SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 211301, November 27, 2019 ]

PARK DEVELOPERS INCORPORATED, REYNALDO JESUS B. PASCO, SR., ROLANDO GOLLA, NENITA B. PA
JULITO CAPARAS, TERESA CAPARAS AND CONSTANCIO BERNARDO, PETITIONERS, VS. ELIZABETH D. D
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

INTING, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set as
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated August 12, 2013 and Resolution3 dated February 10, 2014 in CA-G.R.
97454. The assailed Decision dismissed, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of Rules of Court, the appeal filed by
Developers, Inc. (PDI), Reynaldo Jesus B. Pasco, Sr., Rolando Golla, Nenita B. Pasco, Julito Caparas, Teresa
and Constancio Bernardo (petitioners) from the Decision4 dated March 31, 2011 of Branch 67, Regional Trial
(RTC), Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70647. The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied for lack of meri
petitioners' subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

The Antecedents

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

On September 24, 2003, [respondent] Elizabeth D. Daclan, through a document denominated as Application f
Continual Use, purchased from [petitioner] Park Developers Incorporated ("PDI" for brevity) a family estate m
located at Sanctuary Memorial Park ("Sanctuary" for brevity), Barangay Timalan, Naic, Cavite. The total contr
P708,000.00, payable in thirty-six monthly installments. At the time of the institution of the instant case, [resp
had already paid PDI a total amount of P457,760.74.

However, sometime in 2005, [respondent] learned that, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
(HLURB), it had never issued any Certificate of Registration or License to Sell in favor of PDI. Thus, on Janua
2006, [respondent] filed the instant case [for Annulment of Contract with Damages] against PDI and its corpo
officers, Reynaldo Jesus B. Pasco, Sr., Rolando G. Golla, Nenita B. Pasco, Julito P. Caparas, Teresa B. Capar
Constancio R. Bernardo.

On March 31, 2011, the RTC rendered judgment against [petitioners], disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolved as follows, to wit:

a. Annulling the agreement denominated as 'application for continual use' entered into between [respondent]
[petitioners] and ordering the latter, jointly and solidarily, to return to the [respondent] all payments made by
total amount of Four Hundred Fifty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty and 74/100 (Php457,760.74), plus l
interest computed from the time [petitioners] failed to return said amount despite valid demand;

b. Ordering [petitioners], jointly and solidarily, to pay [respondent] moral damage in the amount of Fifty Thou
Pesos (Php50,000.00);

c. Ordering [petitioners], jointly and solidarily, to pay [respondent] Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) exem
damages;
d. Ordering [petitioners], jointly and solidarily, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of One Hundred Thousan
(Php100,000.00).

On the other hand, compulsory counterclaim of [respondent] is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."5 (Citations omitted.)

Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, petitioners interposed an appeal in accordance with Section 2(a), Rule 41 o
of Court which was given due course in the RTC Order6 dated July 11, 2011.

In their Appellant[s'] Brief,7 petitioners imputed a lone error:

THE LOWER COURT PATENTLY ERRED IN RENDERING THE APPEALED DECISION DESPITE LACK OF
JURISDICTION.8

According to petitioners, it is the HLURB and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction over the subject ma
case filed by respondent.

The CA's Ruling

On August 12, 2013, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision9 dismissing petitioners' appeal. It led that si
petitioners' appeal raised no question other than the issue of jurisdiction, they should have taken their appea
to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not an ordina
with the CA under Rule 41 of the same Rules.

The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 50, Section 2 of
Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.11 In the assailed February 10, 2014, Resolution,12 the CA den
motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal for raising a pure question of law without first p
judgment on whether the HLURB has primary jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. They assert tha
were only constrained to raise the sole issue of jurisdiction considering that the judgment of the RTC is void
Petitioners thus beseech this Court to now "decide the novel issue of jurisdiction over action to annul contra
purchase or continual use of memorial lots."13

The Courts Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

I. The CA was correct in dismissing petitioners' appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court; h
for the sake of justice and equity, the relaxation of the rule of procedure is warranted in this case.

At the outset, the CA's finding that petitioners solely anchored their appeal on a purely legal question deserv
from this Court.14 In their appeal before the CA, petitioners raised the sole issue of whether the trial court wa
with jurisdiction to hear and try the case filed by respondent. In the present petition, they also readily admit t
"assigned as error only the validity of the appealed Decision of the lower court for lack of jurisdiction of the R
the present case for rescission of the 'Application for Continual Use', x x x."15

Under the Rules of Court, there are two modes of appeal from a decision or final order of the trial court in the
of its original jurisdiction: (1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 if questions of fact or questions of f
are raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where onl
questions of law are raised or involved.16 This is glaringly clear from the provisions of Section 2, Rule 41, viz

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the e
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be require
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

xxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be t
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Thus, this Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioners' appeal. Since what petitioners raised
appeal was a pure question of law, their proper recourse was to file before this Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.17 In fact, the CA's dismissal of petitioners' appeal was the
and unavoidable outcome as Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. - An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regio
Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being
reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the ap
judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but sha
dismissed outright. (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the absence of error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioners' appeal, this Court finds
imperative to resolve the substantive issue of the instant case in order to render a just and speedy dispositio
As held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corp.,18 courts have the prerogative to relax proced
of even the most mandatory character, bearing in mind the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an
litigation and the parties' right to due process.19 In numerous cases, the liberal construction of the rules has
allowed by this Court when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.20

In Nursery Care Corp., et al. v. Acevedo, et al.,21 this Court adopted a liberal approach and resolved the case
merits despite its ruling that the CA's dismissal of the appeal therein was proper as it raised only questions o
Similarly, this Court finds it proper to relax the technical rules or procedure in this case, taking into consider
earlier pronouncement in Spouses Go v. Chaves, et al.:22

Our rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and permit the prompt dispo
unmeritorious cases which clog the court dockets and do a little more than waste the courts' time. These tec
procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, rather than suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from
enforcement may thus be allowed, as petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the mer
case, rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. x x x23           

II. The HLURB has primary jurisdiction over respondent's complaint; however, the judgment of the RTC rema

The issue brought before this Court is "whether it is the HLURB and not the [RTC] which has the jurisdiction
complaints to annul contracts involving the purchase or continual use of memorial lots based on the develop
alleged lack of certificate of registration and license to sell and the absence of improvements in the memoria

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are also within the jurisdiction of the courts.25 U
doctrine, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialize training and knowledge of
administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is
if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.26 The doctrine applies where a claim is originally co
the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, u
regulatory scheme, have been place within the special competence of an administrative agency.27 In such a
court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may either suspend the judicial process pending referral of
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss t
without prejudice.28

Article IV, Section 5(c) of Executive Order No. 64829 has vested the HLURB the power to "[i]ssue rules and re
to enforce the land use policies and human settlements as provided for in Presidential Decrees No. 399, 815,
1216, 1344, 1396, 1517, Letter of Instructions No. 713, 729, 833, 935 and other related laws regulating the use
including the regulatory aspects of the Urban Land Reform Act and all decrees relating to regulation of the v
and improvements, and their rental."

Pursuant thereto, the HLURB promulgated HLURB Resolution No. 681-00 (Amending the Rules and Regulatio
Memorial Parks and Cemeteries), which was approved on September 21, 2000. The rules and regulations ther
to new development and/or expansion/alteration of existing memorial parks/cemeteries and other private bur
grounds.30 Section 2, Rule I thereof provides that every registered owner or developer of a parcel of land wh
convert it into a memorial park/cemetery shall apply with the Board or city/municipality concerned for the ap
the memorial park/cemetery plan by the filing of required documents as stated therein. Further, Rule II thereo
prescribes the procedure for the registration and licensing of memorial park/cemetery projects.

Given the foregoing, although respondent's complaint was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstan
surrounding her purchase of a memorial lot brought it clearly within the ambit of the HLURB's primary jurisd

However, this Court disagrees with petitioners' insistence that the March 31, 2011 Decision31 of the RTC is v
of jurisdiction. It bears mentioning that at the time respondent filed her Complaint32 dated November 25, 200
specific provisions of law, other than Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1344,33 delineated the cases over which t
has exclusive jurisdiction.

For reference, Section 1 of PD 1344 provides:

Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its pow
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [later transferred the HLURB] sha
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against t
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivisi
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman.

In the 2007 case of Delos Santos v. Spouses Sarmiento,34 this Court held that not every case involving buye
sellers of real estate may be filed with the HLURB whose jurisdiction is limited to cases filed by the buyer or
subdivision lot or condominium unit.35 In addition, the HLURB's jurisdiction shall be based on any of the cau
action enumerated under Section 1 of PD 1344, and the jurisdictional facts must be clearly alleged in the com

Subsequently, the jurisdiction of the HLURB was expanded through the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA)
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations," which was approve
January 7, 2010. Under Section 20(d) of RA 9904, the HLURB is vested with the authority to "[h]ear and decid
association and/or inter-association controversies and/or conflicts x x x."

The Revised Rules of Proceedings Before Regional Arbiters

On December 7, 2017, the HLURB promulgated and adopted HLURB Resolution No. 963-17 or the "Revised R
Proceedings Before Regional Arbiters" (2017 Rules). Through this Resolution, the scope of jurisdiction of the
was made clear.

Rule 2, Sections 5 and 6 of the 2017 Rules set out the general and specific jurisdiction of the HLURB Regiona
Arbiters, viz.:

Sec. 5. General Jurisdiction. - Arbiters have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving laws being implem
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and such other cases as may be provided by law unless specifi
vested in another tribunal.

Sec. 6. Specific Jurisdiction. -

6.1. Jurisdiction over real estate developments. The Arbiters shall exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction
and decide cases involving subdivisions, condominiums, memorial parks and similar real estate developmen
follows:

6.1.1. Claims for refund, complaints against unsound real estate business practices and other actions for spe
performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer aga
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and other complaints for violation of Presidential Decr
and other related laws;

6.1.2. Suits filed in opposition to an application for certificate of registration and license to sell, development
condominium projects, clearance to mortgage, or the revocation or cancellation thereof, and locational clear
certifications or permits, when issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board;

6.1.3. Suits filed by the project owner or developer or the duly registered homeowners association of the pro
pertaining to the open spaces or common areas of the subdivision or condominium, except those where thir
are involved; and,

6.1.4. Disputes involving easements within or among subdivisions projects.

6.2. Jurisdiction over homeowners and homeowners associations. The Arbiters shall exercise exclusive juris
hear and decide cases involving homeowners associations, as follows:

6.2.1. Suits filed in opposition to an application for, or the revocation of, certificate of registration of homeow
associations;

6.2.2. Intra-association disputes or controversies arising out of the relations between and among members o
homeowners associations; between any or all of them and the homeowners association of which they are me
including federations and other umbrella organizations of homeowners associations;

6.2.3. Inter-association disputes or controversies arising out of the relations between and among two or mor
homeowners associations or condominium corporations, federations or other umbrella organizations of hom
associations;

6.2.4. Disputes or controversies between the association and the homeowners or other beneficial users relat
exercise of their respective rights, duties and obligations;

6.2.5. Disputes between the homeowners association and the State, insofar as its registration or right to exis
which are intrinsically connected with the regulation of homeowners associations.

The 2017 Rules also provides that "[t]he 2011 Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Rules of Procedure37
Rules) and the Rules of Court shall have suppletory application insofar as these have not been specifically re
are no inconsistent with this Rules."38 With reference to the 2011 Rules, the disputes or controversies it cov
listed under Section 2, Rule 139 thereof. It is worth mentioning that the 2011 Rules does not specifically state
HLURB shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the cases so covered.

This Court also observes that disputes involving memorial parks, like the one at bar, are not among those co
the 2011 Rules. Significantly, the 2017 Rules, through Section 6.1, Rule 240 thereof, has expressly included c
involving memorial parks as among those which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB Arbiters.

The recent enactment of RA 11201 otherwise known as the "Department of Human Settlements and Urban De
Act" and the promulgation of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR); the reconstitution of the HLURB
transfer of its functions to the Human Settlements Adjudicatory Commission

On February 14, 2019, RA 11201 known as the "Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development A
approved. The law created the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (Department), defi
mandate, powers and functions, and decreed its inclusion in the annual General Appropriations Act for its co
implementation. Section 4, Chapter III of RA 11201 pertinently provides:

Sec. 4. Creation and Mandate of the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development. - There is he
created the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development, hereinafter referred to as the Departm
through the consolidation of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) and the Ho
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The Department shall act as the primary national government entity re
for the management of housing, human settlement and urban development. It shall be the sole and main plan
policy-making, regulatory, program coordination, and performance monitoring entity for all housing, human
and urban development concerns, primarily focusing on the access to and the affordability of basic human n
shall develop and adopt a national strategy to immediately address the provision of adequate and affordable
all Filipinos, and shall ensure the alignment of the policies, programs, and projects of all its attached agencie
facilitate the achievement of this objective.

It is important to note that under Section 12, Chapter IV of RA 11201, the HLURB has been reconstituted and
henceforth be known as the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC). The adjudicatory function
HLURB has been transferred to the HSAC and shall be attached to the Department for policy, planning and p
coordination only.41

On July 19, 2019, the "Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Settlements and Urb
Development Act" was approved. Significantly, the IRR of 11201 has defined the term "real estate projects" o
estate development projects" as referring to "subdivisions, condominiums, townhouses, memorial parks, co
and other similar projects which by law are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department."42 From
definition, it is readily observable that the term "real estate," which used to cover only subdivisions and cond
under PD 1344, has now been broadened to also include townhouses, memorial parks, columbaria and other
projects.

Additionally, the confusion as to the jurisdiction of the HLURB, now the HSAC, has been removed as the IRR
11201 has listed the cases over which the Regional Adjudicators of the HSAC have original and exclusive jur
well as the cases over which the Commission Proper has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Sections 33 and 34
of 11201 specifically provide:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of the Commission. - The Commission shall have the exclusive appellate jurisdiction ov

33.1 All cases decided by the Regional Adjudicators; and

33.2 Appeals from decisions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies.

The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt by t

Sec. 34. Jurisdiction of Regional Adjudicators. - The Regional Adjudicators shall exercise original and exclus
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:

34.1 Cases involving subdivisions, condominiums, memorial parks and similar real estate developments:

(a) Actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers or homeowners against the pr
owner or developer, which cause prejudice to the buyers or committed with bad faith and disregard of the bu
rights;

(b) Claims for refund, and other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the projec
developer, dealer, broker or salesman: Provided, That when the cause of action arises from the buyer's right
Section 23 of PD 957 and the purchase price of the property is paid through a housing loan from a bank or ot
financing institutions, the latter shall be impleaded as necessary party;

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations arising from the sale of the
and development of the subdivision or condominium project;

(d) Disputes involving the open spaces or common areas and their use filed by the project owner or develope
duly registered HOA, including the eviction of informal settlers therein, in accordance with the requirements
the rules and regulations promulgated by duly constituted authorities;

(e) Suits to declare subdivision, condominium or other real estate developments within the regulatory jurisdi
Department as abandoned, as defined under Section 3 of the Act for the purpose of Section 35 of PD 957;

(f) Disputes involving easements within or among subdivision projects; and

(g) Actions to annul mortgages executed in violation of Section 18 of PD 957 filed by a subdivision lot or con
unit buyer against the project owner and/or developer and the mortgagee.

34.2 Cases involving [Home owners Associations (HOA)]:

(a) Controversies involving the registration and regulation of HOAs;

(b) Intra-association disputes or controversies arising out of the relations between and among members of H
between any or all of them and the HOA of which they are members;

(c) Inter-association disputes or controversies arising out of the relations between and among two (2) or mor
between and among federations and other umbrella organizations, on matters pertaining to the exercise of th
duties and functions; and

(d) Disputes between such HOA and the State, insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exis
those which are intrinsically connected with the regulation of HOAs or dealing with the internal affairs of suc

34.3 Disputes involving the implementation of Section 18 of RA 7279, as amended by 10884, and its impleme
and regulations; and

34.4 Disputes or controversies involving laws and regulations being implemented by the Department except
cases falling within the jurisdiction of other judicial or quasi-judicial body.    

The March 31, 2011 Decision of the RTC remains valid.

To stress, however, the 2017 Rules as well as RA 11201 and its IRR were not yet in force at the time the prese
controversy arose.

Accordingly, this Court rules to uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case filed by respondent involvin
purchase of continual use of a memorial lot. As declared in Durisol Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:43

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the ju
over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under th
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. x x x44 (Emphasis supplied)           

III. The RTC was correct in annulling the Application for Continual Use,45 in ordering the return of the payme
respondent made in the total amount of P457,760.74, plus legal interest, and in ordering the award of moral a
exemplary damages and attorneys fees to respondent.

It bears to reiterate that petitioners did not raise any other issue besides jurisdiction. They did not question t
findings of fact.ᇈ WᑭHIL Neither did they challenge the very judgment of the RTC which, among others, ann
agreement with respondent denominated as Application for Continual Use; ordered them to return to respon
payments she made in the total amount of P457,760.74, plus legal interest; and ordered them to pay moral an
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. To this Court, petitioners' omission to question the RTC's judgment
their admission that they are indeed liable to respondent.

At any rate, this Court finds the RTC Decision46 dated March 31, 2011 to be in order. The RTC correctly annu
Application for Continual Use on the ground that respondent's consent to enter into such agreement was viti
mistake. Under Article 1331 of the Civil Code, "[i]n order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer
substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally mov
both parties to enter into the contract." Here, the RTC found that respondent was enticed by the written adve
of PDI stating the convenient features one would enjoy at Sanctuary Memorial Park which did not materialize
RTC also noted the absence of knowledge on the part of respondent that PDI was not clothed with authority
dispose of the memorial lots at Sanctuary Memorial Park at the time the agreement was executed.48 Undenia
conditions vitiated respondent's consent and sufficiently justified the annulment of the Application for Conti

As to the damages awarded, this Court also finds no reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC. Moral da
may be awarded when there is willful injury to property if the court should find that, under the circumstances
damages are justly due.49 Further, exemplary damages may be awarded by way of example or correction for
good, in addition to the moral damages.50 In this case, the RTC found that the attendant circumstances caus
respondent to suffer sleepless nights.51 It also noted that petitioners' acts were accompanied with bad faith.
the award of moral and exemplary damages to respondent was proper.

Moreover, the RTC correctly ordered the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent who was constraine
hire the services of counsel, and incur expenses to enforce her rights and protect her interests.53 As provide
2208(2) of the Civil Code, recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, ma
allowed in cases where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to prot
interest.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2011 of
67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70647 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Zalameda,* JJ., concu

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2724 dated October 25, 2019.

1 Rollo, pp. 7-15.

2 Id. at 17-21; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino a
Corales, concurring.

3 Id. at 22.
4 CA rollo, pp. 18-26; penned by Judge Amorfina Cerrado-Cezar.

5 Rollo, pp. 17-18.

6 CA Rollo, p. 17.

7 Id. at 31-38.

8 Id. at 35.

9 Rollo, pp. 17-21.

10 Id. at 21.

11 CA rollo, pp. 92-93.

12 Rollo, p. 22.

13 Id. at 11.

14 Escoto v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 797 Phil. 320, 326 (2016).

15 Rollo, p. 10.

16 Cando v. Sps. Olazo, 547 Phil. 630, 635 (2007).

17 Macawiwili Gold Mining and Dev't. Co., Inc. v. CA, 358 Phil. 245, 257 & 261 (1998).

18 551 Phil. 768 (2007).

19 Id. at 780.

20 Id.

21 740 Phil. 70, 82 (2014).

22 633 Phil. 342 (2010).

23 Id. at 350.

24 Rollo. p. 10.

25 San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Sec. Perez, et al., 17 Phil. 244, 262 (2013).

26 Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, 527 Phil. 623, 626 (2006).

27 Id. at 626-627.
28 Id. at 627.

29 Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.

30 Section 1, HLURB Resolution No. 681-00.

31 CA rollo, pp. 18-26.

32 Records, Vol. I, pp. 3-14.

33 Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Presidential Decree No. 957.

34 548 Phil. 1 (2007).

35 Id. at 16.

36 Id.

37 HLURB Resolution No. 871-11 otherwise known as the "2011 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Housing a
Use Regulatory Board."

38 Sec. 4, Rule 1, HLURB Resolution No. 963-17.

39 Sec. 2. Rule 1, HLURB Resolution No. 871-11 provides:

Section 2. Coverage. - This Rules shall be applicable to the following disputes or controversies:

(a) Actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers;

(b) Claims involving refund and other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the p
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;

(d) Intra-association disputes or controversies arising out of the relations between and among members of
homeowners associations between any or all of them and the homeowners association of which they are me

(e) Inter-association disputes or controversies arising out of the relations between and among two or more
homeowners associations;

(f) Disputes between such homeowners association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franc
right to exist and those which are intrinsically connected with the regulation of homeowners associations or
with the internal affairs of such entity;

(g) Suits filed in opposition to an application for certificate of registration and license to sell, development pe
condominium projects, clearance to mortgage, or the revocation or cancellation thereof, and locational clear
certifications or permits, when issued by the Regional Field Office of HLURB;

(h) Appeals from decisions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies; and,

(i) Other analogous cases.

40 Sec. 6.1, Rule 2, HLURB Resolution No. 963-17, pertinently provides:

Sec. 6.1. Jurisdiction over real estate developments. The Arbiters shall exercise exclusive and original jurisd
hear and decide cases involving subdivisions, condominiums, memorial parks and similar real estate develo
x. (Emphasis supplied.)

41 See Section 12, Chapter IV of the RA 11201.

42 See Section 3.30, Rule I of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Settleme
Urban Development Act.

43 427 Phil. 604 (2002).

44 Id. at 612.

45 Records, Vol. I, pp. 15-18.

46 CA Rollo, pp. 18-26.

47 Id. at 24.

48 Id.

49 CIVIL CODE, Article 2220.

50 CIVIL CODE, Article 2229.

51 CA Rollo p. 25.

52 Id.

53 Id.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

19 Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mariano Serrano; Rollo, pp. 48-51.

20 108 Phil. 335 [1960].

21 53 Phil. 423 [1929].

22 131 SCRA 532 [1984].

23 169 SCRA 455 [1989].

24 246 SCRA 162 [1995].

25 Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil. 505, 517 [1911].

26 Joven y Monteverde, et al. v. The Director of Lands, 93 Phil. 134, 136-137 [1953].

G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration
case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does
ownership of land formed by alluvium.

The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His
registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan
River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down
towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east
and on the west.

The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land.
Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.

The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it
naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as
foreshore land?

Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions 2 of
the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No.
N-84, 4 the application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial
Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore
lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So
was his motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,

filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of
foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the
Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon
motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to his
application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by
the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural
Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf
of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.

On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application
to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan,
described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual
claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the
eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the
northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General,
filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public
domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry,
through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as
that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew
his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.

On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on
February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro
claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it
being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part
of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and
confirmed by the Office of the President; and that be bad already converted the area covered
by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso
Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and
their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth,
force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The
defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have
thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding
repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been
docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject
matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case and
was jointly tried by the court a quo.

During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on
November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.

Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein
private respondents.

On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be
foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings.

The decision's dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in
Civil Case No. 2873;

(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in
question; and

(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and
as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances." 6

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assisted the
following errors:

1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of
the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants
[private respondents].

2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.

3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the land in controversy in favor of
applicants-appellants [private respondents].

4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents]
are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]. 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the
petition for registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from
corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the
Psu-175181.

The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:

The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their
respective briefs is — whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or
foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of
Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay
and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay
then it is foreshore land.

xxx xxx xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately

adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830
is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the
north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing
downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the Talisay River and the
Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said
land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land
was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the
land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is
immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at
the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can
understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it
was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the
action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the
shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy
to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of the State as
the lower court did in fact rule . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these two
rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade
preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to
the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.

It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit
thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as
they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add anything to the land but instead subtract
from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the
two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths,
thus causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to accumulate therein.

However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept
this theory and stated that the subject land arose only when . . . . Pascual planted "palapat"
and "bakawan" trees thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how this
act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came into being. Much less
will it prove that the same came from the sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that
it were the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have
stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this is not so because the land
mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.

On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants [private respondents] clearly show that
the land that accumulated beyond the so- called boundary, as well as the entire area being
applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees . . . The existence of
vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came from inland rather than
from the sea, for what could the sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and
corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow
which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and
dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.

In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that
the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private
respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of the Talisay
and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in
the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:

"Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it was
found out that the said land is . . . . sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers . . . . These two rivers
bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods every year thus raising
the soil of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private respondents].
About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees
thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers that has caused the
formation of said land . . . . subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by
accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the said land may be considered the private
property of the riparian owner who is the applicant herein [private respondents] . . . .

In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn,
except for the portion recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960,
to be excluded and considered foreshore. . . ."

Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands
withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited "the same to the northern portion
of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay, which
should be declared public land as part of the foreshore" . . . . 8

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of
the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the
reversion to private respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property
included in Navarro's fishpond permit.

On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited
decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision.
Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision,
to read, viz:

(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in
their fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion
to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide
along Manila Bay on the northern portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings
and which area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards
corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. . . . 9

On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of
Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the
decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited
resolution dated November 21, 1980.

Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for
review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We, however, denied
the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely
filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to
set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.

On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for

reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.

On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the
decision dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein
petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.

On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November
29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.

On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners'
request for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.

On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section
1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-
parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment.

Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in
appreciating the fact of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law
relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.

We find no merit in the petition.

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay
and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which
brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted
thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries,
respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the
land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the
process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate
fronting the river bank 12; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian
owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13 The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment
the soil deposit can be seen 14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons 15.

Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.

First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila
Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of
the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on
their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the
waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after
he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to
rise. 16

Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own
tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side
lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were
to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium
should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of
petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the
alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.

Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila
Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind
of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:

Appellant next contends that . . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said
contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentatiom of the same:

"Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of
the shore of the sea or of a lake. " 7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17

The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts
of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:

A perusal of the survey plan . . . . of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the
eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River,
on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to
state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both
flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit
meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila
Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered
an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers].

Applicant Pascual . . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has
applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth
or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action
of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must have been
caused by action of the bay. 18

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that
the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public
domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed
land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because petitioners' own
land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two
rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated
somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the
light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the
eastern or western portion of petitioners' land where a river each runs, but on the northern
portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are
further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of
Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the
northern boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and
valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated
that:

As appellants' (titled) land . . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and
considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and the Manila Bay,
measuring some 593.00 meters . . . . it is believed rather farfetched for the land in question to
have been formed through "sediments of sand and salt [sic] . . . . deposited at their [rivers']
mouths." Moreover, if "since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the
sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths," why then would the alleged cargo
of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled land facing
Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the
case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the
current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion . . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the
contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less
than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-
examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948 that he
noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had planted trees thereon in
1948. . . . .

. . . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach
as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike now
separates this titled property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had
already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch as these trees
were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike. This must be so because in . . .
. the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the
north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the
planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to rise or to get higher
in elevation.

The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the
same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the
very waves that brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which must have
caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to the
formation of the land in question." 19

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan
trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its
former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the
formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of petitioners' own tract of land.

The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of
the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, part of the public domain

At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.

While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and

Valeriano  20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on
accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as
accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.

In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose  21, Republic v. Court of

Appeals  22, Republic v. Alagad  23, and Meneses v. Court of
Appeals  24, we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the
mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land
contiguous thereto.

The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of
Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the
disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all
legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein
disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority." 25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the
right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is
no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special
industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the
executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of
the estates adjacent thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Vitug, J., concuring:

I concur; the amandatory provisions of the Water Code (P.D. 1067) did not affect Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Water of 1866.

Separate Opinions

Vitug, J., concuring:

I concur; the amandatory provisions of the Water Code (P.D. 1067) did not affect Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Water of 1866.

Footnotes
1 In CA G.R. No. 59044-R, dated November 29, 1978, penned by Associate Justice Porfirio v.
Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Nestor B. Alampay, Jorge R. Coquia, and
Rafael C. Climaco, with Associate Justice Mariano Serrano, dissenting; Rollo, pp. 39-54.

