 1) Mitigating Circumstances

 (a) Jabalde v. People GR#195224 June 15, 2016

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016 ]
VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision[2] dated August 12, 2010 and the Resolution[3] dated January
4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424, which affirmed with
modification the Judgment[4] promulgated on May 31, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 210, finding
Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron (Jabalde) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act (R.A) No. 7610, otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, Discrimination Act."

The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

Jabalde pleaded "not guilty" in a criminal information dated October 14, 2002, for
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, before the RTC of Dumaguete
City, Branch 31,[5] which reads:
That on December 13, 2000 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, in
Barangay Cawitan, Santa Catalina, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, [Jabalde], with cruelty and with intent to abuse, maltreat and
injure one LIN J. BITOON, 8 years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously slap and strike said Lin J. Bitoon, hitting said Lin J. Bitoon on the
latter's nape; and immediately thereafter[,] [c]hoke the said offended party, causing
the latter to sustain the following injuries: Abrasions: Two (2), linear 1 cm in length
at the base of the right mandibular area; One (1), linear 1 inch at the right lateral
neck; Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the anterior neck; and Four (4), minute
circular at the left lateral neck, which acts of sa[i]d accused caused the said offended
part[y] not only physical but also emotional harm prejudicial to his development.
CONTRARY to the aforesaid.[6]
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were: Lin J. Bito-on (Lin), the minor victim;
Dr. Rosita Muñoz (Dr. Muñoz), the physician who examined Lin; Ray Ann Samson (Ray
Ann), the classmate of Lin who witnessed the incident; and Aileen Bito-on (Aileen), the
mother of Lin.[7]

Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School.
At around 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, he was playing "langit lupa" during recess
with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova and another classmate. During the course of their game, he
touched the shoulder of Nova, Jabalde's daughter, causing the latter to fall down and
wounding her head. He then helped Nova to stand while one of his classmates called
Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building, which was near
the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck
and choked him. Lin was able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his
neck. He immediately ran towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. He
told his mother Aileen about the incident. Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina
Hospital for treatment and a medical certificate was then issued to him. [8]

Dr. Muñoz testified that she was the physician who issued the medical certificate to Lin
on December 13, 2000 for the physical examination conducted upon the latter. Dr.
Muñoz stated that Lin sustained abrasions: two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the
base of the right mandibular area; one (1) linear abrasion 1 inch in length at the right
lateral neck; two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the back of the neck; and four (4)
minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck. According to her, the abrasions could
have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted and that these linear abrasions
were signs of fingernail marks. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color signifying
that they were still fresh. She did not notice other injuries on the body of Lin except those
on his neck.[9]

Ray Ann, the classmate and playmate of Lin, testified that she knows Jabalde because she
was a teacher at Cawitan Elementary School. At about 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000,
she was playing "langit lupa" with Lin, Nova, Ryan and Rhea. Nova, who was standing
on top of an unstable stone fell on the ground and thereafter hit her head on the stone.
Then, somebody called Jabalde, Nova's mother. When Jabalde came to see her daughter,
she struck Lin on his neck then squeezed it. Lin cried and was able to free himself and
ran towards their house. Jabalde then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself
because if not I should have killed you."[10] Ray Ann saw Lin again after their class
dismissal at 11:00 a.m. when she went to their house. Lin did not return to school again
because he was afraid of Jabalde. During cross examination, Ray Ann testified that Lin
did not run into the dilapidated building after the incident and that she was near them
when Jabalde struck Lin.[11]
Aileen testified that Lin is her son who was born on September 4, 1993, and at the time of
the incident, he was still 7 years old. That at about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, Lin
came home crying and trembling. Lin told her that he was strangled by Jabalde, who
happens to be Aileen's aunt and Lin's grandmother. Lin was running back and forth
crying but Aileen noticed his neck with scratches. Thereafter, she went to see his teacher-
in-charge whom she asked for details of the incident. While in the school campus, she did
not see Jabalde. She also testified that they went to Dr. Muñoz for the examination of her
son's injuries. Afterwards, they went home. Her son no longer returned to the school
because of fear but they let him pass on that school year. During cross-examination, she
testified that Jabalde's house is just adjacent to their house in Cawitan, Sta. Catalina.
Aileen also filed two cases against her for stealing and physical injuries in the year 2002
in Sta. Catalina. After she filed two cases, she then filed the instant complaint in the
Provincial Prosecution's Office in Dumaguete City. She said it took her until 2002 to file
the present charges against Jabalde because she was still pregnant during the time of the
incident and that her husband was still assigned in Surigao. She admitted that when she
was still a child, she already feared Jabalde. She also initiated the filing of the present
case because she heard that if she will not file a case against Jabalde, the latter instead
will file a case against them.[12]

The defense, on the other hand, presented Jabalde herself She testified that she is a school
teacher at Cawitan Elementary School for 18 years. Lin is her grandson and that his
mother Aileen is her niece. She remembered that it was about 10:00 a.m. of December
13, 2000, she was teaching Mathematics when some children went to her classroom and
shouted "Mam Jabalde, Ma'm Jabalde, Nova's head was punctured (nabuslot)".
[13]
 Thinking that her daughter was dead, her vision got blurred and she fainted. When she
returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about 5 to 10
minutes. The children then came again and shouted that her daughter's head got
punctured. She ran towards her daughter's classroom while at the same time, looking for a
gathering of people in the hope of finding her daughter. But, before reaching the place of
the incident, she saw her grandson Lin crying. She asked him the whereabouts of Nova
but he just kept on jumping and so she held him still. Lin said, "Lola[,] forgive me,
forgive me"[14] and immediately ran. Jabalde proceeded to her daughter's room and saw
the latter seated on the desk. Thereafter, she brought Nova to her own classroom and
applied first aid. Then she resumed teaching. She believed that there was a motive in
filing the instant complaint which has something to do with a family grudge because of
inheritance.[15]

Another defense witness Rhealuz Pedrona, playmate of Nova and Lin, testified that Nova
got injured while they were playing "langit lupa" during their recess on December 13,
2000. She went to Jabalde to inform her that Nova's head was punctured. Jabalde
immediately ran to the place of incident. She, however, did not see Jabalde slap or choke
Lin.[16]
In its Judgment[17] promulgated on May 31, 2006, the RTC found Jabalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of [Jabalde] beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Article VI of R.A. 7610, as amended,
[Jabalde] is Convicted. Appreciating in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obluscation, and applying the provisions of the indeterminate sentence law, [Jabalde]
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum

The bond posted for her temporary liberty is hereby ordered release.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Naturally dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Jabalde appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On August 12, 2010, the CA dismissed Jabalde's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
with modification.[19] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2006 Decision, of the [RTC], Branch 63, Bayawan City,
Negros Oriental, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that [Jabalde] is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[20]
Jabalde filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on January 4,
2011.[21]
The Issues
1. Whether or not acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or R.A. No. 7610.

2. Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in
appreciating the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is
punishable under the RPC particularly Article 266(1)[22] which defines slight physical
injuries; hence, she should be punished under the RPC and not under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.[23]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out in its Comment[24] filed on May
24, 2011 that since the issue was just raised for the first time on appeal by Jabalde, this is
already barred by estoppel citing the cases of People v. Francisco[25] and People v.
Lazaro, Jr.[26]

The cases cited by the OSG do not apply in this case. In Francisco, the appellant assailed
the order of the trial court for failing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt for
the records show neither proof nor a transcript of the proceedings that the appellant
indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he fully understood its import. The
appellant also maintained that he was not given the opportunity to present evidence and
that the case was submitted for decision immediately after the prosecution filed its offer
of evidence. In Lazaro, the appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance
with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In both cases, this Court held that issues
raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel.

However, the reliance on the foregoing cases is misplaced due to different factual
antecedents. Here, Jabalde postulates that the acts complained of do not fall within the
definition of R.A. No. 7610 and therefore, she should not be convicted on the basis of the
said law, to wit:
[Jabalde] postulates that other acts of child abuse falling under Section 10 (a), Art. II,
R.A. 7610 is limited to acts not punishable under the [RPC]. As the law is being defined
in this section:

"Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
[RPC], as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period[."]

Needless to say, acts which are covered under the [RPC] will be dealt with under the
provisions of the [RPC] and definitely, out of the context of R.A. 7610, particularly
Section 10 (a). In the case of [Jabalde], the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they
were, is punishable under the [RPC] particularly Article 266 (1) which defines slight
physical injuries. The act of [Jabalde] in slapping, striking and choking [Lin], causing
abrasions on the different parts of his neck is absolutely covered within the realm of
Article 266 (1). When the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate
the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance
during the same period, shall be punished with arresto menor.[27] (Citations omitted)
Here, Jabalde questions the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances
of the case and is correct in claiming that the instant petition raises pure question of
law[28] and not question of fact[29] as being argued by the OSG. In Cucueco v. CA,[30] the
Court discussed the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, to wit:
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled.
There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of
fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.

Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is
sometimes complicated. In a case involving a "question of law," the resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to
each other, the issue in that query is factual.

x x x The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to
such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.[31] (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
"The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the alleged
falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them."[32]

In the case on hand, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood of the alleged
facts nor the sufficiency of the evidence, but the appreciation of R.A. No. 7610 on the
factual circumstances of the case. Jabalde is simply correct in raising the question of law
in the instant petition.

Now, on the substantive issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the case at bar, the
Court agrees with the contention of Jabalde in her Reply to OSG's Comment[33] that the
acts complained of do not fall within the definition of the said law, to wit:
The [OSG] in his comment is correct in saying that the issues that could be raised in a
petition for review are purely questions of law. Guided by this principle, [Jabalde] comes
to this Court to raise a question of law. [Jabalde] has been arguing when she availed of
his right to appeal that the acts of the [OSG] does not fall within the definition of R.A.
7610 and should not be convicted on the basis of the said law. This is not a new matter
that [Jabalde] raised.[34]
The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section
10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, which states:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis ours)
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as follows:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. -

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,[35] the Court expounded the definition of "child
abuse" being referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case, therein petitioner was similarly
charged, tried, and convicted by the lower courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article
VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse,
otherwise, it is punished under the RPC, to wit:
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that
the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the
above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate
or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have
been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters
who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime
of child abuse.[36] (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his nape, and
immediately thereafter, choking the said offended party causing the latter to sustain
injuries.[37] However, the records of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human being.

Black's Law Dictionary defined debasement as "the act of reducing the value, quality, or
purity of something."[38] Degradation, on the other hand, is "a lessening of a person's or
thing's character or quality."[39] Webster's Third New International Dictionary defined
demean as "to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character."[40]

The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being
informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already
dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she fainted. When she returned into
consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about five to ten minutes.
[41]
 Moreover, the testimony of the examining physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied the accusation
that Jabalde, with cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin, to wit:
[T]he abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted. She also
testified that the linear abrasions were signs of fingernail marks. She did not notice other
injuries on the body of the victim except those on his neck. Moreover, the abrasions were
greenish in color, signifying that they were still fresh.[42] (Emphasis ours)
It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness
herself testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde
indeed intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-
old boy with heavy blows.

As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her
flesh, is the most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the
acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to
rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions,
scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical
injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so
essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not
established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution
under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

What crime, then, did Jabalde commit?

Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC, to wit:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment - The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

xxxx

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender has
caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require medical assistance.

xxxx
As found out by Dr. Muñoz, Lin only sustained abrasions namely: two linear abrasions of
1 cm in length at the base of the right mandibular area; one linear abrasion of 1 inch in
length at the right lateral neck; two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the back of the
neck; and four minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck.[43] When there is no
evidence of actual incapacity of the offended parly for labor or of the required medical
attendance; or when there is no proof as to the period of the offended party's incapacity
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.[44]

Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde lacked the intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
as required under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, her acts of laying hands
against Lin showed the essential element of intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes
punishable under the RPC.

The case of Villareal v. People[45] is instructing. In that case, the Court discussed that the
RPC belongs to the classical school of thought. The criminal liability is thus based on the
free will and moral blame of the actor. The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration.
In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by
means of "dolo" or "malice".[46]

The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving
the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of
the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term
"felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart
or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional
felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act.[47]
In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the [RPC],
the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that
is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from
the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no
criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case
of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person,
so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting
physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless
his intentions are.[48]
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde slapped
him on his neck and choked him,[49] and that of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin
on his neck, squeezed it and then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself
because if not I should have killed you,"[50] deserve more credit than Jabalde's own
statement that she merely held Lin still because the latter kept on jumping. [51] The laying
of the hands and the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin established the fact that
Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause or inflict physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one (1) day
to thirty (30) days of imprisonment.[52] In imposing the correct penalty, however, the
Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article
13(6). of the RPC,[53] because Jabalde lost his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power.[54] There is passional obfuscation when the
crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.
[55]
 For passion and obfuscation to be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be
shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was
committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable
length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in
the accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and
not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.[56] With her having acted under the belief that
Lin had killed her daughter, Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten [10] days)
when only mitigating circumstance is present in the case.[57] Accordingly, with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding
one year,[58] Jabalde shall suffer a penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto
menor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 12, 2010 and Resolution dated January 4,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424 are SET ASIDE; and a new
judgment is ENTERED (a) finding petitioner Virginia Jabalde y
Jamandron GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES under paragraph 2, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code, and (b)
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.

SO ORDERED.

