold

QA/QC documents from vendors?
Maintenance Have warehouse receiving

Equipment, procedures been carried out?
Materials, and
Spare Parts QA Are vendor
certifications/approvals in place?
Have supplier Assurances been

carried out and documented?
How many suppliers are subject to

annual review?
Are certified vendors re-assessed

every three years?
Are ‘special’ verification activities,

when specified, carried out in
accordance with the inspection
plan?
Have receiving nonconformances

been satisfactorily resolved?
Are receiving nonconformances

reported to the supplier to improve
service?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Are detailed specifications

prepared for purchase of material
and equipment?
Has receiving and material

management been effective?
Is NCR reported, resolved and

tracked in a systematic way to
prevent recurrence?
Maintenance Have Maintenance and

and Construction Job Plans been
Construction developed?
Installation QA
Have QA activities been specified
in the job plan?
Have required checklists been

used (e.g. QA/QC, inspection and
test records)?
Preparing and Have Activity Procedures been

Using Activity annually reviewed for content and
Procedures format?
Has action been taken to assure

that revisions are carried out and
communicated to the personnel
who use the procedures?
Data and Report Are Inspection Plans subject to

Management periodic review for content and
accuracy?
Are equipment files maintained in

the locations specified in the MI
procedures?
Do equipment files for ‘old’

equipment contain the required
information?
Do equipment files for ‘new’

equipment contain the required
information?
Is there evidence that the Lead

Person has properly initiated
Nonconformance Reports when
nonconformances are identified in
activity results?
Have Test and Inspection Status

reports been issued as required?
Have Deficiency Tracking Reports

been issued as required?
Are corrective action work orders

placed on the schedule?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Are overdue corrective actions (if

any) managed in a safe and timely
manner?
Are overdue inspections and tests

resolved?
Have designated personnel

approved
inspections/tests/corrective
actions via the defined review
process?
Have inspection and test reports

been filed in the equipment file?
Is the equipment file control

strategy for check-out effective?
Do equipment files contain the

required information as shown on
the equipment file checklist?
Does the MOC process ensure

that equipment data (such as that
shown on the equipment data
sheet) is current?
Deficiency Have required inspections and

Management tests been carried out in
accordance with the schedule?
Have nonconformance and

deficiency reports been issued
and reviewed monthly?
Are conclusions from the

nonconformance and deficiency
report review executed?
Has the inspection and test status

report been issued and reviewed
monthly?
Is the ICS support been effective

for management of documents
and data?
Are equipment files complete?
Planning and Has a schedule for MI

Scheduling implementation been prepared?
Are actions being carried out in

accordance with the schedule?
Have inspection contractor

procedures been reviewed and
approved?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Have equipment files been

verified according to the
implementation schedule?
Are the required inspections and

tests entered into the work
schedule?
Have all baseline inspections and

tests been performed on
schedule?
Have all subsequent inspections

and tests been placed on the
schedule?
Is there a mechanism to manage

“overdue” activities?
Evaluation of Are all activity results reviewed for

Non- nonconformances?
conformances
and Correction Are all nonconformances
of Deficiencies reviewed to determine if a
deficiency exists?
Have corrective actions been

placed on the schedule?
Are NCR/Deficiency reports fully

completed and approved by
appropriate personnel?
Are Inspection Plans

revised/updated to include
activities required for temporary
operation with a deficiency?
Are new/revised inspection

activities placed on the schedule?
Are all deficiencies corrected in a

safe and timely manner?
Are delinquent deficiency

corrections dealt with in a safe
and timely manner?
Have nonconformances and

deficiencies been prioritized?
System Are Inspection Plans updated

Updating based on the results of inspection
and test activities and
nonconformance reports?
Does the information flow process

ensure that the equipment files
reflect the current equipment data
and information?
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Have supporting codes and

standards been revised and
subsequently updated in the
reference library?
Has new equipment been added

or service changed that has not
been reflected on the PEFSs or
ISOs?
Maintaining Do equipment files reflect the

