The SAGE Handbook of

Cultural Sociology

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 Quantitative Analysis in Cultural
Sociology: Why It Should Be Done,
How It Can Be Done
D ick Ho utman and Peter A c ht erber g
INTRODUCTION: SOCIOLOGY AND
CULTURE - AN UNHAPPY MARRIAGE
-ociology took shape LD tfie 19 cen ry as an
ffshoot of Enlightenment thought, which cri-
qued religion, tradition, and belief as sources of
gnorance and tutelage, conceiving of science,
·ea on, and techno · uperiru:...succ.es...
_ r . hese E nlightenment roots have had pro-
ound and las mg e IO..!....gy....no eas y
m talling a blind spot for culture (Houtman,
~003) . In the hands of sociologists, culture got the
:onnotation of premodern backwardness or even
~ru pidi ty: it came to be understood as a lack of
rational insight into the true nature of things - as
the misunderstandings that people needed to be
·berated from to enable tbe light of reason to
hi ne and to make social progress possible
eidman, 1994: 19-53).
This blind spot for culture stil] exists today, as
can be seen fro m the notion of 'modernization',
which was introduced in the mid-20th century by
,\merican sociologists to refer to the social trans-
ormations already studied by their classical pre-
decessors. Until the present day, ' modernization'
refers hardly, and certainly not in the first place, to
rocesses of cultural change. It is primarily under-
tood as a process of economic and technological
change that especially takes place in tbe realms of
work and organization and that is ultimately driven
by new scientific knowledge and technological
inventions. In their textbook Sociology: A Global
Introduction, to cite just one example, Macionis
and Plummer (1997: 673) define 'modernity' as
'social patterns linked to industrialization' and
'modernization' as 'the process of social change
initiated by industrialization'. This example could
effortlessly be replaced by many others with the
same effect: that industrial (or post-industrial)
order is seen as constituting the major character-
istic of modernity, from which its cultural features
follow more or less logically and automatically.
We understand cultural sociology as a nece -
sary correction to this intellectual marginaliza-
tion of culture and expand in what fo llows on the
methodological requirements of such a correction.
After an e laboration of the sociological habit of
relegating culture to Ifie status o some ·-g ess
relevant tfian economiC'"iiiid technolo icalfactors,
we argue at or cu ra soc10logy to success-
fulJ y reconstruct and rejuvenate the rusciptine as
awhole 1t should not de ine itself as just ano er
~pec1@zat10n (besides political sociology, SciClOl-
ogy of religion, sociology of work and organiza-
tion, sociology of crime and deviance, etc.2._P~
already overly fragmented discipline, but rat er
as a general and substantially non-specialized
 226 THE SAGE HANDB OO K OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
sociologt Its principal amb ition shou ld be to dem-
onstrate to non-cu ltural sociologi ts, and indeed to
researchers in disciplines beyond sociology and
the social sciences, that taking culture more seri-
ously yields increases in explanatory potential.
As we see it, suc h an endeavor requires a
dep loyment of the quantitative methods that are
so strongly emphasized in mainstream sociol-
ogy and other disciplines. Drawing on examples
from our own work of the past ten years, we
demonstrate how the classical sociologies of
Max Weber and Emile Durkheim can be used to
inform quantitative cultural-sociological studies
that demonstrate culture's explanatory potential
by means of survey research and experimental
research respectively.
THE PROMISE OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
Sociology's Positivist Legacy and
its Blind Spot for Culture
It is te Uing that most introductory textbooks in
~p socio ogy o no m on at ugus e om e--;
\.ytf' founder of positivism and godfather of SOCJOlogy,
~ later in his life also fo unded a p~udo-scient11k
'\r° · o · · · 'Religion of Humanity', procla1m10g
~.J' himself its po ntiff. For later sociologi sts, this was
t indeed quite embarrassing, not lea t because
Comte was not just another sociologist - in the
United States at the beginning of the 20th century
he was even the most often cited sociologist after
Herbert Spencer (Hart, 1927). This makes it
"understandable, as Hadden (1987: 590) and
Seidman (1994: 31-2) point out, that later sociol-
ogists have often dismissed his shenanigans as an
unfortu nate accident that bad in itself nothing to
do with the nature of his positivist sociology.
Alvin Gouldner (1970: 88- 108), however, gives
good reasons to assume that the two were inti-
mately connected so that it is not merely a coinci-
dence that Comte attempted to change sociology
into a religion - Comte, who was so convinced
that superior 'scientific knowledge' cou ld, would
I
7' ;/
and should replace ' religious belief'.
V' More important, but also often unacknowl-
;jedged, is the circumstance that the sociologies of
~ ~ .~ Kar l Marx and Emile Durkheim, the discipline's
...> ~ two classical founders besides Max Weber, also
~ ~'\ share the scientisti tion of being ab le to sci-
entifically groun mora
too, consider Lt ir ass
Je's beliefs and c
and to reconstruct the former on the basis of the
latter if it is found wanting. They both fo llow the
same logic in doing so: they derive their evalu-
atJons of what LS 'abnormal' and what 1 not, of
what is ' ood' and what is ' bad', from an alleged
msight JO t e nature o a re soc1 rea JtY. sLlu-
ated '6eyona' or unaerneath ' flie mystifyi ng and
concealing real mof culture .outman, 2003:
-9; 8). Ast othe exact nature of that 'real '
and ' more fundamenta l' reality, they both point ru
the industrial division of labor, even though the)
imagine the latter quite differently.
