Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees
are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
1. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object
** As expressed in the literal reading of the text
1. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Facts:
On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay
before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in
Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for
arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision
in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment of holiday pay.
Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the
Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the
provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by
authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor)
promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The
controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who
are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary
of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all
days in the month whether worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by
the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by
reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy
Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.
On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s
decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter,
instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its
employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of
the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc
dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21
February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for
reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC
issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute
the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the
Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor,
through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of
the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for
certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Held:
From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the
same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday
pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor
excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of
the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly paid by the
month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the
statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such
construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an
administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the
mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as
the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein
or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and
reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Power to construe
THECHARTEREDBANKEMPLOYEESASSOCIATION
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary ofLabor,andTHECHARTEREDBANK
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representati on of its
monthly paid employees/members, insti tuted a complaint with the Regional
Offi ce No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) against Chartered Bank, fo r the payment of ten (10) unworked legal
holidays, as well as for premium and overti me diff erenti als for worked legal
holidays from November 1, 1974.
The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered Bank Employees Associati on’s
claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Secti on 2 ,Rule IV, Book I ll of the
Integrated Rules and
Policy Instructi on No. 9, which respectively provide:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid
by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less
1
than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid
for all days in the month whether worked or not.
POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors
SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy
in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of
working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the
benefit.
Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered
definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no
certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were alreadypaid to him or not.
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment
for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. the rules implementing PD 850, this
policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid
employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less
than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January
to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if
deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur,
then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new interpretations must be
uniformly and consistently upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating Sec. 2,
Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
Held:
Yes. The Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded
h i s statutory authority granted by Arti cle 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. While it is true that the Minister
has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the statute
sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.
**a. Dura lex sed lex
Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-
BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO
T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT,
and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240
March 25, 1992
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died
intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children..
Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC
Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her
late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend
that the term “illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious
children”).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
Aguila v. CFI of Batangas
G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico Alabastro and, after his
death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the disputed property as the only surviving child of
the second marriage. The private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria
Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage and had sued for partition and damages against
the petitioner, alleging that some properties held by them pertained to the first marriage as
Juliana and her second husband had not acquired anything during their marriage.
On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court then issued a writ of execution pursuant to which the
properties held by the defendants were levied upon and sold at public auction to the plaintiffs as
the highest bidders. The defendants filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired
by the defendants in the earlier action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In
their answer, the defendants alleged res judicata as one of their affirmative defenses.
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ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner may rightfully alleged res judicata in this case.
(2) Whether or not the Court should allow reconveyance of the properties in the exercise of
its equity jurisdiction.
HELD:
(1) No since the petitioner does not seek to do away with the rule of res judicata but merely
proposes to undo a grave and serious wrong perpetuated in the name of justice. As a matter of
fact, he was not denied the opportunity to submit evidence which the due process guarantees.
Records show that he did not have the ooprtunity to be heard because of the gross ineptitude of
petitioner’s original counsel.
(3) No. The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This remedy
is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property is registered in the name of a
person not its owner. However, it cannot be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of
a court of justice determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate
proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the
question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed now through the
remedy of reconveyance.
Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant
although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. All abstract arguments based only on
equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional
appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the
mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim is "aequetas nunquam
contravenit legis.
**Inapplicability in criminal cases
People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took
no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
Facts:
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by
then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an
undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the
pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment
as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of
his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in
Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them.
An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the
accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged.
Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
Held:
The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People
v.Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the
authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official
duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col.
Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt.
Adolfo Bring as as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa
revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after
the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the
pistol in question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for
his provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4.
On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-
made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that
he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret
agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his
defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is
explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore
the accused is not exempted.
As determined through Construction
**General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
3
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits
of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said
people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you
approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose
Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the
1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and
after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved
for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission
indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s
initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but, as
worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the
Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of
the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to
be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress
can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution
which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1]
Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President;
[3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to
administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation
4
and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely
entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
** 2. Specific Rules
a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children
without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the
Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who
has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may
be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status
of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or
mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to
allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The
rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child.
Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire
these rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The
law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a
natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the
words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in
1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13,
1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation
was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
KING vs HERNAEZ
MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ETAL., respondents-
appellants.
FACTS
Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen Import Meat and Produce" Philippine Cold Stores,
Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce
and Industry)DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus(Court of First
Instance of Manila)
writ of preliminary
appeal
(RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180
No person who is not a citi zen of the Philippines, and no associati on,
partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: . ." emphasis supplied)(x)
merely to ban them from its ownership and not from its management control or operation.
5
(Anti -Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act Historical Backdrop
No.134)
which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the law s of nati onalizati on of certain
rights, f r a n c h i s e s or p r i v i l e g e s . " R e a d in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
t h e R e t a i l T r a d e L a w , t h e A n t i - Dummy Law would punish acts intended to
circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the retail business.

Itchong Case

ISSUE

Is the employment of aliens in non-control positi on in a retail establishment or

trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?

RULING

Yes, it is prohibited. Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law(X )unconsti-right of employer to
choose The nati onalizati on of an economic measure when founded on grounds of
public policy c a n n o t b e b r a n d e d a s u n j u s t , a r b i t r a r y o r o p p r e s s i v e o r
c o n t r a r y t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n because its aim is merely to further the material
progress and welfare of the citizens of a country. Indeed, in nati onalizing employment in
retail
trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but i ts sphere is merely
limited to the citi zens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities. falls within the
scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and
security and the supreme welfare of its citizens
W H E R E F O R E , t h e d e c i s i o n a p p e a l e d f r o m is r e v e r s e d . T h i s p r e l i m
i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. The
petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against appellees.

Bustamante vs. NLRC, 1996

Petitioner
Osmalik S. Bustamante, Paulino A. Bantayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, Mario D. Sumonod, and
Sabu J. Lamaran

Respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Evergreen Farms, Inc.
Ponente
Padilla, J.

Docket Number and Date of Decision

G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996
Significance of the Case
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due an employee on account
of his illegal dismissal should not be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him
elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
This case finally abandoned the “Mercury Drug” rule and “deduction of earnings elsewhere” rule
then prevailing at that time.
6
Prior to the present case, SC had applied different methods in the computation of backwages.
Backwages under RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) was given wide
discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an employee, it also had the
implied power of reducing the backpay where backpay was allowed. In the exercise of its
jurisdiction, the CIR can increase or diminish the award of backpay, depending on several
circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the employee’s employment in
other establishments during the period of illegal dismissal, or the probability that the employee
could have realized net earnings from outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to
search for outside employment.
This method caused undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases. Cases are usually
held up in the determination of whether or not the computation of the award of backwages is
correct. Mercury Drug Rule . In order prevent undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal
cases, the SC found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co vs. CIR, 1974, to rule that a fixed
amount of backwages without further qualifications should be awarded to an illegally dismissed
employee.
In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages equivalent to
three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) was made the base figure for such awards
without deduction, subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstances in favor of
the employer but subject to increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating
circumstances (e.g. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employer’s part.
On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279 of the said code
provides:
“*...+ An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed from the time his compensation
was was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement.”
The above provision nothwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the Court after the
promulgation of theMercury Drug case, and during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 was still
the Mercury Drug rule. In effect, this qualified the provision under P.D. No. 442 by limiting the
award of backwages to 3 years.
“Deduction of Earnings Elsewhere” Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on 21 March 1989, the
pertinent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows:
“*...+ An employee who unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.”
In accordance with the above provision, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full
backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Despite the amendment, however, in a subsequent case, Pines City Educational Center vs.
NLRC, 1993, the Court returned to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount
derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the
date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted from backwages.
The rationale for such ruling was that, the earning derived elsewhere by the dismissed employee
while litigating the legality of his dismissal, should be deducted from the full amount of
backwages which the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich
the employee at the expense of the employer.

Issue
Whether or not the income derived by the employee elsewhere during the period of his
illegal dismissal should be deducted from the award of backwages.
7

Ruling
Conformably with the evident legislative intent of RA 6715, backwages to be awarded to an
illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the
earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of
his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be
paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his
employee.
The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than
was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the “deduction of earnings elsewhere”
rule.
Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind RA 6715 points to “full backwages” as
meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by
the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision
calling for “full backwages” to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity
and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo
est (literally “speech is the index of intention”).
US v. Toribio
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html
Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao
described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an
Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition
contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without
a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer.
Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers
(1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food
at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer,
and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the
municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should
be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the
Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of
large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO T.
PONFERRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH
42; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; BINALBAGAN – ISABELA SUGAR
COMPANY, INC., and NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
“Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than in the sugar
industry. While it is the lowly farm worker who must toil in the field under the harshness of
conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more the fruits of production. While the planter lives
in the comfort of his palatial home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than
not defies the basic tenets of human dignity.”[1]
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the August 8, 1993 Decision[2] and January 21, 1994 Resolution[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42, [4] Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 6894 for
Declaratory Relief.
The antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and
for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing additional financial benefits to sugar
farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621.
Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross production of
150,000 piculs or more), institutionalized production sharing scheme, in the absence of any
private agreement between the planters and farm workers, depending on the mill’s total
production for each immediately preceding crop year; and specifically providing that any increase
in the planters’ share shall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to
the planter and 60% to the farm workers.[6]
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as amended, charged a lien of P2.00 per picul
on all sugar produced, to be pooled into a fund for subsequent distribution as bonuses to sugar
workers.[8]
Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the social amelioration
program in the sugar industry:
8
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; and respondent BISCOM, to continue implementing R.A. No.809 per recommendation of the Sugar
2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (In milling districts where the annual gross production is Tripartite Council.
less than 150,000 piculs) Consequently, the petitioner, Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc. (PASON), an
On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposed a lien of P5.00 per picul on the organization of sugar farm plantation owners milling with private respondent BISCOM, filed with
gross production of sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, with an automatic additional lien the respondent court a Petition for Declaratory Relief against the implementation of the said D.O.
of P1.00 for every two (2) years for the succeeding ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act No. 2. It theorized that in view of the substitution of benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982,
subject to the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and upon recommendation of whatever monetary rewards previously granted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No. 809
the Sugar Tripartite Council.[9] and
Directly addressing the effect of the new P5.00 per picul lien vis-à-vis the two previously existing P.D. No. 621 were deemed totally abrogated and/or superseded.[14]
laws, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, provides: On August 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with the assailed Decision; the dispositive
“Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. - All liens and other portion of which held:
forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar industry under Republic Act No. “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares:
809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under 1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits
this Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies under RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at the time
at the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be affected thereby. of the effectivity of RA 6982; and
In connection therewith, Section 14 of the same Act further states: 2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling district shall continue to enjoy the benefits
“Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof notwithstanding, under RA 809 in addition to the benefits that will henceforth be provided for by RA 6982 now being
nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed implemented by private respondent.
by the workers at the time of the enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary SO ORDERED.”[15]
under this Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.” With the denial of its motion to reconsider the aforesaid Decision, petitioner found its way to this
Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) is engaged in the business of, Court via the present petition.
among others, milling raw sugar cane of various sugar plantations in their milling district. For the The petition is not visited by merit.
crop year 1991–1992, the sugar farm workers’ share in BISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 amounted From a cursory reading of Section 12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the inevitable conclusion would be that
to P30, 590,086.92.[10] the benefits under R.A. No.809 and P.D. No. 621 have been superseded by those granted under
Under P.D. No.621, the workers’ benefit for the same crop year amounted to P2,233,285.26, the new law. This substitution, however, appears to be qualified by Section 14 [17] which disallows
computed as follows: substitution if its effect would be to diminish or reduce whatever financial benefits the sugar farm
Gross production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46 workers are receiving under existing laws at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6289.
(In Piculs) How then should Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982 be interpreted in light of the qualification under
Less: 30% BISCOM Share 478,555.33 Section 14 of the same Act?
70% Planter Share 2,116,626.13 Petitioner insists that the word “substitution” in Section 12 should be taken in its literal sense
Multiplied by P2.00 lien x P2.00 considering that the intention of Congress to effect a substitution of benefits is clear and
TOTAL P2,233,258.26[11] unequivocal. Under this interpretation of “unqualified substitution”, the sugar farm workers in
But considering that the P2.00 lien under P.D. No.621 is obviously lesser than the P5.00 lien under the subject milling district will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, as against
R.A. No.6982, the same was no longer imposed by BISCOM pursuant to R.A. No.6982. the P32,823,345.18 to which the workers were entitled under P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809.
Hence, before R.A. No.6982 took effect, the total farm workers’ benefit was: So also, invoking the Opinion[18] “It is believed that the benefits conferred upon labor by RA 809
Under R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92 have been superseded by those granted to it under RA 6982. This conclusion is inescapable from
Under P.D. No. 621 2,233,258.16 a reading of Section 12 of the latter law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the
P32,823,345.18 production-sharing scheme decreed in RA 809 cannot remain in force upon the effectivity of the
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No.6982, the total workers’ benefit in BISCOM’s milling district was new production-sharing procedure prescribed in RA 6982; otherwise, sugar workers would be
computed as follows: receiving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously.
Gross Production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46 The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 by RA 6982 is qualified by
(In Piculs) Section 14 of the latter. This section provides that if the effect of such substitution will be to
Less: 30% BISCOM share 478,555.34 diminish or reduce whatever monetary rewards sugar industry laborers are receiving under RA
70% Planter Share 1,116,629.12 809, then such workers shall continue to be entitled to the benefits provided in such
Multiplied by P5.00 lien x P5.00 law. Expressed otherwise the production-sharing scheme in RA 6982 does not apply to sugar
TOTAL FARMWORKERS’ BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12] industry workers in milling districts where its application would be financially disadvantageous to
Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling on the effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. them, in which case the existing production-sharing agreement based on RA 809 shall still govern.”
621, respondent Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No.2 (1992), [13] directing, inter alia, (Opinion No. 115, S. 1992 dated September 2, 1992, signed by Justice Secretary Franklin
the three milling districts in Negros Occidental, namely: SONDECO, San Carlos and herein private Drilon.)18 of the Secretary of Justice, petitioner contends, in the alternative, that the application
9
of R.A. No. 809 can be maintained but in no case should the benefits thereunder be
implemented

10
in addition to R.A. No. 6982. Applying this interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers
would amount toP30,590,086.92.
On the other hand, under the interpretation espoused by the public respondent (that the benefits
conferred by R.A. No.6982 should complement those granted by R.A. No. 809 which cannot be
superseded by the former Act since Section 14 thereof prohibits diminution of benefits), the total
worker’s benefit would be as follows:
R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
R.A. No. 6982 ,583,145.61
P36,173,232.53
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should be construed in
connection with every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole and every meaning to be
given to each word or phrase is ascertained from the context of the body of the statute.[19] Ut
magis valeat quam pereat.[20]Consequently, laws are given a reasonable construction such that
apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them,
reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.[21]
Applying the abovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore, which apparently mandates a total
substitution by R. A. No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 existing at
the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982, can not be construed apart from Section 14 which
prohibits such substitution if the effect thereof would be to reduce any benefit, interest, right or
participation enjoyed by the worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The Court finds as
untenable the interpretation of the petitioner based an unqualified substitution of the benefits
under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 by the monertary rewards conferred by R.A. No. 6982 in the
amount of P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previously enjoyed by the sugar farm
workers under the former laws.
It bears stressing that the primordial objective behind the enactment of R.A. No. 6982 was to
augment the income of sugar workers by establishing a social amelioration program in cases
where sugar farm workers had none, and at the same time, to improve whatever amelioration
schemes already existing in the sugar districts concerned.[22] In recognition of the avowed
guarantee under Section 3, Article 13 of the Constitution to uphold the right of workers to a just
share in the fruits of production, the policy of R.A. No. 6982 states:
“Section 1. Policy. – It is the policy of the State to further strengthen the rights of workers in the
sugar industry to their just share in the fruits of production by augmenting their income and,
among other schemes, institutionalizing the mechanism among the partners in the sugar
industry to enable the workers and their families to enjoy a decent living.” (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing studiedly considered, there can be no other construction that would best
promote the welfare of the sugar farm workers, than the interpretation of the public
respondent, implementing R.A. No. 6982 as a complement to R.A. No. 809.
Citing the floor deliberations of Congress,[23] petitioner insists that the non-diminution of benefits
referred to in Section 14 pertains only to pending claims of the workers at the time of the
effectivity of the Act. Stated differently, it is contended that the benefits to which the workers are
entitled under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 601 can be validly diminished by virtue of the application
of R.A. No. 6982, because the non-diminution provision in Section 14 thereof refers to pending
claims accruing under P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809, and not to the very benefits previously enjoyed
by the workers under the said laws. With this construction, from a total benefit of P32,823,345.18
conferred by R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, the sugar workers would only be entitled to a meager
amount of P5,583,145.61.
The contention is barren of sustainable merit. To limit the application of the non-diminution
principle only to pending claims would be repulsive not only to the policy of the Act but also to the
salutory provisions of the Constitution. Verily, the glaring disparity
of P27,240,199.57 between P32,823,345.18 andP5,583,145.61 would not warrant such an
interpretation. As aptly ratiocinated[24] by the respondent Court, the evolution of legislation in the
sugar industry had always had for its foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the sugar
farm worker. Hence, through the years every law or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always
provided for an increase in wages and benefits. The reason is obvious. Amidst the rapidly
changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the industry, the sugar worker can
hardly cope with his meager income to lean on.
Equally wanting of merit is the alleged double recovery under the interpretation subscribed by the
public respondent. Note that had not R.A. No. 6982 been enacted, sugar farmworkers would be
entitled to a total a share of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; whereas under
the alternative view of the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92) granted by R.A.
No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits provided by R.A. No. 6982, sugar farm workers stand to
lose the difference of P2,233,258.56, from a total of P32,823,345.18 which they were entitled
before RA 6982 took effect. Certainly, such a disadvantageous construction cannot be
countenanced, being violative of the non-diminution principle under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6982.
In view of the foregoing, the addition of the monetary rewards under R.A. No. 6982 to the
benefits granted by R.A. No. 809, is what is called for in the case under consideration. While it is
true that “addition” is different from “substitution”, the circumstances involving subject milling
districts (where the sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits both from R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniary advantage under
R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a diminution
of benefits. Therefore, the increase of monetary advantage in favor of the sugar farm workers, as
a consequence of such interpretation, is merely incidental to the application of the non-
diminution policy of R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which should be liberally construed to further
its purpose.[25]
Neither does the Court find convincing the interpretation proposed by private respondent
BISCOM. While maintaining the application of R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 (where the total
share of the workers is P32,823,345.18), and disregarding R.A. No. 6892, would be beneficial to
the sugar farm workers, to the mind of the Court, the assailed construction of the public
respondent (where the total share of the workers is P36,173,232.53), would be more in keeping
with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the living condition of workers in the sugar
industry. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
should prevail.[26]
Premises studiedly considered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, and so holds, that the
respondent Court ventured not in any judicial legislation but merely gave life to the avowed policy
of the State under Section 18, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
“Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall guarantee the rights
of workers and promote their welfare.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED; and the assailed Decision in Civil Case No. 6894, dated
August 18, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42, Bacolod City,
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Villanueva v. COMELEC Case Digest
**When literal import must yield to spirit/intent
11
Villanueva v. COMELEC
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986)
FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the
January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy
without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board
disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the
presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed
a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission
on the
grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was e
ffective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects.
HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used
to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the
substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candi
dacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even
going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law
rather than its literal reading should have
guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-
minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.
**When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to
appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of
the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional
liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men
facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred
to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which
they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that
"failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right
to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release
and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The
Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other
bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a
speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge
investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right
of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the
petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO
FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA, defendants-appellees.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Vicente A. Torres for appellant.
Emiliano D. Castellanes for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a
violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in
12
December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her
riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective
harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a
cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch
VI).chanrobles virtual law library
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to
the exact date of the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion
because they had already entered their plea.chanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds
(1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged;
(2) that there is no law punishing it, and
(3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the alleged time
The fiscal opposed the motion.
The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11,
1966. It held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe lie
circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused
tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not
allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share
based on the last normal harvest.The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The
Solicitor General argues in his brief that the information in this case alleges all the elements of the
offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263.
Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. - It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder,
without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date
set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot
furnish such and refuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the
date set for its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share
in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any
violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act
and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.
SEC. 57. Penal Provision. - Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine
of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court.....*
We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held in People vs. Adillo, L-23M,
November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the
Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and
as implemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was already in force when
the act complained of was committed. The repeal may be rationalized in this manner:
The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident
purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of
the harvests.chanrobles virtual law library
The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified
in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share
tenancy subject to certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39
is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or
part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.chanrobles virtual law library
Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre
because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389
which took effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.chanrobles
virtual law library
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the
country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold.
Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential
Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant from the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No.
316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the
promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 27. (See People
vs. Adillo, supra).chanrobles virtual law library
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing
without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished
share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-
threshing.chanrobles virtual law library
All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural
Tenancy Law with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agricultural Land Reform Code, at
least as far as ricelands are concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord,
which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the
subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of
Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of
that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping
and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.chanrobles virtual law library
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to
contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contain in the old act and not
included in the amendatory act" (Crawford, Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo
case).chanrobles virtual law library
A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently
intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising
statute is in effect a 'legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall
prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).chanrobles virtual
law library
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a
violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs.
Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S.
vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252,
254).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual law
library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
13
Endnotes:
* Appellees' contention that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the offense
because inferior courts have jurisdiction over offense in which the penalty is imprisonment for not
more than three years, or a fine of not more three thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment and that it is the Muñoz municipal court that has jurisdiction is wrong. The Court of
First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior court in mm in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of-more than two hundred
pesos (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law).
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She
then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also
in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to
manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was
still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was
elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.
In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter
in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood"
in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months
residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running
as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose
a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
**b. ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole
i. Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible; reconcile apparently
conflicting provisions
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION represented herein by Administrator AMANTE SIAPNO,
EVANGELISTA A. GARCIA, RICARDO BRIONES, CLARITA B. CASTRO, CRISTINA LOPEZ, JESUS C.
BONDOC and ROSALINA C. CARINO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to
review and set aside the decision of the Commission on Audit [1]dated February 7, 1995 in COA
Decision No. 95-108.[2]
The National Tobacco Administration (NTA, for short), under Executive Order No. 116, as amended
by Executive Order No. 245,[3] is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC, for
brevity) tasked to supervise and improve the viability of the tobacco industry in this country.
On August 9, 1989, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6758, [4] entitled “An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes.” On
October 2, 1989, pursuant to Section 23 of said law, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10) to serve as the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6758.
Pertinent records show that even prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6758, officials and
employees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year Social Amelioration Benefit equivalent to one-
14
and-a half (1 1/2) month of their basic salary. From 1989 to 1993, however, the said benefit was
reduced to one (1) month of the basic salary due to financial/budgetary constraints. In May, 1993,
the nomenclature of subject social amelioration benefit was changed to educational assistance in
order to reflect the rationale behind the same, which is to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue
graduate studies and to finance the schooling of their children.
Sometime in February, 1994, Miss Dalisay E. Aracan, Resident Auditor of NTA, issued a Notice of
Disallowance of the payment of the educational assistance for calendar year 1993, opining that
the NTA has no statutory authority to grant the incentive. In January, 1995, the same Resident
Auditor caused the disallowance of the same benefit paid in 1994, for the same reason.
On April 25, 1994, the petitioners appealed to the Commission on Audit, praying for the lifting of
the disallowance in question, pointing out that: (1) Benefits received by employees as of July 1,
1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized, pursuant to
Section 12 of R.A. 6758; (2)the benefit having been received for so many years, even prior to the
effectivity of the Salary Standardization Law of 1989, has been a vested right, on the part of the
recipients and (3) such allowance regularly granted, forms part of the total compensation package
of NTA Officers and employees, and, therefore, the disallowance thereof amounts to unathorized
diminution of pay.
On February 7, 1995, the Commission on Audit came out with its questioned Decision
the pertinent portion of which, reads:
“After a thorough evaluation, this Office believes and so holds that the disallowance of the Auditor
on the payment of the mid-year social amelioration benefits or the educational assistance benefits
is in order. It bears stress that Sec. 5.6 of CCC No. 10 (Implementing R.A. 6758) is so explicit when
it provides that:
‘Payment of other allowances/fringe benefit and all other forms of compensation granted on top
of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above
shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe
benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public Funds.’
Since the educational assistance or the mid- year social amelioration is not among those
allowances mentioned in Sub-pars. 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, the same shall be discontinued
effective November 1, 1989 and considering that NTA paid its officials/employees this type of
allowance, such payment shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.
The provision of Sec. 12 second sentence thereof as invoked by the Administrator should be read in
conjunction with the first sentence thus -
‘Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances except for representation and
transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subistence [sic] allowance of marine
officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise
specified herein as may be determined by the DBMshall be deemed included in the standardized
salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.” xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Premises considered and for lack of legal basis, the herein request of the Administrator, NTA for
the lifting of the disallowance in question, may not be given due course.” [5] [Underscoring;
supplied]
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari, filed on April 24, 1995, seeking the annulment of the said COA Decision; theorizing
that the respondent Commission on Audit erred:
I.
IN HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION /EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
BENEFIT - A BENEFIT CONTINUOUSLY BEING RECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER
NTA EMPLOYEES STARTING WAY BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE SALARY STANDARDIZATION
LAW (R.A. 6758) ON 1 JULY 1989 - IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAME LAW (R.A. 6758) OR IS
OTHERWISE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS;
II.
IN FAILING TO REALIZE AND CONSIDER THAT THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT
SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT IS CONSTITUTIVE OF DIMINUTION OF
COMPENSATION PROSCRIBED UNDER EXISTING LAWS AND IN VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION;
III.
IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED NTA
EMPLOYEES HAVE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER SAID SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL
ASSISTANCE BENEFIT AND COA’s DISALLOWANCE THEREOF IS AN ILLEGAL VIOLATION OF SUCH
RIGHT.
Petitioners raise the pivotal issues: (1) whether or not the social amelioration or educational
assistance benefit given to the individual petitioners prior to enactment of R.A. 6758 is authorized
under the law, (2) whether or not the disallowance of the said benefit is tantamount to diminution
of pay, and (3) whether or not the individual petitioners have acquired a vested right thereover.
First Issue:
Proper Interpretation of Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. 6758 in Relation to Sub-paragraphs 4.1,
5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.10, the Implementing Rules and Regulation of
R.A. 6758.
A. Sections 12 and 17 of R. A. 6758, read:
“Section 12: Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into
the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local
funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee
and shall be paid by the National Government.”
while
“Section 17. Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and
additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and
other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary
adjustment that the incumbent shall received *sic+ in the future.”
B. Section 4.1 of CCC No. 10:
4.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS
4.1 The present salary of an incumbent for purposes of this Circular shall refer to the sum
total of actual basic salary including allowances enumerated hereunder, being received as of June
30, 1989 and certified and authorized by the DBM.
4.1.1 Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA)/Bank Equity Pay (BEP) equivalent to forty percent
(40%) of basic salary or P300.00 per month, whichever is higher;
15
4.1.2 Amelioration Allowance equivalent to ten percent (10%) of basic salary or P150.00 per
month, which ever is higher;
4.1.3 COLA granted to GOCCs/GFIs covered by the Compensation and Position Classification
Plan for the regular agencies/offices of the National Government and to GOCCs/GFIs following the
Compensation and Position Classification Plan under LOImp. No. 104/CCC No. 1 and LOImp. No.
97/CCC No. 2, in the amount of P550.00 per month for those whose monthly basic salary is
P1,500.00 and below, and P500.00 for those whose monthly basic salary is P1,501.00 and above,
granted on top of the COLA/BEP mentioned in Item 4.1.1 above;
4.1.4 Stabilization Allowance; and
4.1.5 Allowance/fringe benefits converted into “Transition Allowance” pursuant to
Memorandum Order No. 177, as implemented by Corporate Budget Circular No. 15, both series of
1988.
4.2 Allowances enumerated above are deemed integrated into the basic salary for the
position effective July 1, 1989.
4.3 Transition allowance, for purposes of this circular shall mean the excess of the present
salary of the incumbent defined in Item 4.1 hereinabove, over the eighth step of the Salary Grade
to which his position is allocated.
C. Sub-Paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCC. No. 10:
5.0 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
xxx xxx xxx
5.4 The rates of the following allowances/fringe benefits which are not integrated into
the basic salary and which are allowed to be continued after June 30, 1989 shall be subject to
the condition that the grant of such benefit is covered by statutory authority.
5.4.1 Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) of incumbent of the position
authorized to receive the same at the highest amount legally authorized as of June 30, 1989 of the
level of his position within the particular GOCC/GFI;
5.4.2 Uniform and Clothing Allowance at a rate as previously authorized;
5.4.3 Hazard Pay as authorized by law;
5.4.4 Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special projects of inter-
agency undertakings;
5.4.5 Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who are
of acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization;
5.4.6 Honoraria for lecturers and resource persons/speakers;
5.4.7 Overtime Pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
5.4.8 Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence of marine officers and crew on board
GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of hospital personnel who attend
directly to patients and who by nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms;
5.4.9 Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently entitled to the same;
5.4.10 Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized for personnel
stationed abroad;
5.4.11 Night Differential of personnel on night duty;
5.4.12 Per Diems of members of governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribed in
their respective Charters;
5.4.13 Flying Pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
5.4.14 Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members/Staff of collegial bodies and
Committees; and
5.4.15 Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and local travel
outside of their official station;
5.5 Other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise Integrated into the basic salary and allowed to
be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of
the same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or
legislative issuances are as follows:
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy;
5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy;
5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
5.5.4 Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
5.5.5 Children’s Allowance;
5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
5.5.7 Meal Subsidy;
5.5.8 Longevity Pay; and
5.5.9 Teller’s Allowance.
5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on
top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above
shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe
benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.”
Petitioners maintain “that since they have been receiving the social amelioration or educational
assistance benefit before July 1, 1989, when R.A. No. 6758 took effect, and the benefit was not
integrated into their standardized salary rate, they are entitled to receive it even after the
effectivity of the said Act.”[6] They base their claim on the second sentence of Section 12 and on
Section 17 of the Salary Standardization Law which, for the sake of thoroughness and clarity of
discussion, we deem it expedient to quote again, to wit:
“Second Sentence of Section 12, R.A. 6758 - xxx. Such other additional compensation, whether in
cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized;”
xxx
“Section 17: Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and
additional compensation /fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units
and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred as
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary
adjustment that the incumbent shall received in the future.”
It is the submission of the Commission on Audit that payment of the educational assistance in
question is not authorized under Republic Act No. 6758, arguing “that the provision of Sec. 12,
second sentence thereof as invoked by the Administrator [representing the petitioner herein]
should be read in conjunction with the first sentence...;”[7] and if the entire Section 12 is further
considered in relation to sub-paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCC No. 10, respondent concluded
that the grant of subject educational assistance would have no legal basis at all.
Confusion as to the proper interpretation of Section 12 springs from two seemingly contradictory
provisions. The last clause of the first sentence of Section 12, reads:
[A]nd such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by
the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed;”
while the second sentence of Section 12 is to the following effect:
“Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents
only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be
authorized.”
Before proceeding to rule on the proper interpretation of the two provisos aforecited, the salient
features of the provision as a whole should first be pondered upon and tackled.
16
Under the first sentence of Section 12, all allowances are integrated into the prescribed salary
rates, except:
(1) representation and transportation allowances (RATA);
(2) clothing and laundry allowances;
(3) subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on board government vessels;
(4) subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
(5) hazard pay;
(6) allowance of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
(7) such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may be
determined by the DBM.
Analyzing No. 7, which is the last clause of the first sentence of Section 12, in relation to the other
benefits therein enumerated, it can be gleaned unerringly that it is a “catch-all proviso.” Further
reflection on the nature of subject fringe benefits indicates that all of them have one thing in
common - they belong to one category of privilege called allowances which are usually granted to
officials and employees of the government to defray or reimburse the expenses incurred in the
performance of their official functions. In Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on
Audit,[8] this Court rationalized that “if these allowances are consolidated with the standardized
rate, then the government official or employee will be compelled to spend his personal funds in
attending to his duties.”
The conclusion - that the enumerated fringe benefits are in the nature of allowance - finds support
in sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10.
Sub-paragraph 5.4 enumerates the allowance/fringe benefits which are not integrated into the
basic salary and which may be continued after June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the
grant of such benefit is covered by statutory authority, to wit:
(1) RATA;
(2) Uniform and Clothing allowances;
(3) Hazard pay;
(4) Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special projects or
inter- agency undertakings;
(5) Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who are
of acknowledged authorities in their fields of specialization;
(6) Honoraria for lectures and resource persons or speakers;
(7) Overtime pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
(8) Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on
board GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of hospital personnel who
attend directly to patients and who by nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms;
(9) Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently entitled to the same;
(10) Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized for personnel
stationed abroad;
(11) Night differential of personnel on night duty;
(12) Per Diems of members of the governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribed
in their respective Charters;
(13) Flying pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
(14) Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members or Staff of collegial bodies and Committees;
and
(15) Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and local travel outside of
their official station.
In addition, sub-paragraph 5.5 of the same Implementing Rules provides for the other
allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be
continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of the
same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative
issuances, as follows:
(1) Rice Subsidy;
(2) Sugar Subsidy;
(3) Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
(4) Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
(5) Children’s Allowances;
(6) Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
(7) Meal Subsidy;
(8) Longevity Pay; and
(9) Teller’s Allowance.
On the other hand, the challenged financial incentive is awarded by the government in order to
encourage the beneficiaries to pursue further studies and to help them underwrite the expenses
for the education of their children and dependents. In other words, subject benefit is in the
nature of financial assistance and not of an allowance. For the former, reimbursement is not
necessary while for the latter, reimbursement is required. Not only that, the former is basically
an incentive wage which is defined as “a bonus or other payment made to employees in addition
to guaranteed hourly wages”[9] while the latter cannot be reckoned with as abonus or additional
income, strictly speaking.
It is indeed decisively clear that the benefits mentioned in the first sentence of Section 12 and
sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 are entirely different from the benefit in dispute,
denominated as Educational Assistance. The distinction elucidated upon is material in arriving
at the correct interpretation of the two seemingly contradictory provisions of Section 12.
Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction “that the particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but thewhole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. A statute must so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible.”[10] And the rule - that statute must be construed as a whole -
requires that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized, if at all
possible.[11] It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature
is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the subject statute.[12] With these rules and the
foregoing distinction elaborated upon, it is evident that the two seemingly irreconcilable
propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the
aforesaid “catch-all proviso,” the legislative intent is just to include the fringe benefits which are in
the nature of allowances and since the benefit under controversy is not in the same category, it is
safe to hold that subject educational assistance is not one of the fringe benefits within the
contemplation of the first sentence of Section 12 but rather, of the second sentence of Section 12,
in relation to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6758, considering that (1) the recipients were incumbents
when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on July 1, 1989, (2) were, in fact, receiving the same, at the time,
and (3) such additional compensation is distinct and separate from the specific allowances above-
listed, as the former is not integrated into the standardized salary rate. Simply stated, the
challenged benefit is covered by the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, the
application of sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 being only confined to the first sentence
of Section 12, particularly the last clause thereof which amplifies the “catch-all proviso.”
Furthermore, the non-inclusion by the Department of Budget and Management of the
controverted educational assistance in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 is expected since
the term allowance does not include the questioned benefit which belongs to a
different genus. The argument that the said fringe benefit should be disallowed on the ground
17
that it is not mentioned in the Implementing Rules of the Statute is consequently fallacious. It is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that the implementing rules and regulations (CCC No. 10, in this
case) cannot amend the act of Congress (R.A. 6758). The second sentence of R.A. No. 6758
expressly provides that “such additional compensation ... being received by incumbents ... not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.” To be sure, the said
Circular cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the statute as to prohibit something
permitted and allowed by law.[13] The Circular cannot extend the law or expand its coverage as the
power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.[14]
Conformably, as mandated by the second sentence of Section 12, in relation to Section 17 of the
Republic Act under interpretation, the mid-year educational assistance should continue to be
authorized.
THE SECOND AND THE THIRD ISSUES:
That the Disallowance of the Payment of Subject Educational Assistance Constitutes Diminution of
Compensation; That the NTA Employees Have Already Acquired a Vested Right Over the Same.
Gleanable from the wordings of the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 is the
intention of Congress to prevent any diminution of the pay and benefits being received by
incumbents at the time of the enactment of the Salary Standardization Law. Verily, disallowing
any such benefit is against the spirit of the Statute and is inconsistent with the principle of equity
which “regards the spirit and not the letter...” [15] of the law. Hence, while it cannot be said that
the NTA employees have acquired a vested right over the educational assistance in dispute as it is
always subject to availability of funds,[16] nevertheless, disallowing the same, where funds are
available as in the case under consideration, would be violative of the principle of equity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED; the assailed COA Decision No. 95 - 108 is SET
ASIDE, and the disallowance in question LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL
CORPORATION,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of Land Linoan, Montevista, Davao
del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657). Private respondent’s certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per hectare for the
riceland and P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears,
however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings (“LISTASAKA”) which private
respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower “Fair Value
Acceptable to Landowner” was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the
Philippines valued private respondent’s lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the
amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be paid for the lands.
Private respondent rejected the government’s offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the
same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained
the initial valuation made by the LBP.
On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent
prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its
petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter’s Revised Rules of Procedure,
before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation of the
DARAB’s rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of
the decision of the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on October 13,
1994. Private respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of
Appeals which, in its decision[1] of October 4, 1995, set aside the order of dismissal of the
RTC. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform, filed this petition for
review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether in cases involving claims for just compensation
under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must
first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC under §57. Petitioners sustain the
affirmative proposition. They cite §50 of R.A. No. 6657 which in pertinent part provides:
§50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the Dar. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)….
and argue that the fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a
“*matter+ involving the implementation of agrarian reform” within the contemplation of this
provision. They invoke §16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that “any party who disagrees to
the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation,” as confirming their construction of §50.
The contention has no merit.
It is true that §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate “agrarian
reform matters” and exclusive original jurisdiction over “all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform,” except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is also true, however,
that §57 provides:
§57. Special jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act. the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
(1) “all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners” and
18
 (2) “the prosecution of all criminal offenses under *R.A. No. 6657+.”[2] The provisions of §50 case. In the terminology of §57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has “original and
must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as
excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases
of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in
EPZA v.
Dulay[3] and Sumulong v. Guerrero[4] we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s
Department Store v. Micaller[5] we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial
Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.
Petitioners also cite Rule II, §5 and Rule XIII, §1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure in support of
their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators may only be appealed to the
DARAB. These rules provide:
Rule II §5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review,
reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, and other dispositions of its
[regional and provincial agrarian reform adjudicators].
Rule XIII, §1. Appeal to the Board. – a) An appeal may be taken from an order or decision of the
Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, by giving or stating
a written or oral appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution,
order or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if
the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the
appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or adverse party within ten
(10) days from the taking of oral appeal.
Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies – rules of procedure cannot – it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the
DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not
satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to
the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, §11 of the new rules
provides:
§11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional
Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts.
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for
their taking.[6] Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR
makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is
held[7] and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for
the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC
acting as Special Agrarian Court.[8]This in essence is the procedure for the determination of
compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent’s case
was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the
19
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.”This principle is consistent with the
landowners.”[9] It would subvert this “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute
vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to
the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to
transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs
into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void. What
adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this
question.
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO

184861, JUNE 30, 2009

FACTS

Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Afterwards, private
respondent, together with her husband, filed a complaint against petitioner for the rescission of
an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter,
private respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of
an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on
the basis o f “prejudicial question” in Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.[
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree with private
respondent’s argument that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either
before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action and
that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that
the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case
preceded the filing of the civil case.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had.”In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term
criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal
action. Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that “a statute should be construed
not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as

20
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting
laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law
to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
“previously instituted civil action” in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of
alternative interpretations. The clause “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to
suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.
This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the principles of
statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in
order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay Region”.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since
Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…”
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake
with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those
declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of
Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1. Which agency of the government – the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region – should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,
specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of
all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA
7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on
municipal waters.The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the
LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other
hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay
region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is
the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power
of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters affecting the construction
of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush
with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift
and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4,
1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court
21
of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid
and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Gaerlan vs Catubig
Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the eight -seatCity Council
of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest number
of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan
went to the Court to challenge Catubig‘s eligibility for officeon the averment of non-age. Catubig
was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy
on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and
22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the
time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13
days. Whether his age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the
election date, or the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same.
Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held
Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant. Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of
age eligibility should be governed not by R.A.170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484
amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950;
whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years later.
R .A . 170, as amended
Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified
electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than twenty- three
years of age. xxx"
R .A .2 2 5 9
Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at least
twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified
voter.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended, has been repealed
by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259
Decision:
Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The question of whether or not a special law has
been repealed or amended by one
or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent of the Congress in enacting
the latter. The discussions on the floor of Co ngress show beyond doubt that its members
intended to amend o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof.
In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states that
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations in consistent with the provisions
of this Act, are hereby repealed.
Section 1of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the Philippines‖,
whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece
Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio,
thusshowing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act are
subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that
voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials.
Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its
charter provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are
not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body
has expressly ordained.It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -
age because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the
time he took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.
City of Manila vs Genaro Teotico
22 SCRA 267 – Civil Law - Torts and Damages – Liability of municipal corporations in certain cases
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila
when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for
damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the
city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The
CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila
assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be
liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the
charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the
accident happened in national highway.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.
22
HELD:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of
Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular
provisions of each law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability
caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from
negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general
exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to
the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a
certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision.”
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time
in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due
weight. At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if
whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s
control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions
thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road
where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of
the city’s roads, P. Burgos included.
City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes
FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary, the
franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, distribute, and sell electric current
for light, heat, and power shall be 25 of their gross receipts.
Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special
law, the province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding 50%
of 1% of the gross annul receipts.
RULING: the phrase is all-encompassing and clear that the legislature intended to withdraw all tax
exemptions enjoyed by franchise holders and this intent is made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the
Code, when it provides that unless otherwise provided in this code tax exemptions or incentives
granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, and non-
stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of
the Code.
Lagman v City of Manila (QUICO)
Lagman vs. City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) (Quico's version)
Facts:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service Commission to
operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the
transportation of passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing
business under the name and style of “Marco Transit”, began operating twelve (12) passenger
buses along his authorized line.
On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section 18,
paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled “an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and
Streets within the City of Manila, and for other purposes”, which the city mayor approved. The
pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;
“Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has
grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and
convenience, xxx”
Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control
relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the
Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact
Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the said office. In
compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.
Issue:
WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails over
Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)?
Held:
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548
and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the
provisions of the former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to amend,
modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision
which can be found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend,
regulate or control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the
occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The
power vested in the public service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to
the authority granted to the said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of
public works-----to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national
roads and streets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is
deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are
not favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general
law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C.
Lagman.
DELA CRUZ VS PARAS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that
the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed
to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84
after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads
“AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid
exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they
were deprived of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
23

HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power
by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.
Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001)
Vda De Urbano v Gsis
2001
Facts
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing loan.
Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on
the property and emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets
Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On October 16, GSIS told them to pay the
redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.
The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired Assets
Department subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an extension of 30 days to the
November date. Failure to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a public
bidding.
The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The
Gsis AAD declined.
The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000 with the GSIS real
estate department to repurchase their foreclosed property. Despite attempts from Vice Governor
Mathay to adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were
unable to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.
The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for 250,000
spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the petitioners then offered a 50,000
downpayment with the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as
earnest money. The Board informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their
offer to repurchase.
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They accepted
her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a certificate of
award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the
petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasn’t given due
consideration.
Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal
investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC
branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding?
3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
1. No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and
dispose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981
which gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the
system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in determining the terms
and condition of financial accommodations to its members with the dual purpose of making the
GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board
could exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioner’s offer to repurchase the
subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the whereas clause of PD
1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members.
With regard to the Board’s exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court also held that
repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption period imposes no such obligation on the
purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell the property since the property belongs to him (the
board as well)
The board’s denial of petitioner’s request to purchase the subject property was not based on
whim but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the petitioners to make good their
repeated offers to purchase the subject property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners
were repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD manager,
the observation was that the petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board
exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS can’t be
faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted under the petitioner’s application under
Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent can’t be annulled on such invoked “right”.
2. No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.
Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of
the assets through public bidding and only upon its failure, through a public sale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered unserviceable govt
property and not acquired assets.
SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable govt property or
those no longer needed. The house was obviously not unserviceable. And it was still used by
petitioners.
With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the “General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of
assets of government owned corporations” the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to
the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of
merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business. The Court read it in relation to Coa
circular 89-296 which provided for “Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets
of Government Agencies”, which also did not apply the public bidding disposal requirement to
merchandise or inventory held for sale in the regular course of business nor to the disposal by
24
gov’t financial institutions of foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular course of
business and not transferred to the Govt under proclamation no 50.
The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.
Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the subject
property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to
be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same
thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established
rule of law that all acts in pari material are to be taken together as if they were one law.
Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to
generate more revenue for GOCC’S through the disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look
into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent on
the disposition of acquired assets then governed the case at bar.
Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said yes,
which meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular course of business, and thus did not
offend the requirements of the said coa circulars.
3. No.
GSIS denial of petitioners’ further requests for repurchase of subject property was based on a
factual determination of the petitioners’ financial capacity and the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also,
GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving them one year to repurchase.
The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, can’t also impute bad faith on GSIS when
it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the Valmonte case, the court held that the
constitutional right to information was limited to matters of public concern to transactions
involving public interest.The sale of the property was not imbued by public interests as it was a
purely private transaction. Pets. Can’t demand to be informed of such public negotiation since
they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply with the GSIS terms of
repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.
DECLARADORVS.GUBATONG.R. No.159208,August18,2006
Facts:
A 17 years old minor was proven to have committed a crime of murder with evident
premeditation and abuse of strength of stabbing 15 times a teacher, wife of the petitioner, in
Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz but the sentenced is suspended by
the Judge automatically. A petition that the suspension of sentenced was not proper because the
minor is disqualified as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in suspending the sentence of a minor of a crime committed punishable by
death.
Held: Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
will be automatically suspended without a need for application except when the youthful offender
was disqualified on any one of the following grounds: (1) the youthful offender has once availed or
enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions, (2) to one who is convicted for an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment, (3) to one who is convicted for an offense by the
Military Tribunals. In the case at bar, the youthful offender’s crime of murder is punishable,
not the actual sentence, by death or life imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic
suspension of sentence is not applicable.
Liability
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug
National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency,
as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug
National High School and during school hours.
SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL M.
ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government & Chairman,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner,
NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional
Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA, Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII;
and MARIO VALDEZ,respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[1] to set aside
the decision (in the form of a letter) of 24 March 1995 [2] of public respondent National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due course for lack of jurisdiction the appeal and the
petition for review filed by petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman,
respectively. Challenged in the said appeal and petition for review were the decision of 15 August
1994[3] and resolution of 25 October 1994[4] of the Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional
Command (RAB 8), which affirmed their dismissal from the service.
The pleadings and annexes filed by the parties disclose the following factual and procedural
backdrop of this case:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary
Detention, and Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in
Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez.[5] The complaint was referred to the Philippine
National Police Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after conducting its own
investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and
instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision [6] finding the
petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police
service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994,[7] was issued
ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service.
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision and that
they were able to secure a copy thereof “thru their own effort and initiative” only on 13 June
1994.[8] However, they received a copy of Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994.
Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order No. 174,
[9]
petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal[10] filed with the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the
said motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
In its decision of 15 August 1994, [11] the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. In its
resolution of 25 October 1994,[12] it denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its
decision. The petitioners received a copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995.
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and
Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their “Appeal”[13]dated 5 February 1995 and “Petition for Review”[14]
dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
25
In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado,
denied due course to the petitioners’ appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction “it
appearing x x x that both the Decision and the Resolution of the Regional Appellate Board had
long become final and executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to decide
respondents’ appeal within the reglementary period of sixty (60) days.”[15] In support thereof,
the NAPOLCOM cited Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and
Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:
Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. — Failure of the Regional Appellate Board to
decide the appeal within the reglementary period shall render the decision final and executory
without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. — The decision of the Regional Appellate Board on an
appealed case shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof
by the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within said period.
A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by the
Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that the same is filed within ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1) Motion for
Reconsideration may be allowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity
because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter
alia, dismissal from office. The said provision reads:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, or removal or dismissal from office. x x x
(2) The Secretaries x x x shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. x x x In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially
appealed to the Department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case, the same shall be executory only
after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision covers PNP personnel, like the
petitioners; consequently, they should have appealed to the CSC. It also advances the view that
the instant petition should have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional Trial Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether
(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal from and petition for review of the decision and resolution of
the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.
I the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990[16] provides for the finality of disciplinary actions against
members of the PNP as follows:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. — The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the
PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional
director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the
regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision:
Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion
or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be,
shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally,
That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the
decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party
with the Secretary. (Italics supplied)
The last proviso of this section is restated in Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
provides:
Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB Decisions. — The
NAPOLCOM appellate board concerned shall decide the appealed cases within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the entire records of the case from the PNP summary dismissal authority. However,
failure of the NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to act on the appeal within said period
renders the decision final and executory without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the
respondent-appellant with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government. The decision rendered by the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing
an appealed case shall be final and executory unless a timely Motion for Reconsideration is filed
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, in which case, it shall become final and executory upon
receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the aforesaid board denying, modifying or
affirming the decision.
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal
within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed decision becomes final and executory
without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of
the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a
decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period.
This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered
within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded Finality of
Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein that explicitly bars any further appeal. Complementary
laws on discipline of government officials and employees must then be inquired into considering
that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope
and civilian in character, [17] it is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganizedDILG.[18] As such, it falls
within the definition of the civil service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.[19] For this
reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. — The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.
The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter
alia, that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the
Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of
known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32,
Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:
26
SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Commission shall have
the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees.
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department, then to the
Merit Systems Protection Board, and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only
after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262,[20] the Secretary of the DILG has the power of supervision and
control of his Department. His powers and functions thereunder are recognized and affirmed in
Section 10 of the DILG Act of 1990.[21]
In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations implementing it must be taken into account in
light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[22]
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within
sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and
executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of
theDILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may
still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada’s appeal was addressed to “the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government x x x as Chairman and Presiding Officer of the
National Police Commission,”[23] while De Guzman’s petition for review was addressed to “the
Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government and Chairman, National
Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila.”[24]
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not
have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and just because both mentioned the
Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them
within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction because
Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary action
involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine
National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases
against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. x x x
This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the
following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or
dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative
cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue, through
Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995decision denying due course to the appeal
and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of
jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and
Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOMMemorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules
suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if
the latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a
suggestion is flawed because it would allow a ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests
upon itself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner
Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a
Chairman and four Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of theDILG Act of 1990.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual and set aside
the NAPOLCOM’s decision of 24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its
reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with.[25]
II
The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the
Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner
Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of
the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, the appeal would have to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners’
claim in their Reply to the Comment of theOSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners relating to
the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision (in the form of a
letter) of the National Police Commission of 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government isDIRECTED to RESOLVE with
reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL
CABADA and SPO3RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994
and resolution of 25 October 1994 of the Regional Appellate Board, Eighth Regional Command, if
the same were filed on time.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City
of Naga, petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.
Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners.
Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents.
27
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga,
et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year following its
approval and requiring petitioners to pay to private respondents the amounts sought for in their
complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the present controversy as proper parties are
Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga,
respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the
graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of
the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to
said ordinance, private respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:
Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim
for refund of the following amounts, together with interests thereon from the date of payments:
To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing
the difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of
Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They alleged that under existing law,
Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take
effect in 1970, the year it was approved but in the next succeeding year after the year of its
approval, or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the
quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be refunded to them by
the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So private
respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084),
seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective only in the year following the year of its
approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust,
oppressive and arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund the
sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes complained of were paid and
to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further
prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were not
"compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the
said ordinance was published in accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No.
305 (Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its
passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law the City of Naga is
authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish the collection of sales taxes in
the most effective manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
private respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that the collection of
taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction; that the refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable;
that petitioners Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the City
of Naga, respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private respondents are estopped
from questioning the validity and/or constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360.
Petitioners counterclaimed for P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and
malicious filing of the claim against them, in such amount as the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the
pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on the
following stipulation of facts: That on June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted
Ordinance No. 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a
sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of Naga," which
ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto on June 25, 1970; that the
ordinance was duly posted in the designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board;
that private respondents voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but
that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer who denied the
same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360,
series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the year following the date of its approval,
that is, in 1971 and required the petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they
paid their taxes to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna,
P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from the filing of the
complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees
and the costs of the proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in the
quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No.
305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others,
provides that "Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after the 10th
day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They contend that
Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and
was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted
upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect after the 10th day following its passage on June
15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect
upon its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed
approved. According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after
receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is
deemed approved." Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his
veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the same was deemed
approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the
petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even under
Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly provides: "A tax
ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage unless the ordinance shall
provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the
fifteenth day after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as
earlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance was deemed
approved because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon its approval. Of the
two provisions invoked by petitioners to support their stand that the ordinance in question took
effect in the year of its approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that
is more relevant because it is the provision that specifically refers to effectivity of a tax
ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is deemed to have superseded Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is
concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and
enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:
28
Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.—A municipal license tax already in
existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December
of any year after the next succeeding year, but an entirely new tax may be created by any
ordinance enacted during the quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is one which
changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and
sari-sari merchants provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on
their gross sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the next
succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became
enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there really
such a conflict in the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a
municipal ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in existence and (2) an
ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax already
in existence shall be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
December of any year after the next succeeding year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior
to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence will
have to take effect in next succeeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the
taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance.
This is different from the second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax may be
created by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any
subsequent quarter. We do not find any such distinction between an ordinance which changes a
municipal license tax already in existence and an ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section
2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without
any qualification whatsoever.
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9 which reads:
Section 9 — All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory construction that a statute will
not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that
effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is
evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise itself the sole
and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be
made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation......6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-
enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari
materia. Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or
to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are
in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together.
This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to
form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the
earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter,
whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in
accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express
repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes
relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new provisions and if possible
by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every
provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject
cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative
will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more
apparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be
reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code when
the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax
already in existence. But where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an
entirely new tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales tax on
gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which
definitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly it
should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in
1971 and private respondents should be refunded of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners
on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the
corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay
RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the
instant petition.
Ramirez vs. CA
29
Issue:

30
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under
this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication”
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
“to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private
communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and
“communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the
Bill.
GARVIDA VS. SALES
n 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival
Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time
of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and the SK
elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got
76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides
that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years.
Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21
years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less
than 22 years – so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still,
technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be:
Filipino citizen;
an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent to
“less than 22 years old.” The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on
election day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have
expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as
the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the second
highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winner’s eventual
disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simply because he did not get the
majority or the plurality of votes – the electorate did not choose him. It would have been different
if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility,
this would have rendered her votes “stray”.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who
obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed
Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales’ situation – Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not SK
membership.)
The above argument can’t be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when the
SK Chairman “refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns,
dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for
more than three (3) consecutive months.” Garvida’s case is not what Section 435 contemplates.
Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being “eligible” means
being “legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen.” Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to
the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK
Chairman.
G.R. No. L-16704
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs.
31
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers
in computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay,
as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof,
petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission
in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October
7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and
employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of
the circular for lack of autho
rity on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the
President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social
Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval
of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law
should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and
an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative
body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-
members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Mataguina Integrated Wood vs. CA
FACT:
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group
Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros
Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be
transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a
complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon
the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE
guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE
appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew
her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged.
Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI
to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m 3worth of timbers. The Minister
then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the
Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing
the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI
averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued – a separate entity).
That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in
excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any factual or legal basis,
hence, a gross violation of MIWPI’s constitutional rights under the due process clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order
of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to
defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against
it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’s letter
requesting for the Execution of the Minister’s decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable
upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE and
MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for
the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution,
MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most
basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make
conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA
(Davide, Jr., 1996)
A search warrant has a lifetime of 10 days. It could be served at any time within 10 days. If its
object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day
or days until completed, provided it is within the 10 day period.
FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID),acting on information that a
huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber,
conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard. The team saw a truck loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber coming out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990,RTC Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On
32
same day, the team seized from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber,
and various species of lumber and shorts. On 4 April 1990, team returned to lumber yard and
placed under administrative seizure (owner retains physical possession of seized articles, only an
inventory is taken) the remaining lumber because Mustang Lumber failed to produce required
documents upon demand. Upon recommendation of SAID Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran
suspended Mustang Lumber¶s permit and confiscated in favor of the gov¶t the seized articles.
Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles,and questioned the validity of the
April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless seizure on April 1 is valid as it comes within
the exceptions where warrantless seizure is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April
4seizure was also valid pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang
lumber filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
a) WON the search and seizure on April 4 was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid.
(1) April 1 search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully conducted without
a search warrant. (2*) The search on April 4 was a continuation of the search on April 3 done
under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio. Under
ROC Rule 126Sec 9, a search warrant ahs a lifetime of 10 days. Hence, it could be served
at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1
day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed, provided it is still
within the 10-day period.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming RTC judgment.
Search and seizure done was valid
.CASE DIGEST BY Agee Romero***There were other issues in the case: the owner of Mustang
Lumber was charged with violation of the Forestry Reform Code. Mustang lumber movedto quash
the information on the ground that the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal
offense (subject matter of the information is³lumber´, which is neither ³timber´ nor ³other forest
product´ under Forestry Reform Code and hence, possession thereof w/o the required legal
documents is not prohibited) and to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the formal
challenge of Mustang Lumber regarding the legality of the seizure. Lengthy discussion on the
meaning of ³lumber´. But SC held that the information validly charged an offense because lumber
is included in the term ³timber´.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970General words construed generally
Facts:
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. RR
707 which states that “donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies or
corporations owned and
controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election
Code.”
The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised
Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign funds and other contributions by the
Advertising Council of the Philippines and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the
Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or
special election. Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, filed a complaint with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the both resolutions,
alleging that both are violative of Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, which
provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any
manner any elections.The prohibited active intervention of foreigners there under may consist of:
(1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election;(2) taking part in any election; and
(3) influencing in any manner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioner’s motion, declaring "that contributions by
foreigners to the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC
billboards are not made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and
that the allocation of space for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way
influence the result of the election,.....He then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said
order of the COMELEC is null and void as contrary to law or having been issued in excess of the
powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ
of preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No restraining order was issued as COMELEC itself
did not implement the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term “any elections,” “foreigner,” and “any candidate;” as well as the terms
“aid,” “take part,” and“influence,” as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code,
had other meanings
Held:
The term “any elections” definitely comprehends or applies to election of delegates
Constitutional Convention. “Foreigner,” on
the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or organized groups, as
provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the application of the
term and not limiting the prohibition to natural
persons only. “Any candidate” likewise comprehends ‘some candidates’ or ‘all candidates.’ The
terms “aid,” “to take part,” and“influence,” were also construed in their general sense with “aid”
referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen or
to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence"
means to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or
have an effect on the nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to
sway; to persuade; to affect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or
act upon physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a
mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or sway by modifications, feelings or conduct.
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different
meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general sense.
There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be
restricted or limited.
33

Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it
is expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, in
this case, “generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda” applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but the effect that all
candidates benefit from the contribution amounts to an assistance greater than the aid that may
be given to one candidate. Allowing such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a
circumvention of the laws protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the
COMELEC in the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the Revised Election Code.
The law penalizing corrupt election practices should be given a reasonable construction in the
interests of the purity of the elections. The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-
707 and 731 promulgated respectively on August 13, 1970 and September17, 1970 are therefore
declared illegal and null and void.
G.R. No. L-28360 January 27, 1983
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO C. MENOR, as Acting General Manager of the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority, and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRE-QUALIFICATION, NAWASA, defendants-
appellants.
Nicolas T. Benedicto, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Gov't. Corporate Counsel for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the requirement of a tax clearance certificate as a prerequisite for taking part in
public biddings or contracts to sell supplies to any government agency.
Judge Cloribel of the Court of First Instance of Manila in his decision dated March 1, 1967 in Civil
Case No. 66750, a mandamus case, ordered the Acting General Manager of the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and the members of the Committee on Pre-Qualification to
allow C & C Commercial Corporation to participate as a qualified bidder in the public bidding for
the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes to the Nawasa in spite of the fact that it had a
pending tax case and had no tax clearance certificate.
By virtue of that judgment, which became final because the Nawasa did not appeal, C & C
Commercial Corporation took part in the bidding. When the bids were opened on May 18, 1967, it
was found to be the lowest bidder.
In a letter dated July 25, 1967, Antonio C. Menor, the acting general manager of the Nawasa,
required C & C Commercial Corporation to submit the tax clearance certificate required in
Presidential Administrative Order No, 66 dated June 26, 1967, 63 0. G. 6391, which reads as
follows:
Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the disqualification of any
person, natural or juridical, with a pending casebefore the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs or criminal or civil case in court pending or
finally decided against him or it involving non-payment of any tax, duty or
undertaking with the Government, to participate in public biddings or in any
contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities. including government-owned or controlled corporations,
until after such case or cases are terminated in his or its favor, or unless the
Secretary of Finance shall certify that such cases are pending and not decided
without fault on the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bond for
payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices entities and instrumentalities and local governments shall
impose this condition and shall require, in addition, the latest certified copy of
BIR Letter of Confirmation Form No. 19.65-E-I and BIR tax clearance Form
No. 1761 as prerequisites to participation in any public bidding orexecution of
any contract with them. Violation of this order shall be a ground for
administrative action. (pp. 8-9, Brief for defendants-appellants).
Menor said that the requirement as to the tax clearance certificate was mandatory as held by the
Government Corporate Counsel in his Opinion No. 159, Series of 1967.
On that same date, July 25, 1967, or long after Judge Cloribel's judgment had been executed and
when he had no more jurisdiction to amend it, C & C Commercial Corporation filed a motion in
Civil Case No. 66750 wherein it prayed that the Nawasa officials be ordered to award to the said
corporation the contract for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes, that they be
restrained from awarding the contract to another bidder and that they be required to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of court. In effect, that motion was another petition
for mandamus.
Judge Cloribel in his order of August 23, 1967 granted the motion and ordered Menor and the
other Nawasa officials to award within ten days from notice the contract to C & C Commercial
Corporation as the lowest bidder. From that order, the Nawasa appealed to this Court. Judge
Cloribel approved its record on appeal in his order of November 9, 1967.
Realizing that the appeal would delay the award and that another bidder might be given the
contract, C & C Commercial Corporation filed in the lower court another petition for mandamus
dated November 21, 1967 wherein it prayed that the Nawasa Board of Directors, its Committee of
Awards and Menor, its acting general manager, be restrained from awarding the contract to
another bidder and that they be ordered to award the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation
(pp. 29-30, Rollo).
34
That case, Civil Case No. 71346, was assigned to Judge Francisco Geronimo. In his order dated
January 8, 1968, he denied the motion of C & C Commercial Corporation for a preliminary
injunction. He said that the injunction would be inimical to the public interest (p. 37, Rollo).
The Government Corporate Counsel in a manifestation dated January 15, 1968 apprised the lower
court that the Nawasa board of directors in its resolution dated January 11, 1968 awarded the
contract to Regal Trading Corporation as the "lowest complying bidder" (p. 38, Rollo).
Menor in his letter of January 16, 1968 forwarded to the President of the Philippines for
examination and review the contract entered into between the Nawasa and Regal Trading
Corporation, acting in behalf of the Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha, Ltd., for the supply of asbestos cement
pressure pipes worth $387,814.72 (p. 41, Rollo). The Presidential Economic Staff and the Office of
the President approved the contract (p. 64, Rollo).
Unable to get an injunction from Judge Geronimo, C & C Commercial Corporation sought recourse
in this Court. In its ex parte motion of January 28, 1968, it asked this Court to enjoin the
implementation of the said contract (p. 16, Rollo).
The Nawasa opposed the motion on the ground that there was nothing more to be enjoined. Its
counsel revealed in its opposition what C & C Commercial Corporation had suppressed: the fact
that after Judge Geronimo had denied its petition for injunction C & C Commercial Corporation
instituted another action (the third case) in the Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal (presided
over by Judge Pedro Navarro), docketed as Civil Case No. 10572, wherein it sought a declaration
of the nullity of the award to Regal Trading Corporation.
Judge Navarro in his order dated February 7, 1968 restrained Menor, the Nawasa, the
Committee of Awards and Regal Trading Corporation "from going through" with the said contract
and from opening the corresponding letter of credit until the injunction incident is resolved (pp.
58-59 and 80-81, Rollo).
In contrast, this Court in its resolution of March 18, 1968 denied C & C Commercial Corporation's
aforementioned motion for the issuance of an injunction. As the parties herein had already
submitted their briefs, the appeal was submitted for decision. The issue is the propriety of Judge
Cloribel's order compelling the Nawasa officials to award the said contract to C & C Commercial
Corporation.
It may be argued that the issue had become moot because the contract had already been
awarded to Regal Trading Corporation in 1968 and at this late hour it can be presumed that the
contract had been fully performed and implemented. Nevertheless, a ruling on the contentions
of C & C Commercial Corporation is necessary, according to the Government Corporate Counsel,
"if only to make the appellee-corporation stop playing around with our courts" (p. 70, Rollo). For
the guidance of the bench and bar, we have to resolve the legal issues raised by the Nawasa.
We hold that Judge Cloribel acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
his erroneous order, directing that the Nawasa officials should award the contract to C & C
Commercial Corporation. The order is erroneous and void for the following reasons:
1. The said order was an amendment of a judgment that had already been satisfied. The case was
closed and terminated. Judge Cloribel had no right and authority to issue such an order after he
had lost jurisdiction over the case. The award of the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation
was not the lis mota in the mandamus case before Judge Cloribel. It was an extraneous matter
that could not have been injected into that case nor resolved therein. What was in issue was
whether C & C Commercial Corporation should be allowed to take part in the bidding even if it had
no tax clearance certificate.
2. The Nawasa was justified in not awarding the contract- to C & C Commercial Corporation
because it had no tax clearance certificate. It had a pending tax case in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. The award to C & C Commercial Corporation would be in gross
contravention of Administrative Order No. 66.
That was the ruling in Nawasa vs. Reyes, L-28597, February 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 905, where the
bidder was also the appellee herein, C & C Commercial Corporation. It was held therein that C & C
Commercial Corporation was disqualified under the said order to take part in the bidding to
supply the Nawasa with steel pipes because it had "tremendous tax liabilities".
Under Administrative Order No. 66, the Nawasa officials would be subject to administrative
disciplinary action if they awarded the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation in spite of its
unsettled tax liabilities.
The trial court erred in holding that Administrative Order No. 66 could not be given a retroactive
effect to the bid of C & C Commercial Corporation which allegedly had been allowed to bid in prior
transactions with the Nawasa in spite of its pending tax case,
It erred because Administrative Order No. 66 (promulgated after Judge Cloribel had rendered his
decision of March 1, 1967) covers not only the bidding but also the "execution of any contract
with" the lowest bidder. In this case, at the time the said order was issued, no award had as yet
been made and when the award was to be made, the said order was already in force.
3. Moreover, it was not the ministerial duty of the Nawasa officials to award the contract to C & C
Commercial Corporation even if it was the lowest bidder, The Nawasa in its addendum No.1 to
the invitation to bid dated July 6, 1966 reserved the right "to reject the bid of any bidder" (p. 35,
Record on Appeal).
Therefore, a bidder whose bid is rejected has no cause for complaint nor a right to dispute the
award to another bidder (Esguerra & Sons vs. Aytona, 114 Phil. 1189; Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board vs. Cloribel, L-27072, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 491).
It should be noted that "advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals, and
the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears"
(Art. 1326, Civil Code). No such contrary intention appears in this case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order is reversed and set aside with costs against C & C Commercial
Corporation.
35
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur. I wish to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro Manila was
considerably delayed because contractors filed baseless suits and they were aided by judges who
should have known better.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 66750 filed by the
C & C Commercial Corporation principally against the NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court
ordered the NAWASA to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualified bidders in
the bidding for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
complaint was filed because of the imposition of a requirement by NAWASA for the bidders to
submit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes due with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as illegal. 2
Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final and executory, and in compliance
therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff corporation which thereupon
submitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could make any award of the corresponding
contract, the President of the Philippines promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying
any person, natural or juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court, pending or finally decided against him or
involving non-payment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the government, to participate in
public bidding or in any contract with the government or any of its subdivision, branches or
instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which
NAWASA refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to file a
motion praying that defendants award the contract called for to said plaintiff being the lowest
responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court ordered the defendants to award the
contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court observing in its Order dated August 23, 1967, that the
plaintiff is "the lowest bidder and practically the only one who can furnish a Filipino or local
product under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants contended that the
matter of award of the contract was not included in the Decision dated March 1, 1967; that
Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 applies to the
contract called for; and that the matter of the award of the contract in question rests on the
absolute discretion of the defendants, taking into consideration all the circumstances attendant
thereto. 5 This motion having been denied, defendants took the present recourse to have the
Order dated August 23, 1967 of th lower court set aside.
The only issues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for short) are: (1) whether or not
the award of the contract in question may be deemed to have been included in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance dated March 1, 1967, or inferred therefrom; and (2) whether or not
Administrative Order No. 66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines applies in the
instant case.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated March 1, 1967 disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
relief prayed for by ordering the defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation
to enter as among the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of
locally manufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of different sizes from
12" to 24" diameter, without costs or damages.
In accordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short) submitted its
bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have been the lowest responsible
bidder, appellee was not forthwith given the final award of the corresponding contract because,
as stated earlier, the President of the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Administrative
Order No. 66 pertinent provisions of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the disqualification
of any person, natural or juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court
pending or finally decided against him or it involving non-payment of any tax,
duty, or undertaking with the Government, to participate in public biddings
or in any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
until after such case or cases are terminated in his or its favor, or unless the
Secretary of Finance shall certify, that such cases are pending and not
decided 'without fault on the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits
bond for payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities and local governments,
shall impose this condition and shall require in addition, the latest certified
copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation Form -No. 19.65 E-I and BIR Tax Clearance
Form No. 17.61 as prerequisite to participation in any public biddings
orexecution of any contract with them. Violation of this Order shall be a
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis supplied)
What appellant Antonio C. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did was to address a letter
to appellee on July 25, 1967, requesting it to comply within ten (10) days from receipt of the letter
with the requirements of the presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proof of
said compliance. 6
On the same date, July 25, 1967, plaintiff filed a "Motion" with the court below for the issuance of
an order to compel appellants to "award the contract called for in the aforementioned bidding" in
36
its favor. To the motion, appellants filed an opposition, despite which, the lower court issued the
questioned Order of August 23, 1967.
The main contention of appellants in seeking the setting aside of the aforementioned questioned
order is that the subject thereof is not included in, or inferred from, the judgment of March 1,
1967 which merely "ordered appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified
bidders." Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already satisfied when appellants pre-qualified
the appellee and allowed it to tender its bid, and that nothing more is to be done under the
judgment.
It is at this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of judgment" comes
into play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) . . .
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of action or special proceeding,
litigation for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgement
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necesarry thereto.
Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract in question was not "so
adjudged" in the judgment of March 1, 1967 which limited its dispositive portion to adjudging
only the pre-qualification of appellee. Appellee contends otherwise and maintains that the
awarding of the contract to it is necessarily implied from and included in the order in the
judgment declaring it qualified to take part in the bidding.
I find merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel appellants to allow it to
take part in the bidding in question, appellee necessarily meant to be also awarded the
corresponding contract if its bid is found to be the lowest within the meaning of the term "lowest
bidder" under the law and jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering appellants to allow appellee to
enter its bid would be empty and meaningless if despite the fact that appellee is found to be the
"lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not made in its favor, without any valid reason to
reject any or all bids as is generally set forth in all invitations to bid. No valid reason is intimidated
by appellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No. 66, after the
judgment has become final and even already executed, at least insofar as it ordered appellants to
allow appellee to enter its bid. This is evident from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10)
days within which to comply with its provision, indicating that if the requirement thereof is
complied with by appellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the lowest bidder.
For obvious reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned requirement, for it is an
admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely
for this reason that appellee went to court and filed Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants
imposed on it (appellee) the same or similar requirements as those found in Administrative Order
No. 66, in order to have itself declared qualified to take part in the bidding. When the lower court
decided in favor of appellee by declaring it to be qualified to so take part in the public bidding in
question, the judgment must take precedence over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated
after the judgment has become final.
As may be seen, the presidential administrative order disqualified a person, natural or juridical,
who has a pending tax case, administrative or judicial, from participating in public biddings or
any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily includes the award
to him of the corresponding contract, if found to be the lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in
the bidding would be a meaningless exercise and the judgment, an empty victory for
appellee.1äwphï1.ñët The judgment has become the "law of the case," and in a true sense, the
judgment has become "property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of law.
This is exactly what Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines would do if it is
made to apply to the instant case, for while the Court, by final judgment, qualified appellee to
participate in the bidding, the Administrative Order would disqualify said party. This would be an
illegal interference on the power of the judiciary.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealed from, affirmed, if only on reliance
of the provision of Section 11, Article X of the New Constitution for reasons I have set forth at
length in Malacora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having
been submitted more than eighteen (18) months before the instant case could be decided.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur. I wish to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro Manila was
considerably delayed because contractors filed baseless suits and they were aided by judges who
should have known better.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 66750 filed by the
C & C Commercial Corporation principally against the NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court
ordered the NAWASA to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualified bidders in
the bidding for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
complaint was filed because of the imposition of a requirement by NAWASA for the bidders to
37
submit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes due with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as illegal. 2
Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final and executory, and in compliance
therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff corporation which thereupon
submitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could make any award of the corresponding contract,
the President of the Philippines promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any
person, natural or juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court, pending or finally decided against him or
involving non-payment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the government, to participate in
public bidding or in any contract with the government or any of its subdivision, branches or
instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which
NAWASA refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to file a
motion praying that defendants award the contract called for to said plaintiff being the lowest
responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court ordered the defendants to award the
contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court observing in its Order dated August 23, 1967, that the
plaintiff is "the lowest bidder and practically the only one who can furnish a Filipino or local
product under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants contended that the
matter of award of the contract was not included in the Decision dated March 1, 1967; that
Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 applies to the
contract called for; and that the matter of the award of the contract in question rests on the
absolute discretion of the defendants, taking into consideration all the circumstances attendant
thereto. 5 This motion having been denied, defendants took the present recourse to have the
Order dated August 23, 1967 of th lower court set aside.
The only issues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for short) are: (1) whether or not
the award of the contract in question may be deemed to have been included in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance dated March 1, 1967, or inferred therefrom; and (2) whether or not
Administrative Order No. 66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines applies in the
instant case.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated March 1, 1967 disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
relief prayed for by ordering the defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation
to enter as among the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of
locally manufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of different sizes from
12" to 24" diameter, without costs or damages.
In accordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short) submitted its
bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have been the lowest responsible
bidder, appellee was not forthwith given the final award of the corresponding contract because,
as stated earlier, the President of the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Administrative
Order No. 66 pertinent provisions of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the disqualification
of any person, natural or juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court
pending or finally decided against him or it involving non-payment of any tax,
duty, or undertaking with the Government, to participate in public biddings
or in any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
until after such case or cases are terminated in his or its favor, or unless the
Secretary of Finance shall certify, that such cases are pending and not
decided 'without fault on the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits
bond for payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities and local governments,
shall impose this condition and shall require in addition, the latest certified
copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation Form -No. 19.65 E-I and BIR Tax Clearance
Form No. 17.61 as prerequisite to participation in any public biddings
orexecution of any contract with them. Violation of this Order shall be a
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis supplied)
What appellant Antonio C. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did was to address a letter
to appellee on July 25, 1967, requesting it to comply within ten (10) days from receipt of the letter
with the requirements of the presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proof of
said compliance. 6
On the same date, July 25, 1967, plaintiff filed a "Motion" with the court below for the issuance of
an order to compel appellants to "award the contract called for in the aforementioned bidding" in
its favor. To the motion, appellants filed an opposition, despite which, the lower court issued the
questioned Order of August 23, 1967.
The main contention of appellants in seeking the setting aside of the aforementioned questioned
order is that the subject thereof is not included in, or inferred from, the judgment of March 1,
1967 which merely "ordered appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified
bidders." Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already satisfied when appellants pre-qualified
the appellee and allowed it to tender its bid, and that nothing more is to be done under the
judgment.
It is at this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of judgment" comes
into play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) . . .
38
 (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of action or special proceeding,
litigation for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgement
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necesarry thereto.
Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract in question was not "so
adjudged" in the judgment of March 1, 1967 which limited its dispositive portion to adjudging
only the pre-qualification of appellee. Appellee contends otherwise and maintains that the
awarding of the contract to it is necessarily implied from and included in the order in the
judgment declaring it qualified to take part in the bidding.
I find merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel appellants to allow it to
take part in the bidding in question, appellee necessarily meant to be also awarded the
corresponding contract if its bid is found to be the lowest within the meaning of the term "lowest
bidder" under the law and jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering appellants to allow appellee to
enter its bid would be empty and meaningless if despite the fact that appellee is found to be the
"lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not made in its favor, without any valid reason to
reject any or all bids as is generally set forth in all invitations to bid. No valid reason is intimidated
by appellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No. 66, after the
judgment has become final and even already executed, at least insofar as it ordered appellants to
allow appellee to enter its bid. This is evident from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10)
days within which to comply with its provision, indicating that if the requirement thereof is
complied with by appellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the lowest bidder.
For obvious reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned requirement, for it is an
admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely
for this reason that appellee went to court and filed Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants
imposed on it (appellee) the same or similar requirements as those found in Administrative Order
No. 66, in order to have itself declared qualified to take part in the bidding. When the lower court
decided in favor of appellee by declaring it to be qualified to so take part in the public bidding in
question, the judgment must take precedence over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated
after the judgment has become final.
As may be seen, the presidential administrative order disqualified a person, natural or juridical,
who has a pending tax case, administrative or judicial, from participating in public biddings or
any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily includes the award
to him of the corresponding contract, if found to be the lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in
the bidding would be a meaningless exercise and the judgment, an empty victory for appellee. The
judgment has become the "law of the case," and in a true sense, the judgment has become
"property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of law. This is exactly what
Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines would do if it is made to apply to
the instant case, for while the Court, by final judgment, qualified appellee to participate in the
bidding, the Administrative Order would disqualify said party. This would be an illegal interference
on the power of the judiciary.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealed from, affirmed, if only on reliance
of the provision of Section 11, Article X of the New Constitution for reasons I have set forth at
length in Malacora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having
been submitted more than eighteen (18) months before the instant case could be decided.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1985)Ponente: Makasiar, C.J.Topic: Delay (Art. 1169)
Facts:
April 28, 1965 - Island Savings Bank (ISB) approvedthe loan application for P80,000 of Sulpicio
Tolentino, who, asa security for the loan, also executed a real estate mortgageover his 100-ha
land. The approved loan application called for P80,000 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments
for a period of 3 years, with 12% interest.May 22, 1965 – a mere P17,000 partial release of
theloan was made by ISB, and Tolentino and his wife Editasigned a promissory note for P17,000 at
12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of execution of thecontract at semi-
annual installments of P3,459.An advance interest for the P80,000 loan covering a6-mo period
amounting to P4,800was deducted from the partial release of P17,000, but this was refunded to
Tolentinoon July 23, 1965, after being informed by ISB that there wasno fund yet available for the
release of the P63,000 balance.Aug. 13, 1965 – the Monetary Board of the CentralBank issued
Resolution No. 1049, which prohibited ISB frommaking new loans and investments, after finding
that it wassuffering liquidity problems.June 14, 1968 – the Monetary Board issuedResolution No.
967, which prohibited ISB from doing business in the Philippines, after finding that it failed to put
upthe required capital to restore its solvency.Aug. 1, 1968 – ISB, in view of non-payment of
theP17,000 covered by the promissory note, filed an applicationfor the extra-judicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgagecovering the 100-ha land; and the sheriff scheduled auction.Tolentino
filed a petition with the CFI for injunction,specific performance or rescission and damages with
preliminary injunction, alleging that since ISB failed to deliver the P63,000 remaining balance of
the loan, he is entitled tospecific performance by ordering ISB to deliver it with interestof 12% per
annum from April 28, 1965, and if said balancecannot be delivered, to rescind the real estate
mortgage.CFI issued a TRO enjoining ISB from continuingwith the foreclosure of the mortgage,
however, after findingTolentino’s petition unmeritorious, ordered the latter to payISB P17,000
plus legal interest and legal charges and liftingthe TRO so the sheriff may proceed with the
foreclosure.CA, on appeal by Tolentino, modified CFI’s decision byaffirming dismissal of
Tolentino’s petition for specific performance, but ruled that ISB can neither foreclose themortgage
nor collect the P17,000loan.
SC: The parties, in the P80,000 loan agreement,undertook reciprocal obligations, wherein
theobligation/promise of each party is the consideration for thatof the other; and when one party
has performed or is ready andwilling to perform his part of the contract, the other party whohas
not performed or is not ready and willing to performincurs in delay (Art. 1169, CC).When
Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage, hesignified his willingness to pay the P80,000 loan, and
fromsuch date, the obligation of ISB to furnish the loan accrued.Thus, ISB’s delay started on April
28, 1965 and lasted 3 yearsor when Resolution No. 967 was issued prohibiting ISB fromdoing
further
39
business
, which madit legally impossiblefrom ISB to furnish the P63,000 of the loan.Resolution No. 1049
cannot interrupt the default of ISBin complying with its obligation to release the P63,000 balance
because it merely prohibited ISB from making new loans andinvestments, not from releasing the
balance of loanagreements previously contracted.The mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an
engagementdoes not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does itconstitute any defense
to a decree of specific performance; andthe mere fact of insolvency of a debtor is never an
excuse for the nonfulfillment of an obligation, but instead, is taken as a breach of contract.The
fact that Tolentino demanded and accepted the refundof the pre-deducted interest cannot be
taken as a waiver of hisright to collect the P63,000 balance. The act of ISB in askingfor the
advance interest was improper considering that onlyP17,000 out of the P80,000 loan was
released.The alleged discovery by ISB of the overvaluation of theloan collateral cannot exempt it
from complying with itsobligation to furnish the entire P80,000 loan because bank
officials/employees have the obligation to investigate theexistence and valuation of the
properties being offered as aloan security before approving the loan application.
Issues/Held/Ratio
1)
WON the action of Tolenitno for specific performance can prosper.
NO.Since ISB was in default under the agreement, Tolentinomay choose between specific
performance or rescission, butsince ISB is now prohibited from doing further business, theonly
remedy left is Rescission only for the P63,000 balance of the loan.
2)
WON Tolentino is liable to pay the P17,000 debtcovered by the promissory note.
YES.The bank was deemed to have complied with itsreciprocal obligation to furnish a P17,000
loan. The promissory note gave rise to Tolentino’s reciprocal obligationto pay such loan when it
falls due and his failure to pay theoverdue amortizations under the promissory note made him a
party in default, hence not entitled to rescission (Art. 1191,CC). ISB has the right to rescind the
promissory note, beingthe aggrieved party.Since both parties were in default in the performance
of their reciprocal obligations, both are liable for damages. Incase both parties have committed a
breach of their reciprocalobligations, the liability of the first infractor shall be equirablytempered
by the courts (Art. 1192, CC). The liability of ISBfor damages in not furnishing the entire loan is
offset by theliability of Tolentino for damages (penalties and surcharges)for not paying his
overdue P17,000 debt. Since Tolentinoderived some benefit for his use of the P17,000, he
shouldaccount for the interest thereon (interest was not included inthe offsetting).
3)
WON Tolentino’s real estate mortgage can beforeclosed to satisfy the P17,000 if his liability to
paytherefor subsists.
NO.
The fact that when Tolentino executed his real estatemortgage, no consideration was then in
existence, as there wasno debt yet because ISB had not made any release on the loan,does not
make the real estate mortgage void for lack of consideration.It is not necessary that any
consideration should pass atthe time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage.When the
consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, thelatter can take effect only when the debt secured
by it iscreated as a binding contract to pay. And when there is partialfailure of consideration, the
mortgage becomes unenforceableto the extent of such failure. Where the indebtedness
actuallyowing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sumnamed in the mortgage, the
mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due.Since ISB failed to furnish the
P63,000 balance, the realestate mortgage of Tolentino became unenforceable to suchextent.
P63,000 is 78.75% of P80,000, hence the mortgagecovering 100 ha is unenforceable to the extent
of 78.75 ha.The mortgage covering the remainder of 21.25 ha subsists as asecurity for the P17,000
debt.Judgment:1)Tolentino is ordered to pay ISB P17,000 plus P41,210 (12% interest per
annum)2)In case Tolentino fails to pay, his real estate mortgagecovering 21.25 ha shall be
foreclosed to satisfy histotal indebtedness3)The real estate mortgage covering 78.75 ha
isunenforceable and ordered released in favor of Tolentino
Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals
Director of Lands vs. CA
276 SCRA 276
G. R. No. 102858
July 28 1997
Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title under P.
D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence his heirs
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were
substituted as applicants.
The Land Registration Court in its decision dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.”
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The trial court
dismissed the petition for the reason that the applicants failed to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case to the Supreme
Court.
40
 agreement to hold the venue in the Court of First Instance of Naga City was merely optional to
Issue: both contracting parties.
W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land registration case CFI of Pampanga decided that it is an improper venue.

mandatory or directory. Issue:

Held:
It is mandatory. The word “shall” denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for
Initial Hearing. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold
that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
Stat Con Principle: When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.
WON the venue of action was improper (CFI of Pampanga)? NO, it made use of the word “may”,
hence only directory.
Held:
It is well settled that the word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not
connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or
possibility.
The stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said
stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of
First Instance of Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without
waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where the plaintiff
resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.

