I.

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW

A. Definitions / Characteristics / Philosophies

B. Theories and Doctrines

Doctrine of Pro Reo / Lenity Rule / Equipoise Rule / Utilitarian Theory / Mens Rea & Actus Reus
/ Mala in se & Mala Prohibita
Doctrine of Pro Reo

Lenity Rule

Equipoise Rule

Utilitarian Theory

Mens Rea & Actus Reus

Mala in se & Mala Prohibita

Minucher vs. Scalzo GR
142396 11 February 2003
C. Cases
Facts: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against
Minucher following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine
police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher,
an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized.
Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for
damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims said that he had acted in the
discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. 

Issue: Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is applicable

herein.

Ruling: YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be

cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he
is acting within the directives of the sending state. 
Liang vs. People GR
125865 28 January 2000
Del Socorro vs. Van
Wilsem GR 193707 10
December 2014
Hernan vs.
Sandiganbayan GR
217874 05 December
2017

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Magno vs. CA GR 96132
26 June 1992

Loney vs. People GR

152644 10 February 2006
Garcia vs. CA GR 157171
14 March 2006

II. BOOK ONE, REVISED PENAL CODE and RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

A. Article 2 Territorial and Extra-Territorial Jurisdictions

ART. 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations
and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations
and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in
Title One of Book Two of this Code.

Cases:
People vs. Lol-lo GR Facts: On June 30, 1920, two boats containing Dutch subjects sailed
17958 27 February 1922 from one Dutch island to another. After navigating for a number of
days, the second boat, while still on Dutch East Indies territory, was
surrounded by 6 Vintas containing 24 armed Moros, which includes Lol-
lo and Saraw. The Moros pretended to ask for food to board the boat.
Once on the boat, they attacked some of the men, raped two of the
women, and took all of the cargo. The Moros took the two women to
the island of Maruro and repeatedly raped them. The two women
managed to escape. After returning to the island of Tawi-tawi, both Lol-
lo and Saraw were captured, charged with and eventually convicted of
the crime of piracy.

Issue: Whether or not our courts has jurisdiction to convict Lol-lo and
Saraw for the crime fo piracy.

Ruling: YES. The Court held that piracy is a crime against all mankind
and and not just against any particular state and provides that it may
be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Therefore,
although piracy is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

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 Philippines, Art. 2 of the RPC states that our courts has extra-territorial
jurisdiction to charge and convict Saraw and Lol-lo for the same
because piracy is a crime against the law of nations/crime against all
mankind.

B. Article 3 Felonies

ART. 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful
act result from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Cases:
People vs. Delim GR Facts: Modesto Delim was murdered by conspirators Marlon, Manuel,
142773 28 January 2003 Robert, Leon and Ronald Delim. They barged in and entered the house
of Modesto while he was having dinner with his wife, son and 2
granchildren, armed with short handguns, grabbed and tied him and
with of abuse of strength stabbed and killed him by a gunshot wound
in the head.

RTC - Marlon, Leon, Ronald Delim are guilty of the crime of murder
SC – automatic review; guilty only of homicide because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and abuse of strength was not alleged in the
killing of Modesto.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum

of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of
murder.

Ruling: The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in

crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the
victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is presumed.

However, the Court found them guilty only of homicide because the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of strength was not
alleged in the killing of Modesto.
Rivera vs. People GR Facts:
166326 25 January 2006 As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera
mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support.
Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words

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 ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and his three year old
daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his
brother Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and
ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist
blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a
hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera brothers fled when
policemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and
superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not
promptly intervened.

Issues:
(1) WON there was intent to kill.

Held: Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and
Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him
three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by
the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his
death, intent to kill is presumed.

Insofar as intent to kill is concerned, there are several factors which

must be looked into in order to establish intent to kill:
1. Evidence of motive;
2. Nature and number of weapons used by the offender;
3. The nature and number and location of wounds inflicted on the
victim;
4. Manner of committing the crime; and
5. The acts or statements made by the accused before, after, or during
the commission of the crime.

The Supreme Court said, these factors would establish the present of
absence of intent to kill.
Mondragon vs. CA GR L- Facts: Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefiled to drain the
17666 30 June 1966 water because he will plan the next morning when Mondragon shouted
telling him not to dare open the dike but he still continued opening it.

Suddenly, Mondragon was coming towards him and without much ado,
tried to hit Nacionales who dodged the blow. Mondragon drew his bolo
and struck Nacionales on different parts of his body.

Mondragon was charged with Frustrated Homicide but was found

gulity by CFI Iloilo only for Attempted Homicide.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding Mondragon guilty of A.H.

Instead of S.P.Is.

Ruling: YES. The Court held that the CA erred in finding Mondragon
guilty of Attempted Homicide because the intent of accused to kill
nacionales was not conclusively shown. The CA’s findings of intent to

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 kill was merely from the admission of Mondragon the “he will do
anything” to stop Nacionales from opening the dike because he needed
the water.

Therefore, since deliberate intent to kill was not established and his
wounds were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than 30
days, the Court found him guilty only of the crime of less serious
physical injuries.

Fernandez vs. People GR

241557 11 December
2019
JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES
U.S vs. Ah Chong Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
GR L-5272
19 March 1910 The act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so.

FACTS:

The defendant Ah Chong worked as a cook while the deceased Pascual

Gilberto who was a house boy. The two of them shared a room having
a door with no permanent lock. As a means of securing it, a chair was
placed against the door.

At around 10 in the evening, Ah Chong who was sleeping was

awakened by someone trying to forcefully open the door. He called
twice but there was no response. Fearing that the intruder might be a
thief, Ah Chong took his knife and struck the intruder when it entered
the room. It turned out that the said intruder was his roommate
Pascual. Despite his plea of self-defense, said defendant was found
guilty with homicide by the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant by reason of mistake of facts criminally

liable. -NO, HE IS NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE

RULING: No.

The Court held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an
offense or act due to ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to
negligence or bad faith. Such ignorance of the fact is sufficient to
negative the particular intent which under the law, is an essential
element to the crime of murder charged cancels the presumption of
intent and works for an acquittal.

In the case, the defendant struck the fatal blow on the belief that the

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 intruder was a robber, on which his life and property was in danger. It
is clear that he acted in good faith without negligence and without any
criminal intent in exercising his right to self-defense. There can be no
crime, large or small, without an evil mind.

The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an

essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors. It is a
principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it cannot exist. In other words, punishment is the sequence of
wickedness, without which it cannot be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any people in
any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was
so. This doctrine confirmed by the maxim actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea in which the act itself does not make a man guilty unless
his intention were so. Thus, the Court held that the defendant should
be acquitted.
Yapyucu vs. DOCTRINE:. The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment
Sandiganbayan of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the
GR 120744-46 Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the
25 June 2012 performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office,
and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. The justification is based on the
complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused,
inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with
criminal intent or with
fault or negligence.

Facts: One night, the accused got a call from an informant alerting them
of some armed men who were suspected of being members of the
NPA.

In response of the information, the accused proceeded to the area,

with the view in mind to apprehend the suspects.
Upon the information relayed by the informant, the accused, members
of the PNP, tried to flag down a Toyota Tamarraw motor vehicle said to
be carrying the suspected members of the NPA.

Pursuant to the standard operating police procedure, the accused

claimed that they tried to flag down the vehicle but instead of pulling
over, the vehicle tried to speed away. In order to immobilize the
vehicle, the accused claimed that they shot the tires of the vehicle As a
result, one died, one suffered fatal injury and many suffered from
attempted murder.

Murder, frustrated and attempted murder were filed against the police

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 officers who participated in the operation.

During the trial, the accused invoke mistake of fact as a defense

claiming that they honestly believed that the passengers onboard the
motor vehicle were armed and dangerous and the suspected
members of the NPA.

They tried to justify that their act of firing bullets at the vehicle was
because it tried to speed away and that there only purpose in shooting
was just to immobilize the vehicle.

Issue: Whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful
performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order and
hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in
Article 11 (5) of the RPC.

Ruling: The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of

duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code rests on proof that
(a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful
exercise of his right or office, and;
(b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.

The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and

negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony
connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence. Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be
penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary
consequence of the due performance of
his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be
shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were
indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him
to prove such hypothesis.

The SC affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan and found the

Yapyuco and other members of the PNP and the Brgy. Captains liable
for Murder, FM and several counts of AM.

C. Article 4 Proximate Cause Theory and Impossible Crime Doctrine

ART. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

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 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

NOTES:
Art. 4. Par 1.
o The “proximate cause doctrine”
o Elements:
1. That the intended act is a felonious act;
2. That the resulting act is a felony; and
3. The resulting felony is the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felonious act of
the offender.

o 3 circumstances under Par. 1

o Aberratio ictus/Mistake in the blow (with Art. 48)
o Error in personae/Mistake in the identity (with Art. 49)
o Praeter intentionem/The resulting felony is greater than what was intended
 May be a mitigating circumstance if the following elements are present:
1. That a felony has been committed;
2. That there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
offender and the resulting felony and out of the means employed, the
resulting felony could not have been foreseen.

Art. 4 Par. 2.
o “Impossible crime” doctrine
o Elements of an impossible crime are:
1. The act done would have amounted to a crime against persons or property;
2. The act was done with evil intent;
3. The act was not accomplished because of its inherent impossibility or the means
employed are ineffectual or inadequate; and
4. The act does not fall under any other provision of the RPC.
o Kinds of inherent impossibility:
1. Legal Impossibility - all the intended acts, even if accomplished, would not amount
to a crime
2. Physical or Factual Impossibility - extraneous circumstances are unknown to the
offender, beyond the control of the offender, which prevented the consummation
of the crime
EX.
 Stabbing a person not knowing that such person is already dead
- the offender is liable for an impossible crime of murder since it is legally impossible to kill a man
that is already dead.
 Peppering a room/house with gunshots not knowing that their target was not there in the room
(Intod v. CA)
- the offender is liable for an impossible crime of murder since the consummation of the crime
was prevented by an extraneous circumstance unknown to him or beyond his control.
- thre is physical impossibility of accomplishing the crime

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Cases:
Garcia vs. People Doctrine: A person committing a felony is responsible for all the
GR 171951 natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the
28 August 2009 unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended.

Facts: Amado Garcia and Fidel Foz Jr., had a drinking spree in the
morning of September 1999 that lasted the until the evening of that
day. Because of the blaring noise of the videoke machine that the two
were enjoying, Manuel Chy, told the group to quiet down. Two days
after, the met again on a wedding and again, Chy told the two to stop
singing. On the next day, the two, now with a friend, decided to have a
drinking session and later moved to Punta.

On their way to Punta, they saw Chy. Garcia suddenly assaulted Chy
and struck him on the lower part of his head with a bottle. When Chy
found a way to escape, he rushed to his home and phoned his wife and
told her to call the police. When they arrived, they found Chy
unconcsious and later pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital

The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

The petitioner contended that he should only be charged with slight
physical injuries as his assault on Chy was not he cause of his death.

Issue: WON Garcia is liable for Manuel Chy’s death.

Ruling: YES. It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing

statements that the emotional strain from the beating aggravated
Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable
conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the
victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
that petitioner had intended to commit.

The essential requisites for the application of this Article 4 of the RPC
are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a
felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily
caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.

Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment
does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. a person committing a
felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from
the one he intended.

Urbano vs. IAC There was settlement, hence, Urbano was acquitted.

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GR 72964
07 January 1988 Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
 
FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of
cutting grass which caused the flooding of the storage area of the
petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the
soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued.
Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right
hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the treatment of the
wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his
tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the
hospital. Doctors findings showed that he was suffering from tetanus
infection. The next day, Javier died.

RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

homicide.
Petitioner raised the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death
of Javier was due to his own negligence.

ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of

Javier.
 
RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is that
the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the
death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected
with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended
his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.

Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus

after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding
Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or

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 a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into

operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause.

CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of
homicide.

People vs. Villacorta RTC – Villacorta is guilty of murder

GR 186412 CA – affirmed the decision of RTC; V appealed to the SC
07 September 2011 Crime charged – murder
Cause of death – tenatus infection secondary to stab wound

FACTS: 

While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly

appeared and stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using
a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in
Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. 

RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by

treachery. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in
toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time

Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano
from any liability for Javier's death 

HELD:

The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection and not

the stab wound.

In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be

held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz.

If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later.

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 Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely
the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have
been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death. 

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime.

ABERRATIO ICTUS (Mistake in the blow)

Art. 48.
o Complex crime – when a single act results in 2 or more grave or less grave felonies, as in
cases of Aberration Ictus, the penalty to be imposed is that of the most serious crime in its
maximum.

People vs. Flora In “aberratio ictus” or mistake in the blow, a person directed the blow at
GR 125909 an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on
23 June 2000 somebody else. The intended victim as well as the actual victim are both
at the scene of the crime.

FACTS: There was a dance for the bday celeb of Jeng Jeng. Violence
ensued and Hermogenes Flora fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and
hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead so he became liable for
Emerita’s death and Flor’s injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape
culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act
be different from that which he intended. (CHECK NOTES)

Note, however, that when a person intended the commission of several

felonies with a single act, it is not called aberratio ictus or mistake of
blow, simply because there was no mistake in the commission of crime.
People vs. Adriano GR FACTS:
205228 In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others,
15 July 2015 overtook a policecar and a maroon Honda CRV. With intent to kill,
treachery, and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot Danilo
Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death.

The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a

stray bullet and eventually die.

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 Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended
up arresting Adriano. Adriano was charged for the Murder of Cabiedes
and Homicide for the death of Ofelia.
RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of
Ofelia Bulanan.

CA affrimed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adriano is responsible for the death of Ofelia

Bulanan, a bystander.

RULING: YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes.

However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet
hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his
act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes
criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not
have been Adriano’s intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan’s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano
was the natural and direct consequences of Adriano’s felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.

SC found adriano guilty of the crime of murder of Ofelia and Cabiedes.

The treachery is appreciated in Aberratio Ictus/Mistake in the blow.
ERROR IN PERSONAE (Mistake in the identity)
Art. 49
People vs. Sabalones GR Facts: Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga were
123485 convicted of two counts of murder and three counts of
31 August 1998 frustrated murder. The victims of murder were Glen Tiempo
and Alfredo Nardo. The three injured are Nelson Tiempo,
Rogelio Presores, and Rey Bolo. The incident happened as the
party of victims was approaching the house of Stephen Lim
where they were “ambushed”. Previously, the rival of
Sabalones, Nabing Velez, got into an altercation with his father
in a cockpit, was killed in a separate incident. The RTC
ruled that the attack by Sabalones and Co. was the effect of
their assumption that they the friends of Nabing Velez will
attack them. Unfortunately, the victims of the incident had
nothing to do with the case. They were unarmed and
defenseless. The group of Sabalones tried to downplay the
credibility of the eyewitnesses (Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores) but the court ruled that they were credible and
that their statements are valid. The court ruled that this was not
a case of Aberatio ictus (mistake in blow) but rather error in

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 personae (mistake in the identity of the victims) and carries a
heavier penalty.

Issue: 1. Whether there is error In personae hence, they should be

absolved of the crime.

Ruling: NO. They should not be absolved. Error in personae is not an

absolutory cause. They are still liable for the crime committed although
the victim is different.

RULING:
1. Error in Personae (mistake in identity of the victim). There
was enough evidence to believe that they accused were trying
to defend themselves
***Isipin niyo nalang: nagkaroon ng away yung Nabing Velez at
Sabalones. For some reason, pinatay si Velez. Syempre orime
suspect ng mga tropa ni Velez sina Sabalones. Akala nila yung
mga nakasakay sa jeep tropa ni Velez and GAGANTI. Inunahan
na nila.
2. MURDER. There was treachery involved and according to the
statement of another witness (Jennifer Binghoy), the group
seems to be planning something in the wake of the brother
of Sabalones. They also seems worried upon hearing about the
death of Nabing Velez on radio. Treachery was also present as
the victims did not have any chance to defend themselves.
***ambush nga eh so medyo obvious na hindi accident, it was
planned.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED. However, the penalties are hereby MODIFIED

PRAETER INTENTIONEM (The resulting offense is greater than what was intended)
Elements:
In order for praeter intentionem to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. That a felony has been committed;
2. That there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the offender and the
resulting felony and out of the means employed, the resulting felony could not have been
foreseen.

People vs. Sales Doctrine: In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony
GR 177218 different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a)
03 October 2011 that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by
the perpetrator.

FACTS: In the night of September 2002 in Camarines Sur, appellant Noel

T. Sales beaten his two sons Noel Jr. and Noelmar because they failed to

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 return home after joining the fluvial procession of Our Lady of
Penafracia. Sales whipped his son with a piece of wood approximately
one meter in lenght and one and a half inches in diameter. After he was
finished beating his sons, his wife, Maria, noticed that there was a crack
in the head of Noemar so they brought him to a quack doctor, who said
that Noemar was already dead.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed
his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving
up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw
him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a
vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus
decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.

The wake of the child lasted only for a day and his body was never
examined by a physician.

Sales surrendered to the police the day after.

RTC found Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

parricide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Sales appealed to CA but the CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

Appellant raised the argument that it was at this moment that Noemar
died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant
presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered
seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

ISSUE: WON Sales was responsible for the death of Noemar.

RULING: YES. Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing

that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him.
However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act

done be different from that which he intended.
xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from
that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony
was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be
the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting
upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence

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 of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal
liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Intod vs. CA GR 103119 Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
21 October 1992 unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation
of the intended crime.

FACTS: Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with

three other armed men, went to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired
gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his
bedroom, and the house was occupied by his son-in-law and his family.

RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petioner raised the case to

CA but the same affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he
is only responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.

Issue:: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

Ruling: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances

where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to
a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this
category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place
and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where
the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to
create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil;
intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt
takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a

defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances
been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in
reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty

of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an

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 impossible crime and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.
Jacinto vs. People GR FACTS:
162540 13 July 2009 Petitioner, Gemma Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam
International, received a check amounting to Pho 10, 000 as payment
of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam. However, instead of
delivering it to Megafoam, she deposited it to her bank account. The
check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and CA ruled that
the petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for
review of certiorari to SC.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of
Qualified Theft.

RULING:
 
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
(1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property;
(2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
(3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully

taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing (check) unlawfully
taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless (unfunded)
because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

D. Article 6 Stages in the Execution of a Felony

ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of

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causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by over acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

Cases:
INDETERMINATE OFFENSE
o It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in
relation to is objective is ambiguous.

People vs. Lamahang GR TOPIC: Indeterminate Offense – it is one where the purpose of the
43530 03 August 1935 offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in relation to is
objective is ambiguous

FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing,

who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the
City of Iloilo, caught the accused Arelio Lamahang (an habitual
delinquent) in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the
wall of a store of cheap goods located in Fuentes street. At that time
the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and
in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up,
who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

CFI – found the accused guilty of attempted robbery

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was erroneously charged guilty of

attempted robbery.

HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the accused was guilty of attempted
trespass to dwelling committed by means of force, with the aforesaid
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three
months and one day of arresto mayor.

An offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective
is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.

There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the

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 accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through
the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to
commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman
Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But
it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an
act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it
is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon
its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and
punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of
execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense.

Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by

means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered
an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact
established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in
question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of
Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his
evident intention was to enter by means of force the said store against
the will of its owner and not robbery.
Baleros vs. People GR Doctrine: Overt or external act has been defined as some physical
138033 22 February 2006 activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.

FACTS: In early morning of December 1991, Renato Baleros went to the

dormitory room of Martina Lourdes T. Albano (Malou), palced himselp
on top of her, and pressed a hankerchief soaked in chloroform. Malou
struggled to free herself in the hands of Baleros and succeeded by
grabbing his sexual organ and squeezing it.

Malou went straight to Marvilou and said “”may pumasok sa kuarto ko

pinagtangkaan ako”.

The morning after, the police said to the tenants of the dormitory to grab
the things that are theirs. The room was left with an unclaimed bag
which Christian, one of the tenants, knew right away that was Renato’s.
Among the contents of the bag was a hankerchief with a volatile

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 substance.

They later found out that Renato was a suitor of Malou which she
rejected a week ago.

RTC found Renato guilty of attempted rape. CA further affirmed the

decision.

ISSUE: WON Renato is guilty of attempted rape.

Whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a
chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act
of rape.

RULING: NO. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or
intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article
of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse

or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus
comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the
pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes
an overt act of rape.

It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that

there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her
private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s
guess.

Assailed decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for
attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light
coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and
to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to
pay the costs.
FRUSTRATED MURDER (Fatal/Mortal wound)
People vs. Trinidad GR
79123-25 09 January Facts: Lolito Soriano, Ricardo Tan, and Marcial Lara were driving on
1989 their way to Davao City to sell fish when the accused Trinidad asked for
a ride to Agusan Del Norte.

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 Trinidad was a member of the Integrated National Police (PNP). He
carried two firearms and wore his uniform.

Tan was driving the car, and he was instructed by Trinidad to slow down
because they were specifically at a dangerous territory. While in the
vehicle, Tan heard two gunshots. He then inspected his surroundings and
found out that Soriano and Lara were hit on the head. Tan, however, was
able to get off the car and hail a jeepney passing by. Tan noticed that
Trinidad was seated at the back of the said jeepney, and the former
immediately jumped off.

When the jeepney started to drive away, Tan clung to its side, but
Trinidad fired two gunshots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan
came across a Philippine Constabulary member and the latter helped Tan
board a bus for Butuan.

RTC charged Trinidad with frustrated murder.

ISSUE: WIN Trinidad is criminally liable for frustrated murder

HELD: NO. Trinidad was hereby charged with Attempted Murder

beyond a reasonable doubt. The wound on Tan's thigh was not fatal
and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is
not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder,
the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would
have brought about the death.
People vs. Labiaga
GR 202867 Doctrine: In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that
15 July 2013 the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical
intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound
sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical
attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and
not frustrated murder.

Facts: Sometime in December of 2003 in Iloilo, accused Regie Labiaga

(Regie) and three others conspired, confederated and helped one
another, with an unlicensed firegun, willfully and unlawfully shot Judy
Conde (Jojo) in different parts of her breast which caused her death
thereafter. The same individuals also conspired to kill Gregorio Conde
but the latter succeeded and did not die. Appellant said that the shooting
of Conde was an act of self-defense when Conde challenged him to a
gunfight. RTC ruled out his defense.

RTC convicted the appelant of murder and frustrated murder.

CA affirmed the decision with modifications as to civil indemnities.

Issue: WON Regie is guilty of frustrated murder.

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 Ruling: 
NO, only attempted murder because Conde’s wound was not found to be
fatal.

In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound

would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the
evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would
have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated
murder.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by
Gregorio Conde was fatal. Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not
mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be
two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder
under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law provides:
Appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer
an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
THERE IS NO FRUSTRATED THEFT
Valenzuela vs. People GR Doctrine: Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking,
160188 or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender
21 June 2007 gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same.
 
Facts: Sometime in May 1994, petitioner Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon
were sighted outside SM North EDSA by security guard Lorenzo Lago,
unloading cases of detergent Tide on an open parking space. Minutes
later, petitioner loaded the cartons of detergent while Calderon was
looking  into a taxi and procedeed to leave the parking area. Lago
stopped the cab, checked the cartons, and asked for a receipt but
Valezuela and Calderon reacted a fled on foot. The same were
apprehended on the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered was
worth P12,090.
The two pleaded not guilty. Valenzuela said that he was with a friend to
buy snacks when they heard a gunshot fired by Lago. Calderon, on the
other hand, said that he was with his cousin when he heard a gunshot
fired by Lago that caused everyone to flee on the viscinity.

RTC convicted the appellants guilty of consumated theft. CA affirmed.

Petitioner contends that he was only guilty of frustrated theft since at
the time he was apprefended, he was never placed in a position to

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 freely dispose the articles stolen.

Issue: WON Valenzuela is guilty of consummated theft.

Ruling: YES. Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the

consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.

