INTEGRATIONS
Magazine by Youth Section of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia

October 2016

Outlook for
the Western
Balkans

│ Integrations
 

Integrations │ 2
 

The Word of Editor-in-Chief

Dear Reader, INTEGRATIONS

is a magazine published by Youth
Section of the Euro-Atlantic Council
From our last issue on the NATO of Slovenia
Summit in Warsaw, we decided to
shift our focus to the region of the ISSUE
Western Balkans. Having sided with
October 2016
Balkan SAYS – Security Architecture
Ljubljana, Slovenia
Youth Seminar we have been able to
ISSN 2463-9419
reach many young professionals in-
terested in and working within this
field. We so received many quality EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
papers that you will find on the follow- Nikolina Čenić
ing pages.

EDITORIAL BOARD
The way authors’ interests differ, so
does the scope of the topics gathered in this issue of the magazine. Hav- Anja Ancelj
ing in mind that the Balkan SAYS seminar is oriented towards burning Blaž Grilj
security concerns of the Western Balkans, our authors are in this fashion Meliha Muherina
offering a range of perspectives on multiple issues that region is faced
with recently. From the always topical question of the Euro-Atlantic inte- PUBLISHER
grations of the Western Balkans, over the recent migration and refugee Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia
crisis that hit the Balkans as well, to the ever more relevant topic of vio- Kardeljeva pl. 5, 1000 Ljubljana
lent extremism and radicalism in the region – the October issue of the E-mail: info@euroatlantic.org
Integrations magazine is showcasing some very pensive papers about Tel: +386 1 5850 327
the overall outlook of the Western Balkans. Fax: +386 1 5805 322
www.euroatlantic.org
The cooperation between the Integrations magazine and Balkan SAYS
seminar is once again stepping up our effort in advocating for youth par- PRINT
ticipation in the perplexed decision-making process. We hope to contin-
IZI PRINT d.o.o.
ue down this path with the generous assistance of the Euro-Atlantic
1000 Ljubljana
Council of Slovenia that does not cease to enable our effort in this mat-
ter.
NUMBER OF COPIES
100
Wishing you a pleasant reading,

Nikolina Čenić PRICE

Editor-in-Chief Free of charge

3 │ Integrations
 

Integrations │ 4
 

Contents
SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE INTEGRATIONS MAGAZINE:
BALKAN SAYS AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION
by Blaž Grilj 6

PROTESTS AS A TOOL FOR OVERCOMING

DIVISION: THE CASE OF BIH
by Hana Semanić 7

KOSOVO AND THE EU ENLARGEMENT:

REORIENTATION OR FURTHE REINTEGRATION?
by László Szerencsés 8

RADICAL ISLAMISM IN BIH AS A THREAT OF FOREIGN

FIGHTERS FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS
by Jakub Rafay 10
BIH: A POSSIBLE FERTILE GROUND FOR VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AND RADICALISM AND A THREAT TO I
NTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY
by Hana Đogović 12

DEALING WITH EXSTREMISM AND RADICALISM IN THE

WESTERN BALKANS: PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION
by Sandra Vučić 13

THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE

WESTERN BALKANS
by Aleksandar Vanchoski 15

THE THREAT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS FROM WESTERN

BALKANS TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
by Angela Yausheva 17

ACTING AT THE GRASSROOTS TO TACKLE BALKAN

FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND RETURNEES
by Leonardo Taccetti 21

REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS: GOOD

PRACTICES FROM CROATIA
by Tonja Sedlar 22
5 │ Integrations
 

   
Special Issue of the Integrations
Magazine: Balkan SAYS and Youth
Participation
by Blaž Grilj
Contemporary security challenges are diverse, multidimensional, interconnected and
increasingly complex in nature. They range from traditional full scale war to modern hy-
brid conflicts, terrorism and increasingly concerning new threats such as cyber-attacks.
Young people around the world are both targets and perpetrators of violence. Radicaliza-
tion of youth that leads to terrorism especially seems to be spreading faster than the de-
velopment of prevention policies. Recruitment methods of extremist groups are evolving
and becoming more sophisticated. Several research findings suggest that social media
play an important role in the recruitment process.
Blaž Grilj is a Research Assistant  
at the Department for Defense
Current security challenges undeniably shape our current and future political reality.
Studies at the Faculty of Social
Global developments are indicating a rise of nationalistic political options that are wining
Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
votes by promoting radical solutions to seemingly unsolvable challenges such as influx of
He is also Secretary-General of
undocumented migrants, terrorism, economic hardships and general lack of sustainable
YATA International and a Presi-
long-term political vision.
dent of the Youth Section of the
Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia.
Western Balkans are an example of raising tensions of nationalism that seemed to be
adequately addressed through the prospect of the common prosperous future inside the
EU. As the attraction of the Union seems to decline and new challenges appear, nation-
alism seems to re-emerge. While the Balkans may not seem to be the center of the pre-
sent security threats, the region is heavily impacted by most of the risks the Europe is
facing today. It is a transit route for mass migrations towards EU, the region is origin of
some of the highest percentage of foreign fighters relatively to its size, it has substantial
challenges of extremism and radicalism and at the same time its stability remains rela-
tively fragile, still suffering from economic and social disparities, lack of the rule of law,
weak governance, corruption, widespread poverty and high unemployment.

What role can young people play in addressing those challenges? We believe that young
people can have an active role in developing responses to the current and future chal-
lenges. Starting with radicalization, experience in youth engagement in addressing social
issues such as trafficking, drugs abuse, violence etc. – seems to suggest that youth can
play an important role in countering violent discourse. While a fraction of young people is
   
indeed inspired by the radical and nationalistic ideas, the vast majority seems to continue
to aspire for common future. As the intolerance appears to be gaining political power and
becoming increasingly normalized in politics, youth engagements should offer a mean-
ingful alternative.

It is for that reason that we decided to dedicate this special issue of the Integrations
magazine to the thoughts and ideas written by the participants of Balkan SAYS 2016,
many of who are likely to become future leaders in the areas of politics, law, security and
other. The objective of the Balkan SAYS seminar is to address and question some of the
most important challenges of the region and connect young people from the Balkans and
beyond. While the seminar and this magazine may be just a small piece of the puzzle,
we believe they showcase that youth engagement can offer relevant contribution to our
common efforts while young people should be considered as relevant partners in this
process.

Integrations │ 6
 

   
Protests as a Tool for Overcoming
Division: The Case of BIH
by Hana Semanić
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a country with unique constitutional arrangements and
excessively perplexed administrative framework. The constitution grants limited powers
to the state-level institutions, while vesting most of them in the two entities, the Federa-
tion of BiH (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS), each with its own president, government,
parliament, and other bodies. In addition, Brčko district1 retains its special status as an
autonomous self-governing unit. This complex system has been in place since the 1995
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)2 which stopped the 1992-1995 war that was tearing the
country apart. The DPA also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
which, in 1997, was granted the so-called “Bonn Powers”, enabling the High Representa-
tive to impose laws at any level of government and to dismiss any elected or non-elected
  Hana Semanić is a Research Fel-
officials within various administrative structures.3 On the ethnic level, the constitution
low at the Central European Uni-
recognizes Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as “constituent peoples”4, based on the principle
versity, Center for European
of self-declaration, while remaining BiH citizens are defined as “others”.5 Simply put,
Neighborhood Studies (CENS).
people who do not identify themselves as Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs are effectively
She joined CENS in November
barred for standing for the BiH and RS presidencies. Needless to say, this restriction is
2010, concentrating on SEE-EU
discriminatory and runs counter to Protocol no. 12 of the European Convention of Human
relations with a special focus on
Rights and article 7.3 of the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document.6 Not only there is the
the Western Balkans.
complex administrative framework, but also deep divisions that have led to political stag-
nation and vulnerability to corruption.  
1 Annex 2, Article V, of the DPA on 8
BiH is created on a national basis instead of laying its foundations on the sovereignty of March 2000, formed Brčko district as an
autonomous entity and a neutral, self-
citizens and universal values and civil liberties. The country has been a matrix of manipu-
governing administrative unit that is cur-
lation and self-deception since the early 1990s, unable and unwilling to establish democ- rently shared territory by both entities, the
racy, the rule of law and liberate itself from the frantic budgetary costs which are destroy- FBiH and the RS. Both legal and political
ing the economy. Due to the lack of socio-economic well-being and economic develop- entities have their own independent legis-
ment, high unemployment rate and accumulated debts, the matrix came to the moment lative, executive and judicial functions with
their own capital, government, president,
when a confrontation with its own moral and material unsustainability in the current form parliament, customs and police responsi-
was not avoidable any longer. Political elites have created an imprisoned society full with bilities.
idée fixe in which being a Bosniak, Croat or Serb has become more important than being
2 BartM.J. Szewczyk, “Occasional Paper:
a human and a citizen with its individual identity, while the borders and sovereignty of
entities and cantons have become more important than Unisa, Tasa, Čajavec, Energoin- The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina: pow-
ers, decisions and legitimacy”, European
vest, Dita, Šipad7 and Zenica Steel Factory. One of the outcomes of those venture were Union Institute for Security Studies 83
the protests against economic, political and cultural degradation that took place in Febru- (2010): 23. Accessed August 20, 2016.
ary 2014. http://www.osce.org/bih/126173?
download=true.
More than two years ago the cities in BiH were burning. The protests started in Tuzla, the 3 Office of the High Representative.
third largest city in the country and a heart of the country’s (failed) industrial sector. High “General Information”. Accessed August
unemployment and the disappointment with the winners of the October 2010 elections 20, 2016. http://www.ohr.int/?
triggered the protests in Tuzla, which quickly erupted across the country and spread to page_id=1139.
Sarajevo, Zenica, Bihać and Mostar. Most of the former protests in BiH and in the neigh- 4 Office of the High Representative.
boring countries were related to ethnic and religious issues. Not this one. This was a “Constituent Peoples’ Decision of the BiH
rebellion against the nationalist elites and badly governed cites and cantons. The people Constitutional Court”. Accessed August
in BiH came to understand who their real enemies were. They were not different ethnic 20, 2016. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/
groups, but the leaders who pretend to protect them from the other two groups. The de- const/default.asp?content_id=5853.
monstrators were united by a radical demand for justice and fairness. Their demands 5 Constitutional
Court of Bosnia and Her-
could not be simpler: jobs, opportunities for a decent life, and the end of corruption. zegovina. “Preamble of the Constitution of
FBiH”. Accessed August 20, 2016. http://
The RS initially remained relatively calm. Why were there protests in Tuzla, Zenica, Bi- www.ccbh.ba/public/down/
USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.
hać, Sarajevo, Mostar and Brčko and not in Banja Luka, Bijelina and other places in the
pdf.
RS? From the perspective of the RS leadership, it was the dysfunctional nature of the
FBiH and another piece of evidence that FBiH was not in the interest of the RS. There is 6 Organization for Security and Co-

no doubt that the institutions of the FBiH are more dysfunctional than in the RS with its operation in Europe (OSCE). “OSCE/
cantons, but this argument at the time was self-serving Milorad Dodik, the President of ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final
Report”. Accessed August 20, 2016. http://
the RS, and his election campaign. However, the calmness in the RS also disappeared. www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/23945?
In late February 2014 in Banja Luka, the former RS soldiers supported by hundreds of download=true.
7 │ Integrations

