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P RICE R IGIDITY:

M ICROECONOMIC E VIDENCE AND


M ACROECONOMIC I MPLICATIONS

Emi Nakamura Jón Steinsson

UC Berkeley

March 2019

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W HY C ARE A BOUT P RICE R IGIDITY IN M ACRO ?

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W HY C ARE A BOUT P RICE R IGIDITY IN M ACRO ?

Diverse evidence that demand shocks affect output:


Monetary shocks: Friedman-Schwartz 63, Eichengreen-Sachs 85,
Mussa 86, Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans 99, Romer-Romer 04,
Gertler-Karadi 15, Nakamura-Steinsson 18
Fiscal shocks: Blanchard-Perotti 02, Ramey 11, Barro-Redlick 11,
Nakamura-Steinsson 14, Guajardo-Leigh-Pescatori 14
Household deleveraging shocks: Mian-Sufi 14

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 2 / 79


W HY C ARE A BOUT P RICE R IGIDITY IN M ACRO ?

Diverse evidence that demand shocks affect output:


Monetary shocks: Friedman-Schwartz 63, Eichengreen-Sachs 85,
Mussa 86, Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans 99, Romer-Romer 04,
Gertler-Karadi 15, Nakamura-Steinsson 18
Fiscal shocks: Blanchard-Perotti 02, Ramey 11, Barro-Redlick 11,
Nakamura-Steinsson 14, Guajardo-Leigh-Pescatori 14
Household deleveraging shocks: Mian-Sufi 14
Major challenge: How to explain this empirical finding?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 2 / 79


W HY C ARE A BOUT P RICE R IGIDITY IN M ACRO ?

Diverse evidence that demand shocks affect output:


Monetary shocks: Friedman-Schwartz 63, Eichengreen-Sachs 85,
Mussa 86, Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans 99, Romer-Romer 04,
Gertler-Karadi 15, Nakamura-Steinsson 18
Fiscal shocks: Blanchard-Perotti 02, Ramey 11, Barro-Redlick 11,
Nakamura-Steinsson 14, Guajardo-Leigh-Pescatori 14
Household deleveraging shocks: Mian-Sufi 14
Major challenge: How to explain this empirical finding?
In RBC type models, demand shocks have small effects on output

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 2 / 79


W HY C ARE A BOUT P RICE R IGIDITY IN M ACRO ?

Diverse evidence that demand shocks affect output:


Monetary shocks: Friedman-Schwartz 63, Eichengreen-Sachs 85,
Mussa 86, Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans 99, Romer-Romer 04,
Gertler-Karadi 15, Nakamura-Steinsson 18
Fiscal shocks: Blanchard-Perotti 02, Ramey 11, Barro-Redlick 11,
Nakamura-Steinsson 14, Guajardo-Leigh-Pescatori 14
Household deleveraging shocks: Mian-Sufi 14
Major challenge: How to explain this empirical finding?
In RBC type models, demand shocks have small effects on output
Leading explanation: Prices adjust sluggishly to shocks

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 2 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY AND THE B USINESS C YCLES

Monetary shock: Increase in money supply


Flexible prices: Prices increase, while output and real rate unchanged
Sticky prices: Reduction in nominal interest rate reduces real rates

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P RICE R IGIDITY AND THE B USINESS C YCLES

Monetary shock: Increase in money supply


Flexible prices: Prices increase, while output and real rate unchanged
Sticky prices: Reduction in nominal interest rate reduces real rates
Fiscal shock: Increase in government spending
Flexible prices: Real rates rise, which crowds out private spending
Sticky prices: Real rate sluggish unless nominal rate moves,
output increases more

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 3 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY AND THE B USINESS C YCLES

Monetary shock: Increase in money supply


Flexible prices: Prices increase, while output and real rate unchanged
Sticky prices: Reduction in nominal interest rate reduces real rates
Fiscal shock: Increase in government spending
Flexible prices: Real rates rise, which crowds out private spending
Sticky prices: Real rate sluggish unless nominal rate moves,
output increases more
Same logic implies muted response of real rates to other shocks such as:
deleveraging shocks, financial panics, increased uncertainty, “animal spirits”

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C OULD P RICE R IGIDITIES C AUSE M AJOR R ECESSIONS ?

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C OULD P RICE R IGIDITIES C AUSE M AJOR R ECESSIONS ?

Many people’s first reaction is that this is not plausible

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 4 / 79


C OULD P RICE R IGIDITIES C AUSE M AJOR R ECESSIONS ?

Many people’s first reaction is that this is not plausible


But many shocks call for sharp movements in the real interest rate

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 4 / 79


C OULD P RICE R IGIDITIES C AUSE M AJOR R ECESSIONS ?

Many people’s first reaction is that this is not plausible


But many shocks call for sharp movements in the real interest rate
Deleveraging shocks:
(Eggertsson-Krugman 12 and Guerrieri-Lorenzoni 17)
Sharp increase in desire to save →
Sharp drop in “natural” rate of interest

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 4 / 79


C OULD P RICE R IGIDITIES C AUSE M AJOR R ECESSIONS ?

Many people’s first reaction is that this is not plausible


But many shocks call for sharp movements in the real interest rate
Deleveraging shocks:
(Eggertsson-Krugman 12 and Guerrieri-Lorenzoni 17)
Sharp increase in desire to save →
Sharp drop in “natural” rate of interest
But if prices are sticky and nominal rate constrained by ZLB ...
Real rate stuck at too high a level, output stuck at too low a level

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 4 / 79


C OULD P RICE R IGIDITIES C AUSE M AJOR R ECESSIONS ?

Many people’s first reaction is that this is not plausible


But many shocks call for sharp movements in the real interest rate
Deleveraging shocks:
(Eggertsson-Krugman 12 and Guerrieri-Lorenzoni 17)
Sharp increase in desire to save →
Sharp drop in “natural” rate of interest
But if prices are sticky and nominal rate constrained by ZLB ...
Real rate stuck at too high a level, output stuck at too low a level

Financial disruptions and investment hang-overs have similar effects

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P RICE R IGIDITY AND C OORDINATION FAILURE

Nominal price stickiness not the whole story!

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P RICE R IGIDITY AND C OORDINATION FAILURE

Nominal price stickiness not the whole story!


