SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, HYDERABAD

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

RESEARCH PAPER ON

APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULES OF INTERPRETATION

SUBMITTED BY-

SRIJAN JAIN 18010324145

DIVISION – ‘D’

SUBMITTED TO-

Mr. SHAILENDRA KUMAR

(Faculty of Interpretation of Statutes)
 INTRODUCTION

“The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the
external manifestation of the intention that underlies it”

– Salmond

A democratic society's judiciary is one of its most important organs. In a democracy, judges must
perform a delicate role. He has been tasked with bridging the gap between law and society, as
well as safeguarding the constitution and democracy. All courts have two purposes: to resolve
conflicts and to control the future aspects. A judgment is intended to justify the outcome of the
dispute before it and to influence the behavior of others whether private people, corporate
officer, or government official – who possibly will want to avoid a similar situation in future. 1

If the law used in settling the dispute was obvious to the public and the explanation offered in the
court opinion was preserved in plain, the law would be molded in adjudication less frequently by
the interpretation of past legislation. However, such clarity would necessitate a static law. If the
law were clear and static, a day in court would be significant only in sorting out factual matters;
what occurred, when, to whom, and so on. If the law were clear and static, a day in court would
be essential only in sorting out factual matters; what happened, when, to whom, and so on.

It is self-evident that such a stable condition of affairs is unachievable in modern India. Our legal
system is just too complicated for even professionals to understand, and it will very certainly stay
so. The legislation must evolve over time as well. The process of interpretation is the only way it
may alter. The judiciary cannot stick to age-old conceptions of interpretation's underlying
philosophy. It must adapt to the changing times.

The laws of interpretation might be considered a subset of the so-called adjective law. The role
of these rules in the administration of justice is no less essential than that of procedural and
evidentiary rules. The courts must deal with three things in particular: laws governing rights and
obligations, Facts establishing such rights and liabilities in specific instances, and the apparatus
for executing the law and discovering the facts.

1
“Harry H. Wellington: Interpreting the Constitution – First Indian Reprint 2005, p. 3.”

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The court's primary responsibility is to deal with the substantive law provided by the State, as
well as the facts offered by the parties to provide. The law of evidence is there to assist them
with the bigger obligation. The norms of interpretation are intended to aid them with the former
responsibility. As a result, the rules of interpretation and the laws of proof coexist. Despite this,
the rules of interpretation have gotten far less attention than the laws of evidence. 2 One of the
reasons is the belief that judges are capable of interpreting the law without the need for any clear
and fast guidelines to guide them.

Without a doubt, a well-trained judge will arrive at the correct reading of a piece of legislation
without considering any rules of interpretation that may exist on the issue. A guy with common
sense, on the other hand, may argue correctly without having any grasp of logic. No one,
however, will argue that logic is unnecessary, because many men reason correctly without even
realizing it. It can no longer be argued that rules of interpretation are unnecessary since excellent
judges understand the law correctly without considering any rules. 3

When there is a disagreement over the interpretation of a statute, it is up to the courts to make
authoritative judgments about the sense of the terms in subject. According to an examination of
the workloads of India's bench, they spend a substantial amount of time considering cases
involving concerns regarding the appropriate interpretation of legislative provisions. Because
interpreting statutory language wastes so much time, it's a good idea to establish a well-defined
and well-understood standard interpretation procedure.

In law and legal practice, interpretation is a common occurrence. The practice of law necessitates
the use of interpretation. In the sense that it aids the legal system in "understanding" the law,
interpretation plays a critical function in justice administration.

The term "interpretation" is not without its own ambiguities. It can be used in the broadest
meaning to describe Judges' creative actions in so far as they can expand, restrict, or alter the
operation of a rule of law that is established in statutory form in the course of their duties; when
this is done, it is referred to as "extensive" interpretation. In a narrower sense, the term refers to a
judge's interpretation of the meaning of words or phrases in legislation.

2
“K.L.Sarkar’s Mimansa Rules of Interpretation – Tagore Law Lectures 1905– Third Edition, p.33.”
3
Ibid.

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 METHODOLOGY

This paper is based on a doctrinal method of research methodology also known as library based
research. The source of research used in the paper will be from the legal concepts defined under
the law and developed interpretations over the years in the court decisions. The research deals
with the legal doctrine applied. This is a theoretical research paper and is aimed towards finding
“one right answer” to the legal issue in question. The methodology used is the optimum type to
write a paper which is based on qualitative research.

