2015 International Conference on Protocol Engineering (ICPE) and International Conference on New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NTDS).

D2D Group Communications Security

Emad Abd-Elrahman, Hatem Ibn-khedher and Hossam Afifi
Institut Mines-Telecom, RST Department, Saclay, France
{emad.abd_elrahman, hatem.ibn_khedher, hossam.afifi}@telecom-sudparis.eu

Abstract—Proximity Services (ProSe) discovery or Proximity Service security). Moreover, those two phases have
communications using LTE-based Device-to-Device (D2D) to use a secure key for each ProSe which is considered as a
communications have been recently in the heart of the group of D2D users.
discussions about the advent of 5G networks. Meanwhile, their
related security aspects are of a major concern especially when
dealing with direct radio communications and large-scale
deployment of D2D groups. As the security features of short
radio communications are much less robust than those used in
public cellular systems, they would not be adequate for major
public services and they would be unsuitable for public safety
(PS-ProSe) applications proposed by D2D. Yet, existing security
algorithms and solutions are not adapted to these emerging new
types of communications and group formation. The goal of this
paper is focused on D2D communications’ security issues in both
ProSe discovery and communication phases. First, we address the
global security stakes and challenges in group communications.
Then, we propose a Group Key Management (GKM) mechanism
to secure the exchanged D2D messages during the discovery and
communication phases. The proposed solution is discussed and
compared to similar solutions for GKM near to our D2D use
cases (i.e. ad-hoc). Moreover, the implemented solution results Fig. 1. Main phases in D2D communication.
indicate an efficient key management system for our D2D group
communication. In our previous work [6], we provided a secure D2D
discovery solution to be integrated with 3GPP discovery
Keywords—Device-to-Device communications; LTE; Security;
Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
phase. This IBE based solution is implemented and tested for
its performance and security measure analysis either for single
or multiple domains.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Identity-based cryptography schemes that have been
Today, security is considered as an important step in the proposed based on a single Private Key Generator (PKG) as
design and implementation of new versions for the Fifth- shown in Fig. 2 is not suitable for multi-domain networks or in
Generation (5G) cellular network. However, the security is a our D2D ProSe use case. This is due to the high mobility of
matter of different requirements. Therefore, we study key D2D aspect (dynamicity issue).
distribution systems to manage the security phases for
discovery and communication in inter and intra operators In this work, we are going to present an ID-based
D2D. cryptography scheme based on multiple PKGs. We believe
that our scheme is more suitable for multi-domain ad-hoc
Recent studies on LTE-based D2D have been already networks than previously proposed schemes as it will be
discussing some of the major aspects of D2D, such as D2D clarified in results section.
high bitrates, lower communication delay [1], peer discovery
mechanisms [2], LTE protocol stack extensions to support
D2D communications on both radio and core networks [3],
and radio ressource allocation methods [4][5]. Despite being
of a major concern for the deployment of D2D-based services,
security and privacy aspects still need many investigations to
cope with the dynamic ProSe security requirements.
The D2D has mainly two phases (Discovery and
Communication) after passing the initialization phase as
shown in Fig. 1. We assumed that, the phase of initialization is
Fig. 2. D2D secure phases based PKG integration
pre-done and secured enough by the 4G/5G core network
security elements for authentication and key agreement. For For securing any group communication like multicast
D2D phases, each phase has to be secured in order in order to architectures, we need to build a strong protocol for the Group
assure the security requirements of the application (i.e Key Management (GKM).

978-1-4673-9265-5/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE

2015 International Conference on Protocol Engineering (ICPE) and International Conference on New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NTDS).
Fig. 3 details the preliminary security requirements for
general group communications as follows:
Group communication has two important security
requirements: ‘Group Confidentiality’ and ‘Key Management’.
Furthermore, we must guarantee the security of established
sessions. Therefore, we can conclude that; the base for
providing common security services for group
communication is the ‘Key Management’.
Fig. 3. Security requirements for group communications.
Group key Management has very simple usage but it
suffers from two problems: the problem of keys distribution
and the problem of keys revocation. Thus, the security issues
for building a secure group communication have two types:
security requirements in GKM (our study) and QoS which is
not the goal of this paper.
We now enumerate the five security requirements in
GKM: forward secrecy, backward secrecy, collusion freedom,
Key Independence and Trust Relationship. All those security
requirements can be defined as follows:
• Forward Secrecy (FS): for users who left the group,
they should not have an access to the future key.
• Backward Secrecy (BS): for new users who join the
session, they should not have an access to the old
key.
• Collusion Freedom (CF): for any set of fraudulent
users, they should not be able to deduce the current
traffic encryption.
• Key Independence (KI): for different groups (i.e
different ProSe(s)) keys must not be able to discover
any other group key.
• Trust Relationship (TR): for not revealing the keys
to any other part (same domain) or party (another
domain).
The preliminary solutions for these requirements are
presented in Table I.
To better understand the security issue in D2D, it is
important to explain the difference between general cellular
security constraints and those to meet in D2D; in the current
LTE system, the device is first identified, then authenticated
and the radio link is encrypted. The whole communication
process is controlled by the operator core network which is
acting as a trusted third party. In LTE-based D2D, a new
communication scheme has been introduced based on the use
of the proximity information of devices to establish LTE direct
radio links between them without the assistance of the network
infrastructure [7].
TABLE I. PRELIMINARIES SOLUTIONS FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Security Requirements Solution
Perfect FS Re-Key Algorithm
Perfect BS Re-Key Algorithm
KI ECDLP
CF ECDLP + Refresh Algorithm
TR Authentication + Key Agreement
Hence, before exchanging the data, a proximity discovery
phase is needed. Also, in order to secure the user information
and the exchange of data over direct links with proximate
peers, a key derivation mechanism is needed for encryption
operations. So, the main objective from this work is to secure
the restricted D2D discovery and communication for any
ProSe application.
However, security and privacy issues in D2D are seldom
mentioned to date. The only proposed solutions are those
based on the guarantee of 3GPP system [8]. Due to its
sensitivity and time cost, security and privacy levels in D2D
face many challenges, such as efficient encryption and
decryption algorithms (heavy or light techniques), encrypted
information retrieval (such as session information), attribute
based encryption, attacks on availability bands (those bands
assigned to D2D discovery or communication), reliability and
integrity of identities. So, assuring D2D security requires
having certain balance with performance. This paper aims at
providing a light security measure in order to keep the
performance level of low capacity devices.
The predominant security approaches use asymmetric
crypto rather than symmetric key architectures1. In general,
the solutions with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provide
strong security features but they require extra communications
to manage the Certificate Revocation Lists (CLRs) and high
storage overheads. To our knowledge, there is no security
solution for either Restricted Discovery process or Direct-D2D
Communication which uses Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Our Approach is a
hybrid solution that integrates IBE and ECC as a new design
model which enhances the level of security for both
(Restricted Discovery and Direct Communications).
The following sections are organized as follows; Section II
summarizes background and related works on D2D security
aspects. Section III describes our IBE-based solution for
secure direct D2D group communications. Then, the
implementation details of the proposed solution are presented,
along with performance evaluation results in Section IV.
Finally, this work is concluded in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
D2D mechanisms have been recently standardized by the
3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) as extensions to the
LTE architecture [6] for the deployment of Proximity-based
Services (ProSe). They proposed different deployment
schemes of D2D discovery and communication phases were
identified; for instance, network-assisted D2D schemes allow
1
http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html
2015 International Conference on Protocol Engineering (ICPE) and International Conference on New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NTDS).
a partial control from the core network over the D2D phases
i.e data flow routed via eNB(s) (D2D-A), while direct D2D
schemes (D2D-D) allow the establishment of direct links
between devices without any involvement of the core network.
In both schemes, the device is initially authenticated during
the network attach (USIM authentication & terminal
authentication using UMTS AKA protocol for authentication
and key agreement) [8], and then grants authorization from the
LTE core network to use the D2D resources.
The Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) has emerged as a
long-term evolution or substitution to Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). It is a crypto system in which the public
key is generated using the identity of the client (user) and the
private key is the public key multiplied by the secret key of
the server. The latter is responsible of the user’s private key
distribution and is called the Private Key Generator (PKG).
D2D security procedures for Proximity-based services
including key generation systems for Direct D2D are not yet
well investigated in the 3GPP standards. However, there are
few works in the literature that propose some solutions:
In [9], authors propose mechanisms to achieve D2D
security through Key Hierarchies (KH); the solution is based
on a Key Distribution System (KDS) when two users are
connected to the same operator, eNB and Mobile Management
Entity (MME). They also propose a Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
based security scheme for Public Safety scenarios (PS)
specifically for out of network coverage users’ use case and
using homomorphic encryption for user privacy
amelioration. Generally, the proposed solution in [9] reuses
the existing security features of LTE-A so as to reduce any
CAPEX cost. But, it did not deal with multiple domains
scenario with two eNBs. Moreover, the user privacy is
elevated in our solution especially in discovery phase using
strong identity creation procedure. In our solution, we propose
an asymmetric cryptographic system using the IBE key
generation based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), in
order to secure both D2D discovery and communication
phases. The ECC can achieve the high degree of security with
the short lengths keys comparing to RSA.
Authors in [10] investigate the security aspects for routing
informations through the study of secure Network Coding
(NC) routing for Public Safety (PS) D2D communications
over LTE Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets). The proposed
approach named SNCDS is based on a Data Splitting
algorithm (SNCDS) and consists on a core network security
solution. Whereas, in our solution, we propose a complete
secure communication protocol between the device and the
network entities (i.e PKG and ProSe servers).
Besides, a secure ‘smart’ solution is proposed in [11] to
enhance D2D communications efficiency while adding
security features; the proposed security framework is designed
to decrease network congestion while reducing security
threats. A discussion about security issues in D2D and D2D
security business models are proposed. In our work, we
propose a technical complementary solution for security issues
in D2D phases. This solution can be integrated with security
framework architecture proposed by 3GPP for LTE-A [12].
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
We present an ID-based cryptography scheme based on
Elliptic Curve Cryptography for securing multicast group
communication.
The proposed protocol is based on the idea of key graph
[13]. The idea is to divide the group of members formed after
the discovery process into subgroups. Each subgroup has 2
members D2D users and shares one session key. This sub-
grouping reduces the complexity of the two main processes:
join process and leave process. This reduction is from O (size
of group) to O (log4 (size of group)/2). This protocol works in
a hierarchy of two levels of controllers: Group Controller
(GC), and Subgroup Controller (SC). Each SC works as the
server of the D2D users and shares a secret key (symmetric
key) with GC.
In Fig. 4, we define the group formation procedure. Our
group formed in this process is a sequence of subgroups
formed by D2D multiple domains.
Fig. 4. Group formation procedure
We denote the Key Server (PKG) related to the group
which is responsible for Key distribution. The goal of this
scheme is to secure a group communication by sub-grouping
the whole group of discovered devices into subgroup of 2
members. In order to achieve perfect forward secrecy and
perfect backward secrecy, the group key should be updated
any time when dynamicity occurs in the group membership by
joining or leaving the group. The proposed scheme is
organized like LKH approach [14].
A. Steps of the proposed protocol
We can detail our proposed work as follows:
Step1: Secret keys generation
Each node picks its private/public key as mentioned in the
first scenario of intra-domain communication (details in [6]):
• Kpub=H (PID)*Y
• Kpriv=H (PID)*X
Step2: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) protocol
In this step, we execute the ECDSA [6] protocol for fast
group discovery.
Step3: Signature verification
After ECDSA, each device in interest of the sender node,
verifies the signature.
2015 International Conference on Protocol Engineering (ICPE) and International Conference on New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NTDS).
Step4: Group Formation Procedure
In this step, we formed a group as shown in Fig. 5. The
formation of the group is based on the Logical Key Hierarchy
(LKH) Protocol as following:
Fig. 5. The 4-ary key tree for our group formation procedure
Each subgroup "i" is formed by D2D users and shared a
common Key Ki as an output of Elliptic curve Diffie–
Hellman Protocol (ECDHP) [6].
Step4: keys generation
In this step, each subgroup self-calculates its subgroup Key
Ki as following: Ki=a*b*P=KD2D, (where a and b are the
private numbers used by ECDHP). Finally, the Key Server
calculates for each i=1, 5, 9, 13:
Ki, i+3=sum (Ki, Ki+1, Ki+2, Ki+3) which is called the
node key.
KG=sum (Ki, i+3) which called the group key.
Step5: Join process
In this process, when new user equipment joins the
multicast group, a re-keying must be done in order to achieve
perfect forward secrecy (PFS) requirement. In this process an
authentication with the key server is first done, and then the
user will share with the key server a session key sent from key
server to the new member in a secure way. The key server
assigns a subgroup identity and an identity to the member. As
an example, if we suppose that the subgroup 16 has one
member, then new user will belong to subgroup 16 and its
identity is 2. At this time the keys that must be updated are
K16, K13, 16, and KG to K’16, K’13, 16 and K’G.
The key Server receives from SC the new Key of D2D
users, calculates the required Keys and sends them unicast.
Then, it will be encrypted by the session Key to the new
member.
S unicast U2 {K’13, 16, K’G} session_key
The key server also encrypts K’13, 16 by k13, 16 for
subgroup 13, 14, 15 and encrypts also k’G by KG for
subgroup 1 to 12. Then, it distributes these encrypted keys
through multicast for the existing members.
S Multicast Existing Members {(K’16) k16, (K’13, 16) k13,
16, (K’G) KG} session_key
Step6: Leave process
In this phase, we have to achieve the perfect backward
secrecy (PBS). In fact, when user equipment leaves the
session, it should not decrypt the transferred data. So a process
of re-keying must also be done like in join process. At this
process, the member, who wants to leave the group, sends a
leave request to the key server. Group members update their
keys as following:
• K’’16 = an arbitrary choice from the member left
alone in the form (x*P) where x is a random number.
• K’’13, 16 =K’13, 16 – K’16 + K’’16
• K’’G=K’G – K’13, 16 + K’’13, 16
As we notice, the key server does not need to generate
solely a new key after a leave from a member, the process of
re-keying is in cooperation between members and Key Server.
The key server has only to broadcast the new key received
from the remaining member of the subgroup 16.
IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this part, we present the performance evaluation
obtained in the security of group communications
implementation. We used the IBE provided with “MIRACL
Library” [15] on which we integrated some modifications to
implement the necessary communication procedures between
entities in D2D2. We used the elliptic curve y2=(x3-
3x+b)modp, where p is 256-bits prime number and b is
determined through a function in MIRACL that calculates the
number of points in a finite field (prime number). The
obtained results are estimated using a computer machine with
the following configuration: Intel Core i5 2410 M CPU 2.30
GHz, memory 4G in Linux Ubunto12.
Since we must answer several security requirements, our
proposed work uses (IBC + ECC) for key Management. The
IBC + ECC are used also for Master Key and Private Key
Generation. Moreover, they are also used for Group Key
Generation and Agreement. Therefore, our approach increases
the level of security in order to prevent any form of attack and
guarantee the following requirements:
• Non-Repudiation
• Integrity and Protection
• Privacy in Group Communication (GK)
• Anonymity in GK
• Dynamicity with ECC
• Key Revocation
• Key Escrow
• Identity Disclosure
We now extend our solution in order to include group
communication then we will make a comparison between our
approach and the related work or paradigms. Generally and
based on security techniques, we can compare IBC
straight/weaknesses between our approach and other works
(see Table II).
Our proposed solution has two new contributions:
• Dynamicity: It is assured by rekeying after the phases
of join and leave.
• Anonymity: ECC is based on pseudonym instead of
identity which leads to assure privacy, anonymity and
2
The code: http://www-public.int-evry.fr/~afifi/D2D-security.rar
2015 International Conference on Protocol Engineering (ICPE) and International Conference on New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NTDS).

solve identity disclosure problem. Further, the use of TABLE III. KEY GENERATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
ECC achieves the highest speed of IBE’s functions. Process on Key Server Process on Member Node
Approach
Join Leave Join Leave
TABLE II. COMPARISON IBC STRAIGHT/WEAKNESSES BETWEEN OUR SA 2 1 0 0
APPROACH AND OTHER WORKS LKH Log2n Log2n 0 0
Implicit Key DOD Need for OFT Log2n Log2n-1 Log2n Log2n
Approach
Certificate Escrow Attack CA Manisha Log4(n/m) 0 0 0
PKI [16] No Yes No Yes
Our Protocol Log4(n/2)-1 0 0 Log4(n/2)-1
IBC [17-18] Yes Yes No No
CL-PKC [19] Yes No Yes No
AHMAD [20] Yes No No No
Our Protocol No No No No

In order to evaluate the performance of our solution for

secure group communications, we considered two evaluation
approaches:
The first evaluation approach consists on comparing our
solution with other IBE/ECC based solutions according to the
following metrics: the computational overhead, the
communication overhead, the re-keying message size and the
key storage overhead. Thus, we use those mentioned metrics Fig. 6. Key generation overhead at the key server during join process (m=2
with a focus on the computation overhead of the key for D2D use case).
generation. The second approach consists on evaluating the
weakness of the IBE and the ways of creating and using keys. 2) Key storage overhead
This metric is measured by the total number of keys. Table
A. First Comparison Evaluations IV shows that our solution outperforms the LKH and OFT
In terms of complexity and performance, the key protocols and equals to Manisha protocol because both
generation overhead for key server and member nodes at join approaches are based on 4-ary key tree.
or leave process is summarized in Table III. In fact, this table
shows a comparison of the number of keys generated in the TABLE IV. COMMUNICATION & RE-KEYING OVERHEAD
joining and the leaving phases. This comparison is done Process on Key Server
Process on Key Server Node “Re-
between our solution and other approaches such as Simple Node
Approach keying”
Application approach, Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) Protocol “Communication”
[14], One-way Function Tree (OFT), and Manisha et al Join Leave Join Leave
Protocol [21]. The Simple Approach (SA) reduces the SA 1 n-1 1 N
LKH 2*Log2n-1 2*Log2n 2*Log2n-1 2*Log2n
maximum number of keys that should be generated after the
joining or the leaving process. Compared to LKH, OFT and OFT Log2n+1 Log2n+1 Log2n+1 Log2n+1
Manisha protocols, our approach minimizes the number of Manisha 1 1 Log4┌n/2┐+1 Log4┌n/2┐+1
keys that should be generated if a UE joins or leaves the Our
1 1 Log4┌n/2┐+1 Log4┌n/2┐+1
group. The most important is that in our solution, the key Protocol
server does not need to generate new keys for the members at
TABLE V. KEY STORAGE OVERHEAD
leave.
Approach Key storage on Server Key storage on Member
From Fig. 6, we prove that our solution reduces the
SA 1 N
number of keys generated by the key server for members who LKH 2n Log2n+1
join the group. In addition, it exceeds the performance of
OFT 2n 2*Log2n+1
LKH, OFT, and Manisha protocols [21] (for m=2, as our case
Manisha (4/3)*n Log4┌n/2┐+1
is D2D means 2 users).
Our Protocol (4/3)*n Log4┌n/2┐+1
1) Communication and Re-Keying message size overhead
The first metric is measured by the total number of B. Second Comparison of IBC Weaknesses
transmitted control messages while the second by the total We will compare Key Management Using IBC and some
number of keys included in one multicast messages. Table III weaknesses of IBC. Therefore, the following (Table VI) will
shows that our solution outperforms the LKH and OFT summarize the main characteristics and weaknesses of Group
protocols. Indeed, in our solution the key server sends in one key (GK) generation and agreement scheme.
multicast message all key information to existing members at
join, and to remaining members at leave. For the Re-keying Moreover, we can address another comparison for the
message size, the key server does not need to generate the sub- main problems of IBC in MANETs such as: Identity
group keys to existing members at join and at leave. Disclosure, Identity Revocation, and Key Escrow. Therefore,
the following Table VII summarizes the main characteristics
and weaknesses of schemes overcoming problems of IBC.
2015 International Conference on Protocol Engineering (ICPE) and International Conference on New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NTDS).

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