In libel as a rule, truth of the defamatory statement is not a defense by itself, as “[e]very

defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true.” 31 Even if the offender is

able to prove the truth of the defamatory statement, he is not relieved from liability. By way of
exceptions, proof of truth will help exonerate the author of the defamation in the following:

1. In a criminal prosecution for libel, if the accused presents, in addition to proof of the truth
of the matter charged as libelous, good motives and justifiable ends in publishing the
matter, he shall be acquitted (Arts. 354 and 361, RPC).

The Court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of That of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.

In People v. Lobino:44

It has been held that "[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason."

"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result
from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a
person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because
the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense."

Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his normal
equanimity."  (Emphasis supplied)
45

There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The provocation and the
commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length of time has passed
during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to reflect on the consequences of
his or her actions. What is important is that the accused has not yet "recovered his normal
equanimity" when he committed the crime.

To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be examined on
a case-to-case basis.

In People v. Mojica,  Aurelio Mojica was accused of murder for stabbing Diosdado Tormon to death.
46

He attempted to mitigate his liability by alleging that the victim humiliated him a month before the
incident. The trial court convicted him of murder without appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation. This court agreed, stating:

The last point to consider is whether the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation ought to
have been appreciated in favor of appellant. What was done to him on that fateful day of November
16, 1968 when he was subjected to treatment offensive to his dignity, having been slapped and
asked to kneel down in the attitude of a supplicant, certainly could give rise to the feeling of passion
or obfuscation. There is a host of cases from United States v. Ferrer, a 1901 decision, to People v.
Pareja, decided in 1969, that so attests. Conduct of that character, in the language of United States
v. Salandanan, would ordinarily be expected to have produced "such powerful excitement as to
overcome reason and self-control." Unfortunately for appellant, however, this mitigating
circumstance cannot be invoked because the killing took place one month and five days later. The
language of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala is relevant: "As to the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation we likewise cannot agree that it can be taken into
consideration because more than twentyfour hours elapsed after the insults of Cotton to the accused
and the criminal act." In the relatively recent case of People v. Constantino, such a plea was likewise
rejected. There the killing took place after four days. As pointed out by Justice Romualdez in People
v. Alanguilang: "In order that the circumstance of obfuscation can be considered, it is necessary to
establish the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind;
and that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity." Reference may also be made to People v. Dagatan, where this Court could not
consider the presence of this mitigating circumstance as the act that caused the resentment "took
place long before the commission of the crime." People v. Gervacio had another way of putting it, "a
time not far removed from the commission of the crime." The lower court, therefore, did not commit
any error in refusing to credit appellant with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
47

However, a fight between the accused and the victim prior to the crime is not always enough to be
able to successfully prove that passion and obfuscation attended it.

Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or
means of livelihood." The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly;
(4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause
dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It
becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

G.R. No. L-3580             March 22, 1950

CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, 

Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of
a new one for the treason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did
not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense.

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to article
III, section 1 (20) of our constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this
jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in
the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every
system of jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. It found
expression in the Spanish Law and in the Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in
our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen.

It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for
the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always
been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged
in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two
offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and
deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules
there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the
first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or
when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.
(Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs. Martinez, 55
Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former
constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has
been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the
latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then
go down step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither
can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result." (People vs.
Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U. S. vs.
Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)

This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies,
the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the
ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S.,
223 U. S. 442, followed by this Court in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and these
two cases are similar to the instant case. Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicated for the
new offense.

This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our constitution for was the one prevailing in
jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning could have been
intended by our Rules of Court.

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another

offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were
in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was
then inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a
subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things
there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be
construed to recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist.
General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that
exceptions have been intended to their language which would avoid results of this character. (In
re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)

When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no intention of abandoning the ruling
laid down in the Diaz case, and the proof of this is that although the said Rules were approved on
December 1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the Espino case reiterating therein the
Diaz doctrine. Had that doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the Rules of Court as being
unwise, unjust or obnoxious, logically it would have likewise been repudiated in the Espino case by
reason if consistency and as a matter of justice to the accused, who should in consequence have
been acquitted instead of being sentenced to a heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that had
already been found to be wrong. There was absolutely no reason to preclude this Court from
repealing the doctrine in the Espino case, for as a mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in
the decision of any case where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the mind of the Court, even after
the approval of the Rules, was not against but in favor of said doctrine.

For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as
followed in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is not only contrary
to the real meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of Court
but is also obnoxious to the administration of justice. If, in obedience to the mandate of the law, the
prosecuting officer files an information within six hours after the accused is arrested, and the
accused claiming his constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on new
fact supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious
offense, under the Tarok ruling, no way is open by which the accused may be penalized in
proportion to the enormity of his guilt. Furthermore, such a ruling may open the way to suspicions or
charges of conclusion between the prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave detriment of
public interest and confidence in the administration of justice, which cannot happen under the Diaz
ruling.

Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an
offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said
penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to the trial of the
criminal case under the amended information. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-58886 December 13, 1988

CONSUELO E. MALLARI, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,

By the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, it is understood that "when a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
Identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience."  3
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three (3) requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.  4

With the prior conviction by a final judgment of petitioner for the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public document in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, there is no question that the first and second requisites
above enumerated are present in the case at bar. The problem then lies with the third requisite. Is
the crime charged in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR the same as in this case (

A comparison of the Informations filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings of
facts of the appellate court tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts
amount to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing offense. 

A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal
resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and
operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of
acts, there is only one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.

The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further demonstrated by the fact that the
falsification of the two (2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the
same date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same occasion. This Court has held in
the case of People v. de Leon,   that the act of taking two or more roosters in the same place and on
10

the same occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and therefore, there is only one crime of
theft even if the roosters are owned by different persons. 

It has also been ruled that when two informations refer to the same transaction, the second charge
cannot prosper because the accused will thereby be placed in jeopardy for the second time for the
same offense.