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 LITERATURE REVIEW

Duxbury, Neil. "Golden rule reasoning, moral judgment, and law." Notre Dame L. Rev. 84
(2008): 1529. the author in this paper talks about the origin of golden rule and its practical uses.
The paper is very comprehensive in its read however what it lacks is the Indian scenario. In order
to understand the philosophical and ethical point of view the paper is very enriching. I used the
explanation of rule of interpretation in this paper to explain the concept in my paper.

“THE PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION OF LAW AND THE JUDGE” is a paper written by

Professor Ashutosh Pushkerrey. This paper is vividly filled with information and judgments. I
used the paper in extracting different judgments and dictums given by judges over the years on
how the interpretation be done using the golden rule. The paper however lacks the criticisms of
the golden rule which I have covered in this paper.

“A STUDY ON THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Srijayashree.G and Saleem

Ahmed MR.” This research paper expands on the concept of interpretation of statute and
compares different rules of interpretation together. I used this paper in extracting the criticism of
golden rule.

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 LEGAL ISSUE

Judicial decisions affect a vast number of people, including litigants, because the law often
becomes what judges say it is. For example, the Supreme Court's decisions are well-known for
their importance. The Supreme Court has the power to reverse even the most thoughtful and
popular judgments made by other government departments if it feels they are unconstitutional,
and it therefore has the last word on whether and how states may execute murderers or outlaw
certain acts, among other things.

The goal of this study is to come up with a solution or to give clearly-defined and easy-to-
understand consistent principles of interpretation, which might include mimansa rules of
interpretation as well as principles of interpretation based on the common law legal system.

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 GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE

The “golden rule” of interpretation is that the rules of literal interpretation should be followed
unless the literal interpretation of a text results in oddity or absurdity. 4 The golden rule of
interpretation permits a court to interpret legislation in ways that produces a reasonable
conclusion, even if it means straying from the terms' prima facie meaning. 5

Because "there is some presumption that Parliament does not intend its legislation to produce
highly inequitable results," when a statutory provision produces an unexpected and inequitable
result under one interpretation, the Court may seek an additional interpretation that will do
improved fairness, because "there is some presumption that Parliament does not intend its
legislation to produce highly inequitable results." 6

“Lord Reid” was of the opinion –

“To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and to produce
a wholly unreasonable result. To achieve the obvious intention and to produce a reasonable
result we must do some violence to the words. The general principle is well settled. It is only
when the words are absolutely incapable of a construction which will accord with the apparent
intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words of the
enactment must prevail.”

Grey v. Pearson7 was the catalyst for this change. The 'golden rule' was established in that case,
which said that a court might interpret a legislation by deviating from the precise sense of the
text if doing so would prevent ridiculous outcomes. "In construing wills, and indeed statutes, and
all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to,
unless that would lead to some absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency with the rest of the
instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified to
avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no further," it stated.

4
Compack (P) Ltd. v. CCE., MANU/SC/1155/2005; Dayal Singh v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0058/2003;
Swedish Match AB v. Securities and Exchange Board, India, MANU/SC/ 0693/2004.
5
Glanville Williams, “Learning the Law” (1982) p. 106 as referred to by P.M.Bakshi, ‘Legal Interpretations’
(Ancient and Modern) (1993) p. 26.
6
Coutts & Co. 48 I.R.C. (1953) A.C. pp.267, 281: (1953) 1 All ER 418.
7
Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC.

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The golden rule is still resorted to by courts as a method of reducing the literal rule's strict
application. Lord Blackburn outlined it in River Wear Commissioners v Adamson. He said that
the golden rule permitted the courts to: "to take the whole statute together, and construe it all
together, giving their words their ordinary significance, unless when so applied they produce an
inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the court that the
intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary significance, and to justify the court
in putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the court
thinks the words will bear."8

The Supreme Court remarked in Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)9 that the attitude of the
Courts in interpreting the Statute has evolved, and what was formerly regarded the golden rule
focusing under "grammatical meaning" has at the present shifted to "intention of legislature"
otherwise "purpose of Statute."

8
Interpretation of Statutes’, 12th Edition, p.228.
9
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) MANU/ SC/0241/1988.

