EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP
Alphaland branch
FERNANDEZ v. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE (June
2019)
X worked as butcher in slaughterhouse owned by Y. Later on, he
was terminated from work due to old age (working for 20 years)
although it was made to appear that he was not allowed entry
because he has no ID & uniform.
*Slaughterhouse defense: Independent contractor – working under
Z.
Issue: W/N there is EER (recall the 4-fold test)
Held: YES
1. The fact that the company provided identification cards and
uniforms and the vague affidavit of the purported employer were
sufficient evidence to prove the existence of employer-employee
relationship (for security measures + identify as EE)
Here, the totality of petitioner’s evidence and the admissions of
Kalookan Slaughterhouse convinces the Court that petitioner was
indeed an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse. Petitioner was
able to present an I.D., gate passes, log sheets, and a trip ticket.
Kalookan Slaughterhouse even admitted through De Guzman that
uniforms were given to all personnel, including petitioner.
Cannot be Z’s EE because Z has no substantial capital, etc. + Z
denied it
2. Exercised control over petitioner’s means and methods as he
reprimanded petitioner for his failure to properly store his
butchering knives, coming to Kalookan Slaughterhouse with dirty
clothes, reporting for work drunk, and not having an I.D. before
going to the slaughterhouse
NON-DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS
BELTRAN v. AMA (April 2019) – Wanted early retirement
(based on company’s retirement plan)  not allowed
*Petitioner’s claim: It is already a long-standing practice
practice
*Respondent’s defense: Not yet ripened into practice (even
if it was granted previously to 2 EEs before)
*Non-diminution of benefits rule
Article 100 of the Labor Code expressly prohibits the
elimination or reduction of benefits received by employees.
However, the basis for the grant of said benefit must be
shown through an express policy, written contract, or an
unwritten policy that has ripened into a company practice.
To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and
deliberately made by the employer over a significant period
of time.
In this case, petitioner was able to prove the existence of an
established company practice of granting early retirement
to its employees who have rendered at least 10 years of
service, regardless of age, with substantial evidence 
Substantial evidence presented: 8 other EEs already availed
of it + not controverted by ER
Other cases:
1. Award of Attorney’s Fees
2. Liability of Corporate Officers
PROHIBITION against LABOR-ONLY
CONTRACTING
Daguinod v. Southgate Foods, Inc. (February 2019)
Daguinod is a counter crew/cashier in Jollibee.
Under the Service Agreement, Generation One was
contracted by Southgate to provide specified noncore
1
functions and operational activities for its Jollibee
Principal: Southgate (franchise operator of Jollibee)
Contractor: Generation One
EE: Daguinod
Daguinod was alleged to have committed qualified theft
and was imprisoned to avoid regularization. Terminated.
1. Whether Generation One is a legitimate labor
contractor (recall elements of labor-only contracting)
No. Generation one is not a legitimate labor contractor.
Hence, Daguinod is a regular employee of Southgate
(principal)
1.1.
a. One of the factors in determining whether there is labor-
only contracting is the nature of the employee’s job, i.e.,
whether the work he performs is necessary and desirable to
the business of the principal.
As cashier, Daguinod was also tasked to receive payments
and give change. These tasks are undoubtedly necessary
and desirable to the business of a fast-food restaurant such
as Jollibee. The service of food to customers is the main
line of business of any restaurant. It is not merely a noncore
or peripheral activity as Generation One and Southgate
claim.
b. Also, no substantial capital (ITR & Financial statements
not submitted to BIR).
c. Certificate of Registration (as an independent contractor)
is not conclusive evidence of legitimate status - only
presumptive proof. The totality of evidence must be taken
into account.
1.2. Control was not shown by Generation One.
Southgate took it upon itself to discipline Daguinod for an
alleged violation of its company rules, regulations, and
policies, validating the presence of its right to control
Daguinod.
Service contract with South Gate is also blank
Others:
2. Procedural due process also not complied with
3. Reinstatement is no longer feasible due to the strained
relations of the parties and considering as well the length of
time that has passed since the filing of this case. Thus,
separation pay is awarded in lieu thereof.
Daguinod is likewise entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as his dismissal was attended with bad faith.
+
Daguinod is likewise entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as his dismissal was attended with bad faith.
4. Attorney's fees and interest
JUST CAUSES
Evic Human Resources Management, Inc., Free Bulkers
S.A. (July 2017) - NEGLECT OF DUTY
Agency (petitioner) hired private respondent as Chief Mate
on board a foreign vessel for 6 months.
Terminated from work before contract was completed.
*Respondent: The Captain has an hostile attitude towards
him.
*Petitioner: Just cause - Inefficiency, incompetence &
gross negligence: Failed to observe the safety precautions
during the mooring and unmooring operations; ; displayed
arrogance towards his co-employees on board; and was
caught intoxicated, in violation of the company policies -
all these were put in a crew behavior report by the captain.
Issue: W/N grossly negligent.
Held: NO.
It is a settled rule in labor cases that the employer has the
burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was
for a just or authorized cause, and failure to show this
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified
and, therefore, illegal.41 Furthermore, not only must the
dismissal be for a cause provided by law, it should also
comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process,
that is, the opportunity to be heard and to defend one's
self. Hence, for dismissal to be valid, the employer must
show through substantial evidence or such amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion - that (1) the dismissal
was for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the dismissed
employee was afforded due process of law.
1. Petitioner failed to prove just cause
Incompetence or inefficiency, as a ground for dismissal, is
understood to mean the failure to attain work goals or work
quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the
allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory
results. Neglect of duty, on the other hand, must be both
gross and habitual.
In case of Crew Behavior Report - it must be corroborated.
In this case, it was unverified - no affidavits by injured
seaman; agent concerned.
In the case of intoxication - Section 33(6) of the POEA
SEC provides that drunkenness must be committed while
on duty to merit dismissal from employment.
Here, respondent was admittedly off duty when he was
allegedly caught by the master drinking on board
2. Petitioner failed to follow procedural rules
Section 17 of the POEA-SEC provides that the 2-notice
rule UNLESS there is clear and existing danger to the
safety of the crew or vessel (but still complete report is
necessary)
Here, no notices were given; even if there was clear and
existing danger (no report was made)
AUTHORIZED CAUSES
SACORU v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES
(October 2017) - REDUNDANCY
Dismissal of 27 regular members of the complainant’s
union due to redundancy due to the ceding out of two
selling and distribution systems (to improve system of
selling/distribution)
Redundancy package given, not all accepted (those
accepted were under protest)
1. Whether redundancy program was valid?
YES.
*Management prerogative
*No proof that it was malicious
*Engagement of independent contractor (to replace services
of terminated EEs) does NOT destroy redundancy program
2
PROVIDED it is made in order to effectuate more
economic and efficient methods of production.
*It was based on a study
Others:
2. Whether redundancy amounted to ULP? (diminution of
the union membership amounting to union busting; against
contracting out of services)
NO. Redundancy was with basis
3. Whether the company violated the “return-to-work
order” of DOLE?
YES. Company terminated despite assumption order
(wrong to defend that the assumption order included the
impending termination, hence, EEs were terminated) –
nonetheless since it was already decided, ER has no
obligation to maintain the status quo anymore.
Art. 236(g)
all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout.
Upon assumption, the effectivity of the termination of
employment of the 27 employees should have been
enjoined
Since the union voted for the conduct of a strike on June
11, 2009, when the DOLE Secretary issued the return-to-
work order dated June 23, 2009, this means that the status
quo was the employment status of the employees on June
10, 2009. This status quo should have been maintained until
the NLRC resolved the dispute in its Resolution dated
March 16, 2010, where the NLRC ruled that CCBPI did not
commit unfair labor practice and that the redundancy
program was valid. This Resolution then took the place
of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary and
CCBPI no longer had the duty to maintain the status
quo after March 16, 2010
SOCIAL LEGISLATION
SSS
Haveria v. SSS (August 2018)
Petitioner was an EE of SSS. He was also an officer of the
union there and was reported as the union's EE (private
entity) under compulsory coverage. Made monthly
premium contributions. Later, worked for 2 private
companies then retired.