2 Resolution (on the First Motion for Reconsideration) dated November 21, 1980, penned by
Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente,
Nestor B. Alampay, Jorge R. Coquia, and Elias B. Asuncion; Rollo, pp. 68-69; and Resolution
(on the Second Motion for Reconsideration) dated March 28, 1982, penned by Associate
Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente, Nestor B.
Alampay, Elias B. Asuncion, and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Rollo, pp. 90-91.

3 Fourth Civil Cases Division.

4 L.R.C. Case No. 18607.

5 Branch 1.

6 Decision in CA G.R. No. 59044 dated November 29, 1978, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 40-41.

7 Id., p. 3; Rollo, p. 41.

8 Id., pp. 3-6; Rollo, pp 41-44.

9 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. 59044-R dated November 21, 1980, p. 1; Rollo, p. 68.

10 Docketed as G.R. No. 55584.

11 Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996; Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 374 [1995]; Reynante
v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 794, 799 [1992]; Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374, 385 [1991].

12 Paras, Edgardo, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 3, 1984 Edition, p. 211.

13 Santulan v. The Executive Secretary, 80 SCRA 548,556 [1977].

14 Paras, supra, at p. 212, citing Cortez v. City of Manila, to Phil. 567; Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil.

408; 3 Manresa 236.

15 Id., at p. 216, citing Grande, et al. v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962.

16 The pertinent portion of Sulpicio Pascual's testimony is as follows:

Q: Is that portion contiguous to Manila Bay?

A: Near but not contiguous.

Q: During the high tide is that portion reached by water?

A: Before 1948.
Q: Before you introduced palapat and bakawan in that area?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It was only after you have planted palapat and bakawan . . . .

when the sea water no longer reaches that area?

A: I only planted few trees in 1948 to serve as boundary and as

marker. . . . .

Q: Was it only in 1948 that you observe that portion was

becoming higher?

A: At the beginning of 1948 I noticed that land was getting

higher. (TSN, June 11, 1969, pp. 9-11)

17 Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano, 108 Phil. 336, 338 [1960].

18 Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 122-123.

19 Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mariano Serrano; Rollo, pp. 48-51.

20 108 Phil. 335 [1960].

21 53 Phil. 423 [1929].

22 131 SCRA 532 [1984].

23 169 SCRA 455 [1989].

24 246 SCRA 162 [1995].

25 Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil. 505, 517 [1911].

26 Joven y Monteverde, et al. v. The Director of Lands, 93 Phil. 134, 136-137 [1953].

G.R. No. 146616 August 31, 2006

SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., Respondent.
 DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed on September 18, 1973 a foreshore lease
application over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in its name, located in Loboc,
Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, including Lot 3309. It eventually withdrew the application and filed on
March 1976 a petition for registration over the same foreshore land with the then Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. The case was, however, archived as WESVICO’s representative could no longer
be contacted.

It appears that WESVICO ceased to hold operations and its properties including Lot 3309 were
foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which later consolidated its ownership
thereon. 1

On July 7, 1983, F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City, District Land
Office VI-1 a foreshore lease application 2 over a foreshore land, a portion of which is adjacent to Lot
3309. The application was docketed as FLA (VI-1) 176.

In the preliminary investigation report 3 on F.F. Cruz’ FLA (VI-1) 176, Senior Special Investigator
Ramon Torre who personally visited and examined the land applied for recommended that the
application be given due course.

District Land Officer Norberto Bernas thereafter submitted to the Director of Lands a
report, 4 together with relevant documents including the preliminary investigation report. The
pertinent portion of Bernas’ report reads:

. . . I personally visited the area applied for by the herein applicant and found that the same is
actually occupied and used by them as a sanctuary of their marine equipment which they are using
in their construction work of the Iloilo Port. The applicant has also introduced some facilities on the
area applied for in the repair and maintenance of said equipment. A portion of the land applied for
has already been filled up by the applicant as they are in need of a land area for the repair and
maintenance of their equipment and in the loading and unloading of materials that they use in the
construction of the Iloilo City Port.

x x x x 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner Siain Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN), who purchased from the DBP the properties previously
owned by WESVICO including Lot 3309, 6 filed on September 29, 1986 a foreshore lease
application 7 over the foreshore land adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP.

Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore lease
application overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed on January 9,
1987 a protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of the property adjoining the overlapping area, it
should be given preference in its lease.

On March 6, 1987, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Iloilo City, by Resolution No. 174, 9 approved
the recommendation of its Committee on Finance that "for the mutual interest" of F.F. Cruz and
SIAIN, SIAIN would get 70 linear meters and F.F. Cruz would get 60 linear meters of the disputed
area, in light of its finding that, among other things, both SIAIN and F.F. Cruz would "contribute
substantially to the economic growth of the City of Iloilo."
Concurring with the Sangguniang Panglungsod, the Land Management Bureau (LMB) through its
Director, by Order 10 of July 15, 1989, dismissed SIAIN’s protest in this wise:

. . . While it cannot be denied that protestant is now the registered owner of the property adjoining
the foreshore in question, the disputed foreshore cannot be considered to have been built or formed
by means of accretion but is a reclaimed land made by respondent F.F. Cruz and Company for
the purpose of utilizing the same in the loading and unloading of their equipment and materials and
for the repair and maintenance of said equipment which respondents use in the reclamation of the
Iloilo City Port. This is supported by the findings of the District Land Officer Norberto Bernas who, in
his letter dated February 18, 1984 to this Office, reported that he personally visited the foreshore in
question and found that the same is now actually occupied and used by the respondent
company as a sanctuary of its marine equipment which it is using in its construction work of the
Iloilo City Port and that a portion of the land applied for has already been filled up by the
applicant to be utilized in the repair and maintenance of its equipment and in the loading and
unloading of materials it uses in the construction of the Iloilo City Port. It is therefore clear that the
foreshore in question is neither an accretion nor an accessory to protestants’ property. While
protestant SEI appears to be owner of the property adjacent to the disputed foreshore, it cannot be
considered as a riparian owner within the contemplation of the aforementioned law. 11 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, the LMB disposed:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the protest of SIAIN Enterprises, Inc. be, as it hereby it is,
dismissed and this case, dropped from the records. Both Foreshore Lease Application Nos. (VI-5)
220 and (VI-1) 176 of SIAIN Enterprises, Inc. and F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. respectively, shall be
amended in such a way that SIAIN’s application shall cover SEVENTY (70) linear meters of the
disputed foreshore adjoining Lot 3309 while F.F. Cruz’s application shall cover SIXTY (60) linear
meters thereof. Accordingly, both applications shall be give due course in accordance with the
provisions of the Public Land Law, otherwise known as Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. 12 (Underscoring supplied)

SIAIN appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
arguing that the LMB:

1. . . . made [a] false assumption of fact when it considered the foreshore area under . . . controversy
as reclaimed land;

2. . . . committed a grave error in not considering the preferential right of the riparian owner/littoral
owner, . . . to apply for a lease over the foreshore under controversy; [and]

3. . . . erred in awarding sixty (60) linear meters of the foreshore under controversy to [F.F. Cruz]. 13

By Decision 14 of May 6, 1997, then DENR Acting Secretary Antonio G.M. La Viña set aside the LMB
Order, the pertinent portions of which decision read:

It is blatant error to consider the contested area as reclaimed land as it has no basis in fact, in law
and jurisprudence.

The area in question is unquestionably a natural foreshore for which various applicants prior

to the herein parties have applied. CRUZ’s F.L.A. No. (VI-1) 176 itself which was filed on July
7, 1983, long after it had allegedly filled up the area undeniably shows CRUZ’s admission that
it is a foreshore and not something else.

The assumption that the contested area is a reclaimed land runs smack against the provision of
Article 5 of the Spanish Law on Waters of August 3, 1866 stating that:

"Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by provinces,
pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."

We cannot find in the records anything to show that a "permission" was ever sought by or granted to,
CRUZ for the alleged reclamation of the land in question.

xxxx

It is by reason of the Director of Lands’ erroneous classification of the contested area as

"reclaimed" that he awarded 60 linear meters thereof to CRUZ. However, as heretofore
discussed, the said area in question is clearly a natural foreshore and SIAIN is correct in
claiming it to be so. Hence, the law that applies in this case is Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 which was issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources . . .

xxxx

It is an undisputed fact that SIAIN is the registered owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area in
controversy. Hence SIAIN is the riparian/littoral owner insofar as the contested foreshore area is
concerned and should enjoy the preferential right to lease the entire one hundred thirty (130) linear
meters of said area adjoining its property, which includes the sixty (60) linear meters thereof
awarded to CRUZ in the questioned Order.

x x x x 15 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)

The DENR Acting Secretary thus ordered that the application of F.F. Cruz be amended to exclude
the disputed foreshore area adjacent to Lot 3309 and that SIAN’s application be given due course.

F.F. Cruz appealed to the Office of the President, contending that the DENR Acting Secretary acted
with grave abuse of discretion:

I. IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU

THAT THE CONTROVERTED AREA IS A RECLAIMED LAND UNDERTAKEN BY APPELLANT
F.F. CRUZ . . .

II. IN RULING THAT [SIAIN] HAS A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE;
[and]

III. IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT DECISION CONSIDERING THAT HE IS NOT EMPOWERED BY

LAW OR RULE TO ISSUE THE SAME. 16

By Decision 17 of March 12, 1999, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora, reversed the decision of the DENR Acting Secretary and reinstated that of the
LMB in this wise:
Records reveal that WESVICO, who may be considered as the real riparian owner, had
previously availed itself of the preferential right to apply for the foreshore area adjacent to its
property. However, it withdrew its application, and instead sought the titling of said property
via a petition for registration filed with the court, which eventually archived the case for
petitioner’s lack of interest. In net effect, WESVICO’s preferential right adverted to, albeit
initially pursued, was thereafter abandoned due to its voluntary withdrawal of the
corresponding application and its erroneous resort to some other mode of acquisition, i.e.,
the filing of a petition for registration. Consequent to such abandonment, it may be said that
WESVICO had already waived its preferential right over the controverted area at the time
SIAIN purchased the adjacent property. As vendee, SIAIN was subrogated not only to the
rights and actions of its predecessor-in-interest, WESVICO, but also to the absence/lack of
those.

Also decidedly going for CRUZ is the fact that it applied for the disputed area, occupied the
same and introduced improvements thereon long before SIAIN filed its own lease application.
Subject to certain exceptions, it is axiomatic in public land grant that he who is first in time is
preferred or stronger in law – Priore in tempore, potior jure.

It may be, as stated by the DENR, that the contested area abuts upon the titled property of SIAIN, a
circumstance which ordinarily would accord that firm a preferential right to lease the property in
question, the rule being that a riparian/littoral owner enjoys preference over the abutting foreshore
lands formed by accretion or alluvial deposits.

xxxx

. . . The principle thus enunciated in Santulan properly applies where the adjoining lot is a natural
foreshore, meaning that the foreshore was formed by what may rightfully be considered as
accretion, or the settling down, by natural causes, of soil, earth and other deposits. But such is not
what it obtains in this case, contrary to the bare assertion of the DENR Acting Secretary that the
"area in question is unquestionably a natural foreshore." . . .

xxxx

Not being the product of accretion, the disputed strip of foreshore land cannot be the proper subject
of a riparian or littoral claim.