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 APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE IN INTERPRETATING STATUTES

In a number of decisions in India, the Supreme Court and High Courts have applied the Golden
Construction of Statutes. When it appears that this rule is titled even for the actual rule, there
may be some misunderstanding. As a general rule, start by checking up the provision's literal
meaning; if the meaning is obvious, plain, and natural, and there is no repugnancy, apply the
meaning; if the meaning is unclear or ridiculous, apply the meaning. 10 However, when more than
one meaning is possible, we must go farther to prevent discomfort by altering the language by
adding, removing, or substituting terms in order to make meaning correct expounding of the
legislature's objective.

Under “Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore”11, “In Section 14 of the U.P.
Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953”, which provided for the donation of land to landless people, the
Supreme Court determined that the word "landless person" was restricted to "landless workers."
A landless laborer is someone who works in agriculture but does not own any land.

The Court went on to clarify that a city-dwelling landless businessman is not included in the
definition of "any landless individual." The purpose of the Act was to put the Bhoodan
movement into effect, which aimed to grant land to landless agricultural laborers. A businessman
cannot benefit from the Act under the law since he has lost the land and become landless.

The Supreme Court ruled in “Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar”12, construing Section 6 of “the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958”, that the essential date for calculating an offender's age is the
day the sentence is issued by the trial court, not the date of the offense. An accused who was
under the age of 21 on the day of the offense but over the age of 21 on the date of the verdict is
ineligible for the benefits of the law.

In light of the Act's purpose, this conclusion was reached. The purpose of the statute is to prevent
young offenders from becoming criminals by exposing them to hardened criminals of a mature
age behind the prison walls. An accused under the age of 21 is entitled to the benefit of the Act,

10
“The Interpretation of Statutes, (Law Com No 21) (Scot Law Com No 11), Report No 21, paragraph 80 (1969).”
11
“Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore MANU/SC/0133/1985.”
12
Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745.

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which allows him to avoid incarceration by being placed under the supervision of a probation
officer.

DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION

In scenarios where there is a clear disagreement between the obvious point of the enactment and
“the literal interpretation” is likely to guide to a consequence not anticipated by the Legislature,
the Court has the authority to modify the meaning of the words, even if it means deviating from
grammar rules or giving unusual meaning to specific words. 13

Blacks dictionary states, "inconsistent" is meant "mutually disagreeable or contradictory:

opposed to the other to the point that both cannot exist, yet acceptance or establishment of one
entails abrogation or abandonment of the other." So it was decided whether Section 34 of the
Bonus Act of 1965 and Section 3(b) of the “Industrial Disputes Act of 1947” could coexist. If
they recount to the same topic theme, to the same circumstances, and both considerably extend
beyond and are coextensive while also being so diametrically opposed and repugnant in their
conditions and impact that one must expire entirely if the other were to triumph at all—then, and
only then—then, and only then—then, and only then—then, and only then—then, only then—
then, only then—then, only then.14

When the ordinary meaning and grammatical constructions of a statute lead to blatant
contradictions of the enactment's apparent purpose, or to some inconvenience, absurdity,
hardship, or injustice that was presumably not intended, a construction may be imposed that
modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. 15

13
“Maxwell : Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. p. 228; Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1960 Bom
390; Hazara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 Punj (FB) pp.34, 40; Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of U.P., AIR
1966 All 168; C.W.S. (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1994) 73 Taxman 174 (SC).”
14
9 Basti Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., (1978) SCC pp.88, 99.
15
“M. Pentiah v. Veeramallapa, 1961-S.C.- pp.1107,1115.”

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 CRITICISM OF USAGE OF GOLDEN RULE

“There is a tendency in our systems, less evident in some recent decisions of the courts but still
perceptible, to over emphasise the literal meaning of a provision (i.e. the meaning in the light of
its immediate and obvious context) at the expense of the meaning to be derived from other
possible contexts; the latter include the ‘mischief’ or general legislative purpose, as well as any
international obligation of the United Kingdom, which underlie the provision” 16

-United Kingdom Law Commission.

They aren't rules in the traditional sense while they all spot to diverse ways to solve the same
predicament. There's also no indication in the so-called regulations or in another place as to
which to use in any specific scenario. They may all be used, but they don't have to." In a more
recent work, Zander attacked the golden rule for being silent on how the court should act if an
intolerable absurdity is discovered.