7 Factories that used to employ a large   citizens began to protest as well. They wanted the RS to establish a list of all veterans,
number of people. Today they are either
closed down or are on the verge of bank-
ruptcy due to bad privatization.
8 The Independence Day of BiH is cele-
brated only in the FBiH, while the RS boy-
cotts this holiday and celebrates its own
Independence Day on 9 January .
9 Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are the
three official languages of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
 
László Szerencsés is an intern at
the political department of the Em-
bassy of Hungary in Berlin and
studies Global Political Economy
M.A. at the University of Kassel.
He graduated as an international
relations expert from the Budapest
Business University.
who fought in the last war, to amend the Law on Veterans Benefits, to provide them with
the free health care, and to pass the Law on the Origin of Property. Dodik called these
protests instrumentalized, having nothing to do with social problems in the RS, and which
were part of a bigger plan to overthrow the RS. The fact that the protests in Banja Luka
took place a day before the RS Independence Day8 were interpreted by Dodik as a prov-
ocation orchestrated by “foreign power centers” with the aim of destabilizing the RS. The
people in the RS were afraid of the autocratic president of this entity, as he uses propa-
ganda, police and secret service against his opponents. “People are hungry in all three
languages”9, which was written on one of the banners best described the situation in the
entire country.
It has been over two years since the people of the so-called “Bosnian Spring” protested
for a better life, for combating organized crime and corruption. These were not mass pro-
tests that gathered over ten thousand citizens at the very beginning, but smaller and spo-
radic groups of about a hundred demonstrators who continued to seek for the change.
Most of them requested the same: first, they wanted to form new cantonal governments
led by experts and not by party members; second, revisions of wages and benefits of all
cantonal officials; third, abolition of the so-called “white bread”, one-year-long cash com-
pensation for politicians after the loss of their mandate; fourth, prosecution of the officials
who were responsible for badly conducted privatization in BiH over the past 20 years.
Although not many of these demands have been fulfilled, the dream about the “Bosnian
Spring” could be defined as a partial success. BiH today is still in a vacuum of too high
expectations and the inability of political elites to adapt to the changes that have oc-
curred. The current situation cannot be resolved by a sudden shock of the system. What
the country needs is a surgically precise action accompanied by a complete restoration of
morality in the society. However, it seems that individuals and even big groups of citizens
are still not able to fully cope with the corrupt system of governments on different levels
and are not willing to act responsibly and transparently. The country needs fresh new
blood into the system in order to technocratically master the social occurrences. These
protests were one of the rare instances in which the three “constituent peoples” did not
defend their ethnic interests, which continue to be one of the key challenges for both
practitioners and theoreticians, but a proof that all the citizens of BiH can work together
on the issues of common concern.
This year one could witness two important steps on the BiH calendar: submission of the
application for EU membership in February and adoption of the coordination mechanism
for EU matters. It is still far too early to predict whether the years to come will be the
years that changed BiH, but hope is running high.
Kosovo and the EU Enlargement:
Reorientation or Further Integration?
by László Szerencsés
The relations between Kosovo and the European Union are intense. Kosovo as one of
the youngest countries of the world has not reached full sovereignty yet. Among others,
two member states of the United Nations Security Council and five member states of the
European Union (EU) still have not recognized it as a sovereign country. As a conse-
quence, among the Western Balkans’ countries it is the most isolated state since the visa
-free travel to the Schengen-Area is still not possible for its citizens. The unsatisfactory
stance of the Kosovar economy deters the Western European countries from opening
their borders as they are afraid of the influx of migrants from Kosovo.1 In order to over-
come these challenges Kosovo is committed towards the European integration in the
hopes of reaching the status of visa-free travel to the Schengen-Area and in the distant
future gaining a membership to the EU. However, as Kosovo lies in the neighbourhood of
the EU, it is not only the landlocked country’s interest to move closer to the integration,
but Brussels’ too. Thus, the EU attempts to reconcile the tense relations between Serbia
Integrations │ 8
 

and Kosovo through the Belgrade - Pristina dialogue. Furthermore, still under the umbrel-  
la of maintaining regional stability the EU operates its biggest state-building mission in
1 Emini, D. Migration. Challenging visa
liberalization for Kosovo. Kosovo Centre
Kosovo, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). This article dis- for Security Studies. Policy Brief. No. 8.
cusses the question of Kosovo’ results and further aspirations concerning European inte- September 2015.
gration.
2 Petrovic,Z. and Reljic, D.: Turkish Inter-
ests and Involvement in the Western Bal-
The EU’s enlargement policy seems to have slowed down during the Juncker era of the kans: A Score-Card. In: Insight Turkey.
European Commission. The slowed process might have an influence on the region’s still Vol. 13. No. 3. pp. 159-172. 2011.
fragile countries’ attitude towards the EU, such as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH), Kosovo and F.Y.R.O.M.2 Furthermore, as they do not perceive the expected level
3 Jacoby, W.: Chinese Investment in the
of enthusiasm from the EU they tend to look for other active powers in the region.3 In the
Balkans. In: Re-imagining the Silk Road
case of Kosovo, the historically close relations with Turkey might seem to be an alterna- Articla Series. 2015 In: http://
tive for certain policy actors. Ankara contributes significantly to the preservation of the councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/
Muslim culture in Kosovo and BiH,4 while China carries out infrastructure projects in the chinese-investment-in- the-balkans/
region. On the top of that the so called self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS) is indirectly (Accessed: 22.08.16) .
present in both Kosovo and in BiH and they recruit young men from the hopeless young   4 Ibidem.
population that struggles with high unemployment and poverty.5
5 KCSS. Report inquiring into the causes
As the last country from the Western Balkans, Kosovo signed its Stabilization and Asso- and consequences of Kosovo citizens’
ciation Agreement (SAA) with the EU on October 22, 2015. The SAA came into force on involvement as foreign fighters in Syria
and Iraq. In: Kosovo Center for Security
April 1, 2016 establishing a free-trade area between the EU and Kosovo. Although the Studiey. Occasional Paper. April. 2015 In:
signed SAA is a political success, it is questionable whether it will bring better conditions http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/
for Kosovar entrepreneurs and investments. The Kosovar goods are not as competitive R e -
as the EU’s; therefore the local entrepreneurs can easily be outcompeted from the mar- port_inquiring_into_the_causes_and_cons
equences_of_Kosovo_citizens'_involveme
ket. Despite the fact that the EU supports Pristina financially and assists the normaliza- nt_as_foreign_fighters_in_Syria_and_Iraq
tion of its political status, Kosovo is still the only country from the Western-Balkans _307708.pdf (Accessed: 23.08.16).
whose citizens still need a visa to enter the Schengen Area.6
6 Ebba, L. Visa Liberalization and the Way
The visa-liberalization process with Kosovo began on January 19, 2012 and it has not
Forward: Suggestions for a Strategic Ap-
been closed yet. The process was stalled for a long time due to the high number of mi- proach to the Political Dialogue with Brus-
grants moving from Kosovo to the territory of the EU. During the last Kosovar migration sels. Group for Legal and Political Studies,
 
wave of 2014/2015 67 0007, citizens left the country for Western Europe, and most of Policy Analysis No. 03. May. 2015.
them have to return to the country since they are not eligible for asylum in Western Eu-
rope.8 Thus, for the EU the readmission of returnees is especially of high importance. In 7 EUROSTAT. First time asylum applicants
spite of this, recognizing the need for progress on May 4, 2016 the European Commis- in the EU28 by citizenship. In: EURO-
sion proposed visa-free travel for the people of Kosovo.9 This act does not mean immedi- STAT. Statistics Explained. 2016. In:
ate implementation because the European Parliament and the Council of the EU have to http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
accept the proposal before, which seems to be difficult having in mind 5 member states e x p l a i n e d / i n d e x . p h p /
File:First_time_asylum_applicants_in_the_
that do not recognize Kosovo. In June 2016, the president of Kosovo Hashim Thaci told EU-28_by_citizenship,_Q4_2014_%E2%
the Wall Street Journal: “Brussels literally has no more reasons to delay”.10 So far, in 80%93_Q4_2015.png (Accessed:
August 2016 the decision has not been made. 20.08.16).

8 See note no.1.

There are two main reasons why the EU is relatively passive concerning the enlargement
process: the experience of the euro crisis and United Kingdom’s decision to leave the 9 EC. European Commission proposes
community. On one hand, the conditions for membership are getting stricter, and the EU visa-free travel for the people of Kosovo.
monitors the progress of the candidate countries with more accuracy in order to avoid 2016. In: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
such crises as Greece’s presently.11 On the other hand, for the Union there are seeming- release_IP-16-1626_en.htm (Accessed:
23.08.16).
ly more important issues than enlargement including ones such as the “migration crisis”
or Brexit. Besides Brexit the enlargement process is not under the spotlight anymore,
and the fact that one of the biggest contributors of the EU’s budget leaves the integration 10 WSJ. Georgia, Kosovo, Ukraine’s Visa-

might have a discouraging effect on candidate and potential candidate countries, such as Free Access to EU Delayed. 2016. In:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/georgia-
Kosovo. kosovo-ukraines-visa-free-access-to-eu-
delayed-1465486485 (Acc essed:
As the willingness of Brussels to increase the number of member states is weak, Kosovo 23.08.16).
might be in the position to be dissatisfied with the pace of its integration process. To
complain would be too soon since Kosovo’s economy and its political situation are far 11 Shelton,Joel T. Conditionality and the
from the desires but the dissatisfaction with the pace of visa-liberalization “holds water”. Ambitions of Governance: Social Transfor-
While all of the other countries of the region already reached this status, Kosovo still mation in Southeastern Europe. New York:
awaits for it to happen. Although it may encourage Kosovo to diversify its foreign policy Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 
agenda but its possibilities are limited therefore they have to rely on the EU’s pace

9 │ Integrations

   
Jakub Rafay is an undergraduate   under the banner of the IS.
student of International Relations
and Security and Strategy Stud-
ies at Masaryk University in Brno,
specializing in topics of contempo-
rary terrorism and WMD prolifera-
tion.
 
1 Terrorism Research and Analysis
Consortium: al Mujahedin Special Unit. .
Accesed 16.8.2016. http://goo.gl/q8Zd9y.
2 National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks Upon the United States (2004): AL
QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN
HOMELAND. Accessed 16.8.2016. http://
goo.gl/ZM8VWN.
3 Mulholland, R. (2016): Muslim radicals in
mountain villages spark fears in Bosnia. In
The Telegraph, 30 April 2016. Accessed
15.8.2016. http://goo.gl/KgfoV6.
4 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2016):
Foreign Fighters In Iraq & Syria: Where Do
They Come From? Accessed 14.8.2016.
http://goo.gl/y1OAo9.
5 Weiss, C. (2015): Islamic State touts
jihadists from the Balkans. In The Long
War Journal, June 5, 2015. Accessed
16.8.2016. http://goo.gl/pQBT2A.
concerning enlargement negotiations. Thus, as can be seen both actors have the inter-
est of cooperation, but as the EU has a fragmented and fragile decision-making system,
it faces obstacles in giving an impetus for the Kosovar case. Nevertheless, the future of
Kosovo is in the continued European integration process.
Radical Islamism in BIH as a threat
of Foreign Fighters from Western
Balkans
by Jakub Rafay
Until now an unremarkable threat posed to the region and the neighbouring European
Union by a presence of Islamic radicals in several Balkan countries has recently been
exacerbated by the rise in popularity and military achievements of the so-called Islamic
State (IS). As the past years have shown, not only has the renewed attractiveness of the
Salafi ideology resulted in an increasing number of terrorist attacks in the Balkans, but it
has also inspired hundreds of local Muslims to leave their country in order to wage jihad
The roots of the phenomenon can be traced to the Bosnian War of 1992-95, when the
influx of foreign fighters from Arab countries to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, also Bos-
nia)) resulted in “Islamization” of the conflict; Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina even established a separate 7th Muslim Brigade in order to exert control over the
foreign fighters.1 These individuals were both financially and logistically sponsored by
governments that saw the war as an opportunity to gain foothold in the region, with
spreading of the ultra-conservative Wahhabi ideology by the fighters as one of its instru-
ments. Similarly, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda saw the Balkans as a new
frontier for waging jihad – case in point being that two of 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi
and Khalid al-Mihdhar, took part in the battles alongside the Bosnian Muslims.2 At the
end of the war, however, all foreign fighters were ordered by the peace-establishing Day-
ton agreement to leave the country. While many did, several hundreds of them stayed
behind and concentrated their presence in remote villages in the mountains, practicing
the puritan Salafi version of Islam, enacting sharia as the sole binding legal code and
thus creating secluded safe havens out of reach of authorities. Coupled with the Arab
countries’ involvement in the country – this time overtly – by establishing foundations,
cultural centers and providing financial aid for reconstruction, the circumstances were
ideal for growth of Islamic radicalism.
Nowadays, it is estimated there are about 3000 Salafi fundamentalists in the country of
3.8 million3 and between 300 and 340 have left for Syria and Iraq – this puts BiH on top
of the list of European countries regarding number of foreign fighters in proportion to 1
million of citizens.4 To attract even more recruits, IS released in June 2015 a propaganda
video aimed at the Balkan population with several narrators being of Balkan origin and
urging the audience to commit domestic attacks or to make hijra, all while speaking Bos-
nian or Albanian.5 It is questionable how effective the video is, as many of the fighters
were recruited for the cause long before its release by local radical preachers and com-
munity leaders, with the most notable being Nusret Imamović (left Bosnia in 2013 for
Syria; currently believed to be fighting for Jabhat an-Nusra)6 and Husein Bilal Bosnić (a
successor to Imamović; sentenced in November 2015 for promoting jihad and recruiting
for terrorism); Bajro Ikanović is another notable figure of Balkan origin, having held vari-
ous leadership positions within IS and having commanded the largest IS training camp in
Syria in Azaz.7,8 These facts provide a grim depiction of the security situation in the coun-
try which, unfortunately, might worsen if even a handful of the jihadists were to return
and apply the know-how obtained on the battlefields of the Levant.
However, foreign fighters represent only one dimension of the problem. Since 2002 there
have been several domestic incidents connected to Wahhabism that can be regarded as
Integrations │ 10
  

terrorist attacks, with most of them having taken place in the Muslim heartland of Bosnia.  
Compared to more contemporary jihadi attacks abroad, these attacks were significantly
6U.S. Department of State (2014): Desig-
nations of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Ac-
less deadly, but the element of Wahhabism was present in each one of them. Among the cessed 16.8.2016. Available online: http://
most serious are the bomb attack on a police station in Bugojno by Haris Čaušević in 2010 goo.gl/MJVq7L.
(1 killed, 6 injured), attacks with an automatic weapon on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo
(no casualties) and on a police station in Zvornik (1 killed, 2 injured), both in 2011 and a 7 Holman, T. (2014): Foreign Fighters from
2015 armed assault on soldiers in Sarajevo by Enes Omeragić (2 killed). the Western Balkans in Syria. West Point,
NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Ac-
Third aspect of the issue pertains to the logistical support of the jihad. Due to the country’s cessed 15.8.2016. https://goo.gl/XBHMP1.
recent history of an armed conflict and instability, weapons, munitions and explosives –
many of which predate the dissolution of Yugoslavia – are relatively easily available, as can 8 U.S. Department of Treasury (2015):
be seen in their wide use in the aforementioned incidents. What’s more alarming, though, Treasury Sanctions Major Islamic State of
is the fact that firearms originating from the Balkans have been used in both last year’s Iraq and the Levant Leaders, Financial
major terrorist attacks in Paris.9 Moreover, existence of secluded Salafi villages such as Figures, Facilitators, and Supporters.
Gornja Maoča or Ošve in rural areas of Bosnia (mostly in the centre and north-west of the Accessed 16.8.2016. https://goo.gl/
NxguDN.
country) opens up a possibility of a jihadi safe haven on the European borders. Last year
there were reports of locals decorating their houses and village with emblems and flags of  
the IS.10 It is also feared that local Salafists may have established terrorist training camps, 9 Candea, S. et al. (2016): The Path to
providing the recruits with rudimentary military training. While it is doubtful whether these Death: How EU Failures Helped Paris
camps are really operational and/or whether they provide any effective training, it is very Terrorists Obtain Weapons. In Spiegel
Online, 24 March 2016. Accessed
much conceivable that the villages themselves may be of value as staging posts or refuges
15.8.2016. http://goo.gl/AMNssL
for returning foreign fighters coming back home or even further back to Europe.

A comprehensive approach will be needed in order to tackle the issue and even then it is 10 See note no. 5.
doubtful whether the problem is really solvable or merely containable. A major step to be
taken in suppressing domestic radicalism should be an increase in number and extent of
police operations aimed at confiscating materiel, disrupting and preventing attacks that are
being planned and apprehending individuals with clear links to terrorism (with a good ex- 11 State Investigation and Protection
ample being current Operation Damask, aimed at fighting terrorism in the country).11 How- Agency (2014): Operation “Damask”:
Additional Information. 14.8.2016. http://
ever, effectiveness will be largely dependent on good police work coupled with closer coop- goo.gl/8D0xdT.  
eration, actions coordination and information sharing with intelligence and security agen-
cies – both domestic (on all structural levels of the country) and foreign.
 
Even though closer cooperation with foreign services is crucial in preventing terrorist at-
tacks, strengthening of border controls may prove even more useful. As mentioned above,
illegally smuggled firearms from Balkan countries provided perpetrators of several major
attacks in Europe with means of executing their plans. While many sections of the coun-
try’s borders are closely monitored – notably on motorway crossings frequently used by
tourists and for goods transport – the situation is comparably less complicated on the west-
ern borders with Croatia. Due to both strong Croatian presence on both sides and problem-
atically accessible terrain formed by the northern part of Dinaric Alps, the security
measures are less strict, with many border crossings lacking any security posts (e.g. Čitluk
– Jovića Most or Vaganj – Bili Brig crossings). This provides the would-be terrorists – or
simple weapons smugglers – with a tremendously easy access to Croatia and possibly
other countries of the European Union, making the country an ideal stepping stone and
logistical hub on the way from the Middle East to the heart of Europe. Nevertheless, these
routes are viable only for a handful of low-profile crossings and it can be assumed that fre-
quent and extensive use would raise alarms (notwithstanding the fact that navigating
through the mountainous area would be quite a difficult task for foreigners).

Islamic radicalism in BiH certainly poses a threat to both domestic and wider European
security and looking at the evidence, it is rather hard to over-state this –thousands of radi-
cal Salafists in the country are concentrated in the no-go areas; hundreds of them have left
the country to wage jihad abroad; several have executed terrorists attacks at home; weap-
ons and munitions originating in the area were used in several terrorist attacks. It should be
telling that while many of these characteristics can be applied to far more developed and
more stable European countries most deeply stricken by the rise of Islamic radicalism –
France, Belgium or Germany – nowhere are they seen on such a scale as in BiH. As West-
ern nations are preparing stricter counter-terrorism measures, it remains to be seen wheth-
er the Balkans will catch up with them or prove to be the next center of jihad in Europe.

11 │ Integrations

Hana Đogović is currently an in-  
tern at the Permanent Mission of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
OSCE in Vienna and she is plan-
ning to pursue a Ph.D. in Interdis-
ciplinary Legal Studies at the Uni-
versity of Vienna.
 
1 Morgan Oddie, The Relationship of Reli-
gion and the Ethnic Nationalism in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (George Fox University,
Occasional Papers on religion in Eastern
Europe, 2012), 35 – 42.
2Mladen Ančić, Society, Ethnicity, and
Politic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Institute of
Historical Sciences, Croatian Academy of
Sciences and Arts, Zadar, Croatia, 2004),
8-29.
3 Marie Louise Stig Sorensen and Dacia
Viejo-Rose, War and Cultural Heritage
(Cambridge Unviersity PressNew York,
USA, 2015), 233.
4 Youth Engagement to Counter Violent
Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to
Terror: Report on Findings and Recom-
mendations from an OSCE Secretariat –
OSCE ODIHR Expert Roundtable (OSCE,
2013), 4.
5 LeslieS. Lebl, Islamism and Security in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014),
7.
6 Valery Perry, Countering the Cultivation
of Extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
The Case for Comprehensive Education
Reform (Berlin-Sarajevo: Democratization
Policy Council, 2015), 1-19.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Possible
Fertile Ground for Violent Extremism
and Radicalism and a Threat to
International Peace and Stability
by Hana Đogović
The story of religious extremism and radicalism in the small, heart-shaped country of
Bosnia and Herzegovina begins with the war of ethno-religious nature at the beginning of
1990s. It was in this period that the Bosnian Muslim government started receiving both
moral and financial support from Islamic Gulf states in the form of hundreds of Mujahe-
deens, Islamic foreign fighters, which, although not numerous, have managed to bring
radical Islam ideology in the country where this religion, as well as others, was practiced
in the most moderate manner. The justification by Bosniak politicians of the time was, of
course, the fact that they were fighting on Bosniak “side” against Serb and Croat forces.
Bosnian Muslims have accepted Islam as their religion mostly during the period of the
Ottoman reign, while Christianity and Judaism existed in the Balkan region even before.
Only recently, with the emergence of the Islamic State had this little country started to,
again, receive international attention.
In the country with particularly weak central government, divided society and still ongoing
national, ethnic and religious tensions, violent extremism and radicalism can easily find
fertile ground for growth and further development. Because of the consequences of the
Bosnian war and because of the indoctrination of the people with religious and national
ideologies and dogmas, people mostly vote for the political parties that represent their
religious, ethnic and national groups, and therefore they are reluctant to change their
opinions.1 The result of that is, of course, the ethnic-based nature of politics, which af-
fects not only every single citizen for more than twenty years, but also diplomatic and
political relations with countries from the region.2
The Wahhabis continued until this day to actively propagate radical Islam, which is why
they truly represent a potential threat not only to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but also to regional and international peace and stability. Many experts argue that the
fact that nowadays more and more young men decide to leave their homeland to fight for
the Islamic State in Syria and/or Iraq is precisely a consequence of the radical ideology
brought to Bosnia and Herzgovina during the war.3 Of course, it is clear that in the coun-
try with an economy highly dependent on foreign aid and with a youth unemployment
bypassing 60 percent, it is relatively easy to indoctrinate and manipulate young people.4
Moreover, many believe that some Bosniak political and religious leaders have close
connections with such radical communities.5
The great issue is, terrorism and radicalism do not respect or care about state frontiers –
statistics say that more than 250 Bosnians have so far gone to join the Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq since 2012. Although this number does not sound too serious, it repre-
sents the biggest proportion of population of any European country after Belgium, which
is already a deeply concerning fact. Moreover, in the country of a bit less than 4 million
inhabitants, there are currently about 3,000 Salafist fundamentalists in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.6
Although it is clear that this is mainly a problem that should worry Bosnian authorities, it
is obvious that extremists’ target is not this country only. On the contrary, the Old conti-
nent as a whole should be concerned, since Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country on the
border of the European Union. Moreover, Bosnian authorities are clearly not ready for
the fight against terrorism and probably wouldn’t be able to deal with the threat alone.
After it became evident that the munitions from Bosnia and Herzegovina were used in
the attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in the January 2015, the
Integrations │ 12
 

the attention of international community has been turned to this country even more after   7 Steven Oluic, Radical Islam on Europe’s

the findings by the Bosnian Ministry of Security that some of the weapons used in the Frontier – Bosnia & Herzegovina (US
Military Academy), 1-18.
terrorist attack on Paris in the November 2015 also originated in the former Yugoslav
production.7

The weaker the state and the society, the easier is to develop radical communities. Frag-
ile and post-war countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, are
particularly vulnerable. However, in a modernized and globalized world of today, it is
simply naive to assume that extremist ideas in one country will not surpass its frontiers.
On the contrary, the situation in the Middle East has proven otherwise. As the number of
European foreign fighters rises, so does the threat for international security. Although
most of the Bosnian Muslims continue to adhere to their traditionally moderate version of
Islam, it is undeniable that certain tendencies towards radicalism appear. For all those
reasons, the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism and violent extremism in Bosnia
and Herzegovina should be taken most seriously by international organizations and Eu-
ropean Union, for if humanity fails to do so, the consequences could be severe - not only    
for this country, but for the Europe in general.

Dealing with Extremism and

Radicalism in the Western Balkans:
Prevention and Suppression
by Sandra Vučić
After the conflicts of the 1990s that led to final dissolution of Yugoslavia, especially after
the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which marked the end of the Bosnian war, the issue
of ensuring peace and stability in the region became the main issue for the region itself,
but also for the international community. Although some countries like Slovenia and re-   Sandra Vučić is a Ph.D. candi-
cently Croatia successfully completed the process of the European Union (EU) integra- date at Department of Security
tion, other countries from the region, namely Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montene- Sudies, University of Belgrade with
gro, F.Y.R.O.M. and Albania are still faced with many challenges that cause uncertainty particular interests in the role of
and deepen existing divisions. Lack of consensus on the basic principles, values and strategic culture in shaping nation-
priorities of the political and economic system, including lack of societal consensus al security and defense policy,
or slow pace of Euro-Atlantic integration make them highly vulnerable, living space for securitization theory and terrorism.
reinforcing mistrust within and between communities and often contributing to outbreak of
violence, especially in the religiously and ethnic heterogeneous countries. In addition, the
instability on the global level, caused by economic crises, Ukraine conflict, conflicts in the
Middle East and North Africa, as well as uprising of the threat from so called Islamic state
(IS)1 reflect negatively on the security image of the Balkan states and Europe in general.

European security environment experienced significant changes over the past decade,
but in the last few years it became more then obvious that the territory of the EU coun- 1 Also known as ISIL (the Islamic State of
tries will be the future front of the jihadist terrorism. According to the EU Terrorism Situa- Iraq and the Levant), ISIS (the Islamic
State of Iraq and al Sham), and IS, or the
tion and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016 released by EUROPOL, in 2015, 151 people died Islamic State (reflecting its claim of state
and over 360 were injured as a result of terrorist attacks in the EU. Six EU Member sovereignty over the territory it controls).
States (Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) faced 211 failed, Increasingly, scholars prefer to use the
foiled and completed terrorist attacks, while 1.077 individuals were arrested in the EU for Arabic term „DAESH“ (Dawlat al-Islamiyah
f'al-Iraq wa al-Sham).
terrorism-related offences, of which 424 in France only.2 Although political violence
aimed to weaken and frighten countries and nations is not a new phenomenon, all these
attacks, including those performed in 2016 indicated a shift in broader strategy, so the 2 European Union Terrorism Situation and
threat within the EU countries has evolved from structured groups and networks to small- Trend Report 2016. Available at: https://
er EU-based groups and solo terrorists or lone actors.3 Quick development from radicali- www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-
union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-
zation toward violent extremism and finally terrorism, facilitated by globalized world and te-sat-2016.
free flow of people, the use of Internet and social media pose the main reasons why con-
ventional approaches and strategies failed to identify, predict and disrupt recent terrorist
3 Ibidem.
plots.

13 │ Integrations

 
4 "The Integrative and Complementary
Approach to Counter-Terrorism and Vio-
lent Extremism in the Western Balkans",
Conclusions of the Council of the EU and
of the Member States meeting within the
Council on the Integrative and Comple-
mentary Approach to Counter-Terrorism
and Violent Extremism in the Western
Balkans (3 December 2015).http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-14986-2015-INIT/en/pdf .
5 “Youth Engagement to Counter Violent
Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to
Terror: Report on Findings and Recom-
mendations.” Joint OSCE Secretariat –
OSCE ODIHR Expert Roundtable. 23-24
October 2012, p. 3-5. http://www.osce.org/
secretariat/103352?download=true.
6 “Violent
Extremism in the Western Bal-
kans”.Policy Recommendations Study
Group Regional Stability in South East
Europe. 31st RSSEE SG WORKSHOP -
Belgrade, Serbia 27 – 29 September
2015. p.1
While Europe became important target for the Islamic State, Western Balkans prove to
be one of the main sources of exploitation of potential individuals and groups to be a
protagonist of radical ideologies. Growing radicalization and violent Islamic extremism in
the Western Balkans, including the existence of closed radical communities inspired by
charismatic extremists in the Western Balkans spreading the idea of violent extremism in
the EU,4 is something that has been recognized by regional security and intelligence
experts as well as from EU as a serious threat. Still, a comprehensive picture of the scale
of radicalization and violent extremism in the Balkans remains blurred, mostly because of
the lack of consensus and awareness about the pathways through which some individual
goes from frustration to adoption of certain ideology and eventually acceptance of vio-
lence as a legitimate course. Despite this, almost every day different security experts
from the region warn that the number of radicalized individuals in the region is highly
underestimated and that the scale of extremism is probably much higher than it is be-
lieved. The questions remain how did the radicalism and extremism thoughts gain a foot-
hold in Western Balkans, what are the implications of that on the international security
and what can be done to decrease the level of threat?
In search for the answers, we have to advert to characteristic and role of Muslim popula-
tion in the Western Balkans through history. It is widely accepted that Muslims from the
Balkans are quite different from those who live in the rest of Europe, particularly when it
comes to their attitude toward Islam and thus their identity. As a result of deep connec-
tion and coexistence with the non-Muslim population in the Balkans for centuries, Balkan
Muslims were inseparable part of regional political context. That is why they have more
often identified themselves in relation to nationality instead of religion, which made them
resistant to radicalization for a very long time. The last decade of the 20th, including the
beginning of 21st century brought turbulent changes for the region. Armed conflicts,
slight economic development and slow democratization and state building processes
created favorable conditions for radical Islamists activities which resulted with accelerat-
ed radicalization.
But what are the main driving factors of the radicalization - whether the focus should be
on individual (personality, age, religion etc.), structural factors (intolerance, political, eco-
nomic, and social marginalization, dire economic situation etc.) or both? According to the
2012 report on an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights roundtable, “Youth Engagement to Counter
Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terror”, radicalization can happen at
any age, but young people who are in search of a sense of belonging, purpose, and/or
identity are usually more vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorist radicalization. One
of the findings also proved that “terrorist radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent
extremism and terrorism appear, in many instances, based on social bonding rather than
ideological grounds. Young people may initially turn to violent extremist groups to find a
sense of recognition, fellowship, and identity. Youth may also join these groups because
they offer forms of support that meet their material and socio-psychological needs, e.g.,
money, protection, and solidarity.”5
Weak economy of the Western Balkan states that leaves people hopeless and vulnera-
ble to radicalization, made the region a rich breeding ground and one of the main recruit-
ment centers for Islamic State. A number of violent incidents in the region with demon-
strable IS roots such as terrorist attack on the police station committed by the radical
Islamists in the Republic of Srpska, the attack of the armed group from Kosovo on the
police outpost near the Macedonian village of Gosnice, operation of the Macedonian
police against armed terrorist group in Kumanovo and video message from Islamic State
inviting Balkan Muslims to “either join, or kill over there”,6 leave no doubt that extremism
and radical Islamism experience expansion among the people from the Western Bal-
kans. This assumption is additionally supported by the number of individuals from the
region, who have joined terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. According to the Balkan
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) over 300 fighters from Kosovo have travelled to
warzones in Iraq and Syria, while 330 fighters have come from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
110 from Albania, 100 from F.Y.R.O.M., 50 from Serbia and 13 from Montenegro.
Integrations │ 14
 

Even though this problem has been recognized by all governments from the region and  
international community as well, especially after above mentioned incidents that prompt-
ed countries to increase their security alerts on a higher level, comprehensive approach
still has not been implemented.

Measures taken by the regional governments are mostly driven from the outside and
remain reactive rather than proactive in their nature. Even though most of the govern- 7 B92. Paris attacks suspect registered as
ments have prompted laws against foreign fighters, the problem remains with the fighters refugee in Presevo. (November 16, 2015).
that return. Usually, they return even more radicalized and highly motivated for promoting http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?
radical ideology including further recruiting. No less significant threat is posed by the indi- yyyy=2015&mm=11&dd=16&nav_id=96052
viduals and radical Islamic sympathizers, who have not participated directly in conflicts in
the war-affected areas, but who are usually extremely inspired for individual, small range 8 The New Observer. Brussels Attacked by
attacks or inciting terrorism. Refugee crisis further complicates achieving sustainable and Refugee-Terrorists. (March 30, 2016). http://
effective solution and exacerbates the concerns that an IS terrorist could slip into the www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?
region disguised as asylum seekers, especially after confirmation that the terrorists re- yyyy=2015&mm=11&dd=16&nav_id=96052
sponsible for terrorist attacks in Paris7 and Brussels8 enter the Europe through the Bal-
kans migrant route.

That is why coordination and intelligence exchange among countries from the region and
beyond, prevention, sanctioning, as well as cooperation in cutting main sources of fi-
nancing and recruitment for IS are essential for progress in the fight against extremism
and terrorism in the region.

But the long term solution in fighting radicalization and violent extremism in the Western
Balkans can only be reached through prevention. So far, countries from the region pay a
little or no attention on preventive measures. Identifying and curing underlying causes of
radicalism and violent extremism, and undertaking concrete measures in the areas of
social and economic development, education and unemployment, social welfare, religion
etc. are essential for eradicating radical thoughts and preventing the spread of extremist
ideologies. De-radicalization programs as well as violence prevention campaigns will
contribute in early detection of radicalization and enable providing help and support to
those who are already on a path to become radicalized.
   

The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters

in the Western Balkans
by Aleksandar Vachoski
The 1990s have characterized the Western Balkan countries beside fierce ethnic con-
flicts, bloody civil wars, and radical nationalistic and religious rhetoric of the political
elites, also with the appearance of various forms of radicalism such as the phenomenon
of foreign fighters. Ethnic and religious extremism has grown after the fall of Yugoslavia
and the collapse of Albania’s isolationist communist regime. As a legacy of the Balkan
wars, there came into being a "convenient clime" for radical activists and militants, eager   Aleksandar Vanchoski is MA candi-
to spread their ideologies into the countries where ethnic and religious divisions were date in Democracy and Human rights
frozen for decades. In recent years, these countries have become fertile ground for radi- program organized by University of
cal propaganda. Sarajevo and University of Bologna.
He is a holder of multiple degrees
The war in Syria and in some extent the conflict in Eastern Ukraine made the phenome- from different European universities
non of foreign fighters especially common in the Western Balkan countries. This phe- and he has been extensively in-
nomenon must be seen in a comprehensive manner because it is a serious threat for volved with research, especially fo-
these still fragile democratic societies and for a region which is still facing complex secu- cusing on international and regional
rity problems. As a result, the Western Balkan countries have to make serious efforts on security, human rights, transitional
the national and the regional level in order to prevent the phenomenon of foreign fighters, justice, fight against corruption and
because these individuals very easily can convey their "knowledge and experience" to organized crime.
the domestic and regional criminal groups, and to contribute to jeopardizing national and
international peace and stability.

