Bhagavad Gītā As Duty and Virtue Ethics

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BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ AS DUTY
AND VIRTUE ETHICS
Some Reflections
Bina Gupta
ABSTRACT
The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well-known and
much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gıtā, ¯ in the context of the
Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the
materials published on the Gıt ¯ ā make much of its conception of duty; how-
ever, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the Gıt ¯ ā.
The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of
virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions of duty
and virtue in the Gıt¯ ā. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty
and virtue coexist in the Gıt¯ ā, and (2) the G ı̄tā accords virtue an important
place.
KEY WORDS: Hindu ethics, Hindu duty ethics, Hindu virtue ethics, the
Bhagavad Gı̄tā
ETHICS AS A DISCIPLINE IN THE WESTERN TRADITION since Kant has primar-

ily been concerned with the question, what ought I to do? There are two
components to this question: (1) ought and (2) action. This way of relating
“ought” to “doing” has occupied the attention of moral philosophers, for
example, J. S. Mill, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and H. A. Prichard—some
of the pioneers of contemporary moral philosophy—for the last two cen-
turies. Moral philosophers such as these sought to discover a standard
or criterion that enables human beings to determine what they as moral
agents ought or ought not do and thus their theories make up what is
known as “duty ethics,” the abstract theorizing intended to formulate
ethical guidelines for human action. However, not all philosophers agree
that the idea of what we ought or ought not do completely exhausts the
field of ethics, because there is “virtue ethics,” that is, “ought to be” which
is not included in the notion of “ought to do.” In other words, there is a
distinction between the kind of person one ought to be and the kinds of
actions one ought to perform, such that “ought to be” and “ought to do”
are not co-extensive. As a result, in recent times an increasing number
of moral philosophers have changed their focus from what one “ought to
do” to what one “ought to be” (Anscombe 1997, 26–44).
JRE 34.3:373–395. 
C 2006 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
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A 2006, 34, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary-wiley.ez95.periodicos.capes.gov.br By PUC/SP - Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Sao Paulo- on [13/11/2021]. Re-use and distribution is strictly not permitted, except for O
374 Journal of Religious Ethics
The fundamental concept in virtue ethics is human “flourishing” and

a plurality of virtues constitute the various forms of this flourishing
or well-being. Virtues are manifested in certain specific actions, which
provide the norm (not as an imperative demand but rather as a pre-
scription) for human beings, provided that we want to flourish rather
than live an unfulfilled life. Thus, virtue ethics emerges as a main al-
ternative to duty ethics. Proponents of virtue ethics argue that it solves
difficulties that cannot be resolved by duty ethics, because these latter
theories cannot satisfactorily account for the concrete realities of the
human condition. In the last three decades, a series of articles, essays,
and books have appeared on the subject of virtue. These writings fo-
cus on the nature and traits of a moral person: What kind of trait is
virtue? How is virtue acquired? Do virtues aid in fulfillment of one’s so-
cial role, or one’s telos (purpose), or perhaps both? Is there anything com-
mon among different accounts of virtue? Are virtues good in themselves
or good only as means to an end? Is virtue ethics of the variety one finds
in Aristotle compatible with the sort of duty ethics one finds in Kant and
Mill?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the ethical conceptions of the
most well-known and much discussed Hindu text, The Bhagavad Gıtā, ¯
in light of the above distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics.
I will examine the central ethical conceptions of the Gıt ¯ ā to determine
whether they amount to a duty ethic or a virtue ethic, or a hybrid of
both. The guiding question may be formulated as follows: is the ethical
conception of the Gıt ¯ ā simply concerned with what one ought to do, or
is it also prescriptive with respect to what one ought to be? Anybody
mildly familiar with the ethical conceptions of the Gıt ¯ ā would not doubt
or deny that it accords duty an important place. I will discuss this issue
briefly in the second section of this paper. Most of the materials published
on the Gıt ¯ ā make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no
systematic investigation, to my knowledge, of the notion of virtue in the
Gı̄tā. Thus, it remains to be assessed what place, if any, the Gıt ¯ ā assigns
to virtue ethics, which I discuss in the third section of the paper. However,
before one can meaningfully assess the place of virtues in the Gıt ¯ ā, one
must have a clear understanding of the primary features of virtue ethics.
Therefore, I begin this paper, at the risk of what might appear to be a
digression, with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue
ethics, before undertaking the task at hand, that is, a discussion of the
conceptions of duty and virtue in the Gıtā.
¯ It is my hope that a discussion
of the fundamental characteristics of virtues in the Western context,
keeping in mind Aristotle and MacIntyre, will provide a framework to
assess what place, if any, the Gıtā¯ assigns to virtues.
I am aware that an exposition of virtue, as it has developed in the last
three decades, may not be familiar to many of my readers. The exposition
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Bhagavad Gı̄t ā as Duty and Virtue Ethics 375
presented in the next section is a preliminary account meant for such

readers.
1. Characteristics of a Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is certainly not new, as we find it in Plato, Aristotle,
Thomas Aquinas, and others early in the Western philosophical tradi-
tion. It is difficult to ascertain what one means by labeling a particular
thinker a “virtue ethicist.” Thinkers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Con-
fucius, and the Buddha—who possess widely differing conceptions of
virtue—could all arguably be characterized as virtue ethicists. There-
fore, in this section of the paper I will construct an account of virtue
keeping in mind particularly Aristotle and Alasdair MacIntyre’s theo-
ries of virtue. Although Plato talks about virtues, the first detailed and
systematic account of virtue is found in Aristotle, the main source of
inspiration for virtue ethics in our times.
What is virtue? The American Heritage Dictionary defines virtue as
“the quality of moral excellence, righteousness and responsibility . . . a
specific type of moral excellence or other exemplary quality consid-
ered meritorious; a worthy practice or ideal” (Morris 1978, 1432). The
Dictionary of Philosophy explains the term “virtue” in the following
words: it is “that state of a thing which constitutes its peculiar excel-
lence and enables it to perform its function well . . . . ” It is “in man the
activity of reason and of rationally ordered habits” (Runes 1968, 332).
These definitions make it obvious that the emphasis of virtue is on the
good (or virtuous) character of human beings. Thus, the question be-
comes: what sort of character must one have to be a good philosopher,
a good mother, a good musician, a good teacher, and so on? These may
be termed the virtues or excellences of philosophers, mothers, musicians,
and teachers. Similarly, we can ask what makes one an example of a good
human being—or as Confucius would put it, a “gentleman.” These char-
acteristics would be virtues or excellences of human beings qua human
beings.
Aristotle begins his work on ethics by relating it to his general meta-
physical position. Everything, he argues, has some end in view (Aristotle
1906, Book I, chap. I). This end might be a means to some higher end,
which in turn may be a means to some still higher end, and so on, culmi-
nating in a final end or a highest good. The goodness of a thing consists
in its realizing its form, which is the purpose and the fulfillment of that
thing—for example, the shipbuilder’s aim is to produce a ship. However,
Aristotle introduces a normative element (i.e., a notion of “good”) into
this evaluation of ends; thus, the proper aim of a good shipbuilder is to
produce a good ship. When taken to encompass the human experience,
this notion of “good” introduces the question: what is the good life? If the
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purpose of a shipbuilder qua shipbuilder is to build a good ship, what is

the purpose of a human being qua human being? If we can answer this
question, then we can know what kind of life is the best one for human
beings.
The goal of human life, argues Aristotle, is eudaimonia, often trans-
lated as human “flourishing.” It has to do with living a good life for any
human being. Eudaimonia, the objective state of happiness or flourish-
ing, can be achieved by a person who exercises her faculties in accordance
with reason. The rational part of the soul, however, is not its only part;
it also has an irrational part, the part that includes feelings, passions,
desires, and so on. These two parts must cooperate with each other in
order for a person to realize her end. Aristotle deems the perfect action
of reason “intellectual” virtue or excellence, and the perfect action of the
emotional part of the soul “moral” virtue or excellence, giving rise to the
distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues. The intellec-
tual virtues consist of prudence, that is, excellence in practical reason-
ing, and wisdom, that is, excellence in theoretical reasoning. The moral
virtues, on the other hand, embrace a plurality of more specific virtues,
for example, courage, liberality, temperance, and the like. These virtues
are character traits that are neither determined by nor are contrary to
nature; they are habits, stable dispositions, which can be developed and
improved upon with effort.
Since a virtue, argues Aristotle, is an excellence of a rational person,
the moral virtues must thus be guided and controlled by the rational
attitude, which consists in seeking the mean between excess and defi-
ciency. Thus both indulgence in physical pleasures and ascetic self-denial
are considered extremes, while the virtue of temperance would be the de-
sirable mean between the two. Similarly, courage is a virtue because it
is the mean between bravado and cowardice. Aristotle’s doctrine of the
mean should not be confused with mere moderation. It is not moderation,
but appropriateness—the appropriate response in a given situation. It
is also not a matter of subjective or arbitrary decision; a virtuous per-
son judges everything correctly, providing the standard for things. It is
important to note in this context that Aristotle does not claim that the
principle of the mean has universal application; it does not apply in many
cases, for example, adultery, murder, and the like. Also, the mean is not
the same for every individual and under all circumstances; it is relative
to individuals and determined by reason. Thus according to Aristotle,
“[V]irtue is a disposition or habit, a state of deliberate moral purpose
consisting in a mean which is relative to ourselves, that mean being
determined by reason, or as prudent man would determine it” (Aristotle
1906, Book II, chap. VI).
So, who is a virtuous person? A virtuous person (1) knows what she is
doing; (2) chooses to act for herself; and (3) acts through an expression
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of a stable and mature character. Virtue is something that is acquired,

at least partly, by willpower; it is achieved with effort. To lead a virtuous
life is to fulfill the specific function of a human being qua human be-
ing. Although Aristotle connects the idea of virtue with this function, he
recognizes that a human being is neither virtuous by nature, nor is her
nature contrary to the pursuit of virtue. Cultivation of virtue is a matter
of habituation, just as loss of such excellence results from not continuing
the performance of virtuous acts.
In our own time, Alasdair MacIntyre takes an Aristotelian approach to
the account of virtue in his book After Virtue. He presents his conception
of virtue in three stages: “the concept of a practice, the narrative order of
a single human life, and a moral education” (MacIntyre 1984, 181–225).
He defines virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession and exer-
cise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal
to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achiev-
ing any such goods” (MacIntyre 1984, 191). The focus of MacIntyre’s
work is the whole area of human excellence; it is not simply limited to
moral excellence. “A practice,” argues MacIntyre, “involves standards of
excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods.
To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and
the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to sub-
ject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards
which currently and partially define the practice” (MacIntyre 1984, 190).
Chess playing, for example, is a complex activity that enables its practi-
tioners to develop goods internal to the practice. This is done by seeking
to attain the objective standard of excellence appropriate to the activity
itself. These goods are internal to the practice of the game insofar as they
cannot be gained in any other way except by chess playing (or engaging
in some other game of a similar enough kind). Other goods, for example,
money, fame, and the like, could be gained in many other ways, and are
therefore external to the practice of chess playing itself. External goods
are contingent; they are individual possessions.
In his account of internal versus external goods, MacIntyre explains
how one may tempt a bright young child to learn chess irrespective of
whether the child has any desire to learn it, by offering as a reward for
excellent performance, say, a chocolate candy bar. Initially, the child may
be exclusively motivated by this “external” good (which can be secured by
means other than playing chess), but he will eventually realize the value
of “those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly
particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive
intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a
particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game
of chess demands” (MacIntyre 1984, 188). Such internal goods, argues
MacIntyre, can be realized only by practice and can only be identified
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and evaluated by those well versed in that practice. The achievement

of internal goods results in the well-being of the whole community that
participates in that practice. MacIntyre’s point is as follows: it might well
be the case that we take up a given practice seeking to gain some external
good, but we do not become true practitioners until the realization of
internal goods becomes an end in itself. In other words, a person who
learns to play chess for money or fame is neither a true chess player nor
understands the game in a genuine sense.
For MacIntyre, virtue is a learned quality of human beings neces-
sary to achieve any goods internal to a practice. He argues: “We have to
learn to recognize what is due to whom [justice]; we have to be prepared
to take whatever self-engendering risks are demanded along the way
[courage]; and we have to listen carefully to what we are told about our
own inadequacies and to reply with the same carefulness for the facts
[truthfulness]” (MacIntyre 1984, 191). This is not to suggest that there
are no evil practices, but rather that for something like chess playing
to exist there must be a certain number of chess players who are just,
courageous, and honest, and that these virtues are also required in the
practice itself. So, argues MacIntyre, such practices are necessary for
the existence of human life, which cannot be learned in the absence of
virtues. Thus virtues are essential to any characteristically human form
of life.
The second stage in MacIntyre’s discussion of virtues is “the narrative
concept of selfhood,” which is characterized by the unity of its biograph-
ical narrative. Individual episodes and decisions derive their meaning
and significance only in the context of this narrative. A person finds her
identity in the context of her relation to other individuals, the culture
in which she is born, and her status within that culture. The required
narrative form for the possession of virtues such as justice, truthfulness,
courage, and the like, is the quest for the human good which begins with
our knowledge of the good internal to practice and which brings with it
the realization that these virtues must be ordered. The process of seek-
ing to rank things that we already know to be good and to order our
lives in the context of such ranking results in a clearer conception not
only of human good but also of our own selves. Accordingly, MacIntyre
construes virtues to be those dispositions “which will not only sustain
practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but
which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good,
by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and dis-
tractions which we encounter and which will furnish us with increasing
self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good” (MacIntyre 1984,
219).
This brings me to the last stage of MacIntyre’s account of virtue, that
is, the concept of a moral tradition. The quest for human good is sought
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from the vantage point of a moral tradition. In ancient Greek society,

for example, the virtue of courage was extolled not only as an individ-
ual virtue but also as a social virtue for the protection of an individual
family and community from an outside attack; so courageous individuals
were awarded kudos, that is, they were rewarded and glorified. What is
considered moral or virtuous is partly shaped by the culture and com-
munity in which one lives. Irrespective of whether one accepts or rejects
certain elements of a tradition, both the acceptance and rejection are set
within the parameters defined by that tradition. One’s quest for human
good is determined by the time and place in which she is born, her race,
the status of her family, and the like. A Christian community, for ex-
ample, might emphasize love more than the Greek courage. In other
words, culture-specific particularities provide the point of departure for
our quest; however, the search for the good—a universal—consists in
moving forward from these particularities. So MacIntyre concludes:
The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those re-
lationships necessary if the variety of goods internal to practices are to
be achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in
which that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or
her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which provide both
practices and individual lives with their necessary and historical context
[MacIntyre 1984, 223].
Notwithstanding the differences among virtue ethicists, there is a

common core of concerns that motivates them and determines their ap-
proach to moral thinking. First, in virtue ethics, the notion of virtue
is (naturally) fundamental. The real reason why one should not make
false promises is not because it is against moral law but because it
is dishonest. The focus is on virtue- and vice-concepts, rather than on
obligation-concepts. Second, virtue ethics focuses on the lives of moral
agents, rather than on any of their specific actions, for example, telling
the truth. Virtue ethics is not mere abstract theorizing free of any empir-
ical considerations, but answers the question, what sort of person should
I be? by focusing on characters, capabilities, and dispositions. In em-
phasizing excellences, proponents of virtue ethics are not talking about
duties that one ought to perform, but rather of a state of character that
one ought to cultivate. This state is more enduring and stable than any
particular action that an individual moral agent may perform—for ex-
ample, being courageous is more than performing a single courageous
act. It is not my intention to suggest here that virtue ethics does not
involve action. It does involve doing certain things; it is, for example,
practicing regularly to become a good violinist, or habituating oneself
to become generous, courageous, and the like. Indeed, it seems to me
that most virtues, if not all, can be translated into an imperative for
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action—the virtue of truthfulness instructs us to be truthful, for exam-

ple, and the virtue of compassion instructs us to perform kind actions.
Third, virtue ethics highlights social roles in the context of some tradi-
tion. It underscores one basic point in this regard: virtues to a certain
degree are role specific, and their meaning and significance are insepa-
rable from the tradition in which they are achieved. Fourth, the concept
of a practice in virtue ethics is concerned with the good of the whole of
human life. The focus is not on external goods, for example, on money,
power, and fame, but rather on achieving goods internal to the practice.
Virtues not only sustain practices by enabling us to achieve goods in-
ternal to those practices, but they also help us in overcoming harmful
temptations, and in doing so contribute to our self-knowledge and steer
us in the direction of the relevant kind of quest for the good.
¯ ā
2. Duty Ethics in the Gıt
The very first chapter of the Gıt ¯ ā depicts Arjuna as a hero caught
between the mandates of social code and obligations to his family and
friends. Arjuna’s dilemma is as follows: he belongs to the ks.atriya varn .a
(warrior class) that demands that he fight in an impending battle involv-
ing members of his own family, but his familial duties and obligations
dictate that he refrain from fighting—forming a terrible tension. Arjuna
is overcome with grief. The thought of killing his kinsmen overwhelms
him; he turns to his charioteer, his counselor (Lord Kr.s. n.a in human
form, although Arjuna is not aware of his real identity at the time),
and informs him that he has decided not to fight (The Bhagavad Gıtā ¯
1
1:46).
Kr.s.n.a helps Arjuna to resolve his dilemma from both the absolute
and relative standpoints. Kr.s.n.a reminds Arjuna that from the ultimate
or absolute standpoint, the self is immortal, while the body of any human
being is going to be destroyed sooner or later; hence to mourn over those
bodies killed in battle is futile. The soul, on the other hand, is immortal; it
transcends birth and death. From the relative standpoint, Kr.s.n.a reminds
Arjuna that because he (Arjuna) belongs to the warrior class, it is his
duty to fight. “Duty” (dharma) here is taken in its inclusive sense, in
the context of its philosophical and religious foundations. In this story,
moral and spiritual values are at stake; all amicable means of settlement
have failed. It is thus the dharma of a soldier to fight in a righteous war
in order to establish truth and righteousness, and to restore the moral
1
This translation from the Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā and others later in the paper are my own
from the original Sanskrit. I used the 1987 edition published by Gita Press Gorakhpur,
which contains not only the original Sanskrit verses but also the translation of certain
Sanskrit terms into Hindi as well as a running Hindi commentary.
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balance of his society. So doing his dharma, fighting in the war, is the
only right thing for Arjuna to do. One’s dharma must be performed in a
spirit of nonattachment to the results of one’s actions; the agent should
do his dharma for the sake of dharma, not for consequences.
The notion of dharma or duty as the right course of action is repeated
throughout the text. It is determined by one’s stage in life as well as by
one’s position in society. It is important to remember here that the Gıt ¯ ā’s
conception of duty is very different from what we find in either Kant
or Mill. In the Western context, irrespective of whether one is speak-
ing from a Kantian or Utilitarian framework, the goal is to determine
a single moral principle by which one can derive all second-order moral
principles. That is, a single moral principle in duty ethics is supposed to
work as the criterion by which one can decide what one ought to do in
all situations. For Kant, this principle is the universalizability of max-
ims of action without contradiction; for Mill, it is the principle of utility.
Duty ethics hopes to identify a principle from which all our duties can
be derived, so that all of our duties are finally applications of this single
principle. Thus, whereas in the Western context norms for human behav-
ior are derived from reason and are to be met by individuals, dharma, in
the Hindu tradition, is comprised of rules that have been handed down
over generations and are needed for social cohesion. There never has been
any absolutely valid set of dharmas; at most, the dharmas have consti-
tuted a series of markers. However, the decision has had to be made as
to how to apply these rules in practice. Dharma has never imposed a
sort of discipline that exacts an obedience, which determines every sig-
nificant decision that one makes. There has been considerable latitude
on this count, and the question of how to reconcile the different dharmic
rules has arisen frequently. The rules of dharma are not derivable from
a single principle, or even from a single set of principles; these rules
are learned from scriptures, the only source of true knowledge in the
traditional epistemology, and are ultimately individual (and hence, in
an important sense, manifestly many). Two justifications are tradition-
ally provided for this—first, that śabda (word) is an infallible source of
knowledge, and second, that self-realization is the highest goal of human
pursuit.
A moral rule in the Hindu context is not a categorical imperative,
that is, it is not an unconditional command—and the Gıtā, ¯ too, sup-
ports this view. If one is, like Arjuna, a warrior by caste, then he should
fight in battle if the cause is righteous. Similarly, if one were a priest
by caste, then he should refrain from fighting (an action associated with
another man’s duty) and perform the duties prescribed for his own caste.
However, these dharmas are not universally obligatory for everyone, not
even for members of the same community, but oblige only under certain
circumstances. Some dharmas, for example, are conditioned by the goals
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one wishes to pursue. If one aims to go to heaven, for instance, or to attain

moks. a, then in order to realize these goals she will be obliged to perform
certain duties corresponding to them. Hence the dharma-imperatives
in the Gıt ¯ ā are hypothetical imperatives; they assume the conditional
form, “If you wish to achieve X, then you should do Y,” rather than the
simple declaration, “you ought to do Y.” The latter, as an example of the
strong Kantian notion of “ought” (which is completely independent of all
consequences), is not available in Hindu thought. Dharma in the Hindu
tradition is relative and contingent; it has a self-transcending and open-
ended character because rules of dharma are thus by their very nature
facilitative of constant change. The dharma of a given individual may
change according to time, place, and circumstances. One set of rules may
be applicable during a time of stress, which may be very different from
the rules applicable during a time of peace and prosperity. In short, the
Gı̄tā is deontological (“duty for duty’s sake”) insofar as the motivation of
an action is concerned. One should do her duty (dharma) without con-
cern for the possible consequences to herself. The expected consequences
of one’s actions should not serve as the motivation for doing one’s duty
(or failing to do it). It is important to remember in this context that there
are various kinds of dharmas, not all of which are intended as a means
to self-realization. Furthermore, in addition to those individual duties,
which are conditional upon one’s position in society and other contin-
gent facts, there are universal or common duties, for example, to speak
the truth, to act kindly, to act compassionately, and so on. These duties
are binding upon all human beings, irrespective of their caste, station
in life, creed, and the like. Finally, in this context it must be noted that
the validity of the duty of fulfilling one’s caste obligations or obligations
attached to one’s position in society is justified by the Hindu traditional-
ists by tracing them back to śrutis (heard texts) or to the dharma śāstras,
for example, the Code of Manu. The philosophers, however, in addition,
have worked hard to justify the epistemological thesis of śabda pramān .a
in order to further bolster that argument; but, in this context, it must be
noted that śabda pramān . a applies only to śruti, and not to the dharma
śastras. Thus, there is no absolutely valid support for all the duties and
obligations that define one’s caste, for anything taught by the smr.tis is
in principle fallible and revisable. Any purely analytic deduction of obli-
gations from one’s position in society has to proceed independently of
invoking the support of ancient texts and may have to begin with a con-
ceptual analysis of the roles and functions needed for the preservation
of a society.
¯ ā
3. Virtue Ethics in the Gıt
I will begin by assessing the place of virtue in the Gıtā,
¯ by (1) pro-
viding a list of those virtues that occur in the text and where they are
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to be found; (2) systematizing these virtues; and (3) ranking them in

order to ascertain their meaning and significance relative to the ethical
conceptions of the Gıt¯ ā. In the process, I will also show, wherever rele-
vant, similarities between the conceptions of virtue found in the Gıt ¯ ā and
Western conceptions, namely, the conceptions of virtue found in Aristotle
and MacIntyre.
The task of assessing the role of virtues in the Gıt ¯ ā is a difficult
one. There is no word in Sanskrit that corresponds exactly to the term
“virtue.” This, however, should not dissuade us from undertaking the task
at hand. One finds similar obstacles in the Western context. For example,
when contemporary Western moral philosophers talk about virtue, they
do not usually have in mind what Aristotle calls “aretē” or Aquinas “vir-
tus.” These two terms refer to excellences in the arts and of speculative
intellect, rather than to moral virtues. To further compound the prob-
lem, there is no one-to-one correspondence between what Aristotle calls
“aretai ēthikai” and Aquinas “virtues morales.” Contemporary Western
moral philosophers generally accept four cardinal virtues: courage, jus-
tice, temperance, and wisdom. However, both Aristotle and Aquinas clas-
sify the last, wisdom, under the category of intellectual virtue rather than
moral virtue.
Although there is no term corresponding to “virtue” in the Gıt ¯ ā, the
text does provide us with a detailed discussion of dispositions, qualities,
characteristics, and excellences that we generally associate with virtues.
For example, in Chapter 10, Kr.s.n.a informs Arjuna that both virtues and
vices have their source in God:
Understanding, knowledge, freedom from delusion, forgiveness, truthful-

ness, self-control, calmness, pleasure and pain, being, non-being, fear, fear-
lessness, non-violence, equanimity, satisfaction, austerity, charity, fear and
fearlessness are created by Me alone [The Bhagavad Gıtā ¯ 10:4–5].
In Chapter 13, knowledge is articulated in ethical language—a wise man

is said to be virtuous by definition:
Humility, sincerity, violence, patience, simplicity, reverence for one’s

teacher, purity, firmness or stability, self-control; renunciation of the ob-
jects of sense gratification, absence of ego, perception of the evil of birth,
death, old age and disease, non-attachment to children, wife, home, even-
ness of the mind in fulfillment and frustration of the mind; devotion to
the service of the Lord . . . are called knowledge, and whatever remains is
ignorance [The Bhagavad G ı̄tā 13:7–11].
In Hinduism, the distinction between the devas and the asuras goes
. g Veda. The R āmāyan
back to the R . a and the Mahābhārata tell us of the
struggle between the good and the bad. In Ch āndogya Upanis.ad 1.2.1,
both the devas and the asuras are born of Praj āpti. In Chapter 16 of
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the Gıt
¯ ā, a distinction is made between two kinds of nature: divine or
good nature and demoniac or bad nature. The good is characterized by
qualities such as:
Fearlessness, purity of the inner sense, steadfastness in the discipline of

knowledge, charity, self-control, sacrifice, study of the scriptures, penance,
simplicity, non-violence, truth, freedom from anger, renunciation of the
feeling of I and mine in actions, peacefulness, absence of fault finding,
compassion to living beings, freedom from greed, gentleness, modesty, and
non-fickleness, brilliance, forgiveness, patience, purity, absence of envy and
pride, these characterize a man born of good or divine traits [The Bhagavad
Gı̄tā 16:1–3].
The bad, or vice in general, is a direct inversion of the good or virtuous:
Hypocrisy, arrogance, vanity, anger, harshness, these are the characteris-

tics of a man born with a demoniac (asura) nature [The Bhagavad Gıtā ¯
16:4].
The virtuous endowments lead to self-realization, the demoniac traits tie

one down to bondage [The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 16:5].
The demoniac do not know the way of action (duty) nor the way of renunci-
ation (right attitude), neither purity nor right conduct, nor truth is found
in them [The Bhagavad Gıtā ¯ 16:7].
The bad is finally reduced to three primary vices: desire (kaμma), anger
(krodha), and greed (lobha), which constitute the threefold gate to hell [The
Bhagavad Gı̄tā 16:21].
In addition to this general account of virtue and vice, the Gıtā

¯ also
talks about the qualities or natural born dispositions specific to one’s
place in society:
Serenity, self-control, penance, purity, patience and uprightness, wisdom,

judgment and piety, are natural born dispositions of a priest [The Bhagavad
Gı̄tā 18:42].
Heroism, vigor, firmness, skill, not fleeing even in a battle, charity and
leadership, are the natural born dispositions of a warrior [The Bhagavad
Gı̄tā 18:43].
The virtues noted above occur repeatedly in the Gıt ¯ ā. For the sake of
understanding, I will next attempt to systematize these virtues and de-
termine whether or not they can be ranked in some coherent and infor-
mative fashion. Given below is an initial inventory of the verses in which
specific virtues occur in the text of the Gıtā:
¯
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1. abhayam . (fearlessness, 10:4; 16:1)

2. adambhitvam (sincerity, 13:7)
3. ahim . sā (non-violence, 10:5; 13:7; 16:2; 17:14)
4. adroh.ah . (amity, 16:3)
5. acāpalam (modesty, 16:2)
6. adves.a (non-hatred, 12:13)
7. akrodah. (non-anger, 16:2)
8. aloluptvam . (freedom from greed, 16:2)
9. amānitvam (humility, 13:7)
10. apaiśvnam (absence of fault finding, 16:2)
11. ārjavam (uprightness, simplicity, 13:7; 16:1; 18:42)
12. brahmacarya (abstinence, 8:11; 17:14)
13. damah . (self-control, 16:1; 18:42)
14. d āna 2
(charity, 10:5; 16:1; 17:7, 20-22; 18:5, 43)
15. ks. amā (forgiveness, 10:4; 3:4; 16:3)
16. ks. āntih . (patience, 13:7; 18:42)
17. karun . ā (compassion, 12:13)
18. maitrı¯ (friendship, 12:13)
19. mārdavam . (gentleness, 16:2)
20. samah , s
. āmya (evenness, equanimity, balanced indifference, same-
ness, 2:15, 38, 48; 4:22; 5:3, 7, 18-21; 6:7, 9, 13, 29,
30, 32; 9:29; 12:13, 14, 18-19; 13:27-28; 18:54)
21. ś āntih . (peace, 16:2)
22. satyam (truthfulness, 10:4; 16:2)
23. śaucam (purity, 13:7; 16:3, 7; 17:14; 18:42)
24. śauryam (heroism, 18:43)
25. sam . kalpa (determination or resolve, 6:2)
26. śraddha (reverence, piety, 17:2, 3; 7:21)
27. tapah. (penance, 7:9; 10:5; 16:1; 17:5, 7, 14-19, 28; 18:5, 42)
28. tejah . (vigor, 18:43)
29. ¯ . ā
titıks (endurance, 2:14)
30. vair āgyam (detachment, 13:7; 18:52)
31. vinaya (humility, 5:18)
32. vinigrahah. (control, restraint, 13:7)
The above list leaves no doubt whatsoever in the mind of the reader
that the Gıt ¯ ā is replete with virtues. In fact there are many more
virtues in the Gıt ¯ ā than in the Yogas ūtras of Patañjali (2:35–39) or
Vātsyāyan’s bhās. ya on the Ny āyasūtras (1.1.2), two figures and texts fre-
quently quoted from the āstika (Vedic) systems of Indian philosophy in
the context of virtue discussions. Pata ñjali lists five virtues: non-violence
(ahim. sā), truthfulness (satya), abstention from theft (asteya), chastity or
2 In this work, I have translated “dāna” as “charity.” Although the meaning of the word
“charity” goes beyond “d āna,” the word “charity” is derived from the Latin “caritatem,”
which, in one of its many senses, means “alms-giving,” “act of charity done to the poor,” and
the like. This directly coincides with the meaning of dāna as charity (Fowler et al. 1955,
294).
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continence (brahmacarya), and renunciation (aprigrah. a). Vātsy āyana

makes a distinction among virtues of the body, speech, and mind. He
classifies the will as impious (pāp ātmika) or auspicious (śubha). The
impious will leads to vice and the auspicious will to virtue. Virtues of
the body are charity (dāna), social service (paricarana), and aiding the
distressed (paritrān . a); virtues of the speech are veracity (satya), bene-
ficial speech (hitavacana), gentle and agreeable speech (priyavacana),
and reciting of scripture (svādhyāya); and the virtues of the mind are
kindness (dayā), indifference to material gain (aspr. ha), and reverence
or piety (śraddhā).
There is no way of categorizing the virtues (and vices) that are not
assumptive in some way. No static system of categories is offered in this
text, thus leaving open to scholars the lines of demarcation among gen-
eral types of virtue. Bearing this in mind, I offer the following as an
explanatory attempt at such demarcation. Using the self as the focus,
virtues of the Gıt
¯ ā may be classified as either “self-regarding” or “other-
regarding” virtues depending on whether the focus is upon one’s own
self, or upon others. So we can say that self-regarding virtues are those
in which the primary emphasis is placed upon one’s own self. In these
virtues, a person is primarily concerned with her own self, her own ac-
tions, states, and experiences, and with others only in relation to her-
self. In other-regarding virtues, the primary emphasis is placed on the
other person (or thing). In these virtues, a person is primarily concerned
with others, with their actions, experiences, and states, and with herself
only in relation to those others. Hence, using this self-regarding/other-
regarding distinction, the virtues in the Gıt ¯ ā may be categorized as
follows:
Self-Regarding Virtues: Patience, determination or resolve, self-control,
evenness of the mind, endurance, restraint, simplicity, abstinence, purity,
heroism, vigor, truthfulness, penance or austerity, simplicity, fearlessness,
humility, modesty, gentleness, detachment, and sincerity.
Other-Regarding Virtues: Forgiveness, patience, compassion, friendship,
absence of fault finding, amity, non-hatred, non-anger, non-greed, rever-
ence, charity, non-violence, and peace.
Using Vātsy āyan classification, these virtues may alternatively be cate-
gorized as follows:
Virtues of the Body: Simplicity, abstinence, endurance, charity, gentleness,
purity, heroism, vigor, and non-violence.
Virtues of Speech: Truthfulness and absence of fault finding.
Virtues of the Mind: Amity, modesty, non-hatred, non-anger, non-greed,
humility, freedom from delusion, self-control, forgiveness, patience,
compassion, friendship, evenness of the mind, determination or resolve,
faith, penance or austerity, renunciation, and peace.
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I do not mean to suggest that all the virtues listed above fall neatly into
one category or the other. Virtues are often mixed up with one another.
Some sort of categorization, however, will enable us to come to grips
with the place and significance of the virtues in the Gıt ¯ ā. In review-
ing the groupings suggested, we see that there are more self-regarding
virtues than other-regarding virtues, and more virtues of the mind than
those of the body, or of speech. The reason for this will become obvious
shortly.
In terms of ranking the virtues of the Gıt ¯ ā, it seems that “samatvam”
is the all-embracing master or the executive virtue. The root meaning of
“samah. ” is “the same.” Samatvam in the Gıtā ¯ means inner poise, bal-
anced indifference, equality, sameness, and equanimity. It is used to sig-
nify mastery over one’s self, the conquering of anger, pride, ambition, and
the like. The importance of samatvam of mind is emphasized early on in
the Gıt
¯ ā and reiterated often throughout the text.
Samatvam first occurs in the fifteenth verse of the second chapter,
wherein Kr. s.n. a tells Arjuna that a learned person remains the same in
pleasure and pain (samadukkhasukham . ); he is not affected by changing
emotions. This idea is further developed in the fifth chapter, wherein
“evenness” or “sameness” is articulated as both equanimity of thought
and of action. It is said:
A learned person sees with an equal eye a priest, a cow, an elephant, a dog,
or an outcaste. In this world, everything is overcome by those who master
sameness. The infinite spirit is without any flaws and is the same in all
human beings; these persons (of even minded attitude) are established in
the Infinite spirit.
Remaining disciplined (yogasthah . ), perform actions abandoning attach-

ment with even mindedness about success and failure. This discipline may
be defined as samatvam, i.e., evenness or the sameness of the mind [The
Bhagavad Gı̄tā 5:18-19].
In the above passage samatvam is identified with yoga, or disciplined

activity. Although Kr.s. n.a begins by instructing Arjuna as to why he ought
to fight (i.e., he ought to do his duty), very early in the Gıt ¯ ā, Kr. s.n. a
moves on to the topic of how Arjuna ought to fight (i.e., the attitude with
which Arjuna ought to fight). In fact, verses 38 and 39 of the second
chapter represent one of the most fundamental teachings of the entire
Gı̄t ā. Kr.s.n.a says:
treating alike pleasure and pain,

gain and loss, success and defeat,
get ready for the battle,
you shall not incur any sin [The Bhagavad Gıtā
¯ 2:38].
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Kr.s.n. a argues that acting in this non-attached manner will enable Arjuna
to discipline his buddhi (intellect), which dictates one’s attitude toward
the results of actions (The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 2:39).
He points out that Arjuna’s decision of giving up his duty and not
fighting is the result of the sort of detachment that stems from the nar-
row perspective of filial devotion, diffidence, and fear of losing. Kr.s.n.a’s
answer in these two verses goes beyond Arjuna’s initial question about
duty to the nature of the excellence that Arjuna should cultivate in order
to live rightly, or as Aristotle would put it, “to live harmoniously.” Kr.s.n.a
says:
One whose intellect is exercised has renounced both good and evil. There-
fore, strive for yoga; Yoga is excellence in action [The Bhagavad G ı̄t ā 2:50].
The self becomes pure by cultivating excellence in disciplined activity . . . he

is not contaminated though he works [The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 5:7].
It is important to note that action or activity in the context of the Gıt ¯ ā

does not refer to any activity, but rather to the right or suitable way of
acting. For example, fighting in a righteous war is the yoga or disciplined
activity most suitable to a member of the warrior caste. As a discipline,
samatvam consists in doing actions without being bound by the results; it
underscores the sense of activity present in the yoga and this excellence
is achieved by those who have cultivated samatvam.
Samatvam can thus be said to form the foundation of the three yogas
found in the Gıtā,
¯ namely, karma yoga, jñāna yoga, and bhakti yoga.
Respectively, these are the disciplines of selfless action, knowledge, and
devotion. Throughout the Gıtā, ¯ these three disciplines are said to be
the means of attaining self-realization. These three disciplines do not
contradict each other, but rather reinforce each other; they are interde-
pendent. Irrespective of the particular discipline (yoga) one uses as her
starting point, the ultimate goal is to become disciplined, which is hav-
ing sameness and evenness of the mind (samatvam). It is important to
remember in this context that in the Gıt ¯ ā, the goal and whatever means
is used to attain that goal form a continuum, signifying the interdepen-
dence of the goal and its means. This interdependence is found in the
disciplines of action, knowledge, and devotion. For example, in verses
28–29 of Chapter 5, Kr.s.n.a asks Arjuna to control his senses, mind, and
understanding and to perform actions in worship with knowing Kr.s. n.a;
verses 29–32 of Chapter 6 refer to seeing the self, seeing Kr. s.n.a, practic-
ing yoga, and seeing pleasure and pain to be the same; verses 13–14 of
Chapter 9 speak of the interdependence between knowledge, devotion,
and action; this is reiterated in verses 10–11 of Chapter 10. Thus it is not
surprising that Kr.s. n.a repeatedly affirms the importance of yoga: Arjuna
is asked to be “yogasthah . ,” that is, fixed or established in the intellect
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(The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 2:49), and “buddhi yukto,” that is, yoked or exer-
cised through the intellect (The Bhagavad Gıtā ¯ 2:50–51), and the like,
in order to do his duty skillfully—and this skill has been articulated as
samatvam.
Thus it is not surprising that Kr.s.n.a emphasizes the importance of
samatvam again and again. One must not abandon action, but rather
perform actions with the right attitude, that is, in the spirit of doing one’s
duty without any thought of receiving any benefits from it. Disinterested
performance of one’s duty contributes to the individual’s harmonious
living. Performance of one’s duties with evenness of mind results
in freedom of the spirit, friendliness, patience, and tranquility (The
Bhagavad Gı̄tā 12:13–14, 18–19). A person who cultivates samatvam
also masters other virtues, such as endurance, courage, and wisdom.
Embodied existence involves contact with sensory objects that results
in pleasure or pain, experiences which are transient. These should be
endured patiently; a person of wisdom views pleasures and pain alike
(The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 2:14). Endurance thus encompasses within its
fold two other virtues: courage and wisdom. It involves the courage to
endure—to stand against all adverse situations—so that one is able to
view adversity and prosperity alike; this is undoubtedly the virtue of
a ks.atriya. Courage in this context does not refer to the courage of a
soldier as commonly understood, but of a soldier who has also cultivated
wisdom (Kat. ha Upanis.ad 1.2.24). The person who is not troubled
by grief, who views pleasure and pain alike, and who controls his
response to external stimulus is a person of wisdom (The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā
12:15, 56).
Samatvam is a virtue of the mind, not of the body, because such an
attitude comes from within, and one’s actions become the expressions
of a stable and abiding character. Such a person possesses self-control.
Self-control, when properly understood, implies not simply the control of
the senses such as closing one’s eyes to outer objects (because even after
closing one’s eyes, the desire to enjoy might persist) but also the control
of the mind. Inner purity is more essential than simple conformity to
external code. Inner control, which results from non-attachment, enables
one to excel in performing right action. Serenity, calmness, and wisdom
characterize such a person.
The Gıt¯ ā underscores the importance of cultivating samatvam repeat-
edly. A person who has cultivated samatvam follows the mean between
the two extremes of asceticism and self-indulgence. He is attached nei-
ther to the success nor to the failure of his actions; “he sees non-action in
action and action in non-action” (The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 4:18), and “aban-
doning attachments to the results of the actions, always content and
independent, he really does not do anything, though he is engaged in ac-
tion” (The Bhagavad Gı̄t ā 4:20). Samatvam is the golden mean between
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non-action (nivr.tti) and action with a desire to gain benefits (pravr. tti).
Such a person treats all creatures alike from the highest to the lowest,
as like himself (The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 5:28). The virtuous person delights
in the welfare of all human beings. The notion of a golden mean and
the discussion of the role of buddhi in the Gıt ¯ ā have Aristotelian over-
tones. Aristotle repeatedly argues that moral virtue is an excellence of
a rational person and that these virtues must be guided and controlled
by the rational attitude, which consists in seeking the mean between
excess and deficiency. Thus indulgence in physical pleasures and ascetic
self-denial alike are both extremes, and the virtue of temperance is the
mean between the two. Similarly, foolhardiness and cowardice are two
extremes for which the virtue of courage is a mean. In an Aristotelian
fashion, the Gıt ¯ ā repeatedly exhorts people to cultivate virtues such as
charity, humility, non-anger, courage, and so on. Charity, for example,
is a golden mean between self-sacrifice and niggardliness; humility is
a mean between boastfulness and diffidence; anger is a mean between
belligerence and non-anger; fearlessness is a mean between recklessness
and cowardice, and so on.
Continuous effort is necessary to achieve samatvam. The Gıt ¯ ā alludes
to two different kinds of effort—buddhiyoga and the vyavasāya, that is,
the discipline of the intellect and resolution, respectively (The Bhagavad
Gı̄t ā 2:39–41). Buddhi in Indian thought (“the faculty of reasoning” in
Aristotle) is the controller of the mind insofar as it is the faculty of dis-
crimination or judgment. The essence of buddhi is resolution, because
it encompasses willing within its fold. If one is exercised through the
intellect, one will be able to cast away the bondage of works.
Kr.s.n.a discusses what is entailed in being yoked or exercised through
the buddhi, or possessing correct discrimination (buddhi) that is
achieved by the faculty of discrimination (buddhi). A virtuous person
according to the Gıt ¯ ā is one who has realized her rational being and who
is established in intellect (sthitaprajñā). It reminds us of the role of rea-
son in Aristotle, which controls the irrational part of the soul. Aristotle
also argues that ignorance and lack of self-control are impediments in
our way to attaining virtues; the weak will accounts for the failings of
human beings with good intentions. Because of the weak will, people are
controlled by their passions. Eudaimonia can be achieved only through
moral excellence, which is an activity according to virtue. Reason is the
distinguishing feature of human beings and the achievement of a good
life is contingent upon the use of reason. In a similar fashion, Kr.s.n.a
asks Arjuna to take refuge in buddhi (The Bhagavad Gı̄tā 2:49), which
will enable him to control his passions (The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 2:52), the
irrational part of the soul, according to Aristotle, and to perform right
actions. Thus, both the Gıt ¯ ā and Aristotle speak repeatedly about con-
trolling one’s passions, desires, and emotions; the Gıt ¯ ā sets out to achieve
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this control with the buddhi, Aristotle with reason. Such control is not
possible in the absence of repeated performance—“habit” in Aristotle and
“practice” in MacIntyre. The Gıt ¯ ā recognizes the necessity of “abhyāsa
yoga,” that is, the discipline of practice (The Bhagavad G ı̄t ā 12:9), or,
as Śa ṁkara puts it, “the yoga of constant striving.” Kr. s. n.a reminds
Arjuna that the human mind is restless and that it can be steered in
the right direction by constant practice and non-attachment (abhyāsena
tu kaunteya vairāgyen ca grhyate [The Bhagavad G ı̄tā 6:35]). At an-
other point, Arjuna is asked to engage in the practice of yoga (abhyāsa
yogayuktena), so that his thoughts and emotions do not stray (The Bha-
gavad Gı̄tā 8:8). Kr. s. n.a also affirms that practice consists in repeatedly
fixing the mind on a single object by withdrawing it from everything
else, and this concentration and control in the Gıt ¯ ā has been called “the
discipline of practice” (The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 12:9).
Thus, there is in the Gıt ¯ ā, as in Aristotle and MacIntyre, value placed
on repeated performance according to certain rules. Is repeated perfor-
mance the key to becoming virtuous? One does not become virtuous by
following a rule but by doing virtuous deeds. Virtue is excellence in char-
acter, which one can acquire by repeated performance of some action. Let
us take the virtue of charity, for example. Aristotle argues that one can-
not become charitable without doing charitable deeds; when one keeps
on doing the charitable actions, these actions become his second nature.
Practice is the key. Although the Gıt ¯ ā does not directly deal with the
question as to how one becomes virtuous, it does recognize certain hin-
drances, obstacles, and vices that may present themselves and the need
for repeated practice, control, and strenuous effort on the part of the
individual. Repeated practice results in a kind of joy that is quite differ-
ent from the pleasure that accompanies the satisfaction of some single,
isolated desire.
The Gıt¯ ā makes a distinction among three kinds of happiness. It is not
possible to provide a complete justification of the translation of “sukkha”
as “happiness.” Suffice is to note that I take sukkha to be the oppo-
site of dukkha, that is, pain and suffering. The Gıt ¯ ā uses both “sukkha”
and “dukkha” numerous times to signify everyday experience of plea-
sure and pain (1:32–33; 5:3, 6; 16:14; 17:9; and 18:8). Arjuna is asked
to “hold equal” (samekr. tv ā) each of the opposites, for example, victory-
defeat, pleasure-pain, and the like; and non-attachment transcends both
“sukkha” and “dukkha, indeed all opposites. These three kinds of happi-
ness are contingent upon the three inborn dispositions that predominate
in a person:
That happiness which a person comes to rejoice after long practice ends
his suffering; that happiness which springs from understanding of the self
is of the nature of goodness; that happiness which arises from the contact
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of the senses and the object is passionate; and that happiness which leads
the self astray arises from sloth and inertia is of the nature of darkness
[The Bhagavad Gıt ¯ ā 18:36–39].
To begin in reverse order, the predominance of tamas (passivity, indo-

lence, darkness) gives rise to violent or vicious actions. If rajas (activ-
ity, energy, passion) predominate, then wealth, money, and power—the
“external goods” of MacIntyre—will give us happiness. True happiness,
however, does not lie in the possession of external goods but rather in
developing and cultivating the good within ourselves, that is, the sattva
within us. All of us have the potential within us to become good or vir-
tuous persons. This potential has to be cultivated; hence it is realized by
repeated practice. The process is painful, but it leads to joy and freedom.
This kind of joy is not attainable by any other means.
Attachment to external objects and clinging to the resulting pleasures
take one deeper into the realm of external pleasures, which are tempo-
rary and transient; such pleasures cannot provide real happiness. Once
again, parallels between the Gıt ¯ ā and MacIntyre become obvious. Both
make a distinction between true happiness (internal good, in the lan-
guage of MacIntyre) and happiness that results from the gratification
of the senses, money, power, and the like (MacIntyre’s external goods).
The goal is to flourish, to live harmoniously. Passions and emotions, for
MacIntyre, Aristotle, and the Gıtā,¯ are obstacles to harmonious living;
virtues are correctives insofar as they prevent passions and emotions
from interfering in this harmony. A virtuous person does not simply
do what appears to be courageous or just; she must perform an act
in the fashion in which a courageous or just person would perform it.
Whether a person has a formed or stable character is a function of how
one feels about acting in certain ways. A virtuous person does not be-
grudgingly do her duty; indeed, she finds the idea of not doing her duty
painful.
The virtues find their meaning and significance in the context of a
tradition. In the Hindu tradition, an individual is taken to be one of the
components of a complex social whole and is expected to perform those
duties and tasks assigned to him by that social role. Certain rights and
duties accrue to a person by virtue of his belonging to a certain class
in society. The four stages provide an ideal picture of a person’s journey
toward the goal of self-realization, and the four classes designate an indi-
vidual’s place in the society, while at the same time justifying the worldly
social order and pointing to an order beyond the social, that is, to an in-
dividual’s spiritual nature. Thus, the roles we play, the choices we make,
and their significance—their rightness and wrongness—are conditioned
by the tradition in which we live. MacIntyre notes “that there is no way to
possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we inherit them”
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(MacIntyre 1984, 127). Cultivation of virtue is not possible in isolation,

but rather only in a community of people who strive to achieve the same
excellences. For instance, one cannot really understand the Aristotelian
conception of courage as virtue by detaching it from the Greek tradition
in which Aristotle lived and to which he contributed. Hindu ethics gen-
erally and the ethics of the Gıt ¯ ā in particular are no exceptions to the
need for context, because it is not possible to understand fully the Gıtā’s ¯
conception of family duty (kuladharma), caste duty (varn . a dharma), and
others, by detaching them from the Hindu tradition in which they find
expression. Whereas it is mandatory (right) for a warrior to participate
in a war if the cause is righteous and to kill if necessary, it is wrong for
a priest to participate in a war—and this distinction is rooted deeply in,
among other things, the ancient caste system, which defined the duties
of warriors and others. Although the universal or general virtues—for
example, non-violence, truthfulness, and the like—are not usually de-
fined in the context of specific social institutions but rather in terms of
the generality of human kind, particular dharmas such as kuladharma,
varn . adharma, aśramadharma are tradition-specific and grounded in its
metaphysics. Given that virtue is an excellence and that the excellence
of a thing is the full development of the potential of its essential nature,
each theory of virtue minimally presupposes a theory of human nature.
It is thus important to remember that all actions in the Gıt ¯ ā are done by
the gun . a-self: each of the four varn. as (castes) has duties attached to it;
the particular kind of duty is determined by one’s svabhāva, or inborn
nature, which is a function of the relative proportion of the three gun.as
in an individual. In Hindu thought, an embodied being depending on its
past karmas is born with three dispositions—sattva, rajas, and tamas,
which are found in different proportions in different human beings. No
empirical human being is free from these three gun . as and their interac-
tions in varying degrees of preponderance is the driving force of human
action, by either impelling one toward or leading one away from moral
endeavors. Of these three, it is s āttvika (goodness) that helps one over-
come rajas and tamas and ultimately to transcend sattva itself. Rāga
(desire, attachment) and dves.a (dislike), that is, attachments to sensual
pleasures and aversion to or dislike for the unpleasant, are the two ma-
jor stumbling blocks in the process of disciplining one’s own self. These
two are destroyed in the sāttvika person with the onset of detachment.
Thus, although sāttvika is the highest of the gun . as, it is not perfect; it
constantly struggles to free itself from what is not good or lucid. One’s
nature along with heredity and environment shape the character of an
individual.
Thus according to the ethical conceptions of the Gıt ¯ ā, each person has
his inborn nature (svabh āva) and it is his duty to follow this nature.
So the Gıt ¯ ā, like Kant, argues that there are two components of human
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4679795,
nature: the bad, that is, those desires and passions that moral agents
should try to overcome, and the principle of goodness, which constantly
struggles to free itself from the influence of the other. For Aristotle, in
contrast, the pursuit of goodness or the cultivation of virtues is neither
against nature nor is it something that is brought about by nature. That
is, human nature simpliciter is indifferent to virtue. It is neither pro
virtue nor against virtue; by nature, according to Aristotle, one is nei-
ther virtuous nor vicious. The cultivation of a life of virtue is understood
more on the analogy of a musician practicing to be a good violinist than
as trying to do one’s duty (e.g., Kant’s imperfect duty to cultivate one’s
talents). Aristotle takes a naturalistic view of human nature, viewing
it as the raw material that one can mold according to the principle of
the golden mean. In the Gıt ¯ ā, the gun
. as are potentialities; they contain
both good and bad. Individual beings develop these potentialities in var-
ied ways and one must diligently overcome the bad by cultivating the
good. One who practices detachment and evenness of mind will succeed
in this respect—which explains why cultivation of virtues and the “right
attitude” play such an important role in Hindu ethics.
In Hindu ethics, irrespective of whether one is looking at its begin-
nings, or at its later formulations, the subjective has consistently been
emphasized, although objective morality as exhibited in some external
code of acts, which must be performed to ensure the well-being of society
as a whole, is also recognized. It is important to underscore one important
point here: in Hindu ethics the term “dharma” is used for both “duty”
and “virtue.” The concept of “dharma,” like the German “Recht,” covers
a large spectrum of different but connected meanings. It encompasses
within its fold a theory of ethical rules, a theory of virtue, a social ethics,
and an account of the Kantian notion of duty for duty’s sake, leading to
the goal of moks.a. There are two components of dharma, the subjective
and the objective. The subjective dharma is concerned with inner purifi-
cation, purification of the mind, inner discipline; the objective dharma is
concerned with duties, including universal or common duties and those
duties that depend on a person’s particular position in society and stage of
life. One cultivates virtues in order to conquer one’s passions and desires.
Virtues are character traits that find expression in habitual actions; they
are good for the individual and in turn are conducive to the well-being of
society as a whole. Virtues subdue the impious and manifest the pious.
This explains why there are more self-regarding virtues in the Gıt ¯ ā than
other-regarding virtues, and more virtues of the mind than virtues of the
body or speech. The idea is that cultivation of virtues will translate into
the right kinds of actions, such that actions are the expression of a stable
durable character.
The above discussion leaves room for the following question among
others, for which I am indebted to an anonymous reader of this
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4679795,
manuscript. If the duties to discharge social obligations are to be under-

stood as hypothetical imperatives, is it not the case that at least some
of the highest virtues such as śuci are categorically and unconditionally
binding upon the seeker of moks.a? Alternately, should we say that such
duties are also conditional in their force such that one needs to recognize
that “if you want to achieve such and such goal, that is, moks. a, then
cultivate such and such virtues?” For the present, it is sufficient to note
that such a question arises only if one mixes up virtues with duties and
wishes to find a duty underlying each virtue, namely, the duty to culti-
vate each virtue. Nevertheless, it perhaps should be admitted that even
the highest virtue, for example, samatvam, is prized and valued as a
means to achieving moks.a until it is seen that achieving moks. a, and see-
ing all selves as the same are themselves one and the same, that is, the
supposed means and the ends coincide.
In sum, the above discussion makes it obvious that the cultiva-
tion of virtues is important in the overall conception of the Gıt ¯ ā. The
Aristotelian conceptions of the golden mean and of virtue as an excel-
lence also exist in the Gıt
¯ ā. Its ethical conception also includes a theory
of duty. It instructs an individual person to do his duty as a social being,
and to do so by cultivating certain excellences so that his duties become
part of his nature, an expression of his abiding character. It does not
present any conflict between duty and virtue; duty is not incompatible
with virtue, but rather, the two complement each other.
REFERENCES
Anscombe, G. E. M.
1997 “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp
and Michael Slote, 26–44. New York: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle
1906 Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by James E. C. Welldon. New
York: Macmillan.
Fowler, Mrs. William Little, Henry Watson Fowler, and Jessie Coulson
1955 Oxford Universal Dictionary. London: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, Alasdair
1984 After Virtue. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Morris, William
1978 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Runes, D. D.
1968 Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
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4679795, 2006, 34, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary-wiley.ez95.periodicos.capes.gov.br By PUC/SP - Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Sao Paulo- on [13/11/2021].

Re-use and distribution is strictly not permitted, except for O

ETHICS AS A DISCIPLINE IN THE WESTERN TRADITION since Kant has primar-

The fundamental concept in virtue ethics is human “flourishing” and

presented in the next section is a preliminary account meant for such

1. Characteristics of a Virtue Ethics

purpose of a shipbuilder qua shipbuilder is to build a good ship, what is

of a stable and mature character. Virtue is something that is acquired,

and evaluated by those well versed in that practice. The achievement

from the vantage point of a moral tradition. In ancient Greek society,

Notwithstanding the differences among virtue ethicists, there is a

action—the virtue of truthfulness instructs us to be truthful, for exam-

one wishes to pursue. If one aims to go to heaven, for instance, or to attain

to be found; (2) systematizing these virtues; and (3) ranking them in

Understanding, knowledge, freedom from delusion, forgiveness, truthful-

In Chapter 13, knowledge is articulated in ethical language—a wise man

Humility, sincerity, violence, patience, simplicity, reverence for one’s

Fearlessness, purity of the inner sense, steadfastness in the discipline of

The bad, or vice in general, is a direct inversion of the good or virtuous:

Hypocrisy, arrogance, vanity, anger, harshness, these are the characteris-

The virtuous endowments lead to self-realization, the demoniac traits tie

In addition to this general account of virtue and vice, the Gıtā

Serenity, self-control, penance, purity, patience and uprightness, wisdom,

1. abhayam . (fearlessness, 10:4; 16:1)

continence (brahmacarya), and renunciation (aprigrah. a). Vātsy āyana

Remaining disciplined (yogasthah . ), perform actions abandoning attach-

In the above passage samatvam is identified with yoga, or disciplined

treating alike pleasure and pain,

The self becomes pure by cultivating excellence in disciplined activity . . . he

It is important to note that action or activity in the context of the Gıt ¯ ā

To begin in reverse order, the predominance of tamas (passivity, indo-

(MacIntyre 1984, 127). Cultivation of virtue is not possible in isolation,

manuscript. If the duties to discharge social obligations are to be under-

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