481599

research-article2013
AAS48310.1177/0095399713481599Administration & SocietyChalekian

Article
Administration & Society
2016, Vol. 48(3) 316­–343
Instantiations of © The Author(s) 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0095399713481599
POSDCORB: A aas.sagepub.com

Framework-Theory-
Model Approach

Paul M. Chalekian1,2

Abstract
Challenges have been made to validate “classical” forms of management.
This study facilitates suggestions to view organizational theory from a
design perspective. Affirming how Luther Gulick explored design, tests
of a construct were used to substantiate POSDCORB as a framework.
Integrated within are elements of linguistics and Alexandrian patterns. An
instrument development model was used to approximate POSDCORB as
it demonstrated acceptable content validity, as well as construct validity
and reliability. Having explored a proxy, models were established using
multivariate data. The study provides framework-theory-model scenarios,
evidence to indicate the adoption of institutions, and element support.

Keywords
organizational patterns, contingency theory, goodness of fit, administrative
behavior, multiple inheritance

Challenges have been made to substantiate the “classical” forms of manage-

ment as described by engineer Frederick Taylor, French industrialist Henri
Fayol, and administrator Luther Gulick (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). Their

1University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA

2University of Maryland University College, MD, USA

Corresponding Author:
Paul M. Chalekian, Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno, 108 W.
Gardengate Way, Carson City, NV 89706, USA.
Email: pmc@unr.edu
Chalekian 317

approaches have been described as being more prescriptive than empirical

(Scott, 2003); however, this only hints at the complexities. Sixty-eight admin-
istrative principles were found in the French literature as described by
Charles-Jean Bonnin (Martin, 1987; Stillman, 1991). For simplicity, we can
assume that an encapsulation of principles needed to occur. Taylor (1903)
believed that by removing the variability of humans, new efficiencies could
emerge for accomplishing a given task, and he even had an information
bureau. Until his death, Fayol worked to develop what was described as the
first comprehensive theory of management (Shafritz & Ott, 2001), and Gulick
inherited and extended aspects of Fayol’s work. In Gulick’s quest to teach the
work of an executive, he used pattern-based design, and instances of
POSDCORB-like institutions have evolved.

Early Definitions and Integration

The plan to substantiate the above thesis is to more fully assess POSDCORB
as a framework. It is not the one and only framework, and we refer to
POSDCORB as simply “A Framework” with an emphasis on the word “A.”
A general framework helps to identify the elements (and the relationships
among these elements) that one needs to consider for the analysis of institu-
tions (Ostrom, 2005). Furthermore, frameworks organize diagnostic and
prescriptive inquiries as they provide “the most general list of variables that
should be used to analyze all types of institutional arrangements” (Ostrom,
1999, pp. 39-40). Gulick (1937b) gave voice to POSDCORB within a dis-
cussion of organizational patterns. An analysis, if it is to be of value in future
years, “must be brought within a single system of definition and nomencla-
ture” (Gulick, 1937c, p. 195). What POSDCORB may lack as a research
framework, it may gain as being application based.
The framework-theory-model approach has been described as “a
nested set of theoretical concepts—which range from the most general to
the most detailed types of assumptions” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 27). This
approach has been used to guide research associated with practices
involving common pooled resources (McGinnis, 2000; Ostrom, 2005;
Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994, to name a few). Some early automated
data processing practices among the 50 American states were documented
as being pooled or centralized (Public Administration Service, 1965).
Subsequently, a shift away from controlling computer hardware toward
coordinating information resource management (IRM) occurred. Gulick’s
POSDCORB may illuminate the issues, concerns, and problems for infor-
mation managers (Horton, 1985) and may overarch information resource
318 Administration & Society 48(3)

areas (Caudle, 1990). These concepts will be integrated in more detail

below, but first we will reveal issues that can arise if framework attributes
go unnoticed.
After a brief history, some design attributes of POSDCORB are discussed.
Continuing the plan, definitions associated with this structure are subse-
quently identified. A mixed-methods instrument development model will
then be used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess a comparison.
Quantitative results from an empirically validated construct will be explored
to substantiate a POSDCORB proxy. Two organizational theories are pre-
sented. Multivariate data will then be used to test the strength of the proxy as
influenced by the elements. Finally, we will interpret the results, assess the
theories, and offer some conclusions.

Historical Perspective
The “classical” contributions to organizational theory have been well docu-
mented, including the works of Taylor (1903), Fayol (1937), Gulick (1937b),
and Urwick (1937). Neoclassical organizational theory has been portrayed as
trumping the former in several introductory sources (e.g., Scott, 2003;
Shafritz & Ott, 2001; Stillman, 1991). Generations of scholars may not have
read Gulick (Meier, 2010), yet, his work sits prominently in the representa-
tions and models of contemporary researchers (Agranoff, 2007; Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001; Fairholm, 2004). Submissions to a prominent public admin-
istration journal further reveal how most remain squarely within POSDCORB
categories (Raadschelders & Lee, 2011). Scholars could be sending one mes-
sage, whereas students may be receiving another.
Contributions from Gulick were reformatory and forward-thinking (Meier,
2010), but a distinguishing issue that deserves refocus is his use of design. In
early public administration, design aspects were largely initiated by Gulick.
Accordingly, he made up the word POSDCORB, “designed to call attention
to the various functional elements of the work of a chief executive” (Gulick,
1937b, p. 13). This word was conceived and published in Gulick’s (1935)
earlier notes and discussions and in his collaborative works (Commission of
Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, 1935).
Herbert Simon played a key role in the development of the “neoclassical”
organization theory, thereby challenging the classics (Shafritz & Ott, 2001).
His book Administrative Behavior became the most influential in public
administration (Sherwood, 1990). Vincent Ostrom (1989) claimed that
Simon’s attack on the works of Gulick was associated with an intellectual
crisis of the discipline. Since then, the studies and theories of organizations
have taken several paths.
Chalekian 319

