Pugong, Leizandra D.

Constitutional Law 2 – Section 87

2019-0274 Atty. Frederick G. Dedace

Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, GR 192935 (2010)

Facts:

In the May 2010 elections, Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption
with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability
to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into
reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration to: a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and
corruption which it will investigate; b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of
large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the
Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and
other papers; c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission;

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers... and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in... disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is... a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions. Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time,
as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their... work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the
State.

Issues:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

Yes. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"[87] only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in
other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered... in the future. Such expanded mandate of
the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the
section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive

Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration."