RISK MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT

Aaron Quintana
Arizona State University
OGL 421: Project Risk Management
Professor Matthew Rodgers
March 1, 2022
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT

SHORT HISTORY OF PROJECT CONCEPTION

On December 1st 2010 Airbus announced their A320neo with a stunning fuel
efficiency, 6% better then the Boeing 737NG (Boeing’s latest single aisle
platform). Boeing was taken off guard by the Airbus secret development and
announcement. Boeing decided in a matter of weeks to launch a fast track
project to revamp their current 737 platform that could outperform the new
Airbus A320neo. The Boeing 737 Max project was born and given a six year
timeframe for completion.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT

OVERVIEW OF PROJECT

 Fourth-generation 737
 Fast track completion (6 year project)
 Outperform Airbus A320neo
 Maintain common “type certificate”
 Increase fuel efficiency
 Maintain market niche
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 USE OF OLD PLATFORM
The 737 platform was a 1960s design that would
need to be updated to current needs.
 FAST TRACK
Boeing set a 6 year schedule for project. Shorter
than any other project duration in their history.
 SELF SAFETY CERTIFICATION
Boeing performed most of its safety
certification, since FAA lacked resources and
experience to perform.
 TYPE CERTIFICATION
New 737 Max configuration needed to be similar to
the previous generation and feel and handle
similarly.
 BUDGET
Boeing was aiming on saving on budget by
utilizing existing design.
 INTRODUCTION OF NEW SYSTEMS
Boeing introduced a new software system
(MCSD) without proper oversight and
review.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT

IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 USE OF OLD PLATFORM OUTCOME OF DECISION

The decision to utilize the old platform was
done in a rush by management. They had been
trying to make a decision between a new design
or updating the 737 platform for the past four
years. Due to the launch of Airbus A320neo,
Boeing rushed to make a final decision to
update an older platform rather then have a
new design. Old platform was designed for a
smaller less powerful engine.
An in depth feasibility study should had been done
before making the final decision. Experts in design
and engineers should had been brought in to
determine the effects the larger more powerful
engine could have on the performance of the old
platform.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 FAST TRACK
The decision to implement a six year schedule
for the 737 Max was done for business reasons
and not taking into account historical data for
this type of project duration. The main driver
on this decision was the competition with
Airbus market share.
OUTCOME OF DECISION
Making a decision for business reasons is not
necessarily a bad action but consideration should be
placed on all other aspects of the project. For this
example, safety should have been a high priority
when making the decision to fast track the 737 Max
project. Either more resources should had been
brought in and or a third party review should had
been conducted to alleviate any safety or design
concerns.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 SELF SAFETY CERTIFICATION
Once Boeing accepted to do the certification
when the FAA deferred it to them, Boeing
should have implemented redundant check and
balances of their own processes. Making sure
their products are safe is their responsibility to
their customers and the company had a
reputation to withhold.
OUTCOME OF DECISION
A system to review and certify the safety of its own
products should always be in place in any company.
The issue here is that the FAA who is supposed to
perform safety certification was not doing their part
to keep Boeing accountable for their own oversight.
The system was flaw from the start.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 TYPE CERTIFICATION
Once Boeing accepted to do the certification
when the FAA deferred it to them, Boeing
should have implemented redundant check and
balances of their own processes. Making sure
their products are safe is their responsibility to
their customers and the company had a
reputation to withhold.
OUTCOME OF DECISION
Even thought the type certification presented
Boeing with a marketing advantage when selling the
737 Max to the airlines, it also hindered the ability
for designers to innovate and implement recent
aviation improvements. Type certification make it
difficult for designers to implement cutting-edge
technology. Overall this was a good decision made
by management.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 BUDGET
Boeing sought to save billions of dollars in
engineering costs by utilizing a previous
generation platform for their 737 Max. The
utilization of the older platform also provided
them with a head start on design and
engineering work.
OUTCOME OF DECISION
This was a good decision by Boeing, if the Boing 737
Max would had not had the issues it did the
company would have been in great financial
standing and maintained their hold on the market as
well.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
 INTRODUCTION OF NEW SYSTEMS
The introduction of the MCAS system to fix the
problems cause by the larger engine of the 737
Max, might had been a good idea. The MCAS
system was added as a safety feature for the
plane and in theory it should had been a good
solution to keep the project moving forward and
maintain the schedule.
OUTCOME OF DECISION
The problem came from the implementation of the
new software and hardware system for the MCAS.
Both Boeing and FAA failed to address this part of
the project. All system in planes have redundancy
and the quick turn around of this project made
Boeing engineers and the FAA overlook the missing
required system redundancy.
BOEING 737 MAX PROJECT

RISK SOLUTION(S)
In my opinion the most important task that could had saved all the lost lives from the 737
Max crashes is the implementation of project risk management. Especially a risk study of the
MCAS system that was implemented to fix the stall risk of the plane due to the added lift of
the larger engine. I am sure that if the potential risk of the system would had been looked at
and reviewed by the project team and experts, the lack of the sensor redundancy in the
system would had come to light and fixed. The fact that this was a fast pace project had a big
impact on risks being overlooked. Also, the culture and excitement of the team members for
being able to pull off such a monumental feat made everyone focus on the finish line and
overlook proper engineering and management practices.
REFERENCES

Campbell, D. (2019, May 2). The many human errors that brought down the Boeing 737 Max. The Verge. Retrieved
February 28, 2022, from https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-
human-error-mcas-faa
Gelles, D. (2019, October 28). Boeing 737 Max: What’s Happened After the 2 Deadly Crashes. The New York Times.
Retrieved February 28, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/business/boeing-737-crashes.html
Hall, J., & Goelz, P. (2019, July 19). Opinion | The Boeing 737 Max Crisis Is a Leadership Failure. The New York
Times. Retrieved February 28, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/boeing-737-max.html
Pasztor, A., Tangel, A., Wall, R., & Sider, A. (2019, March 27). How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed. WSJ. Retrieved
February 28, 2022, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-boeings-737-max-failed-11553699239
Project Management Institute. (2017). A guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK guide) (6th
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