Open systems (Katz & Kahn, 1966), contingency theory (Thompson,

1967/2003), and structural contingency theory (Pennings, 1992) make up
some of the core inquiries. Empirical studies have been hypothesized
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Gresov, 1989, to name a few), as well as attempts
at a broad synthesis (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Mintzberg, 1979). But few have
returned to Gulick’s work to analyze POSDCORB as a whole. Meier and
Bohte (2003) explored his principles, and Fairholm (2004) successfully sur-
veyed POSDCORB for completeness. Often organizational paths lead back
to the work of Gulick. For instance, the new “new public management”
approaches may simply be POSDCORB re-dressed with new labels
(Raadschelders & Lee, 2011). For more than 60 years, public administration
has relied, to varying degrees, on the acronym of POSDCORB “to distill
management activities into seven basic tasks” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001,
p. 298).
Without models, Hammond (1990) and Meier and Bohte (2000) revealed
how scholars uncritically accepted the arguments of Simon’s work. Lacking
evidence, the “classical” approach still persists as the base upon which other
theories are built (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). A qualifying framework marker is
that it should help organize empirical research (Ostrom, 1999). Little research
existed about the principles at the time of the critiques (Meier & Bohte,
2000), and evidence supporting the holistic set of principles are still lacking.
Taylor, Fayol, and Gulick were interested in public administration in terms of
what it “should be” (Scott, 2003, p. 9) and through Gulick’s design science,
“how things might be” (Meier, 2010, p. 284).
Gulick was influenced by the work of Fayol (Fitch, 1996), the extent to
which can be seen in that he had his work translated from French to English
(Gulick, 1937a). Fayol had descriptions of administration member tasks,
such as those of planning, organizing, command, coordination, and control,
while another council member was envisioned to undertake financial prob-
lems, and yet another member was assigned to the organization of accounting
and statistics (Fayol, 1937). It appears that Gulick encoded and encapsulated
CO (for “coordination” or “control”), considered “command” to be D (for
direct), and extended Fayol’s work to include “accounting and statistics” and
“financial problems” into B (for budgeting). With a more humanly manage-
able seven components (Miller, 1956), Gulick’s (1937b) codification con-
sisted of Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting,
and Budgeting, hereafter his POSDCORB. Shorthand notes are invented
because we cannot refer to a list each time we think about a problem
(Alexander, 1964). Framework scholars have used single letter markers as
the basis of shared strategies, norms, and rules (Crawford & Ostrom, 2000;
Ostrom, 2005). But could POSDCORB be considered a framework?
320 Administration & Society 48(3)

POSDCORB has been dubbed a framework by at least some (Graham &

Hays, 1986; Stillman, 1991), and extensions have been described (Richardson
& Baldwin, 1976; Graham & Hays, 1986). Gulick used a sequence to his list
(Fitch, 1996), as do other pattern scholars (e.g., Alexander, Ishikawa, &
Silverstein, 1977; Kerievsky, 2005). As criteria, Elinor Ostrom (1999) ques-
tioned whether a framework performs “better than others in a similar range of
applications?” (p. 65). In terms of durability, scholars have asked whether
there is “a POSDCORB equivalent set of tasks that replaces the standard
planning, organizing, and so forth?” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, pp. 297-298).
They later reported “to date, no readily agreed-upon set of functional activi-
ties exists that is the hierarchical equivalent of POSDCORB” (Agranoff,
2007, p. 26).
A discussion of public administration frameworks also appears to be lack-
ing. This differs from policy studies, and the field of policy implementation,
in which several frameworks are described (Sabatier, 1977; Sabatier, 1999;
Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, to name a few).
The same can be said for the field of institutional analysis (Crawford &
Ostrom, 2000; McGinnis, 2000; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom et al.,
1994). Ask any administrator and they will likely report how implementing
policy is among their primary duties, and how analyses are subsequently
done on their teams. From those implementation- and analysis-based discus-
sions, more insightful frameworks, theories, and models have ensued
(Ostrom, 1999; Sabatier, 1999). Arguably, their studies are stronger because
of these structures. In his own field, Gulick (1935, 1937b) sought an early
way to teach public administration, and he developed POSDCORB.
Acknowledging the works of Wamsley and Zald (1973), the taxonomical
works of Debbasch and Van Braam, and attempts by Raadschelders (2011)
and Stillman (2005), the quest for public administration frameworks appears
to be lacking.
What “class” is POSDCORB that could make it enduring? A class can be
defined as a template for the creation of instances (Goldberg & Rubin,
1995). A “base class” is the most generalized class in a class structure
(Booch, 1994). Others have documented instances (Fairholm, 2004) and
positioned POSDCORB within a focal core (Agranoff, 2007, p. 194). Being
a “base class,” a POSDCORB framework cannot be functionally specific.
Social science scholars are now coming to this realization. For instance, a
“base game” of one framework showed only a physical world, and thus emp-
tiness and nothing (Crawford & Ostrom, 2000). Empty classes or categories
appear in linguistics (Chomsky, 1996). James Thompson (1967/2003) found
these attributes in Gulick’s work, and he warned of this difficulty: homoge-
nizing on one dimension does not homogenize on all. However, just as the
Chalekian 321

work of Thompson endures, so does the work of Gulick (Meier, 2010). To

support our beginning thesis, this article attempts—in three main parts—to
(a) reconstruct Gulick’s design, (b) explore blends of framework definitions,
and (c) explain instances of POSDCORB-like institutions.

Reconstructing Gulick’s Design

Gulick’s perspective of public administration was practitioner based. This
included being the director of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service
Personnel and a member of the President’s Brownlow Committee, as well as
many other positions. He not only conceptualized organizational design but
also facilitated a presidential reorganization (Wamsley & Dudley, 1998).
Gulick simply could not have subordinates developing their own forms of
administration, and POSDCORB served the Brownlow Committee as the
framing idea (Stillman, 1991). The purpose of this part is to reconstruct
Gulick’s attempts to simplify public administration by using a pattern-based
language and a framework.
Having a domain for patterns is important (Alexander, 1964). Design is
concerned with how things ought to be and “with devising artifacts to
attain goals” (Simon, 1981, p. 133). A framework serves to codify a lan-
guage, and the resulting structures can be defined as being “a kind of
microarchitecture that codifies a particular domain” (Booch, 1996, p. 274).
The elucidation of fundamental elements is important for frameworks
(Ostrom, 1999). Public administrators indicated that the traditional activi-
ties summarized by POSDCORB “fully explain the purpose and processes
of their work” (Fairholm, 2004, p. 586). Noting the possibility of other
domains and frameworks, the domain of this study may be considered
established.
Gulick (1935) codified initials so that one word could stick in the minds
of administrators. After presenting POSDCORB, his word appeared in
later publications (Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel,
1935; Gulick, 1937b), as well as discussions (too numerous to cite) up to
the present (Raadschelders & Lee, 2011). Those codes look similar to the
reduction schemes later used by Simon in his descriptions of complex
architectures. In a section entitled “Simple Descriptions of Complex
Systems,” Simon (1981) reduced 64 codes down to 35, and then indicated
how many could be reduced to just 1. In Gulick’s treatment of Fayol’s
work, he made use of reducible codes, and from Gulick’s construction, we
can assume he was envisioning a framework. Gulick predicted it would
take at least 2 years to establish a framework (Commission of Inquiry on
Public Service Personnel, 1935) and, right on schedule, he published
322 Administration & Society 48(3)

POSDCORB (1937b). A refactoring and regeneration of this structure may

uncover similarities with engineers.
Scholars believe Gulick was associated with design. One indicated how
Gulick showed “a clear awareness of the complexities of designing organiza-
tions” (Hammond, 1990, p. 145). Another referred to Gulick’s work as a
“Grand Design” (Van Riper, 1990, p. 610). Yet another referred to Gulick as
being a design scientist (Meier, 2010). Simon (1947) sought a comprehensive
framework, but it is possible that Gulick had already designed one.
Mature frameworks are desirable as they can be reused as the basis for
many applications (Fayad, Schmidt, & Johnson, 1999). Yet, parameterized
classes cannot have instances unless we instantiate them (Booch, 1994).
More specifically, decision frameworks “ask that you plan, organize your
work effort, staff your teams, direct and control the work flow” (Goldberg &
Rubin, 1995, p. 13; bold added). Critically, and as indicated above, decision
frameworks need to be refined with organization-specific details to be uti-
lized (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995). As a practitioner, Gulick carefully refined
POSDCORB with research and experience.

Design Applicability
Fayol’s comprehensive work predated Gulick, so it can be said that he inher-
ited Fayol’s works. However, inheritance is also an engineering term. While
designing, the identification of artifacts has been previously suggested.
Artifacts can also be thought of as objects. The use of inheritance is just one
of several techniques in object-oriented design. With systems as diverse as
social institutions, a start might be to decompose a system into objects and
then use the resulting structure as a framework for expression (Booch, 1994).
To practitioners, administrative patterns can be easily identified, and Gulick
saw many similarities in organizations (Van Riper, 1990).
The need for refined frameworks has encouraged researchers to revisit the
foundational work of Christopher Alexander (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, &
Vlissides, 1995; Goldberg & Rubin, 1995; Johnson & Hicks, 2004; Kerievsky,
2005). Alexandrian form applies to objects and design patterns. He admon-
ished designers to look for repeatable patterns in architectural design
(Goldberg & Rubin, 1995). In a condensed Alexandrian form, a small set of
POSDCORB patterns, with associated contexts, forces, and relatedness, will
be provided below.
Contemporaries have subsequently recognized the importance of “a pat-
tern language” as described by Alexander (Johnson & Hicks, 2004; Kerievsky,
2005, to name a few). Elements are the patterns themselves whereby each
one describes a problem which:
Chalekian 323

occurs over and over again in our environment, and then describes the core of the
solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this solution a million
times over, without ever doing it the same way twice. (Alexander et al., 1977, p. x)

Some patterns may be “true invariants,” or a solution that summarizes a

property common to all possible ways of solving a stated problem (Alexander
et al., 1977). Referring to those 68 principles of administration, “unlike
Gulick, Bonnin wrote organizational principles for all levels of the bureau-
cracy from supervisors to ministers” (Martin, 1987, p. 299). For frameworks,
multiple levels of analysis are desirable (Ostrom, 1999). Gulick probably
believed there were too many principles to teach. A person with a pattern
language “can design any part of the environment as . . . [t]he expertise is in
the language” (Alexander, 1979, p. 353). With Fayol’s work, Gulick recog-
nized patterns and compressed them inherently into those of directing.
However, besides inheritance, what other pattern- or object-oriented tech-
niques could Gulick have used?

Object-Oriented Government
In dealing with complexity, the decomposition of concepts into artifacts and
objects was previously suggested. Some have indicated the possibility of
using objects to conceptualize an object-oriented government. For instance,
the delegation of responsibility to operating units, loosely coupled dependen-
cies among these operating units, and reuses of policies and procedures “are
the hallmarks of an object-oriented government” (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995,
p. 49). Other organizational design scholars exist (e.g., DeSanctis & Fulk,
1999), but an object-oriented view may be closer to the designs needed of
record keeping and reporting. Perhaps the discipline of information technol-
ogy and practices in engineering can be tapped for techniques.
Initials have been developed so that one word could remain in the minds
of engineers. Being object oriented has been described as having elements of
polymorphism, inheritance, and encapsulation (Gamma et al., 1995; Goldberg
& Rubin, 1995; Kerievsky, 2005; van der Linden, 2002, to name a few).
Variations exist, but these object-oriented practices are in frequent use. For
brevity, designers refer to these three interchangeably as “PIE” (cf. van der
Linden, 2002). Goldberg and Rubin (1995) describe how a language is object
oriented when its representational capabilities are object oriented and when it
exhibits the properties of: Encapsulation, in which “the language supports the
representation of information and information processing as a single unit that
combines behavior with the information needed to carry out the behavior,”
324 Administration & Society 48(3)

Table 1.  Design Technique Interrelatedness and Select Parts of POSDCORB.

Design technique Base class elements

Inheritance Planning and directing Coordinating

Polymorphism Planning Reporting: data  
or supervision
Encapsulation Reporting (Coordinating and controlling)

Note. Due to manuscript limitations, we have carefully put aside empty base classes. They may exist, but
they are not described in our text. An encapsulation of planning may be relevant for a budget analyst, but
may be less relevant for a program analyst.

Polymorphism, which is characterized by “the language mak[ing] it possible to

send the same message to different objects and elicit a distinct but semantically
similar response from each,” and Inheritance, wherein “the language supports
the definition of a new entity as an extension of one or more existing entities,
such that the new entity inherits existing behavior and information” (p. 46).
To those new to Alexandrian patterns, we seek to provide a template that
can be applied in many situations (Gamma et al., 1995), as animations of
diverse situations may occur. Ostrom (2005) found the need to “limit the
frame” by focusing on only a few components. Similarly, we focus on only
planning, reporting, and coordinating, and Table 1 details those three along
with information about how they are interrelated.

PIE: Inheritance of Planning. Using inheritance, a hierarchy of levels with

regard to organizational directing was indicated earlier. For planning, Fayol
used the word prévoyance which, when translated, could mean either the
behavioral equivalent of “forecast” as in “managing is forecasting,” or to plan
as in to “foresee” (Urwick, 1937). Gulick affirmed, saying how “[p]lanning is
a psychological attitude and a habit . . . to be built into every process of man-
agement” (Blumberg, 1981, p. 247). But planning could also be polymorphic,
depending on the need to obtain similar responses from a variety of sources
(e.g., budget analysts).

