BARMM: THE STRUGGLES OF THE MUSLIM SOUTH

By: Dinglasan Sean Christian, Abanto Sandra, & Palisoc Le ann

Dela-Salle College of Saint-Benilde
 I. INTRODUCTION

A. Historical Background

Identity and Religion

Southeast Asia being christened as a ‘hotbed of intractable civil conflicts” is mainly ascribable to
complex issues such as ethnicity, ideology, and historical grievance. The Philippines is not
exempted from these conflicts that are rooted way back in the colonization period of Spain and
the occupation era of America. Historically, the Moros and the common Christianized Filipinos,
whether Visayan, Ilocano, Tagalog, etc. are distinct from each other. Comparing the two, their
historical identities differ, due to the fact that the Moros were the product of Islamic missionary
work, even before the Spaniards came to place the Philippine archipelago under the crown of
Spain. Stating that the common Filipinos as Christianized, we mean that they are the product of
Filipino nationalism that sprung from the colonial experiences of the christianized inhabitants of
the Philippine archipelago. Knowing this difference, we see that the Moros came first before the
Filipinos, as Islamism brought with them a united identity under the crescent moon and star of
the Prophet Mohammed. Islamic culture came with islamic laws under the sharia, bringing
islamic institutions and art [Vic Hurley, 1936:18-21], these written laws were the first written law
that united different ethnic groups under an identity called Moros, meaning the Muslim
inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago spread over different islands. But, it will prove to be that
the crescent moon and star would not be the main culture that can unite the Philippine
archipelago of over 7,0000 plus islands.

The entrance of Spain gave halt to Islamic missionary work’s entrance into the cultural
environment of the Philippines, as the Spaniards were able to christianized the majority of ethnic
groups, especially the visayans and the tagalogs, who are more populous than other ethnic
groups. These Christianized natives, as time went on, became more and more populous
compared to the Moros, as they adopted an agricultural way of life that supported an increase in
population. As the age of industrialization came, these christian natives would prove to be the
backbone of export cropping plantations, that Spain would try to enhance in order to make
profits in the Philippine colony. This endeavor to create export cropping, resulted in the
impoverishment of native families that became tenants of plantation owners, in a land that they
occupied and cultivated even before these were bought by enterprising businessmen that
wanted to engage in the cash cropping industry.

Part of these Christianized natives were the Mestizo Class, who were financially and sometimes
politically capable of influencing the local environment in the Philippine archipelago. Of these
Mestizo’s that were able to educate themselves in Europe, was Jose Rizal, who was able to
intellectually adapt liberal ideas in Europe, especially in terms of nationalism. Before Jose
Rizal’s martyrdom, the Christianized natives did not identify themselves as Filipinos, but rather
according to their ethnic identities, such as Kapampangan, Boholano, Tagalog etc. Jose Rizal’s
idea proved to be the main instrument for nationalization of the Christianized natives, who would
call themselves as Filipinos no matter what ethnic group they come from [Nick Joaquin
1988:1-57]. This nationalism did not include the already established Moros who already have
their own ethnic identity, from Islamic roots. The Tausugs, Magindanawon’s, Maranos etc. were
united under the common identity they identify themselves with, which is the Moro identity, as
Filipinos identify themselves as Filipinos.

Through their distinct historical development, the Christian-Muslim relations are separated by
both orientation and time. The Filipino Christians undertook the European and Western path of
development while the Muslims developed their history along the Arab and Malay Line; thus, the
two people continue to suffer from mutual distrust, uneasy relationships, and reciprocal images
[Sakili 2012:28] translating to decades of armed conflicts in Mindanao and causing slow
development of the country. The relationship between the two distinct groups was historically
unstable, as the Moros did not engage in a sedentary lifestyle, they were culturally engaged in
fishing, pearl hunting, and sometimes raiding during the 15th to late 19th century [Vic Hurley,
1936:12-15]. This non-sedentary life partly contributed to the friction between the Christianized
Inhabitants, as the Spaniards and Church Orders tried to establish settlements in the Mindanao
islands, the Moros had a culture of sea-piracy, that in the past resulted in the enslavement of
Indio’s (christianized inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago). These slave raiding had its peak
during the 17th and 18th century, so colonial settlements, had to protect themselves from Moro
raiders, especially that the Dutch were at competition with Spain, these Moro raiders had the
incentive for slave raiding as the Dutch were the main market of slave laborers in the plantations
of the Dutch East Indies [Amirrel, 2019]. The relationship between the two were not limited to
conflict, at certain times, the Moros still traded with other colonial communities, sometimes even
in Manila.
The historical conflict between the two may well be regarded as local infighting between
different tribes or groups, rather than a conflict between two cultural identities. Knowing the
identity, culture and historical relationship between the Moros and Filipinos, we will be able to
grasp the full context of our study. As the present struggle of Muslim-Mindanao, had more
deeper historical roots that contemporaries must consider, in studying and identifying the
Muslim-Mindanao Issue.