SSS did not allow him to get retirement benefits while
working with SSS with the union as the employer.
SC: Employer” is defined under Republic Act (RA) No.
1161 as: Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or
foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade,
business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and
uses the services of another person who is under his orders
as regards the employment, except the Government and any
of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including corporations owned or controlled by the
Government.
A labor organization, cannot be considered an employer
under the law. The Labor Code expressly excludes labor
organizations from the definition of an employer,
EXCEPT when they directly hire employees to render
services for the union or association.
Not ER + No proof to show that he rendered services for
the union (work hours, pay slip, contract of employment,
etc.)
Hence, he can only get retirement benefits from the time he
was employed with private entities
Others:
2. SSS cannot be estopped
Basis: Jurisprudence - if ignorance founded on innocent
mistake, estoppel will not arise.
SC: He could get something if he just registered as a
voluntary member of SSS - those who volunteered to be
members although not required by law including
government and private EEs
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice and equity - he can
get something by treating his contributions with SSEA as
voluntary contributions
POEA (POEA Standard Employment Contract or POEA-SEC vis
arts. 191-193 of the Labor Code)
Disability Benefits (usually EEs would like to claim
Permanent TOTAL disability benefits)
Yialos Manning Services, Inc., Overseas
Shipmanagement S.A. (July 4, 2018)  Conflict in
the findings of the company-designated physician
vs. seafarer-appointed physician + Period when
company-designated physician must issue final
medical assessment
Borja (respondent) worked as an oiler in a foreign ship. During
work, he was diagnosed with intervertebral protrusion. He was
repatriated before contract ended.
He reported to agency's office and was referred to a clinic, Marine
Medical Services (MMS). He was then diagnosed with lumbar
strain and undergone medication and physical therapy.
Later on, another company-designated physician of the same clinic
issued a "disability rating" of Grade 11.
He then asked for reimbursement but the agency denied.
During meeting, he was asked to undergone 3rd medical opinion
BUT private respondent backed out
He then consulted another doctor but was diagnosed with "total
permanent disability".
LA: Entitled to permanent disability benefits - test of determining
permanent total disability is the inability to perform customary
work for more than 120 days, which may be extended until 240
days at the option of the petitioner or the company-designated
physician
NLRC/CA: Dismissed appeal of agency.
Issues:
1. Who shall resolve in case of conflict of findings by physicians?
Here, the findings of the company-designated physician and the
seafarer-appointed physician are conflicting.
 Company-designated physician: Grade 11 disability
(PARTIAL permanent disability)
 Seafarer-appointed physician: (TOTAL permanent
disability)
2. Is Borja’s contention that he is entitled to TOTAL permanent
disability benefits tenable (hence, no need to undergone 3 rd
medical opinion?)
According to him is already considered as totally and permanently
disabled by operation of law because the company-designated
3
physician did not declare him fit to work within the 120-day and
240-day periods
Held:
1. It is the COMPANY-DESIGNED physician
The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide
that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board
the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the
company-designated physician.
If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-
designated physician's assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final
and binding on them.
 In view of this, the NLRC promulgated NLRC En Banc
Resolution No. 008-14 which directs all Labor Arbiters, during
mandatory conference, to give the parties a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to secure the services of a third doctor
and an additional period of thirty (30) days for the third doctor
to submit his/her reassessment.
o The duty to signify the intention to resolve the
conflict by referral to a third doctor is upon the
seafarer (as he is the one contesting the findings of
the company-designated physician)
o Thus, without the referral to a third doctor, there is
no valid challenge to the findings of the company-
designated physician. In the absence thereof, the
medical pronouncement of the company-
designated physician must be upheld.
