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A Useful Dialogue?

Habermas and International Relations


Author(s): Thomas Diez and Jill Steans
Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 127-140
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Reviewof InternationalStudies (2005), 31, 127-140 Copyright© British InternationalStudies Association
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210505006339

A useful dialogue?Habermasand
InternationalRelations
THOMAS DIEZ AND JILL STEANS

Introduction

It is now more than twenty years since Jiirgen Habermas's work was first referred
to in International Relations (IR) theory.1 Along with many other continental
philosophers and social theorists, Habermas was initially mobilised in the critique of
positivism, and in particular neorealism, in IR theory. As such, the interest in
Habermas and IR must be located in the first instance within the context of the
fourth debate.2This Forum section of the Review provides us with the opportunity
to take stock and ask whether the dialogue between Habermas and IR has, thus far,
been useful in providing new conceptual and methodological tools to analyse
international politics and in inspiring new research agendas in IR.3 We also ask
whether the role that dialogue plays within Habermas's work has been useful in
formulating a critical theory of international relations.
To date, in his academic work, Habermas has written little explicitly on the
subject of international politics.4 However, as the focus of the fourth debate began

1 Richard K.
Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', InternationalStudies Quarterly,25: 2
(1981), pp. 204-36.
2 Sometimes referredto as the 'third' debate, as in Yosef
Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects
of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era', InternationalStudies Quarterly,33: 2 (1989),
pp. 235-54. We have adopted the term 'fourth debate' to differentiatethe critique of positivism and
the emergence of a more post-positivist orientation in IR, from the earlier 'inter-paradigmdebate'.
On the fourth debate, see Ole Waever,'Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead
of Paradigms', Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever(eds.), The Futureof InternationalRelations:
Masters in the Making (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-37.
3 We would like to thank all members of the International Relations Theory Research Group at the
Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham as well as
the Review'sanonymous reviewerfor their invaluablecontributions in putting this special section
together, and in writing this introduction. The Department's financial support for two workshops is
gratefully acknowledged.
4 See the referencesin the contribution
by Jurgen Haacke in this Forum. Richard Devetak cites the
scant referenceto international politics in Habermas's The Inclusionof the Other:Studies in Political
TheoryParts III and IV (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). Richard Devetak, 'Critical Theory', in Scott
Burchill et al., Theoriesof InternationalRelations (London: Palgrave,2001), pp. 155-80. Fred
Dallmayr (discussed at greater length below) cites Habermas'sviews on global communication, as
espoused in 'Reason in the Diversity of its Voices' as another piece that speaks to the concerns of
post-positivist IR. Fred Dallmayr, 'Conversation across boundaries: political theory and global
diversity', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies, 30: 2 (2001) pp. 331-47.

127

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128 ThomasDiez and Jill Steam

to shift from the critique of positivism to the substance of Critical Theory itself,5
some championed Habermas because he appeared to offer a new direction to IR in
its post-positivist phase. A key concern of Critical Theory has been how to enhance
the institutional setting of international/global politics so that arguing towards a
consensus prevailed over demonstrations of power. In so far as Habermas's work in
this area held out the promise of finding ways to transcend the (what has often been
presented as endemic) problem of power in international politics, we might ask
whether IR scholars have subsequently produced new and compelling visions of an
alternative world politics? More specifically, have the model of dialogue and the
conception of discourse ethics derived from Habermas, proved useful in IR theory,
and indeed, in facilitating the development of a more ethical international/global
politics? Has the engagement with Habermas been fruitful in stimulating attempts to
develop a critical international relations theory; or in the task of constructing a
social theory of international politics? Are the concepts used in Critical Theory
Utopian, especially in the context of international politics, or are they rooted in
concrete social and political practice and, therefore, potentially useful in the
development of a social theory and perhaps history of international relations?
Finally, are productive spaces opening up for an engagement between IR and a new
generation of Critical Theorists?
In this Introduction, we welcome the bridges that have been and are being built
between different strands of critical theory, without subsuming them under a single
coherent frame, and identify the further development of a critical social theory of
IR as a core challenge. In both respects, the work of Habermas has been and
continues to be crucial, although, as this Forum, and in particular the contributions
by Jiirgen Haacke and Martin Weber,will make clear, a new generation of Frankfurt
School thinkers should also be drawn upon.

The 'fourth debate9 revisited

Jim George placed the initial interest in critical theory in IR in the context of the
'widespread sense of crisis' associated with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing
multi-pronged assault on neorealism, then the dominant approach in IR theory.6
Neorealism was attacked on the grounds that it lacked both predictive power and
insight into how world order changed over time. The failures of neorealism in this
regard were held to be rooted in its tendency to present historically contingent
phenomena as natural and immutable features of the international system. As such,

5 The Editorial Board of Millenium:Journal InternationalStudies also


of pushed for a more empirical
basis in critical IR theory (while remaining committed to showcasing post-structuralistand feminist
work as well). A good example is Jurgen Haacke, 'Theory and Praxis in International Relations:
Habermas, Self-reflection, Rational Argumentation', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies,
25: 2 (1996), pp. 255-89. We use 'critical theory' in the broad sense of the term to include a range of
post-positivist positions. Elsewherewe distinguish between critical and/or constructivist approaches in
IR and those inspired by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and Habermas particularly.
b Jim
George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introductionto InternationalRelations
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