Usually combined with coordination failures among price setters
Staggered price setting
Strategic complementarity among price setters
(firm A’s optimal price increasing in firm B’s price)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 5 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY AND C OORDINATION FAILURE

Nominal price stickiness not the whole story!


Usually combined with coordination failures among price setters
Staggered price setting
Strategic complementarity among price setters
(firm A’s optimal price increasing in firm B’s price)

These three features interact powerfully to create a lot of sluggishness

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 5 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY AND C OORDINATION FAILURE

Nominal price stickiness not the whole story!


Usually combined with coordination failures among price setters
Staggered price setting
Strategic complementarity among price setters
(firm A’s optimal price increasing in firm B’s price)

These three features interact powerfully to create a lot of sluggishness

Can price rigidity create long-lived effects on output?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 5 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY AND C OORDINATION FAILURE

Nominal price stickiness not the whole story!


Usually combined with coordination failures among price setters
Staggered price setting
Strategic complementarity among price setters
(firm A’s optimal price increasing in firm B’s price)

These three features interact powerfully to create a lot of sluggishness

Can price rigidity create long-lived effects on output?


Yes! If combined with coordination failure among price setters

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M ICRO P RICE R IGIDITY AND THE B USINESS C YCLES

What matters for the business cycle is the extent to which


micro price rigidity lead to a sluggish response of
the aggregate price level

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M ICRO P RICE R IGIDITY AND THE B USINESS C YCLES

What matters for the business cycle is the extent to which


micro price rigidity lead to a sluggish response of
the aggregate price level
This depends on the nature of the micro price rigidity

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 6 / 79


M ICRO P RICE R IGIDITY AND THE B USINESS C YCLES

What matters for the business cycle is the extent to which


micro price rigidity lead to a sluggish response of
the aggregate price level
This depends on the nature of the micro price rigidity
Stark comparison: Calvo model vs. Caplin-Spulber model

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C ALVO M ODEL

Each firm adjusts with probability 1 − α each period

pt = (1 − α)pit∗ + αpt−1

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C ALVO M ODEL

Each firm adjusts with probability 1 − α each period

pt = (1 − α)pit∗ + αpt−1

CES demand:

X
pit∗ = (1 − αβ) (αβ)j Et mct+j
j=0

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C ALVO M ODEL

Each firm adjusts with probability 1 − α each period

pt = (1 − α)pit∗ + αpt−1

CES demand:

X
pit∗ = (1 − αβ) (αβ)j Et mct+j
j=0

MP targets nominal output: mt = yt + pt


Simple utility and production function: mct = mt
Random walk nominal output (no drift): Et mct+j = mt

pt = (1 − α)mt + αpt−1

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1.2

0.8
Nominal output
% Change

0.6 Real output


Price level

0.4

0.2

0
–4 –2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Months
e1
nse ofNakamura-Steinsson
real output and the price level to a one-time
(UC Berkeley)
permanent shock to nominal aggregate demand
Price Rigidity 8 / 79
C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

MP targets nominal output: mt = yt + pt


mt is increasing (i.e., high inflation)
pt∗ ∝ mt

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C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

MP targets nominal output: mt = yt + pt


mt is increasing (i.e., high inflation)
pt∗ ∝ mt
Fixed cost of changing prices
When real price falls to s, firms raise it to S
Initial distribution of real prices uniform on (s, S)

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C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

Say infinitesimal ∆m occurs

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 10 / 79


C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

Say infinitesimal ∆m occurs


pit − pt∗ falls by ∆m for all firms
Firms with initial real price below s + ∆m fall below s
and raise their price to S (think of this occurring in continuous time)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 10 / 79


C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

Say infinitesimal ∆m occurs


pit − pt∗ falls by ∆m for all firms
Firms with initial real price below s + ∆m fall below s
and raise their price to S (think of this occurring in continuous time)
Fraction of firms that change their price?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 10 / 79


C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

Say infinitesimal ∆m occurs


pit − pt∗ falls by ∆m for all firms
Firms with initial real price below s + ∆m fall below s
and raise their price to S (think of this occurring in continuous time)
Fraction of firms that change their price?

∆m
S−s

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 10 / 79


C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

Say infinitesimal ∆m occurs


pit − pt∗ falls by ∆m for all firms
Firms with initial real price below s + ∆m fall below s
and raise their price to S (think of this occurring in continuous time)
Fraction of firms that change their price?

∆m
S−s
How much do they change their price by?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 10 / 79


C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

Say infinitesimal ∆m occurs


pit − pt∗ falls by ∆m for all firms
Firms with initial real price below s + ∆m fall below s
and raise their price to S (think of this occurring in continuous time)
Fraction of firms that change their price?

∆m
S−s
How much do they change their price by?

S−s

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C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

How much does the price level and output respond?

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C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

How much does the price level and output respond?

∆m
∆p = (S − s) = ∆m
S−s

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C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

How much does the price level and output respond?

∆m
∆p = (S − s) = ∆m
S−s
∆y = ∆m − ∆p = 0

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C APLIN -S PULBER M ODEL

How much does the price level and output respond?

∆m
∆p = (S − s) = ∆m
S−s
∆y = ∆m − ∆p = 0

Conclusion: Money is neutral no matter how sticky prices are!!

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C APLIN -S PULBER VS . C ALVO

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C APLIN -S PULBER VS . C ALVO

Calvo model:
Timing of price changes random
Random assortment of firms that change prices
Some don’t really need to change
Aggregate price level responds modestly

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C APLIN -S PULBER VS . C ALVO

Calvo model:
Timing of price changes random
Random assortment of firms that change prices
Some don’t really need to change
Aggregate price level responds modestly
Caplin-Spulber model:
Timing of price changes chosen optimally
Firms with biggest “pent-up” desire to change price do
Aggregate price level responds a great deal
Golosov-Lucas call this “selection effect”

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Fig. 6.—Price adjustment in menu cost and Calvo models. a, Price adjustment before
aggregate shock. b, Price adjustment after aggregate shock.

