BCU Student No 21132609

BCU Assignment Cover Sheet

Kaplan Student No
CT0352070

Course Bachelor of Law (Honours) (Top-up)

Module Title Legal Project Management (LPM)

Module Code LAW6077 Kaplan Tutor Nirmala Devi

Assignment Type Individual Assignment

Due Date 22 October 2022 Applied for Extension No

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 Legal Project Management | Assessment Brief 3

Skeleton Arguments Moot

Sybil v Fawlty Fireworks Limited

IN THE COURT Between

Fawlty Fireworks Limited as the APPELLANT
And
Sybil as the RESPONDENT

SKELETON ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS (Sybil)

INTRODUCTION

Cleese J. of the Court of First Instance came to the conclusion that the Respondent is
entitled to seek compensation from the Appellant for the nervous shock she sustained as a direct
result of the Appellant's negligence, which led to an accident that resulted in injuries being
sustained by the Respondent's then-husband, Basil. Basil was involved in the accident. The fact
that the Respondent had suffered from a recognised psychiatric disease after first encountering
Basil in a controlled state and was not being treated is relevant to the judgement because it
shows that the Respondent was not receiving treatment. In addition, this conclusion was
reached because of the strong bond of love and affection that exists between the spouses, as
well as the respondent's near closeness to the scene of the accident, both in terms of time and
location; she saw the immediate aftermath of the collision.

Due to the fact that the Respondent's claim is consistent with the applicable legal principles,
the appeal ought to be rejected for the reasons that are outlined in the following paragraphs:

I. First Ground:
The Respondent was diagnosed with a diagnosable psychiatric injury, which the Appellant
should have reasonably anticipated would be the result of the Appellant's negligence. This
is the first ground for the appeal.

II. Second Ground:

The Respondent has the ability to prove the degree of intimacy of the intimate relationship
with the victim, proximity to the accident or its immediate aftermath in time and location,
and how the Respondent perceives the accident.
 III. Third Ground:
The claim made by the Respondent is acceptable in light of the constraints associated with
the shock requirement, and the Appellant is not the immediate victim.

First Ground: Recognizable psychiatric injury that was reasonably foreseeable

The Law

If the Respondent experiences a positive psychiatric illness beyond bereavement as a result of

the Appellant's negligent act (McLoughlin v. O'Brian1, Hinz v. Berry2), the Respondent can
recover damages for the nervous shock, even if the illness is pathologically consequent to the
Respondent's anguish of grief (Vernon v. Bosley (No 1)3).

The Appellant should have known that their carelessness would result in some sort of harm to
a third party, whether psychological, physiological, or both (Page v Smith4). In addition, a
person of average susceptibility could reasonably anticipate that the Appellant's negligent act
would result in psychiatric disease (Hambrook v. Stokes Bros5) or that it would lead to death
(Hay (or Bourhill) v. Young6). Because the spouse-to-spouse relationship is one of the most
important partnerships in everyday human existence, it is not unreasonable to assume that a
spouse who witnesses the immediate aftermath of an event involving their partner will
experience psychiatric disease as a result of nerve shock (Alcock v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police7).

Submission

The evidence established that the accident left the Respondent with a diagnosable
psychological illness. When the Appellant's carelessness caused severe burn injuries to their
employee, Basil, and the employee's spouse, the Respondent, was named as the emergency
contact for Basil, the Appellant should have reasonably predicted such psychiatric injury to
occur. The Respondent's presence at the scene of the accident and subsequent psychiatric
illness owing to nervous shock was predictable.

Second Ground: Proximity Test

The Law

When the Respondent and the victim are married, it is assumed that they have the close bond
of love and affection that is needed (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police8).

1
[1983] 1 AC 410 (HL) 431
2
[1970] 2 QB 40 (CA) 42
3
[1997] 1 All ER 577 (CA) 605
4
[1996] AC 155 (HL)
5
[1925] 1 KB 141 (CA) 162
6
[1943] AC 92 (HL) 110
7
[1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 374, 377
8
[1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 397
But closeness is more important than status (McLoughlin v. O'Brian9), and proof must be
given to show closeness (McCarthy v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police10)

(McLoughlin v. O'Brian11) It must be shown that the Respondent was close to the accident or
its immediate aftermath, both in terms of time and space. The aftermath can be made up of
several parts, from the immediate aftermath to the unbroken chain of events that happened
after the accident (Galli-Atkinson v Seghal12).

The Respondent must have experienced nervous shock upon seeing or hearing, unaided, of
the event or its aftermath (McLoughlin v O’Brian13, Alcock v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police14).

Submission

When the accident happened, the Respondent was still married to Basil, even though they had
been living apart. But it didn't necessarily mean that they weren't close, because they could
still get back together. Also, the Respondent's actions, like going to the factories when she
heard about "a bit of an accident" and brushing it off as minor injuries she was used to and
staying by Basil's bedside when he was in the hospital, showed that she cared about him a lot.
So, they were still close enough to support the idea that they loved and cared for each other
very much.

The Respondent was at the site of the accident, witnessing numerous fire engines and
ambulances, told and directed to a mess room where she saw Basil's untreated condition with
visible signs of serious burn injury. What she witnessed was the uninterrupted sequential
chain of events following the accident, the immediate aftermath, to which she was proximate
in terms of time and space, even though there was a 2.5 hours delay between the time of the
accident and the Respondent seeing Basil. It is distinguishable from the case of Tranmore v T
E Scudder Ltd15, where the Respondent arrived 2 hours later when the immediate emergency
services works had finished and saw his son's body only in the mortuary 1 day later, so he
was not proximate in the immediate aftermath of the accident.

Additionally, because the Respondent was physically there at the scene of the accident, she
was able to see and hear the immediate aftermath of the horrible event using her own senses.

Third Ground: Restrictions

The Law

It is not sufficient for there to just be an accumulation of increased dawning or realisation on

the respondent's mind or neurological system (Sion v Hampstead Health Authority16). There
needs to be a sudden visual or aural appreciation of the horrifying incident that causes a

9
[1983] 1 AC 410 (HL) 422
10
Unreported, 11 December 1996
11
[1983] 1 AC 410 (HL) 422
12
78 BMLR 22 (CA) 31
13
[1983] 1 AC 410 (HL) 422
14
[1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 341
15
[1998] Lexis Citation 4516 (CA)
16
[1994] EWCA Civ 26
vicious disruption to the mind (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police17), or
there needs to be a sequence of such appreciation within a short period of time (North
Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters18).
If the Appellant is the immediate victim of their own negligence, then the claim has a low
probability of being successful (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police19,
quoting Diane J in Jaensch v Coffey20).

Submission

Before arriving at the factory, the Respondent had the presumption that Basil's injury was not
particularly significant and was comparable to the little injuries that she was accustomed to
seeing on him on a reasonably consistent basis. The evident burn injuries and the numerous
emergency services impressed a horrible image on her mind, and anxiety for Basil's safety
quickly assaulted her nervous system within a short amount of time. What she witnessed
stunned her since it impressed a frightening image on her mind.

Because the facts do not demonstrate that the Appellant is the direct victim of their own fault,
it is unlikely that this restriction will impede the claim in any way.

Conclusion

In light of what has been said thus far, the Respondent humbly requests that the appeal be
turned down.

17
[1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 401
18
[2002] EWCA Civ 1792 [40]
19
[1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 418
20
[1984] 155 CLR 549