De La Salle–College of Saint Benilde

School of Diplomacy and Governance

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES OF CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES:

COMPARING THE STATE OF JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GROUP 5
De Asis, Ayanna Franchesca
Dinglasan, Sean Christian
Paglinawan, Mae Ann
Viñas, Summer Bernadette
Yu, David Brant

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 Government Structures of Consolidated Democracies: Comparing the State of Japan and
the Republic of the Philippines

Both the State of Japan and Republic of the Philippines had long been products of the
efforts democratization which can be traced back from the developments in the post-War period,
under the leadership of the United States. Likewise, true to the title of this paper, the Philippines
is known to bear Asia’s oldest democracy while Japan has the most mature, thus qualifying not
only has democracies but consolidated ones—a key term which we define in a while. Yet despite
their similar roots and existing regimes, both countries can be put in stark contrast to its political,
economic, and social factors associated with a consolidated democracy, and the ways in which
they have evolved to survive as democracies is an area this paper endeavors to explore. We aim
to focus on at least one aspect of this, which is the government structures within these
democratic regimes. It is thus proper to understand not only what a democratic consolidation is,
but also what has been principally said about the elements involved, as well as by what criteria
these elements measure up.

Principal Literature on Democratic Consolidation

While there remains no broad consensus as to what constitutes consolidation in a regime,

the indicators of such a democracy are often more agreed upon. Andreas (1998) perhaps well
encapsulates this agreement about the nature of democratic consolidation, which is when
particular elements of a democratic regime (i.e., institutions) are present in such that it is unlikely
for it to regress into authoritarian regimes (p. 91). To put it another way, democratic
consolidation occurs when, owing to long-standing development of the stable and necessary
institutions, the political system renders democracy to become “the only game in town” (Dahl, in
Linz & Stepan, 1996).

This element of stability in democratic institutions, furthermore, can occur when other
conditions or indicators are met, which Linz & Stepan (1996) enumerates as adhering to rule of
law, competitive and fair elections, an independent judiciary, and other civil and political rights
guaranteed to the population, to name some. In the interest, however, on the focus of comparing
government structures, the paper focuses on those elements associated with, and significant in,
the key institutions of governance in any typical modern-day democracy. Operationally, we refer
to the three branches of government, that is to say, the legislatures, executives, and courts of such
regimes. Operationally, we look to the organizations similar to the government branches as
articulated in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Comparing Institutional Design of Democracies: Executive-Legislative Arrangements,

Electoral Systems, and Political Party Systems

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 The comparing of various countries’ government institutional designs typically involves
three key aspects that most scholars agree to bear the greatest analytical importance for
democracy (Landman, 2014, 219). The first is the Executive—Legislative arrangements (“E-L
Arrangements”), which concerns the relative power given to the executive and legislative
branches of government, both in terms of the way each is constituted and the powers that each
possesses with respect to the other. While no two governments have identical relational
characteristics, there are nonetheless three types generalizable. These are helpfully described
under (1) a purely presidential system, (2) a pure parliamentary system, and (3) some hybrid of
both (p. 220). In pure presidentialism, the executive and legislative branches are mutually
independent, and both the executive and the legislatures typically have fixed terms into which
they are democratically legitimated (i.e., by popular elections). In contrast, pure parliamentarism
involves mutual dependence between the executive and legislature, which means the existence of
the executive rests on its confidence of the majority (or coalition) in the legislature. Moreover,
the executive can dissolve the legislature at its behest (or sometimes in conjunction with the
head-of-state); and the elections for both executive and legislatures are not separate—usually
being the case that popular elections are held only in the legislative branch, and the legislature, in
turn, elects or appoints the chief executive.

The second and third aspects involve, respectively, the electoral system, and the political
party system which the electoral system typically produces. The country’s electoral system
provides the rules and formulas through which the votes of the electorate are converted into
support for (or seats to reflect) the popularly elected executives and members of the legislatures.
Again, typical democratic systems produce three generalized forms: (1) majoritarian
systems—which produce a “majority-win” or “winner-take-all” vote, and some examples include
pluralities, First-Past-the-Post, or Single Member Districts; (2) proportional systems—in which
legislative candidates gain seats in proportion to votes cast for them; and (3) some hybrid of the
two.

As hinted earlier, the party system is seen as closely related to the electoral system, and
includes the ways parties can successfully achieve sufficient electoral support to hold legitimate
power in government. The close relationship between the two is often borne out of the tendency
of parties (or coalitions) to behave in such a way that the electoral system will turn out to benefit
them electorally. These three aspects will be the central analytical focus in comparing the
executive and legislative branches of government of Japan and the Philippines insofar as each
aspect benefits which branch the most—which is further explained in the Overview sections.

Independent Judiciaries Conceived by the Use of Judicial Review

The independence of a country’s judicial system (often attributed to the “power” of the
judicial branch) is the primary element of a consolidated democracy which we give attention to.
What is often analyzed by comparative scholars with respect to the Court’s level of independence

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is its scope and power of judicial review—the mechanism in which a court wields powers to
examine the actions of the executives and legislatures, and whether these are consistent with a
country’s constitution (Crepas & Steiner, 2013, p. 140).

Currently, there has been a growing amount of literature around the

democratic-promoting powers of a very powerful supreme court – at least, as far as a
consolidated democracy is concerned (Shapiro, 2022). This is because, contrary to the previously
mistaken notion that strong courts are effective protector of individual rights, studies have shown
that the courts—through its use of judicial review—has had very minimal effects on its ability to
protect and promote civil and political rights, especially for minorities in a democracy; moreover,
its positive uses does not bear much significance when compared to the country’s legislature
(Tushnet, 1999; Waldron, 2006; Rosenberg, 2008). Interestingly, these studies had been
principally built from Dahl’s (1957) work, who had first argued that powerful courts do little to
promote democratically associated rights; instead, judicial review is often a better used as a
check against the power of the other branches. Vanberg (2005) brilliantly showed in his study of
the supreme court of a consolidated democracy that justices, notwithstanding jurisprudential
considerations, may be powerfully influenced by their own policy preferences, strategic or
personal interests, and the broader socio-political environment of the day (a.k.a. the status quo).

Rationale

With the relevant literature on democratic consolidation, as well as the selected

democratic principles pertinent to the comparison of branches of government, we lay out the
rationale of the comparative paper. Our aim is to provide a comparative description of the two
consolidated democracies—Japan and the Philippines—by way of their three government
branches which, as articulated in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, are the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of government. We first describe these government
structures by qualitative data, and then reinforce the descriptions with selected quantitative data,
and then lastly use these data, to make a comparative analysis in conjunction with the literature
on the ideal elements of consolidated democratic government structures.

Limitations

We also exclude or defer any further elaboration, on certain variables which include the
following: (a) internal public or government structures like the bureaucracies, independent
constitutional bodies, or government corporations; (b) local or provincial government units or
parties; (c) public perceptions on government; (d) other elements associated with democratic
regimes like civil rights, rule of law, civil society; and economic, social, and historical factors.
We, however, consult historical data on certain items like party proliferation history or changes
in prime ministers, to supplement the descriptive comparison.

Qualitative Data

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 Legislative Branches

National Diet of Japan

Figure 1
Structure of the National Diet (Legislature)

Composition and Electoral System. The National Diet of Japan or the Kokkai is,
according to its constitution, the “highest organ of state power” and the “sole law-making organ
of the State”. The National Diet is composed of two chambers: the House of Representatives
(Shugiin), also called the lower house, and the House of Councillors (Sangiin) also called the
upper house. The composition of the National Diet members are selected in popular elections
(Japan Module, n.d.). The House of Representatives has 480 members, 300 of whom are chosen
through Single Member Districts (SMDs) and 180 under the proportional representation system,
in which the country is divided into 11 electoral blocs that return between 6 and 30 members
based on their size. While for the House of Councilors a total membership is 242, of whom 96
are elected by the proportional representation system from a single nationwide electoral district
and 146 from 47 prefectural constituencies, each with returning 2 to 8 members.

Japan uses three types of elections: General Elections to the House of Representatives
that are held every four years (unless the lower house is dissolved earlier); Elections to the House
of Councillors held every three years to choose one-half of its members (Country Studies, n.d.).

Political parties. Most parties were established during the Meiji period, but were later
banned during the war years of the 1930s and 1940s. The freedom to organize political parties
was guaranteed by the 1947 Constitution.(Politpro, n.d.) There are several parties that rose to
national prominence, the two most successful of which are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
(the dominant party currently heading the government); the Constitutional Democratic Party

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(CDP); the Kōmeitō or the Clean Government Party; the Social Democratic Party (SDP); and
the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). Given the current electoral arrangements, a
multi-party system is produced, with one dominant party (the LDP) forming a government.

Figure 2
Philippine Congress

Composition and Electoral System. The Philippine Congress is a bicameral body, with
the Senate and the House of Representatives as the upper and lower houses, respectively. The
Senate is composed of 24 members, each serving a six-year term. Senators are elected at-large by
a system called Plurality-at-large voting, representing a national constituency rather than
geographic districts.
Whereas, the House of Representatives consists of members elected from various
legislative districts across the country. Each legislative district elects one representative to serve
a three-year term. The First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system is used for district-based House of
Representatives elections comprising 80% of seats. This system involves dividing the country
into various geographical districts, each represented by a single member of Congress. Voters in
each district cast a vote for one candidate, and the candidate with the highest number of votes
wins the seat. This system tends to favor larger parties and can lead to a winner-takes-all
outcome. For the remaining 20% of seats, a Party-list System (PL) is used, which is supposedly
to represent marginalized sectors. Each party or organization presents a closed list of candidates,
and voters vote for the party, not the individuals. The total percentage of votes a party-list
receives determines the number of seats it gets in the House provided it is not beyond 3% of
seats. This system ensures that a diverse range of sectors and interests are represented.

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 Executive Branches
Government of Japan

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The Prime Minister serves as head of the
government, who leads the Cabinet which forms the leadership of the government. These
Cabinet officials have tasks ranging from enforcing policies and laws, submitting bills to the
Diet, and supervising administrative branches.
Scope of Powers. The Prime Minister has the power to appoint and dismiss ministers,
greatly influencing the day to day functions of the government. A Prime Minister rises from
among the members of the National Diet, the National Diet appoints a Prime Minister.
The responsibilities of the Cabinet and its members are to enforce and implement
government policies, and submit bills and reports to the National Diet, on national affairs and
foreign relations, while supervising administrative branches. Japan's Cabinet Law Article 1 (2)
states that “The Cabinet, in exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the
Diet, which comprises the representatives of the entire nation.” This means that the Cabinet must
always directly report to the Diet since it is under the Diet.

Philippine Administration

President of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines vests executive
power in the President, who serves as both Head of State and Head of Government. The
President is also the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. The President is popularly elected
by direct national vote for a single six-year term,

Composition of the Executive Government. Cabinet secretaries serve as the President's

representatives, wielding Presidential authority within their respective departments. The
President holds the power to create or dissolve departments as needed. Appointing cabinet
secretaries involves the President's nomination and confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

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 The President holds executive power, acting as both the Head of State and Government,
while also overseeing the armed forces and foreign relations. The Vice President steps in if the
President can't continue and may join the cabinet if offered.

Judicial Branches
The Judiciary refers to the system of courts that interprets the law of the state. It provides
mechanisms for resolution of disputes and ensures equal justice under the law. In this paper, the
Judicial Branches of both Japan and the Philippine are discussed for points of comparison
between consolidated democracies.

Supreme Court of Japan

Legal System. At the core of Japan’s judicial system is their constitution. Chapter VI
consists of several articles stipulating the power vested on the Supreme Court and its
corresponding lower courts namely the High Courts, District Courts, Family Courts, and
Summary Courts. A hierarchical diagram is shown below to visualize these courts. For the
purposes of comparative paper in the national perspective, however, the Supreme Court is given
emphasis.
Figure 3
Japanese Courts

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 Composition and Power of Japan’s Supreme Court. The highest judicial authority in
Japan is the Supreme Court, which possesses full jurisdiction over all legal matters and the
administration of the entire judicial system in the country. It is located in Tokyo and operates
independently, free from any influence or intervention from administrative or legislative bodies.
The Supreme Court is headed by a Chief Justice and fourteen other Justices as per nomination
and appointment of the Cabinet. It is divided into three Petty Benches that judge together and
form a specific majority to deliver judgment on legal matters, usually handling appeals against
lower court decisions. Three justices are required to form a quorum when handling a case. When
a case involves significant matters of constitutional interpretation, it falls under the jurisdiction
of the Grand Bench, which comprises the fifteen justices. To handle such a case, the Grand
Bench requires a quorum of nine Justices.

