PEOPLE vs.

CAMPUHAN (329 SCRA 270, 2000)

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused guilty of attempted rape.

FACTS:

 Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four years old Crysthel Pamintuan. Campuhan was caught by child ‘s mother
on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of Corazon ‘s brother was allegedly kneeling in
front of the child with both their pants downa dn child was crying ―ayoko, ayoko‖ while Primo forced his penis into
child ‘s vagina
 On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the
extreme penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659. 6
 As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P.
Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare
Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling
small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of
Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughter’s cry,
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's
room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short
pants were down to his knees.

HELD:

 YES. Modified to attempted rape.

 Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape. Mere touching of external
genitalia considered when its an essential part of penetration not just touching in ordinary sense (People v. Orita). Labia
majora must be entered for rape to be consummated (People v. Escober)
 Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of
attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished
only for it.

 The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged,
which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of
which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years, in any of its periods.
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of
statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE (525 SCRA 306, June 21, 2001)

G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA, respondents.

TINGA, J.:

ISSUE: Whether or not the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated

FACTS:

 The case stems from an Information charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon)
with the crime of theft.
 Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club (a supermarket within SM North EDSA) by security
guard Lago. Valenzuela, wearing a Receiving Dispatching Unit ID, was seen hauling a push cart with cases of Tide
(twice) and unloading these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela then called a cab
and the two loaded the cartoons of Tide and boarded the vehicle. Lago tried to stop them by asking for a receipt, but the
two reacted by fleeing on foot, prompting Lago to fire a warning shot. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended and
4 cases of Tide Ultramatic, 1 case of Ultra 25 grams and 3 cases of detergent were recovered.
 Valenzuela and Calderon pleaded not guilty on arraignment and claimed to be innocent bystanders. According to
Calderon, he went to the said supermarket with his neighbor Rosulada to withdraw from his ATM. Due to the long
queue, they decided to buy snacks and went outside after hearing a gunshot. Suddenly, they were grabbed by a security
guard. As for Valenzuela, he and his cousin Gregorio were walking in the parking lot to ride a tricycle when they saw
Lago fire a shot. People started running and he was apprehended by Lago. During Valenzuela’s cross-examination, he
admitted that he had been employed as a “bundler” of GMS Marketing, “assigned at the supermarket” though not at
SM.
 RTC: Valenzuela and Calderon guilty of consummated theft. The RTC found credible the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the
crime.
 Only Valenzuela filed a brief with CA, causing the dismissal of Calderon’s appeal. Valenzuela argued in CA that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to
freely dispose of the articles stolen.
 CA: affirmed RTC (consummated theft). Valenzuela filed Petition for Review.

HELD:

 Consummated. Theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.” There is no frustrated theft.
 Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or
object of the damage caused by him; and
 3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and
without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
 There is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another.
It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present
the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.

 Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking
be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
 To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
 Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
 With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

 We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the
success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to
adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated
theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable
amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields
to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE vs. ENRIQUEZ (28 SCRA 103, October 23, 1997

G.R. No. 99838 October 23, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ y ROSALES and WILFREDO ROSALES y YUCOT, accused-appellants.

VITUG, J.:

ISSUE: Whether or not appellants should be held accountable for merely attempted delivery of marijuana

FACTS:

 Ernesto Enriquez y Rosales and Wilfredo Rosales y Yucot were charged with having violated Section 4,
Article II, of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended.
 Informant “Danny” told Sgt. Cerillo that a person called “Bulag” was looking for prospective buyers of
marijuana.
 This became the impetus for the buy-bust operation conducted by Sgt. Cerillo and his team of Anti-Drug
Abuse Movement officers.
 Maramot, one of the ADAM officers who posed as a buyer, executed the deal with Enriquez and Rosales.
 Right before the deal was concluded, Maramot announced that she was a policewoman and they
subsequently arrested Rosales. Enriquez was also apprehended eventually.
 Trial court charged Rosales and Enriquez with sale and delivery of marijuana and sentenced them to life
imprisonment with a fine of P30,000.
 Petitioners assailed the decision of the trial court hence this appeal.

HELD:

 In this case, the trouble appears to be that appellant Rosales incorrectly assumes to be, or gives an
impression of being, unaware of the prohibited drug involved in the questioned transaction with appellant
Enriquez; in point of fact, however, it is sufficiently shown that Rosales has known all along that the deal
between Enriquez and the poseur-buyers had only to do with marijuana.
 Appellant Rosales believes that his act of carrying the sack of marijuana is a mere attempt to deliver the
prohibited drug. In other words, the sack being still within his control, he could, he states, have easily
refused to deliver the item to the poseur-buyer. Here, he seeks to capitalize on his being supposedly still in
the subjective phase of the crime. Appellant Rosales thus submits that, if found guilty, he should only be
held accountable for attempted delivery of a prohibited drug.
 Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies, as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
 A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
 There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
 WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of 21 January 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding
appellants Ernesto Enriquez and Wilfredo Rosales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime punished by
Section 4, Article II, of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing on them the penalty of life imprisonment
and the payment of the fine of P30,000 is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
GO TAN vs. SPS. PERFECTO AND JUANITA TAN (567 SCRA 231, September 30, 2008

G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents. *

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF

SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".

FACTS:

 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution 1 dated
March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and
the RTC Resolution dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
 On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this
union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the
RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
 On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
 On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
 On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
 On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being
the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under
the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
 On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
 Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A.
No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

RULING:

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

 Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
 SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws,
shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
 ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
 Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39
of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting
that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
 In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law
referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
 In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of
the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence
of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
 Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
 Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 23
 It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

 Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is
not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the legislature.
 The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination
of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of
conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are
hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
concerned.
PEOPLE vs. MORENO (60 PHIL 712, 1934)

G.R. No. L-41036-B October 10, 1934

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN MORENO, defendant-appellant.

VICKERS, J.:

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant can be sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

FACTS:

 The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence
 The accused drove a car in a reckless manner, and in going around a curve leading to a concrete bridge, he
violently struck the railing of the bridge and crushed the left side of the car. The person who was seated on
the left side of the car received injuries from which he died the same day.
 The accused was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence and violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
(Act No. 3992). That special law has no provision regarding indemnity to heirs of the deceased and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In Articles 39 and 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
indemnity to heirs and subsidiary imprisonment are, respectively, provided.

HELD:
 Articles 39 and 100 of the Revised Penal Code are supplementary to the Motor Vehicle Law.
 In view of the fact that the Revised Motor Vehicle Law contains no provision to that effect and repeals "all
other acts, or parts of acts, contrary to the provisions of this Act."
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, effective January 1, 1932, is as follows:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
 Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable, and article 39 provides that if the convict has no property with which to meet the reparation
of the damage caused, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each
two pesos and fifty centavos, subject to the rules given in said article for the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment.
 Section 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, effective January 1, 1933, provides that no
person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway in these Islands recklessly or without reasonable
caution considering the width, traffic grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the
highway and to the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the
safety or rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.
 For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than
two years and not more than four years of imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eulogio
Pabalan in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is
affirmed.