Non-Computer content required by the Equipment
Equipment Files File Checklist?
Does the file checkout procedure

ensure file integrity?
Additional Comments
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 9: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF MI PROGRAM
To provide a quality process for reducing costs of maintaining equipment by eliminating waste in work
processes and improving equipment reliability.
This standard applies to all MI activities and to the processes in place to operate and maintain the
equipment. The approach to eliminate waste in work processes can be either corrective or preventive.
Attachment A Methods for Identifying Costs of Wastage
Following are some of the methods that can be used to identify costs of wastage in the process of
maintaining equipment reliability:
1. Interviews – One of the most effective techniques for identifying waste costs is to interview the people
who perform the work. When done in a team or group meeting, many ideas will be presented and
ideas will build upon each other. Take notes carefully so that complaints can be sorted from the useful
information for continuous improvement. The interview should be carefully prepared and the objective
clearly defined so that the interview does not turn into a problem-solving exercise, but remains
focused on identifying waste costs. Brainstorming is an excellent technique for identifying problems
causing waste costs.
2. Equipment Failure Reports – Failure Reports should be generated for equipment that fails during
operation. Personnel maintaining equipment that fails during operation should be trained to perform a
“root cause failure analysis” and retain that data in the equipment files.
3. Activity Reports – The Activity Reports have fields for entry of comments by the Assigned Personnel
who performs the activity. The Assigned Personnel should be trained to identify areas for
improvement while performing the activity.
4. Maintenance History Data – The Maintenance Management System contains the performance history
data that can identify equipment causing high costs or frequent outages. Most Maintenance
Management Systems have the capability to generate lists of equipment ranked by repair costs,
repair frequency, and total outage time, and such a list can be generate similar lists based on
equipment type, such as a particular make or model of pump.
5. Incident Investigations and Process Hazards Reviews – Reports from both of these MI elements may
contain suggestions or data that will identify waste costs.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Attachment B Charting Techniques
Following is a description of some of the charting methods used for continuous improvement and
elimination of waste costs associated with maintaining equipment integrity:
B-1 Check Sheets

A check sheet is a chart which show how often events occur in a period of time. Its use is to detect
patterns. A typical check sheet is shown below:
Event Month
Total
(Problem) 1 2 3
A XXXX XX XXXX 10
B X XX 3
C XXX XXXX XXX 10
Total 8 6 9 23
B2 Pareto Chart
A Pareto Chart is a vertical bar graph which indicates the number of times an event has occurred. The
chart is constructed with the event which has occurred most often listed at the left axis. A typical Pareto
Chart is shown below:
Mechanical
Seal
Bearing
Corrosion
Alignment
Other
Centrifugal Pump Failures
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Attachment B Charting Techniques (Cont.)
B-3 Cause and Effect Diagram (Fishbone Diagram)

A Cause and Effect Diagram is used if there is need to explore all the possible cause of a problem. The
causes on the diagram are grouped into four or more categories, such as Method, Manpower, Materials,
Machinery for equipment problems, or Policies, Procedures, People, Plant for administrative problems.
Out of the possible problems listed during a brainstorming session, the most likely causes are selected.
The structure of the diagram is shown below:
CAUSES EFFECT
Method Manpower
PROBLEM
Material Machinery
B-4 Flow Chart

A Flow Chart is a pictorial representation showing each of the steps in a process. As such, the flow chart
can be used to:
• Indicate if all the steps of the process are in a logical arrangement
• Identify missing steps
• Identify steps which are not necessary because they add no value to the process
• Identify duplicated steps
All of the equipment guidelines and several other documents in the MI system contain flow charts that not
only indicate each step in the process, but also indicate the person responsible for the step. When
presented in this manner, the flow chart is also useful for identifying steps where delays are likely
because responsibility passes from one person to another.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 10: FAILURE MECHANISMS
Introduction
Knowledge in about the cause of damage and the likelihood of further damage that might occur in the
future is very important when conducting integrity studies. Flaws and damages that are discovered during
an in-service inspection can be the result of a pre-existing condition before the component entered
service and/or could be service induced. The root causes of deterioration could be due to inadequate
design including materials selection and detailed geometry, or the interaction with aggressive
environments/conditions that the equipment is subjected to during normal service or during transient
periods.
In general, the following types of damages that can be encountered in oil & gas process equipment are
presented below:-
General and localised corrosion