For Durkheim, the industrial division of labor
under ' normal' circumstances constitutes a real m
of shared interests and harmonious cooperation
between labor and capital; for Marx, contrariwise it
is under ' normal ' circumstances the realm of indu -
trial conflict, struggle, and exploitation, due to irrec-
oncilable class-based economic interests. Whereas
for Marx class struggle and exploitation are hence
' normal', and harmonious and peaceful cooperatio
between labor and capital 'abnormal ', Durkheim
remarkably enough asserts exactly the reverse.
Both Marx and Du m s pretend to be sittin_
on God's lap, to say, ena lmg them to fatho
soc1 re y s ts, n a wa inaccessibl
to oralnary mo enabling them to di -
tinguish norm m 'pa o o c ur e1m
and true' from 'false' (Marx) class conscloiiSne
Because o s sc1en c an pos1 1v1st preten 1
of being able to identify in an intellectuaJJy authori-
tative fashion the degree of rationality of the belie
understandings, and behavior of the participants ·
social Life, and to scientificaJJy ground a morali .
that can and should rep lace the latter if they are
found wanting, their sociologies have clear trait
secu lar religions, too. In both cases we are dealin.:
with value judgments disguised as scientific kno\\ -
edge - value judgments that under core that
notion that science can and should replace cultlll.
and religion remains in no way confined to Augus
Comte (Seidman, 1994: 19-53).
The Cultural Turn in Sociology

nces constitutes a realm
larmonious cooperation
for Marx, contrariwi e. i•
ances the realm of indu -
exploitation, due to irrec-
1omic interests. Wherea;
:d explo.itation are hen
and peaceful cooperati
I 'abnormal', Durkhei m
ts exact! y tile reverse
s pretend to be sittin_
na lmg tllem to fatllo
is, a wa inaccessibl
enabling them to di -
affio o 1ca
:ui pos1 1v1s prcten 1
an intellectually authori-
rationalily of the belief
iors of the participants ir
cally ground a morali .
ce the latter if tlley are
ogies have clear trai
otll cases we are dealin_
lised as scientific kn o~ -
hat underscore that the
d should replace culture
way confined to Augu
- 53).
Sociology
coming such a positivb·
1ding of social acto ·
es the principal promise
ultural turn in soc i olo~
reacuon to the crisi
QUANTI TATIVE ANALYSIS IN CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
riencing ... can be ... understood .. . as a
gni tion of tile empirical, theoretical, methodo-
- · al, and ontological limits of existi ng intellec-
frameworks'.
uch a cultural sociology places tile cu ltural
· ngs and understandings of tllose who are stud-
• central stage, while tile role of allegedly ' more
· interpretations and evaluations on tile part of the
her is significantly reduced. In the words of
ood et al. (1993: 375): 'The question .. . hould
be how to demystify culture by showing that .it
' represents something else, but rather how
re allows contemporary actors continually t.Q
y tify their social worlds' . Cultural sociology's
· ipal distingu1sliing feature 1s hence its rec-
at social life carmot have any 'deeE;r'
ngs than those of the particjQants in social
em eN'es. Ciiltural sociology hence refuses
derstand culture as merely a '"soft", not really
ndent variable' and to assume that 'explan£J.;
• power lies in the study of the "hard" variables
• 1 structure, such that structured sets of mean-
- become superstructures an ideologies driven
. these more 'real' and tangible social forces'
xander and Smith, 2003: 13). It under tands
e no longer as something tllat needs to be
rstood in terms of something non-cultural, for
pie as 'the wagging tail of social power, as
· tance to hegemony, disguised govemmentality,
_ 'zational isomorphism, cultural capital, or sym-
. politics' (Alexander, 20 I 0: 283).
This type of cultural sociology has become a
;i ing endeavor since the I 980s, with i ncreas-
- - nu mbers of university chairs dedicated to it,
- reasing numbers of researchers joining the
dwagon, and increasi ngly thriving sections
ociological association like tile American,
opean and Jnternational ones. Yet, a we see
there are also reason for concern. First
pro ortionate c unk · u · Jo ical
-esearch effort remains confined to tile fairly lim-
.:.ed and narrowly defined domain of art, popular
, ltu re, an media. There is nothLng wrong with
e research topics in themselves, of course,
t more thematic variation is urgently called for,
i th pecial attention to research themes that are
m ra l to mainstream socio logy, like social strat-
- cation an pol ICS, 0 ena e CU tural SOCiolCig'y
redeem its promi se of 1m rovin sociolog
::ulturalizm 1t. second reason for concern , in
tual research practice quite closely related to
. ., former, is cultural ociology's self-im posed
triction to a narrowl y defin ed set of research
-:iethods that are conventionally identified Wlti1
tudy of culture, for example ethnography, in-
pth interv1ew111 miiiliiat' tent anal sis,
d disco urse analysis. Although we are obv1-
ly not 'against' qu alitative methodologies
227
like these, and have indeed often reli ed on them
in our own cultural-sociological studi es (e.g.,
Aupers et al ., 2012; Harambam et al., 2011;
O' ei ll et al ., 2014), they appear to invite overly
descriptive empirical studies that fail to make a
clear tlleoretical contribution and fail to deliver
much in terms of sociological exp lanation. Along
related lines, the massive influence in cultural
sociology of Clifford Geertz's ( 1973: 3-30) plea
for 'tllick description' has been critiqued as stim-
ulating a ' move away from general explanatory
theory and towards the fleeting, local and contex-
tual' (S niith 2008: 171 .
his is why we want to stand up for a soHd
xplanatory cultural sociology that addresses the
broader ocial consequences of social actors'
cu ltural meanings and understandin s. f soc1Dr-
ogy's maJor s ortcommg as traditionally been its
dismissal of culture as a mere 'side issue' and a
necessari ly ' dependent' variable, then one has to
wo nder whether descriptive etlmographic research
offers much of a solution. ln our opini on, thi s is
not the case, wh ich calls for research that aims
to go beyond de cription, rever e tile custom-
ary causal order, and explicitly assigns culture
an ex planatory ro le as an ' independent' variable.