Source: Golosov and Lucas (2007)


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C APLIN -S PULBER VS . C ALVO

Both models extreme cases


Calvo: Aggregate conditions have no effect on which firms
or how many firms change prices
Caplin-Spulber model: Aggregate shocks only determinant of
which firms and how many firms change prices
(+ other special assumption that matter for result)

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C APLIN -S PULBER VS . C ALVO

Both models extreme cases


Calvo: Aggregate conditions have no effect on which firms
or how many firms change prices
Caplin-Spulber model: Aggregate shocks only determinant of
which firms and how many firms change prices
(+ other special assumption that matter for result)
Subsequent literature explores intermediate cases and uses
empirical evidence on characteristics of micro price adjustment
to choose between models

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L ITERATURE G ETS R EVITALIZED

Ss literature had gotten a bit stale in late 90’s


Only so much you can do analytically
(computers not yet good enough to simulate realistic models)
Lack of data to discipline models

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L ITERATURE G ETS R EVITALIZED

Ss literature had gotten a bit stale in late 90’s


Only so much you can do analytically
(computers not yet good enough to simulate realistic models)
Lack of data to discipline models
Both things changed after 2000:
Computers became powerful enough to simulate realistic models
Bils and Klenow (2004) introduced massive new source of data

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BASIC FACTS : H OW O FTEN D O P RICES C HANGE ?

Conventional wisdom in late 90’s: Prices change once a year


Cecchetti (1986), Carlton (1986), Kashyap (1995), Blinder et al. (1998)

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BASIC FACTS : H OW O FTEN D O P RICES C HANGE ?

Conventional wisdom in late 90’s: Prices change once a year


Cecchetti (1986), Carlton (1986), Kashyap (1995), Blinder et al. (1998)
Bils and Klenow (2004) used BLS micro data from 95-97:
Prices change every 4-5 months

Spawned a large subsequent literature

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A DDITIONAL FACTS ABOUT P RICES

BLS micro data allowed researchers to document


additional facts about price adjustment
Klenow and Kryvtsov (05,08):
Average absolute size of price changes large: about 10%
Golosov-Lucas 07:
2.5% annual inflation
20% of prices changing every month
Average absolute size of price change 10%
How can this be?

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A DDITIONAL FACTS ABOUT P RICES

BLS micro data allowed researchers to document


additional facts about price adjustment
Klenow and Kryvtsov (05,08):
Average absolute size of price changes large: about 10%
Golosov-Lucas 07:
2.5% annual inflation
20% of prices changing every month
Average absolute size of price change 10%
How can this be?
Evidence for large, transitory idiosyncratic shocks
that drive price adjustment
Quantitatively assess monetary non-neutrality
in menu cost model in light of these facts

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M ODIFIED G OLOSOV-L UCAS 07

Households maximize:

X
E0 β t [log Ct − ωLt ]
t=0

where θ
"Z # θ−1
1
θ−1
Ct = ct (z) θ dz
0

subject to:
Z 1
Pt Ct + Qt,t+1 Bt+1 ≤ Bt + Wt Lt + Πt (z)dz
0

and natural borrowing limits

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H OUSEHOLD O PTIMIZATION

Cost minimization implies


 −θ
pt (z)
ct (z) = Ct
Pt

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H OUSEHOLD O PTIMIZATION

Cost minimization implies


 −θ
pt (z)
ct (z) = Ct
Pt
Labor-leisure optimization yields:

Wt = ωPt Ct

So, nominal wages are proportional to nominal output

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M ONETARY P OLICY

Define nominal aggregate demand as:

St = Pt Ct

Suppose central banks varies interest rate / money supply in such a way
that log nominal aggregate demand follows a random walk:

log St = µ log St−1 + ηt

where ηt ∼ N(0, ση2 ).


This is aggregate source of uncertainty in the model

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F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

Linear production function

yt (z) = At (z)Lt (z)

This implies that marginal cost of production is Wt /At (z)

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F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

Linear production function

yt (z) = At (z)Lt (z)

This implies that marginal cost of production is Wt /At (z)


Idiosyncratic productivity follows an AR(1) in logs:

log At (z) = ρ log At−1 (z) + t (z)

where t (z) ∼ N(0, σ2 )

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F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

Firm maximizes value of expected profits



X
Et Dt,t+τ Πt+τ (z)
τ =0

where profits are

Πt (z) = pt (z)yt (z) − Wt Lt (z) − χj Wt It (z) − Pt U

Firm must hire χj units of labor to change price


U fixed cost of operation
(helpful to reconcile large markups with small profits)
Dt,t+τ is household’s stochastic discount factor

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H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

“Perturbation methods” won’t work due to fixed cost

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H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

“Perturbation methods” won’t work due to fixed cost


Alternative: Dynamic programming, i.e., set up a Bellman equation

V (Zt ) = maxpt [ΠR R


t (z) + E[Dt,t+1 V (Zt+1 )]

 −θ  
pt (z) pt (z) 1 Wt Wt
ΠR
t (z) = Ct − − χj It (z) − U
Pt Pt At (z) Pt Pt
Zt denotes vector of state variables

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 23 / 79


H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

“Perturbation methods” won’t work due to fixed cost


Alternative: Dynamic programming, i.e., set up a Bellman equation

V (Zt ) = maxpt [ΠR R


t (z) + E[Dt,t+1 V (Zt+1 )]

 −θ  
pt (z) pt (z) 1 Wt Wt
ΠR
t (z) = Ct − − χj It (z) − U
Pt Pt At (z) Pt Pt
Zt denotes vector of state variables
Key question: What is the state?
Generic answer: All variables that affect firm’s value

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 23 / 79


H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

“Perturbation methods” won’t work due to fixed cost


Alternative: Dynamic programming, i.e., set up a Bellman equation

V (Zt ) = maxpt [ΠR R


t (z) + E[Dt,t+1 V (Zt+1 )]

 −θ  
pt (z) pt (z) 1 Wt Wt
ΠR
t (z) = Ct − − χj It (z) − U
Pt Pt At (z) Pt Pt
Zt denotes vector of state variables
Key question: What is the state?
Generic answer: All variables that affect firm’s value
At (z), pt−1 (z)/Pt , Ct

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 23 / 79


H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

“Perturbation methods” won’t work due to fixed cost


Alternative: Dynamic programming, i.e., set up a Bellman equation

V (Zt ) = maxpt [ΠR R


t (z) + E[Dt,t+1 V (Zt+1 )]

 −θ  
pt (z) pt (z) 1 Wt Wt
ΠR
t (z) = Ct − − χj It (z) − U
Pt Pt At (z) Pt Pt
Zt denotes vector of state variables
Key question: What is the state?
Generic answer: All variables that affect firm’s value
At (z), pt−1 (z)/Pt , Ct
Any variable that is needed to forecast Zt+1 (e.g., Ct+1 and Pt+1 )