PIE: Polymorphism with Reporting.  Gulick tried to accommodate polymorphism

by bringing together words to send a message that could be interpreted differ-
ently by people in distinct but semantically similar ways. An example is
Gulick’s reporting, wherein he could mean the supervisory chain of com-
mand, the reporting of data, or more. Reporting lies within Gulick’s category
that is “directly concerned with the metamorphosis of the managerial
Chalekian 325

executive” (Van Riper, 1990, p. 611). With at least dual roles, reporting could
be an encapsulation with the behavior of personnel for supervision or the
behavior of reporting information.

PIE: Encapsulation (Coordination and Control).  Gulick encapsulated the work of

Fayol by combining coordination and control. The associated behaviors
could be by either organization, by “allotting,” or by the dominance of an
idea, by “working” (Gulick, 1937b). The coordination and control elements,
as indicated, could have also been inherited by Gulick as he attributed the
essentials of that discussion to Fayol. One must compare the costs and bene-
fits of these competing methods, “just as Gulick described” (Hammond,
1990, p. 170).

PIE: Empty Base Classes and Extensions. We have carefully put aside some
empty base classes. They may exist, but they are not described in our text.
Based on a reader, encapsulations of planning may be more appropriate for a
budget analyst than for a program analyst, depending on their situations.
Scenarios using Gulick’s other elements, such as organizing, staffing, or bud-
geting, are similarly interrelated. Other techniques, such as “abstraction”
(Booch, 1994; Gamma et al., 1995; Goldberg & Rubin, 1995; Kerievsky,
2005; van der Linden, 2002, to name a few) and “A-PIE” (e.g., van der Lin-
den, 2002) have been taught. Gulick tried to use seven simple objects in his
attempt to help teach POSDCORB to public administrators. This is similar to
the way in which engineers have commonly learned PIE or A-PIE.

A Synthesis of PIE and Social Science Literature

Recent literature has become seemingly PIE-like. Three types of isomor-
phism have been described and publicized by organizational theorists (e.g.,
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Encapsulating those three may suggest a need
for organizations to be polymorphic, a trait whose presence has been found in
modern organizations (Usher, 1999). Polycentric approaches to institutions
and framework articulations have been tested (McGinnis, 2000; Ostrom,
2005). These concepts may be new to some, but engineers commonly use
frameworks and PIE.

A Methodology with Criteria

A mixed-methods instrument development model is a form of exploratory
design consisting of two phases: qualitative followed by quantitative
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The remainder will be exploratory/
326 Administration & Society 48(3)

qualitative in one part, and explanatory/quantitative in the second. Ways to

assess the value and usefulness of a framework have been suggested above
(cf. Ostrom, 1999), and two more criteria are as follows: Does the framework
encourage integration across other disciplines? Does the framework provide
a coherent language for identifying universal elements of theories attempting
to explain an important range of phenomena (Ostrom, 1999)? These criteria
will be assessed before our final conclusion.
In summary, no one has analyzed POSDCORB empirically and as a
whole. Some have explored primary aspects of Gulick’s principles (Meier &
Bohte, 2003) and leadership (Fairholm, 2004). It was assumed that Simon
changed his effort to comprehend the whole as it became less interesting or
relevant to research interests (Meier, 2010; Stillman, 1991). An empirical
study, such as the one herein, could possibly renew a focus placed on frame-
work attributes. We believe the elements of control and coordination lie
within information technologies. So why not look at the strength of Gulick’s
POSDCORB in terms of being a framework related to data management?
Simon (1973) has previously suggested applying information technology to
organization design. Having identified PIE-like design properties in Gulick’s
language, let us see whether his concept holds up as a framework.

Exploring Blends of Framework Definitions

This second part will explore the possibility that interdisciplinary constructs
are congruent, or at least similar to POSDCORB. When looking at an acro-
nym from “classical” organization theory, it may help to consider a similarly
seasoned attribute. In describing an “ideal type” bureaucracy, sociologist
Max Weber (1922/1946) theorized how “[t]he management of the modern
office is based upon written documents (‘the files’), which are preserved in
their original or draught form” (p. 197). In our opinion, the files are used for
acquiring, storing, processing, and distributing data so that, subsequently, the
data may be reported. To Gulick (1937b), reporting was essential. Research
has been done in “the quest for a network POSDCORB equivalent” (Agranoff,
2007, p. 233). In exploring a POSDCORB proxy, it may be reasonable to
look within the rule-based practices of the aforementioned IRM.

Shared Definitions
Prior researchers have done a broad synthesis in an attempt to define IRM.
Those definitions, similar to the organizations they support, have evolved
over time. In 1975, in lieu of public complaints about government “red tape,”
Congress passed P.L.93-556 creating the Commission on Federal Paperwork
Chalekian 327

(Plocher, 1996). In their 1977 document titled “Information Resource

Management,” the Commission described the problems of paperwork and red
tape, not as documents to be managed, but rather “as information content to
be treated as a valuable resource” (United States Commission on Federal
Paperwork, 1977, p. 16). In the late 1970s, Forest Horton, Jr., directed the
commission that was the basis for the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act
(Caudle, 1990). The law attempted to create an “umbrella” for governing
virtually all federal agency information activities (Plocher, 1996). The provi-
sional definition of IRM (with our emphasis) became as follows:

(13) The term “information resources management” means the planning,

budgeting, organizing, directing, training, promoting, controlling, and
management activities associated with the burden, collection, creation, use, and
dissemination of information by agencies, and includes the management of
information and related resources such as automatic data processing. (Paperwork
Reduction Reauthorization Act, 1986)

The above definition, as codified in law, illustrates links to POSDCORB.

As Gulick sequenced (Fitch, 1996), planning is first. The relationships among
different organizational variables may be understood in terms of set member-
ship (Fiss, 2007). Four of the elements are the same: planning, budgeting,
organizing, and directing. In this law, “training” activities are associated with
personnel and staff, so, although not explicitly stated, a link can be assumed.
From Fayol, Gulick’s coordinating roles are much like those of controlling. As
indicated by Weber (1922/1946), an idealized bureaucratic use of files may be
storage and reporting. Based on the legislation and the information resource
manager’s duties, Gulick’s POSDCORB could be enduring (see Table 2).

A Construct
A construct for IRM was obtained from a study done by Lewis, Snyder, and
Rainer (1995). Their work was titled “An Empirical Assessment of the
Information Resource Management Construct,” and their analysis is quite apt
for this comparison. They followed a paradigm for construct measurement as
enumerated by Gilbert Churchill (1979). First, the domain of their construct
(with our emphasis) was specified:

IRM is a comprehensive approach to planning, organizing, budgeting, directing,

monitoring and controlling the people, funding, technologies and activities
associated with acquiring, storing, processing and distributing data to meet a
business need for the benefit of the entire enterprise. (Lewis et al., 1995, p. 204)
328 Administration & Society 48(3)

Table 2.  Shared Elements Used in POSDCORB, Legislation, Construct, and

Decision Framework.

Source/purpose Year Elements

Gulick teach 1937b P O Staffing D Coordinating Ra B
U.S. code policy 1986 P O Training D Control Rb B
IRM construct 1995 P O Monitoring D Control Rc B
research controlling people
Goldberg and Rubin/ 1995 P O Staff D Control  
decision framework
Note. a“Reporting informed through records, research and inspection. . .” (Gulick, 1937b, p. 13).
b“[A]ctivities associated with the burden, collection, creation, use and dissemination. . .” (United

States Statutes At Large: PL 99-591, 30 Oct. 1986, Vol. 100, secs. 3341-336.)
c“[A]ctivities associated with acquiring, storing, processing and distributing. . .” (Lewis, Snyder,

& Rainer, 1995, p. 204).

Next, they generated a sample of items, and a measurement instrument

was designed and refined through several iterations. Then they collected data
from which the reliability and validity of their instrument could be assessed.
Finally, they used additional data from an industry sample to summarize and
provide a profile of IRM implementation. They found evidence supporting
construct validity with a rotated factor solution meeting criteria of simplicity,
interpretability, and the percentage of variance explained. They found con-
struct reliability as six Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were above .8 and all
were above .6 (Lewis et al., 1995). Thus, four elements match POSDCORB
and the Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act: planning, budgeting,
organizing, and directing. Training, an activity of technical staff, could be
associated with “controlling the people” (Lewis et al., 1995, p. 204), and this
element could be considered a two-for-one trade-off with Fayol’s control.
The function of IRM, then as now, remains as “storing” and reporting.
Between the two constructs and Gulick’s acronym, it appears that the ref-
erences to control are somewhat incongruous with coordinating. However,
recall how Gulick (1937b) appeared to have encapsulated Fayol’s control and
coordinating to develop a simplified POSDCORB. At least one organization,
the National Association of State Information Systems (NASIS), detected
and reported shifts among their members. From the results of their yearly
surveys, NASIS reported how “[t]here appears to be a shift from outright
control to a coordinating role in the overall management of information sys-
tems” (1987, p. 7). In the next year, they reported how “[t]he slow but steady
Chalekian 329

move from absolute control to a coordinating function continues” (NASIS,

1988, p. 7). If his framework is resilient, centralization (for control) and
decentralization (with coordination) are plausible scenarios. Based on
Gulick’s use of encapsulation, it appears that his element of CO could poly-
morph over time from “control” to “coordination” (or back). He later empha-
sized collaboration and cooperation (Fitch, 1996).

Gulick’s “Holding Company” (Theory 1) and Contingency

Theories
Previously, a study on information technology was tapped for a technique,
but can we also animate some models? Gulick (1937b) envisioned an apo-
litical “holding company” (Theory 1). According to Gulick (1937b), some
large enterprises may need only “the loosest type of central coordinating
authority . . . nothing more than a holding company” (p. 34). It is possible
that some have evolved. Among early contingency theorists, Thompson
(1967/2003) described core forms of technologies. Long-linked technolo-
gies are characterized by serial interdependence in which the actions of Z
can only be performed after the actions of Y, which in turn are contingent on
the actions of X, and so on (Thompson, 1967/2003). An example of this
might be the flow and processing of 80-column cards in the era of early
computers. Around 1960, the processing of data had to be done with this
very limited media. People who could design systems were in short supply.
In intensive technologies, a variety of techniques are drawn upon “to achieve
a change in some specific object; but the selection, combination, and order
of application are determined by feedback from the object itself” (Thompson,
1967/2003, p. 17). As a technique endorsement, Thompson used “objects,”
but more importantly, his statement is quite relevant to the task at hand. Let
us suggest a link between Gulick’s idea of a “holding company” and
Thompson’s technologies.
In established centralized agencies, the routines of feedback have to be
orderly and cyclical to accommodate multiple entities. In a mediating technol-
ogy, the situation arises whereby clients or customers “are or wish to be inter-
dependent” (Thompson, 1967/2003, p. 16). Centralization may be caused by a
crisis (Mintzberg, 1979) and heads of the IRM bureaus surveyed by NASIS
may have found a need to provide intensive technology-type organizations,
mediating technology-type organization, or combinations of both. Given the
early costs of data storage, if a centralized bureau acted as a “holding com-
pany” (Gulick, 1937b), it could aggregate (Williamson, 1975) or retain the
files of an agency, but only those suitable and in a standardized way. Clients
would want unencumbered access or the host would be too restrictive.
330 Administration & Society 48(3)

Structural Contingency Theory (2) and Rule-Based Institutions

Lacking “goodness of fit,” or wherever an instance of misfit occurs, “we are
able to point specifically at what fails and to describe it” (Alexander, 1964,
p. 23). Gulick (1937b) had concerns with overcentralization and “fit” whereby
organizations may fail to be effective. Johannes Pennings (1992) defined
contingency theory (2) as follows: “For organizations to be effective, there
has to be a goodness of fit between its structural design and the conditions of
its environment” (p. 268). Institutions have enduring regularities of human
action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies (Crawford
& Ostrom, 2000). Ask most administrators and they will affirm how IRM
entities are seemingly run by rules. A “goodness of fit” for holding files in a
rule-based institution may change over time.
In summary, close similarities are revealed between the definitions. Gulick
tried to teach POSDCORB, and a law and a construct of IRM appear to be
markedly similar. Long after his vision, IRM policy entities may have become
holding company like (Theory 1), or rule based with contingencies (Theory 2)
by controlling or coordinating files. In the last part that follows, our suggested
framework and associated theories will be modeled.