Moreover, if such an intellectual endeavor is to be
more than just another sociological sub-field or
specialization, two other things are vital as well.
Firstly, to convince not on ly non-cultural soci-
ologists of culture's explanatory potential , but, if
possible, researchers in disciplines like cognitive
psychology and medicine as well, takin g seriously
the (' hard' ) methodologies used in these circles
is essential (Perrin, 2004; Steensland, 2009).
Secondly, it is also vital to remain in constant criti-
cal dialogue witll the th eoretical tradition of soci-
ology rather than to completely discard the latter
and exchange it for more or less fashionable theo-
retical ideas from the humarut1es (eostmodernism,
"POsfstructuralism, semiotics, etc. . our opinion,
such an exchange i not even necessary, because
the classical cultural sociologies of Max Weber
and Emile Durkheim, large ly coincidi ng with tlleir
sociologies of reli gion (Durkheim 1965 [1912);
Weber, 1963 [1922)), offer some simple and pow-
erful insights that can, witllout major difficulties,
be adopted to inform quantitative cu ltural-socio-
logical studies that powerfully demonstrate cul-
ture's cau al conseq uences. More s pecificall ~
ral sociolo y can be used
to inform survey research that gives social aC'tO'i?
motives their causal due, whereas Durkheim 's
treatment of cu lture as a social fact tllat guJdeS
ee mg, mking, and knowing can inform expen-
men · e ar a · emons a es cu ture's causal
efficacY. In both cases we provide .illustrations
'"'ffciffiour own work of the past ten years.
 228 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
SURVEY RESEARCH AND THE WEBERIAN
LEGACY: CULTURAL MOTIVES FOR
SOCIAL ACTION
Cultural Sociology's Skepticism
about Survey Research: A Weberian
Reconstruction
CulruraJ sociologists tead to be skeptical about
survey methodology for two principaJ reasons.
The first is the major influence exerted by
the researcher's theoreticaJ preconceptions on the
findi ngs that may or may not be attained. The
second is the tendency to conceive of people's
cultmaJ understandings - measured as ' values',
'attitudes', or 'opinion ' - as 'determined by'
their 'sociaJ status' or 'sociaJ position' , conceived
as an 'objective' variable that determines the
J!forementioned 'subjective' variables. ,------.
The first objection to survey researcnts in itself
valid. It is after aU the researcher who decides on
the questions to be included in tbe questionnaire,
the response categories to be used for each of
these questions, and the variables that are taken to
be the 'dependent' and 'independent' ones. This
objection assumes, however, that sociological
researc s ou w and necessarily be ai;ned
at the intellectualrepresentation of the culturally
informed Ufeworias of tfiose who are - Stlidied.
1s aim is, owever, not sel -evident and can, as
indicated above, even be critiqued for producing
massively descriptive studies without much theo-
retical. relevance. To the extent that the testing of
sociological theories is accepted as a legiti mate
and worthwhile enterprise, the influence of the
researcher's theoretical preconceptions ceases
to be a problem. More than that: it becomes the
major strength of survey methodoTogy, because it
enatiles researchers to s stematically focus on the
variables that m~rom the pers ect1ve o e justice to the full complexity, richness and subtlety
theory they want to test. Even though such a the-
ory hence defines most of social reality as theoret-
icaJly irrelevant, thi.s does not mean that the theory
is necessarily invalid. Ail testable theories are after
all one-sided reductions of"tfie fuU complexit of
sociaJ reaJity, but the vital question for em iri"Cai
research is w ic 0 tfiem are empincaUy tenable
an w Jcfi are no .
Cultural socwlogists' second reason for skepti-
cism is tbe tendency in survey research to either
leave out people's culturaJ under tandings as ' dis-
tortions of real social reality' or to reduce them to
the status of 'dependent variables' that as 'vaJues' ,
'attitudes' , or 'opinions' need to be explained
from allegedly 'more fundamental' or 'more reaJ'
'objective' variables like 'social class'. Although
this does indeed often occur, it is not inherent to
survey research. More than that: surv e Itural voting, syi
that purposefully includes culturaJ variables and line in class vot
li6erates them from tl1eir tatus as necessari Iy
~ndent ones, constitutes the most pronusrng
way of criti uin such tendencies, it onl~ because
it uses a methodolo ical language that~­
&_ood and acc~ted as le itimate y_ thos~e Illustration: Thi
the targets of such critiques. Includi ng cultural
G ass Voting
vanables m survey research tiius enables cultural
sociologists to go beyond descriptive ethnographic E r ince Marx's
anaJyses by systematicaJJy critiquing theories that hip between cl
fail to take culture seriou ly enough. iology's ma
Max Weber's classicaJ sociology provides use- ld War ll this ·
ful guidelines for enriching survey research by on the analysi
taking culture more seriously. ping and explai1
1s socio ogy LS ase on t e notion that socio- hich class drive
logical analysis should address actors' cultural between countri
understandings and motives on the one band, and · g work in thf
the broader sociaJ consequences of the actions on came to be
informed by the latter on the other.r-tr7"7"1~ifff,.., n_' and came to
to We er s 1stonca and comparative sociology, le index that w.