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Habermasand IR 129

a further problem with neorealism was that it constituted an ideology that reified the
current international order and could potentially be put to the service of con-
servative political ends.7
In contesting the empirical claims that neorealists made about the world, critics
not only challenged the taken-for-granted structures of the social and political
world, but also questioned the underlying and 'embedded standards, criteria,
norms and principles' in neorealism that 'made judgement possible and gave them
privileged status'.8 In so far as the 'failings' of neorealism could be ultimately
attributed to its epistemological, ontological and methodological underpinnings,
the critique of neorealism and the growing attraction of critical theories in IR,
should more properly be viewed as part of the critique of positivism within the
social sciences (including IR) that pre-dated the end of the Cold War. In fact,
Ashley's first articles referred to above were written nearly a decade before the
Cold War ended.
In this context, Habermas argued that the dominance of positivism in the social
sciences was problematic because it had given rise to a tendency to regard all human
problems as technical problems amenable to technical solutions, thus forgetting that
knowledge about the human world was sought to foster greaterautonomy, not greater
control. Critical knowledge of the social realm was generated through self-reflection
that in turn facilitated the development of self-understanding and autonomy of
action and, so, emancipation. Certainly Lapid recognised and acknowledged that the
fourth debate in IR was linked, historically and intellectually, to 'the confluence of
diverse anti-positivististic, philosophical and sociological trends in the social sciences
more generally.'9The critique of the 'real worldism' of neorealism only added to the
critique of the rigid separation of 'facts' and 'values' within positivist approaches in
IR, that worked to preclude, discourage or marginalise the consideration of philo-
sophical or epistemological questions.10
It was not only those inspired by Critical Theory, and Habermas specifically,that
contributed to the fourth debate. An emerging group of, in many ways, diverse
critical theorists began to ask 'first order' questions concerning the nature of know-
ledge claims and how meaning and truth were constituted. As both a strand of
social theory and as an approach to IR, critical theorists took issue with positivism,
arguing knowledge did not arise from the subject's neutral engagement with an
objective reality 'out there', but rather reflected pre-existing social purposes and
interests. As Richard Ashley put it, 'knowledge is always constituted in the reflection
of interests'.11Ashley, who drew on Habermas's work, would later join the growing
ranks of post-structuralist scholars in IR who employed genealogical tools to

7 See, for
example, George, Discourses;Robert Cox, 'States, Social Forces and World Order: Beyond
International Relations Theory', in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealismand Its Critics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 204-54; John McLean, 'Political Theory, International Theory
and Problems of Ideology', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies, 10: 2 (1981), pp. 102-25.
8
Lapid, 'Third Debate', p. 243.
9 Ibid., p. 237.
10
George, Discourses;see also Roger Tooze and Craig Murphy (eds.), The New InternationalPolitical
Economy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
11 Richard K.
Ashley, 'Political Realism', pp. 204-36.

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130 ThomasDiez and Jill Steans

demonstrate how meaning and understanding was not intrinsic to the world but
12
continuously constructed, defended and challenged.
The emergence of feminist scholarship in IR is often presented as having its own
specific origins and trajectory.13Feminist scholarship has been particularlyconcerned
with the invisibility of women and the marginalisation of gender as both a category
and approach in mainstream IR, but feminists also engaged in the critique of
positivism. Feminist IR scholars were (and remain) largely post-positivists of one
kind or another. Feminists rejected rationalism on the grounds that it was imbued
with gender bias. Ann Tickner and Spike Peterson, among others, joined the affray
on the neorealist 'orthodoxy', by pointing to the deeply masculinist assumptions
embedded in its concepts and in the images of an anarchic and dangerous world
propagated in neorealist discourse.14The problematic construction of non-Western
women as 'Other' in Western feminist discourse was much debated in the feminist
academic community in the 1980s and so it is unsurprising that sensitivity toward
difference was manifest in feminist approaches in IR. Moreover, asking the simple
question 'where are the women in IR?' fostered deeper ruminations on the processes
of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' at work in the construction of theories, world-views
and research agendas alike. 15
What emerged from the fourth debate was a generally 'more reflexiveenvironment
in which debate, criticism and novelty could freely circulate'.16Critical theorists of
all persuasions acknowledged the socially mutable and historically contingent nature
of knowledge claims and defended, to some degree, methodological pluralism. The
fourth debate spawned an invitation to those, whose voices had been silenced or
'exiled' in/from the mainstream, to speak and write IR in novel and surprising
ways.17 It thus initiated a conversation that some saw as having transformative
potential, although from the outset there was disagreement as to whether it would
ultimately lead to the 'progression'of knowledge in the field of IR. Moreover, while
Lapid pointed to the enhanced reflexivity in the IR community as a notable and
welcome development- anticipatinga 'liberatingpotential' in the 'Babel of theoretical
voices'18- he also forewarnedthat post-positivism offered as many theoretical dead-
ends as it opened promising paths for future research.19