Explaining Instances of POSDCORB-Like

Adoptions
The prior discussion suggested some design attributes of POSDCORB and
how we have a theoretically grounded proxy. The next section will attempt to
explain some possible causes for the adoption of rule-based POSDCORB-
like institutions. Past studies and practices suggest a wide range of factors
that could influence why centralization in organizations occurs. Additional
coordination may be required due to the rudimentary attributes of files within
bureaus. However, besides narrative descriptions presented by the Council of
State Governments (CSG) and NASIS, it is unclear what causes an American
state to centralize IRM functions. In contrast to qualitative descriptions,
NASIS surveyed the states on a yearly basis, and a high degree of regularity
can be found in its publications. As changes occur over time, the degree of
processing centralization or decentralization may also change. Historically,
four fluctuations of the degree of centralization have been described (Evaristo,
DeSouza, & Hollister, 2005). Based on the perception of problems, and the
degrees of coordination required to fix them, a state’s adoption of a “holding
company” may be found.
Some determinants of IRM centralization, and by proxy, POSDCORB,
may be gleaned from the base strengths of a state. This could include a
Chalekian 331

Table 3.  Variables and Descriptions.

Variable Description
CIRPE 1 if the state established a CIRPE
0 if the state had not established a CIRPE
POPLTN Natural logarithm of a state population [P]
TRANSACT Combination of the logarithm of real per capita direct general
expenditures and intergovernmental revenues to the state [O]
STATEEMP Natural logarithm of state government full-time equivalent
employees per one hundred population [S]
GINSTPWR Index as derived from the chapters on governors in the series
Politics in the American States [D]
PERIOD 1 if the state budgeted annually
0 if the state budgeted biennially [B]
Note. CIRPE = centralized information resource policy entity; POPLTN = premise of planning
for growth and change; TRANSACT = transactions; STATEEMP = state government employ-
ment; GINSTPWR = governor’s institutional power; PERIOD = periodicity.

governor’s institutional power (GINSTPWR). Other factors could include a

state’s population, budget parameters, the number of transactions processed,
and the number of employees. Yet, the states still vary widely in a key respect:
the year in which they established a state IRM policy entity. A deeper analysis
among the 50 American states might suggest what accounts for those
differences.

Method
It may be possible to discern patterns by observing when IRM is centralized
with core public administration variables. The first animation suggests an
instantiation. However, a multivariate data set, acquired from periodic
sources, could suggest a temporal dimension. Under a premise of planning
for growth and change (POPLTN), the number of transactions (TRANSACT)
a state processes could be a factor in organizing entities to adopt IRM. The
number of staff available to troubleshoot problems (STATEEMP) may be of
interest. A plausible metric for directing may be the control sought by a gov-
ernor. The budget time frames to solve state problems (PERIOD) could also
be influential. Table 3 contains the variables and descriptions.
The sources for the dependent variable are national organizations that
monitor data processing practices. The CSG was among the first to assemble
automation information about the states. Since 1965, NASIS, which in 1989
332 Administration & Society 48(3)

became the National Association of State Information Resource Executives

(NASIRE) and, in 2001, became the National Association of State Chief
Information Officers (NASCIO), assembled state IRM practices. As indi-
cated above, links to POSDCORB from IRM have been suggested. A
Centralized Information Resource Policy Entity (CIRPE) for each state is the
dependent variable of this analysis. The representation is dichotomous and
was recorded for each 5-year interval from 1965 until 1995. The year of
adoption was established for each state by NASIRE (1991) and CSG (1996).
The CIRPE data were obtained from a NASIRE (1991) document titled
“State Information Resource Management, Structure and Activities.” We
obtained the year for the dependent variable in a table about the history, roles,
and functions of state information policy organizations. Since that document
was published in the early 1990s and an observation was necessary for 1995,
the CSG (1996) series, Book of the States, was used to obtain those designa-
tions. A 0 was recorded for each period within a state until that year was
encountered, and a 1 was recorded in that and in subsequent periods. Again,
the dependent variable has been linked above.
A population (POPLTN) of each state is used as a proxy for the degree of
change experienced and the need for forecasting, foreseeing, or planning.
This first independent variable is the natural logarithm of the total population
of a state in the year of the observation. POPLTN was obtained from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States. POPLTN is expected to be nega-
tively related to centralized IRM. The higher the number of people in a state,
the less likely IRM will be centralized. The number of transactions a state
processes (TRANSACT) is the organizational average of all outlays as pro-
vided by the U.S. Census Bureau and the transfers from federal and state
governments to the state, derived, adjusted, and logarithmically transformed.
The TRANSACT variable is expected to be negatively related to the presence
of a CIRPE as an increase in the number of transactions a state processes may
cause a state to organize noncentrally. State government employment
(STATEEMP) is the number of full-time equivalent state government employ-
ees per 100 individuals in the state population. The source was the U.S.
Census Bureau. This staffing variable is expected to be negatively related
with the presence of a CIRPE, due to staffing specialization.
The GINSTPWR for each state was assembled from ascending editions of
the book titled Politics in the American States. GINSTPWR is expected to
have a positive influence on a state’s propensity to have a CIRPE. The greater
a governor’s control, the more likely that person would direct an administra-
tive function to be centralized. The periodicity (PERIOD) of a state budget is
a dichotomous variable whereby a 1 was recorded if a state budgets annually,
and a 0 was used if a state budgets biennially. PERIOD is expected to be
Chalekian 333

Table 4.  LOGIT Model Estimates for IRM/POSDCORB.

Full sample Stratified samples

  1965 to 1995 1965 to 1970 1975 to 1980 1985 to 1990

Independent
variables Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE

P POPLTN −0.788* 0.329 −1.596 0.851 −0.606 0.550 1.022 0.918

O TRANSACT −2.018* 0.942 2.305 1.682 1.822 1.018 1.360 1.849
S STATEEMP −1.069* 0.516 −4.227 2.739 −2.337 1.246 −5.685* 2.617
D GINSTPWR 0.313 0.243 1.240* 0.530 −0.038 0.368 −1.390 1.162
B PERIOD 0.471 0.321 0.996 0.706 1.338* 0.551 −0.788 0.960
  Intercept 29.765 9.757 11.987 12.480 1.53 10.296 −9.576 17.691

Note. IRM = information resource management; POPLTN = premise of planning for growth
and change; TRANSACT = transactions; STATEEMP = state government employment; GIN-
STPWR = governor’s institutional power; PERIOD = periodicity. Regional and fixed effects
variables are not shown. LOGIT model: LOG(p/(1−p)) = Intercept + BX.
* p < .05.

negatively related to a state’s propensity to have a CIRPE. If a budget is

requested every 2 years, obsolescence due to change could be twice as severe.
To test each of the variables, econometric methods were used. The cutoff
level for statistical significance is .05. The unit of analysis is each of the 50
American states with the observation years being 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990, and 1995.

Results
The results are presented in Table 4. These include the models across the
range of data, as well as stratifications. The variables were tested using a
LOGIT, a PROBIT, and an LPM; however, we opted not to report and com-
ment on the LPM and PROBIT results, as the LPM can predict probabilities
that can exceed 1, and the PROBIT results were sufficiently similar to those
of LOGIT. The variable coefficients, signage, and levels of significance are
aligned for comparison, and within an ascending chronology.
In Figure 1 (all models), positive signs reveal centralization and control.
Negative signs show decentralization and coordination. The planning vari-
able proxy, POPLTN, in the full sample is within a .05 significance level.
This assumes a two-tailed t-distribution and 330 degrees of freedom. As pre-
dicted, the sign is negative, supporting the assumption that the greater the
334 Administration & Society 48(3)

Figure 1.  Path coefficients for the models.

Note. Coefficients for significant variables (with standard errors) *p < .05. A positive coef-
ficient indicates probability of centralization/control, whereas a negative coefficient indicates
probability of decentralization/coordination.

number of people in a state, the less likely it is that IRM will be centralized.
The estimate for TRANSACT was also significant. Representing the average
of state revenues and expenditures, the model detected a .05 level. It was
surmised that the greater the expenditures and revenues of a state, the less
likely that a CIRPE would exist: The greater the number of transactions, the
greater the need for decentralization. The employee estimate (STATEEMP)
was also significant at .05. Here, too, a negative relationship shows the
greater the number of employees, the greater the propensity for a state to be
decentralized and have coordinated IRM. The variables for a GINSTPWR
and state budget periodicity (PERIOD) appeared to be insignificant at least to
the extent measured by the full sample. Even though the results of these vari-
ables fail to support the postulated relationships, the time-series nature of this
study opens more avenues of inquiry.
To discern more significant variables, we stratified the data. Excluding the
out year of 1995, a closer look at the 10-year intervals starting in 1965 is also
Chalekian 335

presented. The results of the 1965 to 1970 estimation are seen (Figure 1, upper
right) with the power of a governor (GINSTPWR) being significant at the .05
level. The coefficient of this variable was, as expected, positively signed. This
supports how within the earliest time frame, the greater a governor’s control
in a state, the greater the ability to direct and the more likely that a CIRPE will
exist. Based on the 1975 to 1980 interval (Figure 1, lower left), the variable for
budget periodicity (PERIOD) also became significant at the .05 level.
However, the model revealed unexpectedly that PERIOD was positively
signed. This indicates how states that budget annually are more likely to con-
trol a CIRPE. A stratified sample for the next 10 years showed the STATEEMP
variable as being significant and negatively signed (Figure 1, lower right).

Discussion
The purpose of this section is to assimilate the statistical findings. The tech-
niques in the prior section tested the variables by holding other factors con-
stant and by looking at different time frames. Models associated with theories
will be presented. Besides attempting to explain the adoption of POSDCORB-
like institutions, contingency theory (2) will be assessed, as will Thompson’s
technologies, and Gulick’s “holding company” (Theory 1). Also to be revis-
ited are the situational foci that may have led to the scrutiny of Gulick’s work.

Associated Theories
Between the qualitative and quantitative phases, evidence was provided for
the dependent variable, the institutional proxy for POSDCORB. This implies
that the full set of variables could be considered to be determinants of IRM
configurations. After POPLTN, aligned with the need for planning, the next
leading variable in terms of statistical significance was the organizational
relationship to TRANSACT. Transactions play a significant role in interorga-
nizational coordination, and a “holding company” (Theory 1 as described by
Gulick) is transaction based. However, in the later years of the sample, appar-
ently more organizations could branch away from a single data center and
become decentralized. This is intuitive in that more agencies were acquiring
computers and were being networked to send and receive transactions. There
were only a few computer installations or transaction “holding companies” in
the early 1960s, but over the decades that this study covered, a distinct shift
was perceived. Smaller computers emerged as a technological breakthrough,
allowing for the decentralization of many government functions.
But why would not all agencies want to place their transactions on a cen-
tral computer? Or why would some agencies have their data on a central
336 Administration & Society 48(3)

system, and then want to place it on their own system? It could be that, among
other restrictions, the routines of centralized bureaus were too stringent.
Again, structural contingency theory (2) holds that for organizations to be
effective, “there has to be a goodness of fit between its structural design and
the conditions of its environment” (Pennings, 1992, p. 268). Centralized data
processing bureaus had their own set of environmental problems, one of
which was the inability to keep up with peripheral agencies’ requests. For this
reason, moves toward decentralization may have occurred. In terms of orga-
nizational theory, the multiple contingencies a work unit might face could
cause an organizational “misfit” to occur. In one file-intensive study, it was
concluded that organizational misfits result in poor organizational perfor-
mance (Gresov, 1989). For this reason, an agency might want its data added
to (or removed from) a centralized system.
It is of little surprise that the GINSTPWR variable detected those prob-
lems in the earliest periods of the sample. Governors sought control over
mainframe computers and problems. If not resolved at lower echelons, a data
processing crisis in a bureau of a state may ultimately rise to the level of that
state’s chief executive. With the need for an agency to standardize procure-
ment or process critical data, gubernatorial direction may have been the only
catalyst to precipitate interagency cooperation. The stronger the GINSTPWR,
the more likely that a CIRPE will exist in a state. With agency heads attempt-
ing to automate their file-intensive data processing functions, a governor’s
influence was often required to attempt rule-bound control.
A budget cycle, whether annual or biennial, is a certain, controlled event.
Budget totals were increasingly derived from automated sources. The
PERIOD variable, from which the first increases were detected in the mid-
1970s and early 1980s, became statistically significant. As opposed to a nega-
tive relationship in which the propensity exists for biennial states to be
centralized, the opposite was found. Presumably, technological obsolescence
would be twice as bad if budget requests were submitted every 2 years. Based
on the evidence, states that budget annually are more likely to have a central-
ized IRM policy organization. It can be assumed, ceteris paribus, that states
that budget annually make budgetary requests twice as often. The importance
of those requests cannot be overstated, as well as the need for institutional
control. If the data are in a central database, it is more likely to be accessed
and controlled more frequently.
As a proxy for staff, the state employee variable (STATEEMP) showed
negative relationships in the full and stratified samples. The smaller the
number of employees, the more general the services performed by each
position. In contrast, the larger the number of employees, the more a spe-
cialization of services can occur, but also the greater need to coordinate.
Chalekian 337

This was detected in the model: The greater the number of employees, the
greater the degree of decentralization.

Thompson’s Technologies
A focal agency’s core operations may include POSDCORB (Agranoff, 2007,
p. 194). Yet, cases regarding the coordination of administrative policies were
documented much earlier. Based on the core technology descriptions of long-
linked, intensive, and mediating types (Thompson, 1967/2003), these three can
possibly be generalized to the presence of POSDCORB-like entities. Based on
coefficient signage, control elements were more pervasive in the first time peri-
ods, and coordination elements were more likely afterwards, with planning,
organizing, and staffing throughout. Models with those signs were previously
revealed. A progression can be seen whereby long-linked technology agencies
were enhanced by reusable structured designs and intensive technology agen-
cies then became a part of or were influenced by mediating technology agen-
cies. Studies on similar frameworks have uncovered progressions of rule-based
institutions (cf. McGinnis, 2000; Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom et al., 1994). It is pos-
sible that advanced forms of multiple inheritance may be in play, extending
from “one or more existing entities, such that the new entity inherits existing
behavior and information” (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p. 46). Calls have been
made to account for “the instantiation of communication technology into orga-
nizational form or vice versa” (DeSanctis & Fulk, 1999, p. 501). The study
detected in situ examples of these forms as rule-based institutions.

Situational Foci/Ignoring Framework Attributes

Gulick facilitated coordination by “organization” and “the dominance of an
idea.” However, Simon initially focused his early criticisms on only the first
(Hammond, 1990). When focusing solely on specific organizational areas,
Simon could easily find fault with Gulick’s principles and his POSDCORB.
The value of isomorphs has been previously established (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983), as well as polycentricity (McGinnis, 2000). Simon may have
conjured up singular morphs and/or empty framework classes. In his 1997
version of Administrative Behavior, Simon appears to reconsider some of his
1947 criticisms. For instance, he distinguished between his:

“basic science” approach to organization theory that is taken in Chapter II. On

the other hand, we can think of organization theory as providing a guide to
designing organizations—in the same way that architecture provides a guide to
designing buildings, and engineering a guide to designing machines and
structures. (Simon, 1997, p. 50)
338 Administration & Society 48(3)

The first sought elements via empirical evidence, whereas the second was
concerned with designs. Engineering, according to Simon (1997), was more
concerned with “designing systems that will accomplish desired objectives”
(p. 50). Gulick used organizational design by word as well as in action
(Wamsley & Dudley, 1998). But was Simon attempting rapprochement?
Simon (1997) took “a second look at organization theory from an engi-
neering or design standpoint” (p. 50). He later commented how “[t]he ‘prin-
ciples of organization’ still appear with great regularity in textbooks on
organization” (p. 51). From an engineering or design perspective, elements
of coordination are highly desirable to those in IRM. His later book provided
an example of a “fundamental inquiry into the organization of computer
hardware systems” (p. 54). Simon’s work was valuable, but he may have
unintentionally deflected students of administration away from “the proper-
ties of organizational structures” (Hammond, 1990, p. 170). Generations of
scholars have misinterpreted Gulick’s contribution “through the eyes of
Simon’s critique” (Meier, 2010, p. 284).
Finally, would POSDCORB be considered a framework? As with other
framework scholars, scenarios of framework-theory-model were used. The
study suggests answers to the previous framework assessment questions
(Ostrom, 1999). Gulick’s work provides a pattern language for addressing
universal elements, and possibly “true invariants” as described by Alexander.
POSDCORB elements may be “base classes” involving multiple inheritance.
In our view, a better integration has been shown across policy, IRM, and
public administration disciplines. In terms of framework performance, the
studies of other scholars, as well as our group, reveals how POSDCORB
endures. The models that resulted from the framework and associated theo-
ries can partially explain organizational change in rule-based institutions.

Conclusion
Using a mixed-methods approach, evidence was suggested for the dependent
variable, the proxy for POSDCORB. A multidisciplinary study was used to
show how the concept contained elements of patterns and designs. It appears
Gulick attempted to design a framework with a pattern language and tech-
niques like encapsulation, polymorphism, and inheritance. He used encapsu-
lation to simplify and codify his experiences and those of Fayol. He used
polymorphism to widen his audience, depending on their situation. Finally,
he used inheritance to bring together the more numerous concepts into a sin-
gle and complete framework. The blending of a definition, a law and an
empirically validated construct was accomplished. Support could then be
Chalekian 339

found as most of Gulick’s POSDCORB variables became significant, some

over time, with the remainder implying based on signage.
The study is important as it indicates how, in the 1930s, the “classical”
Gulick envisioned design, in the 1940s, the “neoclassical” Simon faulted
Gulick for a lack of evidence, yet in the 1990s, he suggested using design. A
“classical” approach has gained credibility. In terms of POSDCORB criti-
cism, some of it may not have been entirely grounded. Framework structures
can exist, but they lack utility until they are activated. In Simon’s (1997) later
commentary, he suggested a second look at organization theory from a design
perspective. Yet, Gulick was a design scientist (Meier, 2010) and appeared to
use design techniques such as PIE and A-PIE.
The study partially reconciles Simon’s differences between his first and
fourth editions of Administrative Behavior by suggesting an emphasis on
design. It took Pennings (1992) two tries with his version of Structural
Contingency Theory. Organizations need to change. It is up to administrators
to apply the POSDCORB framework, perhaps with coordination or control.
With huge files, data- and IRM-based entities became the “model” institu-
tions for trying to achieve a balance. Over time, these entities became in situ
examples of “holding companies” (Theory 1).
Observing rules and structural contingencies (Theory 2) these roles are
quite challenging. Future studies could be done on framework extensions
toward collaboration. Studies on the centralization of personnel or budgeting
may be insightful. How POSDCORB integrates with institutional analyses or
policy implementation research may also be of interest. To centralize is to
choose one organization form over another. To do so may activate
POSDCORB-like institutions. Another instantiation is to decentralize. Gulick
provided the components, and it is up to others to take action.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.

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Author Biography
Paul M. Chalekian is a senior program assessment analyst with the City of Baltimore.
He is also an adjunct professor in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Nevada, Reno, and in the Department of Management and Technology at the
University of Maryland University College. His experience includes developing per-
formance audits, administering state programs, and enhancing enterprise frameworks.