Most low temperature corrosion problems are not caused by the hydrocarbons themselves, but by
contaminants or injected chemicals within the hydrocarbons. Typical contaminants of concern includes:
Air
Air can enter process equipment during shutdowns/turnarounds through the suction side of pumps if seals
or connections are not tight. Although air is considered to be mainly a problem with regard to fouling, it is
has been cited as the cause of accelerated corrosion in vacuum transfer lines and vacuum towers of
crude distillation units. In particular, air ingress is a problem due to the presence of associated oxygen
and moisture, and increases the corrosivity of different waters.
Hydrogen Chloride
Chloride salts are present naturally in crude oil and may be introduced during secondary recovery of the
well or from seawater ballast in tankers. Some operators add organic chloride solvents to remove wax
deposits or to degrease metals. Often, spent solvent is present in slop oil that is introduced with crude oil
charge into the crude unit. Crude oils contain between 0.1 and 2%vol of water. This water holds the
organic chlorides in the form of an aqueous emulsion, typically comprising: 75% NaCl, 15% MgCl2, 10%
CaCl2 (e.g. 0.01% salt). When heated above 150°C hydrogen chloride is evolved from MgCl2 and CaCl2,
while NaCl remains stable up to about 430°C. Dry hydrogen chloride is mainly formed in the crude
preheat furnace and is not corrosive. However, as steam is added to the bottom of the crude/distillation
tower, dilute HCl is formed where the water dew point is reached (about 60°C). In general, preheated
crude oil is passed through a desalter that electrostatically removes 85-95% of the salt. Apart from
lowering HCl levels, the desalter also reduces fouling in exchangers, coke formation in furnaces and
provides for smoother operations by minimising water slugs. However, the process water entering the
desalter is corrosive, as it contains ammonia and hydrogen sulphide.
In downstream refining equipment, chlorides accelerate corrosion by penetrating protective surface films,
increasing electrolyte conductivity, or complexing with steel surfaces. In reforming units, where organic
chlorides may be used during regeneration of reformer catalyst, HCl is stripped off the catalyst if
excessive water is present in the reformer feed. This leads to corrosion, not only in the reformer unit, but
also in hydrotreating units that use excessive make-gas from the reformer. Severe corrosion of carbon
steel occurs in the form of droplet-impingement attack at elbows in the overhead vapour line and at inlets
of overhead condensers (crude/distillation tower). Also in condenser tubes where most of the water
condenses out and droplets of dilute HCl become entrapped under deposits that are present on tower
trays, in condenser shells, and at baffles. The resultant underdeposit corrosion is highly localised and
usually quite severe.
Hydrogen Sulphidation
The processing of crude oils containing high percentages of sulphur compounds such as mercaptans,
mono- and polysulphides and thiophenes, which can result in high temperature corrosion of steel. Crude
oils are often termed "sweet" or "sour" depending on their propensity to form H2S, a sour gas. The main
corrosive sulphur compounds are H2S and mercaptans which may be initially present in the crude oil or
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

result from distillation. In aqueous solutions a black iron sulphide (FeS) scale is formed which can lead to
fouling of condenser tubing.
Sulphur compounds, are potentially more serious at high temperatures. Sulphidation of steel leads to
uniform wastage at temperatures between 250 and 480°C. The corrosion product is largely iron sulphide
scale and becomes significant temperatures exceeding approx. 250°C. The rate of corrosion has been
compiled from numerous data that has resulted in recommendations for "safe" operating temperatures for
the various materials. These data have been laid down in the appropriate graphs for the various materials,
typically as corrosion rate for the various grades carbon steel and chrome alloyed steel up to 12% and
stainless steel (18-8) against temperature.
Oxygen
Oxygen plays a critical role in the corrosive behaviour of materials. The basics of corrosion distinguishes
between two types of corrosion in which oxygen plays an important role: wet- and dry corrosion. Wet
corrosion, at relative low temperatures up to approx. 120°C. Under wet corrosion conditions in the
presence of oxygen, the corrosion mechanism of iron proceeds further.
Oxygen corrosion of the "wet corrosion type" can occur in steam raising- and cooling equipment, and any
other facility that uses water.
CO2 Corrosion
This refers both to areas of uniform wall thinning and local wall thinning for carbon steels. CO2 corrosion
is associated with the water phase, and is therefore likely to e located where water is consistenly in
contact with the metal surface. Such areas are around the 6 o’clock position in piping, however, CO2
corrosion may also be seen around the 12 o’clock position where unhibited water vapour condenses on
the metal surface. Large amounts of water will ensure that the metal loss is more widespread; corrosion is
also likely in dead legs and other water traps, including irregularities at welds.Complete dehydration
prevents CO2 corrosion. CO2 corrosion rates increases with the CO2 content ( expressed as mole% or
volume% in the gas phase), the pressure at which gas and water were last in equilibrium together, a
reduction in pH in the water and a reduction in the effectiveness of corrosion inhibitor. CO2 corrosion rate
can either increase or decrease with temperature depending on the starting temperature and the
presence or absence of protective scales. Corrosion inhibitor failure can often be tolerated for short
periods, but extended lack of inhibitor may give rise to extensive degradation. Note that methanol,
injected in quantity, is expected to have an inhibitor effect. Coupons can be used to detect corrosion and
monitor inhibitor effectiveness, giving due consideration to their location with reference to water content.
Corrosion under Insulation
This gives external uniform or local corrosion of carbon steel in the presence of water, and occurs under
wet insulation such as under pipe supports and flange joints. CUI corrosion rate increases with the
presence of water and increased temperature; note that temperatures in excess of 100º C will dry wet
insulation but in the process will concentrate any salts and there will be corrosion during the period when
the temperature was rising. Subsequent cooling will also allow further corrosion due to re-hydration of
these salts.
Galvanic Corrosion
When two dissimilar metals come into contact, accelerated corrosion of the less noble metal might occur,
depending on how the metals react (polarise) in the environment and on the relative areas.
In refineries and chemical plant carbon steel can be used for many plant items, because during normal
operation no water is present in the majority of the equipment. If in the case of mis-operation (feed too
wet), too much water is present, corrosion will occur. The severity of corrosion is related to the electrical
conductivity of the solution. Galvanic corrosion does not occur in hydrocarbon or vapour systems unless
free water is present.
Erosion
Erosion and abrasion (often combined with corrosion) can lead to significant material loss by the abrasive
action of a moving stream of gas, liquid, or (fluidised) solid particles. The carrier may be gaseous (e.g.
catalytic cracking units), liquid (e.g. slurries), or gravity pulled (e.g. catalyst transfer lines or coke handling
equipment). Attack tends to increase with (fluid) velocity, especially turbulent conditions, and is a function
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

of the angle of impingement, depending on the material the greatest wear will occur either at an angle of
90° impingement or throughout the angle-range 45 - 90°. Metals that rely on a passive film to provide
corrosion resistance are particularly susceptible to erosion-corrosion. Hardness can act as a simple
relative measure of erosion resistance within a particular alloy system. Attack often takes the form of
elongated directional grooves, dependant on the material containing the erosive medium and the medium
itself.
Impingement takes place by the impact, cutting action or frictional wear produced by freely moving solid
particles, such particles are usually fairly small. Because of their mobility, these particles may move at an
angle to the general direction of flow and frequently undercut portions of the material they strike. Erosion
by fluidised particles is an significant problem only at locations where velocities are high or where
directional changes or other conditions produce turbulence. Impingement can also take place in a special
form of erosion-corrosion associated with liquid droplets suspended in a vapour stream; often containing
dissolved acids, H2S or HCl.
Cavitation damage is caused by rapid formation and collapse of vapour bubbles or vacuum cavities on a
metal surface. The resultant shock waves can produce plastic deformation in most metals, cracking of
brittle metals, and removal of material. The plastic deformation induces an increase in hardness.
Cavitation is often induced by vibration with the rate of attack accelerated by corrosive media. Typical
equipment involved are centrifugal pumps, ship propellers and lines or equipment transporting liquids at
high velocities.
Oxidation
Metals and alloys are oxidised when exposed to elevated temperature in air or in other highly oxidising
environment, although oxidation can also occur in nominally reducing environments. Frequently oxidation
contributes to a high temperature corrosion reaction, even if it is not the dominant mechanism. Carbon
steels, low-alloy steels, and stainless steels react at elevated temperature with oxygen in the surrounding
air and become scaled. Scaling resistance increases with chromium and nickel content (see Table below),
as well as small additions of silicon. At elevated temperatures, scaling resistance decreases in the
presence of steam, as steam can decompose at metal surfaces to form hydrogen and oxygen, which can
cause steam oxidation of steel. In turn, the hydrogen can attack the steel and cause local blowouts, e.g.
boiler tube failures. Further reductions in scaling resistance occur with themal cycling, applied stress,
moisture and sulphur-bearing gases.
Cladding Disbondment
Cladding and linings are used to provide corrosion, oxidation and wear resistance to the under-lying
material, which is usually carbon steel. Cladding and lining materials can be metallic, organic or inorganic
and can be bonded to a substrate by a number of processes.
Metallic cladding by stainless steels and other corrosion resistant alloys are often used for
corrosion/oxidation prevention. These are usually made by explosive bonding, hot rolling or weld overlay.
These processes produce intimate metallurgical bonds between the cladding material and substrate. A
metallic lining is fabricated by attaching a series of small segments of sheet or plate, usually by welding to
the substrate metal, termed ‘wall papering’.
Linings can fail if process fluids are allowed to enter between the lining and the substrate metal interface
either via failure of the welds or the lining itself. Once this occurs, weld repair is difficult, as material
trapped behind the lining is a source of contamination. This can also occur in clad material if joining
processes have not been correctly applied, and partial disbondment exists. Disbondment is possible when
hydrogen produced by chemical and electrochemical reactions on the cladding surface is absorbed and
migrates into the clad material. Hydrogen accumulation either in voids found in the clading/substrate
interface or in the interface itself can cause mechanically disbondment of the cladding.
Corrosion resistant alloy weld overlays can be susceptible to corrosion if the underlying substrate metal
dilutes the overlay metal too much and the protective oxide can no longer be maintained. This is due to
depletion of chromium in the weld deposit through chromium carbide formation, leading to pitting
susceptibility. Therefore, usually two or preferably three weld passes are used to deposit the corrosion
resistant weld metal.
Organic linings are used for corrosion resistance or where electrical isolation is required. A number of
organic coating systems are used for lining including, amongst others, systems based on epoxies, vinyls,
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