after aU, all world religions define paths to saJ- h i calculated '
vation, and hence define religious interests and on in non-m:
motives that encourage particular types of action, · " parties from
while discouraging others. Religiously informed ·ers voting for 1
actions by devout believers subsequently have o, the more free
all sorts of broader sociaJ consequences, fre- oartie and the le
quently unintended ones, of which Weber singled higher the Alfi
out the rationalization of the West for special ~ of class voting.
attention. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of hen a quarter o:
Capitalism ( 1978 [1904-1905]) addresses just affirmatively a
one single causal link in this much more complex title of their
and wide-ranging process. Even though virtually J ( 1991 ), thei
aU contemporary sociologists underscore the lat- ) methodologic<
ter's exemplary status, Colin CampbeU (2006) caJled 'Death c
points out just how remarkable it is that at a closer re than ten yei
and more criticaJ look hardly any of them follow lhough calculati
Weber's acclaimed approach in his or her own · imple enough, tt
research (see also Campbell, 1996). ver-time variatic
It is clear that survey methodology cannot do lications that dem
procedures (e.g
of Max Weber's historicaJ and comparative sociol- _ thi emphasis 1
ogy.J'et, even the mere inclusion of motives for ing, because it c
action so often left out as irrelevant in surve eatures of mainstn
research, can area make a tremendous dif- ca e - and do
ference. It enables survey researc ers o rep, ace - it obscured majo
.!JlOre or less _prob lematic theoreticaJ assum t10n - 1 of the empiric
about why people do what they do by a systematic . e pecially the r
analysis of the actuaJ rOTe o motives m nvmg neglect of votin
.§Ocial action. We provide an example of our own _. because resean
research into the alleged decline in class voting aJways had clea
since World War U. It demonstrates how includin eadi ng ' Why Ex
motives can be used to test and critique sociologi- , Alford wrote ii
cal theories that downplay the role of culture. In
this ca e this leads to the remarkable conclusion - ·;: ation between 1
that the often proclaimed decline in class vot- :-,,vier is a natural a
ing has not even occurred. Instead, the We t h ,.. estern democraci1
witnessed a massive increase in non-economi stence of class ir

m that: surv r r
I culturaJ variables and
:s on the one hand, an
1uences of the actioru
t the other.r-tr."""..>tt-
comparative sociolog).
ns define paths to al-
religious interest an
ticular types of action.
Religiously informed
~rs su bseq uentl y ha'
aJ consequences, fre-
f which Weber sing!
the West for speci
~lhic and the Spirit . ·
1905]) addresses ju
is much more comple
Even though virtual!.
sts underscore the lat-
Jlin Campbell (2006
1ble it is that at a clo
lly any of them folio
c h in hi s or her O'>'
I, 1996).
,e thodology cannot d
1, richness and subtle
nd comparative ocio ·.
;lusion of motive fi
s irrelevant in sur\e
ce a tremendous dif-
researc ers to r!:I? la
1
1eoreti.caJ assu m.£!!.Qill
ey do by a systema
of motives in ri\iil
n example of our o'>';:
ecline in class voti n
1strates how includi n-
md critique sociol o~-:
the role of culture. 1 ~
emarkable conclu i -
decline in cla v -
Instead, the West h
ase in n o n -eco n oiru~
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
ruraJ voting, systematicaJ ly misinterpreted as a
line in class voting due to the neglect of voting
llustration: The Alleged Decline in
Gass Voting
E er ince Marx's classicaJ sociology, the re la-
hi p between class and politics has been one
ociology 's major research interests. After
rid War II this sparked a research trad ition
eel on tbe analysis of survey data and aimed at
ppi ng and explaining differences in the degree
hich class drives voting behavior across time
between countries. After Robert Alford' s pio-
ring work in the 1960 , the strength of this
lion came to be known as the level of 'class
·ng' and came to be mea ured by means of a
pie index that was ubsequentl y named after
m. It is caJculated 'by subtracting the percentage
• persons in non -manu al occupations voti ng for
ft" parties from the percentage of manual
rkers voting for such parties' (Alford , 1967:
. o, the more frequently workers vote fo r left-
parties and the less frequently non-workers do
. the higher the Alford index, and the higher the
el of class voting.
hen a quarter of a century later Clark and
et affirmatively answered the question po eel
the title of their article 'Are Social Classes
. ing?' (199 J), their claim was critiqued on
tly methodologicaJ grounds. Thi s resulted in
o-called 'Death of Class Debate' that raged
more than ten years. Critics maintained that
en though calculating the AJford index is .in
e lf imple enough, the study of between-country
over-time variations entails methodologicaJ
mp lications that demand more sophisticated sta-
tical procedures (e.g., Hout et al ., 1993). Even
ugh this emphasis on statistics is in itself not
ris ing, because it co nstitutes one of the defin-
- features of mainstream qu antitative ociology,
- this case - and doubtl es .ly in many others,
- it obscured major th eoretical shortcom ings
most of the empirical studi es that the debate
• oked, especially the neglect of voting motives.