(1) High Courts

The High Courts are located in eight of Japan’s major cities namely Fukuoka, Hiroshima,
Nagoya, Osaka, Sendai, Sapporo, Takamatsu, and Tokyo. Six of these high courts have branches
in their territories to reduce workload in a location. In 2005, it expanded with the creation of the
Intellectual Property High Court as a special branch of the Tokyo High Court. The high court is
headed by a President, supported by three judges. They collectively preside over criminal and
civil legal cases involving direct registrations or appeals from lower court decisions but they also
possess special jurisdiction such as it is the primary court referred to for administrative cases
concerning elections, criminal cases involving insurrections, and actions to challenge decisions
made by quasi-judicial bodies. Meanwhile, the Intellectual Property High Court holds exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals against district court judgments on cases related to patents and other
intellectual property matters.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

Legal System. The Philippine Judicial system is stipulated in Art. VIII, sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution citing that judicial power of the country is under the Supreme Court and the Lower

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Courts. As stated in paragraph 2 of the article, the courts are responsible for settling disputes
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The Supreme Court is the
highest accompanied by a regular court for reviews, trials, and a special court with judicial
powers for Filipino Muslims. Like the previous one, a hierarchy is illustrated below.

Figure 4
Philippine Courts

Composition and Power of the Philippine Supreme Court. The highest court of the
land or the final decision maker is the Supreme Court. It has appellate jurisdiction to review,
revise, or affirm final judgments of the lower courts, as well as original jurisdiction on cases filed
involving state actors such as ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, and regarding petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. As per paragraph 6 of
Article VIII, the Supreme Court has the administrative power to supervise all courts and court
personnel of the Philippines through the Office of the Court Administrator. The court is headed

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by a Chief Justice along with fourteen Associate Justices and they are all appointed by the
President as recommended by the Judicial and Bar Council of the Philippines. In voting, the
court may sit en banc with all the justices or in divisions of three, five, or seven justices.

Quantitative Data

Legislatures of Japan and the Philippines

Figure 5
Japan’s General Election Results in 2014 and 2021 and (Japan)

Figure 6
Japan’s 2021 General Elections

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Leadership in Japan’s One-Party Dominance System

One salient feature of the Japanese party system, as seen in Figure, is the existence of an
overwhelmingly dominant LDP forming the whole, or the core, of governments. Although at
times, as observed in the 2021 General Elections, the LDP is forced to make coalition
arrangements from other parties, otherwise they get excluded altogether. These coalition parties,
however, tend to erode the LDP’s monopoly on power, and thus, the role of coalition government
should not be underestimated.

Figure 7
Party Proliferation in Philippine Congress since Post-War (Philippines)

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Executives of Japan and the Philippines

Figure 8
Number of Elected Japanese Prime Ministers relative to Philippine Presidents, 1945-2023

Japan and the Philippines have a difference in terms of the exercise of executive power.
The Prime Minister of Japan cannot exercise veto powers, while the President of the Philippines
is able to exercise veto powers and block bills passed by the congress. In Japan’s constitution
article 65 states that “the executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet”, but article 66 modifies
the executive power of the Cabinet to be rsponsible to the National Diet, it states that “the
Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.”. When
we look at the present constitution of the Philippines it states on article 7, sec. 27 that “The
President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.”. We can
see here the laws pertaining to the exercise of executive power by the two countries are entirely
different. The executive power of Japan is strictly checked by the National Diet, making The
Cabinet of Japan under the power of their legislative (National Diet).

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 Japan had 38 prime ministers since 1945 post-war after the establishment of a civil
government that replaced the militarist Japan during world war two. That makes the average year
term for Prime Ministers to be 2 years and a half in a span of 78 years, except for some few that
had a 6-10 years term. In the Philippines the number of Presidents since 1945 after world war
two is 14 Presidents with terms averaging 5 years and a half in a span of 78 years.