15 │ Integrations

 
1 Colgan, Jeff; Hegghammer, Thomas;
"Islamic Foreign Fighters: Concept and
Data"; Montreal; 2011; p. 6.
2 Al-Nusra
Front leader Abu Mohammed al
-Jolani in video published on 28th July
2016 announced that al-Nusra announce
his group's name has also changed to
Jabhat Fath al Sham.
3 The Soufan Group; "Foreign Fighters -
An Updated Assessment of the Flow of
Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq";
2015; http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/
u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 5 / 1 2 /
TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf; Ac-
cessed August 10, 2016.
4 Deutsche Welle. 2014. "Serbian merce-
naries fighting in Eastern Ukraine"; 2014;
www.dw.de/serbian-mercenaries-fighting-
in-easternukraine/a-17855479; Accessed
August 17, 2016.
 
5 Milekic, Sven; 2015. "Croatia tells fighters
to return from Ukraine" Balkan Insight;
2015; http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/
article/croatia-calls-citizens-to-return-from-
ukraine; Accessed August 18, 2016.
The term foreign fighters in the past three decades is progressively becoming a catch-
phrase that "followed" all major armed conflicts in the world. It refers to a phenomenon,
which is extensively present in the media and academic discourse, especially connected
to the foreign nationals or transnational insurgencies which are taking part in the armed
violence in the conflict zone situated outside their domicile country. Taking into consider-
ation the complexity and dynamics of this phenomenon, the following characteristics of
the foreign fighter concept can be emphasized: a) they are not overtly state-sponsored;
b) they operate in countries which are not their own; c) they use insurgent tactics to
achieve their ends; d) their principal objective is to overthrow a single government/
occupier within a given territory; and e) their principal motivation is ideological rather than
material reward.”1 Very often the dominant motives for individuals to become a foreign
fighter are not financial, but religious and ideological in nature. Although the phenome-
non of foreign fighters is not considered new because its origin can be traced centuries
back in the human history, after the beginning of the global war on terrorism which fol-
lowed after the September 11 attacks on the USA, it become in some ways the primary
stigmatized term used for labelling persons who have Islamist and jihadist motives for
becoming a fighter in a particular armed conflict abroad.
With the beginning of the Arab Spring, and especially with the escalation of civil war in
Syria and the rise of power of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL (also known
as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS), many persons from Western Balkan countries
mainly of Muslim confession started individually or organized into groups to join different
insurgent factions to participate in the armed conflicts against national security forces of
Syria and Iraq. Therefore, the region of the Western Balkans is becoming a place of
origin for foreign fighters, with most of the recruited persons fighting as members of the
radical Jabhat al-Nusrah (or al-Nusra Front )2 and ISIS. "The Soufan Group (TSG) has
identified reports suggesting that at least 875 fighters have traveled to Syria from the
Western Balkans, with fighters coming from at least seven different countries in the re-
gion. Almost 800 of these fighters come from just four countries − Albania, Bosnia, Ko-
sovo, and F.Y.R.O.M. − all located in the Western Balkans.3
Further escalation of the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine also reflected on the growing
numbers of individuals from the Western Balkans, mainly from Serbia - according to the
estimation from 45 to 100 persons4 and in some small extend from Croatia more than 30
persons,5 who as volunteers take part in the armed activities either on the side of anti-
government and pro-Russian groups or pro-Ukrainian paramilitary "territorial defense
battalions". However, it must be emphasized that the available data with regards to the
recruited persons could not be considered accurate because many of the reports and
analyses rely on the media or not so precise information from statements of state offi-
cials. Current trends are showing an alarming tendency concerning the foreign fighter
phenomenon and the Western Balkans, which is turning the region into a transit hub for
fighters who seek to join the radical terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. The proximity of
the Western Balkans to the conflict zones in the Middle East or Ukraine, existence of
small but well-established networks of radical Islamist groups in these countries and
skilled persons from ex-Yugoslav wars are good preconditions for indoctrination, recruit-
ment, training and logistical support of individuals for becoming foreign fighters.
The available data and statistics are showing that the ongoing armed conflicts in Syria,
Iraq and Eastern Ukraine among the other devastating effects resulted in hundreds of
citizens from the Western Balkans who have joined different paramilitary, para-police and
radical groups from these conflict zones. The current economic crisis, high rates of youth
unemployment, political corruption and consequent desire for moralization among the
young, are all elements that have always been exploited by radical and extreme organi-
zations or individuals in order to find more followers. Societies of the Western Balkan
countries still find themselves in a fragile phase of recovery and democratic normaliza-
tion of neighboring relations, and this kind of individuals or groups, can pose a serious
threat in the form of re-appearance of radical ethnic and religious divisions from the
1990s, and re-hashing significant fear among the populations.
State institutions of Western Balkan countries such as BiH, Kosovo, F.Y.R.O.M. and Ser-
bia have answered to the rising threat of this phenomenon almost at the same time and
Integrations │ 16
 

and with similar measures. However there are some specifics in the conditions of every    
country, which are mainly related to the socio-economic or religious background. In all 4
countries, legal amendments to the National Criminal Codes was one of the first steps
the state authorities took towards preventing and sanctioning their citizens’ participation
in foreign conflicts. Nevertheless, the practice of law enforcement agencies shows that
the phenomenon of foreign fighters is too complex to be settled just through the model of
criminalization. Criminal charges and prison sentences could not successfully solve this
problem if it is not tackled at the same time by combined measures of prevention, reha-
bilitation and reintegration. And this is exactly where the biggest failure of the Western
Balkan countries lies.

The serious consequences this phenomenon can cause for the multiethnic and multi-
religious society inevitably calls for the timely detection of persons involved in this kind of
criminal activity in order to prevent them from carrying out their intentions. But, more im-
portantly, at the same time they should be suitably re-socialized. The solutions to the
current situation must be based on multi-dimensional approach and incorporate more
professional and more efficient capabilities of law enforcement agencies, improved re-
gional cooperation among countries. In addition, it will require more coordinated inter-
ministerial cooperation between different state agencies from local to central level, far
more efficient penitentiary system, with focus on re-socialization of the convicts, as well
   
as development of efficient cooperation and partnership with civil society and different
religious communities.

The Threat of Foreign Fighters from

the Western Balkans towards
International Security
by Angela Yausheva
According to the Soufan Group, since 2011 there have been over 27,000 foreigners, who
have joined the fighting in Syria and Iraq, amongst which 6,000 people are of European
origin, which is unprecedented. The main problem that arises from this alarming trend is   Angela Yausheva is a final year
that, having absorbed the ideas of a radical Islamist ideology and gained a battle experi- student of BA in International Rela-
ence, these citizens might come back to their place of residence and commit terrorist tions at Saint Petersburg State
attacks against their homelands. This threat is even more evident and severe for Europe- University, Russia. She is currently
an countries, considering recent deadly attacks in France and Belgium. enrolled in an internship at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
The Balkan region is not an exception: there are over 800 citizens of Balkan countries Russian Federation, and is plan-
fighting in Syria and this number is rising dramatically. According to political analysts, the ning to continue her work in the
situation in the Balkans resembles a powder keg: the region finds itself in a post-conflict field of conflict resolution and
phase and society undergoes a transitional stage. Apart from this, economic instability peace studies.
and a high level of unemployment contribute to the flow of foreign fighters. Current secu-
rity institutions fail to prevent the movement of people to areas of conflict; therefore, a
threat of ‘blowback’ arises. Balkan countries now more than ever need to develop an
adequate national strategy, combined with a close cooperation with other states, to tack-
le this problem for the sake of international security.

In the light of the ongoing armed conflict in the Middle East, drawing attention to such
topics as the spread of violent extremism and radicalism becomes of increased im-
portance for international security. Currently, the war in Syria combines a variety of wor-
rying factors, that have an impact on international stability, although, the biggest potential
threat is, without a doubt, the phenomenon of foreign fighters from European countries.
The unprecedented numbers of volunteers, who travel to Syria and join jihad, represent
an imminent danger to the countries of their origin. The main problem that arises from
this alarming trend is that, having absorbed the ideas of a radical Islamist ideology and
gained a battle experience, these citizens might come back to their place of residence
and commit terrorist attacks against their homelands. This threat is even more evident

17 │ Integrations

1 “The real threat of foreign fighters in   and severe for European countries, considering recent deadly attacks in France and Bel-
Syria,” The Al-Jazeera, accessed August
27, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2015/12/real-threat-foreign
-fighters-syria-151213100618715.html.
2 “Could Syria’s Islamist fighters hit Eu-
rope?” The Washington Post, accessed
A u g u s t 2 7 , 2 0 1 6 ,
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2014/07/24/could-syrias-
islamist-fighters-hit-europe.
3 Thomas Hegghammer “The Rise of
Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the
Globalization of Jihad” International Secu-
rity, (2013): 11.
4 Richard Barrett. Foreign Fighters in Syria
(New York: Soufan Group, 2014), 16
5 Ibidem, 7.
6 “ISIS in the World’s Largest Muslim
Country,” The Atlantic, accessed August  
27, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/a rc hiv e/2016/01/is is -
indonesia-foreign-fighters/422403.
7 See
note no. 4.
8 See note no. 6.
9 Sandra Kraehenmann “Foreign Fighters
under International Law Geneva” Geneva
Academy of International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights, (2014): 33..
10 “Pressrelease: 3319th Council meeting
Justice and Home Affairs Luxembourg, 5
and 6 June 2014,” Council of the Europe-
an Union, accessed August 27, 2016,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
jha/143119.pdf.
11 “European
Council, 26/27 June 2014:
Conclusions,” Council of the European
Union, accessed August 27, 2016, http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
 