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 23 / 79


H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

“Perturbation methods” won’t work due to fixed cost


Alternative: Dynamic programming, i.e., set up a Bellman equation

V (Zt ) = maxpt [ΠR R


t (z) + E[Dt,t+1 V (Zt+1 )]

 −θ  
pt (z) pt (z) 1 Wt Wt
ΠR
t (z) = Ct − − χj It (z) − U
Pt Pt At (z) Pt Pt
Zt denotes vector of state variables
Key question: What is the state?
Generic answer: All variables that affect firm’s value
At (z), pt−1 (z)/Pt , Ct
Any variable that is needed to forecast Zt+1 (e.g., Ct+1 and Pt+1 )
Entire joint distribution of (pt−1 (z)/Pt , At (z))

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H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

Krusell-Smith (1998):
Assume firms are slightly boundedly rational
Firms perceive price level as being a function of a small number
of moments of the joint distribution of (pt (z)/Pt , At (z))

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H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

Krusell-Smith (1998):
Assume firms are slightly boundedly rational
Firms perceive price level as being a function of a small number
of moments of the joint distribution of (pt (z)/Pt , At (z))
Response to single unexpected shock
Conjecture path for endogenous aggregates
Solve household problem conditional on this by backward induction
Simulate and update conjecture

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 24 / 79


H OW TO S OLVE F IRM ’ S P ROBLEM

Krusell-Smith (1998):
Assume firms are slightly boundedly rational
Firms perceive price level as being a function of a small number
of moments of the joint distribution of (pt (z)/Pt , At (z))
Response to single unexpected shock
Conjecture path for endogenous aggregates
Solve household problem conditional on this by backward induction
Simulate and update conjecture

Reiter (2009) method


Continuous time methods (Ahn-Kaplan-Moll-Winberry-Wolf 17)
More generally, see Ben Moll’s website and Alisdair McKay’s website.

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 24 / 79


menu costs and phillips curves 181

Fig. 1.—Pricing bounds for 0.64 percent quarterly inflation. Solid lines: upper and
lower bounds U(v) and L(v). Dotted line: g(v).

Source: Golosovscription
and Lucasof(2007)
finite-element methods. That is, we studied the Bellman
equation
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Policy Function

1.9
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3

1.4
2
1.8 1.2
1.6
1
1.4
0.8
Left axis: Prior price. Right axis: Marginal cost. Vertical axis: New price.
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 26 / 79
186 journal of political economy

Fig. 3.—Fraction of prices changed each month

Source: Golosov and Lucas (2007)


the United States is also shown. This pair lies very close to the upper
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 27 / 79
1.65

1.6

1.55

1.5

1.45

1.4

1.35

1.3

Price
1.25
Price Level

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Sample path without idiosyncratic shocks. Small price changes. No price decreases.
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5.5
Price
Desired Price
Price Level
5

4.5

3.5

3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Sample path with idiosyncraticFigure:


shocks.Sample Path with Idiosyncratic Shocks
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 29 / 79
menu costs and phillips curves 189

Fig. 5.—Output responses in menu cost and Calvo models

Source: Golosov and


TheLucas (2007)
impulse responses are much more transient than a standard time-
dependent
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) model would predict.
PriceThe two heavy curves in figure 5 com-
Rigidity 30 / 79
G OLOSOV AND L UCAS 07

Very strong selection effect


6 times less monetary non-neutrality than in Calvo model

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 31 / 79


G OLOSOV AND L UCAS 07

Very strong selection effect


6 times less monetary non-neutrality than in Calvo model
Bottom line: Realistic menu cost model yields monetary non-neutrality
that is “small and transient”

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 31 / 79


A SSAULT ON K EYNESIAN E CONOMICS

Bils and Klenow (2004)


Prices change every 4-5 months

Golosov and Lucas (2007)


Monetary non-neutrality is “ small and transient”

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 32 / 79


K EYNESIAN E CONOMICS F IGHTS BACK

Perhaps Golosov-Lucas model not sufficiently realistic to yield


credible policy conclusions

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 33 / 79


K EYNESIAN E CONOMICS F IGHTS BACK

Perhaps Golosov-Lucas model not sufficiently realistic to yield


credible policy conclusions

Empirical Issues:
How should we treat temporary sales?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 33 / 79


K EYNESIAN E CONOMICS F IGHTS BACK

Perhaps Golosov-Lucas model not sufficiently realistic to yield


credible policy conclusions

Empirical Issues:
How should we treat temporary sales?
How does heterogeneity in price rigidity matter?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 33 / 79


K EYNESIAN E CONOMICS F IGHTS BACK

Perhaps Golosov-Lucas model not sufficiently realistic to yield


credible policy conclusions

Empirical Issues:
How should we treat temporary sales?
How does heterogeneity in price rigidity matter?
Are all price changes selected?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 33 / 79


K EYNESIAN E CONOMICS F IGHTS BACK

Perhaps Golosov-Lucas model not sufficiently realistic to yield


credible policy conclusions

Empirical Issues:
How should we treat temporary sales?
How does heterogeneity in price rigidity matter?
Are all price changes selected?
What is a realistic distribution of idiosyncratic shocks?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 33 / 79


2.5

2.3

2.1

1.9

1.7

1.5
Dollars

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.7

0.5
September September September September September September September September September
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Figure 2
Price series of Nabisco Premium Saltines (16 oz) at a Dominick’s Finer Foods store in Chicago.

Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)


price rigidity is more informative? Which should we use if we wish to calibrate the frequency of
price change in the model in Section 3?
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 34 / 79
P RICE R IGIDITY

Two features stand out:


1. Change in “regular” price is infrequent and “lumpy”
Only 9 “regular price” changes in a 7 year period

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 35 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY

Two features stand out:


1. Change in “regular” price is infrequent and “lumpy”
Only 9 “regular price” changes in a 7 year period
2. Frequent temporary discounts (sales)
117 price changes in 365 weeks

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 35 / 79


P RICE R IGIDITY

Two features stand out:


1. Change in “regular” price is infrequent and “lumpy”
Only 9 “regular price” changes in a 7 year period
2. Frequent temporary discounts (sales)
117 price changes in 365 weeks

Does this product have essentially flexible prices?


