It is the Court’s noble duty to interpret the law passed by the Parliament.

It is not up
to the Court to arbitrarily creates its own laws by interpreting one law into a whole
new one. Therefore, the rules of statutory Interpretation are important to determine
the accurate ways on how a body of statute is to be interpreted. Its primary purpose
is to give effect to the express words of the statutes and to imply the intention of the
Parliament. This is aptly described by Salmond, who said that “interpretation is that
process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through
the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”

There are four classifications of the rule of interpretations namely, the literal rule, the
golden rule, the purposive rule, and the mischief rule.

In criminal matter, the Court will usually adopt the literal rules when there is no
ambiguity in the expressed words of the statutes. This rule takes only the plain and
literal meaning of the words used because those are the words the parliament chose
to employ. It does not call the judge to consider the consequences of such
interpretation and views the words as sacrosanct. This can be illustrated in the case
of Jusninawati bt Abdul Ghani v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 MLJ 1, wherein the
Federal Court held that:-

“[27]   It is a well-established principle of   statutory  interpretation  that

Parliament is not presumed to have intended to limit or interfere with the
personal liberty of a citizen, unless it indicates this intention in   clear,
unmistakable and  unambiguous  terms. It is trite that criminal
and  penal  statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged
or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In
other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which the
statute was enacted. Therefore, no act or omission is to be deemed criminal
unless it is clearly made so by words of the statute concerned (see Maxwell
on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Ed) at pp 239–240 and Craies on Statute
Law (7th Ed) at p 529).
 [28]  In our considered view, unless the contrary intention appears,
Parliament could not have intended under the old s 13(1)(a) of the CPC to
impose a legal obligation on persons to furnish information in respect of the
possible commission of s 130JA offence. On that score, we were in
agreement with the Court of Appeal that the learned JC had erred in his
reliance on the old s 13(1)(a) of the CPC. In the light of above discussion, it
was our considered view that the prosecution of the appellant for non-
reporting the possible commission of s 130JA offence by SP1 and ‘Abu
Kedah’, under s 130M of the Penal Code was unsustainable in law.”

Similarly, in the case of Syamsul Fazwan bin Abdul Aziz v Public

Prosecutor [2020] MLJU 2383, wherein the High Court held that the Court is not to
speculate as to what might have been in the mond of the enacting authority from the
preamble or otherwise if the terms used are clear, precise and unambiguous. In this
regard, the High Court herein followed the principle in the Federal Court case of
Kumaran Suppiah v Dato’ Noh Hj Omar [2006] 4 CLJ 675, at page 681 wherein
Augustine Paul FCJ said:

“It is a rule of construction that where the terms of an enactment are clear,

precise and unambiguous it must be applied and enforced according to its
plain meaning and it is not the function of the court to speculate as to what
might have been in the mind of the enacting authority as it may appear to the
court from the preamble or otherwise (see Badri Prasad v. Ram Narain Singh
AIR [1939] All 157).”.

However, there are situation where the words of the stature are not clear. Such is in
the case of Eng Howe Sing vs Ketua Polis Daerah & Anor [1999] MLJU 221,
wherein Section 39B (3) and 39B(4) of the Dangerous Drug Act does not specify
the time limit prescribed as to when the consent to prosecute should be tendered in
the Magistrate Court. The Court here adopted the following principle of Maxwell on
the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition at page 239:-

"there appears any reasonable doubt or ambiguity," it will be resolved in

favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty. "If there is
 a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular
case," said Lord Esher M.R., "we must adopt that construction. If there
are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. That
is the settled rule for the construction of penal sections".

The Court therefrom held that since the provision does not specify the limit and that
the Applicant’s personal liberty is involved, a favourable inference must be
constructed in favour of the Applicant. The Inspector should have obtained the
chemist report at the first opportunity and if he had done so, the consent to
prosecute could have been obtained earlier and it should be obtained as soon as
possible. The Court in this case therefore found that there is mala fide in the act of
the Inspector due to such unexplained delay.

In conclusion, when the words employed by the Parliament in a statute is clear,

explicit and unambiguous, the Court must not go on a tangent trying to import
meanings that is not expressed intended by the Parliament through its clear express
words. In such situation, a literal interpretation of the provisions is necessary.
However, when the provision is not clear or there is a lacunae as to the details of the
same, the Court therefore has a duty to give meaning to the statute in favour of the
Accused since his personal liberty and rights as protected by the Federal
Constitution is at risk. However, such meaning must not be against the expressed
words of the Parliament.