21. People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Martinada et. al.

G.R. Nos. L-66401-03

February 13, 1991

FACTS:

On the midnight of February 13, 1982, Segundina Naboya was awakened

by the barking of their dog and her husband Alejandro, herein victim,
descended from their house after having been awakened by a gun report. At
the same time, Pascual Naboya, brother of Alejandro Naboya who was residing
about 50 meters away from the latter's house, also heard the barking of the
dog then he heard a gun burst which made him walk towards Alejandro's
house armed with a bolo. After such, he heard a second shot and then saw
Alejandro already lying on the ground; that the victim was hit at the neck.

Segundina and Pascual Naboya recognized the assailants, Bonifacio

Mesias and Francisco Martinada. After Alejandro was shot, appellant
Martinada untied the carabao and the latter and his companions took the
carabao away. The victim's wound required seven to nine days to heal.

Three separate informations were charged against the assailants, (a)

qualified theft of large cattle or cattle rustling; (b) illegal possession of firearms
and (c) frustrated murder.

Section 8 of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of

1974, provides, to wit:

Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of

cattle rustling as herein defined shall, irrespective of
the value of the large cattle involved, be punished
by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period of the offense is
committed without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. If the offense
is committed with violence against or intimidation of
person or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously
injured or killed as a result or on the occasion of the
 commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed. . . .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused still be charged of frustrated murder and qualified
theft of cattle rustling?

HELD:

NO, the crime of frustrated murder is already absorbed in the crime of

cattle rustling, thereby the latter being the qualifying aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the trial court could no longer convict separately accused
Martinada and Mesias of the crime of Frustrated Murder, otherwise there
would be double jeopardy.

However, graduation of penalties as determined by the presence of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances still applies.

P.D. No 533, in the context of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads, to wit:

Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. —

Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.

P.D. No. 553 merely modified the penalties provided for qualified theft of

large cattle under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing stiffer
penalties thereon under special circumstances. In other words, P.D. No. 553,
served only the purpose of amending Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Hence, the accused need not be charged of frustrated murder as it was

already absorbed in the crime of cattle rustling.
People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397)

Facts:

On September 3, 1992, four men identified to be Daniel Mendoza Cerbito,

Vicente Mendoza Acedera, Jimboy Cerbito Morales, and John Doe boarded a Philippine
Rabbit Bus at Eurobake. Daniel Cerbito, armed with a gun, announced the hold-up.
The four armed men proceeded to seize the passengers of their money and belongings.
A passenger, who happened to be a policeman, was shot by one of the accused and,
as a consequence, died.

The Trial Court found the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 532 and of homicide.
It was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of violation of the Anti-Highway Robbery
Law?

Decision:

The Court ruled that accused are guilty of highway robbery/brigandage under
Section 2(e) of P.D. 532. As defined by law, brigandage is the taking of the property of
another using violence against or intimidation of persons or other unlawful means. It is
committed by any person against another on any Philippine Highway. It must also be
directed against any prospective victims and not only against specific victims. In this
case, the elements of highway robbery were proven and present thus the accused are
guilty of violation of P.D. 532.
People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656)

Facts:

On May 10, 1994, Gregorio and Lilia Tactacan were on board their passenger
jeepney on their way to San Roque, Batangas from San Miguel, Batangas.  Two
unidentified men climbed their vehicle.  One pointed a revolver at Gregorio and the
other a balisong on Lilia's neck.  They were asked to pull over.  Once they pulled over, 2
more persons, one identified as Armando Reanzares, approached the vehicle. 
Gregorio was gagged and blindfolded by one of the culprits.  His hands and feet were
tied and his Seiko watch was taken.  While the vehicle was driven by one of the
accused, he heard his wife beg for mercy and cry in pain.  After which, he was told not
to move, then the culprits left.  He untied himself and ran for help.  When he returned to
the jeep, he found his wife in the passenger's seat, bloody and her bag containing their
earnings gone.

An Information for violation of P.D. 532 and another Information for violation of
R.A. 6539 were filed against Reanzares.  The Trial court found him guilty of Highway
Robbery with homicide and Reanzares appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is liable for highway robbery?

Decision:

The court held that the accused is not liable for highway robbery but of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.  For conviction under P.D. 532 to
prosper, proof that several accused organized for the purpose of committing
indiscriminate robbery must be established.  There was no proof, in this case, showing
that there was organization by several persons to commit this purpose.  There was only
the establishment of a single act of robbery which is not contemplated under the law.
 ROMEO SAYOC y AQUINO and RICARDO SANTOS y JACOB vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 157723   April 30, 2009 SECOND DIVISION TINGA, J

FACTS: In the afternoon of 4 March 1999, Elmer Jaen (Jaen) was aboard a bus when a fellow
passenger announced a hold-up. Three (3) persons then proceeded to divest the passengers of their
belongings. Under knife-point, purportedly by a man later identified as Ricardo Santos (Santos),
Jaen’s necklace was taken by Santos’ cohort Teodoro Almadin (Almadin). The third robber, Romeo
Sayoc (Sayoc), meanwhile, reportedly threatened to explode the hand grenade he was carrying if
anybody would move. After taking Jaen’s two gold rings, bracelet and watch, the trio alighted from
the bus.

PO2 Remedios Terte (police officer), who was a passenger in the same bus, ran after the
accused, upon hearing somebody shouting about a hold-up. Sayoc was found by the police officer
hiding in an "owner-type" jeep. The latter instructed Jaen to guard Sayoc while she pursued the two
robbers. Sayoc was then brought to the police station.

A few hours later, barangay officials arrived at the police station with Santos and Almadin.
They reported that the two accused were found hiding inside the house of one Alfredo Bautista but
were prevailed upon to surrender. 1avvphi1

On 25 November 1999, the RTC convicted petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No.
532, otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and sentenced them to suffer
imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They
were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P4,500.00 to the victim6

On 30 January 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Are accused guilty for violation of PD 532?

RULING: The Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
the Decision dated 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24140, finding
appellants Romeo Sayoc and Ricardo Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple highway
robbery. Appellants are hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally the amount of P4,500.00 to the
private complainant, Elmer Jaen as their civil liability, with legal interest from the filing of the
Information until fully paid. Since appellants are detention prisoners, they shall be credited with the
period of their temporary imprisonment.
 HARRY TANZO vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, MANUEL J. SALAZAR and MARIO J. SALAZAR

G.R. No. 106671 March 30, 2000 SECOND DIVISION DE LEON, JR., J

FACTS: Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and
transporting "balikbayan" boxes from California, U.S.A to Metro Manila, Philippines. Manuel J.
Salazar managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a business registered in his name
with principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias Street, Quezon City. On the other hand, Mario J. Salazar
handled the U.S. side of the forwarding business as General Manager of M.J.S. International, Inc., a
corporation with principal office at No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. Mario tried to
convince him to invest some money in the said business. Mario had allegedly represented that
petitioner's money will be held in trust and administered by both him and his brother for the exclusive
use of their forwarding and transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario promised him
a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum (10%) for one month, at the end of which,
his money plus interest earned shall be returned to him.

When petitioner returned to the Philippines, it was Manuel's turn to persuade him to part with his
money under the said investment scheme. Eventually convinced by the private respondents'
representations and assurances, petitioner agreed to invest the total amount of US $34,000.00
which he entrusted to his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in the U.S.A. Thus,
petitioner issued several personal checks made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo.Except for California
Federal Check No. 322 which was encashed by Mario himself, private respondents received the
proceeds of the above checks through Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several occasions in August 1989.

Upon the expiration of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded from Mario in the
States and Manuel in Quezon City proper accounting of his financial investment and/or the return of
his capital plus interest earned. At the outset, private respondents avoided their obligation to
petitioner by making various excuses but after persistent demands by the latter, Manuel finally
admitted that their shipments had encountered some problems with the Bureau of Customs.

When private respondents continued to ignore petitioner's demand for the return of his money, the
latter filed, on June 31, 1991, a complaint-affidavit for estafa against private respondents before the
Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor . In a resolution dated September 4, 1991 the prosecutor
dismissed the said complaint on the ground that "[t]he Quezon City Prosecutor's Office has no
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged as it was committed not in Quezon City,
Philippines."7 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the
prosecutor on the same ground.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review of the dismissal of his complaint for estafa against private
respondents with then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon. On April 10, 1992, Acting Secretary
of Justice, Eduardo G. Montenegro dismissed the said petition for reason that the incident
complained of took place in the United States, and under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our
courts have no jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the territory of the Philippines.

Dissatisfied, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above resolution. However, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioner's motion for the same ground.

ISSUE: Is Estafa present in the case?

RULING:The true nature of the contract between petitioner and private respondents was that of a
simple loan. In such a contract, the debtor promises to pay to the creditor an equal amount of money
plus interest if stipulated. It is true that private respondents failed to fulfill their promise to petitioner
to return his money plus interest at the end of one month. However, mere non-compliance of a
promise to perform a thing does not constitute deceit because it is hard to determine and infer
a priori the criminal intent to the person promising. In other words, deceit should be proved and
established by acts distinct from and independent of, the non-compliance of the promise, and this,
petitioner failed to do.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED. 1âwphi1.nêt

NO DIGEST

[G.R. No. 175700. July 5, 2010.]

SALVADOR V. REBELLION , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES , respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO , J : p

The threshold issue confronting us is whether the facts presented in this case make out a

legitimate instance of a warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender

a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed or had just been

committed.

This petition for review assails the September 26, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29248 which affirmed with modification the December 8, 2004

Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, finding

petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as

amended (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended).

Factual Antecedents

On July 31, 2000, an Information was filed charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion with

violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the accusatory portion thereof

reads:
 That on or about the 27th day of July 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong,

Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use

any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in

his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent

plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance and one (1)

piece of aluminum foil strip with trace of white crystalline substance, which were

found positive [for] Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as

"shabu", a regulated drug, without the corresponding license and prescription, in

violation of the above cited law.

Contrary to law. 3

When arraigned on September 6, 2000, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-

trial, trial on the merits forthwith commenced.

At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000, PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3

Romeo Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3 Sotomayor), together with Michael Fermin and Joseph

Apologista, all members of the Mayor's Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City,

were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon two

individuals chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers introduced

themselves and then inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out

from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also
found on petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white crystalline

substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the substance was "shabu", he

confiscated the plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was later identified as

Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal Investigation

Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of the plastic
sachet weighing 0.03 gram were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or

shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive

for traces of shabu.

On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of

dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further investigated by the City

Prosecutor's Office.

Petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was merely standing in front

of a store waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill when he was suddenly accosted by the

MAC team.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer an

indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four

months of prision correccional as maximum. The trial court gave credence to the

straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and ruled that the elements of

the offense charged were duly established.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was not

committing any crime when he was arrested.

On September 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification. The

appellate court sustained the validity of the warrantless arrest of petitioner holding that

the latter was caught by the MAC team in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of

giving to Clarito a plastic sachet of shabu. The CA brushed aside the self-serving version of

petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated December 8, 2004 of the trial court is

affirmed, subject to the modification of accused-appellant's imprisonment

 sentence which should be six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, as the

minimum penalty, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision

correccional medium, as the maximum penalty.

SO ORDERED. 4

Issue

Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us raising a singular issue on:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. STaCIA

Petitioner challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest by asserting that at the time he

was apprehended, he was not committing or attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner

argues that since his arrest was illegal, the eventual search on his person was also

unlawful. Thus, the illicit items confiscated from him are inadmissible in evidence for being violative of
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Our Ruling

We sustain the appellate court in affirming petitioner's conviction by the trial court.