T his neglect of voting moti ves is in a way sur-
. ing, because researchers in this field have of
• ur e always had clear idea about this. Under
heading ' Why Expect Class Voting?' , for
tance, A Iford wrote in the 1960 :
A relation between class position and voting
behavior is a natural and expected association in
he Western democracies for a number of reasons:
he existence of class interests, the representation
229
of these interests by political parties, and the regu-
lar association of certain parties with certain inter-
ests. Given the character of the stratification order
and the way political parties act as representatives
of different class interests, it would be remarkable
if such a relation were not found . (1967: 68-69)
Because different classes have different economic
interests that are promoted by different partie ,
people are hence held to vote for the party that
best promotes their own econo mic interests. In the
words of Lip et et al. ( 1954: 1136), 'The lower-
income groups will support [the lefti st parties] in
order to become better off, whereas the hi gher-
income groups will oppose them in order to main-
tain their economic advantages'. What was
assumed, in hort, was that the working cla s
voted for leftist parties because it was in favo r of
economic redistribution, wbereas tbe middle c lass
opposed these parties, because it rejected thi
political aim.
Research fin dings by Paul Nieuwbeerta (1995),
reprinted in two edited books witb the most rel-
evant researc h findings the debate has sparked -
The End of Class Politics ? (Evans, 1999) and The
Breakdown of Class Politics (Clark and Lipset,
2001) - have done much to demonstrate that the
metbodological critiques by Hout et al . (1993)
were fu til e. The use of more advanced statistics
and data from more years and more countries,
Nieuwbeerta demonstrated, produced basical ly the
ame conclusions in terms of differences between
countries and the decline in class voting. Much
more importantly, but unfortunately also mu ch
Jess ack now ledged, is th at Nieuwbeerta's attempt
to explai n these differences and this decline from
ocio-economic context variables derived from a
class-theo retical framework failed mi serably : vir-
tually all hypotheses were refuted (Nieuwbeerta,
1995: 57-77).
Our own studi es of tl1e alleged decline in
class voting have meanwhile demonstrated why
ieuwbeerta's results were so disappointing. The
principal cause is that the obsession with statistics
in the 'Death of Class Debate' has obscured sig-
nificant theoreti cal weaknesses and shortcoming ,
especially caused by the co mplete neglect of vot-
ing motives. lncluding these motives in our own
research quickly revealed that the newly grown
consensus of a dec line in class voting in We tern
countries had in fact been built on quicksand
(Achterberg, 2006; Houtman, 2001; 2003; Van der
Waal et al., 2007).
Figure 16. l demonstrates why this is o. It
features a conceptualization of voting that gives
two voting motive their due. It firstly in erts
the voti ng motive that has always been a sumed ,
i.e., 'economic conservati m' . The type of 'clas
230 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
2 (+)
Economic capital
conservatism
I, (+)
Cultural capital
4 (-)
conservatism
Figure 16.1 Distinguishing class voting (path 2 x path 3) from cultural voting (path 4 x path 5)
voting' that the Alford index and its statistically
more advanced offspring aim to capture is hence
represented by the upper part of Figure 16. 1. It can
be defined as voting for a leftist or rightist political
party on the grounds of economically progressive
or conservative political values that are generated
by, respectively, a weak or a strong class posi-
tion. Figure 16.1 also introduces a second voting
motive, referred to as 'cultural conservatism' .
Among the general public it is basically unrelated
to economic conservatism and unlike the latter it
is also unrelated to class in an economic sense,
i.e., to 'economic capital' in Bourdieu's (1984)
sense. Yet, it is closely related to what Bourdieu
calJs 'cultural capital' , measured in our research
as high levels of education and participation in
highbrow culture, either combined or as two
separate variables (Houtman, 200 I; 2003). The
lower part of Figure 16.1 hence represents what
we call 'cultural voting' , i.e., voting for a leftist
or rightist political party on the grounds of cultur-
ally progressive or conservative political values,
respectively, grounded not so much in economic
capital, but in cultural capital.
Employing this simple model of voting, our
research has demonstrated that what has hap-
pened in Western countries since World War II is
not so much a decline in class voting, but rather
a massive increase in cultural voting. Whereas
class voting has remained more or less stable dur-
ing thi.s period, cultural eli.tes (and decidedly not
economic ones) have become increasingly likely
to vote for leftist or progressive parties for rea-
sons of cultural progressiveness (tolerance, mul-
ticulturalism, cosmopolitanism, postmaterialism
or however one prefers to call it), whereas those
without cultural capital (and decidedly not
the poor) have become more and more likely to
vote for rightist ones on the basis of culturall y
conservative motives (authoritarianism, ethno-
centrism, nationalism, or however one prefers to
ca.ll it). Due to the widespread and routine use of
the Alford index, which neglects the role of voting
Economic
~
Leftist voting
Cultural
~
motives, political sociologists have hence mis-
taken a massive increase in cultural voting for a
decline in class voting (Houtman and Achterberg.
2010; Van der Waal et al, 2007). Small wonder.
then, that Nieuwbeerta's attempt to explain dif-
ferences in 'class voting' fai led: what he recorded
were not even differences in class voting in the
first place.
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH AND THE
DURKHEIMIAN LEGACY: CULTURE
AS A SOCIAL FACT
Cultural Sociology's Skepticism
about Experimental Research:
A Durkheimian Reconstruction
Consistent with his positivist leanings in The
Division of Labor in Society (1964 [ 1893] .