We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime
of frustrated theft. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize
that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does
not detract from the correctness of this conclusion.

Canceran vs. People

GR 206442 Facts: Petitioner accused Canceran was caught stealing 14 boxes of
01 July 2015 Ponds Whitening Cream by hiding he said item inside a box of Magic
Flakes. The accused was caught trying to pass the said items when he
trying to pay for the items as Magic Flakes. When the guard inspected
the said box, he discovered the 14 boxes of Ponds. After the discovery
of the items, the accused ran, but was apprehended by the Mall
employees. The accused was charged of Frustrated Theft. The
information was filed by the prosecution.

The RTC held that Theft has no Frustrated stage hence, based on the
evidence presented, sentenced the accused of Consummated Theft.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted in the crime of

theft as it was not charged in the information.

Ruling:
Yes, it is a Constitutional guarantee that the right of every person
accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature of and
causes of the accusation against him. It is fundamental that every
element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

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 As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information
can never be read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because
the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced.
Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran
was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily,
Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft
because he cannot be made liable for a higher offense than that which
he is charged in the Information which will violate his constitutional
right to be informed of the cause and accusation against him.

An accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which

he was charged in the complaint or information and on which he was
tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt
may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense,
unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried,
or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial,
and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized
denial of that right.

THERE IS NO FRUSTRATED RAPE

People vs. Orita
GR 88724 Facts: Cristina Abayan (Abayan) was a freshman student. While
03 April 1990 Ceilito Orita (Lito) was a Philippine Constabulary soldier. Abayan
arrived at her boarding house, when suddenly, somebody held
her and poked a knife to her neck. She recognized Lito who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.

Lito ordered her to go upstairs with him. He commanded her to

look for a room. Upon entering the room, Lito pushed Abayan who
hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, Lito
undressed himself and ordered Abayan to take off her clothes.
Scared, she took off her t-shirt and pulled off her bra, pants and
panty.

Lito ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her.
He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. SHE
FOLLOWED HIS ORDER AS HE CONTINUED TO POKE THE KNIFE TO
HER. At said position, however, appellant could not fully
penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she
kept on moving.
Lito then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount
him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was
inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his
hands flat on the floor. Thus, abayan thought of escaping.

Abayan dashed out to the other rooms and darted to the

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 municipal building. Policeman Pat. Donceras was the first
policeman to see her.

Afterward, the complainant was brought to Eastern Samar

Provincial Hospital where she was examined

RTC – there is rape

CA – no rape

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was consummated

rape.

Ruling: YES. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of
the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be
done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated.

We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape,

perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is suffi cient. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is suffi cient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559;
People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9
Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on
the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in
rape can ever be committed.

People vs. Campuhan GR Facts:

129433 30 March 2000 Campuhan was a helper in the business of the family of the victim, a 4-
year-old girl. One time, the mother of the victim heard the latter cry,
“Ayoko!”, prompting her to rush upstairs. There, she saw Campuhan
kneeling before the her daughter, the victim, whose pajamas and panty
were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
Campuhan was apprehended. Physical examination of the victim
yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury
was noted. Her hymen was intact and its orifice was only .5 cm in
diameter.

RTC – found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death.

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 Issue:
Whether or not Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.

Ruling: NO.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of
woman below 12 as provided in RPC 335(3). The victim was only 4
years old when the molestation took place, thus raising the penalty
from “reclusion perpetua to death” to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659 Sec. 11, the offended party being below 7 years
old.

In concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the

vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of hymen
necessary; the mere touching of external genitalia by the peni capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.

But the act of touching should be understood as inherently part of the

entry of penis into the labias of the female organ, and not mere touching
alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum (the part instantly visible
within the surface).

Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

Here, the prosecution failed to discharge its onus of proving that

Campuhan’s penis was able to penetrate the victim’s vagina however
slight. Also, there were no external signs of physical injuries on the
victim’s body to conclude that penetration had taken place.

Therefore, Campuhan is liable only for Attempted Rape.

People vs. Pareja GR

188979 05 September Facts:
2012 Pareja raped the 13 year old sister of his common law wife.
Even the slightest penetration was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
hence, Pajera is liable only for attempted rape and not consummated
rape. Based on the testimony of the girl, the penis of Pareja only touched
the outer surface of her genitalia

Issue: whether or not the acts Pareja constituted consummated rape.

Ruling: NO. Pareja is liable only for attempted rape. The element of
penetration was not proved beyond reasonable doubt but the intent to
have carnal knowledge with the victim is clear and established.
Therefore, Pajera is liable for Attempted Rape and not merely Acts of
Lasciviousness.

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Cruz vs. People GR
166441 08 October 2014 Doctrine: The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the
distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of
lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender
establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing
on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without
proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's
vagina.

Facts: Spouses Cruz were sellig plastic and glass wares around the
country when they employed AAA and BBB. AAA alleged that she was
at her tent sleeping when they were in La Union when she woke up and
found Cruz on top of her smashing her breast and touching her private
part. BBB on the other hand was seen by AAA being touched also by
Norberto on her private parts with lewd design.

Norberto Cruz was charged with Attempted Rape and Acts of

Lasciviousness.

RTC – guilty of both Attempted Rape and AOL

CA – gulity of AOL but not with attempted rape

Issue: whether or not Cruz is liable for attempted rape

Ruling:
No. Liable only for Acts of Lasciviousness because intent to have carnal
knowledge with the victim was not established.

E. Article 8 Conspiracy

ART. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. - Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to
some other person or persons.

NOTES:
o Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are mere preparatory acts in committing a crime
o As a rule, they are not punishable acts per se except when the law specifically provides a
penalty therefor (e.g. proposal to commit/conspiracy to commit sedition)
o 2 concepts of conspiracy:

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 1. Conspiracy as a crime by itself (the exception above)
2. Conspiracy as a means of committing a crime
o 2 kinds of conspiracy as a meand to commit a crime:
1. Express conspiracy – there is a pre-conceived plan between 2 or more persons to
commit a crime and they decided to commit it
2. Implied conspiracy – there is no pre-conceived plan but they acted simultaneous in a
synchronized and coordinated manner towards a similar criminal objective.

Cases:
ONCE CONSPIRACY IS ESTABLISHED, THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL
People vs. Carandang,
et.al. (Milan, Chua) FACTS: In the afternoon of April 2001, La Loma Police Station received a
GR 175926 06 July 2011 request from the sister of accused Milan that there is a drug trade that
is happenning on their house in Quezon City. At around 4:00 PM, SPO2
PO Pilar (red) Wilfredo Pilar (Red) along with PO2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores, and
Alonzo SPO1 Montecalvo went to Milan’s house and surrounded the area. The
Montecalvo door of the house was open, enabling the police officers to see
Estores Carandang, Milan, and Chua inside. When the group introduced
themselves as POs, Milan immediately shut the door.

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, and shouted “Walang
gagalaw!”. They are instantly shot and failed to return fire causing their
instant death. SPO1 Montecalvo fell on the ground, SPO1 Estores heard
Chua say to Milan “Sugurin mo na!”. Milan lunged Montecalvo but
failed to maul him because the police officer was able to fire his gun at
Milan. Thereafter, Estores went inside the house to pull Montecalvo
out.

RTC – found the 3 guilty of 2 counts of murder and 1 count of frustrated

murder in Relation to Article 6 par 2, having been acted in conspiracy.
CA – affirmed RTC’s decision

Accused appealed to SC, arguing that the court a quo erred in holding
that there is conspiracy among the appellants.

Issue: WON accused-appelants are guilty of conspiracy to commit

murder against SPO1 Montecalvo.

Ruling: YES.  Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the
conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission
of the crime.  Proof of concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is
sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all
regardless of the degree of participation of each.

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 In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the
victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). These facts are convincing
circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the
three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct
participation.

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of

conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for
conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to
afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy
arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the subject felony.

The SC affirmed the CA’s decision and found them guilty for 2 counts of
murder and frustrated murder.

People vs. Octa GR Doctrine: There must be intentional participation in the transaction
195196 13 July 2015 with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Facts: The prosecution alleged that around 6:40AM, Johnny Corpuz and
Mike Batuigas was on board a silver Honda Civic Car travelling on
Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc, Manila when their way was blocked by a
red-orange Mitsubishi box type Lancer car. The 4 armed occupants of
the Lancer alighted and kidnapped them (one of them fired their pistol
that compelled Johnny to open the car door; he was then ordered to
transfer at the back seat of the car; he was handcuffed, blindfolded and
even boxed).

The armed men called his mother-in-law saying that Johnny was in their
custody. When they reached the safehouse, the armed men called
Johnny’s wife Ana Marie to inform her that they are indeed kidnapped.
The armed men started demanding P 20 Million but were reduced to
P538,00.

Finally, on September 30, 2003, Ana Marie were instructed to give the
ransom money to a man wearing a red cap that she will see on Caltex
Auto Supply. Ana travelled to Quiapo church then to QC Circle then to
SM Fairview and to Robinsons Fairview and she was made to stop at
Red Lips Beer House and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply where
she would see a man wearing a red cap and who would ask her "saan
yong padala ni boss". After they got the ransom money, they released
Johnny. She reached the location before giving the money to the man,

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 who was further discovered to be Estanly Octa, she first phoned the
kidnappers to confirm whether or not Octa is one of them. Johnny and
Mike were released on October 1 2003.

RTC - found Octa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping, and

was sentenced to suffer maximum prison term of reclusion perpetua.
CA - affirmed the decision of RTC.

Octa contended that the trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a
conspirator to the crime charged. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant was guilty of kidnapping as co-

conspirator.

RULING: YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had
the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution,
conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the
felony.

Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of

conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that
he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a principal for being a
co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of
the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659.

While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material element of
the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in fact
the main reason for kidnapping the victims.

People vs. Feliciano, Doctrine:

et.al. GR 196735 Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the
05 May 2014 accused, regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an
express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation
of law the act of one is the act of all.

Facts: During lunch, 7 members of Sigma Rho Fraternity were attacked

by several members of Scintilla Juris Fraternity using baseball bats and

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 lead pipes as their weapon. 1 of them, Dennis Venturina, died because
of his injuries.

Crime charged: 1 count of Murder; 3 counts of Attempted Murder; 2

counts of Frustrated Murder

RTC – some of the accused are found guilty of Murder and Attempted
Murder. Some were Acquitted.
CA – Affirmed RTC decision.

Issue: WON all the members of Scintilla who participated in the assault
are liable for the Murder and Attempted Murder.

Ruling: YES. The SC held that since there was finding of

CONSPIRACY, all of the accused-appellants are held liable for
murder and attempted murder, regardless of their degree of
participation. (Even if the others desisted from pursuing the victims)

The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that
intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to
distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the
victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers

Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-
appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent
to kill. Therefore, since there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all, thus, making all of them liable for Murder and Attempted Murder.

THERE IS NO UNITY OF CRIMINAL INTENT

People vs. Bokingco GR
187536 10 August 2011 Doctrine: As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as
the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be implied. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the
acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and
unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish the existence of conspiracy.

Facts: Noli and Elsa Pasion are the owners of 2 rows of apartment units
and a pawnshop in Mac Arthur Highway Angeles City. Apartment No. 3
is being leased to herein accused Bokingco. Because of his fed up anger
against Pasion, he killed Pasion in his apartment unit using a claw
hammer. Vitalicio, the brother-in-law of Pasion saw him lying on the
floor. Vitalicio was likewise attacked by Bokingco but he was able to

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 escape.

On the other hand, Elsa was in the master’s bedroom when she heard
the moans of her husband Pasion so she went to see what’s happening
but before she can reach the kitchen, she was blocked by Col. Col asked
her to open the vault of the pawnshop but she said that she didn’t
know the lock. They were about to go to the back door when Bokingco
arrived and said to Col “tara, patay na siya”.

Crime charged – Murder

RTC – found only Bokingco gulity for the crime of Murder
CA – found Bokingco and Col liable for Murder as conspirators

Issue: whether or not there is conspiracy making Col liable BRD for the
crime of Murder.

