Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo Manese and/or Princess Cruise Lines Ltd. vs.

Cynthia De Jesus
G.R. No. 203943; August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeal’s decision which
upheld the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiter’s finding that
the cardio-vascular disease of respondent Cynthia De Jesus’ husband was work-related.
Petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (MMC), the local manning agent of Princess
co-petitioner Cruise Lines Ltd., hired Bernardine De Jesus as an accommodation supervisor for
the cruise ship Regal Princess. During his employment, Bernardine allegedly reported chest pains
but he was not provided medical attention. Upon repatriation, his request for medical attention was
likewise denied. Two months after such disembarkation, Bernardine was diagnosed with aortic
aneurysm and later died. MMC denied Cynthia’s claim.
Petitioners argued that that Bernardine's death was not compensable under the POEA
SEC and that it cannot be presumed that the cause of his death was work-related. Meanwhile,
Cynthia contended that the findings of the administrative tribunals are supported by substantial
evidence. She maintained that her husband’s condition was suffered while on board the vessel
and that he reported his condition during the term of his employment contract.
ISSUE:
Was the aortic aneurysm suffered during the term of the contract so as to make the illness
compensable?
RULING:
Yes. The condition of the seafarer was suffered during the term of the contract.
Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC requires that for a seafarer to be entitled to death benefits,
he must have suffered a work-related death during the term of his contract. However, Section 32-
A of the POEA-SEC acknowledges the possibility of "compensation for the death of the seafarer
occurring after the employment contract on account of a work-related illness" as long as the
following conditions are met: (1) The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; (2)
The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) The
disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to
contract it; (4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Both labor tribunals found that Bernardine first experienced chest pains while he was still
onboard the cruise ship, i.e., during the term of his employment contract. It was likewise
established that while Bernardine requested medical attention when he started to feel ill and upon
his repatriation, his requests were repeatedly ignored. The Court agreed with the fact that the
seaman's work exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather also helped trigger
the onset of his disease. The Court agreed that the complainant has clearly established that her
husband's condition was suffered while he was on board the vessel and during the term of his
employment contract, the resulting death was compensable.
Thus, the aortic aneurysm is suffered during the term of the contract and is a compensable
illness.
24 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN SHOULD ARRIVE AT A DEFINITE
ASSESSMENT
OF FITNESS TO WORK OR PERMANENT DISABILITY WITHIN 120 OR 240 DAYS,
AS
THE CASE MAY BE
Desiderio C. Cutanda vs. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc, and/or Marlow Navigation Co. LTD.
and/or Antonio Galvez Jr.
G.R. No. 219123; September 11, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to set aside the decision of the
CA which reversed the decisions of the NLRC and the LA in granting petitioner Desiderio C.
Cutanda’s permanent total disability benefits. In this case, Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. (MNPI)
hired Cutanda to work as a Key Able Seaman on board MV Malte Rambow.
While performing his duties, Cutanda had an accident wherein his left index and middle
fingers were severely injured when the tug’s rope crushed his left hand. He was immediately
repatriated and examined by the company-designated physician who recommended him for
physical therapy. Cutanda underwent physical therapy sessions. However, on February 11, 2013,
while complainant finished only 4 sessions out of the 12 sessions prescribed, the company
designated physician already assessed complainant's disability as Grade 10. Meanwhile, the other
attending physician, who is also company-designated, issued another Medical Certificate on April
2, 2013 or on the 174th day, stating that complainant is "not fit to work" as of that date, and
recommended that he undergo rehabilitation treatment for another three (3) to six (6) months.
Petitioner alleged that his injuries rendered him unfit to return to work for more than 240
days and that his continuing inability to pursue his usual work and earn therefrom constitutes
permanent and total disability. Respondents contended that the finding of the company-designated
physician as to the temporary nature of the disability should prevail.
ISSUE:
Was the period of temporary disability beyond the allowable period of 120 or 240 days so
as to warrant the award of total and permanent disability?
RULING:
Yes. The period of disability exceeds the allowable maximum period of 240 days.
