Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of Sabah

Author(s): Paridah Abd. Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar

Source: Asian Survey , Jun., 1992, Vol. 32, No. 6 (Jun., 1992), pp. 554-567
Published by: University of California Press

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 MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS
The Issue of Sabah

Paridah Abd. Samad and

Darusalam Abu Bakar

The level of irritation in the relationship between Ma-

laysia and the Philippines is considered unnatural for two immediate
neighbors who belong to a common regional grouping. In normal circum-
stances, their regional commonality would have served as a catalyst to ce-
ment and widen mutually beneficial ties of friendship and cooperation.
Unfortunately, the relationship has been allowed to float and continues to
be marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. The main contributing factor
to this disturbing situation is the Philippines's claim on Sabah, one of Ma-
laysia's 13 states. It is an issue that has remained unresolved for nearly 30
years.
On historical and legal grounds, the administration of President Dios-
dado Macapagal officially initiated the Philippine claim to Sabah (North
Borneo as the island was known under colonial rule) as it was about to be
incorporated into the proposed Federation of Malaysia. The claim was
relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled within the wider con-
text of the Republic of Indonesia's "confrontation" with Malaysia and the
Sukarno regime's threats to resort to military means to crush the fledgling
nation. Upon termination of the confrontation, the dispute over Sabah
was carried to Bangkok, where bilateral negotiations aimed at its resolu-
tion were abruptly aborted. In the United Nation's General Assembly, the
disputants exchanged contentious charges and countercharges.
Ironically, President Ferdinand Marcos recognized the formation of
Malaysia in 1966, soon after he took over political power in the Philip-
pines. With the inception of the five-member Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), there was a tacit agreement between Malaysia

Paridah Abd. Samad is Senior Lecturer, School of Mass Communi-

cation, Mara Institute of Technology, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia, and Research Associ-
ate, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur. Darusalam Abu Bakar
is Lecturer, School of Mass Communication, Mara Institute of Technology.

? 1992 by The Regents of the University of California

554

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 555

and the Philippines that the issue be shelved in the interest of regional
solidarity, and they agreed that it should be finally resolved through
ASEAN. However, in the more than 25 years since ASEAN's formation,
the Sabah dispute has never been an important agenda item at any
ASEAN conference or meeting. While its leaders have depicted the organ-
ization as a panacea for existing intraregional tensions and disputes, they
have been disinclined to consider the Sabah matter as a potential catalyst
for ASEAN disintegration. As a result of other dimensions of regional
cooperation through this organization, which the two countries cannot
simply ignore, ASEAN has been able to contribute to softening the polit-
ical tension. 1
While the importance of Sabah to the government in Manila lies in the
perception of Philippine historical and legal interests, internal political de-
velopments are among the important determining factors in patterning the
crisis. The Muslim resistance in the southern Philippines, the political in-
terests of present and former leaders, deterioration of the country's polit-
ical and economic performance all contributed significantly to hindering
the Philippine government from dropping its claim to Sabah. This article
attempts to describe and explain the pattern of relations between Malaysia
and the Philippines in the context of the Sabah dispute. The significance of
various internal political developments will be related to the dispute in
order to understand how crises developed. We also examine the prospects
for bilateral relations between the two countries, considering the options
and interests of both parties.

The Territorial Dispute

While territorial jurisdiction over Sabah is foremost among a number of
disquieting issues in the relationship between Malaysia and the Philip-
pines, others include the presence of Filipino refugees and illegal immi-
grants in Sabah, alleged Sabah support to the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), piracy along Philippine-Malaysian border waters, overlap-
ping territorial boundaries, territorial intrusions, and the Corregidor issue.
The genesis of the main impediment to the normal and steady growth of
constructive relations started in June 1962 when the Philippines officially
filed its claim to Sabah.2

1. Paridah Abd. Samad, "Internal Variables of Regional Conflicts in ASEAN's Interna-

tional Relations," Indonesian Quaarterly, Jakarta, April 1990, p. 171.
2. Discussion on genesis of the Sabah claim is in Malaya - Philippine Relations, 31st Aug
1957 to 15th September 1963 (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 1964); also in Lela
Garner Noble, Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence (Tucson: Univer-
sity of Arizona Press, Assn. for Asian Studies, 1977).

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 556 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXII, NO. 6, JUNE 1992

Once a part of the Sultanate of Sulu, Sabah's land area exceeds 29,000
square miles, smaller than neighboring Mindanao by about 8,000 square
miles. Its centuries-old ties with the Philippines are indicated by the fact
that inhabitants of both came from the same racial stock and have similar
customs and traditions. The Sultan of Brunei originally ruled this part of
Borneo, but in 1704 the Sultan of Sulu helped suppress an uprising there
and, as a reward, North Borneo was ceded to Sulu. Subsequently, Europe-
ans came to Southeast Asia for the valuable minerals, spices, and other
rich sources of revenue, and in 1878, two of these enterprising merchants
leased North Borneo from the sultan for 5,000 Malaysian dollars. Soon
the British North Borneo Company was formed and awarded a royal char-
ter.3 In the course of laying the groundwork for Philippine independence,
the treaty signed in 1930 by the U.S. government and the British Crown
circumscribed the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Republic. This
treaty did not include Sabah within the boundaries of Spanish, American,
or Philippine jurisdiction. Then, a mere six days after the Philippines was
granted its independence (July 10, 1946), the British North Borneo Com-
pany turned over all its rights and obligations to the British government,
which in turn asserted full sovereign rights over Sabah through the North
Borneo Cession Order.4
There was no advancement of Philippine claims to Sabah from 1946 to
1962. Within that period, successive administrations conducted low-keyed
investigations on the merits of such a claim, and a study of these and other
documents convinced Diosdado Macapagal, then chief of the Legal Divi-
sion of the Philippines' Foreign Affairs Department, that a claim on North
Borneo could be filed. The first official Philippine act on the matter-
House Resolution No. 42 adopted on April 28, 1950-stated explicitly that
North Borneo belonged to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and authorized
the president to conduct negotiations for the restoration of sovereign juris-
diction.5 But it was June 1962 before the Philippine government notified
the United Kingdom of its claim on Sabah, and the following December
the two agreed to hold talks on the issue. The promulgation of the claim
brought the Philippines into diplomatic conflict with the British, who re-
garded it as a nuisance in relation to their own plan to change the status of
North Borneo from a colony into a state of an expanded federation of

3. Ting Ting Conjuangco, "Sabah: A Footnote of History," Manila Standard, 3 August,

1990.

4. Santanina T. Rasul, "The Resolution of the Philippine Claim to Sabah," Foreign Rela-
tions Journal (Manila), December 1988, p. 90.
5. Ibid., p. 89.

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 557

Malaysia.6 The British government rejected the Philippine position in

view of the overriding need to form the Federal Republic of Malaysia,
ostensibly to contain communism in Southeast Asia.7
At the first ministerial conference on the claim, held in London in 1963,
a joint communique was issued by the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, and the Philippines stating that the inclusion of North Borneo in the
Federation of Malaysia "would not prejudice either the Philippine claim or
any right thereunder." This joint statement was ratified by the presidents
of the three countries when they met later that year in Manila, and Ma-
capagal's participation in it jeopardized the Philippine claim to Sabah. In
any case, the Federation of Malaysia came into being on September 16,
1963, and due to the physical possession of Sabah by Malaysia, the Philip-
pine government refused to accord diplomatic recognition, contrary to its
solemn commitment in the Manila Agreement. When Soekarno started
his "confrontation" against Malaysia, Manila reduced its representation in
Kuala Lumpur to consular level.8
Various unsuccessful efforts were made to reconcile the Philippines and
Malaysia until the two finally agreed to restore full diplomatic relations in
June 1966. Both countries have since tried to keep their relationship
friendly, using ASEAN as a cornerstone of their foreign policies. They
have agreed to cooperate in the eradication of smuggling, subsequently en-
tering into an Anti-Smuggling Pact and a Protocol on Border Crossing. In
March 1967, the Philippine government was invited to send observers to
witness the first direct elections in Sabah, but Manila refused on the
grounds that this might prejudice its position on the claim. The refusal did
not, however, impede the participation of the Philippines and Malaysia in
the formation of ASEAN in August 1967, and the following January Pres-
ident Marcos and his wife paid a state visit to Kuala Lumpur. But deterio-
ration in bilateral ties, again involving Sabah, led to a rupture in relations
in 1969. The Philippines's institutionalization of the claim through enact-
ment of Republic Act 5546 incorporating Sabah as part of the territory of
the Philippines triggered Malaysian suspension of diplomatic ties.9 How-
ever, in the spirit of regional cooperation, relations were restored on De-
cember 16, 1969, during ASEAN's third ministerial conference.
President Marcos made a dramatic move toward normalization of bilat-
eral relations in 1976, just prior to an ASEAN summit meeting, when he

6. Michael Leifer, The Foreign Relations of the New States (Camberwell: Longman Austra-
lia, Pty., Ltd., 1974), p. 62.
7. Santanina T. Rasul, "Resolution of the Claim," p. 91.
8. Afalaya-Philippine Relations, op. cit.
9. Malaysia's Ambassador to the Philippines Eman Datuk Mohd. Hanif, Malaysia-Philip-
pine Relations, paper delivered at Ateneo de Manila University, September 1989.

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 558 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXII, NO. 6, JUNE 1992

stated that the Philippines no longer intended to press its claim to sover-
eignty over Sabah, though he did not officially drop it. The pronounce-
ment, however, was never followed by any concrete action. The
heightening Muslim rebellion in the southern Philippines appeared to hin-
der the government from formally implementing the policy. 10 The dispute
dragged on into the Aquino administration, which tried to resolve the
problem through revising legal and constitutional provisions in order to
drop the claim.11 The Philippine Constitution of 1987 no longer includes
the phrase "by historical and legal rights" as part of the definition of the
national territory. Also, Senate Bill No. 206, redefining the archipelagic
boundaries of the Philippines, called for amendments to Republic Acts
5546 and 3046, and it particularly excluded Sabah from Philippine terri-
tory. However, Sultan Jamalul Kiram III's denouncement of Aquino's
government for endorsing the bill without consulting him12 and bungling
by the newly installed administration kept the bill from getting through
the Senate, denying Mrs. Aquino a diplomatic victory at the ASEAN sum-
mit in December 1987.

The Moro Connection

The Philippines cannot just drop its claim to Sabah in order to patch up
differences with Malaysia, as it must first consider the repercussions of
such a decision on the politically unstable Sulu Archipelago. Sabah and
Moro are interrelated in prolonging settlement of the dispute and in deep-
ening the security concerns of the Philippine government. Since Sabah has
a total land area of 74,398 square kilometres and is only 10 miles from
Sulu, it is a Philippine security concern. Control of the northern tip of
Borneo by an unfriendly power would constitute a serious threat to the
country. Such concerns may have moved President Macapagal on April
20, 1963, to write to President John F. Kennedy stressing the importance
of North Borneo (Sabah) as vital to the security of the Philippines.
Malaysia has been implicated in the Muslim conflicts in the Philippines
from the beginning. Sabah's ruler, Tun Mustapha, who was himself a
Taudug-the ethnic group domiciled primarily in the Sulu Archipelago
and from which MNLF leader Nur Misuari came-was suspected by the
Philippines of tolerating, even assisting the provision of military supplies

10. Philippine/Malaysia: The Sabah Dispute, Asia Research Bulletin, Singapore, August,
1977, p. 359.
11. New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 6 June 1986.
12. Impact International (Muslim news magazine), London, December 1987; Star, 9, 12
July 1986; and Bangkok Post, 21 November, 1987.

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 559

to the Muslim rebels and providing sanctuary for Moro fighters.13 As

chief minister of Sabah, Tun Datu Mustapha allegedly allowed Sabah to be
used, during 1972-76, as a training camp, supply depot, communication
center, and sanctuary. He also allegedly allowed the Moro rebels to ac-
quire motorboats in Sabah to be used to smuggle arms and ammunition to
the rebels in Mindanao and to bring rebel casualties back to Sabah for
treatment. Sabah was alleged to have become a refuge for displayed Mo-
ros, and in 1983 it was estimated that between 160,000 and 200,000 evacu-
ees were living there. 14
However, Tun Datu Mustapha's United Sabah National Organisation
(USNO) was defeated in the April 1976 election, partly because non-Mus-
lim Sabahans felt that the presence of large numbers of Moros in Sabah as
a result of the policy of accommodation had adverse political and social
implications. The predominantly non-Muslim Kadazans feared that the
influx of Moros would jeopardize their political and cultural status, and
they perceived the tolerance shown to the Moros as part of a policy aimed
at restructuring the communal balance in Malaysia. Tun Mustapha was
replaced by Datuk Harris Salleh in 1976, during whose period Malaysian-
Philippine relations remained more or less stable. The present chief minis-
ter of Sabah, Datuk Pairin Kitingan, has not revived Tun Mustapha's pol-
icy of accommodation. In October 1980, Philippine Admiral Romulo
Espaldo claimed that the Malaysian government was tolerating secession-
ist Moro training camps in Sabah. In November 1981, former Philippine
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile referred to "anti-government activi-
ties" in Sabah, primarily of the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party,
which was using the state as a "southern backdoor: commuting between
Sulu and Sabah." Sometime in 1969, cadres of the MNLF were discovered
to be undergoing training in Lahad Datu and Banguey islands in Sabah, as
well as in Pulau Pangkor in Malaysia. Malaysian officials were accused of
having knowledge of their activities. In April 1982, a television documen-
tary was aired in Australia which claimed that British and Australian mer-
cenaries were training Filipino Muslim guerrillas in Malaysian jungle
camps under the financing of Libyan strongman Muammar Ghaddafi.15
The Malaysian government has never publicly admitted its involvement
in the Moro struggle. But one thing is certain: Malaysian assistance gave
the essential incentive to the Moro separatists. The support of Sabah and

13. David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: 1988), p. 183;
New Straits Times, 11 March 1974.
14. Author's discussion with personnel from the Philippine Authority in September 1990,
Manila.
15. Hans H. Indorf, Impediment to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints
Among ASEAN Member States, (Singapore: ISEAS, 1984), p. 26.

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 560 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXII, NO. 6, JUNE 1992

other Malaysian Muslim sectors enabled the Moros to elevate the level of
conflict from a fight for equality and justice to a war of liberation, demand-
ing self-determination. Although Sabah's support under Pairin Kitingan
has diminished, an important role played by Tunku Abdul Rahman in
1970 in promoting international support for the Moro cause still has con-
temporary significance. As secretary-general of the OIC (Organization of
Islamic Countries), he endorsed the Moro case submitted to him in 1972
and asked King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Ghaddafi to help in
persuading other OIC member states to support it. For the first time, the
case of the Muslims in the Philippines was taken up by the OIC. Malay-
sian involvement in supporting the Moros was not so much based on their
commitment to religious duty as to pressure the Philippine government to
drop its claim on Sabah.
Geographical proximity as well as ethnic and religious ties between the
Muslim people of Sabah and the Philippines allow easy transmigration.
These factors have given pirates virtually free rein in border waters, and
the problem has become serious, especially in the coastal areas of Lahad
Datu. It was officially reported that since 1979 there have been at least
eight major pirate raids at sea, the bloodiest of which occurred in August
1984 in which 33 people were killed and Filipino pirates landed on Lahad
Datu and robbed the Standard Chartered Bank and the Malaysian Airline
System office, leaving 10 dead and 11 wounded. In an ensuing action, the
Philippines claimed Malaysian forces attacked Filipinos on Maldanas Is-
land in the Tawi-Tawi group, during which 53 residents were either killed,
injured, or taken as hostages. The possibility of Malaysian intrusions was
briefly raised in Manila but quickly denied in Kuala Lumpur.16 Such inci-
dents have continued time and again, each one lowering the level of har-
mony between the two countries.

Overlapping Territorial Boundaries

The problem of overlapping maritime boundaries is not confined to the
eastern waters but extends to the Spratlys, an archipelago that occupies a
strategic crossroad between the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific and
commands the southern entrance to the South China Sea. The phenome-
non can be explained by poor knowledge of the maritime boundaries of the
Sabah-Sulu maritime region, related to an unusual set of theories delimit-
ing the Philippines that are rather unique but confusing at the same time.
This confusion is further compounded by the presence of a myriad of is-
lands, islets, and reefs in the Sabah-Sulu maritime zone where maritime

16. Author's discussion with personnel from the Philippine Authority in September 1990,
Manila.

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 561

boundaries have not been strictly administered in the past. The colonial
treaties also clash with the provisions of the most recent 1982 Convention
of the Law of the Sea.17
The dispute over the Spratlys will be even more difficult to resolve be-
cause it involves not only Malaysia and the Philippines but also China,
Taiwan, and Vietnam, who have made similar claims. Although maritime
boundaries have been drawn by some parties in the Spratlys, it is not so
much a matter of delimiting boundaries as it is claims by the contending
parties.18 As of May 1988, Vietnamese forces were occupying 21 islands
in the Spratly group, the Philippines 8, China 7, Malaysia 3 and Taiwan 1
(claims exceed actual physical occupation). Vietnam and China insist on
their right to the entire archipelago, while the other three claimants have
more limited demands. Publicly, all five countries have expressed a prefer-
ence for a negotiated solution while continuing to emphasize their inviola-
ble right to their current possessions and to strengthen their military
patrols. The situation is, therefore, anomalous and adherence to the status
quo can only be a temporary accommodation. 19
Thus, it is not an easy task for Malaysia and the Philippines to sort out
the Spratlys problem. In 1979, when Malaysia published the most recent
map of its national territory, seven cays and reefs of the Spratly group
were included despite the protests of its neighbors. Four years later, in
September 1983, 20 commandos from Malaysia landed on Layang-Layang
atoll to establish a permanent Malaysian presence there. The reef is 198.4
miles off Sabah and thus falls within Malaysia's Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), which may explain the action but not necessarily justify the territo-
rial acquisition. Still at issue is Amboyna Cay, 40 miles from the Malay-
sian-held atoll and currently under Vietnamese control.20
Meanwhile, the interests of the Philippines in the Spratlys may have
originated because of a private initiative. Shortly after World War Two,
Tomas Cloma, a Manila-based businessman, organized several expeditions
to the Spratlys. The Philippine government failed to support his claims of
discovery but in 1955 announced its own formal rights without establish-
ing a presence on the islands. By 1968, the Philippines had troops on five
islands and today control eight, which have been renamed the Kalayan
(freedom) islands and incorporated into Palawan Province as a municipal-

17. Lee Yong Leng, The Malaysian-Philippine Maritime Dispute (Singapore: ISEAS, June
1989), p. 61.
18. B. A. Hamzah, "Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicting Claims in the Spratlys," Foreign
Relations Journal, Manila, March 1990, p. 1.
19. Hans H. Indorf, The Spratlys: A Test Case for the US' Bases in the Philippines (Manila:
IISS/CRC, 1989), p. 2.
20. Ibid., p. 3.

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 562 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXII, NO.6, JUNE 1992

ity. Subsequently, oil exploration by the Reed Bank consolidated Philip-

pine economic interests. Meanwhile, the application of the Law of the Sea
archipelagic concept extended Philippine territorial waters and solidified
its claim of legitimacy.21 In response, Malaysia sent a strong protest note
to the Philippines stressing non-recognition of the Philippine claim and
reaffirming Malaysian sovereignty over the southern portion of Kalayan.
While Malaysia declared the disputed area as part of its EEZ, the Philip-
pines claimed that the said area is within Philippine territory based on the
200-mile extension rule as provided for in the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea to which both countries are signatories. The seriousness of the
problem of overlapping territories was demonstrated by the Malaysian au-
thorities when 49 Filipino crew members were apprehended in April 1988,
allegedly for illegal fishing near Rizal Reef.22
While the two countries have initiated talks on resolution of their dis-
puted territorial boundaries, the efforts have proved unsuccessful. Three
rounds of talks on maritime claims held in 1989 failed to reach any con-
crete agreement.

Accusation of Malaysian Intrusions

The relationship between the two countries is further exacerbated by the
Philippine accusation of several intrusions by Malaysian naval vessels and
aircraft into Philippine airspace and territory, particularly in the vicinity
of Langaan, Taganak, Turtle, Balabac islands Palawan, and adjoining ar-
eas. In 1980, 18 instrusions were alleged to have been committed by Ma-
laysian naval vessels in the month of April when a Malaysian Air Force C-
130 violated Philippine airspace and twice buzzed a Philippine Navy ship.
In September 1988, some members of the Philippine Navy and the Senate
nearly provoked a serious diplomatic row with Malaysia when, misreading
a Malaysian map, they erroneously assumed that the Malaysian govern-
ment was poised to annex some of the islands of the Tawi-Tawi group.
The erroneous report of Malaysian instrusions into Philippine waters in
the Sulu islands led to an anti-Malaysia tirade in the Filipino press. Mala-
canang Palace kept its composure throughout the episode, but not without
losing face over the unjust accusation. The public apology issued thereaf-
ter by the erring party did little to compensate for the bad publicity that
was created. Notwithstanding the fact that both states are members of
ASEAN, such blames of instrusions have further strained relations be-
tween them.

2 1. Ibid.
22. Lee Yong Leng, op. cit., p. 61-73.

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 563

Filipino Refugees and Illegal Immigrants in Sabah

The presence of Filipino refugees and illegal immigrants in Sabah is per-
ceived as insignificant in the context of sensitive relations between Malay-
sia and the Philippines. The transmigration of mostly Filipino Muslim
refugees to Sabah has put the Philippines in a favorable position because
this has significantly contributed to reducing the Muslim population ratio
and its resistance strength.
The movement of Filipino refugees to Sabah began just after the declara-
tion of martial law in the Philippines and the outbreak of the secessionist
movement spearheaded by the Moro National Liberation Front. The mi-
gration reached its peak at the height of the secessionist problem in 1974-
75. Immediately following the signing of the Tripoli Agreement between
the Philippine government and the MNLF in 1976, Muslim entry to Sabah
decreased relatively. However, another wave of Filipino immigrants ar-
rived in Sabah in 1980, largely in search of trading and job opportunities as
a result of the declining economic performance in the Philippines.
Initially, the Malaysian federal government appeared to freely allow Fil-
ipino migration to Sabah, granting refugee status on humanitarian
grounds. In 1976, however, the Sabah state government under the ruling
Berjaya Party formally adopted a policy designed to help the Filipino
Muslim refugees already in the state to settle, but it ruled out all those who
arrived after 1976 who were considered illegal immigrants. Then, in April
1985, under the leadership of Chief Minister Pairin Kitingan, Sabah took a
tough stance towards the refugees. Kitingan, a strong Christian, expressed
his belief that the influx of refugees should be controlled regardless of their
race, religion or country of origin in the interests of national security, and
that Filipino refugees must be eventually repatriated since they not only
deprive some Sabahans of job opportunities but also pose a serious security
problem to the state, apparently referring to the alleged involvement of
Filipinos in the series of demonstrations, fire and bombing incidents pro-
testing his new state government in Sabah in March 1986. Consequently,
in July 1988 the state government started to implement a new immigration
policy under which all foreign nationals who enter Sabah without proper
travel documents face deportation. The state government stressed that all
Filipino entrants must secure the necessary travel documents and work
cards, and those with no regular employment and who cannot secure work
permits would be arrested and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines.
Illegal entrants were given up to December 31, 1988, to legalize their sta-
tus. Sabah's Immigration Office disclosed that about 4,281 Filipinos were

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 564 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXII, NO. 6, JUNE 1992

deported from the East Malaysian state during the first five months of
1989, among the 11,912 detained during the same period.23

Resolving the Disputes

The Sabah issue appears to be the main irritant to Malaysia-Philippine
relations and it has functioned as an important source of deterioration on
other even minor issues of dispute. As a result, political relations have
been stunted, marked by sensitivity, mutual suspicion and distrust. For
Malaysia, these relations are in deep contrast to those with other neigh-
bors, where periodic consultations between the heads of government, min-
isters and senior officials have been an institutionalized practice and
exchanged visits encourage greater understanding and friendship. Equally
absent are any kinds of formal and informal arrangements in almost all
areas of cooperation.
It is vital in generating a national consensus on the issue that it lead
towards the formulations of an effective strategy for resolving the Philip-
pine claim to Sabah. Resolution of this dispute is expected to provide an
impetus to the process of settling other sensitive issues. The advent of the
Aquino administration in 1986 and its resolution to drop the claim offered
a fresh impetus for the enhancement of relations. This positive gesture was
well-received by the government in Malaysia, and it reciprocated by ac-
commodating Philippine interests with several agreements that would ex-
pand the scope of cooperation between these two countries once the claim
is satisfactorily resolved. But Malaysia's optimism and hope for a new and
brighter chapter in Malaysia-Philippine relations remain unfulfilled.
While the Aquino administration made the effort and took the initiative to
drop the sovereignty claim on Sabah, it was unable to push through its
initiative because of stumbling blocks. Senate Bill 206, which excludes
Sabah from Philippine territory, remains unenacted.
At this stage, the achievements in resolving the Sabah issues are mini-
mal and the opportunities lost, considerable. Political cooperation and in-
teraction on matters of mutual interests have been almost non-existent and
overall relations sadly devoid of substance. These two governments sel-
dom consult each other on bilateral matters that would normally have ben-
efited both, and thirty years of the unsettled Sabah dispute reflect the
absence of any specific formula for resolution that would not jeopardize
the national integrity of both parties. The Philippines's national interests,
the rights and the requirement of its claim, its dilemma over Sabah, the
possibilities of steps towards resolution of the dispute all should be well

23. Author's discussion with personnel from the Malaysian Authority in December 1990,
Kuala Lumpur.

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 565

understood. Understanding is the only sound basis for a consensus even

though this could put Malaysia in both an advantageous and disadvanta-
geous position.
Other restraints that contribute to the difficulty to the Sabah claim reso-
lution should be related to the nature of Filipino perception of its national
pride. The claim was demonstration of the Philippine ability to act inde-
pendently to protect what is defined as Philippine interests, rights and
honor, hence to improve the national image. The political factors affecting
the Philippine policy are complex. Besides examining the connection be-
tween Filipino perceptions of the relationship between their pursuit of
claim and their national image, one of the most significant aspects of the
Philippine system of pluralism should be considered in understanding the
difficult process of solving the dispute. The system based its legitimacy on
democratic principles. Roles and responsibilities were constitutionally al-
located and checked, elections provided regular opportunities for selection
and replacement of major decisionmakers, guarantee of free speech, press
and assembly allowed constant review and commentary. As a conse-
quence, an extraordinary large number of people, groups and institutions
were involved at every stage of policy making, which made it difficult for
the authority to resolve the problem. Indeed, whatever efforts might have
been exerted to pursue the Philippine claims to sovereignty over Sabah
may have been practically impaired by the country's military and eco-
nomic debility. It cannot afford to go to battle in circumstances where it
does not have the necessary logistic and finances, and the government is
beset by pockets of rebellion and secession.
In the situation facing both parties, Malaysia must state its position
clearly that the sovereignty claim to the state of Sabah must be finally
resolved. The prolongation of the Sabah claim would be self-serving and
in no way contributes to the long-term interests of either country. The
prospects for the 1990's, therefore, depend very much on how the Philip-
pines continues to approach and perceive this problem. Malaysia, mean-
while, will continue to face an uncertain prospect in its relations with the
Philippines should the administration be unable to resolve the claim by
May 1992 since it is difficult to speculate how the next administration
would choose to handle this thorny problem in the conduct of its relations
with Malaysia.

The Present Predicament

The position of the Philippines in not actively pursuing the claim is a con-
crete step for its government to maintain its national image. It has left a
mutual suspicion and distrust that either stagnates or exaggerates the pres-
ent pattern of bilateral ties. This option has seemed to ignore the repercus-

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 566 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXII, NO. 6, JUNE 1992

sion of a protracted and possibly deeper Philippine-Malaysia rift. Though

it has been said that the Philippines does not stand to gain or lose anything
from the preservation of the status quo in Sabah, the kind of inaction being
adopted by the Philippine government over the issue may, in fact, entail
the loss of a number of opportunities. In the meantime, while the status
quo remains, Malaysia will continue to benefit exclusively from the boun-
ties of Sabah and the surrounding waters. More significant though, while
the cost of the maintenance of the status quo is minimal, non-resolution of
the claim would continue to be a hindrance to wider intra-ASEAN cooper-
ation.
Since no law has yet been passed on the dropping of the Sabah claim, the
Philippine government still has the option to actively pursue the claim
through internationally accepted norms that include adjudication by the
International Court of Justice and bilateral negotiations. By pursuing the
claim, the Philippine government could promote the Philippines's historic
rights and legal title over Sabah as well as the proprietary rights of the
heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. However, the 1930 treaty between the U.S. and
Great Britain drew a precise boundary to separate their island possessions
off the northeast coast of Sabah. The allocation of islands defined in these
treaties was enshrined in Article I of the Philippine Constitution of 1935.
Philippine diplomatic blunders over the Sabah issue have not made its
claim any easier to pursue. During past negotiations for the settlement of
the dispute, the Philippine panel usually faced its Malaysian counterpart
without adequate preparation, resulting in a public display of diplomatic
inefficiency. The Philippine negotiators' embarrassing unpreparedness did
not stem from their lack of comprehensive knowledge of the issue in-
volved, but rather, the dearth of consensus between its executive and legis-
lative branches that kept them from presenting a cohesive stand.24 More
seriously still, by continually hesitating on what it should do to settle the
dispute, the Philippine government has let Malaysia score valuable propa-
ganda points in the eyes of international observers. The Philippine claim
has no known international support while Malaysia is morally supported
by Great Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations in rejecting the claim.
Even the United States has assumed a position of neutrality. The other
ASEAN countries, though discreetly distancing themselves from the issue
since it involves two of their fellow members, also seem to silently ac-
knowledge Malaysia's right to the disputed territory. For the Philippines
to drop its claim to Sabah without concessions would mean outright recog-
nition of Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah. Taking this position might

24. Wilfredo G. Reyes, and Abel. Icatlo, op. cit.

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 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 567

also jeopardize the proprietary rights of the Sultan of Sulu. In general,

choosing this option appears to be damaging to national integrity.
The Malaysian government considers the Sabah dispute as a creation of
the Philippine side and hence any effort towards its resolution obviously
would have to be initiated by the Philippines. For its part, Malaysia agrees
to negotiate to find ways and means to resolve the dispute once and for all,
and it has monitored closely every effort by the Philippine administration
on this issue and welcomed any definitive step taken by the Philippines.
At best the Malaysian administration is at the moment indulging in a wait
and see attitude, and will respond accordingly when the Philippines is
more ready either to pursue the claim more seriously or abandon it. How-
ever, in Malaysian willingness to assist the Philippines overcome what is
essentially the Philippines' own problem, the Malaysian government is go-
ing beyond its formerly held position and, to an extent, even against cur-
rent public opinion.
As regards the tensions on the overlapping EEZ, Malaysia has indicated
its readiness to negotiate an interim measure with the Philippines. This
may need discussions at the highest political level, but on this issue Malay-
sia has clearly stated that they should be conducted without any precondi-
tion or linkage to the Sabah dispute. Malaysia has also indicated its
readiness to extend the 1987 treaty of friendship and cooperation with the
Philippines, especially on the agreement on border crossing and border
patrol. It further gave a solemn commitment to satisfactorily resolve the
proprietary claim with the recognized Sulu heirs once the sovereignty
claim is legally and finally dropped. It sees no linkage whatever between
the two claims. In its initiative to solve the problem of Sabah, Malaysia
has always insisted that sovereignty and proprietary rights over Sabah are
two separate questions. Malaysia avers that it has consistently honored its
financial obligations to the Sulu heirs for the lease of Sabah and is prepared
to negotiate with them directly, without Philippine government interven-
tion, emphasizing that the matter solely concerns itself and the heirs of the
Sultan of Sulu. The current descendant of the Sultan still receives
M$5,000 (US$2,008) a year as part of the cession of 71,110 square kilome-
ters leased in perpetuity to the British company in the nineteenth cen-
tury.25

25. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 December 1987, p. 24.

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