 (b) Del Poso v. People GR#210810 December 7, 2016

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 210810, December 07, 2016 ]
RICARDO DEL POSO Y DELA CERNA, PETITIONER V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court dated January 28, 2014 of petitioner Ricardo Del Poso y Dela Cerna seeking the
reversal of the Decision[1] dated July 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the Decision[2] dated July 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38,
Manila in Criminal Case No. 05-239429 convicting petitioner of violation of Section 10
(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610.
The facts follow.
The victim, VVV[3] was given by her biological mother to the petitioner when she was 7
years old and the latter then acted as her guardian. On September 10, 2005, when VVV
was 9 years old, petitioner ordered her to attend to petitioner's photocopying business.
While attending the business, VVV fell asleep. When petitioner saw VVV asleep, the
former became furious and laid VVV on top of an ironing board and placed a heated flat
iron on her. When VVV tried to evade the heat emanating from the flat iron, her
forehead, right elbow, left cheek, left buttock and back got burned. Thereafter, petitioner
got her down from the ironing board and ordered her to sleep. The following morning,
petitioner's wife saw the burns on VVV and told petitioner not to do it again. Later on,
VVV went to her Lola Ma. Luisa to watch TV and the latter, and several other people,
saw the burns prompting Lola Ma. Luisa to bring VVV to the Barangay Hall where the
incident was put on blotter. Thereafter, VVV was brought to the hospital and then to the
police station. Hence, an Information was filed against petitioner, which reads as follows:
That on or about September 10, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly commit cruelty and
abusive acts upon VVV, a minor, 9 years old, by then and there injuring the said minor
on the forehead, right cheek, abdomen and at her right forearm with a hot flat iron,
inflicting upon her multiple 1st degree burns, which debases and demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of said VVV as a human being, an act prejudicial to her normal growth
and development, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses, namely: Anielyn Barnes, the Social
Worker-on-case; SPO2 Susan Mendez of Station VI, the investigator; Redentor Torres, a
Barangay Kagawad; VVV, herself; Laura Delos Santos, Records Custodian of the Ospital
ng Maynila; Nanette Repalpa, a social worker who took custody of the victim; and Dr.
Martin Joseph Cabahog. VVV, during her testimony, also narrated the other acts of
physical abuse that petitioner had inflicted on her prior to the incident which became the
basis of the present case.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the incident happened accidentally. According
to him, on that particular day, he just came from work when he saw VVV playing under a
table and to teach her a lesson, he tried to scare her with a hot flat iron. Petitioner was
then not aware that VVV was hurt as there were no marks on her. The marks only
became evident the following morning. Petitioner claimed that he applied medication on
VVV's burns.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10 (a)
of R.A No. 7610 in its Decision dated July 1, 2011, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt from the crime of violation of Section 10
(a) of RA 7610, "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act" and hereby sentences Ricardo Del Poso y Cerna to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed his appeal with the CA and the latter court, in its Decision dated July 22,
2013, dismissed the same appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by appellant is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated 1 July 2011 and Order dated 27 October 2011 RTC, (NCJR) Branch
38, Manila in Crim. Case No. 05-239429 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Hence, the present petition.
The grounds relied upon by petitioner are the following:
 I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER WHEN THE MINOR CHILD-COMPLAINANT ADMITTED
THAT SHE SUSTAINED THE BURNS WHEN SHE TRIED TO EVADE THE
HEATED IRON THAT (PETITIONER) WAS HOLDING OVER HER WHILE
LYING ON THE IRONING BOARD JUST TO SCARE HER AS A WAY OF
CHASTENING HER, WHICH THE COURT FOUND IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION. [EQUALLY] OF WEIGHT, WHICH IT LIKEWISE FOUND AND
WHICH IT UNCEREMONIOUSLY DISREGARDED IS THE RELATION OF
THE PARTIES ESTABLISHED BY FATE.

II. ASSUMING THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT, IT

ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPRECIATE IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NO INTENTION
TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED DESPITE THE
PARALLEL CASE OF PEOPLE V. ENRIQUEZ, 58 PHIL. 536 IN WHICH IT
WAS HELD THAT TO BE PRESENT, PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND
SUCH OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES ANALOGOUS THERETO.

III. HENCE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

MODIFYING THE SENTENCE OF THE PETITIONER TO ONE DEGREE
LOWER.[5]
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in convicting him when the minor admitted that she
sustained the burns when she tried to evade the heated iron that he was holding over her
while lying on the ironing board just to scare her as a way of chastening her. He also
claims that assuming the CA is correct, it still erred in refusing to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
and passion and/or obfuscation, thus, also erring in not modifying his sentence to another
degree lower.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment[6] dated June 19, 2014, argues
that the trial court and the CA correctly convicted the petitioner for violation of R.A. No.
7610. It also avers that the trial court correctly denied appreciation of the mitigating
circumstances of passion and/or obfuscation and lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong, and as such properly applied the corresponding penalty without any mitigating
circumstance.
In its Reply[7] dated October 8, 2014, petitioner reiterates the arguments and issues he
presented in his petition.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
As an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a Rule 45 Petition if any of
the following is present:
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on
speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of
Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[8]
A question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts."[9] On the other hand, a question of law exists "when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." [10] A close reading of
the issues presented by petitioner shows that they are all factual in nature, and thus, does
not fall within the scope of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court nor
do they fall within the exceptions to the general rule.
Nevertheless, even if this Court should disregard such infirmity, the petition still fails to
impress.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 otherwise known as "An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination,
and for Other Purposes," provides the following:
ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
Section 3 of the same law defines child abuse as -
3 (b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
The prosecution was able to prove the elements of the violation of the said law, namely:
(1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by petitioner
against VVV; and (3) the said acts are clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610. As aptly
ruled by the CA citing the factual findings of the RTC, all the elements of the crime
charged are present, thus:
We agree with the trial court when it ruled that the prosecution have established the
elements of child abuse in this case, to wit: (a) the victim's minority; (b) the acts
constituting physical and psychological abuse when accused employed the use of a
heated flat iron; and (c) said excessive acts of rebuke and chastening are clearly
punishable under RA No. 7610. This is clearly shown in the evidence it presented during
trial particularly the testimonies of its witnesses and that of the minor victim, VVV, who
gave a clear, consistent, and credible account of the events on September 10, 2010, in a
straightforward and candid manner. Settled is the rule that when the victim's testimony is
straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of
credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Hence, We see
no reason not to affirm the factual findings of the trial court. Equally, settled is the rule
that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to respect and are not to be disturbed on
appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, having been
overlooked or misinterpreted, might materially affect the disposition of the case. Not one
of the exceptions is present in this case.[11]
In Araneta v. People,[12] this Court discussed the nature of the crime of child abuse as
defined in R.A. No. 7610, thus:
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the
population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under
Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that The State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of
existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal
Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute
that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child
abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by
which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of
child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under
existing laws but includes also other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development.
Article VI of the statute enumerates the other acts of abuse. Paragraph (a) of Section 10
thereof states:
Article VI
OTHER ACTS OF ABUSE
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse,
(b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show
that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the
child's development. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and
be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any
of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child
cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act
prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word or is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
or in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development supposes that there are four punishable
acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation;
and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The
fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying
condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
The subject statute defines children as persons below eighteen (18) years of age; or those
over that age but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.[13]
As to the contention of petitioner that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong should have been appreciated, this Court finds it unmeritorious.
It is a hornbook doctrine that this mitigating circumstance can be taken into account only
when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident disproportion between the
means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences. [14] The facts found by
the trial court and the CA show that petitioner intended the natural consequence of his
act. The observation of the OSG that petitioner's intention of inflicting such harm should
be judged in accordance with his previous acts of abusing the victim, of regarding VVV
as a mere adoptive child who is not his blood relative and petitioner's evident superiority
of physique as a fully grown man inflicting harm upon a 9-year-old victim, and thus,
when petitioner pressed the hot iron upon the body of the victim, it must be presumed
that his intention was to physically abuse her since such act was sufficient to produce the
evil which resulted from such act is also worth noting.[15]
Applying the same set of facts, petitioner is also not entitled to the application of the
mitigating circumstance of passion and/or obfuscation. The mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation only applies if the act of the victim is both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such condition of mind.[16] A child who fell asleep while attending to a
business establishment is not an offense at all and could not give rise to an impulse
sufficiently powerful to naturally produce a justified diminution of an adult's selfcontrol.
As correctly ruled by the CA:
Going now to the theory of appellant that the trial court committed error when it did not
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of passion and/or obfuscation and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong, the same deserves scant consideration.
To be entitled to the mitigating circumstance [of] passion and/or obfuscation the
following elements must be present: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. These elements are
not present here. There was no unlawful and sufficient act on VVV's part which
sufficiently provoked passion and/or obfuscation on appellant's side. As correctly
observed by the trial court, the dozing off of VVV when she was ordered to watch over
the Xerox machine for possible clients is not an unlawful act sufficient to produce
passion and raging anger, even to a disciplinarian foster parent. Hence, appellant cannot
successfully claim that he was blinded by passion and obfuscation. [17]
Hence, the trial court and the CA correctly imposed the penalty by not considering the
mitigating circumstances claimed by petitioner. Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 imposes
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the trial court did not err when it imposed the penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dated January 28,
2014 of Ricardo Del Poso y Dela Cerna is DENIED for lack merit and the Decision
dated July 22, 2013, dismissing petitioner's appeal and affirming the Decision dated July
1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Manila in Criminal Case No. 05-239429,
convicting petitioner of violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A No. 7610 and imposing upon
petitioner the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

 (c) People v. Moro Macbul No. 48976 October 11, 1943

[ G.R. No. 48976, October 11, 1943 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MORO
MACBUL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

OZAETA, J.:

Appellant pleaded guilty to an  information  for theft of two sacks of papers valued at P10
belonging to the Provincial Government of  Sulu, alleged to have been committed on
March  9, 1943, in the municipality of Jolo; it being also alleged that he was a habitual
delinquent, having been twice convicted of the same crime on November  14, 1928, and
August 20,  1942.  The trial  court sentenced him  to suffer one month and  one day
of arresto mayor as principal penalty and two years, four months,  and one day of prision
correccional as additional penalty for habitual  delinquency.

The trial court found two mitigating circumstances: plea of guilty under paragraph 7, and
extreme  poverty and necessity under paragraph 10,  of  article 13 of  the  Revised Penal
Code; but it took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism in imposing the
principal as well as the additional penalty.

The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the
consideration by the trial court of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the
purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, counsel contending
that  recidivism should not have  been taken into account because it is inherent in habitual
delinquency.  While that contention is correct, as we have decided in the case of
People vs. Tolentino, 1 Off. Gaz., 682, it is beside the point here because the error
committed by the trial court lies not so much in its having considered recidivism  as  an
aggravating  circumstance  for the  purpose of penalizing habitual delinquency, as in its
having considered appellant as a habitual delinquent at all, it appearing from the
information that his two previous convictions were more than  ten  years apart.  "A
person  shall be deemed to be habitually delinquent,  if within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener."  (See last 
paragraph, article 62, No.  5, of the Revised Penal Code.)  Therefore, appellant's first
conviction, which took  place in  November, 1928, cannot be taken  into account because
his second conviction took place  in August, 1942, or fourteen years later. Hence, within
the purview of the Habitual Delinquency Law appellant has  only one previous
conviction  against  him, namely, that of 1942.

The trial court considered extreme poverty and necessity as a mitigating circumstance
falling within No. 10 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which authorizes the court
to consider in favor of an accused "any other circumstance of a similar .nature and
analogous to those above mentioned." The trial court predicates such consideration upon
its finding that the accused, on account of extreme poverty  and of the economic
difficulties brought about by the present cataclysm, was forced to pilfer the two sacks of 
papers mentioned in the information from the Customhouse Building, which he sold for
P2.50, in order to be able to buy something to eat for various minor children  of his.  (The
stolen goods' were subsequently recovered.)  The Solicitor General interposes no
objection to the consideration of such circumstance as  mitigating under No. 10 of article
13. We give it our stamp of approval, recognizing the immanent principle that the right to
life is more sacred than a mere property right.  That  is not to encourage or even
countenance theft but merely to dull somewhat the keen and pain-producing edges of the
stark realities of life.

Conformably to  the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the sentence appealed
from is modified by affirming the principal  penalty  and eliminating the  additional 
penalty, without costs.

Yulo, C. J., Moran, and Paras, JJ., concur.

 (d) People v. Pujinio No. L-21690 April 29, 1969

[ G.R. No. L-21690, April 29, 1969 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
EPIFANIO PUJINIO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, EPIFANIO PUJINIO,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case is before Us for an automatic review of the sentence of death imposed by the

Court of First Instance of Cebu upon Epifanio Pujinio whom it found guilty of robbery
with homicide, with six aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance.
Epifanio Pujinio and Eladio Pacquiao were charged in the lower court as follows:
"The undersigned accuses Epifanio Pujinio and Eladio Pacquiao of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 18th day of February 1963, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in
the municipality of San Fernando, province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused together with
one Sofonias Balbuena who is still at large and who shall be prosecuted also when
arrested, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with
firearm and a scythe and with disguise by half covering their faces, with intent of gain
and with force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, enter the dwelling or house of Aquilino Sebial thru the kitchen and once
inside shot the latter, pointed their firearm at the occupants thereof and demanded from
them money and other valuables, thereafter ransacked the house and without the consent
of the owner took and carried away a transistor radio worth P180.00 and cash in the
amount of P100.00 to the damage and prejudice of the owner, the family of
said Aquilino Sebial in the total amount of P280.00; that on the occasion of the said
robbery and in order to insure success of their purpose, the said accused in pursuance of
their conspiracy, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of night time, superior number, strength and the use of their firearm, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot the
said Aquilino Sebial while the latter was asleep, thereby inflicting upon him:
"At the abdomen a semicircular wound located 2-1/2 inches above umbilicus at line of
abdomen.  Wound surrounded by contusion with blood oozing out and measures 1 inch at
its widest length and 1/2 inch.
"Right forearm-ulnar side, 3 inches below elbow joint is another semicircular wound is
1/2 inch in width.
"Right arm a clean cut wound measuring 1/2 inch in length is found at the ulnar side
about 1/2 inch above elbow joint with blood oozing out which injuries resulted in the
death of said Aquilino Sebial shortly thereafter.
"That in the commission of the offense the aggravating circumstances of evident pre-
meditation, treachery, night time, superior number and strength, committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, disguise, and in addition, recidivism with respect
to Epifanio Pujinio, for having been previously convicted by final judgment to a life
sentence in Crim. Case No. V-6110 for Murder on February 27, 1960, but he escaped
from Davao Penal Colony while serving said penalty on Dec. 31, 1962.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cebu City, March 14, 1963.
(Sgd.) TOMAS EVANGELISTA
Actg. Asst. Provincial Fiscal"
Upon being arraigned on May 17, 1963, both defendants pleaded not guilty.  However, at
the hearing called on the 30th of the same month and year, their counsel de parte stated in
open court that Pujinio was willing to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and
thereafter to plead guilty, provided the court would allow him to prove the mitigating
circumstances of extreme poverty and lack of instruction.  Having been allowed to
withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and thereafter arraigned anew, Pujinio pleaded
guilty and was sentenced as stated above.
The other defendant, Eladio Pacquiao, after trial, was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor, to indemnify the offended party
in the sum of P100.00 (the money in cash that was stolen), jointly and solidarily with his
co-defendant, and to pay one-third of the costs.
Before the decision against Pujinio had become final and executory, appearance on his
behalf was made by Atty. I. V. Binamira, who subsequently filed two motions for re-
consideration.  Both were denied by the lower court.  In this instance, the brief submitted
by the same counsel on behalf of Pujinio claims that the lower court erred in imposing the
capital punishment upon the latter inspite of the fact that "his affidavit shows that he was
not the one who fired the fatal shot that killed the victim but it
was Sofonias Balbuena".  This contention is exclusively based upon the sworn statement
(now in the record as Exhibit C) made by Pujinio before Sgt. Alfoja of the Cebu P.C.
Command.  It appears, however, that the same was presented as part of the testimony of
Sgt. Alfoja and of the Justice of the Peace of San Fernando, Cebu, against the other
defendant, Eladio Pacquiao, to prove the latter's participation in the conspiracy to commit
the crime of robbery with homicide.  At that stage of the proceedings the case had already
been submitted as far as Pujinio was concerned.  Moreover, it is obvious that, with his
plea of guilty, Pujinio was deemed to have admitted all the facts and circumstances
alleged in the information which, as a matter of fact, was read to him twice before he
entered his plea.
Pujinio’s counsel further claims that although the latter entered a plea of guilty he,
however, explained to the court that it was Balbuena who killed Aquilino Sebial, end
that, therefore, he should be found guilty only of robbery.  This contention finds support
only in the sworn statement mentioned heretofore and which, as already stated, can not be
considered in connection with Pujinio's case.
Moreover, even assuming that Pujinio testified to that effect, it would not justify a finding
that he was guilty only of robbery, for it is settled that one who participated in the
commission of the crime of robbery in connection with which homicide was also
committed - as in this case - will be equally guilty as principal of the crime of robbery
with homicide, unless there is clear evidence that he tried to prevent the commission of
the latter offense (People vs. Morados, 70 Phil., 558; People vs. Carunungan, et al., G. R.
No. L-13283, September 30, 1960).
With respect to the propriety of the penalty imposed by the lower court, it appears that
the information charged Pujinio with robbery with homicide, with the attendance of
seven aggravating circumstances, namely: evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime,
superior number and strength, commission of the offense in the dwelling of the victim,
use of disguise, and recidivism.  On the other hand, the lower court considered in his
favor only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, and refused to consider in his
favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and extreme poverty as follows:
"But the other two mitigating circumstances that he was claiming in his favor, namely (1)
lack of instruction and (2) extreme poverty, cannot be appreciated in his favor.  He
admitted that he has studied up to sixth grade.  That is more than sufficient schooling to
give him a degree of instruction as to properly apprise him of what is right and
wrong.  And with respect to poverty, he himself said that his mother owns real
properties.  He could have gainfully occupied himself by working on these properties, if
he cared to.  Moreover, this accused once had an employment with the Caltex way back
in the year 1960, which he lost when he embarked on his carrier of criminality by
committing his first case of murder.  In short, he impoverished himself and lost his
gainful occupation by committing crimes.  He was not driven to the commission of
crimes due to want and poverty (pp. 94-95, record)."
We agree with the lower court that the two mitigating circumstances mentioned
heretofore can not be considered in favor of Pujinio.
The offense having been committed with six aggravating circumstances - that of
nighttime being absorbed in treachery - and with only one mitigating circumstance to
offset them, the penalty provided by law should be imposed in its maximum degree -
Death.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is affirmed, with costs.

 2) Aggravating Circumstances

 (e) People v. Lora No. L-49430 March 30, 1982

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-49430, March 30, 1982 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BELINDA
LORA Y VEQUIZO ALIAS LORENA SUMILEW, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The defendant Belinda Lora y Vequizo alias Lorena Sumilew was accused in the Court of
First Instance of Davao of serious illegal detention with murder in an amended
information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Serious Illegal
Detention with Murder under Art. 267 in relation to Articles 248 and 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about May 28, 1975, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then a private
person, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and for the purpose of extorting ransom from
spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap, illegally detained their three (3) year old child
Oliver Yap, a minor, from May 28 to 29, 1975 and with treachery, evident premeditation
and with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted Oliver
Yap by tying his mouth with stocking, placing him inside a Pallmall cigarette box,
covering the said box with a mat and piece of sack and filing the same with other boxes
in the third floor (bodega) of the house owned by said spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna
Yap, thereby inflicting upon said Oliver Yap the following to wit: "Asphyxia due to
suffocation" which caused the death of said Oliver Yap.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the following aggravating
circumstances: (1) taking advantage of superior strength; (2) disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of his age; (3) that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party; (4) that the crime was committed with abuse of
confidence, she being a domestic helper (maid) or obvious ungratefulness; (5) that craft,
fraud and disguise was employed; and (6) that the crime was committed with cruelty, by
deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim.
Contrary to law.
According to the trial judge, "he has appointed as counsel de oficio Atty. Hildegardo
Iñigo a bar topnothcer with considerable practice," in view of the gravity of the offense.
Upon motion of the counsel for the accused, the arraignment was postponed to enable
him to study the charge against the accused. Thereafter, after being arraigned, the accused
Belinda Lora, in the presence and with the assistance of her counsel, entered a plea of
guilty in Visayan dialect, which is her native dialect.
The Court thereafter directed the prosecution to present its evidence and the counsel for
the accused manifested that the evidence of the defense would be presented only for
proving mitigating circumstances.
Eight witnesses for the prosecution, namely: Myrna Yap, David Cortez, Fidencio Bisnar,
Ricardo Yap, Agaton Bonahos, Emmanuel Mesias, Rolando Estillori and Juan Abear, Jr.
were presented.
The facts are undisputed.
On May 26, 1975, accused Belinda Lora, using the name "Lorena Sumilew", applied as a
housemaid in the household of the spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap at 373 Ramon
Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City. The spouses had a store on the ground floor; a
mezzanine floor was used as their residence; while the third floor was used as a bodega
for their stocks. They had two children, Emily and Oliver Yap. Oliver was 3 years and
five months old.[1]
Belinda Lora was accepted as a housemaid in the residence of the Yaps and reported for
work the following day, May 27, 1975. Her duties were to wash clothes and to look after
Oliver Yap.[2]
On May 28, 1975, Mrs. Myrna Yap returned home from the market to find her mother-in-
law and her husband panicky because their son, Oliver, and the maid, accused Belinda
Lora, were missing. The mother-in-law had found a ransom note at the stairway to the
mezzanine floor. The note said that Oliver was to be sold to a couple and that the writer
(defendant herein) needed money for her mother's hospitalization.[3] Four pieces of
residence certificates were also found inside the paper bag of the maid. One residence
certificate bore the No. 1941785 with the name "Sumiliw, Lorena Pamintil."[4]
The incident was reported immediately to the police. Mrs. Yap, accompanied by one Mrs.
Erlinda Velez, went to look for Oliver and the housemaid. Not finding them in Davao
City, they went to Digos and Bansalan (Davao) and looked in the hospitals there. The
residence certificate in the name of Lorena Sumiliw was issued in Digos and the ransom
letter stated that the mother of the defendant was very sick.[5]
In the evening of May 28, 1975, the Yaps received two telephone calls at their residence.
The first call was received by Mrs. Yaps's mother-in-law while the second call was
received by Ricardo Yap. Lorena Sumiliw (defendant), the caller, instructed Ricardo Yap
to bring the amount of P3,000.00 to the island infront of the (Davao) Regional Hospital
and to go there alone without any policeman or companion, after which his son (Oliver)
would be left to the security guard of the hospital at the emergency exit.[6]
The Yaps borrowed the amount of P3,000.00. Upon instructions of the NBI, the money
was marked with Mrs. Yap's initials "MY".[7]
Ricardo Yap wrapped the P3,000.00 in a piece of paper and went to the Regional
Hospital at 9:30 in the evening of May 28, 1975. He placed the money near the Imelda
Playground. He proceeded to the hospital and looked for his child from the security
guard. However, the security guard said nobody left a boy with him.[8] Ricardo Yap
stayed at a corner looking and calling for his child but could not locate him. After ten
minutes, he went back to where he had placed the money but the money was not there
anymore. He waited until 11:00 o'clock, after which he went home.[9]
The following morning, May 29, 1975, Mrs. Yap received a phone call from the accused
informing her that her son was at the Minrapco Terminal and that she was asking for
another P3,000.00. Mrs. Yap proceeded to the terminal whereupon she learned that the
terminal had moved to a place near a theatre. When Myrna Yap arrived at the place, she
saw the accused board a Minica bus. She followed and grabbed the accused. [10] As the
accused said that Mrs. Yap's son was brought to the Regional Hospital, they proceeded
there. Upon arriving there, a couple, Mr. and Mrs. Bonahos, said that the Yap son was in
Panacan. Mrs. Yap and the accused went to Panacan. After arriving at Panacan, the
accused told Mrs. Yap that her son was in the custody of a woman whom she paid
P100.00 and that the woman would return her son at 6:00 o'clock P.M. that day. Mrs. Yap
therefore, made the accused sign a promisory note that she would return Oliver on the
same day.[11] After the accused boarded a bus for Surigao, Mrs. Yap listed down the bus
number and the seat number and reported to Lt. Mesias of the Davao City Police Force
that the "kidnapper" was on board the Surigao bus.[12]
Lt. Mesias stopped the bus and placed the accused under arrest. From the body of the
accused was taken an improvised pouch containing 36 pieces of P50.00 bills and 24
pieces of P20.00 bills. The money had initials reading "MY" below the serial numbers. [13]
The following morning, May 30, 1975, upon waking up at around 6 o'clock in his house,
Ricardo Yap noticed that blood was dripping from the ceiling. He went upstairs, which
was being utilized as a bodega, to verify, and found his son placed inside the carton of
Marlboro cigarettes. The head of the child was inside the carton while his feet protruded
outside.[14] His mouth was tied with stockings.[15] The child was already dead.[16] He had
died of "asphyxhia due to suffocation."[17]
The defendant presented evidence only for the purpose of proving alleged mitigating
circumstances. She claims that she did not intend to kill the child.[18]
To support her plea for mercy, she stated that she had three children aged from one to
five years whom she left in Pagadian.[19] On objection to the materiality of the evidence,