Ruling:
NO. Conspiracy was not established. Unity of criminal intent and unity
in the execution of the unlawful act was not established by the
actuations of Bokingco and Col at the time of the commission of the
crime.

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had
been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that
they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only
proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously
and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they
separately committed.

The Supreme Court acquitted Col of the crime of Murder since

conspiracy was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He can only
be held liable at most for the crime he was actually committing at that
time and that is Attempted Robbery.

People vs. Castillo GR Facts:

132895 10 March 2004 March 1, 1995, Rosanna (victim's yaya) and Femie (another housemaid),
bathed and prepared Rocky (victim). The parents advised Baria that
someone would fetch Rocky. At 8:00 am, a tricycle arrived and on-board
was Evangeline Padayhag (accused co-principal). Baria assisted Rocky to
board the tricycle.

The tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom Rocky pointed to in
court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag to a nearby
"Mcdonald’s". Thereat, they were joined by another woman whom
Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo.
The three proceeded to a house far from the "Mcdonald’s" where Rocky
slept "four times"

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 7:30PM – a woman called asking for the ATM of Mr. Cabrero.
March 2 – called again asking for 1 miliion but said that he doesn’t have
that kind of money.
March 3 – no call. Was able to raise 800,000
March 4 – called again asking for the money.
At 2AM – they gave the money in front of Sabadista chapel in Obando,
Bulacan
March 5 – Rocky was released

Crime charged: Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention

RTC – found Castillo and Padayhag guilty of Qualified Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.
CA – affirmed RTC decision.

Issue: Whether or not Padayhag’s act of fetching Rocky and bringing

him to Castillo demonstrates the existence of conspiracy between her
and Castillo.

Ruling: NO. The alleged conspiracy in this case was not established with
moral certainty. Conspiracy must be established with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as
the commission of the crime.

In this case, the act of Padayhag in fetching Rocky because she was told
that Castillo misses him and the fact that she brought Rocky to Castillo
are not sufficient to establish that she has the same criminal intent
with that of Castillo. It must be established beyond reasonable doubt
that there is indeed unity in the criminal objective of the conspirators
for them to be held liable for the crime regardless of the degree of their
participation. Since conspiracy was not established and there is no
unity in the criminal intent/design, the Supreme Court acquitted
Padayhag and affirmed the conviction of Castillo.

WHEEL/CIRCLE CONSPIRACY
GMA vs. People GR Facts: it was alleged that Gloria Macapagal Arroyo conspired with
220598 19 July 2016 Uriarte and Aguas in the commission of the crime of Plunder.

The Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied

conspiracy when he signed the disbursement vouchers despite the
absence of certain legal requirements and that Arroyo approved not
only Uriarte's request for additional CIF funds in 2008-2010, but also
authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK" notation and
signature on Uriarte's letter-requests signified unqualified approval of
Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the last
paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase:
"With the use of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and

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 integrity of its operations.”

SB – found GMA, Uriarte and Aguas guilty of Plunder by virtue of

implied conspiracy

Issue: Whether or not there is conspiracy to commit Plunder.

Ruling: No. The Court held that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored
the failure of the information to sufficiently charge conspiracy to
commit plunder against the petitioners because the Information failed
to allege who is the Main Plunderer; and ignored the lack of evidence
establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least
P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate crimes. The
Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Prosecution cannot rely on the Doctrine of Command

Responsibility which pertains to the responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict and in cases of human rights abuses. In this case, it does not
involve a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it
is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the
absence of any conspiracy between them. Since conspiracy was not
proven, they can only be punished to the extent of their actual
participation.

The SC acquitted GMA.

Fernan vs. People GR Facts: the Regional Director ordered the verification of sub-allotment
145927 24 August 2007 advises issued to variouse Engineering Districts in Cebu. It was found to
the districts received 2 sets of LAAs (Letters of Advice of Allotment) –
regular and fake LAAs. These fake LAAs were all signed by the
Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat who had no
authority to approve them.

It was found that Chief Account Mangubat, Accountant III Delia

Preagido, Budget Examiner Sayson and Clerk II Cruz of MPH Region 7
hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from
government coffers.

FRAUDULENT SCHEME: Fernan is one of the civil engineers in MPH

Region 7 who signed 6 tally sheets or statements of deliveries of
materials which are used to prepare the general vouchers.

SB – Fernan jr. Is guilty of 6 counts of Estafa through falsification of

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 public documents. Torrevillas is guilty of 9 counts of Estafa through
falsification of public documents.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable as co-principals.

Ruling: YES. Conspiracy, in the present case, resembles the “wheel;”

conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive
conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single
hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz
(Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy.
Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.

When each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases

performed their assigned tasks and roles with martinetlike precision
and accuracy, by individually performing essential overt acts, so
much so that the common objective is attained, which is to secure
the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or
simulated public documents, then each and everyone of said
accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-
established and universally-accepted principle that, once a
conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of
all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every
detail in the execution of the offense.

CONSPIRACY IN RELATION TO SPECIAL LAWS

People vs. Morilla GR R.A. No. 9165 “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”
189833 05 February 2014
Facts: Morilla and Mitra (then mayor of Panukulan, Quezon Province)
were driving vans to Manila when they passed a police checkpoint.
Mitra’s van was already ahead of Morilla’s van and was cleared.

While Morilla’s van was being inspected, police officers saw sacks of
crystalline granules which they suspected to be shabu. They then also
intercepted the van of Mitra and also found sacks of shabu.

Both of them are charged with violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 for the
transportation of shabu, a dangerous drug.

Issue: WON there is conspiracy between Mitra and Morilla.

Ruling: YES. In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties

came together and agreed in express terms to enter and pursue a
common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole.

In this case, the records of the trial show that after the officers instructed
Morilla to open his van for inspection, the latter stated that he was with
Mitra in an attempt to persuade the officers to let him pass through the

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 checkpoint. Had there been no actual conspiracy between Morilla and
Mitra, the former would not have stated that he was with the latter.

Conspiracy to transport dangerous drugs is punishable per se under RA

9165.

Go-Tan vs. Tan GR R.A. No. 9262 “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
168852 30 September 2004”
2008
Facts: Sharica and Steven Tan were married. Barely 6 years into their
marriage, Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective order against her husband Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Tan alleging that they are causing
psychological, verbal and economic abuses upon her because they
would not allow her to work and they would not give her money.

RTC – held that spouses Tan are not covered by RA 9262 hence the case
was dismissed as to them.

Issue: WON respondent-spouses Perfecto & Juanita, parents-in-law of

Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective
order, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9262.

Ruling: YES. The principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law which is also in accordance with Art. 10 of
the RPC. Hence, conspiracy under Art. 8 is likewise applicable in RA
9262.

Also, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another. The protection order that may be issued for
the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman
or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband.

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may
include individuals other than the offending husband as provided for by
R.A. 9262.

F. Article 9 Felonies according to Severity

As amended by RA 10951

ART. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the
law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in
accordance with Art. 25 of this Code.

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Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period
are correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned article.

Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or
a fine not exceeding 200 pesos 40,000 or both; is provided.

G. Article 10 Suppletory Application of the RPC

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

H. Article 11 Justifying Circumstances

Include: Battered Woman Syndrome, RA 9262

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur; Self-defense

First. Unlawful aggression.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity
in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that
the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present,
and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that
the one making defense had no part therein. Defense of a relative

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first
and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are present and
that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
Defense of a stranger

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another, provided that the following requisites are present; State of Necessity; accused
must not be the author of the said state of necessity.

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

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 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office. Performance of a duty – 1. In the fulfillment of a duty; 2. In the lawful exercise of a
right; 3. In the lawful exercise of an office.

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose. Obedience to an order

7. Battered Woman Syndrome, R.A. No. 9262

NOTES:
o Rule: Jusitifying circumstances absolves the offender of his criminal AND civil liability.
Exception: State of necessity (Art. 11 Par. 4) – the accused and all persons benefited by the
said state of necessity are still liable for civil liability (Art. 101).
o If many persons are benefited, they are proportionally liable for civil liability.
o The accused must not be the author of the said state of necessity, otherwise, he will be
criminally liable for the crime committed.
o Elements of performance of duty:
1. Offender acted in the due performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office.
2. The resulting felony is an unavoidable consequence of the due performance of his duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
o Battered woman syndrome - refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.
o Battery – the infliction of physical harm on the woman or her child which results in physical,
psychological, or emotional distress.
o For BWS to lie, there must be at least 2 battering episodes which has the following phases:
1. Tension building phase;
2. Acute battering incident phase;
3. Tranquil or loving phase.

Cases:
People vs. Olarbe
GR 227421 Olarbe and common-law wife were sleeping.
23 July 2018 Arca forcibly entered their house and was drunk shouting “mga
putangina nyo pagpapatayin ko kayo!”.
He held his gun and aimed it at them so Olarbe wrestled to get the gun
and was successful and in a jiff, he fired the gun at Arca who did not fall
to the ground but instead was able to get his bolo from his waist. Olarbe
was able to get the bolo and immediately hacked Arca causing his death.

NOT LIABLE on the ground of self-defense and defense of a stranger

(the common-law wife)

Ganal, Jr. vs. People

GR 248130 Facts: Petitioner, Prudencion Ganal Jr, admitted the killing but invoked
02 December 2020 self-defense and defense of relative. Hence, the order of the trial was
reversed.

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 Testimonies of Barangay Captain Sherwin Mallo, Mario Ubina, Florante
Orden Castillo, Jr, Prudencio Ganal Sr, Erlina Ganal, PO3 Erick
MArcelino and petitioner showed that at 7pm of May 20 2013 Castillo
and Ubina were drinking with petitioner. By 9:30 petitioner’s neighbor
Angelo arrived uninvited and insisted to join the drinking session.
Petitioner refused because Angelo was already drunk. Angelo then
challenged the petitioner to a fight but was appeased and left. And so
the drinking session resumed. 30 minutes later, stones were thrown at
adjacent house and the roof of petitioner’s father’s (Ganal Sr’s) house.
It turns out that it was Angelo and his uncle Julwin- the deceased.
Ganal Sr. tried to pacify them but was hit with a stone and fell
unconscious. Petitioner seeing Julwin advances towards him with a
knife went inside to get his gun. Petitioner fired warning shot causing
Angelo to run away but Julwin continuous to advance. Julwin continues
to advance, threatening to kill everyone inside petitioner left with no
choice fires all his rounds in his gun on Julwin killing him. Petitioner
called the Baggao police station and asked for assistance and to
voluntarily surrender himself.

RTC – found Ganal guilty of Homicide.

CA – affirmed RTC’s decision

Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense

should be appreciated.

Ruling: YES.

ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any

criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

As it was, petitioner witnessed up close how Julwin threw stones onto

the roofs of his and his father's houses, pushed his way through the
gate, knocked petitioner's father unconscious, hitting the latter with a
large stone on the chest, shouted threats that he would kill petitioner
and his family, and advanced toward petitioner even after petitioner
had already fired a warning shot. Clearly, petitioner was immediately
put on the defensive when Julwin started disturbing the peace of his
home and posing a risk to his safety and that of his family.

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts

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 should not demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of
a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. He had no time to
reflect and to reason out his responses. He had to be quick, and his
responses should be commensurate to the imminent harm.

The test is whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and

seriousness of the danger was reasonable or not, and the
reasonableness of his belief must be viewed from his standpoint at the
time he acted. The right of a person to take life in self-defense arises
from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the
reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the
circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of
circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief
that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of
the danger and the necessity to kill.

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful

aggression does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that
one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to
think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the
calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not
indispensable need.

People vs. Jaurigue

C.A. No. 284 Facts: The Amado Capina, had been courting Avelina Jaurigue in
21 February 1946 vain. One night, Avelina woke up with Amado in her room. He felt the
forehead of Avelina. She shouted and asked for help which
awakened her parents. Amado’s parents thereafter asked for
forgiveness.

In a Seventh Day Adventist chapel, Avelina went inside with her father.
When Amado saw her in the bench, he went there and put his hand on
the upper part of her right thigh which caused her to get her fan knife from
her bag and stabbed Amado at his neck causing his death.

Ruling: Avelina is liable and did not act in self-defense. Passion and
obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, immediate vindication of a
grave offense committed against her moments before and voluntary
surrender.

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is

justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. In this
case, there is no imminent or actual danger of being raped because
the chapel was well lighted and there are several persons present
therein.

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Toledo vs. People Facts:
GR 158057 Victim Ricky Guarte and three others (Lani, Michael, and Rex) were
24 September 2004 having a drinking session at the house of the victim’s parents, which is
5 meters away from the house of the accused Toledo. Toledo requested
the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Around 9:00 p.m.,
Gerardo, Ricky’s uncle arrived, had dinner and went home
accompanied by Ricky. Thereafter, Ricky returned to the house and
went to sleep with the three others. They had not laid down for long
when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house and Ricky
saw Toledo stoning (three times) their house.

Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to Toledo’s house. When
Ricky asked why Toledo was stoning the house, the latter did not
answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (accused’s) house and,
without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo
thereby causing his death.

Toledo contends that Ricky, already inebriated, was incensed when he

admonished Ricky’s group not to make any loud noise. According to him,
Ricky pulled out a balisong and threatened to stab him. To defend
himself, Toledo took his bolo returned to the door and pushed it with all
his might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his
right hand, towards Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the
stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to the floor.

Thereafter, he surrendered to the barangay captain.

Crime charged – Homicide

RTC CA – Homicide
SC - Homicide

Issue: Whether or not self-defense should be appreciated.

Ruling: NO. There is no unlawful aggression in this case. To prove self-

defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements
thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3)
employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the
aggression.

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying

circumstances of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression

on the part of Ricky. While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at

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 the doorstep of appellant’s house, which would give a semblance of
verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however, is
belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and
had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw
stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or
defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival
at appellant’s doorstep.

Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest
any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being.
Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent
threat to appellant’s life necessitating his assault on Ricky.

People vs. Delima

GR L-18660 Facts:
22 December 1922 Lorenzo Napilon (escapee) had escaped from the jail where he was
serving sentence.
A few days after, policeman Felipe Delima found Napilon in the house of
Jorge Alegria and demanded his surrender.
Napilon was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo. Delima was able
to dodge the former’s strikes and fire his revolver but did not hit
Napilon. Napilon was able to run away carrying with him the piece of
bamboo. Delima was able to chase him, this time hitting and killing him
with the revolver.
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to
reclusion temporal prompting him to appeal.

Issue: whether or not Delima is liable for Homicide. NO.

No.

The Court ruled that the killing was done in the performance of a
duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had
no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault
and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the
policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which although
prove to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.

Delima committed no crime and is hereby acquitted.

People vs. Lagata

GR L-1940-42 Petitioner Accused Lagata was a Provincial Guard assigned 6
24 March 1949 Prisoners Epifanio Labong Ceferino Tipace, Eustaquio Galet, Jesus
Manoso, Eusebio Abria and the witness, Mariano Ibanez to work in
the Capitol Plaza and thereafter go back to prison. However, he
allowed them to go to the nursery to pick up gabi.

After a while, the Prisoners were called to assemble, and all but

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 Epifanio Labong answered, so the 5 present prisoners were ordered
to look for him

Eusebio Abria notified Petitioner of Labong’s possible footprints by

a camote foundation, immediately afterwards he was shot at by
Petitioner in the left arm. Petitioner again assembled the 5 Prisoners
then shot Ceferino Tipace, killing him. The rest of the prisoners ran
away either to the Capitol Building or the Provincial Jail to report the
incident .
(Petitioner fired his gun because the prisoners were running far from him
when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one
in jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be
discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless already.
Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work.)

Petitioner’s main defense was the Justifying Circumstance of acting in the

fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office under Art
11 par. 5.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner’s act of shooting is justified by Art 11 Par
(Performance/fulfillment of lawful duty)

Ruling: NO. While custodians should take care for prisoners not to
escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize custodians to fire
against the prisoners.
Even if appellant sincerely believes that in firing the shots be acted
in the performance of his official duty the circumstances of the case
show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the
prisoners so as to seriously wound one of them and kill
instantaneously another.

The Requisites for Art 11 Par 5 to be applicable are:

1. The accused acted in the Performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office;
2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the
Necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office

However, the court ruled that Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of

the mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance.
In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes
incomplete thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under
Art. 13.

Mamangun vs. People

GR 149152 Facts:
02 February 2007 On July 31, 1992, at around 9 in the evening, the desk officer of the
Meycauayan PNP Station received a telephone call that a robbery-
holdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Team Leader SPO1 Andres Legaspi, with PO2 Eugenio Aminas and
herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun were among those
dispatched to respond to the scene. Upon arriving at the scene,
petitioner went to the rooftop of the house where the suspect was

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 allegedly taking refuge. At the rooftop, they saw a man whom they
thought was the robbery suspect and petitioner Mamangun shot him
fatally on the left arm. The man turned out to be Gerard Contreras
who was not the robbery suspect and died later.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of murder. On his defense, he

invoked self-defense (Article 11, par. 1) and acts in fulfillment of a duty
(Article 11, par. 5) in hopes to exculpate him from liability.

Issue:
WON the justifying circumstance of acts in fulfillment of a duty applicable
in this case.

Ruling:
NO. The justifying circumstance of acts in fulfillment of a duty is not
applicable in this case because the requisite that the injury inflicted
must have been a necessary consequence of the performance of the
lawful exercise of such duty.

There are two requisites for Article 11, par. 5 to apply. The defense
should prove that (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and
(2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

In this case, the accused was a police officer who responded to a

robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was
in accordance with the performance of his duty. The shooting of the
victim however was not the necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty as a policeman. The victim was already
unarmed and shouting the words “Hindi ako! Hindi ako! “ before the
accused shot him in the left arm. The accused even uttered the
words “Anong hindi ako?” before shooting him.

People vs. Dagani

GR 153875 Facts: At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group of
16 August 2006 4 composed of Javier, Miran and two other individuals had been
drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the Philippine
National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All
of a sudden, appellants, who were security officers of the PNR and
covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen
and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing
the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while Santiano
shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.

Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and

lawful performance of official duty as PNR security officers. They also
argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and
conspiracy.

Crime charged - Murder

RTC - found them guilty for the crime of Murder

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 CA – affirmed RTC’s conviction

Issue:
1. Whether or not appellants acted in self-defense.
2. Whether or not appellants acted in the lawful performance
of official duty.

Ruling:
1. NO. The defense failed to prove that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Javier. Self-defense requires that
there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or
killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. All these conditions must concur.

Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would

presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger on the life and limb of a person — not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude — but most importantly, at the time the defensive
action was taken against the aggressor. To invoke self-defense
successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack
that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict
severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to
resist the attack.
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that
Javier, during the course of the struggle for the firearm, "could have
easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is
aggression in contemplation of the law only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.
2. NO. Two requisites must concur before the defense of
performance of duty can prosper: 1) the accused must have
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed should have been the necessary consequence of
such lawful exercise.

These requisites are absent in the instant case. They failed to prove that
they were oon duty at that time and

The justifying circumstances invoked are not applicable in this case

hence, the SC found the accused guilty of Homicide and not Murder.

People vs. Genosa

GR 135981 Facts: Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first

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15 January 2004 year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but soon thereafter,
the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
Battered Woman Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke
Syndrome was not her, slap her, pin her down on the bed or beat her. These incidents
appreciated because happened several times and Marivic would often run home to her
The 3 phases of a parents. She had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but Ben
battering cycle was not would always follow her and they would reconcile.
proved.
On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then 7 months pregnant,
and the victim quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was able to
run to another room. Allegedly there was no provocation on her part
when she got home that night, and it was her husband who began the
provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting
to make sure she would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted
having killed the victim, who was then sleeping at the time, with the
use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts
opined that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman syndrome and
at the time she killed her husband, her mental condition was that she
was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the imprint of all the
abuses that she had experienced in the past.

Issue: Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered

Woman Syndrome as constituting self-defense.

Ruling: No. The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the
elements of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome,
to wit:
a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner;
b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; and
c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable –
not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense.

"Cycle of violence," which has three phases: (1) the tension-building

phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.

Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly
established. Here, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In fact, she
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape

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 to their children’s bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the
reality or even imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether.
Ben was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her
life or safety.

I. Article 12 Exempting Circumstances

ART. 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Imbecility and Insanity

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines
as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

2. A child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
Minority

As amended by RA 9344 “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” –

xxx SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child 15 years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

3. A child above 15 years but below eighteen 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws. Minority

As amended by RA 9344 –
SEC. 6. Xxx A child above 15 years but below eighteen 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. Accident

5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. Irresistible force

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 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury. Uncontrollable fear

7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause. Lawful and insuperable cause

Include: RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630

XXX. SEC. 3. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall
be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

“A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.

“A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

“The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.”

NOTES:
o General rule: The offender is absolved from criminal liability but not from civil liability except in
cases of accidents and lawful and insuperable cause.

ELEMENTS:
 Elements of Accident:
1. Offender is performing a lawful act;
2. He was performing the lawful act with due care;
3. He causes injury to another by mere accident; and
4. The injury is without fault or intent on the part of the offender.
o No criminal and civil liability because the act performed is a lawful act.
o

 Elements of Irresitible force:

1. The compulsion is by physical force;
2. Physical force must be irresistible; and
3. Physical force must come from a third person.

 Elements of Uncontrollabe fear:

1. Existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2. Fear must be real or at least imminent; and

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3. Fear of the injury is greater than or equal to that committed.

 Elements of Lawful and Insuperable cause:

1. An act is required by law to be done;
2. A person fails to perform such act;
3. Failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable cause.

Cases:
IMBECILITY AND INSANITY (Complete deprivation of discernment/intelligence)
People vs. Taneo GR L-
37673 31 March 1933 Facts: Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly
got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried
to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father
after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then 7
months pregnant, died 5 days later as a result of her wound, and also
the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that

Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his
feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his
enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a
bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say
to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really
wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed
to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and

upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion
perpetua.

RTC – guilty of parricide

Issue: WON Taneo is guilty for the crime of parricide.

Ruling: NO.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any
trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have
any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting
them.
The Court concluded that the defendant, who acted while in a dream
and his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense
of entailing criminal liability. We are taking into consideration the fact
that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does
not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not

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 known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience
where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our
observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral
perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but
just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances
of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant
tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence
presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to
voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.

The doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an
hallucination and not in his right mind. Nobody saw how the wound
was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife.
He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What
the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala,
intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming
out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but
he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his
wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.

SC – Taneo is not criminally liable. He is ordered to be confined in a

Government asylum wherein he shall not be wherein he shall not be
released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer
constitute a menace.

People vs. Puno GR L-

33211 29 June 1981 Doctrine: Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of
(Read also: J. Makasiar’s intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of
Dissent) reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total
deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.

Based on the report of the National Mental Hospital on the mental

condition of the accused, it showed that his ailment of schizophrenia
did not necessarily impair his discernment of right from wrong.

Facts: Ernesto Puno, 28yo, has been an out-patient of the National

Mental Hospital and had undergone psychiatric treatments for
schizophrenia since 1962. Although he recovered, he had a relapse of
the same mental illness and remained unimproved until 1966. He
continued treatment at JRR Memorial Hospital until July 1970 after

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 which he was relieved of his symptoms and did not come back to the
hospital for medications. Doctors later testified that he was quiet and
usually manageable and was fairly clean in person and without undue
display or emotion.

In the afternoon of September 8, 1970, he entered bedroom in the

house of Francisca Col, a.k.a. Aling Kikay, 72 yo, and insulted her with
words like "mangkukulam, mambabarang, mambubuyog", then
repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a
hammer until she died. That time, one Hilaria dela Cruz was in the
bedroom with the old woman and another tenant named Lina Pajes
was in the adjoining room.

After the killing, Puno warned and threatened the said two tenants
against going to the police. Then Puno fled and subsequently went to his
second cousin's house in Bulacan. He later on surrendered to the police
but was shortly sent to the National Mental Hospital.