2. NO. Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those illnesses or
injuries classified as Grade 1 shall constitute total permanent
disability. Thus, those from Grade 2 to Grade 14 are considered
as partial permanent disability, subject to the schedule of rates also
provided in the POEA-SEC.
The lapse of the 120-day or 240-day period does not automatically
entitle the seafarer to a total permanent disability. It is the
company-designated physician who will certify him as either fit
to work or classify his condition as partial or total permanent
disability within the said periods.
The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within 120 days
from repatriation.
In case of failure to give assessment within 120 days from
repatriation:
 Without justifiable reason = Disability becomes
permanent and total;
 With justifiable reason (e.g. seafarer required further
medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative) =
Period of diagnosis and treatment extended to 240 days
o In case of failure to give assessment
within the extended period = Disability
becomes permanent and total
(regardless of any justification) –
conclusive presumption
In the present case, Borja arrived in the Philippines on November
25, 2010. He had continuous check-ups at Marine Medical
Services of Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC). On March 11,
2011, he had a follow-up check-up where he was advised to
continue physical therapy and medications. He was advised to
return on April 1, 2011 for re-evaluation. Thus, the 120-day period
(ending on March 25, 2011) was justifiably-extended as Borja
required further medical treatment. On April 15, 2011 the
company-designated physician, Dr. William Chuasuan, Orthopedic
Surgeon of MMC, issued a disability rating of "Grade 11 - slight
rigidity of 1/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk" after
Borja's follow up check-up. Thus, the company-designated
physician's assessment was made within the allowed 240-day
period. Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, therefore, such
assessment must be upheld, in the absence of a contrary finding
from a third doctor agreed upon by both parties.
Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc., v. San Jose
(July 23, 2018)  Reiteration on period when
company-designated physician must issue final
medical assessment (w/ mandatory procedures
and periods)
Respondent San Jose was deployed as wiper in aboard a foreign
vessel. Before deployment, he underwent medical examinations
and was declared fit for work.
Respondent upon waking complained of loss of/impaired vision in
his left eye. He was repatriated.
Referred to company-designated physician, undergone surgeries
and was later declared as "fit to work".
However, respondent vision is still blurred, hence, he filed for total
permanent disability claims.
LA: Total permanent disability - more than 120 days
NLRC: Reversed
CA: Total permanent disability
Issue: W/N Permanent total disability?
Held: YES.
MANDATORY PROCEDURES and PERIODS
(POEA-SEC, Labor Code, IRR, etc)
1. The seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return. If physically
incapacitated to do so, written notice to the agency within the same period shall be
deemed compliance.
2. The seafarer shall cooperate with the company-designated physician on his medical
treatment and regularly report for follow-up checkups or procedures, as advised by the
company-designated physician.
3. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the
seafarer's disability grading within 120 days from repatriation. The period may be
extended to 240 days if justifiable reason exists for its extension (e.g., seafarer required
further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative).
4. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of
120 days or the extended 240 days, as the case may be, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total.
In the instant case, respondent was repatriated on March 3, 2011.
He underwent the first eye operation on March 16, 2011 (13 days
from repatriation). His next operation was performed on September
18, 2011 (or 199 days from repatriation). Justifiably, the extension
of the 120-day period was in order as the respondent required
further treatment.
However, the company-designated physician's assessment of
fitness to work was issued only on November 21, 2011, which
was 263 days from repatriation. Thus, the medical assessment
of respondent was made beyond the maximum 240-day period
prescribed under the POEA-SEC. As such, the disability of
respondent is deemed total and permanent.
Carino v. Maine Marine Philippines (October
2018)  Liability of ER when the seafarer is
repatriated due to disability
Complainant hired as deck boy aboard foreign vessel.
While performing duties, he accidentally slipped into a manhole;
due to said accident, he experienced severe pain [in] his right ankle
and was immediately brought to the ship hospital. Sustained
fractures and undergone surgery in India.
He was repatriated.
Agency refused to provide further treatment. As a result, he was
constrained to consult an independent doctor and found that he was
entitled for permanent and total disability benefits.
Defense of company: He abandoned his treatment, thus, waiving
his right to claim disability benefits.
Issue:
1. Did he abandoned the treatment?
2. Should he be granted permanent TOTAL disability?
4
Held:
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related
injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time
he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a
foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical,
serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging
until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention
arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the
employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has
been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed
by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed
120 days.
3 liabilities of ER when seafarer is repatriated
 Payment of medical treatment of the employee,
 Payment of sickness allowance (equivalent to basic wage), both
until the seafarer is declared fit to work or when his disability
rating is determined, [and]
 Payment of the disability benefit (total or partial), in case the
seafarer is not declared fit to work after being treated by the
company-designated physician. 
1. NO. Based of facts of the case, he did not attend medical check-
ups of company-designated physician because agency had not
approved his medical examination and the reimbursement of
expenses despite follow-ups (in short, walang pambayad and pang-
commute)
The duty of the seafarer to be present during the appointments
with the company-designated physician should be viewed
TOGETHER with the duty of the employer to provide medical
treatment and pay the sickness allowance of the seafarer;
otherwise, seafarers would be put at the mercy of companies
2. YES. 2 requisites:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of
120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him; [and]
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then
the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total[.]
Here, there was failure to give assessment within 120-day period
***
Hence, entitled to the following:
1. Permanent and total disability benefits
2. Sickness allowance for 120 days (that was not given)
3. Moral damages + Exemplary damages (for bad faith - unheeded
request; finding made only after complaint already filed)
4. Attorney's fees
Note: He was also allowed to benefit from the CBA (technical
rules disregarded)
Jebens Maritime, Inc. v. Mirasol (June 2019) 
Reiteration on period when company-designated
physician must issue final medical assessment VIS
non-work related illness
Edgardo working as a cook claims total permanent disability
benefits (testicular cancer).
Agency: Not work related.
(a) Experienced it 10 days after joining the crew
(b) Failure to present substantial evidence that it is work-related
Issue: Permanent total disability?
Held: YES. Company-designated physicians' failure to issue a
final and definite assessment within the 120-day period makes
respondent entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
It was no longer necessary for respondent to present evidence that
his illness is work-related and compensable because the law
operates to declare respondent entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits after the company-designated physicians' failure
to issue a final and definite assessment within the 120-day period
Esposo v. Epselon Maritime Services (November
2018)
Hired as chief engineer.
Declared fit to work prior to discharge albeit with the
recommendation, "Hypertension Controlled with medication.
Later on, he experienced the symptoms of high blood while on
board but he was asked to stay since his contract is nearly expiring.
104 days after repatriation, he then filed a case for pemanent total
disability without being referred to a company-designated
physician. He nonetheless consulted a private physician regarding
his illness.
Issue:
1. Should he be entitled to benefits?
Held:
MANDATORY PROCEDURES and PERIODS
(POEA-SEC, Labor Code, IRR, etc)
4. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of
120 days or the extended 240 days, as the case may be, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total.
. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed 120 days.
 SC: Within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to
determine if the illness was work-related or not. After that period, there would be
difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness.
1. NO. The claim was filed prematurely.
He must be referred to a company-designated physician first within
the initial 120 (or extended 240) days.
In this case, the company had no occasion at all to refer Esposo to
its designated physician for assessment because, as will be
discussed further, Esposo never submitted himself to the company
physician for medical examination. In fact, before discharge, he
was found fit by company physician.
While a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors
under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, this is on the assumption
that there is already a certification by the company-designated
physician as to his fitness or disability which he disagrees with.
2. Failed to show that the illness was work-related
wo (2) elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be
work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have
existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract
"[w]ork-[r]elated illness" as "any sickness resulting to disability or
death as a result of an
(a) occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of [the] Contract
(b) with the conditions set therein satisfied.
SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1) The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein;
2) The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure
to the described risks;
3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
(Emphasis supplied)
5
Cardio-Vascular diseases are explicitly listed by Section 32-A(11)
as occupational diseases when contracted under the conditions
therein set, thus:
In the present case, Esposo failed to substantially prove his claim
that his illness was work-related or that it was existing during the
time of his employment with Epsilon. He failed to show that his
illness was known to have been present during his employment or
that the nature of his work brought an acute exacerbation thereof as
required under Section 32-A (11)(a).
Julieza v. Orient Line Philippines, Inc. (July 2019)
Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Buico (Dec. 2019)
Death Benefits
Amalia Menez v. Status Maritime Corporation (August
2018)
In order for the beneficiaries of a seafarer to be entitled
to death compensation from the employer, it must be
proven that the death of the seafarer (1) is work-
related; and (2) occurred during the term of his
contract.”
STRIKE
BIGG’S INC. v. JAY BONCACAS, et. al. (March 2019)
Union staged strike without following procedure. ER
terminated them since there was no explanation given by
the union.
1. As defined under Article 219 (formerly Article 212)(o) of the Labor Code,
a strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
2. Only a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may
declare a strike in case of a bargaining deadlock.
However, in cases of unfair labor practices , the strike may be declared
by any legitimate labor organization.
3. In a strike due to bargaining deadlocks, the union must file a notice of
strike or lockout with the regional branch of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) at least thirty (30) days before the intended date
of the strike and serve a copy of the notice on the employer. This is the so-
called “cooling-off period” when the parties may enter into compromise
agreements to prevent the strike.
In a strike grounded on unfair labor practice, the following are the
requirements: (1) the strike may be declared by the duly certified bargaining
agent or legitimate labor organization; (2) the conduct of the strike vote in
accordance with the notice and reportorial requirements to the NCMB and
subject to the seven-day waiting period; (3) notice of strike filed with the
NCMB and copy furnished to the employer, subject to the 15-day cooling-
off period. In cases of union busting, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not
apply.
4. For union members, what is required is that they knowingly participated
in the commission of illegal acts during the strike for there to be sufficient
ground for termination of employment. For union officers, however, it
suffices that they knowingly participated in an illegal strike.
1. The union conducted an illegal sit-down strike on
February 16, 1996.
The union did not file the requisite Notice of Strike and
failed to observe the cooling-off period. In an effort to
legitimize the strike on February 16, 1996, the union
filed a Notice of Strike on the same day. This cannot be
considered as compliance with the requirement, as the
cooling-off period is mandatory. The cooling-off period is
not merely a period during which the union and the
employer must simply wait. The purpose of the cooling-off
period is to allow the parties to negotiate and seek a
peaceful settlement of their dispute to prevent the actual
conduct of the strike. In other words, there must be genuine
efforts to amicably resolve the dispute.
*No unfair labor practice in the form of union-busting to
dispense with the cooling off period

2. Union President (and other officers) were validly
terminated - not only knowingly participated but was the
one who principally organized two illegal strikes on
February 16, 1996 and March 5, 1996
However, as to the union members who did not participate
in any prohibited act during the strikes, their dismissal was
invalid
[GR] Union members who participate in illegal strike may
be reinstated BUT no backwages (applicable in the case –
no XPNs in the situation)
[XPN] [LURD]
1. EEs were illegally locked to compel them to stage a strike;
2. ER is guilty of the grossest form of ULP
3. EEs who staged a voluntary ULP strike offered to return to work
unconditionally but the employer refused to reinstate them
3. ER committed discrimination in the rehiring of strikers refusing
to readmit those against whom there were pending criminal cases
while admitting non-strikers who were also criminally charged in
court
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
Duration of Constructive Dismissal:
Apply by analogy article 301 – not more than 6 months
 Otherwise, constructive dismissal [BAR]
Seventh Fleet Security Services v. Loquie (Caguioa, 2019)
[POSSIBLE QN]: However, the mere lapse of six
months in "floating status" should not automatically result to
constructive dismissal. The peculiar circumstances of the
employee's failure to assume another post must still be inquired
upon (e.g. EE refused assignment – Exocet v. Seerano case)  EE
must be assigned to a particular client (or must indicate that he
would be assigned to a particular client)
In the case, Loque (security guard) was on floating status for 6
months and 21 days. ER faulted him for not reporting to the office
when asked to do so. However, he was not yet assigned to a
particular client
Others: No abandonment (incompatible with constructive
dismissal)
Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services v. Egos (Caguioa,
2018) [POSSIBLE QN]: EE is janitor of Meralco. ER as
his agent. ER was never reassigned. ER averred that he was placed
in a “floating status” because contract with Meralco. Floating
status?