Petitioner's claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere in

the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his

arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped

from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the

quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over

the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the

objection is deemed waived. 5 In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a

negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived

any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of

the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause

for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free

from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. 6

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual

under any of the following circumstances: 7

Sec 5.Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person

may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b)When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to

believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to

be arrested has committed it; and

(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal

establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily

confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from

one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
 warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and he

shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.

Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was

effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The MAC team

witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing their suspicion

that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted

from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold

of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members

introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the latter

presented three strips of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a distance, PO3

Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of the plastic sachet which contains white

crystalline substance. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and

brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline

substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine

hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante

delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the

view of the arresting team. Thus, his case comes under the exception to the rule requiring a

warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the attendant search and

seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged. As correctly

pointed out by the appellate court in addressing the matter of the purportedly invalid

warrantless arrest:

In any event, the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was lawful because he

was caught by the police officers in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of

handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu". Upon seeing the exchange,

PO3 Sotomayor and PO3 Garcia approached accused-appellant and Clarito

Yanson and introduced themselves as members of the MAC. PO3 Sotomayor

confiscated from accused-appellant the plastic sachet of "shabu" while PO3

Garcia confiscated the aluminum foil strips which accused-appellant was also

holding in his other hand.

Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest

has the authority to search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate

those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense. . . . ETIDaH

Petitioner's version, on the other hand, cannot stand against the positive evidence of the

prosecution. It strains our credulity to believe his version that at the time of his arrest, he

was merely standing in front of the store waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill and
that the small plastic sachet was in fact recovered from another male individual standing

in front of him. Petitioner is thus suggesting that he was arrested for no cause at all. We

are not swayed by his account. His version of the incident is simply incredible. Moreover,

he was positively, categorically and consistently identified by the prosecution witnesses

who were shown to have no ill motive on their part in testifying against him. Consequently,

their testimonies should prevail over the alibi and denial of petitioner whose testimony is

not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 8

In fine, we defer to the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate

court, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings. Well-settled is the

rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to

great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear

showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would

substantially affect the disposition of the case. 9

The essential elements in illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the accused is in

possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such

possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess

the said drug. All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case.

We now proceed to determine the propriety of the penalty imposed upon petitioner.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted for violation of Section 16, Article III of RA

6425, as amended, for having possessed a sachet of shabu with a weight of 0.03 gram.

Section 16 provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to

four years and a fine ranging from P600.00 to P4,000.00 on any person found in

possession or use of any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription,

irrespective of the volume or amount of the drug involved. However, said Section 16 was

amended by RA 7659 1 0 which took effect on December 31, 1993. As amended, Section
16 now provides:

Section 16.Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten

million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any

regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the

provisions of Section 20 hereof.

Section 20 of RA 6425 was likewise amended by Section 17 of RA 7659 where the

imposable penalty now depends on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved. Thus, as

amended by Section 17, the pertinent provision of Section 20, Article IV of RA 6425 now

reads:

Section 17.Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as

the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under

Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article

III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of

the following quantities:

xxx xxx xxx

3.200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride

xxx xxx xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
 penalty shall range from prision correcional to reclusion perpetua depending upon

the quantity.

Thus, in People v. Tira, 1 1 we classified the penalties and graduated the same by degree

where the quantity of the shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride involved is less than

200 grams, viz.:

Under Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of

possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is

prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated

drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

less than one (1) gram to 49-25 prision correccional

grams

49.26 grams to 98-50 grams prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Following the above illustration and considering the shabu found in the possession of

the petitioner is only 0.03 gram, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision

correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellate court correctly

sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months

o f arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and one day of prision

correccional as maximum

RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, increased

the penalty for illegal possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu to an imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20 years and a fine

ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. Said law, however, not being favorable to the petitioner,
cannot be given retroactive application in this case.

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the September 26, 2006 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29248 affirming the conviction of petitioner Salvador V.

Rebellion for the unlawful possession of 0.03 gram of shabu and sentencing him to suffer

the penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and one

day of prision correccional as maximum is AFFIRMED . SAHEIc

SO ORDERED.
 NO DIGEST

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57170 November 19, 1982

KO BU LIN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-53663 November 19, 1982

LOLITA BAÑARES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Separate Decisions of the Court of Appeals are sought to be reversed through these
two appeals by certiorari files by petitioners Ko Bu Lin (in G. R. No. L-57170), and Lolita
Bañares (in G. R. No. L-53663), involving Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on
Estafa, and the doctrine of double jeopardy.

The Petitions were initially denied by the former First Division of the Court, but, on
Motions for Reconsideration filed by both petitioners, and after of both cases to the
Court en bank due to failuer to get the concurrence of five members within the Division,
the Court en banc resolved to give due course.

G. R. No. L-57170

Petitioner Ko Bu Lin was charged in Criminal Case No. 6959 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XL, mwith Estafa under the following Information:

That on or about the 5th day of May, 1970, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one Go Song Hiap in the following manner, to wit: the
said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which he made to said Go Song Hiap to the effect that he
(accused) has 23,000 bags of cement for sale of 94 pounds each in his
bodega at 1332 Tayabas, Manila, all valued at P33,500.00; that said bags
of cement are ready for delivery anytime to the buyer upon demand and
that he (accused) is willing to issue Checj No. BA--HO 345479A which has
 sufficient funds in the bank of Asia as a cover check to guaranty the
quality of cement which Go Song Hiap may encash on May 25, 1970 if the
cement is not of the standard quality, and by means of other deceits of
similar import, induced and succeeded in including the said Go Song Hiap
to deliver the sum of P33,500.00 as payment for the said 23,000 bags of
cement, which said accused received well knowing that he has no cement
and that he has no sufficient money in the bank up his cover check sums
of money, once in his possession, in spite of repeated demands made
ipon him to return the said amount of P35,500.00 or deliver the 23,000
bags of cement, he refused and failed, and still fails and refuses to do so,
and instead misappropriated, misaplied and coverted the said amount to
his personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Go
Song Hiap in the aforesaid sum of P33,500.00, Philippine currency.

