INTERRUPTION OF RUNNING OF PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES COVERED THE RULES

ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE
By Judge Marlo Campanilla

According to the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen in Jadewell Parking

Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013, the filing of
complaint involving violation of ordinance for preliminary investigation will not
interrupt the running of 2-month prescription. The provision in the Rules on
Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by institution of
criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance because case involving
this crime is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

It is however submitted that the Jadewell principle is only applicable to crime

punishable by an ordinance and not to a felony (e.g. slight physical injuries or
unjust vexation) under the Revised Penal Code, which is covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.

The prescription of offense covered by an ordinance is governed by Act No. 3326,

which provides that “the prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person.” According to Jadewell case, the word
“proceedings” in Act No. 3326 pertains to judicial proceeding.

In sum, only the institution of judicial proceeding for violation of ordinance or

the filling of information in court interrupts the running of prescription.

On the other hand, prescription of felony is governed by Article 91 of the

Revised Penal Code, which provides “the period of prescription shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.”

According to the case of Francisco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983, the
filling of complaint for preliminary investigation if the fiscal’s office interrupts
the running of prescription of simple slander because Article 91 does not
distinguish whether the complaint is filed in the Office of the Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation or in court for action on the merits. It should be noted
that simple slander is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. In People vs.
Bautista, G.R. NO. 168641, April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court applied the
Francisco principle to slight physical injuries, which is also covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.

The Supreme Court in Jadewell case is not sitting En Banc, and thus, it cannot
abandon the principle in Francisco case. Under Section 4 of Article VIII, of the
Constitution, no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc. Moreover, Jadewell case is interpreting Act 3326 and not Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the governing law on prescription of
felony.

Another point to consider is that the interpretation of the Supreme Court in

several cases as to the word “proceedings” in Act No. 3326 in connection with
prescription of offense punishable under special law is different to that in the
Jadewell case.

According to the case of SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No.
135808, October 6, 2008, the term “proceedings” in the said law is either
executive or judicial. In sum, the institution of executive proceedings or the
filing of complaint for preliminary investigation interrupts the running of
prescription of crime under special law. In People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662,
June 13, 2012, Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November
25, 2008, Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65,
September 11, 2013, and People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
166510, April 29, 2009 reaffirmed the Interport Resources case.

It is worthy to note that in Pangilinan case, and Panaguiton case, the crime
involved is violation of BP Blg. 22. This crime is covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, and yet, the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of
complaint in the fiscal office interrupts the running of prescription.

Again, the Jadewell case cannot abandon the principle in Pangilinan case and
Panaguiton case since the Supreme Court is not sitting En Banc. In fact, in the case
of People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019, the Supreme Court said
that Jadewell did not abandon the doctrine in Pangilinan. Jadewell presents a
different factual milieu as the issue involved therein was the prescriptive period
for violation of a city ordinance, unlike here as well as in the Pangilinan and other
above-mentioned related cases, where the issue refers to prescription of actions
pertaining to violation of a special law.

The Jadewell case is a controversial case. It made an interpretation of Act No.

3326 different from that in Interport Resources case and other cases simply
because an ordinance is covered by the rules on Summary Procedure. The
Jadewell case reaffirmed the Zaldivia principle, which provides that the filing of
complaint in the fiscal office interrupts the running of prescription while Interport
Resources case and other cases abandoned that principle. At any rate, the
Supreme Court in the Jadewell case has already spoken that the filing of
complaint for preliminary investigation will not interrupt the running of
prescription of violation of ordinance. But such principle in the Jadewell must be
confined to violation of ordinance, and not to felonies under the Revised Penal
Code or offenses under special law such as BP Blg. 22, regardless of whether they
are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure or not.