Actors Involved in the Bangsamoro Struggle

The Muslim-Mindanao issue is not wholly fixed between the Philippine government and the
rebel groups, rather it is a very complex and complicated issue involving many actors that shape
and affect the socio-political environment of the region. Those actors up to now are shaping the
current autonomous Bangsamoro government that is being established, with a date of election
in the year 2025. The various groups affecting the socio-political environment of Muslim
Mindanao are a combination of local strongmen (Moro-Elites), Rebel Groups (e.g. MILF, BIFF, &
MNLF), Philippine Government, International Organizations (e.g. IMT & CHR), and the civil
society (i.e. academics, activists, scholars, etc.)

These groups (i.e. Moro Elites, and Rebel Groups) affect and shape the process of establishing
peace and prosperity in Mindanao through the push for an autonomous Bangsamoro, by either
taking enforcement and governance into their own hands, taking into account that the Philippine
government fails to provide law and order in the region [Mindanao: The Long Journey to Peace
and Prosperity 2016:199-272]. For the Civil Society and International Organization, their
influence is limited in pressuring the government to take the right actions, by holding them
accountable to bad policies, in tackling the peace process in Mindanao. The Philippine
Government is the main actor capable of implementing a proper peace process settlement, as
the Mindanao Issue is a national issue. It has the legal and enforcement capability and
resources, to create a long lasting viable peace settlement solution and to continue it in a
manner that the BARRM government that is currently being established, will proceed smoothly
under the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA).

We should not forget that to comprehensively understand the Muslim-Mindanao issue, we must
go into details of what the two main rebel groups have in differences, as these two main rebel
groups have been at the forefront of the Bangsamoro struggle for autonomy, or in the case of
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), independence during the early years of its struggle.
The MNLF was the first official group that challenged the Philippine government formed in the
1970s during the Marcos Dictatorship. Under Nur Misuari, it advocated for complete
independence from the Philippine government. But, even in revolutionary groups, tribal or ethnic
origin does not separate itself from revolutionary politics, as the MNLF was mainly popular
within the Sulu Islands, inhabited mainly by Tausugs. This tribal or ethnic affinity, gave tensions,
within the revolutionary Bangsamoro’s as the MNLF, due to complications in the peace process,
accepted a solution that did not favor other groups, especially in Mindanao island itself, such as
the Maranaos and Maguindanaon, mainly located in the Lanao region and Maguindanao. The
peace agreement was signed by the MNLF and the Philippine Government in September. 2,
1996, which established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), was not in the
interest of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) revolutionary group. This resulted in the split
of other revolutionary Bangsamoros that established and formed the MILF, who advocated for a
new settlement, which is the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (BARMM). This was achieved through the signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in
July. 26, 2018.

Although a little distant or off-topic, the students would like to accentuate the role of another
non-state actor that plays a vital role in peacebuilding and governance in the new Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In BARMM, women constitute 51% of the total
population [Ramachandran, Karon 2022], making their active participation in conflict resolution
and the peace process significant and meaningful. Throughout the Bangsamoro peace process,
women have played critical roles as activists, facilitators, mediators, and peacebuilders. As
mentioned in one of the SDG's Women's Month Webinars in 2022, thousands of these
Bangsamoro women in 2018 walked barefoot in the scorching sun to campaign and rally for the
passage and ratification of the BBL. Suppose we want to improve community resilience and
achieve long-term peace in Bangsamoro. In that case, we must continue to invest in women by
involving them in the peace process as liberalists promote.

Timeline of the Peace Process

The formation of MILF created a series of offensive events until formal peace negotiations
started in 1997, including the agreement on a general cessation of hostilities, also called as
Ceasefire Agreement in 1997. Moreover, the negotiations also became an avenue for defining
the three factors of the negotiation agenda, such as security, humanitarian response, and
ancestral territories that all started with the Tripoli Agreement in 2001 [Herbolzheimer 2015:3].
These factors are all in light of establishing a system that is congruent with the Bangsamoro
people. In July of 2008, the former Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced
together with the MILF the creation of the Memorandum of Agreement-Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD), a document that drafted the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity having its designated
police, military and judicial systems. The MOA-AD suggested the existence of an autonomous
political region. In October of the same year, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining
order on the signing of the MOA-AD and later on, they also deemed the agreement
unconstitutional and illegal. In October of 2012, the Framework of Agreement on the
Bangsamoro was finalized by the government and the MILF in order to allow a new autonomous
political entity which is the Bangsamoro. The agreement consisted of signing ceremonies in
Malacañan Palace with the vital presence of President Benigno S. Aquino III, Malaysian Prime
Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak, together with other dignitaries.