1. It has the same troubles as the literal move toward in conditions of a lack of less wide
context understandings of "meanings."
2. Merely a small number of instances are covered by the term "absurdity." The greater part
of the time, tough decisions must be made between multiple quite reasonable arguments,
rather than instances in which the words lead to glaring “absurdity”.
3. Professor Willis pointed out in his renowned paper, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell,"
that the application of the "absurdity" safety valve may be highly unpredictable.

Legislation must be interpret in its entire, and one proviso should be construe in light of other
sections in the similar Act in order to ensure that the entire statute is enacted in a consistent
manner. Such an interpretation has the advantage of eliminating any contradiction or repugnancy
inside a section or between sections of the legislation.17 The courts must avoid "a head-on
collision" between two parts of the same Act and, "to the extent feasible, to construe clauses

16
“The Interpretation of Statutes”, (Law Com No 21) (Scot Law Com No 11), Report No 21, paragraph 80 (1969).
17
Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC pp.202, 203.

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which appear to conflict in such a way that they harmonise." 18 "Parliament had given with one
hand what it took away with the other" should not be taken lightly. 19

SUGGESTION AND CONCLUSION

Only a few police officers feel that enforcing a rule even when you know it is wrong is the same
as making one. You must provide an interpretation even if you feel it is unethical for the court to
use it. Some believe that this rule fosters the erroneous assumption that words' meanings are
predefined. In reality, when the wording of a legislation is unclear, judges are obliged to interpret
it using their own preconceptions. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "words like statutory
and contractual are regarded with relatively limited meanings under this construction."

When the sense of an Act can be quite deduced from the language used, that is, when one
creation would result in “absurdity” while a different would give consequence to what common
sense would show to be clearly intended, the construction that would overpower the Act's ends
must be discarded, even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence,
must be interpreted in a different way. Certainly, the law requires courts to alter grammatical and
customary definitions of phrases in order to avoid absurdity and contradiction.

The Court should not be so quick to invalidate a part of the Act that appears to have a clear
meaning on the surface. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of recasting an Act or
any part of it. The intended meaning must be able to be deduced from the actual words used.

Since the framer is presumed to use language that conveys the intention, it would be safe to give
words their natural meaning unless they are meaningless or absurd, and refusing to give
consequence to the provisos of a law on the elusive ground that doing so would result in
consequences that are inconsistent with the notion would not be in accordance with any sound
construction principle.

18
University of Allahabbad v. Amritchand Tripathi, AIR 1987 SC pp.57, 60, Krishna Kumar v. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1992 SC pp.1789, 1793, 1794.
19
Dormer v. Newcastle-on-Tyne Corpn, (1940) 2 All ER (CA) pp.521, 527; Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP AIR
1959 SC pp.1012, 1022; K.M. Nanawati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC pp.112, 137;

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in “Essays on Jurisprudence”,

Columbia Law Review, p.51
 Gwyer, J in Central Provinces and Bearer Act, 1939 (1949 F.C.R 18 & 12) Hon’ble Mr.
R.S. Pathak, C.J. H.M. Simla, Inaugurated Speech at the First Conference of the H.P.
Judicial Officers, AIR 1978 Journal 39
 Justice Aharon Barak, President of Supreme Court of Israel says in Harward Law
Review, Vol. 116 (2002-2003)
 Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court, “Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes”, 47 Columbia Law Reports 527
 Justice M. Katju, Judge, Allahabad High Court, “The Mimansa Principles of
Interpretation-I”
 R. Randall Kelso, “Styles of Constitutional interpretation and the four main approaches to
constitutional interpretation in American legal history”, 29 Valpariso University Law
Review, 122 (1994-95)

LIST OF CASE LAWS:

 Compack (P) Ltd. v. CCE., MANU/SC/1155/2005;

 Dayal Singh v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0058/2003;
 Swedish Match AB v. Securities and Exchange Board, India, MANU/SC/ 0693/2004.

 Coutts & Co. 48 I.R.C. (1953) A.C. pp.267, 281: (1953) 1 All ER 418.
 Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC.
 Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) MANU/ SC/0241/1988.
 Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745.
 Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC pp.202, 203.
 University of Allahabbad v. Amritchand Tripathi, AIR 1987 SC pp.57, 60, Krishna
Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1992 SC pp.1789, 1793, 1794.

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INTERNET SOURCES:

 SCC Online
 Manupatra
 Westlaw
 Heinonline
 Lexis Nexis

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