Under Section 3225 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified
as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities
with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer
from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the
need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently
disabled. Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite
assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240
days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the
seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
In this case, although petitioner has been assessed to fall under the category of Grade 10
within the period provided by law, such was not a definite assessment as to his fitness to work as
shown by the medical certificates issued by the company-designated physician and the
coordinating physician and surgeon. From such findings, it appears that petitioner had been unfit
to work way beyond the 240 days provided by law. Hence, petitioner can be legally considered as
totally and permanently disabled.
| 25COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
MERE LAPSE OF THE 120-DAY PERIOD ITSELF DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
WARRANT THE PAYMENT OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Noel N. Orbeta
G.R. 211111; September 25, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on Certiorari assails the CA decision which modified the LA award
of temporary disability benefits for respondent Noel N. Orbeta to permanent disability benefits.
Petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (CF Sharp), acting for its principal Gulf Energy
Maritime, hired Orbeta as able seaman on board M/T Gulf Coral.
While on duty closing the vessel’s air valve, Orbeta slipped and fell on his back. Since he
experienced pain in his abdomen and had difficulty urinating, he was examined and thereafter
diagnosed with acute lumbago. Accordingly, he was repatriated. Upon arrival on February 8, 2010,
a company-designated physician examined him. After a series of treatment, on June 16, 2010 or
after 126 days, Orbeta was temporarily diagnosed with lumbosacral muscular spasm, for which
the company-designated physician gave a Grade 10 partial disability rating and scheduled him to
undergo a bone scan. Instead of following the said recommendation, Orbeta consulted an
independent doctor who declared him to be unfit for sea duty. Orbeta then filed the claim for
permanent total disability benefits.
Petitioner argued that inability to work for more than 120 days is not tantamount to
permanent total disability and that Orbeta is not entitled to his claim because there was no
declaration with respect to his fitness to work or permanent total disability, as he required further
medical treatment and yet he abandoned the same. Meanwhile, Orbeta contended that since there
was no declaration of fitness for work after more than 120 days of treatment, he is entitled to
permanent disability claim.
ISSUE:
Does the lapse of 120 days automatically entitle to total permanent disability?
RULING:
No. The mere lapse of the 120-day period itself does not automatically warrant the payment
of permanent total disability benefits.
An employee's disability becomes permanent and total only: (1) when so declared by the
company-designated physician, or (2) in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or
permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment periods, while the
employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such
period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the
employee's fitness or disability. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration
is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability
period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.
In this case, petitioners are correct in arguing that respondent abandoned treatment, as
under the law and the POEA contract, the company physician is given up to 240 days to treat him.
Consequently, respondent is entitled only to compensation equivalent to or commensurate with
his injury, and not permanent total disability benefits.
26 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN’S ASSESSMENT PREVAILS OVER THE
SECOND
OPINION IF THE LATTER IS NOT DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROCEDURE
Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd. and/or
Ramon S. Herrera vs. William David P. Ocangas
G.R. No. 226766; September 27, 2017
Reyes, Jr. J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision reversing
the NLRC decision and reinstating the LA’s award of full disability benefits in favor of respondent
William Ocangas (Ocangas).
Ocangas was hired as a pumpman by petitioner MOL Tankship Management, through its
local manning agency – petitioner Oriental Shipmanagement. Prior to his employment, Ocangas
underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit to work. He was
deployed on November 29, 2011. On July 12, 2012, while on duty, Ocangas became ill as a result
of him having to lift the cover of the ballast pump manually. However, his condition did not improve
despite medical attention. Thus, he was recommended to be repatriated to obtain further medical
treatment. Upon his repatriation on September 4, 2012, he immediately reported to petitioner and
was referred to the company’s accredited physician. On January 23, 2013, he was declared by Dr.
Chuasuan, the company-designated physician, to have reached the maximum medical cure with
Grade 11 disability impediment.
Ocangas filed a complaint for recovery of permanent total disability benefits against
petitioner. On March 25, 2013, he sought the medical opinion of Dr. Cadag who declared him no
longer fit for sea duty or for any work abroad seafaring given his medical condition. On the part of
the petitioners, they alleged that the findings of the company-designated physician should be the
only primary consideration in the assessment of the illness or injury of the seafarer.
ISSUE:
Does the assessment of Dr. Chuasuan prevails over that of Dr. Cadag in the determination
of the entitlement of Ocangan to payment of disability benefits?
RULING:
Yes. The assessment of Dr. Chuasuan prevails over that of Dr. Cadag with respect to the
determination of entitlement to payment of disability benefits.