After trial, the lower Court convicted petitioner of Estafa undr Article 315, 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code (by issuance of bouncing checks).

On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed conviction but penalized the accused
instead Article 315, 2(a) (thru false pretenses or similar deceits). Two Motions for
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposed the instant appeal by
Certiori.

G. R. No. L-53663

Petitioner Lolita Bañares was accused of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 1772 of the Court
of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch III, under an Information reading:

That on or about, the 2nd and 3rd week of June, 1974, in the municipality
of San Enrique, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-assorted jewelries worth
P92,100.00 on consignment basis, with the condition to return the same
within one (1) month from receipt thereof if unsold or the money value of
the same if sold, far from complying with her said obligation, with abuse of
confidence and with intent to defraud, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the proceeds thereof after said jewelries
were sold and disposed of, and in order to cover up her aforesaid unlawful
and felonious act, well knowing that she no longer had any deposit with
the banks herein below mentioned having already closed her account with
said banks issued and delivered to said Dolores Centeno the following
postdated checks drawn against the banks hereinbelow mentioned:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

 which checks, when presented for payment, wre dishonored and not paid
for the reason stated in the foregoing, to the damage and prejudice of said
Dolores Centeno in the total amount of NINIETY-TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED PESOS (P92,100.00), Philippine currency.

The Trial Court convicted here of Estafa under Article 315 2(d) after Revised Penal
Code (by issuance of bad checks) as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of estafa as so defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 4885 and as further amended by Presidential
Decree No. 818 and senteces her to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment
o Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty-two (22) years and eight (8) months of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum, to indemnify the offended party in the amout of Ninety Two
Thousand One Hundred Pesos (P92,100.00), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

On appeal, respondent Court modified the lower Court judgment and convicted her
instead of Estafa under Article 315, 1(b) (by misappropriation or conversion). The
decretal portion of that Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the appellant Lolita a Bañares GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of ESTAFA as defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of, from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prison
correccional as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P92,100.00 but without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency, and
to pay the costs.

After denial of her Motions for Reconsideration, the accused filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner Ko Bu Lin argues that when he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, he was
exposed to the jeopardy of conviction of Estafa by means of false pretenses [Art. 315,
parag. 2(a)], or by issuing a check with no f unds [ibid, parag. 2 (d)], or both; that the
Trial Court's findings appearing in the body of the judgment that "he cannot be said to
have falsely pretended or fraudulently acted in selling the 23,000 bags of cement to Go
Song Hiap" and that "Article 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to
this case" exonerated him from the charge of Estafa thru false pretenses [Art. 315, 2(a)]
and was as good as an acquittal although omitted from the dispositive portion of the
Decision; that said acquittal is final and the Appellate Court cannot therefore be justified
in reopening his acquittal; that because he never disputed said findings of the Trial
Court and concentrated his appeal on his conviction under Art. 315, 2(d), nor did the
prosecution appeal from said findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the limits of
the assigned error and the facts upon which conviction was based, thus depriving him of
his day in Court and denying him his right to due process in his appeal.

Petitioner Lolita Bañares contends that the Information charged her with two separate
and distinct offenses of Estafa: that defind and penalized under Art. 315 1(b), Revised
Penal Code, or Estafa through misappropriation, and that defined and penalized under
Art. 315, 2(d), Revised Penal Code, or Estafa issuance of bouncing checks, thereby,
she was already placed in jeopardy of being convicted of both offenses; that when the
trial Court chose to convicrt her of only the Estafa defined and penalized under Art. 315,
2(d), it necessariily "impliedly acquitted" her of Estafa under Art. 315, 1(b), Revised
Penal Code; that her siad "implied acquittal" of Estafa through misappropriation was
immediately final; that she appealed only from the judgment convicting her of Estafa
through issuance of bouncing checks, so, what was opened up for review was only the
concerning Estafa through issuance of bouncing checks; that the Court of Appeals went
beyond the limits of its power contrary to the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.

The decisive issue is whether ir not respondent Appellate Court erred in convincing
petitioner Ko Bu Lin of Estafa by means of false pretenses [Art. 315, parag. 2 (a)], and
petitioner Lolita Bañares of Estafa by misappropriation or conversion [Art. 315, parag. 1
(b)], when the Trial Courrts had allegedly "impliedly acquitted" them of the said offenses
when they were respectively found guilty of Estafa through the issuance of bouncing
checks [Art. 315, parag. 2 (d)].

It must be condeded that the elements of Estafa committed by means of the issuance of
bouncing checks [Art. 315, 2 (d)], of which petioners were convicted by the Court, are
different from the elements constituting Estafa by means of false pretenses [Art. 315, 2
(a)], of which Ko Bu Lin was convicted by the Court of Appeals, and from the elements
constituting Estafa by means of misappropriation or conversion under Article 315, 1(b),
of which Lilita Bañares was convicted by the same Appellant Court.