Legal Maxims: Verba Legis and Dura Lex Sed Lex

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
CAPATI vs. OCAMPO
G.R. No. L-28742 April 30, 1982
Directory statute. FIRST DIVISION
It is permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way
that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner
other than that prescribed and substantially the same result can be obtained.
G.R. No. 126496 April 30,
Facts: 1997

damages. Ocampo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of
Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank for action was improperly laid. Capati (plaintiff) filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their
the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. He entered into a sub-contract with the
defendant Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City where he undertook to construct the vault
walls, exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications
indicated therein. Defendant further bound himself to complete said construction on or before
June 5, 1967. To emphasize this time frame Ocampo affixed his signature below the following
stipulation in bold letters: “TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE’ 67.”
At the back of the contract which reads:
“14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Naga.”
Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question only on June 20, 1967, plaintiff
filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential

41
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.;
ISLA
COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC.,
petitioners, vs.
BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of
the National Telecommunications, respondents.

COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION,
petitioner, vs.
BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

42
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision 1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals 2 declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter,
NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit
and act en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation
of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (hereafter,
BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to
Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and
to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority. This
application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time of the filing of this application,
private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business
of telecommunications service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in
the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service 4. Thus, only
petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of
service area assignments in April and May, 1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a
congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to
carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and
between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this
purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or wireless
telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive
systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-added
services such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile,
control signals, audio and video, information service bureau, and all other
telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be
made available through technical advances or innovations in the future, or
construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting and receiving
stations and switching stations, both for local and international services, lines,
cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently carry out
the purposes of this franchise. 5
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application 6 praying for
the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation
and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem
telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic
cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an
integrated system. This second application was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229. In this second
application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10) years using the most
modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local
exchange telephone network
Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case No. 93-
481. In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without
prejudice.
The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229
was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTel's evidence. Written
opposition and other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications
Corporation as oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel's application were
Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting
Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone
Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.
On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-
chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the
aforementioned oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence
together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application.
Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization
Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.
On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy Commissioner
Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995 7 manifesting his findings and
recommending that "based on technical documents submitted, BellTel's proposal is technically
feasible." 8
Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD,
conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of private respondent BellTel. On March
29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to support its
proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years.
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo
Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval thereto by
making the following notation on the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6,
1995:
With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application
merits due/favorable consideration. 9
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez affixed
43
their signatures and the date, "4/6/95."

44
 In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC,
the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft 10 of the order granting
provisional authority to private respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed
by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a quasi-
judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy
and the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate
and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the
Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all
orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes
the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the issuance of a
provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority 11. Reference was explicitly
made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and
Perez that were all favorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was also made of the
aforementioned working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel, which draft
was made by the Legal Department of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy commissioners.
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May 12, 1995, private
respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion 12 reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition 13 to the aforestated two motions of private respondent
BellTel.
In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead
of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a
hearing on May 29, 1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was
reset on June 13, 1995.
On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate
(Amending the Motion to Resolve) 14. In said motion, private respondent prayed for the
promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to private
respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed
by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three
commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that
the NTC was a collegial body and that as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes
by the members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.
On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition 15 to the aforecited motion.
On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated
July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a Manifestation In
Lieu of Comment 16in which the Solicitor General took a legal position adverse to that of the NTC.
The Solicitor General, after a close examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors
and a studious analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent to the issue of
collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court:
(a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as
a collegial body;
(b) restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating
unto himself alone the powers of the said agency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecom's
application under NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and]
(e) uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614. 17
On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed decision
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Petitioner's petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby
granted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex "J" of the
Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex "K" of the Petition and the
Order of Kintanar, Annex "L" of the Petition, are hereby SET ASIDE for being
contrary to law. The Respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf
45
are hereby enjoined and prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same;
[and]
2. Petitioner's petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the
Respondent NTC, composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners Perez and
Dumlao, are hereby directed to meet en banc and to consider and act on the
draft Order, Annex "B" of the Petition, within fifteen (15) days from the finality
of this Decision. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 18
The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar
and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications
Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the
application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority, they filed
with this court separate petitions for review.
Commissioner Kintanar's petition, docketed as G.R No. 126526, ascribes to the
respondent appellate court the following assignment of errors:
1. The Court of Appeals in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC 3-1-93 and the
Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995, made a collateral attack on a law
which was nowhere called for in the pleadings of the parties nor is authorized
by the Rules of Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that the Commission
is a collegial body simply by reason of the fact that other bodies which were
a spin off from the defunct Public Service Commission were created as a
collegial body. The law that created EO 546 erased the collegial character of
the proceeding before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals' decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it
considered evidence not formally offered or incorporated into the records of
the case; yet failed to consider evidence submitted by petitioner- appellant
nor on the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties.
3.1 CA erred in assuming that the NTC is collegial by the
fact that Charters of other regulatory agencies
expressly made them collegial while this express
provision was absent in NTC's charter.
3.2 CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-
614 prevails and [requires] collegiality.
3.3 The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco signed
by her and her 2 deputies are in no way indicative of
collegiality and should not be considered as having
any persuasive effect . . .
3.4 The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of
Communications Rules of Practice and Procedures.
4. The Court of Appeals erred when it granted mandamus, directing and in
effect controlling Commissioner Kintanar and deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez, to meet en banc to consider and act on a "draft Order" only which
the Court itself recognized no longer had the approval of two (2)
Commissioners while in the same token the Court of Appeals had set aside a
duly promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 allegedly because it did not carry the
approval of 2 commissioners. 19
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R No. 126496, assail the
decision of respondent appellate court on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the instant Petition outright
for its failure to implead indispensable parties, in violation of Section 5, Rule
65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of and passing
upon BellTel's Petition, which on its face is premature since the Order of July
4, 1996 assailed was not a find decision of the Commission;
3. Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of
the Petition, the disposition in Decision therein which nullifies NTC
Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 itself constitutes a collateral attack
on the said laws, the validity of which were never put in issue by any of the
parties, contrary to the clear legal requirement that the validity of laws can
be attacked only in direct proceedings instituted for that purpose;
4. It was in fact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of
NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 and Memorandum Circular No 3-1-93 since the
same was absolutely unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;
5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the prime issues
as being that of collegiality, nonetheless the Court of Appeals committed a
serious error of law in declaring the NTC as a collegial body despite the clear
intent of E.O. No. 546 and the provisions of DOTC MC 95-640, and the obvious
implications of pending bills in Congress on the reorganization of the NTC;
6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioners sit to consider the draft-and only the draft-in rendering its
Decision in BellTel's application constitutes an unwarranted, unauthorized and
46
 unlawful interference in and canalization of the discretionary functions of the
Commission as a quasi-judicial entity; and
7. The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel of
surreptitiously securing a draft decision, and encourages and places premium
on future similar illegal acts-all in violation of the ruling and the mandate of
the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado: Adm. Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12,
1990). 20
On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filed an Omnibus Motion 21 praying for, among
others, the consolidation of G.R Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment. 22 On the same day, the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion 23 echoing the prayer for the consolidation of
the G.R Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation/Motion 24 reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse to that of the NTC
and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse the Solicitor
General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC, require the NTC to file its own comment in
G.R No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion 25 praying
that the latter's petition in G.R No. 126526 be adopted as their comment in the consolidated
cases.
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive the fundamental issue to be
that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three
members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily,
the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner
Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone
does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the
three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the
historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive
Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No.
146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial
body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the respondent Court of
Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC:
In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service
Commission (PSC). While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public
Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it clear that
the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner
could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service
Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was
transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public
Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment
provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law,
Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated
Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications
(BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed
of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
. . . The Board of Communications shall be composed of a
full time Chairman who shall be of unquestioned integrity
and recognized prominence in previous public and/or
private employment; two full-time members who shall be
competent on all aspects of communications, preferably
one of whom shall be a lawyer and the other an economist
...
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its "Rules of Procedure and
Practice" in connection with applications and proceedings before it.
On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546, creating
the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications,
merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that —
. . . The Commission shall be composed of a
Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners, preferably
one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist.
...
47
The aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 . . . Rules of
However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice.
Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated
by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. In the meantime, the
Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the NTC which
rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners "non-participative" in the task of
decision-making. This prompted the then Minister of Transportation and
Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinion of the then Minister
of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC was a collegial body or not.
On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno sent a letter-opinion . . . to the effect that
the NTC was not a collegial body but a single entity and thus the then practice
of only the Chairman of the NTC signing the Decisions of the NTC was
authorized by law. . . .

Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight . .

. . However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts........We
find and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not correct.
Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial
body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a
case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the
absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the
NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of
Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15]
of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc.

. . . In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders,

rulings, decisions and resolutions disposing of the merits of
the matter within its jurisdiction shall be reached with the
concurrence of at least two regular members after
deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion. Any member
dissenting from the order, ruling, decision or resolution
shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.

In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all

orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions pertinent to the
case assigned to him. Copy of the decision on the merit of
the case so assigned shall be furnished the Chairman of the
Board.

xxx xxx xxx

Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a
member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision
thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC in which case
the concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is
necessary for a valid Decision While it may be true that the aforesaid

48
Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, word "and", whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s],
however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another . . . .
procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order No.
546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of "Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission,
131 SCRA 200" when it declared that:

The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on

January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the
immediate predecessor of respondent NTC . . . govern
the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC
then, now respondent NTC. . . .

In the case of "Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus

National Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717", the Supreme Court
applied and cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC . .
..

Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its
predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.

Respondents Kintanar's and NTC's pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is

vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is
antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order
No.
546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:

[a] body composed of several persons acting under

lawful authority to perform some public senica (City of
Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public
Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter,
2nd, page 286).

A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials

appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain
jurisdiction of a public nature or service (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246).
There is
persuasive authority that a "commission" is synonymous with "board" (State
Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash
County, 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easily
discerned from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the
Commission is composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy
commissioners.....................................................................................not the
commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive word
"and" is not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a
surplusage in the law. It means "in addition to" (McCaull Webster Elevator
Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The

49
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, "that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed" . . . If it was the intention of President Marcos to
constitute merely a single entity, a "one-man" governmental body, instead of
a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a
commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is
composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the
two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission
composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together
in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions,
conformably with the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the
BOC and applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that . . . of Executive Order 546 used the word "deputy"
to designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate
against the collegiality of the NTC.......The collegiality of the NTC cannot be
disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof.
Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are without
functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of
administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. . . .
In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the
NTC when he promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614......Even
then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement
opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia and opted to seek
refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno........It was only
when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Kintanar was
designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flip-
flapped [sic], and suddenly found it expedient to recall his Department Order
No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all cases pending
with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of Procedure and Practice before
the NTC, more specifically Rule 15 thereof . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their
argument......because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed into a
collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents' pose tenuous. For, it can likewise
be argued, with justification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the
existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming the same.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 . . .
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 . . . and the Order of Kintanar......declaring
the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law and thus
null and void and should be, as they are hereby, set aside. 26
Second. Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that respondent appellate
court's act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 issued by then Commissioner
Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then
Commissioner Benedicto on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited
circulars and an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the court's power to nullify administrative
regulations.
It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their
validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement. Memorandum
Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary
to law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and,
as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations
has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a
ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous
interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these
illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons
with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for being
totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body,
no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations.
Third. In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent BellTel
was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the former's adherence and
defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner
Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties. After all, it is they whom private respondent
BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave abuse of their
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final determination of
the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his
capacity as chairman of NTC because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the
Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors' cause could not be significantly affected by such ruling
because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the
oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of
a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the
commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private respondent
BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises to be the most technologically
advanced telephone service in the country. This court is not in any way concerned with whether
or not private respondent BellTel's project proposal is technically feasible or financially viable, and
this court should not, in fact, delve into these matters which are patently outside of its review
50
jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or
not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so we must
review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this
score, and this score alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of indispensable parties in
the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent appellate court has
actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en banc and forthwith grant private respondent
BellTel's application for a provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read
the second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered by respondent
Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in causing a
quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for adjudication and long-
awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm
outside the office of the special civil action ofmandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after
all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar, Dumlao and Perez to
meet en banc and to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional
authority to BellTel, said court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial
body, and the subject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working
draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent BellTel's
application for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order
the NTC to forthwith grant said application. This is understandable since every commissioner of
the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTel's application
and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the
commission of their individual discretion in private respondent BellTel's case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the
consideration of private respondent BellTel's application for provisional authority, for the same
has been ripe for decision since December, 1994. With the marked propensity of Commissioner
Kintanar to delay action on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to
promulgate any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals' order for the NTC to sit and
meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel's application for a provisional authority,
attains deep significance.
Fifth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order granting provisional
authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the latter through illegal means, is a
serious charge. However, not a single piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove
this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working draft. In private
respondent BellTel's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and For Issuance of
Provisional Authority, it is alleged that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of
the Legal Department of the NTC. 27 Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr.
Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. 28 The working draft is
attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by any person for any
stated purpose. 29
Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or
declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of any
illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft.
The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be diverted from the
principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the
procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation
than in the instant proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL
ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as
having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of
the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
I
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent
Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or oppression
for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the petitioner amounting to
P36,779.02.
51
 (2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of authority for component cities.
installing a water pipeline which is being operated, maintained and paid for
by the municipality to service respondent's private residence and medical
clinic.

On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two Administrative cases in the
following manner:

(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby

ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND
AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO CENTAVOS
(P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus legal interest due thereon from the
time it was approved in audit up to final payment, it being legally due the
Complainant representing the money value of his leave credits accruing for
services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly elected
Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is
hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for
a period of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse
of authority coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others
similarly inclined from using public office as a tool for personal vengeance,
vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).

(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL of

Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from
office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
beginning after her service of the first penalty of suspension ordered in
Administrative Case No. 02-92. She is likewise ordered to reimburse the
Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount the latter have paid for electric
and water bills from July to December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p. 16).

Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision
and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of
the Local Government Code, which provides:

Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty

(30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of

the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent

52
Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
President issued an Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted
below:

Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as
having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an
appeal in the events he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in
an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments
during the pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).

Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the

decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon filing of the appeal
within the period prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during
the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay
the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No.
18).

xxx xxx xxx

After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review filed before
this Office, we find that a stay of execution pending appeal would be just and
reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the

suspension/stay of execution of:

a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay

in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993
suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a
period of two (2) months, and

b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Albay in Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July
1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a
period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of
the President.

53
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a
mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and
executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle
"Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the
President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the
appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petition is devoid of merit.
of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative
intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such
authority can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in
administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of
the entire provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at
bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.

Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with
any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang
Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest.
Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the
execution of the decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 SO ORDERED.
because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be
repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).
FIRST DIVISION

If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication
though such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The
Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a
[G. R. No. 126496. April 30, 1997]
presumption against implied repeal.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict stay
must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency
and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be absolutely incompatible
(Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a
repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford,
Construction of Statutes 631 [1940]).

We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact
be read together.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving
discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is
nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a
54
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.;
ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION
PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
HON.
SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications, respondents.

[G. R. No. 126526. April 30, 1997]

COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.BELL TELECOMMUNICATION
PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondent.

55
 DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
[1]
Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals[2] declaring the National Telecommunications Commission
(hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 [3] and ordering the NTC to
heretofore sit and act en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.
(hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications
Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional
Authority. This application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time of the filing of this
application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in
the business of telecommunications service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was
excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier
service[4]. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications
Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of
formal awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel
a congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority
to
“carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and between provinces, cities,
and municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease,
maintain and purchase telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or
wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive systems, and
other telecommunications systems and their value-added services such as, but not limited to,
transmission of voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio and video, information service bureau,
and all other telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be made
available through technical advances or innovations in the future, or construct, acquire, lease and
operate or manage transmitting and receiving stations and switching stations, both for local and
international services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently
carry out the purposes of this franchise.”[5]
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second
Application[6] praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the
installation, operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and
international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave
radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture
antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second application was docketed as NTC Case
No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten
(10) years using the most modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to
provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network.
Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case
No. 93-481. In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn,
without prejudice.
The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as NTC Case No.
94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTel’s
evidence. Written opposition and other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc.,
Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications
Corporation as oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel’s application were
Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting
Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone
Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.
On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation of its
evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined
by the aforementioned oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its
application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers
Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.
On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy
Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995[7] manifesting his
findings and recommending that “based on technical documents submitted, BellTel’s proposal is
technically feasible.”[8]
Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD,
conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of private respondent BellTel. On March
29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to support its
proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years.
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners
Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval
thereto by making the following notation on the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated
February 6, 1995:
“With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application merits
due/favorable consideration.”[9]
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez affixed their
signatures and the date, “4/6/95.”
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC, the
Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft [10] of the order granting provisional authority
to private respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners
Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
56
 While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a
quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing
policy and the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign,
validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the
Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all
orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes
the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment[16] in which the Solicitor General took a legal position adverse
to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close examination of the laws creating the NTC
and its predecessors and a studious analysis of certain Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions
pertinent to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:
“WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:

Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the issuance of (a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as a collegial body;
a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority [11]. Reference was explicitly (b) restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating unto himself alone
made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and the powers of the said agency;
Perez that were all favorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was also made of the
aforementioned working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel, which draft
was made by the Legal Department of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy commissioners. (c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecom’s application under
NTC-94-229;
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May 12, 1995, private
respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion[12] reiterating its earlier prayer. (d) declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and]
[13]
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition to the aforestated two motions of private
respondent BellTel. (e) uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.”[17]

In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC,
On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed
instead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
for a hearing on May 29, 1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the
same was reset on June 13, 1995.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to
Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve)[14] In said motion, private respondent prayed for
1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby
the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to private
granted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex ‘J’ of the Petition,
respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex ‘K’ of the Petition and the Order of
by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three
Kintanar, Annex ‘L’ of the Petition, are hereby SET ASIDE for being contrary to law. The
commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted
Respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined and
that the NTC was a collegial body and that as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three
prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same; [and]
votes by the members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.
2. Petitioner’s petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the Respondent NTC,
On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition [15] to the aforecited
composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby
motion.
directed to meet en banc and to consider and act on the draft Order, Annex ‘B’ of the
On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner Petition, within fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision. Without
Simeon Kintanar. pronouncement as to costs.

On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995
denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
SO ORDERED.”[18]
The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar and
petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the application of private respondent
BellTel for a provisional authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for review.

57
 Commissioner Kintanar’s petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, ascribes to the respondent
appellate court the following assignment of errors:
“1. The Court of Appeals, in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC 3-1-93 and the Order of the
Commission dated July 4, 1995, made a collateral attack on a law which was nowhere called for in
the pleadings of the parties nor is authorized by the Rules of Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that the Commission is a collegial
body simply by reason of the fact that other bodies which were a spin off from the defunct
Public Service Commission were created as a collegial body. The law that created EO 546
erased the collegial character of the proceedings before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals’ decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it considered evidence
not formally offered or incorporated into the records of the case; yet failed to consider evidence
submitted by petitioner-appellant nor on the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable
parties-
3.1 CA erred in assuming that the NTC is collegial by the fact that Charters of other
regulatory agencies expressly made them collegial while this express provision was absent in
NTC’s charter.
3.2 CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614 prevails and [requires] collegiality.
3.3 The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco signed by her and her 2 deputies are in no
way indicative of collegiality and should not be considered as having any persuasive effect xxx.
3.4 The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of Communications Rules of
Practice and Procedures.
4. The Court of Appeals erred when it granted mandamus, directing and in effect controlling
Commissioner Kintanar and deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez, to meet en banc to
consider and act on a ‘draft Order’ only which the Court itself recognized no longer had the
approval of two (2) Commissioners while in the same token the Court of Appeals had set aside
a duly promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 allegedly because it did not carry the approval of 2
commissioners.”[19]
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R. No. 126496,
assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the instant Petition outright for its failure to
implead indispensable parties, in violation of Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of and passing upon BellTel’s
Petition, which on its face is premature since the Order of July 4, 1996 assailed was not a
final decision of the Commission;
3. Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of the Petition,
the disposition in Decision therein which nullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93
and 3-1-93 itself constitutes a collateral attack on the said laws, the validity of which
were never put in issue by any of the parties, contrary to the clear legal requirement
that the validity of laws can be attacked only in direct proceedings instituted for that
purpose;
4. It was in fact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of NTC Circular No.
1-1-93 and Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 since the same was absolutely
unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;
5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the prime issues as being that
of collegiality, nonetheless the Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in
declaring the NTC as a collegial body despite the clear intent of E.O. No. 546 and the
provisions of DOTC MC 95-640, and the obvious implications of pending bills in Congress
on the reorganization of the NTC;
6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners sit to
consider the draft-and only the draft-in rendering its Decision in BellTel’s application
constitutes an unwarranted, unauthorized and unlawful interference in and canalization
of the discretionary functions of the Commission as a quasi-judicial entity; and
7. The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel of surreptitiously securing a
draft decision, and encourages and places premium on future similar illegal acts-all in
violation of the ruling and the mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado: Adm.
Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12, 1990).[20]
On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filed an Omnibus Motion [21] praying for,
among others, the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment. [22] On the same day, the NTC
and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion[23] echoing the prayer for the
consolidation of the G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation/Motion[24] reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse to that of the NTC
and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse the Solicitor
General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC, require the NTC to file its own comment in
G.R. No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion[25] praying that the latter’s petition in G.R. No. 126526 be adopted as their
comment in the consolidated cases.
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive the fundamental issue
to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident
58
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He
alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and
the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning
a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the
historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive
Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146,
we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body
even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the respondent Court
of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC:
“In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). While providing
that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law
made it clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner could
act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner. As amended by RA
2677, the Public Service Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial body,
composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The
amendment provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law, Presidential Decree
No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the
Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was
composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
‘x x x The Board of Communications shall be composed of a full time Chairman who shall be of
unquestioned integrity and recognized prominence in previous public and/or private employment;
two full-time members who shall be competent on all aspects of communications, preferably one
of whom shall be a lawyer and the other an economist x x x’
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its ‘Rules of Procedure and Practice’ in connection
with applications and proceedings before it.
On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546, creating the Ministries of
Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board of
Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that --
‘x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners,
preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist. x x x’
The aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 x x x. However, the NTC
did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules of
Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. In the
meantime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the NTC which
rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners ‘non-participative’ in the task of decision-
making. This prompted the then Minister of Transportation and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr.
to seek the legal opinion of the then Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC
was a collegial body or not. On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno sent a letter-opinion x x x to the
effect that the NTC was not a collegial body but a single entity and thus the then practice of only
the Chairman of the NTC signing the Decisions of the NTC was authorized by law. x x x
Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight x x x. However, the
same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We find and declare, in the present
recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that
the NTC was a collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in
deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such
provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16
of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its
proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc:
‘x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions
disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall be reached with the concurrence
of at least two regular members after deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the order, ruling, decision or
resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions
pertinent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the decision on the merit of the case so assigned
shall be furnished the Chairman of the Board.
x x x’
Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a member thereof who is
tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full
membership of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of
the BOC is necessary for a valid Decision x x x. While it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of
Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules
of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was
established under Executive Order No. 546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of ‘Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission,
131 SCRA 200’ when it declared that:
59
‘The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of
Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x govern the rules of practice
and procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC.’ x x x
In the case of ‘Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National
Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717’, the Supreme Court applied and cited Rule 15 of the
Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC x x x.
Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the
BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.
Respondents Kintanar’s and NTC’s pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vested with authority
to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is antithetical to the nature of a commission as
envisaged in Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:
‘*a+ body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform some public
service.’ (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration,
261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286).
A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to
perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service x x x (Black, Law
Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authority that a ‘commission’ is synonymous with
‘board’ (State Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash County, 109
Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easily discerned from the context of
Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a Commissioner and two
(2) deputy commissioners x x x not the commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The
conjunctive word ‘and’ is not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage
in the law. It means ‘in addition to’ (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167
Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The word ‘and’, whether it is used to connect words,
phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another x
x x.
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions. As the aphorism
goes, ‘that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed’ x x x. If it was the intention of
President Marcos to constitute merely a single entity, a ‘one-man’ governmental body, instead of
a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a commission and
would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of, not the commissioner
alone, but of the commissioner and the two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the
NTC is a commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting
together in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably with
the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC and applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that x x x of Executive Order 546 used the word ‘deputy’ to designate the two
(2) other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC. x x
x The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the
membership thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are without
functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of administrative structure or
hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x x
In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the NTC when he
promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x x. Even then Commissioner Mariano
Benedicto openly expressed his vehement opposition to the Department Order of Secretary
Garcia and opted to seek refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno x x x. It was
only when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Kintanar was designated to replace
Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flip-flapped [sic], and suddenly found it expedient
to recall his Department Order No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all
cases pending with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of Procedure and Practice before the
NTC, more specifically Rule 15 thereof x x x.
xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their argument x x x
because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed into a collegial body. Indeed, We find
Respondents’ pose tenuous. For, it can likewise be argued, with justification, that House Bill No.
10558 indeed confirms the existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming the
same.
xxx
In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 x x x Memorandum Circular No.
3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial
entity, are contrary to law and thus null and void and should be, as they are hereby, set aside.”[26]
Second. Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that respondent appellate
court’s act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 issued by then Commissioner
Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then
Commissioner Benedicto on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited
circulars and an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the court’s power to nullify administrative
regulations.
It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive
their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to
implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for
being unabashedly contrary to law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because
they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that
implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man
rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these
illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man
rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of
power.
60
 Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for
being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial
body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations.
Third. In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent
BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the former’s adherence
and defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner
Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties. After all, it is they whom private respondent
BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave abuse of their
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final
determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of
Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC because the task of defending them
primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that
certiorari lies against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors’ cause could not be
significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into
the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that
requires, regardless of the merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority
vote of at least two members of the commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private
respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises to be the most
technologically advanced telephone service in the country. This court is not in any way concerned
with whether or not private respondent BellTel’s project proposal is technically feasible or
financially viable, and this court should not, in fact, delve into these matters which are patently
outside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was the
question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of
discretion, and so we must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent
appellate court on this score, and this score alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of indispensable
parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent appellate court
has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en banc and forthwith grant private
respondent BellTel’s application for a provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously
over-read the second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered by
respondent Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in causing
a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for adjudication and long-
awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm
outside the office of the special civil action of mandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after
all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar, Dumlao and Perez
to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional
authority to BellTel, said court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial
body, and the subject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working
draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent BellTel’s
application for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order
the NTC to forthwith grant said application. This is understandable since every commissioner of
the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTel’s application
and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the
commission of their individual discretion in private respondent BellTel’s case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the
consideration of private respondent BellTel’s application for provisional authority, for the same
has been ripe for decision since December, 1994. With the marked propensity of Commissioner
Kintanar to delay action on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to
promulgate any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals’ order for the NTC to sit and
meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel’s application for a provisional authority,
attains deep significance.
Fifth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order granting provisional
authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the latter through illegal means, is a
serious charge. However, not a single piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to
prove this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working draft. In
private respondent BellTel’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and For Issuance of
Provisional Authority, it is alleged that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of
the Legal Department of the NTC. [27] Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr.
Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez.[28] The working draft is
attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by any person for any
stated purpose.[29]
Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft
or declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of
any illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft.
The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be diverted from the
principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the
procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation
than in the instant proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No.
171101, November 22, 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY
the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking
61
 HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual
land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and
legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in
secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as
the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May
10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on
May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified
FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the
application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots
they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution
that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should
not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently
subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly
not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears
too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land
that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the
decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and
resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the
number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified
FWB will be awarded.
62
 On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government,
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered
that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the
80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands
became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon
the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of
coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice
Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage *after PARC’s revocation of the SDP+, that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court
majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by
any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action
with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the
right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of
land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the
agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the
option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would
be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons
not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
[over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that
the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this
33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in
the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the
common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI
capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to
acquire control over HLI.]
Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On
March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions
(Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that
each province shall have at least one (1) member.
63
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the
general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments
to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and
manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and
appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law.
PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision
that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The
Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action
taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by
the Court.
 Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable Question (Textbook: Cruz,
Professor: Atty. Usita)
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's
prayer for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy
over the facts which are well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying
that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to
Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July
28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the
petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2
and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez
appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the
office of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner,
without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was
appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for
resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that
petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952
at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil
Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15,
1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St.
Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken
cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon,
have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling,
64
she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth
year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
(Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at
the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-
4). Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right
of suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any
felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4).
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the
same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy
and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance
with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with
respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different
surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to
Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is
Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To
allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code
provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because
her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the
remedy is not a petition for change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with
respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that
as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname
of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal
provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677,
679, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable
causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella
S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in
the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her
by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma
under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is
therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary
is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner is allowed to
change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, petitioner,
65
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's
prayer for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy
over the facts which are well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying
that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to
Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July
28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the
petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2
and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez
appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the
office of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner,
without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was
appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for
resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that
petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952
at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil
Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15,
1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St.
Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken
cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon,
have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling,
she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth
year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
(Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at
the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-
4). Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right
of
suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony
or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4).
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the
same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy
and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance
with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with
respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different
surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to
Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is
Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To
allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent
to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code
provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because
her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the
remedy is not a petition for change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with
respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
66
 Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that
as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname
of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal
provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677,
679, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable
causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella
S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in
the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her
by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma
under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is
therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary
is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner is allowed to
change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Floresca vs. Phillex Mining
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection
of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant
to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also
petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that
they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency
due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such
a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the
amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would
go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth
life.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting
No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already liable
to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or
get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly removed
by the legislature NOT the SC.
Case Digest: Chavez v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising
constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost
housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came
into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
67
importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established
EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted
by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President
Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development
into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance
the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay
Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be
owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding
that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current
residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced
incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended
and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done
to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares
to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President
Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of
an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1,
1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both
parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA
reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been
turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands
of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as
alienable and outside the commerce of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said
lands are no longer needed for public use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public
domain
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This
does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation
project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM),
and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government
Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the
authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by
the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was
the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must
be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President
Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed
for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified
beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable
and disposable lands under the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests
and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its
joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published
in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on
May 18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as
percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when
the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by
which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of
public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA
between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10
years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample
opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has
passed.
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby
appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and
compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that
the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March
68
31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes
the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a
mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the
annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.
Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in
each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of
office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors
subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the
president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the
term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory
construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its
meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and
where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to
hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.
G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.
The records reveal that private respondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a
project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from
November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. For having been implicated in a
crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation which was
allegedly committed on March 5, 1975. Juco's services were
terminated by (NHC) effective as of the close of working hours on
May 14, 1975. On March 25, 1977 he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner (NHC) with Regional Office No. 4,
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment)
docketed as R04-3-3309-77 (Annex A, Petition). The said complaint
was certified by Regional Branch No. IV of the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration where it was docketed as Case No. RB-IV-12038-77 and
assigned to Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Peñalosa. The latter conducted
the hearing. By agreement of the parties, the case was submitted for
resolution upon submission of their respective position papers.
Private respondent (Juco) submitted his position paper on July 15,
1977. He professed innocence of the criminal acts imputed against
him contending "that he was dismissed based on purely fabricated
charges purposely to harass him because he stood as a witness in
the theft case filed against certain high officials of the respondent's
establishment" (NHC) and prayed for 'his immediate reinstatement
to his former position in the (NHC) without loss of seniority rights
and the consequent payment of his will back wages plus all the
benefits appertaining thereto. On July 28, 1977, the NHC also filed its
position paper alleging that the Regional Office Branch IV, Manila,
NLRC, "is without authority to entertain the case for lack of
jurisdiction, considering that the NHC is a government owned and
controlled corporation; that even assuming that this case falls within
the jurisdiction of this Office, respondent firm (now petitioner)
maintains that respondent (Juco), now private respondent, was
separated from the service for valid and justified reasons, i.e., for
having sold company properties consisting of 214 pieces of scrap G.I.
pipes at a junk shop in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and
thereafter appropriating the proceeds thereof to his own benefit."

The pertinent portion of the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Amante A. Pimentel for respondents.
reads:

The fact that in the early case of Fernandez v. Cedro (NLRC Case No.
201165-74, May 19, 1975) the Commission, (Second Division) ruled
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: that the respondent National Housing Corporation is a government-
owned or controlled corporation does not preclude us from later
Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the Labor Code or by laws taking a contrary stand if by doing so the ends of justice could better
and regulations governing the civil service? be served.

The background facts of this case are stated in the respondent-appellee's brief as follows: For although adherence to precedents (stare decisis) is a sum
formula for achieving uniformity of action and conducive to the
69
 smooth operation of an office, Idolatrous reverence for precedents
which have outlived their validity and usefulness retards progress
and should therefore be avoided. In fact, even courts do reverse
themselves for reasons of justice and equity. This Commission as an
Administrative body performing quasi judicial function is no
exception.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is hereby, set aside. In view, however, of the fact that the Labor
Arbiter did not resolve the issue of illegal dismissal we have opted to
remand this case to the Labor Arbiter a quo for resolution of the
aforementioned issue.
The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation organized in
accordance with Executive Order No. 399, the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations,
dated January 5, 1951. Its shares of stock are owned by the Government Service Insurance System
the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and
Development Corporation, and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Pursuant to
Letter of Instruction No. 118, the capital stock of NHC was increased from P100 million to P250
million with the five government institutions above mentioned subscribing in equal proportion to
the increased capital stock. The NHC has never had any private stockholders. The government has
been the only stockholder from its creation to the present.
There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and
regulations.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the Government, including every government-
owned or controlled corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I which stated:
A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law.
The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of the civil
service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed
government-owned or controlled corporations to avoid the full consequences of the an
encompassing coverage of the civil service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the
addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions of the Government. All
offices and firms of the government are covered.
The amendments introduced in 1973 are not Idle exercises or a meaningless gestures. They carry
the strong message that t civil service coverage is broad and an- embracing insofar as employment
in the government in any of its governmental or corporate arms is concerned.
The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute. Presidential Decree No. 807 is
unequivocal that personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations belong to the civil
service and are subject to civil service requirements.
It provides:
SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel. —
All permanent personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations whose positions are now embraced in the civil service
shall continue in the service until they have been given a chance to
qualify in an appropriate examination, but in the meantime, those
who do not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility shag not
be promoted until they qualify in an appropriate civil service
examination. Services of temporary personnel may be terminated
any time.
The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRC wants to apply in its
entirety to the private respondent provides:
ART. 277. Government employees. — The terms and conditions of
employment of all government employees, including employees of
government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be
standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the New
Constitution. However, there shall be reduction of existing wages,
benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being
enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of the Code.
Our decision in Alliance of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment et all. (124 SCRA 1) gives the background of the amendment which includes
government-owned or controlled corporations in the embrace of the civil service.
We stated:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the
deliberation held relative to what is now Section 1(1), Article XII-
B, supra, the issue of the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations figured prominently.
The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader,
vehemently objected to the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations in the Civil Service. He argued that such
70
inclusion would put asunder the right of workers in government
corporations, recognized in jurisprudence under the 1935
Constitution, to form and join labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining with their employers in the same manner as in the private
section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional Convention).
In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention enlightened the members of the
Committee on Labor on the divergent situation of government
workers under the 1935 Constitution, and called for its rectification.
Thus, in a Position Paper dated November 22, 197 1, submitted to
the Committee on Labor, 1971 Constitutional Convention, then
Acting Commissioner of Civil Service Epi Rey Pangramuyen declared:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that
by reason of the nature of the public employer
and the peculiar character of the public service,
it must necessary regard the right to strike given
to unions in private industry as not applying to
public employees and civil service employees. It
has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the
interests of all people in the public service, and
that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are
present in private labor relations could not exist
in the relations between government and those
whom they employ.
Moreover, determination of employment
conditions as well as supervision of the
management of the public service is in the hands
of legislative bodies. It is further emphasized that
government agencies in the performance of their
duties have a right to demand undivided
allegiance from their workers and must always
maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm
discipline among their staff members. It would
be highly incompatible with these requirements
of the public service, if personnel took orders
from union leaders or put solidarity with
members of the working class above solidarity
with the Government. This would be inimical to
the public interest.
Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by
joining labor unions may be compelled to
support objectives which are political in nature
and thus jeopardize the fundamental principle
that the governmental machinery must be
impartial and non-political in the sense of party
politics. (See: Records of 1971 Constitutional
Convention).
Similar, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing for the inclusion of
government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil Service,
argued:
It is meretricious to contend that because
Government-owned or controlled corporations
yield profits, their employees are entitled to
better wages and fringe benefits than employees
of Government other than Government-owned
and controlled corporations which are not
making profits. There is no gainsaying the fact
that the capital they use is the people's money.
(see: Records of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention).
Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on the inclusion of Government-owned or controlled
corporation Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila
University Professional School of Law, stated that government-
owned corporations came under attack as g cows of a privileged few
enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in the various
branches of government, while the capital of these corporations
belongs to the Government and government money is pumped into
them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should therefore
come under the strict surveillance of the Civil Service System.
(Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974
ed., p. 524).
Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as amended, and the Civil
Service Decree as amended and the precedent in the Alliance of Government Workers decision, it
is clear that the petitioner National Housing Corporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs governmental
functions and not proprietary ones.
The NHC was organized for the governmental objectives stated in its amended articles of
incorporation as follows:
SECOND: That the purpose for which the corporation is organized is
to assist and carry out the coordinated massive housing program of
the government, principally but not limited to low-cost housing with
71
 the integration cooperation and assistance of all governmental
agencies concerned, through the carrying on of any or all the
following activities:
l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands for the
purpose of construction and building therein preferably low-cost
housing so as to provide decent and durable dwelling for the
greatest number of inhabitants in the country;
2) The promotion and development of physical social and economic
community growth through the establishment of general physical
plans for urban, suburban and metropolitan areas to be
characterized by efficient land use patterns;
3) The coordination and implementation of all projects of the
government for the establishment of nationwide and massive low
cost housing;
4) The undertaking and conducting of research and technical studies
of the development and promotion of construction of houses and
buildings of sound standards of design liability, durability, safety,
comfort and size for improvement of the architectural and
engineering designs and utility of houses and buildings with the
utilization of new and/or native materials economics in material and
construction, distribution, assembly and construction and of
applying advanced housing and building technology.
5) Construction and installation in these projects of low-cost housing
privately or cooperatively owned water and sewerage system or
waste disposal facilities, and the formulations of a unified or
officially coordinated urban transportation system as a part of a
comprehensive development plan in these areas.
The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the government to
accomplish governmental policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people. It
would be incongruous if employees discharging essentially governmental functions are not
covered by the same law and rules which govern those performing other governmental functions.
If government corporations discharging proprietary functions now belong to the civil service with
more reason should those performing governmental functions be governed by civil service law.
The respondent NLRC cites a 1976 opinion of the Secretary of Justice which holds that the phrase
"government-owned or controlled corporations" in Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution
contemplates only those government-owned or controlled corporations created by special law.
The opinion states that since the Constitution provides for the organization or regulation of
private corporations only by "general law", expressly excluding government-owned or controlled
corporations, it follows that whenever the Constitution mentions government-owned or
controlled corporations, it must refer to those created by special law. P.D. No. 868 which repeals
all charters, laws, decrees, rules, and provisions exempting any branch, agency, subdivision, or
instrumentality of the government, including government- owned or controlled corporations from
the civil service law and rules is also cited to show that corporations not governed by special
charters or laws are not to be brought within civil service coverage. The discussions in the
Constitutional Convention are also mentioned. It appears that at the time the Convention
discussed government-owned or controlled corporations, all such corporations were organized
only under special laws or charters.
The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may be created by
special charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special law are not covered
by the civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption
from the civil service law imply that government corporations not created by special law are
exempt from civil service coverage. These charters and statutes are the only laws granting such
exemption and, therefore, they are the only ones which could be repealed. There was no similar
exempting provision in the general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the
Constitutional Convention discussed only corporations created by special law or charter cannot be
an argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil service coverage. As stated in the cited speech
delivered during the convention sessions of March 9, 1972, all government corporations then in
existence were organized under special laws or charters. The convention delegates could not
possibly discuss government-owned or controlled corporations which were still non-existent or
about whose existence they were unaware.
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporation."
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible and all taken one by
one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or
controlled entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the
appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.
The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or emasculation of
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution It would be possible for a regular ministry of
government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a
willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations.
These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees
would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service
Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to
the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service
employment. Conceivably,all government-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no
longer by special charters, but through incorporation under the general law. The constitutional
amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have
application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the
case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
72
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
It was I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, series of 1976, for the Commissioner
of Civil Service who wanted to know the scope of the constitutional provisions on the Civil Service
in respect of government-owned or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons
stated therein, that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special law; it was
organized pursuant to the Corpotation Law — Act No. 1459 entitled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE
DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH
CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has been replaced by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 68 known as The New Corporation Code.] In the fight of my opinion, the National Housing
Corporation is not covered by the Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the Labor Code? I am not prepared to answer this
question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that whether or not a corporation is "government-
owned or controlled" depends upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be
"government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for another. In other words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or controlled."
It may be asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civil Service should it
not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My answer is, not necessarily. For it may well be that
the National Housing Corporation is in limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be "government-owned or
controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar proceedings:
Human Settlements Development Corporation
Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc.
Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation
Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc.
Republic Planters Bank
QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and everyone of the above-named corporation is
government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
It was I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, series of 1976, for the Commissioner
of Civil Service who wanted to know the scope of the constitutional provisions on the Civil Service
in respect of government-owned or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons
stated therein, that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special law; it was
organized pursuant to the Corpotation Law — Act No. 1459 entitled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE
DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH
CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has been replaced by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 68 known as The New Corporation Code.] In the fight of my opinion, the National Housing
Corporation is not covered by the Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the Labor Code? I am not prepared to answer this
question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that whether or not a corporation is "government-
owned or controlled" depends upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be
"government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for another. In other words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or controlled."
It may be asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civil Service should it
not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My answer is, not necessarily. For it may well be that
the National Housing Corporation is in limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be "government-owned or
controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar proceedings:
Human Settlements Development Corporation
Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc.
73
 Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation
Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc.
Republic Planters Bank
QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and everyone of the above-named corporation is
government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO, Defendant-Appellee.
DECISION
WILLARD, J.:
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “An Act to regulate the
importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession
of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. ”
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife,
dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: chanrobles virtualawlibrary Provided, That
this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in possession of persons who have secured a
license therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act. ”
The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No. 1780, committed
as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and criminally, had in his possession
and concealed about his person a deadly weapon, to wit: chanrobles
virtualawlibrary One (1) iron bar, about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball on
one end and a string on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed
and made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
“With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Philippine
Commission. ”
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the Government has appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that —
“The words or other deadly weapon’ only signify a kind of weapon included within the
preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis must be applied in
the interpretation of this law, which rule is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“‘The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic
terms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter following
the former. While in the abstract, general terms are to be given their natural
and full signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like nature they
take their meaning from the latter, and are presumed to embrace only things
or persons of the kind designated by them. ’“
In short, the court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about the person would
not be a violation of this Act. The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the
purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent
clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to
the result which would reached by application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give
way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in the view of the legislature the
carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its
intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC
[G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]
FACTS: Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed
separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC,
Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after
hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue
their employment as such for as long as such *project+ activity exists,” but entitled to the salary
of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also
ordered payment of salary differentials.
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work
74
in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been