the appellant's counsel pleaded that she be allowed to prove those facts for "humanitarian
consideration" which might enable the Supreme Court to review the penalty with com-
passion.[20]
The defendant capped her testimony with the following plea:
"A I would request the Honorable Court that LIFE IMPRISONMENT will be the penalty
imposed upon me because I really committed the crime. I did not really intend to kill the
child.
Q Would you like to make any further appeal?
A I really repent to what I have done, sir."[21]
On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that she gagged the child's mouth with
stockings; placed the child inside the box with head down and legs up; that she covered
the box with some sacks and boxes and left the child in that condition inside the store
room of the house of Ricardo Yap.[22]
When the defendant left the store room, the voice of the child, who was previously
shouting, "was already slow and to make sure that his voice would not be heard I closed
the door."[23]
On the basis of the plea of guilt of the defendant and the evidence of the prosecution, the
court convicted the defendant with complex crime of serious illegal detention with
murder and imposed, among others, the extreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.
The guilt of the defendant is so patent that there is no further need to discuss the
evidence. The only task remaining after the plea of guilty and the presentation of the
undisputed evidence for the prosecution is to determine the crime committed, the penalty
to be imposed and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be appreciated.
The crime actually committed is not the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, as
found by the trial court, but the simple crime of murder qualified by treachery.
Kidnapping is a crime against liberty defined in Article 267, Title IX, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code. The essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual
confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of his liberty.[24]
"Where there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive their victims of their
liberty for some time and for some purpose, and there being no appreciable interval
between their being taken and their being shot from which kidnapping may be inferred,
the crimes committed were murder and frustrated murder and not the complex crimes of
kidnapping with murder and kidnapping with frustrated murder."[25]
In the instant case, the gagging of the child with stockings, placing him in a box with
head down and legs upward and covering the box with some sacks and other boxes were
only the methods of the defendant to commit murder. The child instantly died of
suffocation. This is evident from the testimony of Dr. Juan Abear, Jr. who performed the
autopsy on May 30, 1975 at 8 o'clock in the morning. When Dr. Abear conducted the
autopsy, the body of the child was already in a state of decomposition. Dr. Abear opined
that the child must have died three days before the autopsy.[26] In other words, the child
died practically on the very day that the child was stuffed into the box on May 28, 1975.
The demand for ransom did not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder. The
defendant was well aware that the child would be suffocated to death in a few moments
after she left. The demand for ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of the
defendant to murder the child, to conceal his body and then demand money before the
discovery of the cadaver.
There is treachery because the victim is only a 3-year old child. [27] The commission of the
offense was attended with the aggravating circumstances of lack of respect due to the age
of the victim, cruelty and abuse of confidence.
The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in cases where the victim is of
tender age as well as of old age. This circumstance was applied in a case where one of the
victims in a murder case was a 12-year-old boy.[28] In the instant case, the victim was only
3 years old.
The gagging of the mouth of a three-year-old child with stockings, dumping him with
head downwards into a box, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes, thereby
causing slow suffocation, is cruelty.
There was also abuse of confidence because the victim was entrusted to the care of the
appellant. The appellant's main duty in the household is to take care of the minor child.
There existed a relation of trust and confidence between the appellant and the one against
whom the crime was committed and the appellant made use of such relation to commit
the crime.
When the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the
deceased child's amah, the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence is
present.[29]
On the other hand, the defendant invokes the following as mitigating circumstances,
namely; (1) she pleaded guilty; (2) she did not intend to commit so grave a wrong; (3) she
was overcome by fear that her mother will die unless she is able to raise money for her
mother's hospitalization, thus, she committed kidnapping for ransom; (4) the appellant
should live so that her children who are of tender years would not be deprived of a
mother; and (5) we have a compassionate society.[30]
The only mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of the defendant is her
voluntary plea of guilt. Her contention that she had no intention to kill the child lacks
merit. The defendant was well aware that her act of gagging the mouth of the child with
stockings, placing him with head down and feet up in a box and covering the box with
sacks and other boxes would result to the instant suffocation of the child. There being
three aggravating circumstances, namely, lack of respect due to the tender age of the
victim, cruelty and abuse of confidence and only one mitigating circumstance in favor of
the defendant, she deserves the death penalty imposed upon her by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified with treachery and appreciating the aggravating circumstances already indicated
above, We hereby impose the penalty of death with costs de oficio.
With this modification, the rest of the decision is hereby affirmed.

 (f) People v. Mat-an GR#215720, February 21, 2018

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OSCAR
MAT-AN Y ESCAD, ACCUSED-APPELANT.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

On appeal is the 25 April 2014 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05858, which affirmed with modifications the 4 September 2012 Joint
Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case Nos.
29335-R and 29336-R, finding herein accused-appellant Oscar Mat-An y Escad (Oscar)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Slight Physical Injury and Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 266 and Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

THE FACTS

On 13 April 2009, Oscar was charged with the crimes of Attempted Homicide and
Murder in two Informations, the inculpatory allegations of which respectively read, thus:
Criminal Case No. 29335-R (Attempted Homicide)

That on or about the 8th day of April 2009, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to kill ANTHONETTE
EWANGAN, a 1 1/2 year old child, by stabbing her with a knife at the nape, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt acts, but was not
able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a
consequence by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is,
due to some other causes which prevented the accused from consummating his unlawful
purpose.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Criminal Case No. 29336-R (Murder)

That on or about the 8th day of April 2009, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill and
taking advantage of superior strength and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab MINDA BABSA-AY, a 61-year old woman,
twice on her chest with a knife, thereby inflicting upon the latter: Multiple stab wounds
on the chest, and as a result thereof, said MINDA BABSA-AY died.

That the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
considering that the killing was planned, deliberated upon and the criminal design carried
out by the accused, and abuse of superior strength considering that the accused being then
armed with a knife took advantage of his superiority in strength disregarding the sex and
age of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On 13 May 2009, the RTC granted Oscar's motion to consolidate the two cases. [5]

On 2 June 2009, Oscar, duly assisted by counsel, was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to
the charges against him.[6]

On 10 November 2009, pre-trial was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations as to the identity of the accused, among others; the minority of Anthonette
Ewangan (Anthonette)[7]; that Oscar is the husband of Ruby Babsa-ay Mat-an (Ruby), the
daughter of the deceased Minda Babsaay (Minda); and that Ruby works overseas and
sends money remittances through her mother and not to Oscar.[8]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented ten (10) witnesses, namely: Norma C. Gulayan (Norma), Dr.
John L. Tinoyan (Dr. Tinoyan), Dr. Samuel P. Daw-as, Jr. (Dr. Daw-as), Clyde Bunhian
(Clyde), Police Senior Inspector Angeline B. Amangan (PSI Amangan), Rosemarie B.
Ewangan (Rosemarie), Police Officer 3 Leo Mojica (PO3 Mojica), Police Officer 1 Jose
Mana-ar, Jr. (PO1 Mana-ar), Robinson B. Babsa-ay (Robinson), and Sheyanne Mat-an
(Sheyanne). Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

On 8 April 2009, at around 11:00 a.m., Norma was selling halo-halo beside Minda's store
at Sunnyside Fairview, Tacay Road, Baguio City; Clyde was in front of the same store.
At that time, Minda was inside her store cradling her 18-month-old granddaughter
Anthonette in a blanket,[9] its ends tied behind her back.

Moments later, Oscar entered the store and an argument ensued between him and Minda.
Apparently, Oscar was asking Minda why Ruby had not answered his calls. Minda
responded by telling Oscar not to create trouble and to return once he was sober. There
was silence for a few seconds;[10] after which, Norma and Clyde heard Minda moaning as
if her mouth was being covered.[11] Norma immediately ran inside the store where she
saw Oscar stab Minda twice. Norma pulled him out of the store and away from Minda.
[12]
 Norma then asked Clyde, who followed her inside the store, to look for Sheyanne,
Oscar and Ruby's daughter.[13] Norma also called out to neighbors for help.[14] Before
calling Sheyanne, Clyde saw Oscar leaving the vicinity.[15]

Sheyanne testified that on 8 April 2009, while she and her sister Desiree Mat-an were
doing laundry, Norma suddenly appeared, crying and without her slippers and told them
that Minda was stabbed by their father. Upon hearing this, they immediately ran towards
Minda's store. Upon reaching the store, they saw Minda in a prone position with blood
splattered on the floor. Underneath Minda's body was Anthonette who appeared to be
injured as well.[16] Sheyanne then ran to the roadside where her father was being held by
some of their neighbors including PO1 Mana-ar, a police officer on vacation in Baguio at
that time.[17] Thereafter, PO1 Mana-ar, Sheyanne, and some of the neighbors brought
Oscar to the police station and they also turned over the knife used by Oscar to stab
Minda.[18] Meanwhile, Minda and Anthonette were rushed to the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center (BGHMC) where Anthonette was admitted for further observation.
[19]
 Minda died on the same day at the age of 61.[20]

The postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Tinoyan revealed that Minda sustained
four (4) stab wounds in her chest three (3) of which were fatal, while one (1) was
superficial.[21] As regards Anthonette, the medicolegal certificate prepared by Dr. Daw-as
of the BGHMC revealed that she sustained a superficial stab wound in the nape area. [22]

Rosemarie, Anthonette's mother, testified that her daughter was confined in the hospital
for a night; and for that they incurred P929.00 for her medication and hospitalization,
[23]
 as shown by the receipts she presented.[24] The heirs of Minda incurred the amount of
P83,763.00 as expenses for her wake and burial.[25] This amount was admitted by the
defense.[26]

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Oscar as its sole witness. In his testimony, he invoked denial as his
defense and narrated his version of the incident as follows:

On 8 April 2009, at about 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Oscar was invited by
Donato Bunhian for a drink at Donato's house. Later, he went to Minda's store to buy
bread, but he was not able to do so because Minda said to him: "Why are you still coming
here? You are even drunk." He answered back but could no longer recall what his exact
retort was.[27] After that brief exchange, he could no longer recall what transpired next.
When he came to his senses, he was already by the roadside, allegedly waiting for a taxi
to go to his workplace at Camp 7.[28] While waiting for a taxi, however, some persons
approached him and brought him to the police station where he was informed that he had
inflicted injuries on his mother-in-law. He maintained, however, that he did not kill his
mother-in-law and injure Anthonette; and that he was actually surprised by the charges
against him.[29]

The RTC Ruling

In its joint judgment, the RTC found Oscar guilty of attempted homicide and murder.

With respect to the killing of Minda, the trial court was convinced that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Oscar had committed the crime. It also
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation to qualify the killing
to murder. It observed that Oscar decided to commit the crime because of his grudge
against Minda as it was to her, and not to him, that his wife remitted money from abroad.

The trial court also appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. It noted that Oscar was about 5'10" tall, heavily built, and armed with a deadly
weapon; whereas Minda was only 4'11" in height, was already 61 years old, and was
carrying a child.

As to the injury inflicted on Anthonette, the trial court ruled that the same constituted
attempted homicide. It also opined that abuse of superior strength was present
considering her tender age. However, the same could not be appreciated to qualify the
crime to attempted murder because the information charged only the crime of attempted
homicide.
The dispositive portion of the joint judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court, finding the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER and ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE, imposes upon the accused the following penalties:
1. Criminal Case No. 29335-R for Attempted Homicide the Indeterminate
Sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor as the minimum penalty to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as the maximum penalty,
to indemnify the private complainant the amount of P929.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P25,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

2. Criminal Case No. 29336-R for Murder - reclusion perpetua and to

indemnify the heirs of Minda Babsa-ay the amounts of P83,763.00 as actual
and compensatory damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In the service of his sentence, accused shall serve them successively. He shall be credited
with 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment.

Accused is ordered transferred to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
in view of the nature of the penalties imposed upon him pending any appeal he may
undertake.

SO ORDERED.[30]
Aggrieved, Oscar appealed before the CA.[31]

The CA Ruling

In its appealed decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC joint judgment. The
appellate court concurred with the trial court in its assessment that the prosecution was
able to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Oscar killed Minda and injured
Anthonette.

The appellate court, however, ruled that evident premeditation could not be appreciated
to qualify the killing of Minda to murder. It explained that the prosecution failed to
establish with certainty the time when Oscar decided to commit the felony. Consequently,
that he clung to his determination to kill Minda could not also be inferred. Nevertheless,
the appellate court ruled that abuse of superior strength attended the killing due to the
evident disparity in strength between Oscar and Minda. Thus, Oscar is still guilty of
murder for the killing of Minda.

The appellate court also ruled that Oscar could not be held criminally liable for attempted
homicide because there was no evidence that he had the intent to kill Anthonette. Thus,
Oscar could only be convicted of physical injuries; and considering that the physician
who treated Anthonette testified that her injury was only superficial, Oscar is liable only
for slight physical injuries therefor.

The fallo of the appealed decision provides:

FOR THESE REASONS, the September 4, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 59, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 29335-R, accused-appellant OSCAR MAT-AN Y
ESCAD is found GUILTY of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY and is meted
a straight penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor, and further
ORDERED to pay the victim the amounts of P929.00 as actual damages
and P5,000.00 as moral damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case No. 29336-R, accused-appellant OSCAR MAT-AN Y

ESCAD is found GUILTY of MURDER and is sentenced to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim the amounts of P83,763.00 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of the judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[32]
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED IN ADJUDGING

ACCUSED-APPELLANT OSCAR MAT-AN Y ESCAD GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE DEATH OF MINDA BABSA-AY AND
INJURIES SUSTAINED BY ANTHONETTE EWANGAN.
THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal lacks merit.

Factual findings of the trial court; minor inconsistencies between the testimonies of
the witnesses

Oscar assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Norma's. He claims
that Norma's testimony that she had instructed Clyde to look for Sheyanne is inconsistent
with Sheyanne's version that Norma herself appeared before her while doing laundry and
related the incident to her. For Oscar, this discrepancy generated perplexity on who
between Norma and Sheyanne was telling the truth, thereby putting in question what they
actually witnessed on the morning of 8 April 2009.

This argument deserves scant consideration.

The established rule in our criminal jurisprudence is that when the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. Unless it can be shown that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, may affect the result of the case; or in instances
where the evidence fails to support or substantiate the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts; the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses will be upheld.[33]

In this case, no cogent reason exists which would justify the reversal of the trial court's
assessment on the credibility of the witnesses. It is well-settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point
bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy
their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a
prosecution witness.[34]

While there are inconsistencies between Norma and Sheyanne's testimonies, these refer
only to minor details which do not diminish the probative value of the testimonies at
issue. Thus, the fact remains that Norma's categorical and positive identification of Oscar
as the person who stabbed Minda prevails over his defense of denial. Denial is inherently
a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical
statement that has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail.[35]

Furthermore, Oscar himself could not firmly deny the accusations against him. Oscar
himself could not categorically deny the possibility that he stabbed Minda and Anthonette
after he "blacked-out." He merely stated that he was "shocked" by the aforesaid charges
and that he "cannot recall" stabbing Minda and Anthonette, thus:
ATTY. CAMUYOT:
Q. So from the residence of your neighbour Donato Bunhian, where did you proceed, if you
can remember?
A. I went to buy bread at the store, Ma'am.
Q. What store are you referring to Mr. Witness?
A. From the store of my mother-in-law, Ma'am.
Q. And what is the name of your mother-in-law?
A. Minda Babsa-ay, Ma'am.
Q. So were you able to buy bread from the store of your mother-in-law?
A. I was not able to buy, Ma'am.
Q. Why?
A. I was about to buy bread, Ma'am, but then my mother-in-law, Minda Babsa-ay, uttered
some words on me, Ma'am.
Q. What did she utter to you particularly? What word did your mother-in-law uttered against
you, if you can still remember?
A. "Why are you still coming here? You are even drunk."
Q. So how did you answer your mother-in-law, if you did answer?
A. I answered her back, Ma'am, but I cannot recall anymore what I have answered.
Q. So what transpired after that exchange of words with your mother-in-law, if you can still
remember?
A. I cannot recall anymore, Ma'am, I was shocked and I had a black out.
Q. So when did you come next to your senses during that day if you did, Mr. Witness?
A. I was already at the road located at the upper level, Ma'am.
Q. On the same day, Mr. Witness?
A. Yes, Ma'm.[36] (emphasis supplied)
xxxx
ATTY. CAMUYOT:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, you are being charged of murdering your mother-in-law, Minda Babsa-
ay. What can you say about this allegation?
A. I am shocked, Ma'am.
Q. You are also being charged, Mr. Witness of attempting to kill Ant[h]onette Ewangan. What
can you say about this charge?
A. I don't know anything about that, Ma'am.[37] (emphases supplied)
xxxx
PROS. BERNABE:
Q. You do not recall, Mr. Witness, that you stabbed your mother-in-law?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. You do not also recall that you stabbed Ant[h]onette Ewangan whom she was carrying at
that time?
A. No, ma'am.[38]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial and appellate courts did not err in convicting
Oscar. The prosecution was able to establish his guilt for Minda's death and Anthonette's
injury. He cannot escape liability therefor just because he "blacked out" and "could not
recall" that he committed said crimes.

Oscar is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength,and also of slight

physical injury.

The Court concurs that the crime committed against Minda is Murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength.

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in
the commission of the crime.[39] The appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. [40]

In a plethora of cases, the Court has consistently held that the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is present when a man, armed with a deadly weapon, attacks an
unarmed and defenseless woman. In such case, the assailant clearly took advantage of the
superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which
the woman was unable to defend herself.[41]

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Oscar abused his superiority when
he killed Minda. Indeed, it was sufficiently shown that Oscar was armed with a knife, a
deadly weapon, while Minda was then burdened by a child and had no means to defend
and repel the attacks of her assailant. Furthermore, the trial court noted that Oscar was of
heavy build and stood at 5'10" in contrast to Minda's 4'11" frame. Clearly, Oscar abused
his superiority afforded him by his sex, height, and build and a weapon when he attacked
Minda who was then carrying a child. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly
convicted him of murder.

The Court also concurs that Oscar can be held guilty only of slight physical injuries with
respect. to Anthonette. The prosecution failed to present any evidence which would show
that Oscar also intended to kill Anthonette. Without the element of intent to kill, Oscar
could only be convicted for physical injury; and considering that Anthonette's wound was
only superficial, the appellate court correctly convicted Oscar of slight physical injury.

Alternative circumstance of intoxication

Oscar disputes that, on the assumption of his guilt, the trial and appellate courts erred in
not appreciating the alternative circumstance of intoxication to mitigate his liability. He
argues that records would show that he blacked out and could not remember what
transpired; thus, his mental faculties were dulled by the alcohol he imbibed.

The Court is not persuaded.

Drunkenness or intoxication is a modifying circumstance which may either aggravate or

mitigate the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional; and it is mitigating if not
habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime.[42] Once
intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, then, in the absence of truth to the
contrary, it is presumed to be unintentional or not habitual.[43] From the foregoing,
however, it is clear that the accused must first establish his state of intoxication at the
time of the commission of the felony before he may benefit from the presumption that the
intoxication was unintentional and not habitual. He must prove that he took such quantity
of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. [44]

In this case, other than his bare allegation that he blacked out, Oscar failed to present
sufficient evidence that would show that he was in a state of intoxication as would blur
his reason. This uncorroborated and self-serving statement as to his state of intoxication
is devoid of any probative value.[45] On the contrary, there is sufficient reason to believe
that Oscar recognized the injustice of his acts. After stabbing her mother-in-law to death,
Oscar proceeded to the roadside and waited for a taxi in an apparent attempt to escape.
His excuse that he was there because he was going to work is not worthy of any belief.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts did not err in not appreciating the alternative
circumstance of intoxication in favor of Oscar.

Penalties and monetary awards

In Criminal Case No. 29335-R, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance

present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period
or twenty (20) days of arresto menor, following Article 266 of the RPC. The Court
further finds the monetary awards consisting of P929.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00
as moral damages proper in this case.

In Criminal Case No. 29336-R, other than the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
which already qualified the crimes to murder, no other modifying circumstance is
present, whether aggravating or mitigating. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposed in accordance with Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Section 6 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, in relation to Article 63(2) of the RPC.

The Court, however, modifies the CA decision with respect to the monetary awards.
In People v. Jugueta,[46] the Court summarized the amounts of damages which may be
awarded for different crimes. In said case, the Court held that when the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, the following amounts may be awarded: (1) P75,000.00, as civil
indemnity; (2) P75,000.00, as moral damages; and (3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The aforesaid amounts are proper in this case. The Court further retains the award of
actual damages in the amount of P83,763.00.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 25 April 2014
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05858 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 29335-R, accused-appellant OSCAR MAT-AN Y ESCAD is

found GUILTY of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY and is meted a straight penalty of
twenty (20) days of arresto menor, and further ORDERED to pay the victim the
amounts of;p929.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages which shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case No. 29336-R, accused-appellant OSCAR MAT-AN Y ESCAD is

found GUILTY of MURDER and is sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the deceased Minda Babsa-ay the
following amounts: (1) P83,763.00 as actual damages; (2) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(3) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned
from the finality of this decision until their full payment.[47]

SO ORDERED.