xxxx

The actuality of the DENR not formally granting CRUZ a permit to undertake reclamation works on
the disputed area can be conceded. But in the light of the Bernas report, . . . there can be no
quibbling that CRUZ occupied and raised, thru filling, the area to its present level, with the implicit
consent, if not approval, of lands authorities. That consent and/or approval have been given may be
deduced from the fact that the Bureau of Lands required the payment of, and received from
appellant, the amount of P40,032.00 as occupation fee. Any suggestion that CRUZ, after paying the
occupational fee, merely planted itself on the disputed area without as much as dredging and filling
the same is unacceptable. In a very real sense, therefore, the reclamation work undertaken by
CRUZ was with the proper permission, or at least the acquiescence of the Bureau of Lands, the
agency which, following Insular Government v. Aldecoa (19 Phil. 505), is empowered to grant such
permit in behalf of the DENR Secretary. 18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In its petition for review before the Court of Appeals, SIAIN raised the issues of 1) whether the
disputed area is reclaimed land or foreshore land and if found to be foreshore land, 2) whether SIAIN
has preferential right to lease the same. 19

By Decision of July 3, 2000, 20 the appellate court dismissed SIAIN’s petition, ruling that there is no
justification to digress from the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President and the LMB
and that administrative matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by SIAIN.

SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is foreshore land
and not reclaimed land as found by the Office of the President. It invites attention to F.F. Cruz’s own
declaration in its foreshore lease application that the disputed area is a "parcel of foreshore land." To
SIAIN, this declaration is equivalent to a judicial admission which does not require proof and is
conclusive as to it.

Further, SIAIN argues that the records reveal that the only evidence relied upon by the Office of the
President is the Bernas report which speaks of a portion allegedly filled-up by F.F. Cruz, the identity,
location and size of which were never established; and that there is no evidence to prove that the
filled-up portion is one and the same as the disputed area, but that even assuming that it is, F.F.
Cruz cannot have a better right over it as the reclamation was made without the necessary permit,
hence, it cannot be allowed to benefit from its own wrongdoing.

Furthermore, SIAIN contends that there can be no waiver of preferential right over the disputed
property, no advice from the Director of Lands having been communicated to WESVICO, DBP or
SIAIN of their preferential right to lease the adjacent foreshore land, and therefore, the 60 days
within which they are supposed to apply 21 has not begun to run.

The key to the present controversy lies in the classification of the disputed area.

The DENR Secretary found that the disputed area is a "natural foreshore," hence, it concluded that
SIAIN, being a littoral owner (owner of land bordering the sea or lake or other tidal waters 22), has
preferential right to lease it as provided in paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated
April 30, 1936 which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands or
lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall
be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for
the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that
he applies therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right. 23 (Emphasis supplied)

The DENR Secretary found the LMB’s classification of the disputed area as "reclaimed" erroneous
for lack of basis in fact, law and jurisprudence.

On the other hand, while the Office of the President recognized the preferential right of littoral owner
WESVICO, it held that it had waived its preferential right and SIAIN, as successor-in-interest, was
subrogated to WESVICO’s right or lack of it.
The Office of the President went on to hold that since the disputed area is already reclaimed land, it
cannot be subject to littoral claim, SIAIN, not being the littoral owner within the contemplation of the
law, citing Santulan v. The Executive Secretary 24 which elucidated on the principal reason for giving
a riparian or littoral owner preferential right, thus:

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the
foreshore land abutting on his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, when they are no longer washed by
the waters of the sea are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast guard service," shall be declared by the Government "to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral (riparian according to
paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the
action of the sea.

The reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the
riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the
waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain
by its recession. 25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, as reflected above, the Office of the President, finding that F.F. Cruz’s occupation and
introduction of improvements on the contested area long before SIAIN filed its lease application, held
that "it is axiomatic in public land grant that he who is first in time is preferred or stronger in law."

The petition is impressed with merit.

That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore
area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.

It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed foreshore area into
existence. Such foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It was
"formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea." Following Santulan, the
littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same.

Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the appellate court, littoral owner
WESVICO cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its preferential right to lease the
disputed area when it subsequently filed an application for registration thereover. For being a part of
the public domain, ownership of the area could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right
remained, however. Its move to have the contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact
more than proves its interest to utilize it.

As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO’s petition for registration which, as stated earlier, was
archived by the trial court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would not have been barred
from filing anew a foreshore lease application. Parenthetically, the petition for registration of
WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest but because it ceased operations due to
financial reasons.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 3, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The May 6, 1997 Decision of then Acting Secretary Antonio G.M. La Viña of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 90 (dorsal side).
2
 Land Management Bureau (LMB) folder, p. 61. (The LMB folder is paginated from pp. 307-
1).

3
 Id. at 59.

4
 Id. at 65-64.

5
 Ibid.

6
 LMB folder, p. 147.

7
 Id. at 140.

8
 Id. at 130-128.

9
 Id. at 175-170.

10
 Id. at 285-282.

11
 Id. at 283.

12
 Id. at 282.

13
 Id. at 295.

14
 DENR folder, pp. 95-90. (The DENR folder is paginated from pp. 188-1).

15
 Id. at 93-91.

16
 Id. at 120.

17
 Id. at 180-174.

18
 Id. at 177-174.

19
 Court of Appeals (CA) rollo, p. 18.

 Penned by Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and
20

Demetrio G. Demetria, id. at 219-227.

21
 Paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936.

 Santulan v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-28021, December 15, 1977, 80 SCRA
22

548, 556.

23
 In Santulan (supra note 22), this Court held:

The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a

broad sense as referring to any property having a water frontage. Strictly speaking, "riparian"
refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on a bank of a river.
 But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands
on the banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the
shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both
the land along the coast and the water near the coast of the shore zone between the high
and low watermarks.

24
 Supra.

25
 Id. at 557-558.

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