12 Richard
Ashley, 'Living on the Borderlines', in James DerDerian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.),
International!Intertextual Relations (New York: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 259-321.
13 The 1988
Special Issue of Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies along with the publication of
Cynthia Enloe's book Bananas, Beaches and Bases in 1989 (London: Pandora) are frequently cited as
the beginnings of a feminist discourse within IR.
14 J. Ann Tickner, Genderin InternationalRelations
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); V. Spike
Peterson (ed.) GenderedStates: Feminist (Re) Visionsof InternationalTheory(Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1992).
15 See, for
example, Enloe, Bananas;V. Spike Peterson 'TransgressingBoundaries: Theories of
Knowledge, Gender and International Relations', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies, 21: 2
(1992), pp. 183-206; Christine Sylvester, 'Empathetic Cooperation', Millennium:Journalof
InternationalStudies, 23 (1994), pp. 315-36.
16 Lapid, 'Third Debate', p. 250.
17 Richard K.
Ashley and R.B.J. Walker,'Speaking the Language of Exile', InternationalStudies
Quarterly,34: 3 (1990), p. 259; Christine Sylvester (ed.), 'Special Issue: Feminists Write International
Relations'. Alternatives.12: 4 (19931 pp.1-1 18.
18
Lapid, 'Third Debate', p. 236.
19 Ibid., 235.
p.

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Habermas and IR 131

Why Habermas?

Theproblemof powerpolitics and the prevalenceof strategic interest in IR

With hindsight, the conversations of this fourth debate might be seen as a turning
point for the discussion of Habermas'swork in IR theory, in so far as there emerged
more focused deliberations on the nature, role and future of critical theory in IR.20
These came to a head at the end of the 1980s, exemplified in the dialogue between
Mark Hoffmann, who endorsed the epistemological foundations of Critical Theory
in a Habermasian guise, as the 'next stage' in development of IR theory, and Nick
Rengger, who pleaded for a broader conception of critical theory.21While many
aspects of Habermas's work might have provided a potentially rich source of
concepts and ideas to mine in the development of a critical IR theory, the
distinction that Habermas drew between instrumental, technical and critical
cognitive interests and his concepts of discursive ethics and communicative action
were thought to be particularly fruitful starting points.22As we noted above, Ashley
was one of the first scholars to draw on Habermas in this project.23Meanwhile,
Robert Cox's distinction between critical and problem-solving theory bore a clear
resemblance to Habermas's distinction between different cognitive interests, even
though Cox did not make this connection explicit.24
The critical turn in IR could be seen in terms of the rejection of a central premise
of the realist/neorealist'orthodoxy' in IR. The 'orthodoxy' held that actions dictated
by strategic interests in the control and manipulation of others, necessarily prevailed
in IR because power politics were an endemic feature of international relations.
While one should not overstate the commonalities between the various and diverse
critical voices in the fourth debate, to a greater or lesser degree, post-structuralists,

20 Andrew Linklater,'The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-
Theoretical Point of View', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies, 22: 2 (1992), pp. 77-98. See
also, Lapid, 'Third Debate', pp. 235-54.
21 Mark Hoffman, 'Critical
Theory and the Inter-ParadigmDebate', Millennium:Journalof
InternationalStudies, 16: 2 (1987), pp. 231-49; Mark Hoffman, 'Conversations on Critical
International Relations Theory', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies, 17: 1 (1988), pp. 91-5;
N. J. Rengger,'Going Critical?A Response to Hoffman', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies,
17 (1988), pp. 81-9; see also N. J. Rengger, 'The Fearful Sphere of International Relations', Reviewof
InternationalStudies, 16: 4 (1990), pp. 361-68; N.J. Rengger and Mark Hoffman, 'Modernity,
Postmodernity and International Relations', in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (eds),
Post-modernismand the Social Sciences (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 127-47; and Linklater,'The
Next Stage', pp. 77-98.
22 In
English, see, for example, Jiirgen Habermas, Knowledgeand Human Interests (Cambridge: Polity,
1986); Justificationand Application:Remarkson Discourse Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993);
The Theoryof CommunicativeAction (Cambridge: Polity, 1986 [vol. 11;1989 [vol. 21).
23 For instance in
Ashley, 'Political Realism ', where Ashley re-coversclassical (or 'practical') and an
emancipatory (Herzian) realism through Habermas'spractical/technical/emancipatorycognitive
interest distinction (pp. 207-210).
24 Indeed, in the
postscript to Cox's article, reproduced in Keohane (below), he pointed to intellectual
influences other than the Frankfurt School, including Giambattista Vico (p. 242). Cox does, however,
refer to Habermas in the context of the legitimation crisis of the state. See Robert W. Cox, 'Social
Forces, States and World Order', Millennium:Journalof InternationalStudies, 10: 2 (1981),
pp. 126-55, reprintedin an extended form as Cox, 'Social Forces', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism. The
Habermas referenceis on p. 206; the introduction of problem-solving v. critical theory on p. 208.

