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The Mindanao Conflict: Efforts for Building Peace through Development

Article  in  Asia Pacific Review · July 2016

DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2016.1254364

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The Mindanao Conflict: Efforts for Building Peace
through Development
NAOYUKI OCHIAI

Abstract
In its 2003 Official Development Assistance Charter (ODA Charter), the Japanese
government made peace-building one of its areas of focus. Since then, the government
and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have been active in organizing and
implementing peace-building support projects in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. One
of the government’s initiatives is a peacebuilding project in Mindanao, the Philippines,
an effort that represents a break from the traditional mold: the development support
efforts started contributing to the peace process before the signing of any peace
agreement took place.
This article examines how the development support initiatives by the Japanese
government and JICA have contributed to the peace process in Mindanao from 2003 to
2016.
Despite the unfamiliarity and uncertainty clouding the initial stages of the project,
the development support efforts by the Japanese government and JICA are considered
to have played a substantial role in paving the way toward the signing of the
Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro in March 2014.

The Mindanao Conflict: background

In the late fourteenth century, Islamic missionary Makhdum Karim reached the Sulu
Archipelago and started preaching his faith to the local island inhabitants. By the early
sixteenth century, Islamic communities—with progressive political systems—had
already taken shape in the region between the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao and
around the northern port city of Manila. 1 The Sultanate of Sulu, which originated on
the present-day Sulu Archipelago in the fifteenth century, was the largest political unit
in the area. As the years passed through the sixteenth century and into the early
seventeenth century, however, a new countervailing force emerged: the Sultanate of
Maguindanao, which traced its roots to the present-day Cotabato area.
In 1521, Magellan’s Spanish expedition sailed to present-day Mactan (Cebu
Province) as it made its round-the-world voyage. Spain succeeded in conquering and
Christianizing the native inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas, which make up a portion
of the Philippine Islands, but converting the southern islands proved impossible; despite
three centuries of attempts to subjugate the Muslim communities of Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago, the Spanish never fully succeeded. The protracted wars over that 300-
year stretch devastated the Muslim communities on the islands and shaped a history that
would foment enduring mutual distrust and hatred between the Spanish colonies and the
Muslim communities. The roots of the Muslim issues facing the modern-day Philippines
thus stretch back all the way to the sixteenth century, when Spain launched its war of
aggression.2
The American victory in the 1898 Spanish-American War put the Philippines under
US control, but, unlike the Spanish colonizers, the new occupiers showed no intention

1
of proselytizing their Christian faith among the Muslim population. After the
Commonwealth of the Philippines had replaced the United States territorial government
in 1935, however, newly elected President Manuel Quezon laid out a policy of not
granting Muslims any special treatment. This shift marginalized traditional Islamic law
and Islamic leaders, opening the doors for more and more Christians to occupy
government posts in historically Muslim states. President Quezon also made a vigorous
push to transplant farmers onto Mindanao. Over the 30-year period leading up to World
War Two, the provinces of Lanao and Cotabato alone saw their combined Christian
population grow by as many as 300,000.3
After World War Two, the Philippine government adopted a policy of moving
capitulated activists and farmers to arable land on Mindanao for a dual purpose: to
remedy the overpopulation of the country’s rural areas through organized resettlement
and to eradicate the Hukbalahap4 base of power that had formed around central Luzon.
The policy gave the community of Christian immigrant newcomers access to large
swathes of Mindanao’s productive farmland. From 1948 to 1960, after the Philippines
had gained independence, the non-Muslim populations in Lanao (the provinces of
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur) and Zamboanga (the provinces of Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur) swelled—an example of the changing demographics in
the Philippines, which saw waves of immigrants from the north dramatically alter the
ratio of Muslims to non-Muslims in the South (Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago).
Non-Muslims in the southern provinces began to outnumber their Muslim counterparts,
leaving Lanao del Sur and the Sulu Archipelago as the only provinces where Muslims
maintained a demographic majority.5
The national political solution to various problems in the north thus involved the
mass migration of Christian residents to the south. While this national policy may have
had a positive impact on the north, it also heightened socioeconomic anxieties among
Muslims in the south and thereby fueled a drive for “Moro” independence and self-
determination.
In March 1968, 14 young Muslim members of the Philippine Armed Forces were
killed in the Jabidah Massacre on Corregidor, an island in Manila Bay. The impact of
the killings was widespread; Muslim communities teemed with rage against Christians
in the wake of the calamity, which intensified the armed conflict between the two sides
and galvanized support for Moro solidarity among the Muslim population. President
Marcos eventually imposed martial law in 1972, signaling the start of an
uncompromising crackdown against Filipino Muslims.
The next four decades of conflict have claimed approximately 200,000 lives and
resulted in a “domestic refugee” (internally displaced person) population of around
1,500,000, scholars say. In conflict-affected areas on Mindanao, the strife has also
continued to stifle economic growth—the average GDP growth rate in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was 3% in 2014, just half of the national
average of 6%. These centers of poverty in the Philippines are missing out on the
development they so desperately need.
As the historical background suggests, the underlying causes of the Mindanao
Conflict revolve around three central issues: The first is a longstanding pattern of
inequality and injustice—the political, economic, social, and cultural oppression that the
Muslim minority in the Philippines has suffered since the Spanish occupation more than
400 years ago. Compounding that problem is another significant issue, ancestral domain,

