[SHEE] G.R. No.

210266 June 7, 2017

ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Republic Act No. 8484

FACTS: Cruz was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 8484. According to the prosecution, Cruz allegedly tried to
purchase two (2) bottles of Calvin Klein perfume from Duty Free Philippines
Fiesta Mall. Wong, the cashier, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using a
Citibank Visa credit card. The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted
the validity of the credit card since the number at the back was not aligned. Cruz
also tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes using a Citibank Visa credit
card bearing the name "Gerry Santos". The card was approved, but Lim, the
cashier, noticed that the last four (4) digits of the card were not properly
embossed. She called Citibank to verify the credit card. Upon verification,
Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the real Gerry
Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division.

After the prosecution formally offered their evidence, Cruz filed a Demurrer to
Evidence asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it was presented
and offered by the prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1- 09-SC.

The RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and stated that the credit card
receipts were properly identified by the witnesses. The RTC later found Cruz
guilty. The CA upheld such conviction.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction was proper

RULING: Yes.

Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use of
an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and
use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is
not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves that it is
counterfeit.

In this case, petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card
number 4539 7207 8677 7008, which bore the name "Gerry Santos.” He used
the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty
Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was
later proven to be a counterfeit access device.

Petitioner, however, argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the alleged
counterfeit credit card should not have been admitted as evidence because it
was not pre-marked during pre-trial. This provision, however, allows for an
exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no hard
and fast rule to determine what may constitute "good cause," though this Court
has previously defined it as any substantial reason "that affords a legal excuse."

The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented at trial
even if not previously marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed the
presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial due to the prosecution's
explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was still in the
Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's custody.

The prosecution was able to present and mark during pre-trial Citibank's
certification that the access device used was counterfeit. It is this certification that
makes the possession and use of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial
court determined that the access device could still be presented at trial since it
merely formed part of an· exhibit that had already been presented and marked
during pre-trial.
[SHEE] G.R. No. 184274, February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD Y CRISTOBAL, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484,

FACTS: Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile phone from a certain

Rochelle Bagaporo, a credit card agent, who offered a Citifinancing loan
assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, he invited her in her office.
While in his office, Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her
immediate boss, a certain "Arthur" [later identified as petitioner]. Yu submitted
various documents, such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card,
identification cards, and statements of accounts.

During the first week of August 2004, Yu received his Globe handyphone
statement of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone numbers
which were not his and upon verification he learned that he had additional five (5)
mobile numbers in his name, and the application bore the picture of [petitioner]
and his forged signature. Yu also checked with credit card companies and
learned that his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and he
had a credit card application with Metrobank.

An entrapment operation was then conducted where an NBI agent posed as the
delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching the address, the NBI
agent asked for Henry Yu. Petitioner responded that he was Henry Yu and
presented two (2) identification cards which bore the name and signature of
private complainant, while the picture showed the face of petitioner. Petitioner
was then apprehended and was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A.
No. 8484.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed said
conviction.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction was proper

RULING: Yes.

The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently
applied for, penalized by R.A. No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the
word "possession." Thus, we use the term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil
Code, that is, "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right."
The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the material
holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it.

In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained
from private complainant various documents showing the latter’s identity. He,
thereafter, obtained cellular phones using private complainant’s identity.
Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name and
personal circumstances of private complainant. Upon the delivery of the credit
card applied for, the "messenger" (an NBI agent) required two valid identification
cards. Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them,
but bearing the name and forged signature of private complainant. As evidence
of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner signed the acknowledgment
receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein that the content of the
envelope was the Metrobank credit card.

Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to
possess. Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the credit card never came into
his possession because it was only delivered to him, the above narration shows
that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the
identification cards purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he
had the intention to possess the same. Had he not actively participated, the
envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the
acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession
was transferred to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the
envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the
acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the
identity of private complainant.
[ATE WENDY] G.R. No. 175433 March 11, 2015
ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES,vs.MAILA CLEMEN F. SERRANO,
R.A. No. 7877.

FACTS:

Petitioner, the Chief of Legal Division of PHILRACOM, invited Serrano along with
their other co-workers for lunch. While seated at the table waiting for their food to
be served, petitioner suddenly held Serranos's face and forcefully kissed her in
the presence of her workmates and other customers. Respondent tried to ward
off petitioner by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing her
against her will. She was so shocked, terrified, and humiliated that she could
hardly talk and move. After releasing her, petitioner said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi
ni Maila...” Then, he held her hand and said “Maila sige na...” But, she took away
her hand from him. Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to
PHILRACOM Executive Director Juan Lozano. Prior to that “kissing” incident,
petitioner had already degraded her person on four (4) separate occasions.
Hence, the filing of an administrative case for grave misconduct, sexual
harassment and acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE:
 
Whether it is proper to downgrade petitioner's infraction from grave misconduct to
simple misconduct
 
RULING:
 
No. In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident. 
 
In the case at bar, petitioner used his position and authority as well as his moral
ascendancy, to elicit sexual favors and to indulge in sexually malicious acts from
Serrano, his female subordinate. As to petitioner's sole defense that he merely
gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is unconvinced in
view of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly kissed her
on the lips and said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila.x x x”

Petitioner should be held liable for grave misconduct, but holds that a reduction
of the penalty from dismissal from service to a mere suspension of six (6) months
without pay, is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade, there is only one incident of
sexual harassment in this case where petitioner forcibly kissed respondent who
was his subordinate.

NOTE BUT NO NEED TO WRITE: The Court disagrees on petitioner's

contention that the issue of sexual harassment is better addressed in the pending
criminal case for sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, for to do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and
extremely unreasonable. It bears to stress that administrative and criminal
charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and the trial court,
respectively, are separate and distinct from each other even if they arise from the
same act or omission.
[JILL] G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020
LBC EXPRESS-VIS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MONICA C. PALCO,
RESPONDENT
Republic Act No. 7877

FACTS:
Palco started working for LBC as a customer associate and Batucan was her
immediate supervisor.

Palco had initially noticed that Batucan would often flirt with her, which made her
uncomfortable. She reported the incident to the LBC Head Office and she had a
resignation letter prepared in case management would not act on her complaint.

Acting on her complaint, management advised her to request for a transfer to

another team while they investigated the matter.
Palco returned to the LBC Head Office with her mother and submitted her formal
complaint against Batucan. Later, they proceeded to the police station to report
the incident. Sensing that management did not immediately act on her complaint,
Palco resigned. She asserted that she was forced to quit since she no longer felt
safe at work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LBC should be held liable for constructive dismissal

HELD:

YES
This Court rules that LBC is liable for constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal has been described as tantamount to "involuntarily

resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the
employer." One of the ways by which a hostile or offensive work environment is
created is through the sexual harassment of an employee.

Workplace sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor, or agent of an

employer, or any other person who has authority over another in a work
environment, imposes sexual favors on another, which creates in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the latter. (See Section 3 of Republic Act No.
7877)
In this case, it is clear that Batucan's acts were sexually suggestive. He held
respondent's hand, put his hand on her lap and shoulder, pulled her bra strap,
joked about making a baby with her, attempted to kiss her, and eventually scored
one. These acts are not only inappropriate, but are offensive and invasive
enough to result in an unsafe work environment for respondent.

Under Section 5 of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, the employer is only

solidarily liable for damages with the perpetrator in case an act of sexual
harassment was reported and it did not take immediate action on the matter.

Such provision thus illustrates that the employer must first be informed of the
acts of the erring managerial officer before it can be held liable for the latter's
acts. Conversely, if the employer has been informed of the acts of its managerial
staff, and does not contest or question it, it is deemed to have authorized or be
complicit to the acts of its erring employee.

In this case, Batucan cannot be considered to have been acting on petitioner's

behalf when he sexually harassed respondent. Thus, respondent cannot base
her illegal dismissal complaint against petitioner solely on Batucan's acts.
However, even if petitioner had no participation in the sexual harassment, it had
been informed of the incident. Despite this, it failed to take immediate action on
respondent's complaint. Its lack of prompt action reinforced the hostile work
environment created by Batucan.

Worse, it took petitioner another two (2) months to resolve the matter, even if
Batucan's answers in his administrative hearing did not substantially differ from
respondent's allegations.

Indifference to complaints of sexual harassment victims may no longer be

tolerated. The State's policy against sexual harassment has been strengthened
through Republic Act No. 11313, otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act. This
law has expanded the definition of gender-based sexual harassment in the
workplace and has added to the duties of an employer as to its prevention,
deterrence, and punishment. It explicitly requires that complaints be
investigated and resolved within 10 days or less upon its reporting. It likewise
expressly provides for the liability of employers and duties of co-workers as to
sexual harassment. The law likewise specifies the confidentiality of proceedings,
and the issuance of a restraining order for the offended person. Moreover, it
allows local government units to impose heavier penalties on perpetrators.

While this law does not apply to this case as it was enacted after the commission
of Batucan's acts, its principles emphasize the need to accord more importance
to complaints of sexual harassment and recognize the severity of the offense.
In any case, this Court will not hesitate in granting the affirmative relief that is due
respondent under the law. Under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act, she may file a
separate action for any affirmative relief for sexual harassment:

Petitioner's insensibility to respondent's sexual harassment case is a

ground for constructive dismissal. In this instance, it cannot be denied that
respondent was compelled to leave her employment because of the hostile and
offensive work environment created and reinforced by Batucan and petitioner.
She was thus clearly constructively dismissed.
[JEZ] G.R. NO. 146053 : April 30, 2008
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, v. EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN
(RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

Facts:

Bacsin is a public school teacher and Wahiman is the father of AAA, an

elementary school student of the former. AAA claimed that Bacsin asked her to
be at his office to do an errand and once inside, she saw him get a folder. He
then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched
and fondled her breast five times. A classmate of hers, Sorrabas, claiming to
have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen.

Bacsin was charged with Misconduct by the Regional Director of the CSC.

Bacsin claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was
handing AAA a lesson book. He further stated that the incident happened in
about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.

The CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual

Harassment), and dismissed him from the service. The CSC also found Bacsin to
have committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in (RA) 7877,
the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

Issue:

Whether Bacsin was guilty of sexual harrassment under RA 7877.

Held:

Yes.

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized
by said law.

Contrary to the argument of petitioner that he did not explicitlydemand for sexual
favors, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo
v. Rayala,11 it was held, "It is true that this provision calls for a ‘demand, request
or requirement of a sexual favor.’ But it is not necessary that the demand,
request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender."

Under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or

training environment is committed "(w)hen the sexual advances result in an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or
apprentice. In this case, AAA testified that she felt fear at the time Bacsin
touched her.