A seafarer is conclusively presumed to be totally and permanently disabled when the
company-designated physician fails to make a declaration regarding the seafarer's fitness or status
of disability within the specified 120 or 240-day periods. If the physician appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the parties may agree to
jointly refer the matter to a third doctor, whose decision shall be binding between them. Failure to
follow this procedure is fatal and renders conclusive disability rating issued by the company
designated physician.
In this case, instead of expressing his disagreement to the findings of the company
designated physician, Ocangas filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits. It took
respondent two (2) months after the filing of the complaint before he submitted himself for
examination by a physician of his choice.
Hence, for failure to follow the correct procedure, the certification of the company
designated physician is the final determination that must prevail.
| 27COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
EMPLOYER IS NOT BOUND TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS UNDER POEA-SEC IN
CASE OF
DEATH ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE
TSM Shipping (Phils.), Inc., and MST Marine Services Phils., Inc. vs. Shirley G. De Chavez
G.R. No. 198225; September 27, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA decision which reversed both
the NLRC and LA decision and granted the complaint for payment of death benefits filed by
respondent Shirley De Chavez.
On August 23, 2005, petitioners hired Ryan De Chavez as chief cook on board the oil
tanker vessel Haruna Express for a period of nine months. However, on February 26, 2005, De
Chavez was found dead inside his cabin bathroom hanging by the shower cord and covered with
blood. De Chavez’s surviving spouse, herein respondent, filed a complaint for death benefits.
Respondent alleged that her husband did not commit suicide considering that he even
submitted himself to a medical checkup prior to his death and that no suicide note was found. She
claimed that since De Chavez died during the effectivity of his contract and while on board the
vessel, his heirs are entitled to death benefits. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that
respondent is not entitled to death benefits under the POEA-SEC because it was uniformly found
by authorities that the cause of De Chavez’ death is suicide and that under the POEA-SEC, a
seafarer’s death during the term of his contract is not automatically compensable if the same was
due to his willful act.
ISSUE:
Can petitioners be liable for the payment of death benefits to the heirs when the cause of
death of the deceased employee was due to a willful act of the latter?
RULING:
No, the petitioners are not liable to pay the death benefits to respondent for the death of
De Chavez.
The employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it
is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, as provided
under Section 20 (D) of POEA-SEC, the employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully
prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or
willful act.
Given the evidence on record, the SC held that De Chavez’s death was due to his own
deliberate act and deed. This was duly proved by Ulsan City Hospital’s medical certificate of death
and the INTECO’s report. In the absence, as in this case, of incontrovertible proof to the contrary,
it must be presumed that the persons who prepared these documents acted in good faith to attest
to the facts they saw or had personal knowledge of, and that these documents likewise spoke the
truth.
Therefore, petitioners are not liable to pay the death benefits to respondent for the death
of De Chavez.
28 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
FAILURE OF THE COMPANY-PHYSICIAN TO ISSUE EITHER A FIT-TO-WORK
CERTIFICATION OR A FINAL DISABILITY RATING WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED
PERIODS RENDERS THE DISABILITY TO BE TOTAL AND PERMANENT
Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Eduardo J. Godinez
G.R. No. 206826 & G.R. No. 206828; October 2, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the parties' respective Motions for Reconsideration.
Godinez was employed as a deck cadet during his period of employment with Columbian
Ship Management. He was employed at a young age of twenty (20). He had undergone medical
tests the results of which are all cleared. However, during the period of employment, he
experienced and suffered maltreatment from his superior due to his failure to rouse from sleep. On
the subsequent days, Godinez was alleged to have been acting strange which made the other
crews and officers uneasy. Godinez was subjected to psychological exam for evaluation and
treatment. The initial report which was unsigned states that Godinez admitted that he had
experienced insomnia and paranoia when he was 15 years old. His other psychological test
however showed that he is suffering from bipolar disorder, but he was later considered mentally fit
for work.
With the latest result on hand, he asked Columbia if he can now work again but his request
was denied. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) with a prayer that disability
benefits be paid to him. Petitioner argued that Godinez concealed the fact that he had experienced
paranoia. The LA granted the petition of Godinez. This was affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Commission. On appeal, the CA ruled that Godinez is entitled to the disability benefits
since his sickness existed during the term of the employment contract. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Godinez’s bipolar disorder work-related thus entitling him to disability benefits?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent’s illness is work-related and thus he should be properly compensated
with disability benefits.
The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the
seafarer's fitness to work or to determine the degree of his disability within a period of 120 or 240
days from repatriation, as the case may be. If after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer
remains incapacitated and the company-designated physician has not yet declared him fit to work
or determined his degree of disability, the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled.
The conditions of work, the elements, the environment, the fear and loneliness, the strange
surroundings, and the unnecessary cruelty and lack of understanding and compassion of his
immediate superior, the weight of all these was too much for the young man to handle. To
complicate matters, Godinez was never given medical care onboard as soon as he became ill. The
Court concludes that Godinez's grave illness was directly caused by the unprofessional and
inhumane treatment, as well as the physical, psychological, and mental abuse inflicted upon him
by his superiors, aggravated by the latter's failure and refusal to provide timely medical and/or
professional intervention, and their neglect and indifference to his condition even as it was
deteriorating before their very eyes. The Court finds as well that Godinez suffered permanent total
disability, as there has been no definite medical assessment by the company-designated physician
regarding his condition - even up to now.
| 29COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
REFERRAL TO A THIRD DOCTOR IS MANDATORY AND THE FAILURE TO DO SO
WOULD RENDER THE ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED
PHYSICIAN
FINAL AND BINDING
Dohle Philman Manning Agency, Inc., Dohle Limited, et. al. vs. Julius Rey Quinal Doble
G.R. No. 223730; October 4, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners Dohle Philman Manning
Agency, Inc. challenged the CA decision, NLRC affirming with modification NLRC’s Resolution,
which affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter’s (LA) Decision finding Respondent Julius Rey Quinal
Doble
entitled to disability compensation.
The respondent is a Filipino seafarer with employment under the petitioner. According to
the respondent, while on board the vessel, he "twisted his right foot and he immediately fell on the
floor." A few months after, respondent alleged another incident. As a result, he was repatriated
back to the Philippines. Upon his arrival, medical tests were conducted and he was eventually
diagnosed with "Right ankle sprain; Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, Bilateral; and Osteochondral Defect
Femoral Trochlea, Right Knee." He thereafter, underwent surgery and physical therapy.
Eventually, after treatment, the company-designated physician declared him fit to work. Unsatisfied
by the diagnosis, respondent consulted his own medical expert. His own doctor issued a medical
report, stating that he is now permanently disabled and is therefore now permanently unfit to
resume his usual sea duties. In light of this, respondent insisted on his disability benefits. The
petitioners refused. Thus, he filed a claim for disability compensation.
ISSUE:
Does the failure to refer to a third doctor render the findings of the company-designated
physician as to the fitness to work final and binding?
RULING:
Yes. For his failure to refer to a third doctor, the assessment of the company-designated
physician is final and binding. It is well settled that while it is the company-designated physician
who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability during the term of the latter's
employment, the same is not automatically final, binding or conclusive. Should the seafarer
disagree with the assessment, he may dispute the same by seasonably exercising his prerogative
to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. In case of disagreement between the
findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, the employer
and the seafarer may agree jointly to refer the latter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final
and binding on them. Also, it was settled that the referral to a third doctor is mandatory, and should
the seafarer fail to abide by this method, the assessment of the company designated physician
shall be final and binding. Sec. 20 (B) of POEA-SEC provides that if a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer
and the seafarer and the third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. This,
however, was disregarded by the courts in their decision.
In the case at hand, there is no question that the company-designated physician and the
respondent's personal physician had two very different assessment of the respondent's illness.
However, respondent herein did not demand for his re-examination by a third doctor, and instead
opted to initiate the instant case. This is a fatal defect that militates against his claims and has the
effect of consolidating the finding of the company designated physician as final and binding.
Hence, respondent, here, is considered fit to work and not entitled to any disability benefits.
30 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
FOR AN ILLNESS OR INJURY TO BE COMPENSABLE, IT MUST BE WORK-
RELATED
AND MUST HAVE EXISTED DURING THE TERM OF THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT
OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc. vs. Aris Wendel R. Monje
G.R. No. 214059; October 11, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Challenged before this Court via this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals. OSG Ship Management (UK) Ltd. (OSG
UK), through its manning agent in the Philippines, OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc. (OSG
Manila) employed respondent Monje as an ordinary-seaman. Respondent felt a pain on his left
knee while on board the vessel which prompted him to seek medical advice in the United States.
He was later repatriated in the Philippines for further treatment. Dr. Sugay found that the cause of
his left knee pain is unknown but advised that Monje should undergo knee surgery.
On Dr. Sugay’s report, it was stated that the illness was not work-related. Monte, on the
basis of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ticman that his illness rendered him permanently
disabled and unfit to work as a seaman in any capacity, claims for the payment of the total and
permanent disability benefits. The Labor Arbiter issued a ruling in favor of Monje. This was
reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated
the award of the LA.
ISSUE:
Is the left knee pain suffered by respondent work-related?
RULING:
No. The illness suffered by respondent is not work-related.
For an illness or injury to be compensable, Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, now
Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, requires that two elements must concur: (1) the injury or
illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the
term of the seafarer’s employment contract. For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the
POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor of the seafarer that these illnesses are work
related. To overcome this disputable presumption, sufficient evidence must be presented.
In the pleadings submitted, the petitioners presented the letter of Dr. Sugay, the company
designated physician, who opined that the respondent’s condition is not work-related. It must also
be remembered that Dr. Sugay was the attending physician who provided the medical history of
the respondent, and who conducted the medical examination of and provided the diagnosis for the
respondent from the moment that the latter was repatriated back to the Philippines.
Further, De Leon vs. Maunlad Trans, Inc. stated that in order to establish compensability
of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient — direct causal
relation is not required. Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.
To be sure, the assertions made by the respondent in his pleadings are neither backed by
the expert testimony/affidavit of any competent physician, nor are they supported by any evidence
or testimony other than the mere allegations of the respondent.
Hence, the left knee pain suffered by respondent is not work-related
| 31COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
UNDER THE POEA-SEC, FAILURE OF THE COMPANY-PHYSICIAN TO ISSUE
EITHER A
FIT-TO-WORK CERTIFICATION OR A FINAL DISABILITY RATING WITHIN THE
PRESCRIBED PERIODS, RENDERS DISABILITY TO BE TOTAL AND PERMANENT
Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc. vs. Macario Mabunay, Jr.
G.R. No. 206113; November 6, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari seeking to reverse the CA’s ruling on the liability
of the petitioner, Sharpe Sea, agent for CF Sharp & Company which hired Mabunay, respondent,
as an oiler. During the period of employment, Mabunay hit his back on the purifier while cleaning
the second floor of the engine room. This caused him pain in his back and numbness in his legs.
He continued working until he was allowed to have a medical checkup where he was declared unfit
to work. Dr. Cruz, a company-designated physician also reported that Mabunay is unfit for work.
He was confined and underwent surgery. Mabunay is now filing a complaint for the collection of
his medical expenses and his disability benefits.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted disability benefits in favor of Mabunay for being unfit for
sea duty as found by the company-physician, but the claim for medical expenses was dismissed.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision by deleting the award for attorney’s fees. Petitioner argues that respondent’s disability
rating of Grade 8 does not entitle him to any benefits. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
reinstated the awards of the LA with modifications. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is there sufficient evidence presented to warrant the award of disability benefits?
RULING:
Yes. There had been sufficient evidence presented to warrant the award of disability
benefits.
As part of a seafarer’s deployment for overseas work, he and the vessel owner or its
representative local manning agency are required to execute the POEA-SEC. Containing the
standard terms and conditions of seafarers’ employment, the POEA-SEC is deemed included in
their contracts of employment in foreign ocean-going vessels. Section 20(B) thereof provides the
two (2) requisites of compensable disability: a.) work-related injury or illness b) must be suffered
during the term of his contract. It is not disputed that respondent encountered an accident a day
after he boarded M/V Larisa.
Manning and shipping companies are always in a better position than their employees in
accessing, preserving, and presenting their evidence. In this case, despite the uncontested
disability of the employee, he presented all his evidence, even going to the extent of consulting
two other doctors after the company-designated physicians refused to provide a disability rating.
Furthermore, with the company-designated physicians’ failure to issue either a fit-to-work
certification or a final disability rating within the prescribed periods, respondent’s disability was
rightfully deemed to be total and permanent. Clearly, Dr. Cruz, Dr. Castillo, or any other company
designated physician failed to issue respondent either a fit-to-work certification or a final disability
rating after his operation and before the lapse of 240 days from his repatriation. Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err when it considered respondent to be permanently and totally disabled.
32 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
FOR AN EMPLOYEE TO BE ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS, THE ILLNESS
OR
INJURY MUST BE LISTED AS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE; OTHERWISE,
THERE
MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS CONTRACTED DUE TO
WORKING
CONDITIONS
Government Service Insurance System vs. Simeon Tañedo, Jr.