During trial, the defense interposed the exempting circumstance of

insanity and presented 3 psychiatrists. However, instead of proving
that Puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts
testified that Puno acted with discernment. Their testimonies included
statements:
a. that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with society,
although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction";
b. that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a
slight destruction of the ego. Also, they said that suffering from
"schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially
incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his environment
and that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the
killing and
c. That Puno could distinguish between right and wrong. That Puno
was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally
deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high
school.

RTC – Puno is guilty for the crime of Murder

Issue: WON the exempting circumstance of insanity should be lie in

favor of Puno.

Ruling: NO. When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from

responsibility the evidence on this point must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.

Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence.

Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the

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 accused must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. Insanity exists
when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless
victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that
tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom
of will.

MINORITY
People vs. Sarcia
GR 169641 5 year old AAA was raped
10 September 2009
AAA and her cousin were playing when accused Sarcia arrived, asked
AAA to go to the backyard with him, asked her to lie down and then
and there raped her.

Initially, the Information filed is for acts of lasciviousness but it was

upgraded to rape and was only filed 4 years later because AAA’s
parents had to wait until they have enough money for litigation.

Accused Sarcia turned 18 on the year the rape was committed. When
minority is not clear, minority should be ruled in favor of the accused.
However, the suspension of sentence under RA 9344 will still not lie in
favor os Sarcia because he is already about 25 years old when his
conviction was promulgated.

There is a conclusive presumption that there is lack of free consent when

the rape victim is below 12 years old.

SC – guilty for the crime of statutory rape.

People vs. Doquena

GR 46539 Ragojos was stabbed by Doquena (minor) in the chest and died. This
27 September 1939 happened when the latter was insulted after Ragojos chased him,
slapped him in the nape and punched him in the face after Doquena
intercepted the ball while Ragojos was playing volleyball and threw at
Ragojos who was hit at the stomach.

Grade 7, brightest student, CAT chief. Doquena acted with discernment

because he has the mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong which is demonstrated by his attitude and
behavior at the time he committed the act of stabbing Ragojos.

People vs. ZZZ

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GR 228828 Discernment is the mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
24 July 2019 consequences of his unlawful act.

Rape with homicide

BBB saw ZZZ dragging AAA to the school premises at 7PM but presumed
was nothing wrong because they were relatives. The next day, AAA went
missing and her body was found only a couple days later, already
decomposed.

ZZZ claimed that he was only 15 years old at the time of the
occurrence. However, the court was able to prove that he acted with
discernment.

Issue: WON ZZZ is exempt from criminal liability.

Ruling: NO. The court ruled that ZZZ acted with discernment.
He committed the crime in a dark and isolated place; he evaded the
authorities by fleeing to Tarlac; upon confirmation of the social worker
assigned to him, he knew and understood the consequences of his acts
and lastly; Dr. Bandonill made a conclusion that AAA was raped by
means of force, as evidenced by the contusions all over the body and
by the tear in the vaginal area.

Suspension of sentence under RA 9344 would not lie in ZZZ’s favor

because he is already 30 years old at the time of his conviction. The
suspension of sentence is applicable only until the minor reached the
age of 21.

SPARK vs. Quezon City

GR 225442 Facts: Petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section
08 August 2017 4 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, given that
the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the
imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that
no penalty shall be imposed on minors for status offenses such as
curfew violations.

Issue: WON the penal provisions provided in the ordinance is valid. -

NO.

Ruling: NO.
"Penalty" is defined as “punishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually
in the form of imprisonment or fine";
“Punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits
a deliberate or negligent act." Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a]
sanction — such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property,
right, or privilege — assessed against a person who has violated the

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 law."

The prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous.

It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x
violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for
curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance
directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand,
the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the
minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

QC ordinance – constitutional (least restrictive means to achieve the

objective)
Manila and Navotas ordinance – unconstitutional (imposes penalties –
usually sanctions – against minors who will violate the ordinance)

UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
Ty vs. People
GR 149275 27 Facts: Hospital bill for her mother is approximately 657,000 and for her
September 2004 sister is approx 418,000 for a total amount of almost 1.1M due to
Manila Doctor’s Hospital.

Ty executed a promissory note and assumed the payment of the bill in

installment. She issued 7 postdated checks with Metrobank but was all
dishonored for lack of funds with “Account Closed” advice. The MDH
sent demand letters to Ty but to ano avail.

Ty invoked that she issued the checks because of "an uncontrollable

fear of a greater injury." That her mother was not treated well and
because of this “debasing treatment” upon her mother, it affected her
mother’s menta, psychological and physical health to the point that her
mother contempated suicide if she would not be released from the
hospital.

Ty then alleged that she was compelled to sign a promissory note, open
an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to pay for the HB to
effect her mother's immediate discharge.

Issue: WON the accused issued the checks "under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil
or injury.

Ruling: NO. For the exempting circumstance of “Uncontrollable fear” to

be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur:
(1) existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(2) the fear must be real and imminent; and
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that

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 committed.

In this case, the fear claimed by Ty was not real and imminent. There is
only speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by
law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mother's illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its
alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension
of her death.

Secondly, it is not the law's intent to say that any fear exempts one
from criminal liability much less petitioner's flimsy fear that her mother
might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not
impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make
her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital's
threats or demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice
but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many
opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very
own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital
required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of
postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an
account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity
to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without

funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her
counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated
checks "because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big
problem."

Apart from petitioner's bare assertion, the record is bereft of any

evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or
coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospital's demands.

People vs. Labuguen

GR 223103
24 February 2020

Article 13 Mitigating Circumstances

ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances;

1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to
exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. Incomplete justifying or

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 exempting circumstance

2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor,
he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80. Minority or seniority

3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Praeter
intentionem

4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded
the act. Sufficient provocation
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees. Immediate vindication of a grave offense

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation. Passion or obfuscation

7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or
that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution; Voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilt

8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which
thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings. Deaf and
dumb, blind or suffering some physical defect

9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Illness

10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above
mentioned. Analogous circumstances

NOTES:

ELEMENTS
 Elements of Praeter Intentionem:
1. A felony has been committed; and
2. There is a notable disparity between the means employed by the offender and the resulting
felony.

 Elements of sufficient provocation:

1. The provocation must be sufficient;
2. It must originate from the offended party; and
3. The provocation must be immediate to commission of the crime by the person who was
provoked.

 Elements of immediate vindication:

1. That there be a grave offense done to:
a. The one committing the felony,

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 b. His spouse,
c. Ascendants,
d. Descendants,
e. Legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sister,
f. Relatives by affinity within the same degree
2. The commission of the crime was done in immediate vindication of the said grave offense.
o The said grave offense must be the proximate cause of the commission of the crime.
o Therefore, the word immediate may allow a lapse of time provided that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the accused was still enveloped with the pain brought about by
the said grave offense.

 Elements of passion or obfuscation:

1. There be an act that is unlawful and sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation on the part of
the accused;
2. That the commission of the act that produced passion and obfuscation must not be far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the offender
might have recovered his normal equanimity.

Cases:
INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING OR EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
People vs. Narvaez GR L-
33466-67 30 April 1983
People vs. Ulep GR
132547 20 September
2000
Guillermo vs. People GR
153287 30 June 2008
People vs. Sabalberino
GR 241088 03 June 2019

Miranda vs. People GR

234528 23 January 2019
Urbano vs. People GR
182750 20 January 2009
People vs. Benito GR L-
32042 13 February 1975
Bacabac vs. People GR
149372 11 September

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2007
People vs. Gonzales GR
139542 21 June 2001
Bongalon vs. People GR
169533 20 March 2013
People vs. Pagal GR L-
32040 25 October 1977
People vs. Ignas GR
140514-15 30 September
2003

People vs. Nidera GR

250043 02 December
2020
Mariano vs. People GR
178145 07 July 2014

Nizurtado vs.
Sandiganbayan GR Nizurtado voluntarily surrendered and sought to justify the questioned
107383 07 December act in that it was only when the members of the Brgy. Council had
1994 realized that PHP 10,000 was not enough to support the t-shirt
manufacturing project, that they decided to distribute the money in the
form of loans to themselves.

SB - Guilty of complex crime of malversation of public funds through

falsification of public documents.

Voluntary surrender may be treated as a modifying circumstance

independent and apart from restitution.

Mitigating circumstances present in this case:

1. Voluntary surrender (Par. 7)
2. Restitution of money (Par. 10 – Analogous circumstances)
3. Praeter Intentionem (Par. 3)

SC – affirmed but penalty was reduced due to the existence of the 3

MC.

Articles 14 and 15 Aggravating Circumstances and Alternative Circumstances

ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances:

1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. Abuse of public position

2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities. Lack of
respect of lawful authorities

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 3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party
on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, if the latter has not given provocation. Disregard of rank, age, sex, dwelling of the
offended party

4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. Abuse of
confidence

5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or
where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place
dedicated to religious worship. Lack of respect for the palace of the Chief Executive, to the
CE, in a place where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, in a
place dedicated to religious worship.

6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band,
whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense. Night time,
uninhabited place, by a band

Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission
of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.

7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake,

epidemic or other calamity or misfortune. On occasion of calamity or misfortune

8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity. With the aid of armed men or persons

9. That the accused is a recidivist. Recidivism; Quasi-recidivist; Habitual deliquency

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.

10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an
equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
Reiteracion

11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. In

consideration of price, reward or promise

12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a
vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any
other artifice involving great waste and ruin. By means of I,F,P,E,S,I,D, or by the use of any
other artifice involving great waste or ruin

13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation. Evident premeditation

14. That craft, fraud or disguise be employed. Craft, fraud, disguise is employed

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 15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the
defense. Superior strength

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). Treachery

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act. Ignominy

18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an
entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose. Unlawful entry

19. That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be
broken. A wall, roof, floor

20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means
of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means. With the aid of minors below 15 years of
age, by means of motor vehicles, airships,

21. That the Wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for its commission.

Include: Section 29, RA 10591 Use of Firearms in Committing Crimes

o It is a special aggravating circumstance if firearms/loose firearms facilitated the commission
of the crime.
o Separate charge of the crime committed and illegal possession of loose firearms if the firearm
is not used in the commission of the crime.

NOTES:
o Mere presence of the President in the commission of the crime aggravates the crime (Par. 5)
o Par. 18 and 19 (forcible entry and breaking a wall, window, etc as a means of committing the
crime) and Par. 3 (dwelling) are all inherent in the crime of robbery by using force upon things.
o 4 forms of habituality:
1. Recidivism (GAC) Par. 9 Art. 11
2. Reiteracion (GAC)
3. Quasi-recidivism (SAC)
4. Habitual delinquency (SAC)

 Recidivism – exists when one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this
Code.
Elements:

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 1. That the offender is on trial for one crime;
2. That at the time of said trial, he was previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime;
3. That both the first and second offenses are embraced in the same title of the code;
4. That the offender is convicted of the second offense charged. .

 Reiteracion - That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the
law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty.
Elements:
1. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
2. That he previously served sentence for another crime to which the law attaches an equal
or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty;
3. That he is also convicted of the new offense.

 Habitual delinquency – A a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a

period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or
less physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener.
Elements:
1. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
2. That he previously served sentence for another crime to which the law attaches an equal
or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty;
3. That he is also convicted of the new offense.

 Quasi-recidivism - In Art. 160 of the RPC, a quasi-recidivist is one who has been convicted by
a final judgment of any crime whether the first conviction is for a felony or an offense
punished by a special law. But after finality of judgment before serving the first sentence or
while serving sentence he commits a felony.

o Ignominy – moral pain caused by the means/circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime (e.g. raping the victim in front of her father)
o Price, reward or promise – may be applied against the one who gave the PRP (principal by
inducement) and the one who received the PRP (principal by direct participation).
o By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, etc. – it is a GAC but if the crime committed by
using such means is that of killing a person, it is a QAC that qualifies the killing to murder under
Art. 248 of the RPC.
o Cruelty – applicable only to crimes against persons

LECTURE:
o Limit: should not exceed the maximum penalty prescribed by law kahit 10 aggravating
circumstances pa yan
o

Alternative Circumstances

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Article 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the
other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of
instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended
party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.