What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioners were convicted of

crimes charged in the informations as embraced within the allegations contained
therein. A reading of the Informations yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed
against Ko Bu Lin sufficiently charges Estafa through false protenses.So does the
Information filed against Lolita Bañares sufficiently charge Estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. There was no ambiguity in the Informations, and the
accused could adequately prepare for their defense. Petitioners having been adequate
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, petitioners could be
convicted of the said offenses, the same having been proved. Petioners have not
deprived of any constitutional right.
It is inaccurate for petitioners to contend that the Informations filed against them
exposed them to conviction for two offenses. The Informations are not duplicitous ones.
The fact is that the different means of commission have been specifically spelled out.
AS held in the case of Jurado vs. Suy Yan 1, per Makasiar, J., with almost Identical facts as in the
Ko Bu Lin case:

The allegations in the information are clear and do not charge the accused with two
offenses. As contended by the City Fiscal of Iligan City, the information accuse the
defendant of onlu one estafa committed by false pretenses under paragraph 2 of Article
315 of the Revised Penall Code, but specifficaly describes the false pretenses or
deceitful acts employed by the accused in perpetrating the offense, namely, his falsely
pretending to possess property, credit or business under sub-paragraph (a) of the
aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 315 and by post-dating a check or issuing such check in
payment of an obligation knowing that he had no sufficient funds in the bank to cover the
amount of the check, without informing the payee of such circumstances, inder sub-
paragraph (d) of the same paragraph 2 of Article 315. It is emphasized herein that sub-
paragraphs (a) and (d) of Article 315 of Revised Penal Code are two of the five false
pretenses or fraudulent acts that can be employed and were actually employed in this
case by the accused to commit the one crime of estafa charged against him in the
information.

By parity of reasoning, the same can be said in Lolita Bañares' case although separate sections, Article
315, 2(d) and Article 315, 1(b) are involved.

We reiterated the earlier jurisprudence that where an offence may be committed in any of
the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or modes
specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of
committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The
allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby defective
on the ground of multifariousness. (ibid.)

One of the earlier jurisprudence referred to is U.S. vs. Tolentino 2, which held:

It is well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be committed

in any of several modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have
been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed in any one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive
offense.

Besides, the appellants having gone to trial, without objection. on Informations they allege as charging
duplicatous offenses, they be deemed as having waived the right secured to them under Section 12, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. 3

Invocation of the constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is misplaced. When the petitioners
appealed from the sentence of the Trial Court, they waived the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and threw the whole case open of the Appellate Court, which is then called upon to render such
judgment as the law justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, 4 and whether they are
made the subject of assignments or error or not. 5 Petitioners' appeal confered upon the Appellate Court
full jurisdiction and rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 6 Also explicit in this regards is Section
11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
 Power of appellate Court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgement of the Court of
First Instance, the appellate court may reverse. affirm, or modify the judgement and
increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of
First Instancefor new trial or re-trial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)

A case in point is that of Lontoc vs. People, 7 aptly cited by the Solicitor General. In that suit, the accused
was charrged with having committed the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of a Public Document.
The Court of First Instance found him guilty only of Falsification thru Reckless Imprudence and sentenced
him to suffer 4 months and 1 day of aresto mayor. The acused appealed to the Court of Appealswhich,
after reviewing the evidence, found him guilty of the original charge of Estafa thru Falsification of a Public
Document and sentenced him to an interminate penalty of from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of prision mayor, and to pay a fine P200.00 and costs. When the case was elevated to this
Tribunal on Petition for Review on Certiorari, the main question of law involved was: "could the Court of
Appeals legally find the appellant guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of a Public Document as originally
charged against him after the lower Court had found him guilty only of against him after the lower Court
had found him guilty only of Falsification through Reckless Imprudence, thereby acquiting him of Stafa?"
This Court affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals and held:

We find that the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner of the higher
offense with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance is in accordance with the
ruling laid down by this Court in a long line of decisios, from U.S. vs. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83, to
People vs. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1, which has been embodied in statutory from in section 11 of
Rule 120 above quoted. The reason statutory form in section 11 of Rule 120 above
quoted. The reason behind this ruke when an accused appeals from the sentence of the
trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
apppellant. This rule is too well known for any lawyer to ignore. But if the numerous
cases wherein this Court has convicted the appellants of a higher offense or has
increased the penalty imposed on them by the trial court, have not benn seen by some
lawyers for accused-appellants as a red indicative of danger or risk, let the bitter
experience of the herein petitioner serve as a perpetual reminder to others to heed the
moral lesson of the proverbs with which this opinion is prefaced. 8

but modified the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals for being erroneous.

The proposition submitted by petitioner, Lolita Bañares, that the appeal to the Court of Appeals is "limited
only to the judgment or sentence of conviction and does not affect the implied acquittal, which was
immediately final", is unavailing. The power of the Appellate Court on appeal cannot be thus constricted.
Petitioner's appeal was unqualified.

... the rule is well — settled that when an accused unqualifiedly appeals from a sentence
of the trial coiurt — as did the accused in this case — he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon the render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable to the appellant or not. 9

There was no implied acquittal to speak of, only one offense of Estafa having been sufficiently charged in
each Information. The Information in the Ko Bu Lin case merely speaks of a "willingness" to issue "a
cover to guaranty the quality of the cement." While the Information in the Bañares case alleges that the
checks were issued "to cover up a felonious and unlawful act." Absent is an essential elements in Estafa
through the issuance of bouncing checks that the checks be issued in payment of an obligation. But even
if there were implied acquittal, following the Lantoc case, the pertinent excerpt from which has been
quoted hereinabove, there is no impediment to conviction by the Court of Appeals even for a higher
offense with which an accused has been charged.
For the same reason neither can petitioner, Ko Bu Lin, successfully claim that he was "denied due
process of law in hisappeal because the Court of Appeals wentr beyond the limit of his assigned errors
and the upon which his conviction under sub-section (d), paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amendedm, is predicated." As earlier stressed, whether raised in the assignments of error or
not, the entire case is open for full review. 10

In sum, respondent Court of Appeals did not err in modifying the respective judgments of the Trial Courts
by finding Ko Bu Lin guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a), and Lolita Bañares under Article 315 (1) (b),
both of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, denying petitioners' Motions for Reconsideration, both Petitions are hereby dismissed,
and the sentences of conviction respectively affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CRISANTA B. BONIFACIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R.
No. 153198, July 11, 2006]

FACTS:

On March 21, 1996, Ofelia Santos, a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of

jewelry, gave petitioner, Crisanta Bonifacio, several jewelry pieces and signed a document
acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreed to sell the items on commission basis. She
also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold items to Santos within 15
days.

Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale within the given period. She
accumulated unpaid and unreturned items on two other instances totaling P244,500. Santos
then demanded the petitioner for the payment of the amount thru a letter dated July 25, 1996.
Petitioner then gave Santos two checks amounting to P30,000 as partial payment, which was
later on bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.
Petitioner was thereafter charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) in an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the petitioner guilty for the crime of estafa under
Article 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Upon appeal, the court affirmed the RTC decision
with modification as to the penalty. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
maintaining that the element of misappropriation or conversion was not proved, thus her liability
should only be civil in nature. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure to return the pieces of jewelry already constitutes misappropriation or
conversion in the crime of estafa?

HELD:

The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. The essence of estafa under Art. 315
(1)(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the
prejudice of the owner. The words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote an act of using or
disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon.

Being bound by the agency for the sale of jewelry, the demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust and the failure of the petitioner to account for it are circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of jewelry on commission
and likewise admitted that she failed to return the items or their value on Santos’ demand.

The petition was denied by the Supreme Court and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
NO DIGEST

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 143169 : January 21, 2005]

JIMMY ANG, Petitioner, v. ELEANOR R. LUCERO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY

of JUSTICE, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR of MAKATI CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review 1 assails the 29 October 1999 Decision2 and 25 April 2000 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44778. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Jimmy Ang and affirmed the Resolutions issued by former
Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.

The Antecedents

The present controversy stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public documents filed by respondent Eleanor Lucero ("Lucero") against petitioner Jimmy Ang
("Ang") before the City Prosecution Office of Makati ("CPO Makati").

As summarized by then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Secretary of Justice")

and quoted by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision, the antecedent facts are as follows:

The record shows that complainant [Lucero], an American citizen, is a businesswoman and a
native of Pangasinan. On August 8, 1989, she entered into a memorandum of agreement with E.
Ganzon, Inc. for the purchase of Condominium Unit 1512, Makati Cinema Square Tower located
along Pasong Tamo, Makati for P2,417,655.00. As she is a resident of Guam, she appointed by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney,3 Graciano P. Catenza, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact on
November 20, 1990 to manage and administer all her businesses and properties in the
Philippines, including the condominium unit. Catenza, however, delegated his authority to the
respondent.

Complainant claims that respondent [Ang] took advantage of the trust and confidence she
reposed in him when he falsified two documents, namely: letter of authorization4 dated July 6,
1992 by making it appear that she is authorizing E. Ganzon, Inc., the condominium developer
and owner to register her condominium unit under his name; and Deed of Assignment5 dated
June 22, 1992 wherein respondent made it appear that she is transferring to him the
ownership of the condominium unit. She further claims that the falsification was made possible
when the respondent typed the authority to transfer in a blank sheet of paper containing her
signature which he previously requested for the purpose of securing permit from a government
agency in connection with her bus service business prior to her departure for Guam. Moreover,
she avers that her signature in the deed of assignment was forged by respondent. She adds that
she was not in the Philippines when the document was allegedly signed by her on June 22, 1992
and notarized before Atty. Rene B. Betita on July 1, 1992.

Through the use of the aforementioned fictitious documents, her title was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, condominium Certificate of Title No. 23578 was issued in the name of respondent by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City which title he used as a collateral to secure a loan in the
amount of P2,000,000.00 from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). When she
learned of the fraudulent transfer, she executed an affidavit of adverse claim and annotated it on
the title on March 21, 1994. The day after the thirty-day effectivity period of the adverse claim
lapsed, respondent, to add insult to injury, immediately secured an additional loan in the amount
of P700,000.00 with the same bank (RCBC) using the same property as collateral even after the
transport business he was managing for the complainant had ceased operation already.
Respondent failed to act on complainant's demands for accounting and for the reconveyance to
her of Condominium Unit No. 1512.

In his defense, respondent claims that the questioned documents were prepared with the prior
knowledge of complainant and his authority was relayed by her through the telephone. The
transfer of ownership and issuance of a new condominium title in his name were necessary since
RCBC did not want to transact business with her because of her lack of track record and her
citizenship. He avers that he had to do this since complainant failed to send money needed to
support her business projects and to pay her outstanding obligations. As a proof of her
knowledge, complainant gave him P500,000.00 on October 5, 1993 to pay the RCBC loan. To
disprove the allegation that she never appeared before a notary public, he claims that
complainant executed two (2) more documents and had them notarized after she left for Guam
which she never questioned.

xxx6 (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

The CPO Makati referred the notarized Deed of Assignment dated 22 June 1992 and
Authorization Letter dated 6 July 1992, both allegedly executed by Lucero in favor of Ang, to
the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") for verification of signature.

On 16 January 1995, the NBI submitted its report to the CPO Makati. ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

The NBI found the signature on the Deed of Assignment and Lucero's sample signatures to have
been written by "one and the same person." However, the NBI found the signature on the
Authorization Letter a "traced forgery."

After the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Edgardo C. Bautista ("Prosecutor Bautista") of

the CPO Makati issued a Resolution dated 17 April 1995 finding probable cause against Ang.
Prosecutor Bautista recommended the filing of two (2) informations, (1) for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (c) of the Revised Penal Code7 and (2) for estafa through falsification of public
document.
Ang moved for a reinvestigation. Prosecutor Wilfredo Ong of the CPO Makati reconsidered
Prosecutor Bautista's resolution of 17 April 1995 and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence.