There were no significant events in 2013 and talks commenced once more in 2014 where the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed on the 27th of March at a
ceremony. The FAB is significant as it elaborated the nature of a new autonomous political entity
that replaced the ARMM—the Bangsamoro. At the same time, the CAB is fundamental in
establishing a body to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which was in accordance with
the CAB’s major provisions out of the 17 years of negotiation process between the two parties
facilitated by the Government of Malaysia [Guiam 2018]. There were many significant dates in
2015 where the peace process movement made progress. In January 25, there was an
unfortunate turnout in the mission to apprehend Malaysian terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir, alias
"Marwan". There were 44 members of the police Special Action Force that got killed in battle
against the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in Mamasapano, Maguindanao.
The failed operation also killed 18 rebels and 5 civilians. On May 20, the House Ad Hoc
Committee on the BBL approved the draft along with the committee report of the proposed
measure with a 50-17 vote and one abstention. It was reinstated as the Basic Law for the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BLBAR). On August 11, Former Senator Bongbong Marcos
stated that 17 senators had placed their signatures on the committee report on the substitute on
the BBL and it was finally labeled as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region Law.The last event
that occurred that year was on December 8 when Aquino conversed with lawmakers about the
future of the BBL because it has been long pending in the House plenary for a second reading
since September due to lack of quorum.

The 16th Congress unfortunately did not manage to pass the BBL when it adjourned in
February of 2016. On June 30, the first Philippine president that ever hailed from Mindanao,
Rodrigo Duterte, sat into office and his campaign vows to bring peace to the war-torn area by
passing the BBL. In 2017, Duterte communicated with MNLF founder and leader Nur Misuari
on July 19 in order to settle the BBL as well as the change to federalism due to the rejection that
the passage faced. The proceedings then carried over to 2018, starting on January 25 when
Senators Miguel Zubiri, Sonny Angara, JV Ejercito and Risa Hontiveros oversaw the first public
consultation on the BBL proposal. From May 30-31, the House of Representatives approved its
version of the proposed BBL, otherwise known as House Bill 6475 on third and final reading.
Once talks of provision were settled after 10 hours, the Senate finally voted 21-0 to approve
version Senate Bill 1717. On July 18, the final version of the BBL was approved by the
bicameral committee now called the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (OLBARMM) which was meant to be a parliamentary-democratic that would
be first in the Philippines. It would be led by the regional leader to be called the Chief Minister
who will rule over an 80-member parliament. The House of Representatives ruled by then-newly
appointed House Speaker Rep. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo finally ratified the OLBARMM on July
24. Finally, in 2019, January 21 was announced to be a special non-working holiday and the
ARMM residents and Isabela and Cotabato voted in the election for the BOL. Then February 6,
a new plebiscite was held in Lanao del Norte, Aleosan, Carmen, Kabacan, Midsayap, Pikit and
Pigkayawan towns in North Cotabato and other communities that strived for inclusion in the
proposed BARMM. (Cudis, 2019)

For those Filipinos desiring to change the status quo and living in constant fear of the next
armed conflict, the BBL epitomizes the significance of government action, especially effective
legislation. Also, passing the BBL entails a good tribute to the Filipinos who sacrificed their lives
in the pursuit of peace in Mindanao—the 44 SAF soldiers, the 18 MILF soldiers, the three or five
civilians, and the 120,000 nameless ones who cried out for justice and peace in the
Bangsamoro. The BBL is passed for the sake of peace, national unity, security, and social
justice, affecting the Bangsamoro people, the Philippines, and the world. As a result, the CAB is
considered pivotal in peace agreements worldwide and is utilized as a reference for other
contemporary peace processes, accentuating the role of the Filipinos and other global actors in
the international community, such as the institutions, organizations, and the civil society
[Herbolzheimer 2015:1].

B. Ongoing Issues/Problems

Postponed Elections

The first ongoing issue identified is the postponement of the elections from 2020 to 2025
(synchronized with the next mid-term elections). Due to the COVID-19 outbreak and the lack of
a Bangsamoro electoral code, the election that was initially scheduled for May 9, 2022, was
postponed [Medenilla, 2021]. The interim regional government and advocacy groups in
Mindanao successfully lobbied to move the elections' date. However, some people disagreed,
arguing that doing so would be equal to defending the interim Bangsamoro government's
performance, which they believed to be inadequate. Nevertheless, throughout the lengthened
transition period, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) will continue to serve as the
BARMM interim government [Gita-Carlos, 2021]. The issue lies in the arguments indicating that
the BTA has not produced results at the community level. The ordinary Bangsamoro
communities are experiencing a sense of suspended frustration due to the unfulfilled promises
made during the plebiscite campaign for the ratification of the BOL.