ST-79-2014-INIT/en/pdf.
12 “Specialmeeting of the European Coun-
cil (30 August 2014) ‒ Conclusions,”
Council of the European Union, accessed
August 27, 2016, http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-163-2014-INIT/en/pdf.
13 “Pressrelease: 3336th Council meeting
Justice and Home Affairs Luxembourg, 9
and 10 October 2014,” accessed August
27, 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
jha/145033.pdf.
14 Arne W. Dahl “The Legal Status of the
Opposition Fighter in International Armed
Conflict” Military Law and the Law of War
Review, (2004), 141.
15 See note no. 9.
16 Jeanine
de Roy, Edwin Bakker Return-
ing Western foreign fighters: The case of
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia: (Hague:
ICCT Background Note, 2014), 8.
gium.
The war in Syria, started in 2013, has grown into one of the most difficult international
conflicts, with the most prominent feature of an unparalleled stream of foreign fighters to
the country.1 In comparison to previous conflicts, in which foreign fighters took part, the
Syrian case has unique points. Firstly, this conflict attracted more European citizens than
any armed conflict ever before.2 In particular, the biggest number of fighters comes from
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.3 Secondly, the de-
mographics of the coming fighters is extremely diverse. Apart from the expected young
men aged 20-35, amongst foreign fighters one can see European Muslims with Arabic
and South-Asian roots, and even women (the female contingent in Syria accounts for
18% of all foreign fighters).4 Finally, one of the most essential features of the presented
phenomenon is a widespread exploitation of the Internet and social networks in particular
for the sake of propaganda and recruitment.5 In the present moment, there are over
18,000 foreign fighters in Syria, 5,000 of which come from Western Europe, 4,700 – from
former Soviet Union countries, 8,240 – from the Middle East. According to the research,
conducted by the Soufan Group, the number of foreign fighters from Western Europe
increased by 3,000.6
Due to the fact, that it is highly difficult to track down the motivation of each fighter, still,
amongst the main reasons behind becoming a foreign fighter, is a desire to join jihad,
and the prime attractive forces are ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra along with
Al-Qaeda satellites.7 It is also worth noticing, that over 80% of the fighters participating in
the conflict are the citizens of their countries of origin in a second or third generation.8
Before the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, terrorism was a solely domestic matter
that each state was dealing with on its own. However, after the tragic bombings in the
World Trade Center, this phenomenon was internationalized and the fight against it be-
came an issue of a whole world community.9 Due to these changes, counter-terrorist
measures are also taken on the international organizations level.
As for the counter-terrorism practices in the European Union, it must be noted, that in the
past few years it strengthened its coordinative policies in the matter of foreign fighters.
First of all, in 2013, 22 measures of working in six top priority spheres were established:
a better understanding of the phenomenon, prevention of radicalization, recognizing of
suspicious trips, investigations and prosecutions jointly with other countries.10 Secondly,
in June 2014 the European Council worked out strategic principles of legislative and op-
erative actions against foreign fighters, amongst which the main course was stated to be
the need to mobilize all available instruments of judicial and police cooperation, EURO-
POL in particular.11 Thirdly, in August 2014 the conclusions of the European Council in-
cluded recognition of ISIS as a prime threat towards the European Union, which en-
forced the establishment of the 22 measures of 2013.12 Finally, in October 2014 Council
of Justice and Home Affairs worked out additional measures referring to foreign fighters,
and the decision on strengthening the borders control was made, in particular, this meas-
ure was to be put into practice in the framework of the existing criminal legislation.13
When talking about the prosecution of foreign fighters on the state level, several options
are put in practice today. Returning fighters can be subject to prosecution, and they can
persecuted even for common crimes.14 Foreign fighters, who attempt to join a designated
terrorist organization, may be subject to criminal prosecution on the basis of domestic
counter-terrorism legislation.15
Apart from criminal prosecution, there is a number of other possible measures against
foreign fighters. For instance, peaceful rehabilitation, that serves as a foundation of a soft
approach. This program aims at a return of fighters into society and assistance in a fur-
ther socialization. This practice is widely exploited in Denmark and Belgium.16 Or citi-
zenship renunciation as a far more radical measure. Citizenship renunciation in most
countries is used only when the accused possess more than one citizenship, although no
such cases have been carried out yet. This practice can be seen in the Netherlands,
Great Britain, Australia, France, and Norway.17
Integrations │ 18
 

The Balkan region is no stranger to the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In the past, the   17 “Australia
to toughen citizenship laws to
region itself faced an influx of fighters: during the war in Bosnia, there has been estimat- combat terrorism,” BBC, accessed August
27, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world
ed around 5,000 people from other countries, who joined the war.18 However, the Syrian -australia.
conflict became a turning point in recruiting foreign fighters in the Balkans, especially in
the Western Balkan region. According to U.S. Under Secretary of State Sarah Sewall, 18Evan Kohlmann Al-Qaida’s Jihad in
“the Western Balkans had become a source of foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Europe (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2004),
16.
Iraq”.19 The first sign for it was a video, which was released in June 2015 by ISIS, where
Balkan citizens, namely Bosnian fighters, urge their Muslim brothers to join jihad against 19 “Western Balkans ‘source of foreign
“the enemies of Islam”.20 This has really shown the scale of threat and drew govern- terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq’,” Bosnia
ments` attention to the issue. Today, accessed August 27, 2016, http://
www.bosniatoday.ba/western-balkans-
At the present moment, it has been estimated, that there are 875 citizens of Balkan source-of-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-syria-
and-iraq.
countries who travelled to fight in Syria and Iraq, and this number has been rising dra-
matically.21 The states, that are most responsible for the greatest figures of foreign fight- 20 “Western Balkans raising security levels
ers, are the ones with the highest Muslim population in the country. According to the lat- to prevent ISIS threat,” European Forum,
est data, out of all the Balkan countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo account   accessed August 27, 2016, http://
www.europeanforum.net/news/2142/
for the biggest amount of foreign fighters, who joined jihad, the official numbers are 330 western_balkans_raising_ securi-
and 232 respectively.22 Along with these countries, Albania and Macedonia display quite ty_levels_to_prevent_isis_threat.
a worrying upward trend of travelling foreign fighters. Although, in comparison to other
21 ForeignFighters: An Updated Assess-
countries, for instance, Tunisia, which is responsible for around 6,000 foreign fighters,
the figures for the Balkan states might seem low, however, in general, it does raise major ment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into
Syria and Iraq: The Soufan Group, De-
security issues for the region as a whole. There is also a fear, that the situation may be cember, 2015 – 5 p.
worse not only for the threat of “blowback” from the returnees, but due to the severity of
the refugee crisis too, because, amongst those claiming an asylum, there may as well be 22 See note no. 4.
returning foreign fighters.23 23 “IslamicState targets Balkans as next
recruitment hotspot,” The Washington
The reasons behind such uprising are diverse. First of all, the region has a long history of Times, accessed August 27, 2016, http://
radical Islamist activity, especially in the Western Balkans, which makes it a fertile soil for www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/
recurrence of the trend. Secondly, high unemployment rate, in Bosnia in particular, dec/22/isis-targets-balkans-as-next-
comes as a driving force behind the stream of foreign fighters. Thirdly, so-called recruitment-hotspot.
“humanitarian” organizations, that recruit youngsters in the Balkans and send them to 24 “Balkan mercenaries could threaten
Syria and Iraq through Turkey, play an important role in the nourishing of the channel, via   peace in Europe,” The Austrian Center,
which citizens of Balkan countries join jihadist activities in the Middle East. They spread accessed August 27, 2016, http://
propaganda and information on the fighting groups and attract young people to join ji- www.austriancenter.com/2014/09/23/
had.24 Overall, the general context of the post-conflict phase in the Western Balkans pre- balkan-mercenaries-could-threaten-peace-
in-europe.
sent a fertile ground for further radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters.
25 “From Brussels to Sarajevo: Why Bel-
The Western Balkan country, that raises gravest concerns, happens to be Bosnia and gium and Bosnia and Herzegovina Are
Herzegovina. The problem seems even worse, considering existing tensions between Home to Islamic terrorists,” The Huffington
multiple ethnic and linguistic groups, which can be found in the country.25 The highest Post, accessed August 27, 2016, http://
unemployment rate in the world (63%)26, ethnic diversity in the country become contrib- www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-olchawa/
f r o m - b r u s s e l s - t o -
uting factors to the fact, that over 300 Bosnian nationals have travelled to Syria and Iraq sarajevo_b_8640296.html.
and joined jihad, which makes Bosnia and Herzegovina a hub for ISIS to recruit new
members from the Balkans. The contingent of Bosnian foreign fighters can be divided 26 “Isistargets vulnerable Bosnia for re-
into two distinct and large groups: the former soldiers of the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, cruitment and attack,” The Guardian,
accessed August 27, 2016, https://
and young men, who are driven by the desire to gain respect and purpose in life. At the www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/
moment, 51 of them returned home and possess a threat to their country of residence, is is-targets-v ulnerable-bos nia-for-
for it is considered, that they aim to radicalize youth to lure them into joining jihad.27 How- recruitment-and-attack.
ever, what is more crucial and worrying, is the inability and weakness of the state govern-
27 “Bosnia's ISIS problem is growing —
ment to cope with the scale of the problem and halt the recruitment and stop the spread
and that's troubling for Europe,” The Busi-
of propaganda amongst its population. And it is the case not only of Bosnia, where this ness Insider, accessed August 27, 2016,
issue is of great importance, but of the region in general. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-back-
from-syria-and-iraq-bosnian-fighters-pose-
It seems to be that the deficiency of government institutions in dealing with the phenome- threat-at-home-2015-6.
non of foreign fighters is a prominent feature of all Western Balkan states. According to 28 “ISIL
recruits in the Balkans,” The Al-
Erwan Fouere, an associate senior research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Jazeera, accessed August 27, 2016, http://
Studies, security forces “have made efforts to slow recruitment, but it's not at all www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
enough”.28 features/2016/01/isil-recruits-balkans-
160112081705099.html.
The governments fail to prevent the flow of people traveling to Syria and Iraq and conse-
quently do not possess adequate tools for dealing with the returnees. In order to reform

19 │ Integrations
 

  the current legislative norms, considering the issue of the fighters, who came back home,
29 Gordana Igric Balkan Jihadists. The
Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters
in Syria and Iraq (Serbia: Balkan Investi-
gative Reporting Network, 2016): 9.
30 “Fighting violent extremism in the Bal-
kans,” The Foreign Policy News, accessed  
August 27, 2016, http://
foreignpolicynews.org/2015/06/12/fighting- ethno-nationalistic problems, that divide the communities in the Western Balkans, it be-
violent-extremism-in-the-balkans.
Balkan states enforced several reforms. In February 2014, Albania put into practice harsh-
er punishments for those, who take part in armed conflicts abroad, perpetuate and recruit
new fighters, train and organize terrorists, of up to 15 years of jail. In Bosnia, according to
latest amendments to counter-terrorism legislation in 2014, those, who take part in crimi-
nal paramilitary activities, are sentenced to up to 3 years of jail, furthermore, Bosnian na-
tionals, who hold dual citizenship and participate in a foreign armed group abroad, are
renounced of their Bosnian citizenship. As for Kosovo, in 2015 local government also re-
nounces of citizenship those “serving for military and police units controlled by internation-
ally-recognized governments or organizations”, along with an up to 15 years of prison in-
carceration for those, who organize and join foreign terrorist cells. In F.Y.R.O.M., the latest
changes in the legislation in 2015 prescribe a maximum 5 years of jail for those, who are
engaged in any type of jihadist activity. The parliament of Montenegro in 2015 adopted a
set of laws, which sentence an individual, participating in a foreign armed conflict, for up to
10 years of prison. Serbian parliament enforced a law, according to which any activity,
connected to foreign military actions, would be punished by up to 12 years of jail.29 Howev-
er, all the reforms and attempts, that have been made in the recent years, still remain in-
adequate, because highly organized criminal groups “make the existing efforts of the au-
thorities across the Western Balkans extremely difficult on their journey to solve the chal-
lenges posed by the foreign fighter threat, while inflating the ethno-nationalistic element of
the dilemma would hinder regional cooperation on security issues”.30 Due to the existing
comes very attainable for organized military groups to use these cracks in the system and
successfully continue to attract the discontented.