Lucero filed a motion for reconsideration which the CPO Makati denied on 11 October 1995.

Lucero appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the Department of Justice. The Secretary of
Justice issued Letter-Resolution No. 106 Series of 1997 dated 18 February 1997 ("First
Resolution") disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, your resolution is accordingly reversed. You are hereby directed to file the
appropriate information for estafa through falsification of public document against respondent
and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.8

Ang filed a motion for reconsideration which the Secretary of Justice denied in his Letter-
Resolution dated 10 June 1997. ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

Ang filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

On 16 October 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Ang's prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals enjoined the CPO Makati from
filing the information for estafa as the Secretary of Justice directed in his First Resolution,
pending the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.

Thereafter, the CPO Makati filed a Manifestation stating that it already filed an information for
estafa against Ang in Criminal Case No. 97-697 as early as 14 May 1997. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated 18 December 1997 enjoining the Secretary of Justice
and the CPO Makati from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 97-697 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64.

On 29 October 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and affirming the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit, and the challenged Resolution No. 106 Series [of] 1997, dated February 18, 1997, and the
Letter-Resolution dated June 10, 1997 of the public respondent Secretary of the Department of
Justice are hereby AFFIRMED. The Resolution of this Court dated December 18, 1997
enjoining the respondents from proceedings (sic) with Criminal Case No. 97-697 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The said trial court is ordered to continue with the proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, this petition.

 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Special Power of Attorney ("SPA")10 which Lucero granted
to Graciano P. Catenza ("Catenza") pertains only to acts of administration and does not include
acts of strict dominion. The SPA even prohibited Catenza from transferring Lucero's titles to real
property by sale or gratuity to third persons without Lucero's prior written consent. Catenza
allegedly delegated this power to Ang.

The Court of Appeals also found that Lucero granted Ang a general and not a special power of
attorney.11 The Court of Appeals added that even assuming Lucero granted Ang a special power
of attorney to sell her Makati Cinema Square Tower Condominium Unit No. 1512 ("Property"),
it does not include the power to mortgage the Property.

Assuming further that Lucero signed a blank sheet of paper that turned out to be a Deed of
Assignment conveying to Ang all her rights and interest in the Property, such assignment was not
Lucero's real intention.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that Ang relied heavily on the NBI's finding that the signature
in the Deed of Assignment and Lucero's specimen signature were written by one and the same
person. However, Ang ignored the NBI's finding that the signature appearing in the
Authorization Letter is a "traced forgery."

The Issues

Ang seeks a reversal of the assailed decision by contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT PETITIONER CAN
ACTUALLY MORTGAGE THE PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT
CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ALREADY ESTOPPED FROM DISOWNING THE TRANSACTIONS
THAT PETITIONER ENTERED INTO IN HER BEHALF.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER OF

ATTORNEY GIVEN TO PETITIONER DID NOT GRANT HIM MORE THAN ACTS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The issue in this case is the propriety of the Secretary of Justice's finding of probable cause for
estafa.

Ang insists that there is no probable cause to hold him liable for estafa. Ang contends that
Lucero granted him the authority not only to sell but also to mortgage the Property. Ang insists
that even assuming he is not authorized to sell the Property, he is nevertheless allowed to
mortgage the Property if it is urgent and indispensable to preserve "the things under his
administration." Ang further claims that he was justified in mortgaging the Property because the
proceeds of the mortgage would be used for the needs and expenses of Lucero's business.

Ang also argues that Lucero's facsimile letter dated 29 December 1993 shows that Lucero is
estopped from questioning the transactions entered on her behalf. ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

Ang claims that Lucero knowingly and voluntarily signed the documents and blank papers to
further her business interests. Ang contends that "the nature and import of the pre-signed
documents" show that Lucero impliedly authorized Ang to execute more than acts of
administration.

Ang's contentions are untenable.

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable
cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.13 It does not call
for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits.14 As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or moral certainty.15 The complainant need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence.16

In this case, Ang calls on this Court to assume the function of a public prosecutor. Ang's
arguments are essentially evidentiary matters that must be presented and heard during the trial.
Whether Lucero granted Ang the authority to sell and mortgage the Property is a question which
requires an examination of the parties' evidence.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public
prosecutor's function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his
findings. Ang miserably failed to show the presence of any of these exceptional circumstances to
warrant an assessment of the parties' evidence presented thus far in the preliminary investigation.

Contrary to Ang's claims, Lucero sufficiently established the existence of probable cause for
estafa in this case.

First, the SPA Lucero executed in Catenza's favor is clear. Paragraph 7 of the SPA provides:
 xxx

7. To make, sign, execute and deliver contracts, documents, agreements and other writings of
whatever nature or kind, involving the administration of my business(es), with any and all third
persons, concerns or entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to my said attorney,
including agreements, whether or not they be urgent and indispensable for the preservation of my
property under his administration; Provided, however, that contracts by which ownership of
any immovable owned by me is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for valuable
consideration shall not be entered into by my said attorney-in-fact without my prior
written consent.

xxx17 (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

The provision clearly shows that Catenza is not allowed to enter into any contract for the transfer
or acquisition of Lucero's real property without her prior written approval. The same prohibition
applies to Ang. There is no showing that Catenza validly delegated his authority under the SPA
to Ang. Even assuming there was a valid delegation, Ang merely stepped into the shoes of
Catenza and could not exercise more power than what Catenza had under the SPA. Thus, the
prohibition on Catenza applied to Ang, assuming there was a valid delegation.

Second, the NBI found the signature on the Authorization Letter a traced forgery.

Third, Ang obtained a loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation ("RCBC") using the
Property as collateral. There is no showing how Ang applied the loan proceeds.