75

determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the
same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are
“regular” employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to
private respondent’s main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6)
or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being
only “project employees” of NSC.
HELD: NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
RATIO: Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However,
contrary to petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named employees as “project
employees” and their assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good faith,
and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as
“regular employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact
that the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not
detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”. The second paragraph of
Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at
least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to
project employees.
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO,
BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN,
EUGENIO RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO LAPEÑA, LEOPOLDO C.
TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City
Councilors and City Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at
San Carlos City, Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted against
the City of San Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City
Councilors and City Treasurer of San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos
City (Pangasinan, that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its creation in 1966 up
to the present, has been classified as a third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became
effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries of city judges of second and third class
cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then actually receiving a monthly
salary of P1,000.00 of which P350.00 was the share of the national government and P650.00 is the
share of the city government, which salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City
Judge of a third class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary
actually being received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in said act shall be paid by
the city government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21, 1971,
the petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San
Carlos (Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact the
necessary budget and to pay him the said differential but the respondents, without any
justification, whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the same; that it is the clear duty of the
respondent to enact the necessary budget providing for the payment of the salary of the
petitioner as provided for in Republic Act No. 5967; that petitioner has no other plain, adequate
and speedy remedy except the present action for mandamus; and that because of the refusal of
the respondent to comply with their obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the
petitioner was forced to engage the services of a lawyer to file this action for which he was to pay
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees. 2
76
In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents admitted and denied the allegations in
the petition and alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among other things, that the
salary of the city judge shall at least be one hundred pesos per month less than that of a city
mayor; that the city judge receives an annual salary of P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month
less than the salary being received by the city mayor which is P13,200.00 yearly; that assuming the
existence of a salary difference, in view of the provision of Republic Act No. 5967, that the
payment of the salary difference shall be subject to the implementation of the respective city
government, which is discretionary on the part of the city government as to whether it would or
would not implement the payment of the salary difference, and in view of the financial difficulties
of the city which has a big overdraft, the payment of the salary difference of the city judge cannot
be made; and that the petitioner should pay his lawyer and should not charge the attorney's fees
to the respondents who have not violated any rights of the petitioner. 3
The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered its decision dated
May 31, 1971 dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs.
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides higher salary, the
city judge in chartered cities shall receive a basic salary which shall not be
lower than the sums as provided thereinbelow:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos per annum;
xxx xxx xxx
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city
judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district
judge, and for second and third class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand five hundred pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for
other cities, the city judge shall receive two thousand pesos less than that
fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge
shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967
would be interpreted as the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city judges, then the
principal provision of Section 7 fixing the salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that
of a City Mayor (particularly in the case of second and third class cities) would be rendered totally
useless." The petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of the legislature in enacting
Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to increase the salary of the city judges, then the last proviso of
said Section 7 should give way to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) was a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received an annual salary of
P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00
which was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became Republic Act No.
5967, the following discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON — Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will
be some cities where the city judges will receive salaries higher than those of
the mayors. And in all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a
department head — theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It would not be
fair for the purposes of public administration that a city department head
should receive a salary higher than that of the chief executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I would like to
congratulate Your Honor.
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the concern of the
distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in this particular amendment
prepared by the distinguished lady from La Union, this will not require the
council to pay it at P100.00 exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is just
the limit — the maximum — but they may fix it at much less than that. That is
why the words "at least" were suggested by the Committee. It need not be
exactly just P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the cities of Iloilo, Cebu,
Bacolod or Manila for that matter. The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a
month. Now, under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva Ecija
and
Davao — which has already been accepted by the sponsor — does it mean
that if the salary of the city mayor is P1,500, the city judges will receive
P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO — I would like to call his attention to lines 13 to 20. We
presented this amendment because it says here: "For the cities of Baguio,
Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge". So it will happen,
and my attention was called by the gentlemen from Iloilo — that the city judge
win be receiving more salary than the city mayor. Hence the amendment, Mr.
President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas, and this was their
objection. We have proposed this amendment to at least solve this problem,
77
 so that no city judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they will be
receiving less than what is proposed in this Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate
Congressional Records, pages 2773-2787. (Emphasis supplied .) 4
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress in enacting Republic
Act No. 5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city
mayor. The saving clause "Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least
P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the
salary of city judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is given
precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the
legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of
P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of P18,000.00
for the petitioner as city judge of the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision appealed from is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways
& Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630.
Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text
and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco
[however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD:
By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its
own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make
a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993
Ponente: QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the
Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S.
Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint
filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required
respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in
his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension
and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to
directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; *and+ said conditions have not been met in the instant case”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
HELD:
78

YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a
public official or employees (Sec. 13 *3+), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All
the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the
word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated.
Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein
set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
People vs. MagallanesG.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995FACTS:
In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of
P/Col.
Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police
Inspector Abeto’s
cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents:
Fernandez,Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and
Danilo Lumangyao, with theuse of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with
evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity.The other accused secretly buried the victims in a
makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a feeof P500.00 each.The cases were
consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. Theprosecution
presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After
theprosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the reception
of evidence wassuspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several
accused. Garvilles voluntarilyinhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the
prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors tothe Sandiganbayan because the offenses
charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. The trial court ruled
that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the informations do notstate that the
offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the
Motionfor the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but
the same was denied.The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited
himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge totransfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan.
The private respondents were required to comment on the petition andissued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of
thecase.
ISSUE:
Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers
HELD:
The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of theaction. When the informations in the cases were filed, the law governing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan wasP.D. 1861 , which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1)violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to theiroffice, where the penalty
prescribed is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P
6,000.00.If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court or theMunicipal Circuit Trial Court.Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the present
case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of “taking advantage of his position” is not
sufficient to bringthe offenses within the definition of “offenses committed in relation to public
office.” It is considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance.Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on
cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the public officers rank i
s classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a
position classified as Grade “27” or higher. Accused Torres, who is highest in rank among the
accused, only has a rank classified as Grade “18”.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the
subsequent
enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to officers whose rank is
Grade “27” or
79
higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation. Hence, cases already Bank,
under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to
the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged
orders are AFFIRMED

Republic vs Migrino

Vera vs Cuevas

People vs Echaves

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

-express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others

San Pablo Manufacturing Co. vs Commission of Internal Revenue

Noscitor a Sociis

-where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may

be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is

associated

Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961

Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as irish

moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and

dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For

every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the

Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,

transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as

amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank

three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central

80
 immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.
refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax

Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under

section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of

the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of the

Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food

products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present

petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream

stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law

(Republic Act No. 601).

HELD:

YES. The decision under review was reversed.

RATIO:

General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and

flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or

manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory

construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the

general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s object and

purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all

the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the

case at bar, it is

true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of articles that may

be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items

81

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular
recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms
entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of construction.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v Social Security Commision
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission
Case No. 263
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities, and all religious
and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or
partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage
of RA 1161, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.
Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the
principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which
have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain,” because the phrase
“activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry,
undertaking.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.
HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where
the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. The
definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact
that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.
G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983
PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch
XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.
Abundio J. Macarañas for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to
nine years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum. 1 He appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to one
year and eight months as maximum. 2
Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he
filed a petition for probation 3 with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable
recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following
grounds:
(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed, and
(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the
present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in
denying his petition for probation despite the recommendation for its approval by the Probation
Office.
We find for the petitioner.
At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was required by this
Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he points out, petitioner is not among the
offenders enumerated in the probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the
benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following:
(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years;
(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
82
 (c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the nature of the crime, not
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day on the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid down by the law in determining who may be
and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos;

(d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the
decree; and

(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of the decree became applicable, pursuant to
Section 33.

Under the abovequoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the
benefits of probation. Some other provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny
petitioner the benefits of probation which, from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with
liberality, rather than undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified. In
expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear intent
is to allow said benefits to those not included in the enumeration.

If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in order that its objective
could be realized and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial
of the petition for probation insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with
which the law should be applied.

The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed." According to him, the State has shown serious concern with the above of
checks as a commercial paper, as shown by various measures taken to curb the pernicious
practice of issuing bouncing checks.

For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime.
The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the
probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to
maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as
to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened
criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The
consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful
and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of
reformation in him.

If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned with, not the
prevention by means of punitive measures, of the commission of the offense, it is readily seen
that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all
those who commit estafa through bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He
would thereby add to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not subject to
probation.
Thus, the only crimes mentioned in the law based on the nature thereof are those against
national security (Section 9, paragraph b), the other crimes being those punished by more than six
years imprisonment. Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new ground for
83
granted probation. That crime would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms
of estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liability for which is generally separated Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
by a thin line from mere civil liability.

For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or commit an offense of
manifest gravity, it is the long prison term which must be served that will act as deterrent to
protect society. In protecting society, the family of the offender which might be dependent or
the latter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost
sight of, it being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness of the offense, as
measured by the penalty imposed, more than by its nature, as the law so ordains, the offender
is not such a serious menace to society as to be wrested away therefrom, as the more
dangerous type of criminals should be.

The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for probation, is
that petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as shown by his protestation of innocence
even after his conviction by the trial court and the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of
Appeals.

We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has not shown
repentance in committing the crime of which he has been found guilty by both the trial and
appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent judge to the Court of
Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be
acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of
probation.1äwphï1.ñët The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His
penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him within the benign purpose of the Probation
Law. By the move he took by which to achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within
reach, petitioner cannot be said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of probation
benefits. Once the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of appealing
further to the Supreme Court, he promptly applied for probation, made possible only by the
reduced penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. The penalty imposed by respondent court
placed petitioner beyond the pale of the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent
offender, as the law would judge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have
them applied for probation even if he wanted to? Who knows but that if the penalty imposed by
the trial court is that imposed by the Court of Appeals petitioner would have applied for
probation forthwith?

Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification for respondent
judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberality with
which the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the
better means of achieving the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in the case
of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited by
the Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant petition
for probation.

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside, and petitioner
is hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are
prescribed by the law, and recommended by the probation officer.

84
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.
Samson v. CA [Nov. 25, 1986]
24SEP
Samson v. Court of
Appeals Fact:
AO No. 3, issued by Mayor Samson of Caloocan City, summarily terminated the services of
respondent Talens who held position of Asst. Sec. to the Mayor on the ground of “lack and loss of
confidence” and appointing Liwag to the position.
RA No. 2260 declares the position of secretaries to city mayors non-competitive and this was
interpreted by Mayor Samson as to include the position of Asst. Sec. to the Mayor.
Issue:
Legality of Administrative Order No. 3
Held:
Secretary to the Mayor and Asst. Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and distinct positions.
One is of higher category and rank than the other. The functions strictly attributable to a
“secretary,” is not automatically vested or transferred to an “assistant secretary,” because the
latter simply assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
CATU VS RELLOSA
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for
conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a
complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for
the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and,
as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the
violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for
the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as
the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of
Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at
bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the
purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice
of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public
officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713
.Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure
of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first
securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
85
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
 CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oathand/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
G.R. No. L-32441 March 29, 1930
DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.
Jose Varela Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation proceedings,
and particularly the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the
Philippine Islands dated March 30, 1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license
to practice medicine and surgery.
2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the
investigation and the decision of March 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never
been an investigation and an adverse decision.
3. Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a license for the
practice of medicine and surgery in the Philippine Islands, such as he had prior
to the investigation and adverse decision.
4. Granting the plaintiff any proper legal remedy. (Pages 5 and 6, bill of
exemptions.)
The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:
1. In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was
authorized to appear and institute administrative proceedings against Dr.
Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City of Manila, had
personality nor power to institute administrative proceedings against Dr.
Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the
Opium Law, is valid.
4. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is
unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.
5. In holding that section 9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force.
6. In not holding that section 9 Act No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the
supposition that it was valid.
7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.
8. In denying the motion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed by appellant.
The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against the plaintiff,
preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, who, according to the plaintiff is
not authorized by law to file charges with the Board of Medical Examiners, which therefore
acquired no jurisdiction over the matter.
According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, the procedure to
be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the following:
86
 Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall be begun by Act, which details and means need not be stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that
filing a written charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be properly speaking, they are not foreign matter.
preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of
Medical Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said
The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but
charges. Said charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the Board of
one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end
Medical Examiners and a copy thereof, together with written notice of the
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general
time and place when they will be heared and determined, shall be served
object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not
upon the accused or his counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually
only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible.
fixed for said hearing. (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.)
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.)

The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified
The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details
person; it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to require its executive officer to
of the act. The subject must be single; the provisions, to accomplished the
prefer said charges. From the wording of the law we infer that any person, including a public
object involved in that subject, may be multifarious None of the provisions
officer, may prefer the charges referred to in the above-quoted provision. Wherefore, the fact
of a statute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or
that the charges were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not deprive
indirectly, to the same subject, have natural connection, and are not foreign to
the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action
the subject expressed in the title. As very frequently expressed by the courts,
according to law.
any provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title may
properly be included in the act. (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.)
The appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that section 9 of Act No. 2381
is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since said section is foreign to the subject of
In order to hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground alleged by the
said Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing
plaintiff, the violation of the constitutional provision must be substantial and manifest. It is not so
more than one subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill.
in the case at bar.

Our opinion is that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not foreign to the end
2. To warrant the setting aside of statutes because their subjects are not
pursued in said Act, and that in view in the provision of said section it cannot be maintained that
expressed in the titles, the violation of the rule must be substantial and plain.
Act No. 2381 includes more than one subject. The penalty provided in said section for the
(Posadas vs. Menzi, Decision of the United States Supreme Court, page 388,
physician or dentist who prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require
No. 11, May 15, 1929, United States Supreme Court Advance Opinions.)
the use of said drug, is one of the means employed by the Legislature to attain the purpose of Act
No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium; it is one of the details subordinate to the
purpose in view. Such punishment is not the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have At all events the validity of this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, has already been upheld by this court,
just said, it is a means employed to regulate the use of opium. not only in the above cited case, United States vs. Wayne Shoup, supra, but also in the subsequent
case of United States vs. Jao Li Sing (37 Phil., 211).
In passing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power expressly granted
by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection of the health, comfort, and general Passing to the fifth and sixth assignments of error, wherein counsel for appellant contends that
welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands. even granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it was repealed by Act No. 2493 and later by
section 780 of the Administrative Code, we note, first, that there is no express repeal of section 9
of Act No. 2381. Secondly, it cannot be held that it has been impliedly repealed, for the reason
ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON THE
that the provisions of section 9, Act No. 2381, are neither contrary to, nor incompatible with, the
SUBJECT. — The Philippine Legislature is expressly authorized by the Act of
provisions of section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended. Upon this point, we approve
Congress of March 3, 1905, to adopt legislation upon the importation and sale
and adopt the following statements made by the trial judge:
of opium in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of such legislation was to
protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the
Philippine Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the police power of the Counsel contends, in support of the above, that Act No. 2493 being complete,
State. (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil., 56.) and "covering the field" by implication repealed all laws relating to the
practice of medicine, powers of the Board of Medical Examiners and allied
matters; hence, the said law, expressly providing the causes for revocation of
And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 relative to the
medical licenses, necessarily excluded all others, even though embodied in
physicians and dentist are simply detailes and means conducive to the ultimate purpose of said
prior enactments.

87
 Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke As in the case of courts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application
licenses for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the term. Act No. 1761 that mandamus will not lie to review or control the acts of executive officers
(the Opium Law) provided that illegaly prescribing opium should be cause for and boards of state and federal governments in respect of matters as to which
revocation of medical licenses. Clearly, the Opium Law did not repeal Act No. they are vested with discretion. In other words, they cannot be compelled to
310. Act No. 2381 — also an Opium Law — in its section 9, repeated the act or render a decision in any particular way, and this is so, even though the
provision as to doctors and dentists. The repetition did not repeal Act No. 310. exercise of this discretion requires the construction and interpretation of
Act No. 2493, section 11 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their
physicians are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus. (38 C. J.,
phrase. In other words, so far as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No. 659-660.)
2493 is mere reenactment of Act No. 310. The reenactment of the said portion
of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. If said section 9 has
That this action is really a mandamus proceeding, appears clearly from the terms of the complaint
been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends Act No. 2493 (Ad.
filed herein.
Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words "unprofessional conduct" of
the following:
Finding no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
"The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable
conduct" as used in this chapter shall be construed to include the
following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or abeting a criminal abortion; Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
(2) advertising, either in his own name or in the name of any other Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
person, firm, association, or corporation, in any written or printed
paper, or document, of medical business in which untruthful or
improbable promises are made, or being employed by, or in the
service of any person, firm, association or corporation so advertising, Javellana vs Tayo
or advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3)
habitual intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
cocaine or other drugs having a similar effect; (4) conviction of a
crime or misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and
willfully betraying a professional secret." FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of

It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed "unprofessional"
vs.
conduct theretofore deemed grounds for revocation licenses. The
maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-
of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the
plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are appellant.
mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If,
therefore, there exists, "unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws,
with more reason does the criminal use of opium remain a specific cause for
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the
revocation of license. (Pages 11, 12 and 13, bill of exceptions.)
Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below
As to the seventh and eighth assignments of error, we find the judgment and appealed from
correctly rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial properly denied. complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality.

The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of
As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners
to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration and the authority granted the 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of confirming or reversing the decision of said board of examiners,
partake of a quasi-judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-
exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on its merits.
88
Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in

this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding

officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary

presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent

Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When

the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said

minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the

Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid

RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the

conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor

were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the

session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the

proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who

would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely

suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because

the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)

We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to

the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of

appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial

Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.

DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.

[Digest] Lopez vs. CA (1970)

Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals
and Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.

89
 Facts: purveyor of the hoax of the year
January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to 2.
the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to
Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island which
contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to the
authorities in Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committed on
the island since Christmas of 1955.
o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan claro. They
were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story
about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
o Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” the same word to be used by the newspapers
who covered the same
January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a
pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the
misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to
read and write and food and clothing being scarce
January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazine in the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as “a
health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a 4.
murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to
civilization.” Called it “Hoax of the year”
In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a different person of
the same name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
o January 27, 1957 published statements correcting their misprint and explained that confusion and
error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline o
Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages oo
(5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorney’s fees)
CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:
WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in
relation to the “hoax of the year”?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?

Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00

Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by the fact that
it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is
irrelevant.
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libel is "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing,
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead
or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one
who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publication of a person's photograph in
connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is
published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
o In this case 3rd person was Cruz his picture being published beside the article imputes him as the
90
 Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim any talismanic
immunity form constitutional limitations
State interest in press freedom citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public affairs is necessary
for the maintenance of good governance… “Public officials must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comments on official acts”…”of course criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.”
So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to have and express their
opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon freedom of the
press.
“Last word on the subject” Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given leeway and tolerance
as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy
Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was actual malice in publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this
was not done in this case)

Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correction of error in publishing does not wipe out the responsibility
arising from the publication of the original article
Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!

Dissent: Dizon, J.
Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:
No evidence of actual malice
The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz
The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be considered “excusable
negligence”

G.R. No. L-10690 June 28, 1957

APOLONIO PANGILINAN, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FELISA ALVENDIA, respondent.

Emili P. Cortes and Pacifico L. Santiago for petitioners.

Isidro T. Calma for respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case
No. 215 Pampanga (later transferred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which denied
reconsideration of the Industrial Court's decision) authorizing the ejectment of petitioners from
their respective landholdings, and their replacement by other tenants of their landlord's choice.

It appears that petitioners Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel Galang, and Valentin
Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia in barrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida

91
Blanca, Pampanga, under tenancy contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On
July 27, 1954, respondent Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the
ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54 and 1954-55, they
did not personally perform the principal work of plowing and harrowing on their respective
landholdings, but entrusted said work to other persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by
respondent that they do the farm work themselves. Petitioners in their answer, denied
respondent's claims, and alleged that they were the ones working the land although at times, they
were helped by their children and sons-in-law; and that respondent filed the ejectment action
against them because they refused to sign tenancy contracts with her on the 45-55 sharing basis
and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.
After trial, the Industrial Court found that petitioners were being helped either by their sons, sons-
in-law, or grandsons, on their landholdings; held that a contract of tenancy is personal in nature
and can not be entrusted to a son, son-in-law or grandson, especially where there is a specific
prohibition in the tenancy contracts against allowing third persons to do the principal phases of
farming for the tenants; and authorized petitioners' ejectment and replacement by other tenants.
The case was later transferred to the Court of Agrarian Relations upon its creation where
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Industrial Court's judgement, which was
denied. Hence, their present appeal.
The lower court found that the "third persons" referred to by respondent Alvendia to whom
petitioners allegedly entrusted the work of plowing and harrowing on their respective
landholdings were either their sons-in-law or grandsons who were not, however, dependent upon
them for support and were living separately from them. The issue, therefore, is whether
petitioners violated the law and their tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to such
relatives.
Republic Act 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, defines "tenant" as:
. . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another,
with the latter's consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system;
While "immediate farm household," according to the same Act, includes:
. . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him
for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise.
Under the above definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199, petitioners were within their
legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their sons-in-law or grandsons. Such
relatives fall within the phrase "the members of the family of the tenant"; and the law does not
require that these members of the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such
qualification being applicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the
tenant or not", whom, as they are "dependent upon him for support" and usually help him
operate the frame enterprise", the law considers also part of the tenant's immediate household.
But respondent Alvendia claims that as her contracts with petitioners were entered into when Act
4054, the old Tenancy Act, was still in force, the definition of the word "tenant" given in said Act
should be applied in this case, to wit:
. . . a farmer or farm laborer who undertakes to work and cultivate land for
another or a person who furnishes the labor with the consent of the landlord.
Granting that Act 4054 applies to this case, there is, however, nothing in its above definition of
"tenant" to prohibit the farmer who undertakes to work and cultivate the land of another, from
doing such work with the assistance of his family, who are under his control and authority. The
above definition is, in fact, so broad that it even includes the labor of third persons hired by the
farmer to work on his farm, under the clause "or a person who furnishes the labor with the
consent of the landlord". It is the hiring of third persons to do the farm work for the tenant that
the new tenancy Republic Act No. 1199, eliminated from the old concept of "tenant" under Act
4054, thus restricting the meaning of "tenant" to one "who, himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another, with the latter's consent . . ." Whether under the new or the old tenancy law, therefore,
the work done by the members of a tenant's family is, in legal contemplation, included in the work
that the tenant undertakes to perform on the land given to him in tenancy. In the absence of clear
and categorical imperatives, we will not construe statutes in a sense inconsistent with the
traditional unity of the Filipino family.
Respondent Alvendia also contends that her tenancy contract with petitioners, Exhibits A, B, C,
and D, expressly prohibit the latter from asking for and accepting help in the cultivation of their
landholdings from their sons-in-law and grandsons, under the provision in said contracts that:
(a) The TENANT is the one to plow, harrow and prepare the land to be planted,
and likewise, he is the one to plant and fence the seedbed. With respect to
this work, the LANDLORD shall not spend for anything, but she has the power
to tell or order the TENANT when to plow, harrow, or what to do pertaining,
the tenant's work.
The above provision contains no prohibition for the tenant to accept assistance from the members
of his family in the plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting, or fencing of his landholding. It simply
enumerates the exact duties expected of the tenant by his landlord; and the tenant is referred to
as "the one" to perform these duties, only, to distinguish his obligations from those of his
landlord. We see nothing in farming tasks that requires individual specialized skill. Besides, it is a
fact that petitioners Galang and Santos were already 74 and 64, respectively, when respondent
signed the tenancy contracts with them in 1953. Respondent's having accepted petitioners Galang
and Santos as her tenants in spite of their advanced age not only disproves her claim that they are
already too old to perform their duties as tenants, but proves that she had impliedly agreed that
these petitioners would be helped by their families in their farm work, since respondent must
have realized that at their advanced age, these petitioners could not by themselves alone perform
all the farm work without family assistance.
92
The decision appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and the ejectment action filed by respondent
against petitioners dismissed, with costs against respondent Felisa Alvendia. So ordered. No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It
JJ., concur.
should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates

said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to

make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
Florentino v. PNB
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would

G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956 render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of

the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note

FACTS: payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal

one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was

The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to made which permits the use of backpay certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness

compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an in favor of the government. Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many

indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese

incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used them for the payment of

Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of

Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the Republic Act No. 304.

respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953,

refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was subsisting

respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely

the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent. under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.