G.R. No.193500; November 20, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which reversed the decision rendered by the Employee’s Compensation
Commission (ECC).
Petitioner Tañedo was a public servant who worked as records officer at the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). His duties include the encoding, printing, filing and delivering statements
and letters. Tañedo, before retiring, was found to have varicosities or varicose veins in his legs.
Convinced that his ailment was caused by his employment with the BIR, he filed for
compensation benefits before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). This was denied
by GSIS which contends that varicosities is not considered an occupational disease. On appeal,
ECC affirmed GSIS’ denial of Tañedo’s claim contending that for it to be compensable, the ailment
must be enlisted as an occupation disease otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the ailment is increased by the nature of employment. CA granted the appeal and set
aside the decision of ECC.
ISSUE:
Was the respondent’s varicosities work-related?
RULING:
No. The CA erred in ruling that the varicosities are work-related.
Compensable sickness as defined by PD. 626, is any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the commission or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.
It is undisputed that Tañedo’s medical condition is not among the occupational diseases
listed. Therefore, he is required by statute to prove that the risk of contracting the said ailment was
increased by the nature of his working conditions. The CA was correct in ruling that what the law
requires is reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation and that the degree of proof
required under PD. 626 is merely substantial evidence. In this case, Tañedo failed to provide
substantial evidence to prove that his medical condition was caused by his work at the BIR. He
was unable to present any competent medical history that would demonstrate his claim of a
reasonable connection between his work and his medical ailment.
Thus, Tañedo is not entitled to compensation as his condition is not work-related and he
failed to prove that the nature of his work increased the risk of contracting the same.
| 33COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
34 |
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT CONTAINING MORE
BENEFICIAL
CONDITIONS IN FAVOR OF THE LABORER MUST ALWAYS PREVAIL
Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. and AP Moller Singapore PTE., Ltd. vs. Rosemary G. Malicse
(Legal Wife of deceased seafarer Efren b. Malicse, representing the latter’s estate)
G.R. No. 200576; November 20, 2017
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari, petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing Inc, (MAERSK)
seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) awarding death benefits, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Rosemary Malicse as the beneficiary of the
deceased Efren Malicse.
After being declared as fit to work, Efren Malicse, was employed as a seaman by petitioner
Ap Moller Singapore through its agency MAERSK. Efren was employed under a duly approved
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
(POEA-SEC) with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered between his employer Ap
Moller and the Singapore Organization of Seamen, a labor union. During his employment,
Efren died due to multiple organ failure secondary to septicemia or blood poisoning or infection.
MAERKS paid Rosemary USD1,000 for burial and as for death benefits, she was offered
USD40,000 which is half of the amount provided by the CBA.
Rosemary then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for money claims. The LA
sustained the claim of Rosemary that since the labor union of Efren was an affiliate of the
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), the agreement of ITF must prevail over the CBA
and POEA-SEC which grants more favorable death benefits regardless of the seafarer’s cause of
death. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision on the applicability of the ITF agreement. MAERSK responded
that the death of Efren was not caused by work-related illness therefore, Rosemary is not entitled
to death benefits. CA on the other hand affirmed both rulings of LA and NLRC and ruled that
Maersk failed to show that they were not liable to pay such benefits.
ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in granting the death benefits under the ITF agreement over the
benefits provided under the CBA and POEA-SEC?
RULING:
No. The court finds grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for awarding the death
benefits provided by the ITF agreement without any proof of its applicability. The POEA-SEC and
the CBA bind seafarers and their employers as well as the ITF agreement which also forms part
of the covenants of the parties to each other. Since none of the evidence presented show that the
labor union is affiliated with the ITF and that petitioners entered into any special agreement, the
court must apply the terms under the POEA-SEC. However, as stated under Legal Heirs of Deauna
vs. Fil Star Maritime Corp, special clauses on CBA must prevail over the standard terms and
benefits formulated by the POEA in its contract.
A contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions
must be endeavored in favor of the laborer. Comparing the provisions on the CBA and POEA
SEC, the CBA provides higher death benefits of USD80,000 as long as the cause of the death
must be due to an accident; otherwise his beneficiary would only receive USD40,000. Such amount
is lower than the benefit granted by the POEA-SEC, which is USD 50,000 but there must first be
substantial evidence that the seafarer died of a work-related illness.
Thus, Rosemary is entitled to the more beneficial provision of the POEA-SEC if Efren’s
death is proven to be work related, otherwise, the CBA’s provision on the grant of USD40,000
regardless of the cause of death will apply.COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS ONLY WHEN THE
SEAFARER
SUFFERS FROM A WORK-RELATED ILLNESS OR INJURY DURING THE TERM OF
CONTRACT
Teodoro V. Ventura, Jr. vs. Crewtech Ship Management Philippines, Inc, Rizzo – Bottiglieri –
De Carlini Armatori S.P.A and Angelita Ancheta
G.R. No.225995; November 20, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and to reinstate the Labor Arbiter’s (LA) decision
which dismissed the complaint for total and permanent disability benefits filed by the Petitioner
Teodoro Ventura (Ventura). Ventura was employed by Crewtech for its principal Rizzo as a chief
cook on board and after undergoing the required pre-employment examination (PEME) where he
was declared fit for sea duty.
Ventura, while employed, was diagnosed by a specialist with prostatitis and decrlared unfit
for duty He disclosed that he has a history of prostatitis that occurred three years ago, was treated
for kidney stones and was not under any regular medicine. Ventura was then medically repatriated
and referred to the company-designated physician who reiterated that such illnesses were not
work-related and subjected him to further evaluation and treatment. After the 240-day period
expired and because his illnesses remained unresolved, he went to see an independent physician
who declared him to be permanently disabled.
Ventura filed a complaint for total permanent disability benefit and other money claims
against Crewtech before the NLRC. For their part, respondents contend that Ventura’s illnesses
were not work-related and that he was also guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when he failed
to disclose his previous medical history and therefore disqualified under the POEA’s standard
employment contract (POEA-SEC). LA dismissed the complaint ruling that the petitioner failed to
prove that his illnesses were work related. NLRC reversed the decision ruling that such illnesses
were work-related and that there was no concealment because Crewtech was well aware of his
medical history. CA reversed NLRC and agreed with the LA that he failed to prove that his illnesses
were work-related.
ISSUE:
Were the petitioner’s illnesses work-related and thus compensable?
RULING:
No. They are not work-related.
The entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed
by medical findings, the law, and the parties’ contract. In this case, the POEA-SEC governs. It
states that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work
related injury or illness during the term of his contract. In this regard, it also mandates the seafarer
to disclose all his pre-existing illnesses in his PEME, failing which shall disqualify him from
receiving the same. Also, the disease in question must be one of those listed as an occupational
disease; otherwise, such diseases are disputably presumed as work related. However, the
presumption does not necessarily result in an automatic grant of compensation.
In this case, the court ruled that there was no concealment as respondents were well aware
of petitioner's past medical history given that the company-designated physician was able to
provide a detailed medical history of the latter. However, there was also no evidence presented to
establish how and why petitioner’s working condition increased the risk of contracting his illness.
CA correctly ruled that petitioner failed to prove that his illnesses were work-related or at
least have aggravated them and hence, not compensable.
| 35COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
EMPLOYEE IS NOT GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION WHEN THE EMPLOYER
HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF THE EMPLOYEE’S MEDICAL HISTORY
REEMPLOYED HIM
TO WORK FOR SEVERAL MORE YEARS
Almario F. Leoncio vs. MST Marine Services, Inc./ Artemio Serafico and/or Thome Shop
Management PTE., Ltd.
G.R. No.230357; December 6, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Almario F.
Leoncio (Leoncio) seeks the reversal of decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) which
denied Leoncio’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.
Leoncio was repeatedly hired by respondent MST Marine Services (MST Marine) for its
principals. In 2001, Leoncio was repatriated to be treated for his Coronary Artery
Disease/Hypertensive Cardio Vascular Disease (CAD/HCVD). He was provided with sickness
allowance and was in the care and management of the company designated physician. He was
eventually declared to be fit for work and was once again employed by MST Marina as Chief Cook.
He underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty.
However, while on board, he was admitted to the hospital. He was diagnosed with “unstable
angina,” and he underwent a procedure. He was again repatriated to the Philippines while
undergoing treatment. MTS Marine found out that Leoncio underwent stenting procedure. Because
of this, MST Marine cut off the medical and sickness allowances due to failure to declare during
the PEME that he underwent such procedure.