The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances
when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Absolutory Causes - those circumstance which have the effect in Article 12. Absolutory causes
exempts a person from criminal liability but not from civil liability.
o Relationship as absolutory cause
1. When the offender is the

Extenuating circumstances

Cases:
People vs. Ural GR L-30801 27 March 1974
People vs. Gapasin GR 73489 25 April 1994

People vs. Tiongson GR L-35123-24 25 July 1984

People vs. Melendrez GR 39913 19 December 1933

People vs. Sibbu GR 214757 29 March 2017

People vs. Lignes GR 229087 17 June 2020

People vs. Dela Pena GR 238120 12 February 2020

People vs. Moreno GR 191759 02 March 2020
People vs. Corpin GR 232493 19 June 2019
People vs. Enriquez GR 238171 19 June 2019
People vs. Matibag GR 206381 15 March 2015
People vs. Escote GR 140756 04 April 2003

People vs. Bumidang GR 130630 04 December 2000

People vs. Jose GR L-28232 06 February 1971
People vs. Butler GR L-50276 27 January 1983

RELATIONSHIP AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People vs. Lucas GR Lucas raper her 13 year old daughter Mauricia after he fetched her

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80102 22 January 1990 from her work as a housemaid.

They boarded a jeepney, went to someplace she didn’t know, went

inside a dark room, played with the private parts of Mauricia and raped
her while laughing.

6 months later, Mauricia filed a rape case againts her father.

GUILTY OF RAPE WITH AGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

RELATIONSHIP. He would not be able to fetch Mauricia from work and
bring her to some dark place and rape her if it were not for his
relationship with Mauricia as his daughter.

INTOXICATION AS MITIGATION OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

Planos vs. People Planos was charged with rape. He alleged that he should not be held
GR 232506 criminally liable because he was intoxicated hence, his criminal liability
18 November 2020 is extinguished.

INTOXICATION DOES NOT EXEMPT ONE FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

At most, it may mitigate the liability if it is proved to be not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. Otherwise, if intoxication
is habitual or intentional, it is considered as aggravating circumstance.

In this case, the defendant failed to prove that he is a non-habitual

drinker or that it was not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime
of rap.

Articles 16-20 Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies

Include:

PD 1612 Anti-Fencing
The crime of fencing punishes the act of buying, receiving, possessing, or selling an item that a
person knows, or should know, was derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft.

Elements:
2. A crime of robbery or theft was committed;
3. The offender is neither a principal or accomplice in the commission of robbery or theft;
4. He was found in possession of any article of object of value which is the proceeds of the robbery
or theft;
5. He knows or should’ve known that the thing in his possession if the proceeds of robbery or theft;
6. There is intent to gain either for himself of for another.

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PD 1829 Obstruction of Justice
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution
of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal
laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;

xxx

(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement
agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim;
or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities
for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or
disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court.

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher
penalty shall be imposed.

Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in
addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public
office.

Cases:
People vs. Carabbay GR
248872 05 October 2020 Facts: Carabbay punched victim Acang which knocked him down.
Carabbay then ordered Bayot to shoot Acang by saying “tirahin mo na”

Issue: WON there is conspiracy in this case making Carabbay, who did
not pull the trigger, liable as a principal.

Ruling: YES. There is Conspiracy. Conspiracy was implied in the acts of

both carabbay and Bayot. Conspiracy does not need to be established
by direct evidence.

People vs. Dulay GR

193854 24 September Facts: Dulay was with the victim in this case, AAA who was only 12
2012 years old at that time. Dulay delivered AAA to a kubuhan and left after
given the money as consideration. Then and there, AAA was raped by a
certain person named “Speed”.

Issue: WON Dulay is liable as a Principal by Indispensable Cooperation

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 in the crime of rape.

Ruling: NO. Her act of delivering AAA to Speed was not necessary to
commit the crime of rape. Speed could still cosummate the crime of
rape without the cooperation of Dulay. The act of delivering AAA could
have been done by some other person aside from Dulay. However,
Dulay is liable for violating RA 7610.

Apura vs. People GR

222892 18 March 2021 Enriquez together with his cousins were drinking in a bar in Cebu.
While drinking, Apura struck Enriquez in the head with a beer bottle.
Thereafter, 3 other persons who were with accused Que struck
Enriquez with beer bottles. Que then approached Enriquez and shot
him but misfired so he shot him the 2nd time which caused the death of
Enriquez.

WON Apura should be held liable as an accomplice of accused Que.

YES.

Gurro vs. People GR

224562 18 September Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
2019
AAA was last seen with Wennie by witness Patrick. Thereafter, AAA has
gone missing. Wennie thereafter borrowed the phone of Patrick and
texted someone. Joel on the other hand already has in his custody AAA.

WON Excel is guilty as an accomplice to the crime of Kidnapping for

Ransom with Homicide.

NO, ACCESSORY ONLY.

Wennie’s suspicious acts show her complicity to the crime. To begin

with, she was the las person seen with AAA. She and AAA went outside
of the house, but the former returned home alone. AAA went missing
thereafter. Wennie’s staunch efforts at protecting Joel were indeed
questionable. It was certainly suspicious why Wennie constantly misled
Patrick as to Joel’s true cp number. 1st she deleted all of the messages
then she deleted all of Patrick’s contacts. Not content, Wennie even
misled Patrick, by deliberately giving a wrong number. All of these
suspicious deeds cast doubt unto Wennie’s innocence.

Art. 19 of the RPC provides that those who, having knowledge

of the commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the ff manners: 1.) by profiting themselves or

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 assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2.) by
concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3.) by harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

There was no showing that Excel actually cooperated or

assisted in kidnapping AAA and detaining the latter. At best, Excel’s
participation in the incident was limited to acts committed after the
abduction was already consummated. Particularly, Excel retrieved the
ransom money from Metrobank and thereafter immediately forwarded
the same to Joel, through four money transfer transactions two hours
after Arnel wired the money to the kidnappers.

Ong vs. People GR On was selling 13 stolen tires found in his store.
190475 10 April 2013
WON Ong is liable for violating Anti-fencing law.

YES. Elements of fencing:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed
2. The accused took no part in the crime of R or T
3. The accused acquired, was in possession, buys and sells or in any
manner deals with a stolen article or thing
4. He knows or should have known that the thing was a proceed of the
crime of T or R
5. There is intent to gain for himself or for another

Ong
People vs. Dimat GR Dimat purchased a stolen Nissan in this case. He alleged that he had
181184 25 January 2012 not intention to commit the crime and did not know that the car he
puchased from Tolentino was stolen.

WON Dimat is liable for fencing. YES.

YES, Dimat is liable. Elements of fencing. Although initially, he had no

knowledge that the car is probably stolen, Tolentino subsequent act of
not complying with his promise to present to Dimat new versions of
the documents should have tipped off Dimat that the car is probably
obtained by Tolentino from an illicit source. Therefore, Dimat is liable
for fencing.

Articles 21-88 (Article 26 as amended by RA 10951)

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ARTICLE 21. Penalties that May Be Imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by
law prior to its commission.

ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.

ARTICLE 23. Effect of Pardon by the Offended Party. — A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action except as provided in article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the
injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.

ARTICLE 24. Measures of Prevention or Safety Which are Not Considered Penalties. — The following shall not be
considered as penalties:

1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity or
imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.

2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in article 80 and for the purposes specified
therein.

3. Suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.

4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative or disciplinary powers,
superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.

5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form.

CHAPTER TWO

Classification of Penalties

ARTICLE 25. Penalties Which May Be Imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed, according to this Code,
and their different classes, are those included in the following:

Scale

Principal Penalties

Capital punishment: Death.

Afflictive penalties:
Reclusión perpetua,
Reclusión temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Prisión mayor.

Correctional penalties:

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Prisión correccional
Arresto mayor
Suspensión
Destierro

Light penalties:
Arresto menor
Public censure

Penalties common to the three preceding classes:

Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.

Accessory penalties – those attached to the principal penalty

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.

ARTICLE 26. Fine — When Afflictive, Correctional or Light Penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single or as
an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional
penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty, if it be less than
200 pesos.

ART. 26 as amended: LIGHT – less than 40k; CORRECTIONAL – 40k to 2M; AFFLICTIVE – more than 2M

CHAPTER THREE

Duration and Effect of Penalties

SECTION ONE

Duration of Penalties

ARTICLE 27. Reclusión Perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned
after undergoing the penalty for 30 years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious
cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.

Reclusión temporal. — The penalty of reclusión temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty
years. 12 years and 1 day – 20 years

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal
penalty. 6 years and 1 day to 12 years

Prisión correccional, suspensión, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prision correccional,

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suspensión and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. 6 months
and 1 day – 6 years

Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six
months. 1 month and 1 day – 6 months

Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days. 1 – 30
days

Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the
court may determine.

ARTICLE 28. Computation of Penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison the term of the duration of the
temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become
final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall
be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which
the defendant commences to serve his sentence.

ARTICLE 29. One-half of the Period of the Preventive Imprisonment Deducted from Term of Imprisonment. —
Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily;
3. When they have been convicted of robbery, theft, estafa, malversation of public funds, falsification,
vagrancy, or prostitution.

ART. 29 as amended by R.A. 10592 “ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of
imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the
service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being
informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30)
years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he
shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on

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appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate
release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance:
Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court
may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is Destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30)
days of preventive imprisonment.”

SECTION TWO

Effects of the Penalties According to Their Respective Nature

ARTICLE 30. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred
by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

ARTICLE 31. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following
effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

ARTICLE 32. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification for the Exercise of the
Right of Suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage
shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

ARTICLE 33. Effects of the Penalties of Suspension from Any Public Office, Profession or Calling, or the Right of
Suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage
shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage
during the term of the sentence.

The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the
period of his suspension.

ARTICLE 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.

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ARTICLE 35. Effects of Bond to Keep the Peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to
keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the
offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount
determined by the court in its judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the
court to guarantee said undertaking.

The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no
case exceed six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not
exceed thirty (30) days, if for a light felony.

ARTICLE 36. Pardon; Its Effects. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.

ARTICLE 37. Costs — What are Included. — Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial
proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in
force, or amounts not subject to schedule.

ARTICLE 38. Pecuniary Liabilities — Order of Payment. — In case the property of the offender should not be
sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:

1. The reparation of the damage caused.

2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The costs of the proceedings.

ARTICLE 39. Subsidiary Penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the pecuniary liabilities
mentioned in paragraphs 1st, 2nd and 3rd of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each 2 pesos and 50 centavos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prisión correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine and pecuniary liabilities referred in the preceding paragraph are satisfied, but his
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it
continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prisión correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such
penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall

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 continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not
relieve him from reparation of the damaged caused, nor from indemnification for the consequential
damages in case his financial circumstances should improve; but he shall be relieved from pecuniary liability
as to the fine.

As amended by R.A. 10159

SECTION THREE

Penalties in Which Other Accessory Penalties are Inherent

ARTICLE 40. Death— Its Accessory Penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction
during thirty years following the date of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted
in the pardon.

ARTICLE 41. Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal — Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of
reclusión perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the
period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender
shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

ARTICLE 42. Prisión Mayor — Its Accessory Penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that of
temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional — Its Accessory Penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry
with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed
eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

ARTICLE 44. Arresto — Its Accessory Penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of
the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

ARTICLE 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. — Every penalty imposed
for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments
or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless
they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of
lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

CHAPTER FOUR

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 Application of Penalties

SECTION ONE

Rules for the Application of Penalties to the Persons Criminally Liable and for the Graduation of the Same

ARTICLE 46. Penalty to be Imposed Upon Principals in General. — The penalty prescribed by law for the
commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.

Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the
consummated felony.

ARTICLE 47. In What Cases the Death Penalty Shall Not Be Imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all
cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases.

1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.

2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous
in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or
for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall
render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or
members thereof shall have become disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which
event the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.

ARTICLE 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.