Table 1
Affiliation of President’s Party or Coalition in Congress, 1987-2023

Election President Party/Coalition Majority - Majority -

Support in Minority Ratio, Minority Ratio,
Congress of Senate House of
President Representatives

1987 Aquino, Corazon Majority 22-1 214

1992 Ramos Majority 23 - 1 216

1995 22 - 1 160 - 22

1998 Estrada Majority 22 -1 257

2001 Macapagal-Arroyo Majority 13 - 11 185 - 17

2004 13 - 10 193 - 28

2007 15 - 7 193 - 1

2010 Aquino, “Noynoy” Majority 17 - 3 227 - 29

2013 17 - 6 244 - 35

2016 Duterte Majority 20 - 3 252 - 36

2019 20 - 4 266 - 28

2022 Marcos, Jr. Majority 20 - 2 282 - 5

To describe the power of the Philippine chief executive relative to the governing
legislature, comparable to Japan, we look to the party of each president (since 1987) and the
party or coalition in Congress in support of the president. It is obvious that, despite the

14
independence of both executive and legislative bodies compared to a parliamentary system, the
chief executive often has support of the majority in both houses of Congress.

Supreme Courts of Japan and the Philippines

Usage and Discretion of Judicial Review
Judicial review pertains to the ultimate power of the judiciary to determine the
constitutionality of a law or an order. In the Philippines, the earliest case in which the Supreme
Court exercised this power can be traced back to 1936 with Angara v. Electoral Commission,
where the court acted as the final arbiter with the legal mechanism to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries. On the other hand, in Japan, the court only acquired this
power after the shift to the 1947 constitution, first applied in the Tomabechi v. Japan case where
the political question doctrine was invoked. Since then, Japanese judicial powers have developed
in a manner closely aligned with American concepts.
Cited below are more relevant cases where the Philippine and Japanese Supreme Courts
have exercised their judicial review power.
Figure 9
Philippines-Japan Exercise of Judicial Review

In the Philippines, the Constitution itself openly implies the Supreme Court’s power of
judicial review, stating that their power “includes the duty of the courts … to determine whether

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or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Judicial review powers have been
consistently exercised by the Supreme Court (SC) over the years, although they have been met
with criticisms claiming that they are abusive or exploit weak institutions. This scrutiny was
particularly heightened during the administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte. This was
evident in relation to the upholding of Proclamation 2016, which declared Martial Law in
Mindanao, and the removal of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno. The arrest under quo
warranto was deemed unconstitutional by many legal experts. On the other hand, in Japan, the
SC rarely strikes down government actions and practices judicial review on a more theoretical
basis rather than a practical one. According to Law (2011), over the span of six decades, the
Japanese SC has only contested eight laws on constitutional grounds. This is why it is regarded
as the most conservative and cautious court in terms of exercising judicial review.

Analysis

Democratic Consolidation Indicators Relevant to Government Structures

Having examined the relevant literature on consolidated and the elements associated with
the government branches of a consolidated democracy, we situate the description of the branches
of government of Japan and Philippines based on certain indicators of such consolidated
democracy.
Modern-day democracies are difficult to maintain without the necessary help of political
parties because parties aggregate the interests of different sectors of a population, and so these
help organizing the differe constituencies in a state (Bazzaro et al, 2018). Moreover, Shapiro
(2018) asserts that strong parties–in which “everyone is on one team” is more favorable in light
of the endeavor of effective governing, rather than a weak party in which “everyone is for
themselves.”
In this case, we use this thesis to compare the electoral and party systems of each
legislature. We look favorably towards those that have competitive elections and produce strong
parties. Whereas in terms of executive-legislative arrangements, a strong chief executive should
be able to govern on its mandated programs while keeping support of the legislature.

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 And lastly, to hearken back to the literature on judicial review, principally worked by
Dahl (1957), we look towards a judiciary that is independent enough to keep both branches in
check, but also weak enough to be held accountable by its own decisionmaking powers.

Table 2
Categorization of Relevant Indicators: Ideal Type, and Types in Japan and the Philippines

Indicators Ideal Type Japan The Philippines

Legislative Branch

Competitive elections Yes No Yes

Party strength Strong Strong Weak

Executive Branch

Legislative cohesion Strong Strong Strong

Staying power Strong Weak Strong

Judicial Branch

Judicial review Weaker Weaker Stronger

On Electoral Systems: Multipartyism, but Differs on Party Maturity

Both systems share a dominant use of majoritarian systems in electing most of their
legislative bodies, particularly with the FPTP and the Single Member Districts, and these have
created multi-party systems in their governments. But looking to Table 2, we observe that in
terms of competitive elections, Japan is weaker by virtue of their party dominance (of the LDP),
and this can significantly reduce the competitiveness of other parties in its competition for power
in the legislature, compared to the Philippines that has relatively lower costs for entering politics,
at least in structure.
Moreover, what competitive climate the Philippines offers, it owes much of it to the
proliferation of weak parties. Compared to Japan which has had its parties developed for several
decades, there are less disciplined Philippine political parties despite its numbers, perhaps
attributable not only to younger party ages, but to voting rules like plurality at-large voting &
nonproportional systems, e.g., 20% of House seats, with a maximum 3% of seats per partylist.

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On Executive–Legislative Arrangements: Party Dominance vs. Presidentialism
In the executive branch, Executive-Legislative arrangements are compared by looking at
the legislative cohesion and staying power in both governments. We find that the prime minister
of Japan is relatively weaker due to being subordinated by the dominant party within a
parliamentary system. One caveat unique in Japan, however, is that the prime minister has
always enjoyed a legislature with its party being the sole dominant majority--or sometimes in
coalition with an extremely small party. This is a strong indicator for legislative cohesion, but
this also means that the prime minister can easily be replaced at the behest of the dominant
party's decision.
The prime minister's power is thus not as powerful as the president in the Philippines.
Here, the strong presidentialism comes from having fixed terms and a separate electoral mandate
from Congress. The president is independent from any "vote of confidence" from Congress
unless he or she is impeaches. But again, this seems less likely to happen as the president's party,
as far as the 1987 to 2022 is concerned, has always been the same party of the dominant party or
coalition in Congress.

On Judicial Independence: Activism vs. Conservatism in the Courts

Japan’s Supreme Court is weaker, relative to the Philippine SC, due to two reasons.
Firstly, the members of the court are largely nominated and appointed by the Cabinet – whose
body is also derived from the governing majority or coalition in the National Diet. The second
reason, which is connected to the very source of its appointments, stems from the actual use of
judicial review of both Supreme Courts. Vanberg’s finding is relevant in this circumstance,
owing to the status of governing majorities in the legislature, and other conditions that influence
the decision making of a supreme court. Japan’s SC has thus not made much liberal use of
judicial review in striking down government policy. To reiterate, it has, in fact, only exercised
judicial review on eight laws.
In stark contrast, the Philippine Supreme Court suffers neither of these limitations. On the
basis of its appointment, they are appointed by an independently-elected president, from a list of
nominees in the JBC; and these nominates, in fact, need no legislative confirmation. While on
the second matter, the Supreme Court has made liberal use of judicial review as a check on

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government policy, and this is further empowered by the Constitution that allows the Court to
determine “grave abuse of discretion” from either of the two branches of government.

Summation
We have explored the three key government structures of Japan and the
Philippines–countries which qualify as consolidated democracies. We have, furthermore,
identified particular democratic elements or indicators most ideal to maintaining a consolidated
democracy, relevant for each of the branches of government. We primarily used qualitative
references to describe the structures, while we consulted quantitative data to provide an empirical
or practical description of the ways in which these descriptions are realized. After which, we
look back to the said literature on ideal elements and indicators, and attempt to situate the
respective branches of government in an analytically organized manner. This framework was
used as a basis for comparing the executive-legislative arrangements, electoral systems, and
party systems of both executive and legislative branches of governments, while we take the
favorable idea of a weaker, but more scrutinized judicial review power for the ideal judiciary.

The Upshot

While we had undertaken considerable efforts to compare both government structures

based on the ideal types of elements befitting for consolidation, we make no definitive statement
of declaring the conceptual “winning” government structure between both–as far as the sole
comparison of political institutions is concerned. Indeed, even if we tabulated the total points
each country would have based on its compliance to the ideal types in Table 2, Japan and the
Philippines actually receives a tie. This is because, in the broader understanding of democratic
consolidation, there is no broad consensus on what the optimal conditions of a consolidated
democracy is, and neither is there one formula that entails the survival of a democratic regime.
Any attempt to definitively identify these hypothetical conditions, blind to all other
factors–historical, economic, social, and intellectual–would be a painstaking, if not empty,
endeavor to be even undertake. Nevertheless, these same elements, at best, can be guiding
principles or indicators of the higher likelihood of a democratic regime to consolidate
consolidate itself – whether it ends up similar to Japan, the Philippines, or anything else entirely.

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