urethanes. These are sometimes used with reinforcing materials, such as carbon or glass fibre. An
example of this type of material is fibreglass, which is commonly used for lining internal surfaces of
storage tanks. Disbondment of the lining is possible due to poor application or under the action of
excessive cathodic protection current. Although organic (plastic) linings do not corrode like metals, they
do degrade with time. They can suffer from liquid oxidation degradation, melting, swelling, chemical
embrittlement and stress cracking.
Stress Corrosion Cracking
This appears as cracking in areas with high tensile stresses, typically at welds, and is associated with salt
water retained by insulation. The probability of failure due to SCC increases markedly with temperature,
but is dependent on the type of stainless steel, thus control of temperature is important. Attention should
also be paid to exclude water, by effective waterproofing of the insulation. A coating on the steel will
reduce probability of attack, but the deterioration of coating over time must be considered.
Short term overheating - boiler SH
Short-term overheating failure occurs when a single incident or a small number of incidents exposes the
tube steel to an excessively high temperature (hundreds of degrees above normal) to the point where
deformation or yielding occurs. Overheating results from abnormal conditions such as loss of coolant flow
and excessive boiler-gas temperature. These abnormal conditions are created by the following
circumstances:
• Internal tube blocking

• Loss of coolant circulation or low water level
• Loss of coolant caused by an upstream tube failure
• Over-firing or uneven firing of boiler burners
The first three circumstances produce starvation or low-coolant-flow failures. A tube can be blocked by
construction and repair debris, tools, steel shot, preboiler oxide, deposits from carryover or spray water, or
loose pieces of internal non-pressure-part hardware such as bolts, nuts, and steel plates. In pendant
superheater tubes, blocking also can occur as a result of condensate that has not been completely boiled
out, especially during boiler start-ups.
In general, short-term overheating failures involve considerable tube deformation in the form of metal
elongation and reduction in wall area or cross section. Such failures often characterized as having knife-
edged fracture surfaces. Wall thinning and local bulging precede the actual fracture, because the strength
of the material is reduced at the higher temperature. A fishmouth appearance with thin-edge fracture
surfaces and considerable swelling is typical for a ferritic steel tube that has failed before its temperature
has exceeded the upper critical temperature.
If, however, the tube temperature were high enough to transform the iron in the steel from ferrite to
austenite, there would be no noticeable ‘necking down’, or reduction in wall thickness, of the fracture
edges. There would still be metal elongation and tube swelling, with an increase in measured tube
diameter. A metallurgical analysis of the microstructure of the steel should be performed to confirm that
the tube temperature before failure was high enough to transform the ferrite to austenite.
Thermal Fatigue
Fatigue can lead to fracture under repeated or fluctuating stresses having a maximum value less than the
tensile strength of the material, known as the fatigue or endurance limit. Sources for fatigue include
thermal/stress cycling, rotation or vibration, like that produced by reciprocating compressors and positive
displacement pumps.
Thermal fatigue occurs in equipment that experiences frequent changes in temperature. For instance,
each start-up and shutdown induces thermal stresses, which, if significant in number, can lead to thermal
fatigue. In particular, coke drums and reactors (heavy section welds) in cyclic temperature service are
prone to thermal fatigue. Austenitic stainless steel is often used to clad the internal surfaces of thick
walled vessels to protect the alloy steel substrate from, say, H2S/H2 environments.
Austenitic stainless steel exhibit significantly higher thermal expansion (more than 30%) than low alloy
steels and start-up and shutdown can cause plastic deformation of the plastic layer and adjacent base
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