Or is it’s price highly rigid?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 35 / 79


Table: Frequency of Price Change by Major Group 1998-2005
Reg. Price Price Frac. Price Ch.
Major Group Weight Freq. Freq. Sales

Processed Food 8.2 10.5 25.9 57.9


Unprocessed Food 5.9 25.0 37.3 37.9
Household Furnishing 5.0 6.0 19.4 66.8
Apparel 6.5 3.6 31.0 87.1
Transportation Goods 8.3 31.3 31.3 8.0
Recreation Goods 3.6 6.0 11.9 49.1
Other Goods 5.4 15.0 15.5 32.6
Utilities 5.3 38.1 38.1 0.0
Vehicle Fuel 5.1 87.6 87.6 0.0
Travel 5.5 41.7 42.8 1.5
Services (excl. Travel) 38.5 6.1 6.6 3.1

Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 36 / 79


Processed Food Unprocessed Food

0.2 0.2

0.15 0.15

0.1 0.1

0.05 0.05

0 0
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010

Apparel Household Furnishings


0.4 0.3

0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1

0 0
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010

Source: Nakamura-Steinsson-Sun-Villar (2018)


Recreation Goods
0.2
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 37 / 79
5Steinsson ARI 22 March 2013 12:35

Table 1 Frequency of price change in consumer prices

Median Mean

Frequency Implied duration Frequency Implied duration

Nakamura & Steinsson (2008)


Regular prices (excluding substitutions 1988–1997) 11.9 7.9 18.9 10.8
Regular prices (excluding substitutions 1998–2005) 9.9 9.6 21.5 11.7
Regular prices (including substitutions 1988–1997) 13.0 7.2 20.7 9.0
Regular prices (including substitutions 1998–2005) 11.8 8.0 23.1 9.3
Posted prices (including substitutions 1998–2005) 20.5 4.4 27.7 7.7

Klenow & Kryvtsov (2008)


Regular prices (including substitutions 1988–2005) 13.9 7.2 29.9 8.6
Posted prices (including substitutions 1988–2005) 27.3 3.7 36.2 6.8

All frequencies are reported in percent per month. Implied durations are reported in months. These statistics are based on US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)
Consumer Price Index (CPI) micro data from 1988 to 2005. Regular prices exclude sales using a sales flag in the BLS data. Excluding substitutions denotes
that substitutions are not counted as price changes. Including substitutions denotes that substitutions are counted as price changes. For the statistics from
Nakamura & Steinsson (2008), we take the case referred to as “estimate frequency of price change during stockouts and sales.” Posted prices are the raw
prices in the BLS data including sales. The median frequency denotes the weighted median frequency of price change. It is calculated by first calculating the
mean frequency of price change for each entry-level item (ELI) in the BLS data and then taking a weighted median across the ELIs using CPI expenditure
weights. The within-ELI mean is weighted in the case of Klenow & Kryvtsov (2008) but not Nakamura & Steinsson (2008). The median implied duration is
equal to 1/ln(1  f ), where f is the median frequency of price change. The mean frequency denotes the weighted mean frequency of price change. The mean
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 38 / 79
I S A P RICE C HANGE J UST A P RICE C HANGE ?

Temporary sales have very special empirical characteristics


They are highly transient
They very often return to the original price
Strongly suggests that firms are not reoptimizing

How do these empirical characteristics affect degree to which


temporary sales enhance the flexibility of the aggregate price level?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 39 / 79


Table 2 Transience of temporary sales

Fraction return after Frequency of regular Frequency of price change during Average
one-period sales price change one-period sales duration of sales

Processed food 78.5 10.5 11.4 2.0


Unprocessed food 60.0 25.0 22.5 1.8

Household 78.2 6.0 11.6 2.3


furnishings
Apparel 86.3 3.6 7.1 2.1

The sample period is 1998–2005. The first data column gives the median fraction of prices that return to their original level after one-period sales. The second
is the median frequency of price changes excluding sales. The third lists the median monthly frequency of regular price change during sales that past one
month. The monthly frequency is calculated as 1  (1  f )0.5, where f is the fraction of prices that return to their original levels after one-period sales. The
fourth data column gives the weighted average duration of sale periods in months. Data taken from Nakamura & Steinsson (2008).

Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)


This evidence strongly suggests that firms are not reoptimizing their prices based on all
available new information when sales end. Furthermore, the empirical characteristics of sales price
changes do not accord well with the simple model developed in Section 3. This model and most
other standard macroeconomics models do not yield sale-like price changes in which large price
decreases are quickly reversed.
To answer the question of how to treat sales in arriving at a summary measure of price rigidity,
itNakamura-Steinsson
is essential to understand how the distinct empiricalPrice
(UC Berkeley) characteristics
Rigidity of sales affect their macro- 40 / 79
I S A P RICE C HANGE J UST A P RICE C HANGE ?

Temporary sales have very special empirical characteristics


They are highly transient
They very often return to the original price
Strongly suggests that firms are not reoptimizing

How do these empirical characteristics affect degree to which


temporary sales enhance the flexibility of the aggregate price level?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 41 / 79


K EHOE AND M IDRIGAN (2015)

Menu cost model (also consider Calvo model)


Firms can change prices for one period at lower cost
Change regular price permanently (“buy” a new price)
Temporary sale (“rent” a new price)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 42 / 79


K EHOE AND M IDRIGAN (2015)

Menu cost model (also consider Calvo model)


Firms can change prices for one period at lower cost
Change regular price permanently (“buy” a new price)
Temporary sale (“rent” a new price)

Timing of sales chosen optimally and responds to macro shocks

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 42 / 79


K EHOE AND M IDRIGAN (2015)

Menu cost model (also consider Calvo model)


Firms can change prices for one period at lower cost
Change regular price permanently (“buy” a new price)
Temporary sale (“rent” a new price)

Timing of sales chosen optimally and responds to macro shocks


Nevertheless, sales generate very little aggregate price flexibility
Results on monetary non-neutrality close to those if sales had been
excluded

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 42 / 79


S ALES O RTHOGONAL TO M ACRO S HOCKS ?

Two Views of Sales:


Intertemporal price discrimination (e.g., Varian, 1980)
Inventory Management (e.g., Lazear, 1986)
Due to unpredictable shifts in taste (fashion)?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 43 / 79


E MPIRICAL I SSUES

How should we treat temporary sales?


How does heterogeneity in price rigidity matter?
Are all price changes selected?
What is a realistic distribution of idiosyncratic shocks?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 44 / 79


5Steinsson ARI 22 March 2013 12:35

Table 1 Frequency of price change in consumer prices

Median Mean

Frequency Implied duration Frequency Implied duration

Nakamura & Steinsson (2008)


Regular prices (excluding substitutions 1988–1997) 11.9 7.9 18.9 10.8
Regular prices (excluding substitutions 1998–2005) 9.9 9.6 21.5 11.7
Regular prices (including substitutions 1988–1997) 13.0 7.2 20.7 9.0
Regular prices (including substitutions 1998–2005) 11.8 8.0 23.1 9.3
Posted prices (including substitutions 1998–2005) 20.5 4.4 27.7 7.7

Klenow & Kryvtsov (2008)


Regular prices (including substitutions 1988–2005) 13.9 7.2 29.9 8.6
Posted prices (including substitutions 1988–2005) 27.3 3.7 36.2 6.8

All frequencies are reported in percent per month. Implied durations are reported in months. These statistics are based on US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)
Consumer Price Index (CPI) micro data from 1988 to 2005. Regular prices exclude sales using a sales flag in the BLS data. Excluding substitutions denotes
that substitutions are not counted as price changes. Including substitutions denotes that substitutions are counted as price changes. For the statistics from
Nakamura & Steinsson (2008), we take the case referred to as “estimate frequency of price change during stockouts and sales.” Posted prices are the raw
prices in the BLS data including sales. The median frequency denotes the weighted median frequency of price change. It is calculated by first calculating the
mean frequency of price change for each entry-level item (ELI) in the BLS data and then taking a weighted median across the ELIs using CPI expenditure
weights. The within-ELI mean is weighted in the case of Klenow & Kryvtsov (2008) but not Nakamura & Steinsson (2008). The median implied duration is
equal to 1/ln(1  f ), where f is the median frequency of price change. The mean frequency denotes the weighted mean frequency of price change. The mean
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 45 / 79
firms, should one calibrate the frequency of price change to the mean or median frequency of price

25

20

15
Weight (%)

10

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Frequency (probability per month)


Figure 3
The expenditure weighted distribution of the frequency of regular price change (percent per month) across product categories (entry-level
items) in the US Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the period 1998–2005. Data taken from Nakamura & Steinsson (2008).

Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)


www.annualreviews.org  Price Rigidity 5.13
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 46 / 79
H ETEROGENEITY IN P RICE R IGIDITY

Distribution is skewed: long right tail


Many products with low frequency
Some products with very high frequency
Different summary statistics give impressions:
Excl. sales: Mean freq: 23%, median freq: 11%
Questions:
Does this heterogeneity matter for aggregate monetary non-neutrality?
What statistic should single sector models be calibrated to?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 47 / 79


H ETEROGENEITY AND M ONETARY N ON -N EUTRALITY

Heterogeneity matters a lot!


No model free answer for calibrating a single sector model

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 48 / 79


H ETEROGENEITY AND M ONETARY N ON -N EUTRALITY

Heterogeneity matters a lot!


No model free answer for calibrating a single sector model
In Taylor model: Bils-Klenow (2002) use median frequency

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 48 / 79


H ETEROGENEITY AND M ONETARY N ON -N EUTRALITY

Heterogeneity matters a lot!


No model free answer for calibrating a single sector model
In Taylor model: Bils-Klenow (2002) use median frequency
In Calvo model: Carvalho (2007) use mean implied duration
(NOT = inverse of mean frequency)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 48 / 79


H ETEROGENEITY AND M ONETARY N ON -N EUTRALITY

Heterogeneity matters a lot!


No model free answer for calibrating a single sector model
In Taylor model: Bils-Klenow (2002) use median frequency
In Calvo model: Carvalho (2007) use mean implied duration
(NOT = inverse of mean frequency)
In menu cost model: Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) say use
median frequency for US data (no general theorem)
Intuition: Extra price change not as useful in high frequency sector
since everyone has already changed

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 48 / 79


E MPIRICAL I SSUES

How should we treat temporary sales?


How does heterogeneity in price rigidity matter?
Are all price changes selected?
What is a realistic distribution of idiosyncratic shocks?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 49 / 79


Household Furnishings Apparel
0.18 0.18

0.15 0.15
1988-1997
1998-2005
0.12 0.12

0.09 0.09

0.06 0.06
1988-1997
0.03 0.03 1998-2005

0 0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Transportation Goods Recreation Goods


0.3 0.18

1988-1997
0.25 0.15 1988-1997
1998-2005
1998-2005

0.2 0.12

0.15 0.09

0.1 0.06

0.05 0.03

0 0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Figure: Seasonality in Product Substitution

Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)


Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 50 / 79
S UBSTITUTIONS N OT S ELECTED

Nakamura and Steinsson 10:


Consider version of model in which substitutions are not selected
(i.e., substitutions are like Calvo price changes,
while other price changes are selected )
Non-selected price changes matter very little

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 51 / 79


0.12
Increases
Decreases
0.10

0.08
Frequency

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.00
Jan Feb M ar Apr M ay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

FIGURE V
Frequency of Regular Price Increases and Decreases by Month
for Consumer Prices
Note. The figure plots the weighted median frequency of regular price increase
Source: Nakamura and Steinsson
and decrease by month.(2008)
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 52 / 79
Figure 19: Frequency of Regular Price Increases and Decreases by Month
for Finished Producer Goods

0.14
Price Increases
0.12 Price Decreases

0.10

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.00
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

The figure plots the weighted median frequency of price increase and decrease by month.

Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008 Supplement)


Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 53 / 79
E MPIRICAL I SSUES

How should re treat temporary sales?


How does heterogeneity in price rigidity matter?
Are all price changes selected?
What is a realistic distribution of idiosyncratic shocks?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 54 / 79


M IDRIGAN (2011)

Strength of selection effect highly sensitive to assumptions


about distribution of idiosyncratic shocks

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 55 / 79


M IDRIGAN (2011)

Strength of selection effect highly sensitive to assumptions


about distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
Golosov-Lucas 07 assume normal shocks
Suppose we instead assume shocks are either tiny or huge
i.e., that they have huge kurtosis

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 55 / 79


M IDRIGAN (2011)

Strength of selection effect highly sensitive to assumptions


about distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
Golosov-Lucas 07 assume normal shocks
Suppose we instead assume shocks are either tiny or huge
i.e., that they have huge kurtosis
In the limit, model becomes much like Calvo

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 55 / 79


M IDRIGAN (2011)

Strength of selection effect highly sensitive to assumptions


about distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
Golosov-Lucas 07 assume normal shocks
Suppose we instead assume shocks are either tiny or huge
i.e., that they have huge kurtosis
In the limit, model becomes much like Calvo
Midrigan evidence:
Size of price changes dispersed
Many small price changes
Coordination of timing of price changes within category

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 55 / 79


Distribution of p changes: Data vs. GL model

Source: Midrigan (2011)


Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 56 / 79
M IDRIGAN (2011)

Two changes to Golosov-Lucas model:


Leptokurtic distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
Returns to scale in price adjustment

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 57 / 79


M IDRIGAN (2011)

Two changes to Golosov-Lucas model:


Leptokurtic distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
Returns to scale in price adjustment

Selection effect much smaller.


Model yields similar conclusions as Calvo model

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 57 / 79


S UFFICIENT S TATISTIC FOR R EAL E FFECTS

Alvarez-Le Bihan-Lippi 15:


In a wide class of models ...
(Calvo, Taylor, Golosov-Lucas, Reis, Midrigan, etc.)
Cumulative output effect of money shock:

δ Kur(∆pi )
M=
6 N(∆pi )
δ size of monetary shock
1/ − 1 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
Kur(∆pi ) kurtosis of size distribution of price changes
N(∆pi ) frequency of price change

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 58 / 79


S UFFICIENT S TATISTIC FOR R EAL E FFECTS

Alvarez-Le Bihan-Lippi 15:


In a wide class of models ...
(Calvo, Taylor, Golosov-Lucas, Reis, Midrigan, etc.)
Cumulative output effect of money shock:

δ Kur(∆pi )
M=
6 N(∆pi )
δ size of monetary shock
1/ − 1 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
Kur(∆pi ) kurtosis of size distribution of price changes
N(∆pi ) frequency of price change

Obviously, there are some simplifying assumptions


(e.g., unit root shock, no inflation, no strategic complementarity, etc.)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 58 / 79


K URTOSIS IS K EY

δ Kur(∆pi )
M=
6 N(∆pi )

Kurtosis in Calvo model is 6


Kurtosis in Golosov-Lucas model is 1

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 59 / 79


M EASURING K URTOSIS

Kurtosis is hard to measure!!


Heterogeneity:
Mixture of distributions with different variances but same kurtosis
will have higher kurtosis
Authors divide by standard deviation at category level
Measurement errors:
Standard to drop large observations. Kurtosis very sensitive to this!!
Authors drop largest 1% of price changes
Spurious small price changes also a problem
(product not held constant, coupons)
Authors drop price changes that are smaller than 1 cent or 0.1%

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 60 / 79


C ALVO VERSUS M ENU C OSTS

Distinction between time-dependent and state-dependent pricing models


important for key questions:
Degree of monetary non-neutrality
Costs of inflation

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 61 / 79


C ALVO VERSUS M ENU C OSTS

Distinction between time-dependent and state-dependent pricing models


important for key questions:
Degree of monetary non-neutrality
Costs of inflation

Which class of models does the evidence favor?

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 61 / 79


C ALVO VERSUS M ENU C OSTS

Calvo model implies that frequency of price change doesn’t change


as inflation changes
Menu cost model implies that frequency increases

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 62 / 79


C ALVO VERSUS M ENU C OSTS

Calvo model implies that frequency of price change doesn’t change


as inflation changes
Menu cost model implies that frequency increases

Empirical Strategy: Measure how frequency changes


as inflation changes

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 62 / 79


C ALVO VERSUS M ENU C OSTS

Calvo model implies that frequency of price change doesn’t change


as inflation changes
Menu cost model implies that frequency increases

Empirical Strategy: Measure how frequency changes


as inflation changes
Gagnon 09: Mexico 1994-2002 (Tequila crisis)
Nakamura-Steinsson-Sun-Villar 18: U.S. 1978-2014
(Great Inflation/Volcker disinflation)
Alvarez-Baraja-Gonzalez-Rozada-Neumeyer 19: Argentina 1988-1997
(Hyperinflation /Stabalization)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 62 / 79


40
Austria
Belgium
35 Finland
France
)
Luxembourg
Portugal
30
Spain
United States
Mexico
25

20

15

10

0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Period covered by country studies

FIGURE I
Inflation and Time Coverage of U.S., Euro-Area, and Mexican CPI Studies
The studies
Source: Gagnon (2009) shown are representative of at least 50% of consumer expendi-
tures. Data
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC on inflation come from the
Berkeley) OECD Main Economic Indicators, Banco
Price Rigidity 63 / 79
(a) Frequency of price changes
70

60

50
Frequency (%)

Magnitude (%)
40

30

20
Data
10 All observations
Excluding π<0 and VAT change
0
0 20 40 60 80
Inflation (%)
Source: Gagnon (2009)
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 64 / 79
a) Frequency all items
50

40

30
%

20

10

0
0 10 20 30 40 50
annual inflation (%)
Source: Gagnon (2009). Diamonds: data on changes. Boxes: data on increases.
c) Frequency goods
Triangles: data on decreases. Lines: corresponding statistics from model.
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 65 / 79
0.2
Frequency of Price Change
Annual CPI inflation (right axis) 0.15

0.15 0.1

0.05
0.1

0.05
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Figure 12: Frequency of Price Changes in U.S. Data


Source: Nakamura-Steinsson-Sun-Villar (2018)
Note: To construct the frequency series plotted in this figure, we first calculate the mean frequency of pric
changesNakamura-Steinsson
in each ELI (UC for Berkeley)
each year. We then take Price
theRigidity
weighted median across ELI’s. 66 / 79
A LVAREZ ET AL . (2019): T HEORETICAL R ESULTS

At zero inflation:
Derivative of frequency = 0
Derivative of price dispersion = 0
Inflation 9/10th due to “extensive margin”