Suicide (195 1 [1 897]), and The Rules o_.
Sociological Method (1964 [1895]), the earl_
Durkheim has strongly influenced mainstr
positivist sociology. The cu ltu ral sociology of the
late Durkheim of The Elementary Forms •
Religious Life (1965 [1912]) and (wi th Mau :
Primitive Classification (1963 [1903]), on
other band, has had much less of an influence
mainstream sociology (apart fro m the social _
of religion, that is) and much more so on anthro-
pology (Fenton and Hamnett, 1984). Th.
Elementary Forms ofReligious Life (1965 [191~
and Primitive Classification (Durkheim
Mauss, 1963 [1903]) both trace the fundamen
cultural categories that structure a group's thinl.-
ing and cognition to its social organization.
notion nas further been elaborated in M ai.
Douglas' work (e.g. 1966), which because of
has become a major reference point for cultur.:
sociologists in and of itself.
 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
uglas' Durkheimian theory of risk, mostly
~ to as 'cultural theory', outlines how risk
ptio ns pertaining to technology and the envi-
nt are informed by cultural worldv iews that
fro m the strictness of definitions of group
Leftist voting bership ('group') and the strictness of role
~nitio n s ('g rid') (Douglas, 1992; Douglas and
· av ky, 1982). The theory can be critiqued for
·Lerating the rnstitutional and social-organi-
onal embeddedness of cultural world views
_ Kahan, 2012), much li ke John Fi ske (1987)
tuart Hall (1980 [1973]) in cultural studies
1ting (path 4 x path be critiqued for making too strong a priori
ptions about the rootedness of interpretive
:ural frames in the structure of capitalist soci-
>logists have hence . and the inequalities it engenders. The effect
e in cultural votin • same tn both cases, 1.e., ' pushing 'cultural
f-loutman and Achte ·e ' from the domain of meaning into that of
al, 2007). Small " 1al stru cture', as Sherwood et al. (1993: 372)
s attempt to explai rve in the case of cu ltural studies. Be that as it
' fai led: what her _. cultural worldviews not only provide social
:es in class voting - r with motives for conscious value- ration ~!
on, as posited by Weber, but also operate as
ial facts' in a re-refleXiv e ind
backs' of those concerned his Durkheimian
·on provides a second powerful classical socio-
- cal point of departure for quantitative cuJtural-
:ARCH AND THE :ioJogical research.
.CY: CULTURE Culture plays a ro le in matters of health and
s, for example, as exemplified by a study
demonstrates that Chinese-Americans, but
whites, tend to di e earlier than ex ected if
i Skepticism y feature a combination o dise se an 1rt
I Research: _ear that is con ·dei:ed ill-£ated...i.n-Oti.nes astro.l-
onstruction - · and medicine. The diffe rence is statistically
gnificant, exfats across nearly all major causes
;itivist leaning deat , amoun s o no t a cou e of
Society ( 1964 [l _car , and is larger if those concerned are more
, and The Ru :;rnuy embedded in Chinese c and traditions
964 (1895]), the Phi llips et al., 1993). T · 1s a goo ample of
influenced mains ~werful conseque of culture t a c nn be
: ultural sociolo~ monstrated by m '"Of etbnograpliy e at-
Elementary Fo i hence not one o e stronges tit one of
112]) and (with . weakest methodologies eming cultural
(1963 (1 903 ]). iology's pro1mse of Libera.ting culture from Its
1 less of an influ r ina e pos1flon as a side issue mid a 'deperr=-
>art from the ""'"'"?.-- , n~a L y ar e strongest methodology
uch more so on 'r doing so is ironically the experiment, a meth-
Ha mnett, 19 ology that cultural sociologists tend to be even
~ ious Life (196 '."!Ore skeptical about than survey methodology.
ation (D urkhe · Wi thou t doubt, cultural sociology's cold feet
1 trace the fundalnc:a ut experimental research stem to a large extent
m the latter's routine use for wiping out culture
- a source of 'distortion ' that allegedl y prevents
earchers from obtaining an ' objective' image
f the 'real' and ' undistorted' effect of an inde-
;iendent variable (referred to as an 'experimental
condition' or 'treatment variable' in these circles)
231
on a dependent one (referred to as an 'outcome
variable' in these circles). Such a positivist treat-
ment of culture as a 'source of distortion' rather
than the symbolic universe with which humankind
distinguishes itself from other living creatures is
obviously hard to swallow for students of culture.
Yet, the felt methodological necessity of wiping
out cu ltu re's distorting influences does of course
underscore precisely culture's consequences, con- r
ceived in a Durkheimian fashion. 'Placebo effects'
in healing proc esses and m 'double-blind' medi-
cal trials, for instance, are effects of culture. More
specifically, they are the effects of the trust that
patients put m articular ty es of medical drugs,
treatiiierrtS,Or doctors. They are, in arnngto ii'S
words (1997: l), 'the ghosts that haun t our house
of biomedical objectivity, the creatures that rise up
from the dark and expose the paradoxes and fis -
sures in our own self-created definitions of the real
and active factors in treatment'.
The felt necessity of experimentally wip-
ing out cu lture's allegedly distorting influences
even implies that 'cu ltu rally enriched' experi-
ments constitute a powerful cultu ral-sociological
too.I for demonstrating culture's causal efficacy,
even in matters of health and life and death. All
that is needed for this is a cultural enrichment of
experiments by exposing not one si ngle randomly
selected group of test persons to the experimental
and control conditions, but two groups that differ
from one another in a cul tural sense deemed rele-
vant for the experiment at hand. Such experiments
enable cultural sociologists to study in a system-
atic fashion whether different cuJturally defined
groups react differentl y to, for instance, violent
computer games, pornographic movies, leftist or
righti st political messages, or ' alternative' medical
treatments informed by holi stic worldviews, du e
to cu Iturall y mediated differences in interpretation
and understanding.
An example wou ld be a research de-sign with
two cu lturally contrasting groups of patients with
a particular disease, with one adhering to a holistic
worldview and featuring low trust in conventional
and hi gh trust in alternative medicine, and another
adhering strongly to the rationalist world view that
underlies biomedicine and featuring hi gh trust in
conventional and l ow trust in alternative medicine.
One can then give one random half of both group
a conventional medical drug or treatment and the
two other halves its 'alternative' counterpart. The
resu lting re-search design now no longer addresses
the question whether or 1wt the two treatments dif-
fer in effectiveness, but rather for which of the two
groups either of the two treatments works better
or worse. The subsequent statistical analysis of the
resulting data hence no longer focuses on the direct
effect of the contrast between the experimental
232 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
and the control condition, but rather on how this
contrast interacts with the patients' worldview in
affecting healing processes. As we see it, such cul-
turally enriched experiments are methodologically
more powerful. for demonstrating culture's causal
consequence than either ethnographic research
or any other available methodological altern ative.
We provide an illustratio n from our own recent
research that addresses culture's consequences for
cognition.
Illustration: Culturally Mediated
Cognition
One of the mainstays in public opinion research
is that that people first need to have some ele-
mentary understanding of complicated matters
before they can actua lly learn to appreciate them.
This idea applies not only to op.inions about
issue uch as the European Union (Anderson ,
1998) or the judicial system (Van Gelder et al.,
2015), but also to opinions about emerging tech-
nologies (Allum et al., 2008). Following this ' to
know it, is to love it' maxim, scholars working
on this so-cal led 'knowledge deficit' question,
instituti onal ex perts, and policymakers have
often claimed that the public needs to be given
more information to fos ter its appreciation and
support. Such an alleged undifferentiated and
unmediated effect of information provision con-
trasts sharply with our foregoing arg ument,
which ass igns more importance to culturally
defined worldviews .
For th.i s reason we recently did a survey experi -
ment on informational provision about hydro-
gen technology. We deliberately chose hydrogen
technology for two reasons. The first, of course,
is to inform debates about the ' public uptake of
science' (Wynne, 1992: 300). The second is that
research ha shown, time and again, that the public
at large is poorly informed about this complex new
type of energy technology (Ricci et al., 2008).
The idea that th e uptake of information about
such complex technologies as hydrogen technol-
ogy is culturally mediated closely relates to argu-
ments made in the so-called 'framing' literature
(Chong and Druckman, 2007 ; Scheufele, 1999).
The basic argument is that frames - 'principles of
selection, emphasis and presentation co mposed of
little tacit theories about what exists, what hap-
pens, and what matters' (Gitlin , 1980: 6) - vary
across people of different backgrounds. Th.is
underlies our expectation that grou ps of people
interpret knowledge made available to them o n
the basis of their cultural worldviews. More spe-
cifically, information is most likely to be accepted
and translated into support if it suits one's cu ltural
world view.
Previous experi mental research has shown tha:
technological skepticism does indeed affect (
technically speaking: ' moderates' ) the effect ·
informational provision about hydrogen technol-
ogy considerably (Achterberg, 2014). Here, fol-
lowing a wider research tradition that addre
the links between religious world views on the
one hand and public support for science an..
technology on the other (cf. Nisbet and Moon _
2007), we study whether three religious worl
views affect the acceptance or rejection of info·-
mation about hydrogen technology. First, Whi
(1967) has suggested that because of their id
about dominion. of nature, Christi ans are I
concerned with the environment (w hich is c "-
firmed in research by Van Bohemen et al., 201:
Second, Christians are also more inclined to thi
in terms of stewardship - the idea that nature a::
the environment are to be taken care of (whi
is also confirmed by Van Bohemen et al., 201:
While a dominion worldview would actually
little or no reason to trans.late information
sustainable types of energy such as hydro~
into support, the second worldview pertainin
stewardship will do just that. Third, we incl
a non-Christian worldview pertaining to ho ·
spirituality. People with th.is world view sup
the idea that mankind and nature are, and h
be, strongly related, and that nature is a o
of spiritual wisdom (Campbell, 2007; Houan
and Mascini , 2002). As both qualitative (Au
2002) and quantitative (Achterberg et al., ~o·
research has shown that people with such an b
tic piritual worldview are not at all di smi s h
the use of technology, we expect people em
ing such a worldview to be inclined to tram
positive information about hydrogen technol
into support for this type of technology.
Using a representative sample of the Dt.
population (2008, = 1012), we asked the re
dents in our survey several Likert-type items ·
ping the three worldviews (for details on
measures see Achterberg et al. , 2010). Then,
ing from a larger pool of 21 questions, we
each of the respondents to answer a random
tion of seven knowledge questions about h~
gen technology. Some of these question
negative facts (facts that would lead to le
port for hydrogen, for instance by focusing
environmental costs of fabricating hydrogen ·
cells) and some of these questions tapped po
aspects (for instance by focusing on the
tion of p'o lJuting emissions from hydrogen- Negative
vehicles) . Then, respondents were given the
rect answers to these seven knowledge qu 6.2 Type of infom
so that depending on the questions that .__llOcllV (y-axis) for re!
 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY 233

1ort if it suits one's cultura..
al research has shown th ·
m does indeed affect (
'moderates') the effect ·
1 about hydrogen technol-
terberg, 20 14). Here, fol-
:h tradition that addre
gious worldviews on
support for science ani.;
r (cf. Nisbet and Moone_.
1er three religious world-
ance or rejection of info -
1 technology. First, Whi
hat because of their id
1ture, Christians are 1
vironment (which is co
'an Bohemen et al., 201-
ilso more inclined to thi
- the idea that nature
, be taken care of (whii.:
m Bohemen et al., 20L
dview would actually gh
anslate information a
nergy such as hydrog
j worldview pertaining
it that. Third, we inclu
iew pertaining to holi
h this worldview sup
.nd nature are, and ho
1d that nature is a sourc
::roly assigned respondents differed in the
to which they were exposed to either posi-
negative information. Final ly, we asked the
dents five Likert-type items that measured
for hydrogen technology (see Achterberg
- 0 10).
re ults showed that positive information in
lead to more support for hydrogen tech-
. But this does not mean that this effect is
-rai for everyone. Two of our three suggested
\.iew actually conditioned the effects of
ational provision. We found that for people
phold a dominion worldview, informational
ion does not lead to higher or lower support
- "Clrogen technology. Only for those who do
~· brace this worldview does the provision of
\e information actually lead to an adjustment
upport for hydrogen technology - a clear
tration of the conditioning influence of
·• pe of world view. For the stewardship world-
. the re ults are depicted in Figure 16.2.
e 16.2 shows that people with dissimilar
-\iews - those who ·embrace stewardship
· o e who do not - react totally differently to
ation about hydrogen technology. For tho e
nderscore the idea of stewardship, positive
tion leads to more support for hydrogen
logy. For those who do not embrace stew-
- · p. the same type of information leads to less
rt for hydrogen technology. Jn short, the
of informational provision varies consider-
CONCLUSION
As a reaction to the so-called 'crisis of sociology'
in the l 960s and 1970s cultural sociology has in
the past few decades increasingly got the wind in
its sails. It embodies a new intellectual modest
b breakin with the os1t1v1st retension of being
able to reveal what social and cultural phenomena
'really' mean. As such, it refuses to marginalize,
play down, or retouch out culture as 'really' or
'actually' a reflection of an allegedly 'deeper' or
' more fundamental' and essentially non-cultural
social reality. This means that cultural sociology is
not a thematicfilly STI1ffti'lflly specia ize
soc10!ogy, aimed at the study of the soctal aspects
'1lr at t, popufar-cultrrre, nd media, but rather a
general soci~med at the~ of S..Qf.!J!.
-reality's cultural layers Of..!lli<.,an· iu b.! ~ '
oroacler"social consequences. Its appeal is hence
not so much a matter of taste, but rather of intel-
lectual ur enc . Hugely influential rational action
theory, for instance, tends to make far-reaching
assumptions about instrumental-rational motives
allegedly driving peoples' actions. Yet, the result-
ing empirical studies typically refrain from study-
ing whether thi s is actuall y the case. As such,
these studies remain more speculative than they
could and should be, and they are doubtlessly
often beside the mark as far as the actual motives
for action are concerned . . Cultural-so~i?logical)

l
ampbeU, 2007; Hou t survey research , in short, offers a prom1srng way \
i th the religious fran1es or worldviews that of rev.ealing s hort~omi~gs and misinterpretations
both qualitative (Aupe adheres to. This survey experiment, hence,
(Achterberg et al., 20 1 in marnstream soc10log1cal research.
y demonstrates that cognition is in fact cul- Q.! ltural socio.ls:!gy' in Jlec(11alJ:!!g~ncy, more-
people with such an boli. ~ mediated.
lfe not at all dismissive over tr the boundaries of sociology and
ve expect people embra:-
o be inclined to tran I
out hydrogen tech.no! _
~ of technology.
ve sample of the Dut
) l 2), we asked the re
:ral Likert-type items ~
3.5 +------'-..-::-....-~-
..
----
.. _ _"="'_.....:::::::::....__ _ __
3+.-~~~~~--0:::::::::::::...~"-o-:..~..~~~~~~~~~~-,~-
....
!WS (for details on th
2.s+--~~~~~~~~~~~-'~...........~..~~~~~~~~~
t et al. , 2010). Then, dra ·
if 21 questions, we ask
.... • ... - - • Stewardship low
2+--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'~'~-.;-;-
... ~~~~~-
to answer a random ela:- - - Stewardship high
e questions about hy
•.s J__ _ _ _ __:.....___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
if these questions tap
t would lead to !es
stance by focusing on
fabricating hydrogen .s+--------------~~-­
questions tapped po iu o.l-----------r----------..
1 focusing on the red
Negative Positive
ins from hydrogen-fue
lents were given the
1en knowledge questio 16.2 Type of informational provision (x-axis) and predicted support for hydrog.en
the questions that \\ ology (y-axis) for respondents with minimum and maximum levels of stewardship
 234 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY

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