ARTICLE 49. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon the Principals When the Crime Committed is Different from that
Intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to
commit, the following rules shall be observed:

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the
guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher
penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

ARTICLE 50. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Principals of a Frustrated Crime. — The penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated
felony.

ARTICLE 51. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Principals of Attempted Crimes. — The penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to

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commit a felony.

ARTICLE 52. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accomplices in a Consummated Crime. — The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the
commission of a consummated felony.

ARTICLE 53. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accessories to the Commission of a Consummated Felony. — The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon
the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.

ARTICLE 54. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accomplices in a Frustrated Crime. — The penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission
of a frustrated felony.

ARTICLE 55. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accessories of a Frustrated Crime. — The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the
commission of a frustrated felony.

ARTICLE 56. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accomplices in an Attempted Crime. — The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in
an attempt to commit the felony.

ARTICLE 57. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Accessories of an Attempted Crime. — The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempt shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to
commit a felony.

ARTICLE 58. Additional Penalty to Be Imposed Upon Certain Accessories. — Those accessories falling within the
terms of paragraph 3 of article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer
the additional penalty or absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave
felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.

ARTICLE 59. Penalty to Be Imposed in Case of Failure to Commit the Crime Because the Means Employed or the
Aims Sought are Impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the
act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social
danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.

ARTICLE 60. Exceptions to the Rules Established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in articles 50 to
57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty
provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.

ARTICLE 61. Rules for Graduating Penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to
the provisions of articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of
any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:

1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the scale prescribed in article 70 of this

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 Code.

2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more
divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the above mentioned scale.

3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of
the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that
immediately following in said scale.

4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different
divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately
following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty
prescribed, if possible; otherwise, from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned
scale.

5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not specially provided for in the four
preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those
guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices
and accessories.

TABULATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER

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 SECTION TWO

Rules for the Application of Penalties with Regard to the Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances, and
Habitual Delinquency

ARTICLE 62. Effects of the Attendance of Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstances and of Habitual Delinquency.
— Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose
of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for
the purpose of increasing the penalty.

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a
degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his
private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or
mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are

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attendant.

4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to
accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of
them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.

5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:

a. Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prisión correccional in its medium
and maximum periods;

b. Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and

c. Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the
last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum
period to reclusión temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender,
in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period of 10
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. -definition
of habitual delinquent

ARTICLE 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall
be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.

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ARTICLE 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. — In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of
three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76
and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether
there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed
by law in its medium period.

2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty
in its minimum period.

3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the
penalty in its maximum period.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of
one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a
greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.

7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the
number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the
evil produced by the crime.

ARTICLE 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods. — In cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the
foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming
one period of each of the three portions.

ARTICLE 66. Imposition of Fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established
by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

ARTICLE 67. Penalty to Be Imposed When Not All the Requisites of Exemption of the Fourth Circumstance of
Article 12 are Present.— When all the conditions required in circumstance number 4 of article 12 of this Code to
exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave
felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.

ARTICLE 68. Penalty to Be Imposed Upon a Person Under Eighteen Years of Age. — When the offender is a
minor under 18 years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article
80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the
court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always

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 lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

ARTICLE 69. Penalty to Be Imposed When the Crime Committed is Not Wholly Excusable. — A penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason
of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the
several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The
courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature
of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

ARTICLE 70. Successive Service of Sentences; Exception. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties,
he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, said penalties shall
be executed successively, following the order of their respective severity, which shall be determined in
accordance with the following scale:

1. Death.
2. Reclusión perpetua.
3. Reclusión temporal.
4. Prisión mayor.
5. Prisión correccional.
6. Arresto mayor.
7. Arresto menor.

A person sentenced to destierro who is also sentenced to the penalty of prisión o r arresto shall be required to
serve these latter penalties before serving the penalty of destierro.

ARTICLE 71. Fine. — The fine shall be considered as the last of all the principal penalties listed in the preceding
article.

When a fine is so imposed, the duration of the subsidiary liability corresponding thereto, by reason of the
insolvency of the offender, shall not exceed that which is provided in rule 2 of article 39.

ARTICLE 72. Preference in the Payment of the Civil Liabilities. — The civil liabilities of a person found guilty of
two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following the chronological order of the dates of the final judgments
rendered against him, beginning with the first in order of time.

SECTION THREE

Provision Common to the Last Two Preceding Sections

ARTICLE 73. Presumption in Regard to the Imposition of Accessory Penalties. — Whenever the courts shall
impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of
articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also
imposed upon the convict.

ARTICLE 74. Penalty Higher Than Reclusión Perpetua in Certain Cases. — In cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty higher than another given penalty, without specifically designating the name of the former, if such
higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of article 40, shall be

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considered as the next higher penalty.

ARTICLE 75. Increasing or Reducing the Penalty of Fine by One or More Degrees. — Whenever it may be
necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced,
respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without, however,
changing the minimum.

The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist of a fixed amount, but are made
proportional.

ARTICLE 76. Legal Period of Duration of Divisible Penalties. — The legal period of duration of divisible penalties
shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the
maximum in the manner shown in the following table:

TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR PERIODS

ARTICLE 77. When the Penalty is a Complex One Composed of Three Distinct Penalties. — In cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them
shall be the minimum, the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.

Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in this book, the periods

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shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.

CHAPTER FIVE

Execution and Service of Penalties

SECTION ONE

General Provisions

ARTICLE 78. When and How a Penalty is to Be Executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a
final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances
or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions
in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be
performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts
among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.

The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into
different departments, and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.

ARTICLE 79. Suspension of the Execution and Service of the Penalties in Case of Insanity. — When a convict shall
become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance
number 1 of article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.

If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have
prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the
convict is serving his sentence.

ARTICLE 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minor Delinquents. — Whenever a minor under eighteen years of age, of
either sex, be accused of a crime, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of
pronouncing judgment, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or
care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law for the care,
correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of
any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Public Welfare
Commissioner or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of
public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed hereinbelow, until such minor
shall have reached his majority or for such less period as the court may deem proper.

The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor,
his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and
supervision of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong.

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The Public Welfare Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public
schools or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall
submit to the Court every two months or as often as required, a written report on the good or bad conduct of
said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him.

The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the
recommendation of the Public Welfare Commissioner or his authorized representatives or agents, or the
superintendent of public schools or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has
been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him. The provisions of the
first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein.

If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first
paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Public Welfare Commissioner and subject to such conditions
as this official in accordance with the law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay
elsewhere under the care of a responsible person.

If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his
confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the
same may order his final release.

In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has
been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible
person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable,
he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime
committed by him.

The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been
committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if
they are able to do so, in the discretion of the court.

SECTION TWO

Execution of Principal Penalties

ARTICLE 81. When and How the Death Penalty is to Be Executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with
preference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible
to mitigate the sufferings of the persons under sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution.

If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.
ARTICLE 82. Notification and Execution of the Sentence and Assistance to the Culprit. — The court shall
designate a working day for the execution, but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the
expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the
notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may
request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to
consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of
the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.

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ARTICLE 83. Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted
upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon
any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusión perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in article 40.

ARTICLE 84. Place of Execution and Persons Who May Witness the Same. — The execution shall take place in the
penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the
offender and by his lawyers and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the
necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorized.

ARTICLE 85. Provision Relative to the Corpse of the Person Executed and Its Burial. — Unless claimed by his
family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the
execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of
study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains.
Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense,
granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the
latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp.

ARTICLE 86. Reclusión Perpetua, Reclusión Temporal, Prisión Mayor, Prisión Correccional and Arresto Mayor. —
The penalties of reclusión perpetua, reclusión temporal, prisión mayor, prisión correccional, and arresto mayor,
shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in
force or which may be provided by law in the future.

ARTICLE 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places
designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not
less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.

ARTICLE 88. Arresto Menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house
of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its
decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to
it.

Include:
RA 9346 Prohibiting Death Penalty
RA 4103 Indeterminate Sentence Law
PD 968 as amended by RA 10707 Probation Law
Cases:
People vs. Nelmida GR Facts: Ambush of mayor and his 10 escorts. Appellants and their co-
184500 11 September 2012 accused opened fire and rained bullets upon the yellow pick-up
vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his 10 security escorts using high-
powered firearms when they passed through the shed where they
assembled themselves in a diamond position to carry out the
ambush.
of double murder with multiple frustated murder and double at
Crime charged –
RTC – guilty of the complex crime tempted murder.
CA – affirmed RTC

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 SC – guilty of 2 counts of Murder and 7 counts of Attempted Murder

Issue: WON the conviction of appellants must be for the complex

crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder.

Ruling: NO. It should not be complexed. The SC ruled that accused

are guilty for 2 counts of murder and 7 counts of Attempted Murder
because the resulting 2 or more grave or less grave felonies did not
result from a single discharge of firearms but from different firearms
fired by different people aiming each particular moment at different
persons.

Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective

firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime.

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a

single act but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of
the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply
for it speaks only of a "single act."

People vs. Tabaco GR

100382 19 March 1997 Facts: Mayor and 3 peace officers died in the cockpit arena alleging
to be caused by a single burst of gunshots.

Crime charged -
RTC – Single penalty of RP because it should be complexed under Art.
48.
SC – Tobaco is guilty of 4 separate counts of murder and the complex
crime of Homicide with Frustrated Homicide

Issue: WON a single penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for all 4 murder

cases should be imposed.

Ruling:
NO. There are 4 distinct and separate crimes of murder committed
by Tobaco because there are in fact separate bullets that caused
their deaths. The Court stated that the RTC was in error in imposing
only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases.
The RTC holding that a complex crime was committed since "the
evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single
shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning
continuous, does not hold water.

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not

applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were

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 killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the
two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by
the accused of one single act as provided for by said article. Although
it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a
short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into
consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries
inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot
fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as
many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced
the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses
successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each
person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate
crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that
five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking
there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion
offenses.

People vs. Punzalan GR

199892 10 December 2012 Several seaman were drinking in a videoke bar when accused
Punzalan got into a fight with SN1 Basoca. To avoid aggravating the
conflict, they allwent back to their camp in NETC (Naval Education
and Training Command). However, Punzalan followed them there
and hit the group of navy personnel from behind and sped away
resulting to the death of SN1 Anda and Duclayna and injuries to the
rest of the rest of the group.

Crime charged – Complex crime of Double Murder qualified by

treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle.
RTC – Guilty of double murder with multiple attempted murder
CA – Affirmed RTC
SC – guilty of Complex crime of Double Murder with multiple
Attempted Murder.

WON Punzalan is guilty of the complex crime of murder with

frustrated murder.

NO. Only guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple

attempted murder.

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy

personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator,
swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy
personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at
the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa,
SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. The crimes of murder and

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 attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an
afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death)
for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an
afflictive penalty.

Batulanon vs. People GR Leonila Batulanon was employed as a Cashier/Manager of Polomolo

139857 15 September 2006 Cooperative. She took advantage of her position and forged 4 loan
checks by using 4 individual members to make it seem as if they
received a loan when in fact she would release the money to herself.

Crime charged – 4 counts of Estafa through falsification of

commercial documents
RTC – Guilty of the crime charged
CA – 4 counts of Falsification of private documents – indeterminate
penalty
SC – 3 counts of Falsification of Private Docs and 1 count of Etafa as
to loan taken in the name of Leonila’s 4 year old son Dennis.

Ruling:
Since the falsification of the loan checks/vouchers were material to
the commission of estafa, then the CA correctly held Appellant guilty
of Falsification of Private Documents for 3 of the Charges. For the 4th
Loan, which was taken in the name of her 3-year old son, Dennis,
there could not have been any falsification as the voucher was signed
in her name on behalf of her son.

People vs. Salvilla GR 86163

26 April 1990

Santiago vs. Garchitorena

GR L-109266 02 December
1993
People vs. Mallari GR L-
58886 13 December 1988

Moreno vs. COMELEC GR

168550 10 August 2006
Colinares vs. People GR
182748 13 December 2011

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