Fourth, Ang obtained an additional loan18 of P700,000 from RCBC with the Property as
collateral after Lucero annotated an adverse claim on the Property's certificate of title which was
already in Ang's name. The adverse claim clearly indicates Lucero's objection to the registration
of the title to Ang. However, Ang inexplicably ignored the adverse claim and proceeded with the
loan.

Fifth, Ang admitted that Lucero signed blank sheets of paper. Ang typed the Deed of Assignment
in one of these sheets of paper with Lucero's signature.19 Lucero, however, denies authorizing
Ang to type any deed of assignment involving the Property over her signature. Instead, Lucero
claims that Ang requested her signature to secure a permit for her bus service business.

Lastly, Ang refused to render an accounting of his alleged transactions on Lucero's behalf despite
the latter's repeated demands. If Ang merely performed his duties as Lucero's agent in connection
with the latter's businesses, then there is certainly no reason to evade Lucero's valid requests.

Considering these circumstances, there is indeed probable cause to hold Ang liable for estafa in
this case. Estafa or swindling is committed by defrauding another through any of the means
enumerated in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Article 315, paragraph 1(c), estafa is committed by taking undue advantage of the
signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any document above such signature in
blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or any third person. In this case, Ang admitted
typing the Deed of Assignment over Lucero's signature in blank. Thereafter, Ang used the Deed
of Assignment to transfer the ownership of the Property from Lucero to him. Lucero claims that
she was prejudiced by virtue of the Deed of Assignment. However, whether Ang took advantage
of Lucero's signature is a question that should be presented and resolved during the trial.

There is also probable cause that Ang committed estafa by falsification of public document. The
Deed of Assignment is a public document since it is notarized.20 Lucero claims that the Deed of
Assignment was falsified because she was out of the country when it was executed. Moreover,
though the signature in the Deed of Assignment appears to be her signature, it was not Lucero's
intention to transfer the Property to Ang.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 October 1999 and its Resolution dated 25 April 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44778. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177720 February 18, 2009

ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

“A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People

of the Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the

prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil

action deemed instituted with the criminal action.”

FACTS: Eliseo is an employee of Bankard. His job as Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor is to

convert the reports posted by Equicom Services, contracted by Bankard to encode and post credit

card transactions, from ARJ text format used by Equicom, to the Amipro format used by

Bankard. He is the only one tasked to do this job.

Bankard on the other hand is a company that issues credit cards and in acquiring credit card

receivables from commercial establishments using using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by

other banks and credit card companies. Mastercard or Visa pays Bankard for the amount Bankard

has paid the commercial establishments for the invoices it acquires. On the other hand, Mastercard

or Visa debits Bankard for the amount due to other credit card companies or banks which acquire

the invoices where the credit card used for the purchase is issued by Bankard.

One such company who issued credit cards is Solidbank. Francisco is the holder of

Solidbank credit card 5464983300051922. Solidbank reported to Bankard that the card appear to

have numerous suspicious transactions, where the amount of P663,144.56 was allegedly credited

to said account of petitioner Francisco, the credit apparently being a reversal of charges from four

establishments. Bankard conducted an investigation where it found out that upon comparison of the
original reports of Equicom with those converted by Eliseo, it was found that based on Equicom’s

original Daily Transaction Prooflist, there was a reversal of charges from Bankard Travel Services in

the amount of $5,989.60 which was credited to the credit card under the name of Eliseo, with a

conversion date of 10 August 1999. The Outgoing Interchange Transaction also reflected a reversal

of a transaction with Bankard Travel and the credit of the amount of $5,989.60 to Cardholder No.

5464983300051922 on 1 August 1999. The converted report no longer reflected the reversal of

charges. The crediting of the amount of $5,989.60 as stated in the original reports coming from

Equicom and Mastercard was deleted and replaced with the figure zero.There was also no record of

the transactions or purchases from the four establishments charged against petitioner Francisco’s

Mastercard Account No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 and AIG Visa Account No. 4009 9218 0463 3006

that may be reversed. Only those availments which have been charged against the credit cards

could be reversed, and the amount charged for such availments would then be returned and

credited to the same credit card. Since there were no original purchase transactions charged

against petitioner Francisco’s credit cards, the reversal of charges and the crediting of sums of

money to petitioner Eliseo’s credit cards appeared to be fictitious. Because of the fraudulent

scheme, Bankard was deprived of its money amounting to P663, 144.56 for the period where

Solidbank charged it, until such time the money was returned to Bankard when the transactions

were settled.

Bankard then filed a case for Estafa against Eliseo. After trial, the Regional Trial Court

convicted Eliseo and imposed on him a penalty of 2 to 6 years imprisonment. In his Motion for New

Trial/REconsideration, Eliiseo argued that he should be acquitted since it was really Solibank that

incurred damage, not Bankard. The trial court denied the motion.

On his appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA modified his penalty by increasing it from 2 to

6 years imprisonment to 20 years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals ruled that Eliseo

should be held accountable for the amount of P663,144.56, thus increasing his penalty.
 Eliseo appealed his case to the Supreme Court. In his brief, Eliseo essentially argued that

that the prosecution failed to present evidence that he was privy to the business deal between

Bankard and the credit card companies (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa). Eliso seems to be

implying that since he was not privy to the business deal between Bankard and the credit card

companies, he could not have induced Bankard to part with its money or property because of any

false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means committed by him, directed to the credit card

companies.

ISSUE: May Eliseo be convicted of Estafa, even if the private offended party is not the complainant

in the case?

RULING: “The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party

must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that

the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party.

Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons

(Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent

means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is liable for estafa under

Article 315(a), even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended

party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious

act are not intended by him”

xxx

“Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction,

abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the
institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is

sufficient.

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the

Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of

crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted

with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor

need not be filed by the “offended party” but may be filed by any competent person, unless the

offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio.