[ G. R. No.

17122, February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANG TANG HO,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

FACTS

The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly
and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor xxx”.

Pursuant thereto, the Governor-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fixing the
price at which rice should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price
greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found guilty of violation
thereof. He contested the validity of said law claiming that it constituted invalid
delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE STATEMENT

Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?

RATIO/RULINGS

No. Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than
to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into
effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and
it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define a crime, and is
not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

ANALYSIS
All legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone
else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.

A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the
legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but
says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any
cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Gen.

The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever… conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify
or define what is “an extraordinary rise.”

The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of
State,” is authorized to issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what
is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or
emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any
basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-
Gener to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an
extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary rule” or an “emergency
measure” for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.

CONCLUSION

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what I t shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.'