People v. Tamani
ISSUE:
G.R. Nos: L-22160 & L-22161
Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all
Facts: On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and
antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879. attempted murder. On
February 25, 1963, Tamani’s counsel received a copy of the decision and consequently filed for a
motion
for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the lower court sent a
HELD: denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered mail. On September 10, 1963, the said

93
counsel appealed

94
the lower court’s decision.
Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending that the appeal should
have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day period of appeal from the date of notice
and not from the date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47
days late.
2 words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only
Issue: Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation or from the
date of notice of the decision. Held: Appeal was dismissed. The 15-day period should commence
from the date of promulgation. Ratio: Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6.
When appeal to be taken
.
— Chua v. CSC (Civil Service Commission) Case
an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a
motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served
upon the defendant or his attorney.
3 FACTS:
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a
copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-
taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while
the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by
the rule of
reddendo singula singulis
: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let
each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively". Therefore, when
the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July
13th on appellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his notice of appeal and not 11
days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late.
Mapa v. Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case Digest
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
FACTS:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa
defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders
by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa
invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the
development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D.
957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots,
and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans.
ISSUE:
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last
antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect.
HELD:
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said
contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not
apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than
those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the developer. The
to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures”. The word “and” is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to
denote a joinder or a union.
Digest Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2.
Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual
and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua,
believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on
January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same.
Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683
(Early Retirement Law).
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of
the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated
as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in
deciding this case.
G.R. No. L-5127 May 27, 1953
PEDRO BATUNGBAKAL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and MANUEL AGREGADO, as Auditor General of the
Philippines,defendants-appellants.
Government Corporate Counsel Pompeyo Diaz, Assistant Attorney Leovigildo Monasterial and Juan
T. Alano for appellant.
Jose M. Casal for appellee.
95
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal by the National Development Company (NDC) and Manuel Agregado as Auditor
General of the Philippines from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the
appellants to reinstate the plaintiff-appellee Pedro Batungbakal in his former position as property
examiner in the Comptroller's office in the NDC, with a salary of P2,040 per annum, the
compensation he was receiving when he was suspended on December 31, 1946, and further
ordering that he be paid his back salary at the rate of P2,040 per annum from the date of his
suspension up to the date of his reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever amount he still
owed the NDC. The appeal having been taken direct to this court, only questions of law may be
raised and the finding of facts made by the trial court are binding on the parties and on this
tribunal. The facts as found by the lower court may be briefly stated as follows.
On February 14, 1939, plaintiff Pedro Batungbakal was appointed by the Auditor General as cash
and property examiner in the office of the Comptroller of the NDC. Shortly before the Pacific was
the position of cash and property examiner was divided into two, namely, cash examiner and
property examiner, Batungbakal retaining the position of property examiner. Around October of
1944 he went on leave.
When the NDC was reopened in March, 1945, Batungbakal and some other employees in the
Comptroller's office were recalled to duty. The Comptoller was under the supervision of the
Auditor General but his salary and those of his personnel were paid by the NDC. Since the
reorganization of the NDC it became the practice that only the Comptroller was appointed by the
Auditor General with the approval of the Board of Directors of the Company while the personnel
in his office were appointed by the company itself.
On August 24, 1945, Batungbakal was appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Directors and
Acting General Manager of the NDC as property examiner in said company with a salary of P100 a
month; he was promoted in salary to P2,040 a year effective April 1, 1946, in the same position of
property examiner by appointment dated March 30, 1946, signed by the Acting General Manager
of the NDC.
On December 31, 1946, Batungbakal was suspended from office as property examiner by the
Investigating Committee created by Administrative Order No. 39 of the President of the
Philippines, and on April 17, 1947, he received from the officer in charge of the NDC notice of his
dismissal. Said notice reads as follows:
Pursuant to the instruction of the Chief of the Executive Office, I have the
honor to inform you that according to the report of the Investigation
Committee which was created under Administrative Order No. 39 of His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines to investigate the business affairs
and operations of the National Development Company, you have been found
to have committed gross negligence in the performance of your duties to the
detriment of this Company. The said Committee likewise found that
irregularities committed by you constitute acts and ommission which made
possible the ommission of irregularities in the disposal of yarns either in the
names of fictitious buyers or through dummies, contrary to the policy of this
Company.
On May 28, 1947, Batumbakal filed a petition for reconsideration with the Office of the President;
the matter was referred to Hon. Sixto de la Costa as Chairman of the Investigating Committee.
On December 4, 1948, the Investigating Committee of the NDC under the Chairmanship of
Honorable e la Costa submittee to the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of Justice
its report of the investigation which ends thus:
In view of the foregoing, the committee reconsiders its previous findings,
declaring that Batungbakal and de la Cruz have not committed negligence in
the discharge of their duties, and therefore recommends their reinstatement
to the service of the National Development Company.
On August 17, 1949, the Secretary of Justice forwarded the said report together with other
pertinent papers to the Office of the President with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that: (1) Mr. Pedro
Batungbakal be reinstated with the warning that, as representative of the
Comptroller, which included the auditing department, he was bound by the
rules, regulations and instructions issued by the Management of the National
Development Company and his failure hereafter to comply with these rules,
regulations and instructions will be more severely dealt with; . . . "t" (Exhibit
A).
On September 5, 1949, the Office of the President of the Philippines referred the matter to the
General Manager of the NDC through the Chairman of the Control Committee, Government
Enterprise Council (GEC) for appropriate action.
On October 14, 1949, the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Control Committee of the GEC
forwarded the papers to the General Manager of the NDC with the following statements:
The Control Committee, GEC, hereby concurs in the view of the Secretary of
Justice stated in the preceding second endorsement exonerating Messrs.
Pedro Batungbakal and Sisenando de la Cruz of the charge of gross negligence
in the performance of their duties since the evidence gathered by the
Investigating Committee headed by Judge de la Costa shows that they did not
know of the existence of the instructions contained in the memorandum order
of the Management dated June 13, 1946 and the goods sold by the National
Development Company were delivered to an authorize representative of the
party to whom the goods were sold. (See Exhibit 2-A of the respondent
Auditor General.)
On October 27, 1949, the Technical Assistant (Legal Credit and Collection) of the NDC wrote a
letter to the Auditor General through the Auditor of the NDC, wherein after giving a brief
96
statement of the case of Batungbakal including the findings and recommendation of the
Investigation Committee and the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice for the
reinstatement of Batungbakal, he requested the opinion of the Auditor General as to whether or
not Batungbakal was entitled to his backpay from the date of his suspension to the date of his
reisntatement.
The Auditor of the NDC in his first indorsement to the Auditor General among other things said:
Obviously, the reinstatement of Mr. Batungbakal in the Office of the Auditor of
the National Development Company is no longer feasible, because there is no
vacancy for the position of "property examiner" formerly held by him. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
However, in view of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice in this
case, this Office believes that no objection may interposed to the
reinstatement of Mr. Batungbakal in the National Development provided that
the same is not made to any position under the jurisdiction of the General
Auditing Office.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, it is believed that Mr. Batungbakal is not entitled to any salary
from the time of his suspension or dismissal to the date of his resinstatement
or appointment to a position different from that held by him when he was
suspended and later dismissed from office.
On February 15, 1960, the Auditor General returned the papers of Batungbakal of the NDC with
the following statement:
In view of the foregoing circumstances surroundings the case of Mr. Pedro
Batungbakal and the fact that his reinstatement to the position formerly held
by him in that office is no longer feasible, this Office recommends that anew
position be created in the National Development Company to which he may
be reinstated, provided it will not be in the Auditing Department.
With reference to his claim for salary, this Office will offer no objection to the
payment thereof from the ate of his suspension on December 31, 1946, to the
date of his dismissal on April 17, 1957 (Exhibit 1-AG).
On April 15, 1950, the Secretary of the Board of Directors of the NDC wrote to Batungbakal
informing him that the Board of Directors of the NDC in its meeting of April 12, 1950, has
authorized the payment of his salary during the period of his suspension from December 31, 1946
to the date of his dismissal on April 17, 1947, as recommended by the Auditor General, and that
the Board likewise authorized his reappointment to any suitable position in the NDC. His backpay
from December 31, 1946 up to April 17, 1947 amounting to P689 was applied to the sum of
P1,392.42 (should be P1,394.42), leaving an unpaid balance of P705.42.
On August 15, 1950, the Acting Secretary of Economic Coordination replying to a letter of counsel
for Batungbakal said that he approved the action taken by the Board of Directors of the NDC
reiterating its previous resolution that it had no objection to the re-employment of Batungbakal to
any suitable position in the NDC but stating however that it was not possible to re-employ him at
that time because his former item was already occupied by someone else, and that there were no
vacant item to which he could be appointed.
On October 2, 1950, Batungbakal wrote to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the NDC,
requesting his resinstatement in the service of the company and the payment to him of all his
salary up to the date of his resinstatement. Acting upon this request the Board of Directors of the
NDC in its meeting held October 8, 1950 authorized his reinstatement as previously approved by
said Board on April 12, 1950 provided that "he renounce his right to claim for the payment of his
back salary, and authorized the Acting General Manager to look for a suitable position for him in
the National Shipyard & Graving Dock Department."
On November 4, 1950, Batungbakal through counsel informed the General Manager of the NDC
that he declined to accept any position other than the one formerly occupied by him and
requested that his back salary be paid to him as soon as possible.
In its meeting of November 8, 1950, the Board of Directors of the NDC approved Batungbakal's
request for the payment of his salary amounting to P 7,820 as of October 31, 1950, and
appropriated the necessary sum therefore, subject to the final approval of the GEC and the
Auditor General provided Batungbakal relinquished his right to reinstatement in the service of the
NDC.
On November 17, 1950, the Acting General Manager of the NDC wrote to the Secretary of
Economic Coordination transmitting excerpts from the minutes of the meeting of the NDC held on
November 8, 1950, for his final approval at the same time informing Batugbakal's counsel of his
action.
In a memorandum to the Auditor General dated December 29, 1950, the Chief Law Officer, after
discussing the fact of the case of Batungbakal stated his opinion that the action of the Board of
Directors of the NDC authorizing the payment of back salaries to Batungbakal was legally justified
for the reason that Batungbakal had not been suspended and dismissed for cause, and that as an
employee of the NDc which is an agency of the Government he could not be removed except for
cause. The Senior Attorney of the same office in another memorandum to the Auditor General on
the same matter said that he had an interview with counsel of Batungbakal regarding the latter's
claim for back salary, and made reference to efforts of the Auditor's office towards a compromise
and stated his belief that the full back salary of Batungbakal could legally be paid by the
Government because it covered a period of only three years, and that there was a precedent to
support it, namely, that of Severo Yap, former Superintendent of the of about of Prisons who was
paid his back salary for a period of about five years during his suspension, and he expressed his
belief that the office may not insist on further compromise.
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On February 7, 1951, the Auditor General by his 2nd indorsement returned to the Administrator of
Economic Coordination the resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of the NDC on November
8, 1950, authorizing the payment to Batungbakal of the sum of P7,820 as back salary from
December 31, 1946 to October 31, 1950 with the following comment and recommendation:
This office finds no specific provision of law under which payment to Mr.
Batungbakal of the aforesaid amount of P7,820 may be authorized. The
provisions of section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorizes
payment to a suspended employee of his full salary corresponding to the
whole period of his suspension upon his exoneration or reinstatement may
not be applied in the instant case because, as will be noted from the facts
stated in the within letter of Mr. Batungbakal, dated October 2, 1950, he was
not merely suspended from office but also dismissed from the service.
In the case, however, of employees who were dismissed from the service by
the Commissioner of Civil Service but subsequently exonerated upon appeal to
the Civil Service Board of Appeals, it was ruled by the President as a matter of
policy that payment of their salary for the period they were out of the service
shall be discretionary on the part of the Department Head concerned. This
ruling, it is believed, may be followed in the instant case.
In view of the precarious financial condition of the National Development
Company, the undersigned, pursuant to the aforesaid ruling, hereby
authorizes the payment to Mr. Batungbakal of his salary corresponding only to
the period from the date of his suspension on December 31, 1946 to
December 31, 1947.
On April 12, 1950, the Administrator of Economic Coordination in his 3rd indorsement, returned
said resolution to the General Manager of the NDC informing him that in view of the reasons
stated in the preceding indorsement, his office had no objection to the payment of the salary of
Batungbakal from December 31, 1946 to December 31, 1947.
On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied if not disgusted with
the treatment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the NDC
and Manuel Agregado as Auditor General with the following prayer:
Wherefore plaintiff prays this Honorable court:
(a) In the first cause of action, to order the officer-in-charge of the defendant
NDC to reinstate the plaintiff into the service without any condition or
qualification whatsoever;
(b) In the second cause of action, to order the Auditor General to approve the
claim of the plaintiff for his back salary from the time he was suspended on
December 31, 1946 up to the time that he would be reinstated, and also to
order the officer-in-charge of the NDC to pay the back salaries of plaintiff for
the above-stated period at the rate of P2,040 per annum;
(c) To order the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000) representing damages and attorney's fees and also to order the
defendants to pay the costs of this suit; and
(d) To grant the plaintiff all other just and equitable relief.
The defendants each filed an answer. Hearing was had on the preliminary issue raised by the
Auditor General in his answer to the effect that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's
cause of action against the Auditor General whose decisions are appealable only to the President
of the Philippines or to Supreme Court defending on whether the aggrieved party is a government
officer or a private person, citing Article XI, section 3, of the Constitution, Commonwealth Act 327,
and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Auditor General further claimed that his right and duty to
appoint personnel and to approve accounts was discretionary on his part and could not be limited
or compelled by mandamus.
Ruling, that the court had jurisdiction, it ordered the case to be tried on its merits. After trial the
lower court presided by Judge Fidel Ibañez rendered the decision now appealed from as related at
the beginning of this opinion.
To determine the right of plaintiff Batungbakal to reinstatement and to back salaries, it is
necessary to ascertain his status as an employee. Altho his salary was paid by the NDC,
nevertheless, he was appointed by the Auditor General who under section 548 of the
Administrative Code, is ex officio auditor of corporations like the NDC wherein the Government of
the Philippines owns the majority stock. As such ex officio auditor, the Auditor General is
authorized to appoint his representative in the said corporation as well as to appoint and fix the
salary and the number of personnel to assist said representative in said work. Batungbakal was
such employee in the office of the comptroller or auditor of the NDC, under the control of the
Auditor General. Although after the reorganization of the NDC it became the practice for the NDC
itself to appoint personnel in the office of the comptroller or company auditor, nevertheless, the
practice cannot override or supplant the legal provisions of the law, much lees affect the status of
such personnel.
In an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice in his second indorsement of July 27, 1949,
requested by the Auditor General, the said Secretary said that the auditor General controlled
corporations referring to the Cebu Portland Cement Co. (which has the same status as the NDC as
well as their subordinates are not corporate employees but agents of the Government and
therefore they are embraced in the civil service. According to the Secretary of Justice this view
was shared by the Commissioner of Civil Service himself.
Article XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that "no officer or employee in the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Section 694 of the
Administrative Code has a similar provision. Interpreting these two laws, basis and statutory, we
have held in the case of Lacson vs. Romero,1 G.R. No. L-3081, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778 and De los Santos
vs. Mallari2 G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1952, that a civil service official may not be removed from
office except for cause. We have here a case of a civil service employee, suspended and later
dismissed without case as shown by the fact that after a reinvestigation he was exonerated and
found guiltless of the charges of gross negligence filed against him, and was even recommended
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for reinstatement by the Government Committee that investigated him. In other words, his
suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only of the Administrative Code but of
the Constitution itself. To remedy the evil and wrong committed, the least that could be done is to
restore to him the office and post of which he had been illegally deprived, and to include in that
remedy or redress payment of the salary which he should have received during this period of
illegal suspension and dismissal is far from unreasonable and unjust.
courts. This same question was raised and decided in the case of Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47
Phil., 866, where it was held that the failure to appeal from the Auditor's decision does not affect
claimant's right of redress in the Courts, and that although the Organic Act provides that the
"decision of the Auditor shall be final and conclusive upon the executive branches of the
Government," said Organic ACt does not provide that said decision shall be final and conclusive
upon either the Legislature or the Judiciary.

But the Auditor General contends that under the law which gives him right to appoint the
personnel in the office of the Comptroller of the NDC, he has full discretion to appoint or not to
appoint any person in that office; that as Auditor General vested by the Constitution and section
584 of the Administrative Code with jurisdiction over the accounts of the Government including
claims against it, he also has full discretion to grant or withhold back salaries corresponding to the
period of suspension or dismissal of an employee appointed by him. It is also claimed that to
reinstate Batungbakal to his former position would mean the removal without cause of the
present incumbent. We cannot agree with Auditor General. His theory and contention if accepted
and followed would lead to an unfortunate and intolerable situation, incongruous with basic
principles of justice and the constitutional protection of civil service employees against
Government abuse and unjustified suspension or removal. Without reference to the present
Auditor General, let us imagine in the future an arbitrary and wrong-minded Auditor General
dismissing an employee from his office or in an office under his control, without cause, and later
appointing another person to the same position. Such dismissed employee may establish to the
satisfaction of the Government and the courts that he was innocent and was dismissed without
reason or cause, and yet under the theory afore-mentioned, such dismissed employee is utterly
helpless and without redress because his reinstatement and the payment of his back salary are
wholly within the Auditor General's discretion which may not be controlled by mandamus to say
nothing of the fact that having already filed the position, there is no vacancy to which the
dismissed employee may be re-appointed. The unreasonables and fallacy of the theory and
contention above-mentioned is patently revealed and brought home by the case just imagined.
As for the contention that for the Auditor General to reinstate the plaintiff would be tantamount
to compelling him to dismiss without cause the present incumbent who was appointed after
plaintiff's dismissal, suffice it to say that in so doing, neither injustice nor violation of law would be
committed. Inasmuch as Batungbakal was illegally suspended and dismissed, legally speaking, his
position never became vacant, hence there was no vacancy to which the present incumbent could
be permanently appointed. In other words, the present incumbent's occupancy of or tenure in
said post is temporary and precarios and does not come within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition. But, assuming for the moment that the incumbent's tenure were
permanent and that said tenure fell under the protection of the Constitution, still, his being made
to leave the post to give way to the plaintiff's superior right, may yet be considered as removal for
cause, not unlike a case of quo warranto where a respondent incumbent is ousted by court order
to give way to the successful party or petitioner.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.

When a citizen after due hearing establishes his right in court, said right is paramount and must be
given force and effect. The way must be cleared for its enforcement, and technicalities in
procedure, judicial as well as administrative, must give away.

Having proven that he (the plaintiff) had been suspended and dismissed without cause, contrary
to the express provision of the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of
the Auditor General, a duty whose performance may be controlled and enjoined
by mandamus.3 There is no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not being directed to
perform an act which he may or may not execute according to his discretion. He is being asked
and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong done. And the payment of the back salary is
merely incidental to and follows reinstatement, this, aside from the parallel and analogy which
may be found in section 260, paragraph 1, Revised Administrative Code which provides for the
payment of back salary upon reinstatement.

It is further argued that Batungbakal not having appealed from the decision of the Auditor General
denying his claim to reisntatement and payment of back salary, as provided by Article XI, section
3, of the Constitution, the Jones Law, section 255, Revised Administrative Code, Commonwealth
Act No. 327, section 2 thereof, and Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, said decision has become final
and conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, and he may not resort to the
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