material. Repeated thermal cycles can induce high strain, low cycle fatigue of the cladding. Roll bonded
cladding is significantly more resistant to fatigue than weld overlay cladding. In the latter case, the
requirement for some ferrite in the weld deposit induces sigma phase formation during post weld heat
treatment that reduces fatigue resistance. To minimise the risk of thermal fatigue it is recommended that
the heating and cooling rates in hydrotreater plants are slower than 40°C/hr.
Vibration Fatigue
It is a form of mechanical fatigue in which cracks are produced as a result of dynamic loading due to
vibration. There are two types of fatigue, which are high cycle fatigue and low cycle fatigue. Low cycle
fatigue is based on low cycle/high stress fatigue, e.g. thermal stresses associated with infrequent start-
up/shutdown cycles.
High cycle fatigue is of particular importance in the presence of flaws, e.g. welding flaws and weld toes,
cold (hydrogen) cracks. Under these circumstances, the majority of the components’ life will be spent
propagating the crack. In a nominally defect free welded joint, fatigue life will incorporate a substantial
crack initiation period, as well as a crack propagation period. Understandably therefore, the fatigue design
guidance presented in ASME B31.3 is based on nominally defect free welds. The sources of fatigue
loading that have to be considered in the design of pipes are more numerous than those for pressure
vessels.
In addition to internal pressure fluctuations, pipes may also be subjected to external forces from direct
loads, bending moments, and torques. (These low cycle fatigue loads should be accounted for in pipe
flexibility design analyses). In relatively flexible small diameter pipes, a number of failures have been
caused by high-cycle, resonant vibrations due, for example, to external vortexes, internal turbulent flow
regimes, sustained relief valve discharge, etc. If the frequency of any of the modes of these vibrations
coincides with the natural frequency of the pipe, substantial resonant vibrations can be produced.
Nevertheless, in the absence of complex time-history cumulative damage analyses of the small diameter
piping systems, small diameter piping support design is more often than not based on field experience.
References
1. NACE Course Book on Corrosion Control in the Refining Industry,”NACE International, Houston, TX,
1999.
2. API Recommended Practice 571 – First Edition, 1993
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 11: MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
In order to determine the integrity and continual performance of equipment, the analyses listed below can
be used. The findings are fed into the MI task plan for either corrective or preventive actions.
Asset Integrity Management: The overall management of MI which provides support in producing
inspection/maintenance/test plans.
Review Protocols: Assurance protocols to ask relevant questions to uncover real performance, compare
best practices and identify improvement opportunities.
Risk Based Inspection (RBI): Provides cost optimised inspection planning designed to manage risks.
Prescribe what, where, how and when to inspect static mechnical equipment and piping.
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM): Provides optimized maintenance and test plans to ensure
control reliability and safety of plant rotating equipment, valves and controls.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL): Assessment to address the overall functional safety of instrumentations that
are critical to the system/equipment safety.
Reliability Availability Maintainability (RAM): Provides basis for decision making with regard to
solutions and measures toward a more profitable and safe operation of plant, protecting business and
reputation through reduced downtime.
Fitness-for-Service (FFS): Assessment to demonstrate the structural integrity of an in-service

component containing a flaw or damage.
Failure Analysis: Failure investigation to determine root cause, contributing causes and morphology of
failure.
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA): A systematic review of a mechanical system
where it evaluates the effects of failures of individual components.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

APPENDIX 12: MI INTERVENTIONS
Maintenance Methods
Minimum Surveillance: This requires general visual inspection, typically as part of general walk-around
by facility staff. A formal reporting process can be introduced such that any anomalies noted on a day-to-
day basis by the facility staff can be recorded as observations and followed up if necessary.
Corrective Maintenance: The items subjected to this maintenance method generally is not expected to
cause significant injury or loss of business income, and it can be described as “fixing” when a problem
occurs. Although the losses are tolerable it may cause minor damage/inconvenience and such items are
repaired or replaced if and when a failure occurs. This maintenance strategy is reactive only, and
monitoring programs do not feature prominently in this approach. The emphasis is more on repairs,
emergency procedures and use of back-up systems after a problem has arisen. A formal reporting
process can be introduced such that any anomalies noted on a day-to-day basis by the facility staff can
be recorded as observations and followed up if considered necessary.
Preventive Maintenance: Items with losses that cannot be tolerated needs measures to be taken to
ensure that failure do not occur. To ensure actions are taken before a failure occurs,scheduled
maintenance feature prominently to facilitate these preemptive actions. Ideally, the planned intervals of
preventive maintenance are arranged so that corrective action is taken just before significant damage
would set in otherwise. This requireds general visual inspection and preventive maintenance measures to
ensure repairs or replacements are carried out before a failure occurs. The checks may include external
corrosion protection, operating parameters, vibrations, materials deterioration and etc.
Predictive Maintenance: The maintenance actions are based on the actual condition, rather than on
fixed schedules. Corrosion sensors and monitoring activities are important for obtaining information on
actual condition. The aim is to minimize (or even eliminate) unnecessary maintenance and inspection
activities and to focus maintenance efforts when and where they are most needed. Overall, this strategy is
of a highly proactive nature, with the emphasis on predicting when and where maintenance actions are
required.
Inspection Techniques
Radiography: Radiography describes those NDT methods where short-wavelength electromagnetic

radiation (normally X-rays or gamma rays) is used to penetrate a component to produce an image of its
internal structure. As radiation passes through an object it is absorbed more by thicker regions and
regions where the physical density is greatest, cracks and voids on the other hand, absorb less radiation.
In radiography these differences in absorption are normally recorded as an image on photographic film or
fluorescent screen.
Ultrasonic: Ultrasonic testing or UT as it is commonly called is the testing method of introducing a high
frequency sound wave into one exterior side of a material, and reflecting the sound wave from its interior
surface to produce a precise measurement of wall thickness. The round trip duration of travel, divided by
the known sound velocity through that particular material provides a wall thickness measurement equally
accurate to a micrometer reading.
Ultrasonic is a well proven and respected diagnostic routinely employed for weld and flaw detector in
industry applications.
Eddy Current: Eddy currents are electrical currents that can be induced in any electrically conductive
specimen to learn something about its material properties or the presence of any defects. Eddy currents
are generated by placing an AC current carrying coil in close proximity to the electrically conductive
specimen and are sensed using the same or different coil. The phase, magnitude and distribution of these
eddy currents depend on a number of parameters, including the test object’s electrical conductivity,
magnetic permeability and geometry, and the presence of flaws. Eddy current methods are often used for
crack detection, positive material identification and to measure the thickness of surface coatings.
Magnetic Particle Testing: Magnetic techniques may be used only to examine magnetic materials, such
as ferritic steels and irons, (not generally austenitic steels). In simple terms, a magnetic field is induced in
the material by a permanent magnet, electromagnet or electrical field and any flaw that interacts with this
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

field causes a local change in the magnetic flux near the surface of the component. Changes in the
magnetic flux can be detected by magnetic particles or by electrical coils or Hall effect probes.
Penetrant Testing: The first of the surface methods is Liquid Penetrant Inspection. This method is
applicable in detection of surface breakage and can be used on any material. The item being tested is
thoroughly cleaned and then coated with a liquid which is drawn into the surface. After sufficient time has
elapsed for the liquid to be drawn into any cracks, the excess liquid is removed and a second liquid which
acts as a developer is applied. The developer draws the penentrant from the crack which can then be
seen. Some penetrants are colored and require good fluorescent white light to be seen where others
require a darkened room with an ultraviolet light to be seen.
Visual Testing: Although the simplest of all NDT methods, the importance of direct visual examination
should not be overlooked. A careful visual examination of plant equipment can often identify rejectable
flaws without the need to employ more expensive forms of inspection. To carry out visual inspection good
lighting sources should be used together with good vision on the inspector’s part. Magnification equipment
may also be used to assist the inspection. The item being inspected should be thoroughly cleaned prior to
the inspection and this may include simply wiping the item down with a cloth through to blasting and
chemical cleaning. This method is suitable for detection of defects which are visible to the eye, however
this is often not the case with many defects which may occur. As such, other surface and volumetric
methods are used to detect defects which can not readily be seen.
Acoustic Emmision Testing: All solid materials have a certain elasticity. They become strained or
compressed under external forces and spring back when released. If the elastically strained material
contains a defect, e.g. a welded joint defect, a non- metallic inclusion, incompletely welded gas bubble or
similar, cracks may occur at heavily stressed spots, rapidly relaxing the material by a fast dislocation. This
rapid release of elastic energy is called an AE event. It produces an elastic wave that propagates and can
be detected by appropriate sensors and analyzed. AE testing detects and interprets the acoustic events
resulting from these crack processes and can identify, locate, and display a beginning damage to the
tested object within very short time.
Positive Material Identification: This method provides assurance on the composition of materials and
generally uses X-ray fluorescence or spark emmission spectrography for on site testing. It give high
speed confirmation with low radiation exposure and suitable for use to verify high quality metals and
alloys including stainless steels, monels, inconels and etc.
Magnetic Flux Leakage: A magnetic field is applies to inspect ferromagnetic materials. Some of the
magnetic flux escapes in the presence of defects and these are detected by magnetic sensors and
registered as flaw signals. This is usually used in the detection of corrosion on surface and underside of
non-insulated areas of storage tank floors, piping and vessels and coated materials.
END OF DOCUMENT.
PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)


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PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT

MECHANICAL INTEGRITY (MI)

The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users:

1) PETRONAS and its affiliates.

3) Contractor/subcontractors and manufacturer/suppliers under a contract with users

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

2.1 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

This PTS provides:

Structure and Content

2.2 USING THE MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PTS

‘may’ indicates a possible course of action.

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

2.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SYSTEMS

Leadership and Commitment

Hazards and Effects Management

Corrective Action and

Corrective Action and

Figure 1: The PETRONAS HSE MS

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

Implementation and Monitoring: Evidence of the suitable, adequate and effective

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

PTS Number: 60.2202

PTS Title: Mechanical Integrity (MI)

Rev. Chapter Description of Date Amended

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

• Risk-based assessment techniques shall be used to determine the priority of facilities

• Effective operation, maintenance and inspection activities shall be carried out by

• Collected data shall be analysed to identify imminent threats to integrity, and to

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

4.1.3 Links with Other System Elements

Industry Regulation Company

Process Hazards Analysis Preventative

PTS 60.2202 (Rev. 0)

• Management of Change (MOC) – MOC may be triggered by MI finding or may

• Process Safety Information (PSI) – Process Safety Information is essential for

• Operating Procedures (OP) – Operating procedures and practices are necessary to

• Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) – The HEMP assessment

• Contractor Management – Contractors may be engaged to conduct certain specialised

4.1.4 Basis and Compatibility

3) Is compatible with ISO 14001 : 2004 Standard for Environmental Management

4) Incorporates internationally accepted “best management practices.”

4.1.5 Scope of Mechanical Integrity

• Management System: The management of an important activity requires the

o The Head of HCU/OPU shall demonstrate leadership and commitment in ensuring

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o The MI Custodian is accountable for implementing the MI System, and responsible

A combination of breakdown/corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance may

• Quality Control of Maintenance Materials and Spares: As a minimum, essential

• MI Procedures: Written procedures shall be developed and implemented for MI

• MI Training: All personnel, including contractors, involved in operating, and

• Operational Deviation: Critical operating parameters and limits shall be established

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• Quality Assurance (QA): A QA system shall be in place to ensure that process

4.2 ENSURING EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY

In ensuring the MI program is successful, the MI system is appropriately supported by several

The following basic elements shall be managed:

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• Reliability Engineering: Reliability engineering is intended to prevent occurrence of an

4.3 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY MODEL

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UPDATE/REVISE RECORDS & PLANS