2
which the Spanish colonial government, the American colonial government, and even
the independent Philippine government continued to exploit. Centuries of political and
economic repression have also made Muslim areas some of most poverty-ridden in the
Philippines, creating another structural factor shaping the discord.
At the heart of the Mindanao Conflict, then, is the Muslim community’s resolve to
reestablish its self-determination in its long-lost home.

The peace process

In 1971, Nur Misuari teamed up with collaborators Abul Kahil Alonto and Hasim
Salamat to create the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and launch an armed,
unified struggle for Bangsamoro independence. After First Lady Imelda Marcos visited
Tripoli, Libya, in November 1976 to persuade Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi to stop
providing the MNLF with support, the Philippine government, the MNLF, and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) met at the negotiating table the following
month to sign the Tripoli Agreement and thereby grant autonomy—for all
administrative affairs except foreign policy, national defense, and mineral resources—to
the Muslims of 13 provinces in the southern Philippines.6
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which went into effect
under the administration of President Corazon Aquino (elected in 1986), included a
stipulation establishing autonomous regions for Muslims in the southern Philippines.
The autonomy provisions led to the passage of the Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Republic Act No. 6734), a law that
defined autonomy for the residents of Muslim Mindanao within the scope of the
Philippine Constitution and national autonomy. Via a successful local referendum in
1990,7 the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), covering the four
Muslim-majority provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, and Maguindanao,
became a legal entity.
The drawn-out peace talks culminated in the signing of the GRP-MNLF Final
Peace Agreement (FPA) on September 2, 1996. Under the FPA, the Philippine
government and the MNLF agreed to establish the “Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development” (SPCPD) to serve as the interim authority leading up to the
installation of the new autonomous government in 1998, to delineate a “Zone of Peace
and Development” (ZOPAD) subject to interim authority control, and to form a
“Consultative Assembly” that would advise the SPCPD. Chairman Misuari won the
1996 election and took office as governor of the ARMM.
Back in 1984, however, MNLF co-founder Hasim Salamat broke off from the
organization to form the Moro Islam Liberation Front (MILF) and pursue the aim of
independent statehood. While the MILF’s original objective was simply independence,
the group later shifted its focus toward seeking a sophisticated system of autonomous
government. The MILF proceeded to meet with Philippine government representatives
in Tripoli, Libya in June 2001 and to sign the Tripoli Agreement of Peace, which
explicitly recognized three issues—security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain—as
keys to reaching a final peace agreement. After a series of negotiations with the Arroyo
administration, the MILF and the government formalized the creation of a new
autonomous government by concluding a “Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain” (MOA-AD) in August 2008. That success proved fleeting, however: progress
was derailed as politicians challenged the details of the agreement and the Supreme

3
Court issued a temporary restraining order, stopping the signing of the document. As
peace negotiations skidded into a stalemate, the resulting frustration reignited the civil
war.
A new leader of the Philippines, President Benigno Aquino III, took office in May
2010 and continued to engage in active peace talks with the MILF. A significant boost to
the negotiations came in August 2011, when President Aquino and MILF Chairman
Murad got together in Narita, Japan, for a historic meeting and discussed ways to push
the process forward. After harnessing that progress into the October 2012 signing of the
“Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro (FAB),” a basic outline for a peace accord, the
two sides eventually concluded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Bangsamoro
(CAB) on March 27, 2014. The CAB consisted of annexes covering four themes:
Transitional Arrangements and Modalities, Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing,
Power Sharing, and Normalization.
The CAB also provided for the creation of the Bangsamoro Government, a new,
autonomous Muslim administration, via a national election in May 2016. In 2014, the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) was formed to draw up the Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL) and coordinate overall socioeconomic development in the run-up to
the government’s installation in 2016. Once the BBL took shape and a local referendum
made the new government’s territory official, the plan was for the Bangsamoro
Transition Authority (BTA) to take over in propelling the government into actual
operation after further elections. The creation of the BTA would, as a result, dissolve the
existing ARMM government.
The draft of the BBL was submitted to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives in September 2014. Although both arms of Congress began reviewing
the law, deliberations veered off course when the Philippine police and the MILF
military wing clashed in January 2015 (with over 60 casualties in total). Lawmakers
resumed deliberations in May 2015, after the tumult died down, but revision proposals
from both the Senate and the House of Representatives protracted the legislative process
even further. Ultimately, the 16th Congress of the Philippines ended its session on
February 3, 2016, without passing the BBL bill on schedule—and the BBL thus failed to
see the light of day under the Aquino administration.
Newly elected President Rodrigo Duterte, who took office in May 2016, has made
federalizing the Philippines a centerpiece of his political agenda. The administration has
also positioned Mindanao peace-building efforts as another central policy, laying out a
“Road Map” for solutions to the Bangsamoro problem. Based on the premise that the
process now needs to move from promoting peace talks to ironing out an actual peace
agreement, the Road Map involves a wide range of stakeholders—from the MILF and
the MNLF to sultanates, indigenous peoples, and Christian immigrants—in forging a
final solution on Bangsamoro. The goal is to revise the BBL, which failed to pass
during the outgoing Aquino administration, in line with the MILF’s Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), the MNLF’s Final Peace Agreement (FPA), the
ARMM’s Organic Act (Republic Act 9054), and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
(IPRA), and then sign the revisions into law as a “litmus test” for the introduction of a
federalist system. The Bangsamoro government would go into effect sometime between
2019 at the earliest and 2022 at the latest, depending on how the Duterte administration
chooses to approach the situation.

4
Peacebuilding support from the Japanese government and
JICA
The Japanese government and JICA have provided Mindanao peace-building support in
accordance with the government’s Official Development Assistance Charter, official
diplomatic policies, and JICA’s peace-building support policies. The following section
provides an overview of the basic initiatives at the core of the support effort.
The Official Development Assistance Charter outlines Japan’s basic ODA policies.
In the 2003 Charter, the government made “human security” one of its five basic
policies and “peace-building” one of its four priority issues. Aiming to achieve peaceful
stabilization of the conflicts in failed states, fragile nations, and other developing areas,
which represent one of the biggest destabilizing factors in the post-Cold War world,
Japan integrated ODA-based peacebuilding into its diplomatic policy for the first time.
In 2015, 60 years after Japan instituted its ODA program, the government made
major revisions to the ODA Charter, as the international climate surrounding the country
reached a major turning point. The new “Development Cooperation Charter” stipulated
three basic policies, one of which was an element from the previous Charter:
“promoting human security,” which policymakers defined as “a concept that pursues the
right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want, through their
protection and empowerment.” Another basic policy in the 2015 document was
“contributing to peace and prosperity through cooperation for non-military purposes,”
underlining Japan’s role in “proactively contributing to securing [the] peace, stability,
and prosperity of the international community.” The growing importance of Japan’s
ODA-based contributions to peace-building was clearly evident, and more prominent
than it had ever been, in the overall tone of the new Charter.
As the organization responsible for implementing Japan’s ODA, JICA works to
fulfill the Development Cooperation Charter’s mission of promoting peace, stability,
and prosperity around the world by cooperating in socioeconomic development
initiatives. JICA’s peacebuilding support aims at “focusing on conflict-affected
countries and regions and striving to create nations where conflict does not occur or
recur”—in other words, nations with sustainable political stability and the capability to
withstand social and physical shocks and transformations. To create conflict-resistant
conditions, a nation not only needs to establish its legitimacy as a state but also has to
develop the ability to maintain its livelihood through socially based conflict resolution
and mutual assistance. JICA thus pursues a top-down approach, emphasizing the
importance of governments that are “more functional, inclusive, and responsive to the
voices of their constituents,” as well as a bottom-up approach that concentrates on
bolstering countries’ abilities to achieve “compromise, reconciliation, self-improvement,
and conflict resolution.” When conditions on the ground change during an active
support engagement, JICA also needs to keep providing support as fully as possible in
order to convey a commitment to the country, show loyalty to the local society, and
preserve relationships of trust in the area.
As it directs its peace-building support toward helping countries establish
legitimacy and strengthen their social capacities, JICA focuses on four key sources of
national legitimacy: establishing political agreements and processes for distributing
economic and political resources; bolstering basic national functions; providing basic
services and protecting citizens; and helping the country hone its abilities to find social
compromise, pursue reconciliation, achieve self-improvement, and resolve conflicts.

5
How the Japanese government and JICA support peace in
Mindanao
History and track record
In 2001, the then-new Arroyo administration made “peace and development” a focus of
its policy and set out to resolve the conflict with the MILF. With the Japanese
government in full support of the peace-seeking initiative, then-Prime Minister Koizumi
announced a sustained medium- to long-term “Support Package for Peace and Stability
in Mindanao” at a top-level meeting between Japan and the Philippines in December
2002 that would contribute toward the “escape from extreme poverty” and the
“consolidation for peace” in the region. The package included three priority areas—
support for policy formulation and implementation, improvement of basic human living
conditions, and peace-building and combatting terrorism—and pledged assistance via
loan assistance, grant aid assistance, and technical cooperation.
The Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao focused primarily on
“support for policy formulation and implementation” and “improvement of basic human
living conditions.” As the government’s efforts to provide training and formulate
development studies helped the various ARMM Departments (such as the Cabinet,
Public Works and Highways, Agriculture and Fisheries, Health, and Trade & Industry)
enhance their various capabilities, the ARMM gained a solid footing for further
capacity-building. Loan aid—dispensed in various forms, such as the ARMM Social
Fund for Peace and Development Project and the Central Mindanao Road Project—also
created for the people of Bangsamoro a richer infrastructure for their day-to-day life and
improved their lives overall.
In 2006, the Japanese government commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the
normalization of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan by declaring its
determination to “take a more active role in the Mindanao peace process.” The
government honored that commitment by dispatching a socioeconomic development
expert to the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao (IMT), a multinational group
(made up mainly of Islamic countries) of independent cease-fire observers that began its
activities (that encompassed the four components of “Security,” “Civilian Protection,”
“Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development,” and “Socio-Economic Assistance”)
in 2004. Japan’s other initiatives included providing its very own socioeconomic
development assistance (the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and
Development [J-BIRD]), and having the Embassy of Japan, JICA (at the time), and
JBIC (at the time) establish the independent Mindanao Task Force dedicated to
coordinating aid policy.
After the Japanese expert on socioeconomic development (a JICA employee) joined
the IMT in October 2006, JICA launched the “Study for Socioeconomic Reconstruction
and Development of Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao” (SERD-CAAM) in February
2007. Through reconstruction and development work in communities affected by the
Mindanao Conflict, the program aimed to help alleviate poverty—one source of the
conflict—and thereby provide favorable conditions in which the peace process could
make progress and take root. As well as formulating reconstruction and development
plans and projects also implemented community-level development projects.
Progress faltered in 2008, however, when the Supreme Court declared the
memorandum on ancestral domain unconstitutional. The ruling inflamed the MILF

6
contingent, which responded by targeting the Philippine Armed Forces around the
country with escalating armed hostility that ultimately forced the IMT to cease its
activities and led Malaysia and Brunei to pull out of Mindanao altogether. Once the
conflict had cooled down, the parties went back to the peace-negotiating table in
December 2009, and the IMT resumed its operations in February 2010. Knowing from
past experience that a third-party organization would be vital to the peace process, the
United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Japan together with four International and
local NGOs formed “International Contact Group” (ICG), with Japan serving as a
peace-talks observer—a role that has helped make Japan a leader of the Mindanao peace
process alongside Malaysia. The key catalyst behind the progress in the negotiations
between the Philippine government and the MILF in fact took place in Japan—in
August 2011, President Aquino and Chairman Murad had their first ever face-to-face
meeting at a hotel near Narita Airport. The day proved profoundly important, as the
sense of trust that developed between the two leaders paved the way for the resumption
of peace talks. With the peace process gathering momentum, JICA embarked on the
“Project for Capacity-Building for Community Development in Conflict-Affected Areas
in Mindanao” (CD-CAAM) the following March.
After the Philippine government and the MILF signed the Framework Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in October 2012, clearing a relatively straight path to peace,
JICA set up its Cotabato Project Office (JICA-CPO) in central Mindanao and, in July
2013, launched the “Comprehensive Capacity Development Project (CCDP)” to smooth
out the transition to the new Bangsamoro government. The CCDP has four main
components: institution- and organization-building, government human resources
development, improvement of public service delivery (including administrative services
for the agricultural and fishery industries), and development planning. In addition to
providing the Bangsamoro community with expansive, balanced support through this
four-pronged approach, the project also aims to enhance the capacities of the existing
ARMM government. JICA has been active on the grant-aid front as well, repairing
access roads between farming communities and markets, and promoting other
infrastructure development efforts. With the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014, JICA’s various CCDP-based support
initiatives in the institutional, structural, and human resources development fields have
taken on an increasingly specific relevance.
President Duterte assumed office in May 2016 and began pushing his federalist
agenda for the Philippines. The autonomous Bangsamoro government is part of that
vision. JICA’s CCDP initiative and other projects are synergizing into a fruitful peace-
building support system that is geared toward streamlining the transition to a new
administration.

Development support in the pre-peace agreement context (under cease-

fire)
Up until the Mindanao project, JICA would normally wait to launch local development
support activities until the parties in conflict reached some kind of accord and the
situation stabilized. Given the context, then, the Mindanao case was the first time JICA
had ever sent personnel into the field and implemented a set of support programs amid
shaky circumstances and political instability. JICA was heading into the project without
any similar precedent on which to base its operations.

7
 In order to advance the IMT’s “socioeconomic development” mandate, the
Japanese government has been sending Japanese personnel from JICA through Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to the IMT (the first time that JICA had ever dispatched anyone into
an unstable, conflict-affected environment that was still under a cease-fire and had yet
to reach a final peace agreement) and has developed a diverse mix of support projects
through the J-BIRD program. Frequent cease-fire violations during the initial stages of
the initiatives made for challenging conditions, but project organizers have implemented
numerous small-scale, community-level infrastructure efforts (construction of schools,
multipurpose halls, and agricultural facilities, for example) to translate the “dividends of
peace” into tangible forms, secure local popular support for the peace process, and keep
the process marching steadily along without either the Philippine government or the
MILF backtracking. At the same time as making these peace dividend-centered efforts,
JICA has also driven initiatives to improve the administrative functionality of the
ARMM government, train personnel, and iron out a wide range of development plans.
The August 2008 “ancestral domain agreement” impasse and the ensuing relapse
into large-scale civil strife were not enough to deter the Japanese government or JICA,
which kept their IMT personnel on the ground, continued to offer grassroots grant aid,
maintained a variety of small programs as part of the JICA Community Empowerment
Project, and worked doggedly to safeguard against any setbacks in the peace process.
Then-JICA President Ogata, firm in her belief that the flurry of pullouts by other nations
made it even more necessary for JICA’s support projects to press on, actually expanded
the organization’s dispatches to the IMT—winding down the effort would let the
situation slip out of the international community’s sight, she feared, which would allow
the conflict to revert to its original tumult. President Ogata had met with MILF
Chairman Murad and then-Philippine President Arroyo in 2006, when she proposed the
idea of establishing peace through development support on both sides of the dispute.
Murad and Arroyo made it clear to Japan that they were serious about achieving peace
and needed assistance to make that goal a reality.8 The Japanese government proceeded
to mediate the first talks between then-President Aquino and MILF Chairman Murad in
August 2011. The decision to hold the meeting in Japan sprang from the overwhelming
trust that both sides placed in the Japanese government and JICA, which had refused to
back out of the situation in the direst of circumstances.
By rolling out its development support before the signing of a final peace
agreement, Japan was also attempting to fill any gap that might occur between
emergency humanitarian aid which is provided by other donor organization and ongoing,
medium- to long-term development assistance; urgent humanitarian relief may be able
to ensure personal safety, but providing residents with a local infrastructure for
surviving in their homeland goes beyond what emergency support can offer. Amid the
precarious conditions in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, JICA made a concerted
effort to shift smoothly from humanitarian relief to development support in Mindanao.
For the organization, the effort was a far-reaching approach to the endeavor of building
peace and supporting reconstruction, one that operated on a foundation of human
security (freedom from fear and freedom from want). In monetary terms, Japan invested
19 billion yen in support contributions in the Philippines between 2006 and 2015.
JICA’s support projects entered a new phase after the conclusion of the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in March 2014 and the resolution to
establish the new autonomous Bangsamoro government in 2016. While the

8
organization’s community-level efforts to distribute peace dividends remained part of
the agenda, the emphasis gradually shifted toward full-fledged socioeconomic support
geared toward establishing social stability at the regional level. At the meeting between
then-JICA President Tanaka and MILF Chairman Murad shortly after the CAB signing
ceremony, Murad expressed his strong desire to ensure peace for the Bangsamoro
people living in conflict-affected area. President Tanaka agreed immediately,
reaffirming his commitment to keeping the peace process moving forward. JICA
proceeded to launch quick impact projects, which rendered the fruits of peace as small-
scale infrastructure projects, such as school buildings and multipurpose halls for the
Bangsamoro community.
Coming in the post-CAB transitional phase, JICA’s J-BIRD project aims to ease the
process of establishing the Bangsamoro government by instilling hopes for peace,
promoting the social reintegration of MILF military members, and driving
socioeconomic development in conflict-affected communities and regions. To achieve
these aims, the organization is engaging in a wide range of support activities—
institution- and organization-building, human resources development, administrative
service improvement, normalization, and development plan formulation. With each new
phase, JICA continues to demonstrate an unwavering approach to the situation and is
holding true to its top-down and bottom-up approaches in both listening carefully to
people on both sides of the conflict and working to build a society that rests on proper,
community needs-focused governance by local policymakers.

A multifaceted, multilayered approach to support

Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA, the Japanese government is using a
trio of approaches—IMT peace-keeping efforts (on the military framework), ICG peace-
making efforts (on the political framework), and J-BIRD peace-building efforts (on the
reconstruction and development framework)—to make a palpable difference in
socioeconomic development support, impact the political process, and thereby offer
valuable, far-reaching contributions to the peace and stability of Mindanao. The
Japanese advisors to the IMT conduct exhaustive surveys in areas affected by the
Mindanao Conflict, increase the understanding of current conditions and issues on the
ground, and help identify and formulate activities for JICA’s J-BIRD initiative.
Meanwhile, the many practical support projects that JICA is tackling in a variety of
fields to address various problems lend a sense of presence and reality to the Japanese
embassy’s advisory role in helping both sides make progress in peace negotiations. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA continue to support the peace-building effort in
Mindanao, maximizing and integrating the respective elements of their three-pronged
approach.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has Japanese embassy personnel attend all peace
talks in Kuala Lumpur in the role of observer, and Japan plays a sizable part in fostering
trust between the two sides during negotiations.9 In 2008 and 2009, when the talks
were on the verge of breaking down, the political affairs section at the Japanese
embassy was an active player in informal, back-channel diplomacy, aiming to keep the
Philippine government and the MILF on the same page. Embassy delegates also made
frequent trips between Manila and Cotabato City to help maintain communications
between the two sides and piece together a foundation for the resumption of official
peace talks. These efforts won an immeasurable level of trust from the Philippine

9
government and the MILF, and laid the groundwork for the top-secret meeting between
President Aquino and Chairman Murad in August 2011.
The Japanese personnel on the IMT have also been instrumental in enabling Japanese
diplomacy and development support to become woven into the Mindanao peace process
harmoniously, effectively, and efficiently.10 Offering expertise in development support,
the JICA employees function as Japanese diplomats and serve as socioeconomic
development specialists on the IMT through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan’s
IMT contingent represents the nexus of the “all-Japan” effort to build peace in
Mindanao, linking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA. 11 The peace dividends of
the JICA- and Japanese embassy-driven J-BIRD projects represent a crucial source of
diplomatic leverage for finding political solutions to the conflict; considering how
critical it is to maintain the political framework for peace, the development support of
the J-BIRD initiative obviously has a major role in keeping the political basis viable.

Figure 1. Diagram outlining the Japanese government’s efforts to establish peace in Mindanao
(illustration by Author).

Formal peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF as a form
of First Truck always take place in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, which mediates the talks,
but many other stakeholders have an impact on the peace process. Since 2006, JICA and
the Universiti Sains Malaysia have been co-sponsoring “Consolidation for Peace in
Mindanao” (COP) seminars—a form of “Second Truck” diplomacy—with the
Philippine government, the MILF, and various influential stakeholders (the ARMM
government, local governments, religious groups, universities, civil organizations,
NGOs, and participants in the private economy, for example). Facilitating candid—and
occasionally heated—discussions on peace in Mindanao, the COP gatherings represent a
mediatory facet of the peace-building effort and a groundbreaking project for JICA.
COP3, which took place in January 2009, provided an unofficial forum for the
conflicting sides to continue track-II peace negotiations immediately after official talks

10
broke down over the MOA-AD debacle. In January 2012, the COP5 seminar brought in
congressional representatives from the Mindanao area, ARMM government leaders, and
other players to help build momentum for the Mindanao peace process. In June 2014,
after the signing of the CAB, the seminar relocated from its normal site in Penang,
Malaysia, to Hiroshima, Japan, for COP6. With President Aquino, Chairman Murad,
and a host of other Bangsamoro peace process stakeholders in attendance, the COP6
deliberations focused on getting the Bangsamoro government off the ground during the
post-CAB transition. The COP seminars, which bring both sides of the conflict and a
variety of other participants together for track-II peace negotiations outside the
Philippines, represent an extremely effective project that fuses bottom-up development
assistance and top-down peace negotiations.

Figure 2. Consolidation for Peace in Mindanao (COP) (illustration by Author)

Conclusion
Having originated with the Mindanao Support Package (2002), evolved into the Japan-
Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (2006), and continued to
the present day, Japan’s support for peace in Mindanao has aimed to stabilize and
develop the Philippines—a strategic partner for Japan—in light of the changing
international climate.
The efforts, which Japan integrates into a synergistic whole by participating in
political (ICG), military (IMT), and development (J-BIRD) initiatives, represent not
only a remarkable undertaking for the Japanese government but also a revolutionary
endeavor—and the first of its kind—for JICA.
A look at the current global reality, however, reveals that domestic and international
conflicts are always occurring. There are countless examples of groups reaching a peace
accord but later succumbing, once again, to mutual hostility.
On his March 2016 visit to Mindanao, JICA President Kitaoka made it clear that

11
complete peace in Mindanao could provide the world with a valuable model for
resolving conflicts—an extremely challenging venture to tackle. Contributing to the
peace process through JICA’s development support, he said, is of vital importance.

Note: The information reflects the author’s personal perspective and not the views of
the organizations to which he belongs.