π = λ+ ∆+ − λ− ∆−

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 67 / 79


A LVAREZ ET AL . (2019): T HEORETICAL R ESULTS

At zero inflation:
Derivative of frequency = 0
Derivative of price dispersion = 0
Inflation 9/10th due to “extensive margin”

π = λ+ ∆+ − λ− ∆−

At high inflation:
Elasticity of frequency with inflation equal to 2/3
Elasticity of dispersion with inflation equal to 1/3

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 67 / 79


Figure 5: Estimated Frequency of Price Changes and Expected Inflation

Price changes per month λ


Exp. Inflation rate

Monthly Inflation Rate % c.c. per year


1000
Price Changes per Month λ

0
0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Source: Alverez-Beraja-Gonzalez-Rozada-Neumeyer (2019)
Note:
Nakamura-Steinsson Simple
(UC Berkeley) estimator of , ˆ =Price Rigidity
log(1 ft ), where ft is the fraction of out- 68 / 79
Figure 6: The Frequency of Price Changes ( ) and Expected Inflation.

5
inflation 1 week
4 deflation

3
Frequency of price changes p er month

% change in of increasing ⇡ from 0 to 1% = 0.04

2 Elasticity for high inflation = 0.53

1 1 months

0.75

0.5

0.25 4 months

0.1% 1% 10% 100% 1000% 10,000%


Absolute Value of Annual Inflation rate (log p oints)
Source: Alverez-Beraja-Gonzalez-Rozada-Neumeyer (2019)
Note:
Nakamura-Steinsson Simple
(UC Berkeley) estimator of , ˆ = log(1
Price Rigidityft ), where ft is the fraction of out- 69 / 79
H AVE P RICES B ECOME M ORE F LEXIBLE ?

Large changes in technology over past 40 years


Perhaps costs of changing prices have fallen?
This would make price changes more frequent

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 70 / 79


H AVE P RICES B ECOME M ORE F LEXIBLE ?

Large changes in technology over past 40 years


Perhaps costs of changing prices have fallen?
This would make price changes more frequent

However, evolution of frequency of price (excluding sales) change


can be explained by menu cost model with a constant menu cost
over entire sample period
Regular prices have not becomes more flexible

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 70 / 79


Frequency of Price Change in Data and Model
0.16
Freq Up Model
Freq Up Data
0.14
Freq Down Model
Freq Down Data
0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Figure 14: Predicted and Actual Frequency of Price Changes


Source: Nakamura-Steinsson-Sun-Villar (2018)
Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 71 / 79
O PTIMAL L EVEL OF I NFLATION

What level of inflation should central banks target?


Pre-crisis policy consensus to target roughly 2% inflation per year
Academic studies argued for still lower rates
(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2011; Coibion et al., 2012)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 72 / 79


O PTIMAL L EVEL OF I NFLATION

What level of inflation should central banks target?


Pre-crisis policy consensus to target roughly 2% inflation per year
Academic studies argued for still lower rates
(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2011; Coibion et al., 2012)

Great Recession has lead to increasing calls for higher inflation targets
Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, Mauro (2010), Ball (2014), Krugman (2014)
Blanco (2015)

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 72 / 79


P RICE D ISPERSION AND THE C OSTS OF I NFLATION

Higher inflation will lead to higher price dispersion


Prices will drift further from optimum between times of adjustment
Distorts allocative role of the price system

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 73 / 79


P RICE D ISPERSION AND THE C OSTS OF I NFLATION

Higher inflation will lead to higher price dispersion


Prices will drift further from optimum between times of adjustment
Distorts allocative role of the price system
In standard New Keynesian models, these costs are very large
Going from 0% to 12% inflation per year yields a 10% loss of welfare

Much more costly than business cycle fluctuations in output


in these same models

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 73 / 79


Welfare Loss
0.1
Menu Cost Model θ=4
Calvo Model θ=4
0.09 Menu Cost Model θ=7
Calvo Model θ=7
Calvo Varying θ=4

0.08
Fraction of Flex Price Consumption

0.07

0.06

0.05

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.01

0
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16
Annual Inflation

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 74 / 79


NAKAMURA -S TEINSSON -S UN -V ILLAR 18

Measure sensitivity of inefficient price dispersion to changes in inflation

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 75 / 79


NAKAMURA -S TEINSSON -S UN -V ILLAR 18

Measure sensitivity of inefficient price dispersion to changes in inflation

Challenges:
1. Very limited variation in inflation over last 30 years!

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 75 / 79


NAKAMURA -S TEINSSON -S UN -V ILLAR 18

Measure sensitivity of inefficient price dispersion to changes in inflation

Challenges:
1. Very limited variation in inflation over last 30 years!
Extend BLS micro-data on consumer prices back to 1977
Covers "Great Inflation" and Volcker disinflation

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 75 / 79


NAKAMURA -S TEINSSON -S UN -V ILLAR 18

Measure sensitivity of inefficient price dispersion to changes in inflation

Challenges:
1. Very limited variation in inflation over last 30 years!
Extend BLS micro-data on consumer prices back to 1977
Covers "Great Inflation" and Volcker disinflation
2. Difficulty in interpreting raw price dispersion

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 75 / 79


NAKAMURA -S TEINSSON -S UN -V ILLAR 18

Measure sensitivity of inefficient price dispersion to changes in inflation

Challenges:
1. Very limited variation in inflation over last 30 years!
Extend BLS micro-data on consumer prices back to 1977
Covers "Great Inflation" and Volcker disinflation
2. Difficulty in interpreting raw price dispersion
Heterogeneity in size and quality of products
Absolute size of price changes informative about
inefficient price dispersion

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 75 / 79


Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes
0.16
Menu Cost Model
Calvo Model
Calvo Varying
0.14

0.12
Fraction of Original Price

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16
Annual Inflation

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 76 / 79


12 Month CPI Inflation
0.15

0.1

0.05

-0.05
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 77 / 79


Absolute Size of Price Changes
0.16

0.14

0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02 Regular Price Changes


All Price Changes Including Sales
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 78 / 79


NAKAMURA -S TEINSSON -S UN -V ILLAR 18

No evidence that absolute size of price changes rose


during Great Inflation
Suggests inefficient price dispersion not any higher
during Great Inflation
Costs of inflation emphasized in New Keynesian models elusive

Nakamura-Steinsson (UC Berkeley) Price Rigidity 79 / 79

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