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132 ThomasDiez and Jill Steans

feminists and Critical Theorists all envisage a world politics in which strategic
considerations of power and interests do not dominate international relations.
This concern with strategic interests of control resonated with Habermas's
critique of positivism and his contention that technical knowledge could be put to
the service of social domination. Following Habermas,Ashley identifiedthree interests
and three specific forms of knowledge: knowledge that arose from a technical
interest in understanding and extending control over nature and society; knowledge
that was put to the service of a practical interest in understanding how to create and
maintain orderly communities; and knowledge inspired by an emancipatory interest
in identifying and eradicating unnecessary social confinements and constraints.25For
Ashley, emancipationwas about securing 'freedom from unacknowledged constraints,
relations of domination and conditions of distorted communication'.26This at once
pointed to the role that knowledge played in creating and sustaining social arrange-
ments characterised by inequality and domination and in facilitating experiments in
different ways of living and relating to one another.
Such a concern not only raised the seemingly enduring problem of how to
eradicate power politics in IR, but also how to avoid imperialist practices that
imposed Western cultural practices and beliefs on other peoples. In this respect,
Habermas's work was embraced because it provided a useful guide to how beliefs
and actions could be made accountable to others and how they could then be
subjected to scrutiny and accepted or contested by participants engaged in dialogue.
For those taking their lead from Habermas, the central political task was to facilitate
the development of institutional arrangementsthat concretised this dialogic ideal. In
the project of devising new and better institutional arrangements for settling
disputes in IR without recourse to force, Andrew Linklater looked to Habermas
because he seemingly offered insights into how institutional arrangements might be
set up to facilitate the conduct of international relations along consensual, non-
coercive lines.27
Habermas also offered procedural guidance for democratic decision-making
processes, while acknowledging that international norms and institutions must be
submitted to collective scrutiny and deliberation to maintain legitimacy. In some of
the contributions to this collection of articles, the authors have sought to identify
the sites and spaces where conversations take place, often finding that they remain
behind closed doors, thereby defying the first principle of open conversation. Nicole
Deitelhoff and Harald Miiller, in their contribution to this Forum, report their
finding that in the context of the negotiations leading to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty,argumentativerather than strategic behaviour prevailed whenever delegations
were meeting 'in camera'. In his article, Haacke, after mapping out in broad terms
the contribution that Habermas has made to our understanding of international
politics, turns to the notable shortcomings and failings of the Habermasian project
in this respect.

25
Ashley, 'Political Realism', p. 207.
26 Ibid., 227.
p.
27 Linklater,'The Next
Stage', pp. 77-98; Linklater, The Transformationof Political Community
(Oxford: Polity, 1998).

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Habermas and IR 133

Strategic and communicativeaction

While Habermas was originally harnessed to produce a critical IR theory, one


should note at this juncture that Habermas also inspired social constructivists in
their attempts to develop a social theory of international politics. There are both
affinities and disjunctures between these two projects, but here we might note how
social constructivists in particular have found the concept of communicative action,
that is, action driven by the search for the better argumentratherthan strategicpower,
helpful for theorising change. For instance, Thomas Risse and his collaborators
argued that in the process of domestic change through the incorporation of human
rights, communicative action played a crucial part in convincing actors of the
validity of such rights, even though the initial steps both by the government
violating rights and by the actors promoting them were characterised as strategic
action.28In a programmaticarticle in International Organizationwith the title 'Let's
Argue!', Risse drew on an extensive debate within the German IR community to
make the case for the relevance of communicative action in international politics,
and to set out a research programme to determine when and under which conditions
communicative action would prevail over strategic action in decision-making
processes.29
In their article below, Deitelhoff and Miiller report on their attempt to sub-
stantiate the debate about a useful dialogue between Habermas and IR with an
empirical research project to observe the impact of strategic and what they call
argumentativebehaviour in international negotiations. On one level, their assessment
is disappointing, since they were unable to empirically distinguish between both
types of actions, a consequence of the old problem, shared by cognitive approaches,
that motivations can be theorised ontologically but are difficult to demonstrate
empirically. However, as they admit, such an empirical, as opposed to analytical,
distinction between strategic and argumentative behaviour was not actually part of
Habermas's argument. Instead of focusing on actor orientations, Deitelhoff and
Miiller accept that arguing is always present in international negotiations, and turn
their attention to the effect of arguing, and the conditions under which it prevails
over bargaining that is determined by individual preferences and the impact of
material power.

Ethical encounters

Critical theorists of all hues have revealed a deep concern with the ethical dilemmas
and responsibilities that were not only inherent in everyday encounters, but

28 Thomas Risse,
Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Powerof Human Rights:
InternationalNorms and Domestic Change(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999).
29 Thomas Risse, '"Let's
Argue!":Communicative action in world polities', InternationalOrganization
54: 1 (2000), pp. 1-39. The German debate was kicked off by Harald Muller, 'Internationale
Beziehungen als kommunikativesHandeln: Zur Kritik der utilitaristischen Handlungstheorie',
Zeitschriftfur InternationaleBeziehungen1: 1 (1994), pp. 15-44. For further referencessee Risse,
'Let's Argue'. Interestingly,Habermas has yet not commented on this debate.