Judging by the current state of affairs, the Western Balkan region resembles a powder
keg, that is gradually becoming more dangerous. It is vital to tackle the problem of in-
creasing radicalization and spreading of extremist Islamist views to halt the stream of for-
eign fighters to the Middle East. There could be a few key subjects, which are of utmost
importance and must be addressed urgently. First of all, states, security forces, police
must join their efforts in order to resist the threat, that is coming from organized terrorist
groups, because all problems originate from discord. It is essential to understand, that
without joint actions of all government and security institutions it becomes very difficult to
dismantle such sophisticated instruments of luring volunteers into joining jihad. Especially,
the focus must be turned at social networks and local organizations that usually turn out to
be the recruitment points. Secondly, main attention should be drawn to Muslim communi-
ties and local mosques. It is important to promote the policy of tolerance towards non-
radical Muslims to halt the level of hatred in the society, and track down those mosques,
that happen to be recruiting new fighters. Thirdly, in addition to preventing the travel of
fighters abroad, it is essential to treat those, who return, properly. Along with the tough
  measures, that are being implemented, soft approach must not escape notice. Following
the example of some Western European countries, rehabilitation programs should be en-
couraged, although, thoroughly supervised, so that they could truly become points of help
and change. Finally, Western Balkan states should cooperate with a wider European and
world community in order to work out an adequate strategy to fight the problem of jihadist
activity in the region. As it was presented in the beginning, several practices have been
adopted within the UN and the EU, some of them could be applicable in the Balkans. Gov-
ernment officials should bear in mind, that there are no boundaries for international terror-
ist groups, therefore, states must build up their capacity in order to effectively combat
them. Honest cooperation, trust and transparency within and between the states are indis-
pensable in this matter.

To conclude, violent extremism and radical Islamism are by any means a challenging is-
sue for the Western Balkans. The rising jihadist activity possesses an imminent threat of
returning foreign fighters from the Middle East, representing a potential of “blowback”, thus
of committing terrorist attacks in their homelands. It is evident, that the region has plenty
of problems that must be addressed first in order to tackle the phenomenon of foreign
fighters. However, it is more important to remember, that this subject must be dealt with
collectively, and all countries, involving government and security institutions, as well as
non-government organizations, should join their forces and come against the threat to-
gether.
Integrations │ 20
 

 
Acting at the Grassroots to Tackle
Balkan Foreign Fighters and
Returnees
by Leonardo Taccetti
Traditionally, in the Balkan region the most prevalent Islamic school of thought has been
the Hanafi Mazhab. This branch of Sunni Islam has been often regarded as the most
flexible and liberal in Islamic law in particular regarding the area of criminal law, private
property, individual freedom and treatment of non-Muslims.1 In addition, the several years
of communist rule in the region infused step by step a sense of secularism in the Balkan
Muslim communities, which made them more resilient to adopt a radical interpretation of
  Leonardo Taccetti is a master’s
Islam. Indeed, the first impact with more conservative and militant forms was during the
degree candidate in Diplomatic
Yugoslav wars, when about 2,000 Mujahedeen sided up with the Bosnian Muslims. After
Studies at the Società Italiana per
the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement even if it was established that foreign fighters should
l’Organizzazione Internazionale
leave the country, 600 of them obtained citizenship.2 From this moment on, Islamic radi-
(SIOI) in Rome. Prior to that, he
calization increased at the same pace as its political exploitation has been used by differ-
worked as an associate researcher
ent governments to sustain their campaigns and actions. In fact, the narrative concerning
at European Institute for Asian
the term “radicalization” has been phrased from the 1990s and until 2011 in order to po-
Studies in Brussels. He holds a
larize the public for political purposes. Today, instead, it has been reviewed to describe
post-graduate degree in Interna-
the phenomenon of Balkan-born Muslims that go fighting in Syria and Iraq.3
tional Relations as well as a bach-
elor’s degree in International Stud-
The current situation in the Balkans is similar to the one faced by Central Asian govern-
ies from Cesare Alfieri School of
ments. While in the Central Asian region most of the five republics are claimed to use the
Political Science in Firenze.
violent extremist threat as an expedient to phase out political opposition, youngsters join-
ing Daesh reached the numbers of 2,000-4,000.4 Instead in the Western Balkans, ac-
cording to the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, the Balkan-born foreign fighters to  
January 2016 amount to about 107 Albanians, 120 Bosnians, 300 Kosovars, 110 Mace-
donians, 13 Montenegrins and 50 Serbians. Even if the numbers of Balkan-born foreign 1 Warren, C. (2013, 28 May). The Hanafi
fighters are not equal, the governments in the region are dealing with similar issues in School. Oxford Bibliographies. Retrieved
building up more resilient communities and in fighting Daesh. On the sharp-end, most of from http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/
Balkan states lack manpower and resources to support the strategies adopted by the view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-
9780195390155-0082.xml.
governments, and even if the international partners – i.e. the European Union and the
United States – often fill these gaps, some states such as Albania lack the legislation to 2 Petrović, P. (2016, 10 June). Islamic

prosecute would-be returnee foreign fighters. While imprisonment cannot be the optimal radicalism in the Balkans. EUISS. Re-
solution – because more often recruitment and reinforcement of extremist beliefs are trieved from http://www.iss.europa.eu/
p u bl ic a t i ons / d e ta i l / ar t ic l e / is l a m ic -
conducted in prisons – all the Balkans states are lagging behind in developing a coordi- radicalism-in-the-balkans/.
nated multi-agencies response that includes sharing intelligence and a strategy for the
integration of returnees. The complexity of the problems lies also in the complicate rela- 3 Bogdanovski, A. (2015, 12 June).
tions among the different ethnic groups, which are reticent to disclose information and Fighting violent extremism in the Balkans.
cooperate with each other.5 Therefore, more efforts should be made on the soft-end of Foreign Policy News. Retrieved from
http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/06/12/
the problem. In other words, too little has been done to tackle the root causes of radicali- fighting-violent-extremism-in-the-balkans/.
zation, and without a proper understanding of what motivates people to join Daesh not
much can be done to implement the strategy for the integration of returnees and to im- 4 Taccetti,L. Mori, S. (2016, 9 February).
prove the tough situation that some people face before join Daesh. Rising Extremism in Central Asia? Stability
in the Heartland for a Secure Eurasia.
European Institute for Asian Studies. Re-
According to the findings of the Soufan Group in their report “Foreign Fighters” of De- trieved from http://www.eias.org/briefing-
cember 2015, the increased intensity of the campaign launched by the United States did papers/rising-extremism-in-central-asia-
not provoke an increase in the number of foreign fighters joining Daesh. Therefore, as stability-in-the-heartland-for-a-secure-
the report suggests, “the motivation for people to join violent extremist groups in Syria eurasia-february-2016/.
and Iraq remains more personal than political.6 Indeed, a heavy-handed approach can 5 Bogdani, A. et al. (2016, March). Balkan
only be a part of the solution. As Medgar Evers said “you can kill a man, but you can’t kill Jihadists: The Radicalisation and Recruit-
an idea”. In order to prevent people from affiliating with Daesh and increase its ranks, the ment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Balkan
Western Balkans – as the EU – should avoid interventionist policies without a long-term Investigative Reporting Network. Retrieved
from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/
comprehensive strategy. Trying to solve the problem focusing too much on the symp- show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf.
toms and not on the causes of the rising extremist and jihadist threat is a “Sisyphus
task”. Attacking terrorism only geographically will not work if not followed by policies to
combat violent Islamic extremist ideology. Involving also moderate Muslims in this Islam-
ic educational and religious struggle should be taken into high consideration.7
21 │ Integrations

6 The Soufan Group. (2015, December).   Acting at the grassroots should be done in a more coordinated manner not only in the
Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment
of the flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria
and Iraq. Retrieved from http://
soufangroup.com/wp-content/
u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 5 / 1 2 /
TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.
7 Pereira,A. (2015). The Myth of Sisyphus
and military interventions. Graduates of
Democracy. Retrieved from https://
g r a d u a t e s o f d e m o c r a -
cy.wordpress.com/2015/12/23/the-myth-of
-sisyphus-and-military-interventions/.
8 in’t
Veld, S. (2015). A counter-narrative to
violent extremism. Seminar delivered on
12 January 2016 at the ALDE New Year
Seminar in Brussels. Retrieved from
https://www.aldeparty.eu/en/news/alde-
group-host-seminar-violent-extremism.
9 Brown, J. (2016, January 13). ISIL re-
cruits in the Balkans. Al Jazeera. Re-
trieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2016/01/isil-recruits-
balkans-160112081705099.html.
Tonja Sedlar holds a master’s de-   and prolonged wars on Syrian and North African etc. territories, without any prospects of
gree in Sociology, Ethnology and
Cultural Anthropology. She cur-
rently works at the Municipality of
Varaždin, Croatia as an advisor for
associations and institutions in
culture. She plans to pursue a PhD
in Political Science.
Western Balkans but also at the EU level. It is not being “soft on terrorism” – as usually
these policies are labelled – but investing in prevention rather than “securitization” is a
method to improve the understanding of the root causes that lead people to join violent
extremist groups and, therefore, to make the EU more effective in addressing this issue.
Understanding the psycho-socio-economics motivations that drive young Muslims to join
Daesh, will enhance our measures to counter violent extremism, phasing out the breed-
ing ground for terrorists to grow.8
High levels of unemployment in societies with economic issues, weak institutions and
raising discontent increase the vulnerability of potential recruits even in countries that are
alien to a tradition of Islamic radicalism. It is a shared responsibility of governments, se-
curity forces and leaders of religious community to join efforts in order to halt the radicali-
zation process.9 Only by acting together, also with the support of the European Union
community, we can do more. More funds and investments should be focused on educa-
tion, integration and employment at the European level. Training Imams, for instance, is
a practice that worked and is working in different communities and regions such as Cen-
tral Asia. With the support of NGOs and civil groups, we could improve the resilience of
communities towards radicalization and violent extremism. In addition to increasing shar-
ing intelligence and information, which is an instrument that will enhance our capacity of
rapid intervention and prevention, more efforts should be made in further integrating vul-
nerable brackets of the population and returnees. Another example is working closely
with convicts in prisons and help them and returnees in their rehabilitation process, by
cooperating with Muslim communities of the region. Therefore, more coordination is
needed following common standards and best practices at the EU, national and local
level involving different non-governmental partners and communities. The Balkans repre-
sent an important transit route between Western Europe and Middle East, which is cru-
cial to keep in check for the stability of both regions, in order to avoid a potential exacer-
bation of the conflict in Syria and of the feeling of insecurity in Europe.
Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Good
Practices from Croatia
by Tonja Sedlar
The refugee and migrant crisis, in its most extensive part, began about a year ago and
has affected Croatia among other countries also. According to the report written and
published by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of Croatia, the reasons for one of the big-
gest migrations of the Iraqi, Syrian, Afghan, Pakistani and Bangladeshi etc. population
were numerous, but the most dominant threat of the aforementioned nations were grave
settlement and severe economic situations in the countries.1 To avoid the terrors of war
destruction, the threats of militant groups and the ultimate instability of everyday life, the
residents of countries mentioned before searched for ways to try and relocate their lives
into a safer environment. Those ways were often a last cry for help, although there were
some who ran away with other agendas in their minds, within which many people per-
ished trying to illegally enter mainly countries of the European Union, crossing the Medi-
terranean Sea during the night, on boats with not nearly enough space for all those who
were looking to be saved.
The routes that were chosen by the refugees and migrants while trying to change their
living environment were numerous: the Western African route, Western, Central and
Eastern Mediterranean route, Apulia and Calabria route, a Circular route from Albania to
Greece, Eastern Borders route and in the case of the migration through Croatia: Western
Balkan route. “The record number of migrants arriving in Greece had a direct knock-on
effect on the Western Balkan route, as the people who entered the EU in Greece tried to
make their way via the F.Y.R.O.M., Serbia into Hungary and Croatia and then towards
western Europe.”2 A large number of refugees and migrants arrived to Europe through
Integrations │ 22
 

mentioned routes, mostly looking for the most effective and least problematic passage-   1 Ministry of the Interior of Croatia,

way to western countries, which were their aimed destination. In between other reasons, „Migration Crisis in Croatia: overview“,
2015. Accessed on September 13, 2016.
the route selection was influenced by the fact that the Schengen visa restrictions were ,https://www.mup.hr/UserDocsImages/
relaxed for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and FYROM. One of topvijesti/2015/listopad/
the most intense transition points (or entries) was Greece, because a big number of peo- M I G R A -
ple entered and then proceeded on their way towards FYROM, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary TION_CRISIS_CRO_OVERVIEW.pdf
and further towards the western countries.
2 FRONTEX, „Western Balkan Route“,
The key moment for the Republic of Croatia happened right after Hungary constructed a 2016. Accessed on September 12, 2016,
fence on its border with Serbia, a so called barbed tape or razor wire, wherefore the flow http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/
of refugees and migrants shifted to Croatia in September 2015.3 Although Croatia had western-balkan-route/.
not been faced with such a challenge of foreigners passing through the country since the
Homeland War in 1991, the consciousness about the needs of people running from their 3 Se note no. 1.
homes in hope of finding a safer life, in other words a life free of the horrors of war and
terrors of militant groups, was in fact successfully manifested in-between the citizens of
Croatia, the Croatian police and armed forces etc.  

In the context of the existing emergency, which just a few were prepared for, it was more
than necessary to ensure ways of reception and treatment of refugees and migrants, so
the Government of Croatia established Headquarters for the coordination of activities
concerning arrival of refugees and migrants in the Republic of Croatia, on 17th Septem-
ber 2015.4 The mission of the Headquarters was to ensure a coordinated action between
Croatian institutions (like the police or armed forces) and humanitarian organizations (like 4 See note no. 1.
the Red Cross etc.). The main goal was to take care of the refugees and migrants while
being careful of the ways of treating them. Therefore, temporary admission centers were
organized around the country, like hotel Porin in Zagreb (that still houses a large number
of refugees even today)5 Tovarnik and Opatovac, to accommodate the people that were
5 Civilno društvo, „Conditions in Hotel
only passing through Croatia, as well as those that were looking for the asylum. In these
circumstances it was important to try and register all refugees and migrants (to take their Porin have been improved for refugees
and migrants“, 2016. Accessed on Sep-
fingerprints and put them into a computer system) in order to be able to track such a tember 13, 2016.
large number of people for the purpose of international cooperation, informing, move-
 
ment tracking etc., considering a large number of forged documents appeared and many
refugees and migrants did not have any kind of personal identification documents on
them. In the addition to registration of arrivals, the main task was to accommodate peo-
ple who found themselves in Croatia after the borders were closed, therefore several
institutions and associations got together (Croatian Red Cross, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, several NGO's and UNHCR) to provide a tem-
porary accommodation, which was coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together
with the police and armed forces, wherein camps and a number of tents were raised ad
hoc in certain locations (like Opatovac). Other activities of these institutions were related
to the provision of medical care, which means that every camp provided medical help,
food, drinking water, running water for hygiene, blankets, Internet etc. to temporarily aid
the refugees and migrants during their stay in the country.

The statistical estimates of Frontex (The European agency for managing the cooperation
on external borders of the members of the European Union) show that in 2015 about
764,000 people had entered the Balkan region,6 while the Ministry of Internal Affairs data
show that in only one month since the beginning of refugee and migration crisis more 6 See note no. 2.
than 190,000 people entered Croatia (sometimes up to 10,000 people per day).7 For
comparison, there are a little more than 4,280,000 people living in Croatia, so the num-
7 See note no.1.
ber of refugees and migrants equaled approximately 15% of total population of Croatia.
However, only about 40 people wanted to really stay and apply for the asylum in the
country.

A large influx of refugees and migrants was met with divided reactions when it comes to
the citizens of Croatia, which can basically be separated into two groups: those people
who were supporting the refugees and migrants in their fight for a better future, who
would gladly accept them as their future fellow citizens and those who did not want to
accept them even temporarily for all they saw in them was a threat. The media discourse
during the most intense influx of refugees was more than supporting, but the latter is
mostly attributed to the strong involvement of individuals, mostly members of various
23 │ Integrations

   
8 CPS,„About CPS/Who is who“, 2016.
Accessed on September 12, 2016, http://
www.cms.hr/hr/o-cms-u-tko-je-tko .
9 CPS, „National Shadow Observation on
EU Response to Refugee Crisis”, 2016.
Accessed on September 12, 2016,http://
cms.hr/system/article_document/doc/201/
N a c i o n a l - establish safe corridors leading to the certain state borders; secure protected and safe
no_stajali_te_u_sjeni_o_politici_EU_spra
m_izbjegli_ke_krize.pdf.
 
 
associations, who were actively engaged to present the people of Croatia as those who
support the refugees and migrants on their path. The situation in which a relatively small
country such as Croatia found itself, for the first time facing a large refugee and migrant
crisis (not being its own population the one that migrates, as it once did), was very chal-
lenging for both sides (for the refugees and the country). In those conditions it was im-
portant to coordinate a whole number of activities which intertwined political, safety, eco-
nomical, humanitarian aspects and all those alike.
SHARING GOOD PRACTICE: CENTER FOR PEACE STUDIES
Amongst other associations and organizations, I would like to highlight the activities of
the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS) which, as an association of citizens: “Formally it was
founded /…/ with the intention of promotion of the values of non-violence, social justice,
respect of human rights, tolerance and the acceptance of differences through participa-
tive methods of peace education, research and public advocacy”.8 In the year 2011 CPS
established the Coordination for Integration as an informal network within which many
civic organizations provide a certain kind of help for the asylum seekers as well as refu-
gees (legal, psychological, medical etc.).
Among many of their actions and activities CPS coordinated the foundation of the initia-
tive “Welcome“, which consists out of more than 60 civic society organizations, intended
to support refugees, migrants and asylum seekers, and promotes it’s activities via web
site called welcome.cms.hr. The most important activity of CPS and the initiative
“Welcome“ was the making of a document called “National Shadow Observation“ about
the EU policies on refugee and migrant crisis, published at the time of the emergency EU
summit held on 23rd September 2015 and composed by the experts in the field of hu-
man rights, asylum policies and similar, all in purpose of changing the restrictive migra-
tion policies. “We expect the government of Croatia to take the political initiative and try
to find some sustainable and appropriate solutions for the refugee crisis, based on the
principles of the international humanitarian rights, protection of human rights and solidari-
ty”, while it is expected for the European Union to: “secure an effective and humanitarian
reception of refugees to those locations they feel safe at. After the reception of refugees,
the principle of solidarity has to be applied while taking into account the relocation of
refugees, in relation to burden sharing”.9 Moreover, with the aforementioned document,
the EU is called upon to: initiate negotiations with international institutions in order to
sea, air and land travel routes for refugees’ and migrants’ travels to their chosen destina-
tions; develop asylum procedural and integration systems of Member States.
These measures were of course highlighted in order to maximally relieve the situation
the refugees and migrants found themselves in, but the ultimate goal of this Initiative, just
like those similar humanitarian movements, was to unite the international policies in the
stopping of the war in Syria and the surrounding areas.
Another initiative of CPS, called “Are You Syrious“, was even more involved, organizing
a peaceful protest in front of the Croatian Government under the slogan “Closing the
borders kills!“ in order to warn about the consequences which the closure of borders
(that happened after a while because of the EU Directive) has on the lives of refugees
and migrants (increased risk of smuggling activities, staying in war affected areas and
similar). They wanted to emphasize the moral commitment the citizens have towards
other citizens, no matter what country do the latter come from. The initiative “Welcome“
was constantly in cooperation with the initiative “Are You Syrious“ with its activities which
intended to influence the development of a collective consciousness to accept and un-
derstand something different. I would like to point out an action called “There is no us
and them. We are all people.“ which tried to present the empathy and benevolence of the
volunteers who helped the refugees and migrants in shelters, on borders and stations,
taking some of their time to help those many people in trouble and who voluntarily ap-
plied to provide help. Other activities of the initiatives revolved around the encourage-
ment of the youth activism, which included the organization of so called “Current hours“
where people could learn and discuss about the solidarity towards the refugees and mi-
grants.
Integrations │ 24
 

There were sport activities held for the refugees and migrants also, like football games  
amongst them and members of CPS, African nights were held so that they had the possi-
bility to present their folklore, music and dances to all those interested, as well as percus-
sion workshops and so on.

No less important was also to warn the citizens about the „other side“, the (in)action,
which CPS united under the name “Everything the state didn't do for the refugees and
migrants“, whereby the initiative “Welcome“ tried to point out the bad policies of Croatia
in providing the concrete assistance in everyday life. What the state did not do was in
short as follows: it did not shorten the procedure of getting an international protection
which makes the refugees and migrants seek other countries who have a shorter proce-
dure, it did not provide Croatian language courses for an easier integration (they still de-
pend on the support of volunteers), it did not include the children into kindergartens and
provide them with language support, it did not provide suitable and sustainable living
solutions, full health insurance, the facilitation of school enrolment processes, educations
etc. (the refugees and migrants do not own a birth or a certificate of nationality, which is  
often asked for in Croatia while enrolling into educational programs).

CONCLUSION
The engagement of associations and NGO's which has been present from the start of
refugee and migrant crisis until today, when there are still many people in shelters in Cro-
atia, is still very big. It is the groups of people who got organized in the right time and in a
very practical way helped the refugees, migrants and asylum seekers in the context of
their everyday survival in a foreign country, foreign culture and foreign language. Some
of the volunteers and activists themselves have a refugee/migrant experience from the
time of the Homeland War in Croatia in 1991: “Some of us have been refugees about 20
years ago, when we left our homes because of war and ran away to safer neighbouring
countries. Coming to societies that were foreign for us, we were faced with similar prob-
lems – the feeling of being different – although we were just as white as the natives.
When the refugees from the region (i.e. Kosovo) and further countries started to come to
Croatia because of the conflicts in their countries, it became clear the Croatian citizens
 
need to show the support which was once given to Croatian refugees“.10 Because of that 10 CPS, „Introduction: Experience Collec-
experience it was sought to create a space for refugees and migrants which would be tors“, 2016. Accessed on September 13,
2016, http://www.cms.hr/sy stem/
filled with understanding, acceptance and support. It is my opinion that maximum efforts publication/pdf/37/prirucnik_ngo.pdf.
should be invested in creating an intercultural Croatian society, which is traditionally ho-
mogenous, but which will never become different if we do not invest efforts and strate-
gies to provide adequate conditions, institutional support, empathic approach and an
honest welcome to the small number of people who would like to stay and live in Croatia.
It is extremely important to have NGO's, civic associations and other subjects who are
actively involved in the sense of providing concrete help to refugees and migrants “on the
spot“ and in the sense of putting a pressure on governments and policy makers, for there
are some countries that are sometimes very bad at coping with unforeseen circumstanc-
es and often fall under pressure of international institutions that dictate the politics. The
question of refugees and migrants is one that needs to be resolved by international and
common actions, as well as the harmonization of positive practices, considering the fact
that refugees and migrants are a responsibility of all of us and not just a specific country.

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Memories from Balkan SAYS 2015.

Integrations │ 26
 

DISCLAIMER
Cover photo was taken from EACS archive and is copyright to its re-
spectful owners as well as all other graphics used in this issue. The
views expressed in the magazine do not represent official position of the
Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia nor its members.

27 │ Integrations
 

Integrations │ 28