SC: No Jurisprudence requires the following:
a. 1 month notice to DOLE prior to intended date of suspension of
business operations (as per jurisprudence)
b. Existence of a clear and compelling economic reason for the
temporary suspension (no available position to which the EE can
be assigned)
Both were not present.
Hence, constructive dismissal (together with the other
circumstances which were done to make it appear as if respondent
had not been dismissed)
6
* ignoring respondent's follow-ups on a new assignment
* belated sending of letters/notices which were returned to it
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
Heritage Hotel v. Sio (June 2019)
Sio worked in a casino. Sio had an encounter with valued guests
due to attitude (offensive, arrogant words uttered). Suspended 2x.
Sio then filed illegal dismissal.
1 Evidence were hearsay?
-No. Even if it is, Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies and the Court has
allowed cases to be decided on the basis of position papers and
other documents without necessarily resorting to technical rules of
evidence as observed in the regular courts of justice
2. Is she dismissed?
No. Merely suspended which is a management prerogative.
An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the
prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose
penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
RODRIGUEZ v. SINTRON SYSTEMS, INC. (July 2019)
Pet. hired as sales coordinator for the company. She attended
training in US without any condition imposed upon her
attendance.
Petitioner: Upon return, she was made to sign an agreement to
work for 3 years, otherwise, she will be fined. She averred that she
was shouted after she did not sign. She then filed LOA but ER said
they did not see it and she was considered to have abandoned job.
Filed case for illegal dismissal (constructive dismissal)
Issues:
1. W/N EE was able to discharge the burden as EE?
2. W/N there is abandonment?
3. W/N entitle do separation pay in lieu of reinstatement +
backwages?**  What is the remedy?
Held:
1. NO. In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear
the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal
from service.
Here, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA unanimously found that
Rodriguez failed to discharge her burden of proving, with
substantial evidence, her allegation that she was dismissed by SSI,
constructively or otherwise.
She was simply warned that continued absences will amount to
abandonment.
2. NO. 2nd element (intention to abandon) is not present.
Reasons:
-Surprised that she was considered as abandoned (in her attached
exchange of emails)
-Continued filing of LOA (even without waiting for approval)
3. Since there is neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment, there
can NEITHER be:
1. REINSTATEMENT since one cannot be reinstated to a position
he is still holding.
2. SEPARATION PAY (in lieu of reinstatement) considering that
she was not terminated.
 Invocation of the Doctrine of Strained Relationship
does not apply because there is no reinstatement to
speak of
o Strained relations must be demonstrated as a
fact. The doctrine should not be used
recklessly or loosely applied, nor be based
on impression alone) - no basis given
3. BACKWAGES since there was no dismissal.

**Hence, this being the case, SSI must be ordered to reinstate

Rodriguez to her former position without payment of
backwages. If Rodriguez voluntarily chooses not to return to work,
she must then be considered as having resigned from employment.

This is, however, without prejudice to the parties willingly

continuing with their former contract of employment or entering
into a new one.