Leoncio filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits against the private
respondents. LA ruled in favor of Leoncio stating that MST Marine was aware of the existence of
Leoncio’s disease since 2001 but nonetheless reemployed and redeployed him to work. NLRC set
aside LA’s ruling and ruled that Leoncio’s concealment of the stenting procedure during the PEME
is a misrepresentation that bars his right to any compensation. CA sustained NLRC.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner guilty of misrepresentation which bars his recovery of total disability
benefits?
RULING:
No. He is not guilty of misrepresentation.
The resolution of the case pivots on the construction of the phrase "illness or condition" in
Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which provides that states “A seafarer who knowingly
conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME)
shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits.
This is likewise a just cause for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate
administrative sanctions.”
He cannot be considered to have concealed the same during his PEME in 2014. The so
called misrepresentation ascribed to the petitioner is more imaginary than real. The Court ruled
that as it is, the stenting procedure undergone by Leoncio on his arteries is nothing more than an
attempt to discontinue the steady progression of his illness or condition-his CAD/HCVD, which was
already known by his employers. Simply, a stenting procedure is the "placement of a small wire
mesh tube called a stent to help prop the artery open and decrease its chance of narrowing again."
The procedure was intended to improve his health condition. Surely, the non-disclosure thereof
does not diminish MST Marine's knowledge of the "illness or condition" he had already been
diagnosed with since 2001. Undeniably then, Leoncio's failure to reveal the said procedure does
not amount to a concealment of a pre-existing "illness or condition" that can bar his claim for
disability benefit and compensation.
Hence, there is no misrepresentation or concealment on the part of petitioner.
36 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIAL REQUIREMENTS IS
NECESSARY FOR ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS
Veronico O. Tagud vs. BSM Crew Service Centre Phils., Inc.
G.R. No. 219370; December 06, 2017
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Court of Appeals (CA),
petitioner Veronico Tagud (Tagud) assails the decision of the CA, affirming the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing petitioner’s claim for disability benefits
and other monetary awards.
Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (Bernhard), a foreign shipping company doing
business in the Philippines through its local manning agent, respondent BSM Crew Service Centre
Philippines, Inc. (BSM) hired petitioner Tagud as Able-Bodied Seaman. Respondents rehired
Tagud as Able-Bodied Seaman for the Kota Pemimpin vessel under a contract approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) wherein Tagud passed the required
preemployment medical examination. While on duty, Tagud lost his balance due to the sudden
tilting of the ship and his right elbow region crashed against a hard object. As a result, he lost
sensation and strength on his upper right extremity. He was repatriated to Manila. With an illness
which limits the flexion of his upper right extremity, Tagud was no longer employed in any gainful
occupation.
Tagud claimed that as a result of his work-related illness which he contracted during the
term of his employment; he should be entitled to permanent disability benefits. Respondents
denied any liability to Tagud alleging that he was repatriated to the Philippines on a “finished
contract” as stated in Tagud’s disembarkation report and failed to report to his manning agency.
ISSUE:
Is failure to undergo post-employment medical examination within the three-day mandatory
reporting period a ground for denial of permanent disability benefits?
RULING:
Yes. The failure to undergo post-employment medical examination within the three (3)-day
mandatory reporting period is a ground for denial of permanent disability benefits.
In Heirs of the Late Delfin Dela Cruz v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., we held that
the three-day mandatory reporting requirement must be strictly observed since within three days
from repatriation, it would be fairly manageable for the company-designated physician to identify
whether the illness or injury was contracted during the term of the seafarer's employment or that
his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. To ignore the rule would set a
precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to seafarers claiming
disability benefits that are not work-related or which arose after the employment.
One who claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should not only comply with
the procedural requirements of law but must also establish his right to the benefits by substantial
evidence. The burden, therefore, rests on Tagud to show that he suffered or contracted his illness
or injury, while still employed as a seafarer, which resulted in his permanent disability. Tagud
disembarked in Singapore and was repatriated to Manila. He alleged that he reported to his
manning agency but was not given any assistance or referred to a company-designated physician.
However, Tagud did not present any evidence to prove that he tried to submit himself to a
company- designated physician within three working days upon his return. Tagud did not also
present any letter that he was physically incapacitated to see the company designated physician
in order to be exempted from the rule.
Tagud failed to show that his illness or injury was work-related. Hence, the denial of the
permanent disability benefits is proper.