CIVIL LAW

(ANSWER KEY)

I – MULTIPLE CHOICE.
1. A
2. B
3. C
4. D
5. A
6. B
7. C
8. D
9. A
10. B
11. C
12. D
13. A
14. B
15. C
16. D
17. C
18. B
19. A
20. D
21. C
22. B
23. A
24. D
25. C
26. B
27. A
28. D
29. B
30. C

II – ESSAY
1. NO. Under Article 1279 of the Civil Code, in order that compensation may be
proper, it is necessary that: (1) each one of the obligors be bound principally, and
that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the others; (2) both debts
consist in a sum of money, or if things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) the two debts
be due; (4) they be liquidated and demandable; and (5) over neither of them be
any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in
due time to the debtor. In the case of Sam and Daniela, the following requisites
are incomplete, particularly number 1. Support under Art. 194 of the Family Code
refers to everything indispensable for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family. Sam as the father is obliged to give support to his child, under the
law. The P20,000 support is therefore directed or entitled to Wendy and not
Daniela, therefore it cannot be said that Sam and Daniela are both obligors and
debtors of the other.

2. NO. One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that
the isolation of the property is not due to the acts of the dominant estate’s
owners. If Arnold’s allegation that the isolation was due to the acts of Dina’s
predecessor-in-interest is true, then Dina could not claim any right to compulsory
easement even if it was not she who caused the property’s isolation. Dina is
bound by her predecessor-in-interest’s act of causing the isolation of her
property. Assuming, however, that Dina or her mother did not cause the isolation
of her property, Dina still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the
proposed portion of Arnold’s property. This is because she failed to satisfy the
 requirements for an easement of right of way under the Civil Code. This
easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor’s own acts. Under ART. 650, the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. Dina failed to establish that there was no adequate
outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement was the least
prejudicial to Arnold’s estate. Furthermore, there is an adequate exit to a public
highway.

3. Spouses Jose, is entitled to receive the rentals. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to
the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. The rightful recipient
of the disputed rent should thus be the owner of the subject lot at the time the
rent accrued. Rent, as an accessory, follow the principal. When the principal
property is mortgaged, the mortgage shall include all natural or civil fruits and
improvements found thereon when the secured obligation becomes due as
provided in Article 2127 of the Civil Code. Consequently, in case of non-payment
of the secured debt, foreclosure proceedings shall cover not only the
hypothecated property but all its accessions and accessories as well. Since
Spouses Lorenzo are not the true owners of the subject lot, much less of the
building which produced the disputed rent, the foreclosure proceedings caused
by Daks Bank could not have, thus, included the building found on the subject lot
and the rent it yields. Daks Bank’s lien as a mortgagee in good faith pertains to
the subject lot alone because the rule that improvements shall follow the principal
in a mortgage under Article 2127 of the Civil Code does not apply under the
premises. Accordingly, since the building was not foreclosed, it remains a
property of Spouses Jose; it is not affected by non-redemption and is excluded
from any consolidation of title made by PNB over the subject lot. Thus, Daks
Bank’s claim for the rent paid by Pineda has no basis.

4. Neither Sharon, Maricel nor Sharon’s estate is liable for neither of them
contracted the debt. In addition to that, Maricel cannot be deemed to have
substituted Vilma as debtor, for the former is not inheriting from the latter but
rather from Sharon, her grandmother. Hence, Cherry Gil would have to shoulder
the debt herself.