Timeline: The Mindanao Conflict and efforts by the Japanese government/JICA

Year Politics/security Efforts by the Japanese
conditions/events in the government and JICA
Philippines
1965 Ferdinand Marcos elected
president
1968 Jabidah Massacre
1970 Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) begins
separatist struggle for
independence.
1972 September: President Marcos
declares martial law across the
Philippines.
1975 Philippine government and
MNLF begin peace talks in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
1976 December: Marcos
administration and MNLF
sign the Tripoli Agreement.
1977 Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) grants
MNLF observer status.
1984 Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) breaks from MNLF.
1986 Corazon Aquino elected
president
1990 Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
established (RA6734)
1991 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
formed
1992 Fidel Ramos elected president
1996 September: Ramos Japan attends donors meeting for
administration and MNLF Peace in Mindanao.
sign final peace agreement.
1997 July: Ramos administration
and MILF sign cease-fire
agreement.
1998 Joseph Estrada elected Japan initiates the Equipment

12
 president
2000 Philippine military and MILF
wage all-out war during the
Estrada administration.
2001 Gloria Arroyo elected
president
March: MNLF Executive
Council of 15 (later the Vice-
Chairman Sema faction)
formed
June: Arroyo administration
and MILF sign the Tripoli
Arrangement of Peace; BDA
formed.
November: MNLF Misuari
faction launches uprisings in
Sulu and Zamboanga City.
2002 November: MNLF Chairman
Misuari captured
2003 July: MILF Chairman Hashim
Salamat dies; Murad takes
office as chairman.
2004 October: International
Monitoring Team (IMT)
created
2005
2006
13
Supply for Road Construction in
Western Mindanao Project.
JICA begins the Follow-Up
Project for the ex-Trainees of
ARMM government.
December: Prime Minister
Koizumi announces “Support
Package for Mindanao.”
The Japanese government
establishes its ODA Charter.
JICA organizes panel of
Mindanao experts, dispatches
policy advisor to ARMM
government, and launches the
ARMM Social Fund for Peace
and Development Project and
Central Mindanao Road Project.
December: JICA launches the
ARMM Administrative Capacity
Development Project and ARMM
Regional Health Service
Improvement Project.
February: JICA launches a Rice-
Based Farming Systems Training
and Support Program for ARMM.
July: Prime Minister Asō
announces support for peace in
Mindanao during visit to the
Philippines.
September: JICA President Ogata
meets with MILF Chairman
Murad and President Arroyo.
October: First socioeconomic

2007
2008 April: MNLF Chairman
Misuari released
August: Supreme Court halts
ancestral domain land
agreement, causing flare-ups
in civil conflict.
November: IMT (Malaysia
and Brunei) temporarily pulls
out of Philippines.
2009 September: International
Contact Group (ICG) formed
November: Maguindanao
Massacre
2010 Benigno Aquino III elected
president.
June: Aquino administration
resumes peace negotiations
with MILF.
December: Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF) formed
2011 August: President Aquino and
MILF Chairman Murad hold
first-ever meeting in Japan
(Narita).
14
development expert dispatched by
Japan to the IMT
December: Prime Minister Abe
announces launch of the “Japan-
Bangsamoro Initiatives for
Reconstruction and
Development” (J-BIRD).
February: JICA begins
socioeconomic reconstruction and
development of conflict-affected
areas in Mindanao.
August: JICA launches the Local
Governance and Rural
Empowerment for Davao Region
Project.
November: JICA initiates the
Davao Industry Cluster Capacity
Enhancement Project.
May: JICA launches the ARMM
Human Capacity Development
Project.
September: JICA begins the Study
on Infrastructure (Road Network)
Development Plan for the
ARMM.
January: JICA dispatches its
second Japanese expert to the
IMT.
Consolidation for Peace for
Mindanao (COP3) seminar held
October: Japanese government
becomes a member of the ICG.
March: JICA initiates the
Development Study on Local
Industry Promotion in ARMM
Project and the Topography
Mapping Project for Peace and
Development in Mindanao.
August: Japanese government
mediates the meeting between
President Aquino III and MILF
Chairman Murad.
September: JICA starts the

2012 October: Aquino
administration and MILF sign
the Framework Agreement on
the Bangsamoro (FAB).
2013 September: MNLF Misuari
faction raids Zamboanga City
and clashes with the
Philippine military.
2014 March: Aquino administration
and MILF sign the
Comprehensive Agreement on
the Bangsamoro (CAB).
September: Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL) introduced
in both houses of Congress
2015 January: BBL deliberations
suspended as a result of the
Mamasapano clash (possible
cease-fire violation)
September: Amended version
of the BBL (BLBAR) drafted
by both houses of Congress
2016 February: 16th Congress ends
session without passing BBL.
Rodrigo Duterte elected
president
July: Philippine government
releases Mindanao peace
roadmap.
15
Improving Financial Access of
Small Scale Farmers in Mindanao
Project.
January: Consolidation for Peace
for Mindanao (COP5) held
March: JICA launches the
Community Development in
Conflict-Affected Areas in
Mindanao Project and the
Mindanao Sustainable Agrarian
and Agriculture Development
Project.
May: On a visit to Manila and
Cotabato City, JICA President
Tanaka meets with President
Aquino and MILF Vice-Chairman
Jaafar.
July: Comprehensive Capacity
Development Project launched
January: JICA launches the
Human Resource Development
Project for the Bangsamoro
Government (Hiroshima
Prefecture/Hiroshima University).
March: JICA President Tanaka
meets with MILF Chairman
Murad; JICA launches Quick
Impact Projects (QIPs).
June: Consolidation for Peace for
Mindanao (COP6) held in
Hiroshima
February: Japanese government
establishes Official Development
Assistance Charter.
Formulation of the Bangsamoro
Development Plan begins.
March: On a visit to Manila and
Cotabato City, JICA President
Kitaoka meets with President
Aquino, MILF Vice-Chairman
Jafaar, and others; JICA begins
road infrastructure program as
part of the Project for Community
 Development in Conflict-Affected
Areas in Mindanao.
April: JICA starts providing LGU
support in ARMM.
September: JICA launches the
Upland Rice-Based Technology
Transfer Program for the
Bangsamoro.
2017 Bangsamoro Basic Law
passed (forecast)
2018 Bangsamoro Transition
Authority (BTA) established
(forecast)
2019 Bangsamoro government
created (forecast)

