Judicial courtesy

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that while under the Rules of Court, courts may amend,
modify or revoke any decision or order promulgated by them, such power of authority is not absolute.
They state that among the limitations thereof are when a judgment has become final and when an
appeal has been interposed on time. Accordingly, while it is true that what is pending in the present
case is neither a final judgment nor an appeal by certiorari, the effect thereof would be the same.
Therefore, out of respect and courtesy for the higher court, the lower court should have suspended
all pending proceedings in the elevated case as even without any restraining order, the lower court
had lost jurisdiction to further act on the case.

We agree with the respondents on this point.

Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate Court to
prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting respondents'
motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to discuss and denying the latter's
motion to reconsider such, order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have
refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a
petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-
mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations
should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before
taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court.

Brief: as the case was before the appellate court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on an
interlocutory order that denied their petition for reconsideration for an order granting the
respondents motion to expunge from the records the petitioners motion to dismiss. While the
petition was pending before the SC, the appellate court issued a resolution recalling it’s order and
considered the motion submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the appellate court issued another
resolution granting the petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground that it was filed out of time.

In view of the aforementioned dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion
to withdraw the petition for certiorari filed before this Court on the ground that it had become moot
and academic

The dispute revolves on the permit granted by the NPCC to eternals garden to which the respondent
allege that such cemetery will cause water pollution to residents in the area.

NOTE: The perfection of an appeal is reckoned not at the filing of the notice of appeal but from the
payment of docket fees. Full payment of docket fees within the required period is an 'indispensable
step' for the perfection of an appeal.

X
Brief: provincial government of antique executed a moa concerning the life insurance coverage of
qualified baragay workers, obligating the former 4M for the premium payment and subsequently
submitted the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA for pre-audit. The COA disallowed the
payment and further denied the LGU’s appeal. Consequently, the LGU filed a money claim in the COA
but was denied on the ground that only municipal and city goverments are expressly vested with the
power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers and noted its failure to comply with
the requirement of publication under section 21 of ra 9184 (government procurement reform act.

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,7 and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the denial being
received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.10

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari
was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19,2014 for (a) the late
filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c)
the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

Ruling:

Petitioner did not comply with

the rule on proof of service

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with
the requirement on proof of service.

The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz:
Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus
requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of
the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the
paper being served. A compliance withthe rule is mandatory, such that

there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.13

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T.
Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry
Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces found on
pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared
to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The
rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs
did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of
August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of service.15

II

Fresh Period Rule under Neypes

did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition
for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period
rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.16
The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under
Rule 64.

As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a
question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a
prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the
reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast, the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment
or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The
petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.18 Questions of
fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party
is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or
from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is
filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any
event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

X
Hierarchy of courts: bishop navarra v Comelec

Facts, contentions of both parties and ruling:

On feb 21 2013, petitioners posted two tarpaulins, within a private property, that consists of a social
advocacy in view of the RH bill. It referred to those candidates who supports the RH bill as team patay
and those candidates who do not support the RH bill as team buhay . (Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012). the comelec issued a letter notice to the church to take down the
posters with threat of prosecution if not complied.

Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court,
whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power."23 Instead, respondents claim
that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C,
Section 2(3) of the Constitution24 on COMELEC’s power to decide all questions affecting elections.25
Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,26 Repol v. COMELEC,27 Soriano, Jr. v.
COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29 and Cayetano v. COMELEC,30 to illustrate how
judicialintervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En
Banc.

However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to
this general rule. Repolwas another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in
Pagsanghan, Samar.36 This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First
Division issued a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending
appeal.37 This court’s ponencia discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot
take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.38 However, consistent with
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,39 it clarified the exception:

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for
reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available.40

Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests
— despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:

1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;

3) The issue involves the protection of labor;

4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or

5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.

Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the status quo anteorder issued by
the COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.

Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this
court’s expanded exercise of certiorari as provided by the Constitution as follows (expanded
jurisdiction):

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.56 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions
affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution, provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

....

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction,
gravely abused it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any
jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful
political speech.

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on
free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word
"affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to
decide any and all questions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies
during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.

The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the
Constitution.This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power
to review.

Hierarchy of courts

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition."70 As correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have
provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.72

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court
involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has
become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and
freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in
this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the
context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing
their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to
free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore,
allows for the immediate resort to this court.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United
States v. Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may
guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.77

This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether
the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court
has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is
allowed.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court
held that:

. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgmentof this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated
in its discussion.79 (Citation omitted)

In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality
on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the
Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013
election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that
necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for
direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In
Albano v. Arranz,80 cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that
would ensue if the Court of First Instance ofeach and every province were [to] arrogate itself the
power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that
constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."81

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with
the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom
respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the
Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would
be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the
future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation
of their right to freedom of expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally
compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the
course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was consideredas clearly an inappropriate remedy."82 In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens’ right to bear arms,83 government contracts involving modernization of
voters’ registration lists,84 and the status and existence of a public office.85

This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is
permitted.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls
under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.

Atty cabili v judge balindong

Doctrine of judicial stability

Decision of illigan RTC interfered by Marawi RTC without considering the rule on concurrent
jurisdiction.

The Court finds the OCA’s recommendation well-taken.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:22 no court can interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant
the relief sought by the injunction.23 The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment.24

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as
still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.25 A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.26 To hold otherwise would be to
divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

Petitioner secured favorable decision from the RTC of iligan which the CA affirmed which then lapsed
to finality. After securing a writ of execution from RTC iligan. The Office of the Solicitor General
opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU.6 The Iligan City RTC denied the
opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order The MSU resplonded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a
petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff
Gaje.7 The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent
Judge.

The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009.8
After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing
₱2,726,189.90 from MSU’s LBP-Marawi City Branch account.

Hinog v melicor

Doctrine used from the candelaria case: A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against low level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.

FACTS:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against
Bertuldo Hinog. Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the disputed property by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, on June 24, 1998, while trial was still
pending, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services was
terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his appearance
as new counsel for Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all
court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the
complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that
non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the
complaint to be expunged from the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court
reinstated the case after private respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee.

On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for certiorari
and prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency docket fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is proper.

HELD:   

No, it is not proper. 

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners
for extraordinary writs.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious
time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve issues because the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to certiorari unless
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications,
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

Asian trading corp v CA

Facts: PBC filed a collections suit (2.7M but was amended to 8M) against Asian trade corp. After the
presentation of evidence of both parties, the latter filed a demurrer but was then denied and the RTC
rendered judgment in favor of the bank. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the SC.

Issue: w/n the petition is proper.

Held:

Well entrenched to the point of being elementary is the doctrine that certiorari will only lie if there is
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

. . . a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when 'there is no
appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.' Certiorari cannot be
allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, . . . .
(Bernardo v. The Hon. Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413, 426)
. . . Certiorari will only lie if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law . . . . (Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
268 SCRA 666)

. . . the special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. . . . or (Tan v. Court of
Appeals, 275 SCRA 568)

. . . before certiorari under Rule 65 can be availed of, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed. .
. . (Centro Escolar University v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 276 SCRA 699)

Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is an adequate remedy; hence certiorari proceedings, as in this
case, will not prosper. . . .

. . . Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent. (Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission,
278 SCRA 632)