Moreover, an analyst, Englelbrecht (2022), revealed some justification stating that the MILF's
attempt to postpone elections was motivated by self-interest and would impede democratic
development in the Bangsamoro. This is contentious because it emphasizes the idea that since
the current BTA members were appointed (by the president), not elected, the change would
result in another three years without "a popular mandate." Overall, this only stems from the
highly factious polity in the region-Bangsamoro's complex ethnic and political landscape, which
includes on-contiguous provinces, a variety of ethnolinguistic groups, and a plethora of clans
and guerrilla outfits.

In light of all of these factors, the students characterized the delay as an issue because the
creation of the Bangsamoro Parliament has also been stalled. It is crucial to realize that the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao needs this parliament system of
government—one in which the legislative chooses the executive—to implement the BOL's
principles. The Bangsamoro Parliament will, in essence, be the instrument used to carry out the
authority of the Bangsamoro government. It has legislative authority made up of members of
parliament. They are in charge of creating the laws for BARMM. It also has executive authority,
which the chief minister, deputy chief minister, and heads of ministries exercise under his or her
direction. They are the ones who will put the legislation, policies, and projects for the
development of BARMM into action. There will be 80 total representatives seated in the
Bangsamoro parliament, of which 50%, or 40 representatives, will come from political parties,
40%, or 32 representatives, will come from single-member districts, and 10%, or eight
representatives, will come from groups such as women, youth, traditional leaders, and ulama,
as well as non-Moro indigenous peoples and settler communities [Access Bangsamoro, 2020].

For their legislative function, every law that will be passed must go through three readings on
different days, unless certified urgently by the chief minister. The chief minister will then receive
the bill, which must be signed within 30 days. It will automatically pass if not signed. Ten days
after the chief minister signs the law, the parliament speaker must submit the certified true copy
of the approved law to the President and Congress. On the other hand, the Bangsamoro
Government might be overthrown if two-thirds of its members cast a vote of no confidence in it.
The ceremonial leader of the Bangsamoro parliament will be able to conduct another election
with the chief minister's permission.

Fragile Peace

The Philippine government in the past has been unstable with its policy on the Mindanao peace
process, with every election, each president has their own agenda. Sometimes delaying or in
the worst case even rejecting the peace process, to the point of declaring an all-out war policy
against the Moros, which can be an exhausting task on the part of the government. A fragile
peace is also attributed to the fact that establishing an autonomous government requires
government willingness and resources. Establishing peace through a Bangsamoro autonomy
has many issues that must be addressed, which are easier said than done (i.e. land rights,
ancestral domains, compensation for war victims, human rights, discrimination, corruption,
inequality, poverty, and agrarian issues) [Quimpo, 2000].

One instances of the a government all-out war policy that proved to be incapable of settling the
problem in Muslim-Mindanao, was during Erap Estrada’s administration in the year 2000. The
former president stated that the all-out war policy was successful in almost curbing the MILF
group, without noting that the violence in Mindanao intensified more, after the destruction of
MILF camps, especially Camp Abubakar. In following days and weeks, bombings and
massacres occured and guerilla groups initiated ambushes against government forces, showing
signs that the military offensive inititated by the government, although successful in dismantling
MILF holdouts, did not offer a peaceful outcome in Mindanao [Quimpo, 2000], but rather, it
intensified violence in the region. The all-out war policy of the Estrada administration, prolonged
the peace process and in fact was the cause of senseless deaths due to intensifying violence in
the region. Military offensives during the all-out war phase, expended government resources
without achieving beneficial results that helped Mindanao attain peace, only death and
destruction occurred during this all-out war phase. Erap Estrada in 2001 was forced to resign
from the presidential seat due to corruption allegations and was replaced by Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, whose policy favored negotiations in handling the peace process in Muslim-Mindanao.
But, during the Arroyo administration, the peace process went slow and the administration
became involved in corruption allegations.

Not only does the government’s unstable policy making pose a challenge in attaining peace in
Mindanao, local and domestic factors must also be considered. The Muslim-Mindanao region is
home to many different ethnic groups and local governance is usually handled by Moro Elites.
The distinction of local political entities in the region can be strikingly culturally distinct, as the
Datu or Sultan, with their cultural role, also takes role in local governance as they adopt
positions as governors or mayors, affecting local politics, to the point that they have more
control than the central government over the socio-political landscape of the region [Saber,
1973]. In establishing BARMM in the region, the socio-political context of Muslim-Mindanao
must not be ignored, as issues of corruption, land rights, discrimination etc. must be addressed,
and these issues concern local Moro Elites who are in some cases are at conflict with each
other, sometimes resulting in violent clashes and massacres. There is no denying that clan wars
are present in Muslim-Mindanao, that is why the government must ensure that in establishing
the BARMM, local clan conflict will not be escalated and government enforcement would be
transparent, limiting clan affiliation. The government must ensure that Mindanao must achieve
development, whether political, economic, social, and cultural, in order to promote peace and
stability in the region. To be able to eliminate conflict, development is the main key in attaining
long lasting peace in Muslim-Mindanao [Mindanao: The Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity
2016:199-242].
The peace process in Muslim-Mindanao can easily be destabilized or delayed, as the Philippine
Government itself has problems in terms of cooperation between its different institutions,
concerned with enforcement and security. This is evident during the Mamasapano Incident,
where 44 Philippine National Police Special Action Force (PNP-SAF) operatives were slain in a
blundered operation to kill an internationally wanted bomb maker named Marwan, who was
hiding out in Mamasapano Municipality in Maguindanao. Oplan Exodus, was initiated and
planned by Alan Purisima, former PNP chief and Getulio Napenas, a PNP-SAF commander, to
kill the bomb maker Marwan hiding in Mamasapano Municipality, held by the MILF, BIFF, and
other local armed groups. We must note that before and during the commencement of Oplan
Exodus, the Philippine government and the MILF, was in an ongoing ceasefire since 2011.
During this time, negotiations for ratifying the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) were ongoing
with the MILF and the Congress. The encounter in Mamasapano between SAF operatives and
elements of the MILF residing in the area and local armed groups occurred on Jan. 25, 2015, it
resulted in a prolonged clash of 12hrs with the death of 44 SAF operatives.

Investigation was conducted by 8 government bodies and the MILF command, it also included
the International Monitoring Team (IMT). The bodies concerned with investigations presented
their different findings and reports in the joint senate and congressional hearings, according to
their own institutions perspective, creating a problem in regards to the understanding of the
government’s blunder. The AFP, was focused on giving their account, on why they were not able
to reinforce the SAF operatives, while agencies such as the DFA, was busy attesting to the fact
that the operation was not led by the US, as the SAF operatives were assisted by US
intelligence elements during the operation. Each institution was busy with their own narrative,
without being able to come up with a clear understanding of who was accountable to the
violation of ceasefire and the deaths of operatives and civilians. The DOJ's special investigation
team on the other hand, submitted reports, but shielded the identities of their stated
eyewitnesses, making their reports questionable. There were many problems with the
conducting of the investigation, as the area of encounter was not effectively controlled by
security forces, or even the MILF group, investigating bodies' access to the area was limited. It
is worth noting that potential eyewitnesses belonging to the local community were hostile to the
government, and BIFF and private armed groups lacked institutional capacity to issue
well-considered reports. Add into this the PNP-SAF did not cooperate with the verification of
witnesses to the International Monitoring Team (IMT), while the MILF assisted to contact and
made a list of witnesses [De Jesus & Quintos De Jesus, 2016]. This act of non-cooperation by
the PNP, can be attributed to its nature of “covering up for someone”, in times when
accountability is being imposed or pinned on someone. The death of the 44 SAF operatives
resulted in a prejudiced outlook of the Bangsamoro people, especially the groups pushing for
autonomy, without acknowledging that the government itself violated the ceasefire agreement
that was ongoing since 2011. “There is no one to blame for the death of the SAF 44 but their
commanders who deployed them for a poorly planned mission. When it backfired, they blamed
everyone but themselves” [Dizon & de la Cruz, 2015]. It is true that the government blamed
everyone but themselves, the MILF was even considered to be the ones hiding the bomb
maker, when in fact Mamasapano was inhabited by different armed groups, that did not belong
to the MILF elements. In fact, the operation could have been successful and the deaths of the
SAF operatives avoided, if the PNP-SAF cooperated with the MILF in hunting down Marwan. In
regards to the investigation, the Philippine media, congress and senate portrayed that the MILF
were at fault, while in fact, the operation took place within the territories that is said to be
controlled by the MILF, violating the ceasefire. The firefight that killed the SAF 44, was only a
reaction of residents residing in the area, the institutions that conducted the investigation could
not prove that the MILF command had ordered MILF elements to attack the SAF operatives. It is
important to know that different armed elements from different groups, whether MILF, BIFF, etc.
attacked the intruding operatives in their municipality, without their commanders knowing, since
they are residents of the area, they would do what they can against intruders, even if it means
fighting side by side with non-aligned causes. Understanding the local environment in
Maguindanao, may help bring light as to what caused the SAF operatives to die, and those are
loose firearms that are common in the area owned by residents, that take self-defense into their
own hands as there is no strong presence of government enforcement in their area. Blaming the
MILF as a whole is not justifiable, as the investigating bodies could not bring proof that the MILF
command ordered its own elements to attack the SAF operatives in Mamasapano.

The government had a role to cooperate with the MILF in terms of law enforcement in the
region, because in 1997 the Philippine and the MILF signed an agreement for the General
Cessation of Hostilities acknowledging MILF territories presumed under its control, and to
prevent clashes between the government and the MILF, the agreement required coordination
through an Ad Hoc Joint Action Group in conducting military and enforcement operations in
areas under the MILF control. Cooperation was necessary, in a way that the failed operation
could have been easily controlled through the intervention of the MILF Coordinating Committee
(CCCH) on the Cessation of Hostilities, if PNP-SAF informed and cooperated with the
committee avoiding unnecessary deaths during the failed operation [Mindanao The Long
Journey To Peace and Prosperity, 2016: 159-198]. The result of the failed operation was
prejudice against the Moros and the postponement of the ratification of the BOL. We may dwell
on the Mamasapano issue as a one of the determinants of a fragile peace in attaining stability in
Mindanao, government institutions may well violate ceasefire agreements, but the accountability
will not present itself to their directors or commanders, but the whole Bangsamoro people itself,
endangering the peace process in the future. Racist remarks against the Bangsamoro people
have surfaced in the media, especially Larry Gadon’s presence on national television. When
asked if he approves of the BBL, he said that he does not approve of it and he will attack them
bringing the whole force of the military to kill everyone not sparing the children and even rats
(referring to the bangsamoro people) [GMA News, 2016].

We may well see that this norm of unstable institutions and policy making may still continue in
the future, as time goes by with the establishment of BARMM. It will create problems in regards
to peace in Muslim-Mindanao, attributing this condition to the nature of fragile peace in the
region, that can easily spark into violence anytime.

Electoral Violence

Source: Assessment Capacities Project

https://www.acaps.org/country/philippines/crisis/mindanao-conflict

Electoral violence is a hazard that the Filipino people experienced because of the high
stakes it would entail for the political candidates at the national and local scale. Armed group
attacks and military conflicts are still present and pervasive. Groups like the New People’s Army,
Maute, Abu Sayyaf and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters still pose the danger of
intensifying political tensions by taking advantage of the authorities prioritizing the elections in
order to start more attacks [ACAPS, 2022]. There are numerous reports of violence such as the
riots in places like Canizares High School and Barangay Datu Siang where unidentified men
were evidently walking around with wooden batons with nails in their hands, the assasination of
a member of the Barangay Peacekeeping Action Teams in Buluan Maguindanao via multiple
gunshots from unidentified suspects, as well as bombing incidents in Brigada Cotabato, Datu
Unsay and Shariff Aguak. As an added form of precaution, there have been 9,000 police and
military forces stationed in various provinces in the region aside from the designated police
Board of Election Inspectors. In priority provinces such as Datu Odin Sinsuat, Sultan Kudarat,
Datu Piang, Buluan, and Mangudadatu, additional police forces were assigned due to
Comelec’s identification of them having a long history of being election hotspots in Maguindanao
[Tilendo, 2022]. The rivalry of political clans who have much power over the local economy gave
avenue for armed groups to propagate political violence and conflict in Muslim-Mindanao which
places them at high risk from ‘private’ armed groups that are hired to cause a ruckus at election
polls and target political candidates by rivaling politicians. It was predicted that after the election
period, the conflicts that arose because of the election will cause higher-than-average
displacement that would entail concerns for security. This will worsen the poverty rates in
Muslim-Mindanao given that they have one of the highest ones in the Philippines which is then
furthered by the negative repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic [ACAPS, 2022].

C. Related Literature

In the “Bottom-up Peacebuilding: Role of Grassroots and Local Actors in the Mindanao Peace
Process”, Julius Trajano (as the title of the journal suggests) discusses about how the Mindanao
peace process is not isolated to just talks of peace between the government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front. It also entails effective collaboration of grassroots organizations along
with community-based peace advocates towards local conflict resolution. The author then
deduced several realizations and suggestions that corresponded to his research process. He
stated that given the leadership appointed to the MILF, grassroots and civil society organizations
should then directly cooperate with Moro officials and assist them in responding to issues on
security that persists in vulnerable communities in Muslim Mindanao. Mainstream national and
international peace actors that support the Mindanao peace process should also facilitate local
and community-based organizations to spearhead prevention and mitigation initiatives that are
required to increase security in said vulnerable communities. Community-based mediation is still
found to be important to improve peace, security and development to local neighborhoods. The
integral role of the women of Mindanao in dissipating conflicts is also highlighted as well as their
contributions widening the scope of the peace process because they fight for peace by
transforming political, economic and social structures that intensify injustice and deprivation that
negatively affect vulnerable groups such as women. (Trajano, 2020)

The main literature that we used was the compiled journals from the book titled “Mindanao: The
Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity” edited by Paul D. Hutchcroft. Each section of the book
tackles different topics regarding the Peace Process of Muslim Mindanao. From current political
updates during the Aquino Administration, historical foundations, peace prospects and
developmental challenges that the peace process faces. We used different journals in the
compiled works of the book, especially Patricio N. Abanales’ “War And Peace in Muslim
Mindanao: Critiquing The Orthodoxy” and Toby C. Monsod’s “Human Development in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao: Trends, Traps, and Immediate Challenges”, in order
to complement our study.

Nathan Gilbert Quimpo’s work from 2000 titled, “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weaknesses of
a Power-based Approach in Conflict Resolution”, was also used in complementing our study. It
offered insights during the all-out war policy of the Estrada Administration, and implications it
posed for the peace process in Mindanao, during that time period. His work argued for the
interference of an international organization, specifically Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) to act as mediator between the government and the armed groups (e.g. MILF), in order to
promote peace process in Muslim-Mindanao.

Jose Abueva’s proposal for a federal system of government with a parliamentary structure, in
his work “Some Advantages of Federalism and Parliamentary Government”, was used in order
to address the issue of decentralizing the Philippine government in order to empower local
governments. Specifically, we used Abueva’s work in determining the implications that the
formation of an autonomous Bangsamoro will have in the future. The establishment of BARMM
will test the applicability of Jose Abueva’s proposal for decentralization, whether BARMM as a
parliamentary autonomous government, will work in the future or not.
II. ANALYSIS

A. New Public Administration (NPA): BARMM

In this crucial part of the paper, the students utilize New Public Administration to take a closer
on the aforementioned issues of the BARMM. This theory is the most applicable for the reason
that BARMM is a prime example of empowerment through decentralization and
democratization. Moreover, this theory is the most appropriate for this topic because first and
foremost, the establishment of BARMM is an issue of governance that necessitates a call for a
central government that would be capable of flexibility in granting autonomy that gears towards
a self-determined Bangsamoro. Moreover, said government must be able to adapt to
emergency situations that would arise at unpredictable times and in turn, this would empower
autonomous governance for better social equity and change. Also, the NPA theory is quite
beneficial as an aid in predicting the possible future implications of what would result from the
establishment of an autonomous government for the Bangsamoro.

Based on the thorough explanation above, the core conflict in Mindanao is identity-based and
has resulted in a struggle for the right to self-determination [Lingga, 2004]. The historical
background shows that the Bangsamoro people have a unique identity, and the Philippine
government acknowledges this distinct identity through recognized peace accords such as the
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. Therefore, solutions should be found for the issues of
widespread poverty, underdevelopment, and neglect, as well as other social injustices.
However, it should happen once the Bangsamoro people's right to independence—their political
status—has been resolved. It should be noted that the illegal annexation of the Bangsamoro
homeland by the Philippine nation-state was the catalyst for the development of all these
economic and social issues [Lingga, 2004]. More recently, political unpredictability has seriously
harmed security and stability. Then there are the problems of widespread poverty, a lack of
employment opportunities, widespread corruption, the rise of illegal drugs, and encroachment
on indigenous peoples' ancestral lands within the Bangsamoro core territory. All this relates to
the NPA as it was designed to serve the needs and urgent problems of the time, as well as the
turbulence and upheaval of society, particularly in America, after rebuilding administrations in
developing nations and the United States.
The inclusion of "social equity" in this new paradigm places emphasis on the responsibility of
administrators in redistributing chances and wealth in society to lessen the abusive
centralization of power, which is previously demonstrated in Muslim struggles. Through the lens
of NPA, the administrators commit themselves to know the status of equity within the society to
attain good management and fulfill its work and service, especially in times of uncertainties and
emerging issues such as civil rights and inequalities. Consequently, if social equity is applied,
trust and good participation from the people will take place as they are given the chance and
opportunities that could further the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy. For instance, the
postponement of elections is authorized in the hope of giving them ample time and opportunity
to prove their ability to govern effectively, manage intergovernmental relations and genuinely
represent all Bangsamoro communities [Arnado, 2022]. Elite clans must therefore not control
politics because doing so would effectively negate equal representation, which would have
serious consequences for, among other things, the goals of inclusive growth, equitable
development, and political reform throughout the prolonged transition period and beyond.

B. Future implications of an autonomous Bangsamoro Government

The establishment of an autonomous Bangsamoro Government may well enhance peace and
stability in the Muslim-Mindanao region, as this will give representation for the needs of the
Moros. Local enforcement will also be handled by the BARMM, which the central government
was unable to provide in the past, giving the Moros the right to handle peace and order in their
region. This will empower the local government in Muslim-Mindanao, as the BARMM will be able
to systematically address the needs of the Moros, with flexibility, away from the full interference
of the central government, that is unable to grasp local socio-political and socio-economic
problems in the Muslim regions. It is worth noting that the BARMM’s structure is that of a
parliamentary government, that is bicameral in nature, offering more representation for diverse
ethnic groups and IP’s, compared to the current unitary structure of the Philippine’s presidential
system. In the hopes of decentralization, “it would be the most logical step to address local
autonomy issues that have been blocked by legislators who want to maintain their dominance
over local leaders, governments, and communities'' [Jose Abueva: Some Advantages of
Federalism and Parliamentary Government, 2005]. The formation of BARMM may well test the
applicability of Jose Abueva’s proposal of a decentralized federal government with a
parliamentary structure, changing the current inflexible Presidential system of the Philippine
Republic.
An autonomous Bangsamoro government, will have to tackle many challenges, for it to work in
order to stabilize the Muslim-Mindanao region. The main challenges that the BARMM would
face would be the power of the local Moro elites, unarming armed groups, providing
compensation for freedom fighters and war victims, loose firearms, crime, land feuds, clan
feuds, poverty, and many more [Mindanao: The Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity
2016:199-272]. These are vast problems that an autonomous government will have to address,
and the question whether the BARMM will have the necessary resources to address these
various problems and issues, remains to be seen in the future. In case of failure, the central
government will have to either restructure BARMM to make it work, which is the only best choice
there is, or continue going on the same path by not granting autonomy to the Bangsamoro
people encouraging another revolutionary movement and possibly an all-out war policy.
III. CONCLUSION

BARMM was assessed via the New Public Administration and it is better understood how the
distinction of the Bangsamoro identity has birthed the necessity for a new autonomous
government that would govern the Bangsamoro people by leaders selected from their own
localities. Needless to say, this autonomy requires much responsibility to yield improvement in
the Muslim-Mindanao region, that in the past was neglected by the central government, without
proper manpower and resources for keeping law and order. There is an imperative need for
good governance in Muslim-Mindanao, that is careful not to misuse power and always seeks to
serve the general welfare of the people. From this, the people of BARMM could have more
harmonious cooperation that would allow them to create and experience a safer, more
progressive society to prove that, in the future, BARMM will provide for the needs of the
Bangsamoro people, in terms of peace, security, and development.

In concluding our paper, we argue that Bangsamoro autonomy, is the result of the
self-determination of the Bangsamoro people, that will, in the end, prove to be the main driver
for peace and equity in the Muslim-Mindanao region. Years of armed struggle prove that the
demands of the Bangsamoros are deeply binded to the decades of hardships that they faced.
Oppression and neglect by the Philippine government, especially during the Marcos dictatorship
and Estrada administration, led the Bangsamoros to determine their own fate, and that is a path
to armed struggle in the hopes of establishing autonomy in order to achieve what the central
government could not offer. Autonomy may be regarded by the majority of Filipinos as breaking
away from the grasp of the Philippine Republic, but they are wrong in thinking that the
Bangsamoro people have secessionist motives. What it means to be autonomous, is
self-governance within the state and as part of the state, to decentralize from the state and
empower local governance in the Bangsamoro region. Giving autonomy to the Bangsamoros
will enhance representation of the different ethnic-groups within Muslim-Mindanao, and to better
serve their needs and interests, in the hopes of achieving social equity and development. Not
granting the Bangsamoros the right for self-rule, would mean violating fundamental civil and
political rights, that is the right to self-determination, liberty, freedom of expression, and freedom
of association [UN-ICCPR, 1966]. It is very important that the Philippine government grants the
Bangsamoro people their fundamental civil and political rights, as part of the international
community. The central government has responsibilities for its citizens, and it includes the
Bangsamoro people, that they must provide for. The many sacrifices and blood spilt will not be
in vain, as the creation of an autonomous government for the Bangsamoro people, is the result
of a decades-long struggle to attain self-rule.

Policy Recommendations Based on Theoretical Analysis

Through the lens of NPA, which highlights social equity and determines the actual receiver of
the enhanced service-answering the question For whom-the students recommend applying a
multisectoral approach (MSA) that requires collaboration among various stakeholder groups
(e.g., government, civil society, and private sector) and sectors (e.g., health, environment, and
economy) to jointly achieve a policy outcome [Salunke and Kumar Lal, 2017]. The said
approach will create an equitable representation of women, indigenous peoples, Christian
settlers, internally displaced persons, and marginalized sectors that will be essential for the
Bangsamoro government and community to succeed. These stakeholders' active engagement
and participation are vital in the institution building, advancing economic and social
transformation in the region.

Furthermore, the students suggest that all hands be on deck between the parties involved
because there is believed to be a lot of ambiguity and change regarding many aspects in the
Mindanao problem, such as societal gaps. On this basis, different interpretations of how to
successfully implement particular peace accord provisions can be harmonized. Adaptability and
social equity will help public administrators create and carry out just public policies, which will
consequently increase the trust in between the central and autonomous government. This
implies that the administration will be able to manage well and carry out its duties, particularly
for the Muslim minority, which has faced suffering fordecades.
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