Notes
1 Masaru Miyamoto and Takefumi Terada, eds. Asia dokuhon: Philippines [The Asia
reader: The Philippines] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1994).
2 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Translated as Gendai
Philippines no seiji to shakai [Politics and society in the modern Philippines]) (Tokyo: Akashi
Shoten, 1997).
3 Ibid.
4
4 The Hukbalahap was an anti-Japanese people’s army that formed during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Based around the agrarian movement in central Luzon,
the Hukbalahap included laborers from Manila, progressive intellectuals, and Chinese members
in a united effort to fight against the Japanese army and overthrow the existing landlord system.
After World War Two, the organization changed its name to the “Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan” (HMB, or Peoples’ Liberation Army) and continued its armed resistance against the
squirearchical, anti-communist, pro-US administration but later began to fade when Ramon
Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense in the fall of 1950.
5 Susumu Yamagata, “Philippine Muslim no nationality to ethnicity” [The nationality and
ethnicity of Philippine Muslims], in Asia ni okeru kokumin togo [National integration in Asia]
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), 193.
6 The 13 provinces were Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del
Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao
del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan.
7 Voter turnout was under 50%.
8 Takeshi Nobayashi and Masatsugu Naya, eds., Ogata Sadako kaisoroku [The
memoirs of Sadako Ogata] (2015).
9 Keizo Takewaka, “Mindanao wahei e no Nihon no koken” [Japan’s contributions to
peace in Mindanao], Gaiko (2013).
10 Since 2006, JICA has dispatched nine of its members: Masafumi Nagaishi, Tomonori
Kikuchi, Yusuke Mori, Naoyuki Ochiai, Kei Fukunaga, Takayuki Nakagawa, Tomoyuki Tada,
Yosuke Tamabayashi, and Hiroyuki Kawamoto.
11 Yuji Uesugi, “Wahei shien de no gaiko to kaihatsu no renkei” [Coordination between
diplomacy and development in peace support] (2015).

16
 References
Chikaraishi, Jūrō. “Mindanao wahei ni kanren suru Nihon no kaihatsu shien” [Japan’s
development support for peace in Mindanao]. The Philippine Society of Japan Bulletin 260
(2014).
Datu Michael O. Mastuura (2012) “Bangsamoro Quest—The Birth of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front”
Diaz, Patricio P. (2003) “Understanding Mindanao Conflict”
Hutchcroft, Paul D. (2016) “MINDANAO - The Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity”
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (2016) “Peace Is for Everyone”
Ishii, Masako. “Heiwa no haito wa heiwa o motarasu ka” [Do peace dividends bring peace?]. In
Genba (Field) kara no heiwa kochiku-ron [Peace-building theory in the field], edited by
Fukutake Shintarō and Horiba Akiko. 2013.
Kawashima, Midori. Minority to kokumin kokka: Philippines no Muslim [Minorities and the
nation-state: Muslims in the Philippines]. 2012.

MILF Peace Panel, The Asia Foundation (2010) “GRP-MILF PEACE PROCESS” (1997–
2010)

MILF Peace Panel, The Asia Foundation (2016) “GRP-MILF PEACE PROCESS” (2010–
2016)

Nobayashi, Takeshi, and Naya, Masatsugu, eds. Ogata Sadako kaisoroku [The memoirs of
Sadako Ogata]. 2015.

Ochiai, Naoyuki. “JICA.” In Sekai ni muketa All Japan [“All Japan” on the global stage],
edited by Uesugi Yuji, Fujishige Hiromi, Yoshizaki Tomonori, and Honda Tomoaki. 2016.

Jubair, Salah (1999) “BANGSAMORO A Nation under Endless Tyranny”

Jubair, Salah (2007) “The Long Road to Peace – Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process”

Takewaka, Keizo. “Mindanao wahei e no Nihon no koken” [Japan’s contributions to peace in

Mindanao]. Gaiko 18 (2013).

Uesugi, Yuji. Wahei shien de no gaiko to kaihatsu no renkei” [Coordination between diplomacy
and development in peace support] (2015).

17

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