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134 ThomasDiez and Jill Steans

embedded in the concrete practices of world politics and so central to the theoris-
ation of IR.30 In this collection of essays, the authors agree on the need to further
dialogue in world politics, and they recognise the contribution that Habermas's
concept of a discursive ethics has made to this, although they also differ on the exact
nature and limits of this dialogue.
The distinctiveness of Critical Theory lies in its desire to foster an inter-subjective
'conversation' aimed at mutual understanding and communication free from
ideological domination. This conversation ensued in the interest of discovering the
universalconditions of communication and so avoided what was often held to be a
notorious pitfall of post-positivism, moral relativism, by providing a formal and
process-oriented rather than a substantive definition of political alternatives. Thus,
Linklater embraced discourse ethics because it seemingly affirms that the validity of
principles must be established through a mode of dialogue in which human beings
strive to reach an agreement.31Taking as its central concern the contribution of
discourse ethics to the 'civilising process' in international politics, in this collection
Linklater offers what is perhaps the most sympathetic account of the usefulness of
Habermas to IR theorists. For Habermas, the 'life-world' (in contrast to the
'system') is constituted through communicative action oriented towards mutual
understanding. Linklater's project is focused on the strengthening of the lifeworld
through discursive engagement. He sees an obvious connection with Habermas's
defence of a discourse theory of morality in which all people have a right to be
involved in dialogue on decisions and issues that affect them, thus challenging all
boundaries and systems of exclusion. Discourse was understood as a process whereby
reflexive agents turn back upon their habits and assumptions and subject them to a
communicatively rational interrogation and evaluation. Ultimately, Linklater is
prepared to defend only a weak version of the discourse perspective on the grounds
that while not unproblematic, it is nevertheless a productive means of 'advancing the
civilising process in international relations' that would involve promoting social
arrangementsto satisfy basic human needs without causing harm (of various kinds)
to others.
As Linklateracknowledges (in his article below, and elsewhere),there are a number
of objections to Habermas's version of dialogue and discourse ethics. For example,
the emphasis on proceduralism in Habermas might already privilege a concrete
vision of the good life, while also leading to a relative neglect of the need for
substantive moral conclusions. Moreover, Habermas seemingly invokes a ' universal'
- read liberal? - subject that might be incomprehensible to members of other
cultural groups. However, Linklater contends that many of these problems can be
overcome if notions of dialogue are reconfiguredand applied cautiously in relations

30 See, for
example, Fiona Robinson, GlobalisingCare: Ethics, Feminist Theoryand International
Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999); Kimberley Hutchins, 'Towardsa Feminist International
Ethics', Reviewof InternationalStudies, 26: Special Issue (2000), pp. 111-30; David Campbell, Politics
withoutPrinciple: Sovereignty,Ethics, and the Narrativesof the Gulf War(Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1993). For a criticism of post-positivist IR in this regard, see Mervyn Frost, 'A Turn not
Taken; Ethics in IR at the Millennium', Reviewof InternationalStudies, 24: Special Issue (1998), pp.
119-32.
31 Andrew Linklater,'The achievements of critical
theory', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia
Zalewski (eds.), InternationalTheory:Positivismand Beyond(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1996), pp. 279-98.

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Habermas and IR 135

with those who occupy marginal social positions. Part of this project involves
developing a much greater capacity to engage sensitively with the standpoint of
'Others' and opening up to critical scrutiny the acceptability of ethical principles
from the perspective of 'Others'. Linklater thus pleads 'for a historically self-
conscious universalism',which is 'differencesensitive'.
In making concessions to 'Otherness', Linklater might be said to be engaging with
the central concerns of post-structuralism,or perhaps, as others have done, incorpor-
ating the insights of postmodernism within the ambit of critical IR theory.32
However, post-structuralistshave resisted these kinds of engagements. In response to
the charge of relativism, they have counter-chargedthat Habermas's Critical Theory
was characterised by a problematic commitment to rationalism and the modernist
aspiration to totality. Common to critiques of Habermas are deep concerns about
the exclusionary character of Western universal reasoning, which have led some
theorists to argue that the search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone
should be abandoned.
A central objection to Habermas,largelycouched in terms of the problemsinherent
in his commitment to universalist categories and principles, is raised by Kimberly
Hutchings in her contribution to this Forum. Speaking from the nexus of three
overlapping discourses - feminism and Habermas, IR and Habermas, and feminism
and IR - Hutchings addresses important questions about the extent to which the
division of a public and a private sphere in Habermas is a gendered construct. While
it is not an explicit theme of Hutchings' contribution, she hints at the deeply
gendered nature of public space, as it is constituted in Habermas's theory. A key
question for feminists remains whether women can take possession of a public
sphere that has been enduringly reconstructed along masculinist lines?33
Hutchings article prompts questions about the degree to which emotions can be
integrated into the conceptualisation of 'communicative action' in international
politics.34Hutchings concedes that there have been sympathetic engagements between
feminism and Habermas, for example in Seyla Benhabib's efforts to reformulate
discourse ethics as 'interactive universalism'. This accords with concerns held in
some feminist circles that a feminist politics is not possible if one prioritises
difference over equality, and rejects the Enlightenment project of emancipation, or
indeed, the notion of 'truth'.35
However, feminists have more often rejected the notion of ethics as the abstract
application of the rules and/or principles of justice, since this devalued the moral
skills present in an ethics of care that was oriented towards concrete, particular
others. This points to deep problems involving the role and recognition of diverse
identities in conversations across borders, although post-positivists of various

32 See also Devetak, 'Critical Theory'.


33
Nancy Fraser,'What'sCritical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender', New
GermanCritique,35 (1985), pp. 97-131. For a discussion of the usefulness (and limitations) of
Habermas'smodel of dialogue in relation to struggles around women's human rights, see Brooke
Ackerly 'Women'sRights Activists as Cross-CulturalTheorists', InternationalFeministJournalof
/Wi7/«,3: 3 (2001), pp. 311-46.
34 On these issues, see Nancy Fraser,'What's Critical'.
35 One could
point to an extensive number of sources here, but for a good overview of the debate
between post-structuralistfeminism and 'critical' feminism, see Linda J. Nicholson,
Feminism/Postmodernism(London: Routledge, 1990).

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136 ThomasDiez and Jill Steans

persuasions advance different solutions to how we might negotiate such differences.


Hutchings raises the question of whether the aim of dialogue should be to establish
a single common ground, or whether it is possible to have meaningful conversations
across boundaries (of nation, class, culture,gender and so on) without such a common
ground. Relatedly, is there a common basis present in all human cultures on which
to build dialogue and further inter-subjectivity?
Hutchings' overall conclusion is that we should be circumspect about the useful-
ness of Habermas to developing our understanding of areas such as international
ethics and international political theory. She argues that ultimately feminist and
other critical IR scholars will inevitably encounter problems in applying Habermas's
ideas, not least of which is the conception of the human subject which continues to
embody the rationalist bias of a Western philosophical tradition. Hutchings is thus
inclined to eschew further dialogue between Habermas and (feminist) IR, in favour
of further developing an alternative model of dialogue that would empower
'different voices' in a morally pluralist feminist international ethics. IR feminist
scholars with post-structuralist sympathies - for example, Christine Sylvester - have
more often advocated forms of empathetic negotiation and dialogue across diverse
identities and boundaries, in the hope that this would facilitate a new kind of
feminist politics built upon women's multiple identities, experiences and locations;
an approach more in sympathy with an 'ethos of pluralism', perhaps.36

Negotiating the universalist/relativist dichotomy

As the above discussion indicates, Critical Theory has often been criticised on the
grounds that it is committed to modes of thought and action, which ultimately
subsume difference within one totalising identity, despite declarations to the
contrary. A recent exchange in Millennium illustrates this further. In this exchange,
Fred Dallmayr wished to promote 'conversation across boundaries' on the basis of
Habermas's concepts, based on communicative rationality,37 and unfolding in
contexts approximating the 'ideal speech situation', a situation without domination
{Herrschaft).Dallmayr recognised that conceptualisations of communicative ration-
ality were devoid of emotions, and so he suggested these needed to be supplemented
with the concept of friendship.38
However, his critics remained suspicious of what they saw as the very aim of
communicative rationality,namely that it should lead to a common understandingor
inter-subjectivity.Thus William Connolly, on similar grounds to Hutchings, objected
that Habermas's model set a universal matrix in which diversity was acknowledged
and absorbed. Connolly suggested that this desire to seek consensus and absorb
difference arose from a tendency to link diversity to fragmentation. Fragmentation
describes a situation where there is a struggle to occupy the authorative centre of a

36 See
Sylvester, 'Empathetic Cooperation'; Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (eds.), Scattered
Hegemonies: Postmodernityand TransnationalFeminist Politics (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1994).
37
Dallmayr, 'Conversation'.
JB Ibid.,
pp. 342-7.

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Habermas and IR 137

territorialregime. In contrast, a positive ethos of pluralism exists within a state where


citizens reflected critically on the need to avoid excluding or marginalising emerging
constituencies to whom they could otherwise connect positively. Connolly advocated
an 'ethos of pluralisation', in which conversations took place without necessarily
aiming at a common understanding,39suggesting that the pursuit of agonistic respect
across persisting lines of difference established a threshold against which to measure
the element of compassion and forbearancein each contribution. 40
Nick Rengger was similarly appreciative, but ultimately critical of Dallmayr's
project. Rengger expressed a number of reservations that included the interpretation
of Oakshott's concept of conversation in Dallmayr's work. Among other things,
Rengger also argued that ultimately neither communicative rationality nor friend-
ship could rid politics, and therefore international politics, of interest and power,
which were concealed by the notions of a common understanding and inter-
subjectivity.41Moreover, these questions remained acutely relevant in a neo-imperial
age in which conversations across political and cultural boundaries were mostly
conducted on the basis of a particular type of Western rationality.
Yet to construct Critical Theory in a Habermasian sense and critical theory in a
broader sense, including post-structuralism,as standing in marked opposition to one
another, is problematic.42Habermas and Foucault had established a dialogue, which
was prematurely cut off when Foucault died.43 In this spirit, Jim George invoked
Habermas in his attempt to develop an international ethics, while also stressing the
potential of exploring the overlap between the Foucauldian and Habermasian
approaches in this endeavour.44
Post-structuralist scholars have felt compelled to move beyond critique and
deconstruction to find ways in which post-structuralismcan further our understand-
ing of a range of human problems and some have found spaces within modernists'
discourses of 'emancipation' that allow for critical engagement and negotiation.45
This does not mean that there are no differences left, as Hutchings' contribution and
the Millennium exchange vividly demonstrate. Yet, recognising each other's con-
tributions might help in future engagements to focus on the core issues of a critical
engagement with current affairs from multiple, but not necessarily wholly incompat-
ible perspectives.
While post-structuralistsrefute the notion of a single truth or ethics, contra neo-
realists,they also recognisethat one cannot avoid ethical questionsand responsibilitiesin
IR. Following Levinas, David Campbell has advocated an ethics of diversity,which is
based on the principle of respect for diversity,but also cognisant of the condition of
'radical interdependence'.46Therefore, although theoretically dismissive of Critical

39 William E. Connolly, 'Cross-State Citizen Networks: A Response to Dallmayr', Millennium:Journal


of InternationalStudies, 30: 2 (2001), pp. 348-55. See also William E. Connolly, The Ethos of
Pluralization(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
40 Connolly, 'Cross-State Citizen Networks'.
41 N. J.
Rengger, 'The Boundaries of Conversation: a Response to Dallmayr', Millennium:Journalof
InternationalStudies, 30: 2 (2001), pp. 357-64.
42
George, Discourses.
43 Mitchell
Stephens, 'The Theologian of Talk', Los Angeles Times Magazine, 23 October 1994,
<http://www.nyu.edu/classes/stephens/Habermas%20page.htm> (11 December 2003).
44 George, Discourses,pp. 165-6.
45 Ibid.,
pp. 182-8.
46
Campbell, Politics withoutPrinciple, pp. 95-99.

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138 ThomasDiez and Jill Steans

Theory in his work, Campbell has moved beyond critique to engage with concrete
policy issues and to formulatealternativespolicies. This has inevitablyled Campbell to
address ethical concerns in concrete contexts, notably in the ethical choices involved in
boundary marking and processes of 'Othering'. Linklater has similarly engaged with
'Othering'processes in ways that confront problems of exclusion and hierarchy(see,
for example, Linklater'sdiscussion of the 'harm principle'in this issue).
Indeed, the idea found in many post-structuralist works on international ethics,
that there are different forms of Othering, and that some are preferableover others
because they are less exclusionary and/or violent, although rarely spelt out, rests on
notions of acceptable interaction that are not far removed from Linklater'sprinciple
of doing no harm. Both accept that we cannot escape self-other relations; and both
argue that these must be conducted in such a way as to minimise the infringement
on the identity of the Other. They therefore both reject totalitarianism, which
incidentally is also an answer to Critical Theorists' charge that post-structuralism
leads to moral relativism - perhaps so, but if one follows the argument presented by
Linklater here, the boundaries drawn in both Critical Theory and post-structuralism
around which articulations are acceptable seem to coincide much more than such
criticism implies.47

A pragmatic response

In that spirit, it is a good sign that the intellectual climate today is much more
amenable to breaching dichotomies and entrenched divisions than was the case
during the first wave of 'critical IR'. In the articles published in this special section of
the Review, it is noticeable that the authors afford more possibility of establishing
common ground between different forms of critical theory than was the case in some
of the early contributions to the fourth debate. In this context it is worth noting that
a current trend in IR theory is the growing frustration with the construction of
theory from philosophical first principles.There is, it seems, an emergingconstituency
of IR theorists, representing a range of perspectives from rationalism to political
pragmatism, who regard the philosophical turn in IR as unhelpful insofar as, while
highlighting fundamental and important questions about the basis of our knowledge,
it has tended to prioritise ontological, epistemological and methodological questions
and cultivated a theory-driven rather than a problem-drivenapproach to IR. Some
recent avenuesof investigationwithin IR have proceeded in this spirit.
For example, in their contributions to a 2002 special issue of the journal
Millennium, devoted to the subject of pragmatism and IR, both David Owen and
Molly Cochran guard against the dangers of factionalism - communities increasingly
closed off from one another - in IR, not least because this mitigates against achiev-
ing greater understanding of concrete problems in IR.48 Instead they advocate a
pragmatist ethos and pragmatic approach to key ethical questions. In distinctive

47 On the theme of different forms of


Othering, see also Thomas Diez, 'Europe'sOthers and the Return
of Geopolitics', CambridgeReviewof InternationalAffairs, 17: 2 (2004), pp. 319-35.
HO
Molly Cochran, Deweyan Pragmatismand Post-Positivist Social Science in IR , in Millennium:
Journalof InternationalStudies, 31: 3 (2002), pp, 525-48; David Owen 'Re-Orienting International
Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning', in Millennium:Journalof
InternationalStudies, 31:3 (2002), pp. 653-73.

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Habermas and IR 139

ways, both Cochran and Owen draw upon John Dewey in an effort to re-orientate
IR in ways that preserve its pluralism, but also avoid 'disabling and distorting
relations of mutual antagonisms'.49Owen argues that rather than conceiving of IR
as a theoretical war of all against all we might acknowledge that there is a role for
different kinds of theoretical practice.50In this vision of the future development of
the field, IR might be considered as a form of practical philosophy oriented to the
topic of the government of common affairs of humanity.

, (critical) social theory of IR?

Above, we alluded briefly to the way in which Habermas's work on communicative


action has been put to the service of developing a social theory of international
politics. It is probably accurate to say that the most substantive contribution to
social theory in an IR context thus far, has been Alexander Wendt's Social Theoryof
International Politics,51 in which he advocates constructivism as offering a new
paradigm or synthesis for IR. However, while Wendt's work has been influential,
constructivists do not have a monopoly on social theory within the IR community.
In the final article in this Forum, Martin Weber restates the relevance of Critical
Theory to the 'social turn' in IR as an emancipatorysocial theory. Weber points to
the relative neglect, thus far, of the social-theoretic aspect of Habermas's work to
IR, the efforts to include the distinction between differenttypes of behaviourdiscussed
above notwithstanding. Echoing many of the themes of earlier contributions, Weber
claims that IR has yet to explore the usefulness of Habermas's central architectural
edifice in his (revised) critical social theory - the dialectic of 'system' and 'life-
world'. Systemic engagement with Habermas'swork promises at least a new impetus
for investigating the social turn in IR, one in which both criteriology and the social-
theoretic potentials of the diagnostic of the 'colonisation of the life-world' could
yield interesting analytical and practical possibilities.
In his contribution, Haacke is careful to point out that Habermas was deeply
reflexive about the degree of tension between his version of discourse ethics and
actual political development at the international level. For Haacke, this degree of
tension, in turn, indicates the need to consider more recent contributions to Critical
Theory - notably Axel Honneth's attempt to connect a theory of society with a
theory of emancipation through a focus on the struggle for recognition.52Haacke
claims that Honneth's work on the 'moral grammar' of social conflict enriches our
understanding of developments in diverse societies across the world as well as in
international relations, and is easier to put to analytical use in concrete contexts of
internationalpolitics than Habermas'swork. Like Haacke, Weberembraces Honneth's

49 Owen, 'Re-Orienting IR', p. 658.


50 On the issue of different theoretical practices and purposes, see also I homas Diez and Antje Wiener,
'Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory', and Wiener and Diez, 'Taking Stock of Integration
Theory', in Wiener and Diez (eds.), EuropeanIntegration Theory(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), pp. 3, 243-4.
51 Alexander Wendt, A Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,
1999).
52 Axel Honneth, The Strugglefor Recognition: The Moral Grammaroj Social Conflicts(Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1996). For further referencessee Haacke's contribution.

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140 ThomasDiez and Jill Steans

reorientation of critical social theory towards questions of identity, arguing that this
has thickened the conception of the life-world provided by Habermas.One might add
that this concern with identity would also provide a further point of engagement with
Foucauldians in IR, who have long argued that Habermasian Critical Theory in IR
does not take identity seriously enough. The potential for more inclusive conceptions
of political agency also emerges from these enquiries, Weberargues, and thus affords
a better grasp of the relationship between the growth of systems-rationalincursions
into life-worlds and a more developed conception of the politics of the life-world. So
far, these moves are tentative, but they point us along a path where Habermas's
thinking would seem to limit his own critical social theory.

Conclusion

While there are differences in approach and emphasis, this collection of articles
constitutes a fruitful dialogue between the diverse groups of researchers who are
developing some common themes that characterise the influence that Habermas's
work has had on IR. Each of the contributors has approached the question of
whether the engagement between Habermas and IR has been 'a useful dialogue'
from the perspective of her or his own theoretical preoccupations and/or empirical
interests. Nevertheless, each of the contributions to this Forum addresses some (if
not all) of the key questions arising from the engagement between Habermas and
IR, which we have identified in this introduction.
In our view, there has been, and continues to be, a useful dialogue not only
between Habermas' work and IR, but also involving many other figures of the
Frankfurt School and in other locales of critical social theories. Above all, we have
argued that there is more of a crossover between the different versions of critical
theory, as well as between the attempts to formulate a social theory and a critical
theory of international politics than is usually acknowledged. These different
projects should not be seen as separate, as has been the tendency, but rather as
intertwined. In so far as they have not always been taken much note of, or have been
at loggerheads with each other, we hope that this special Forum will facilitate
conversation between them.
Similarly, we hope that, in a modest way, this Forum and the articles by Weber
and Haacke in particular,might promote a wider debate about whether integrating a
new generation of Frankfurt School thinkers, especially the work of Axel Honneth,
is a potentially fruitful path to go down in seeking a remedy to some of the
problems encountered in the 'application' of Habermas to IR. The themes raised in
the contributions to this Forum have lost nothing of their relevance since the debate
about a critical theory in IR first emerged. If anything, they have gained importance
under the conditions of globalisation and what many see as an increasing degree of
hegemony. It is appropriate,perhaps, that we should conclude that not only has the
dialogue between Habermas and IR thus far been fruitful, but also, following
Weber's argument, that Habermas and those who have followed him continue to
provide a tremendous resource that IR is only now really beginning to explore.

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